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rfc9200.html

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1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en" class="RFC">
3 <head>
4 <meta charset="utf-8">
5 <meta content="Common,Latin" name="scripts">
6 <meta content="initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport">
7 <title>RFC 9200: Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)</title>
8 <meta content="Ludwig Seitz" name="author">
9 <meta content="Göran Selander" name="author">
10 <meta content="Erik Wahlstroem" name="author">
11 <meta content="Samuel Erdtman" name="author">
12 <meta content="Hannes Tschofenig" name="author">
13 <meta content="
14 This specification defines a framework for authentication and
15 authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE‑OAuth.
16 The framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0
17 and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), thus transforming a
18 well-known and widely used authorization solution into a form suitable
19 for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used where possible, but
20 extensions are added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use
21 cases.
22
23 " name="description">
24 <meta content="xml2rfc 3.14.2" name="generator">
25 <meta content="CoAP" name="keyword">
26 <meta content="OAuth 2.0" name="keyword">
27 <meta content="Access Control" name="keyword">
28 <meta content="Authorization" name="keyword">
29 <meta content="Internet of Things" name="keyword">
30 <meta content="9200" name="rfc.number">
31 <!-- Generator version information:
32 xml2rfc 3.14.2
33 Python 3.9.13
34 appdirs 1.4.4
35 ConfigArgParse 1.5.3
36 google-i18n-address 2.5.1
37 html5lib 1.1
38 intervaltree 3.1.0
39 Jinja2 3.1.2
40 kitchen 1.2.6
41 lxml 4.9.0
42 MarkupSafe 2.1.1
43 pycountry 22.3.5
44 PyYAML 6.0
45 requests 2.28.0
46 setuptools 44.1.1
47 six 1.16.0
48 weasyprint 56.1
49 -->
50 <link href="rfc9200.xml" rel="alternate" type="application/rfc+xml">
51 <link href="#copyright" rel="license">
52 <style type="text/css">/*
53
54 NOTE: Changes at the bottom of this file overrides some earlier settings.
55
56 Once the style has stabilized and has been adopted as an official RFC style,
57 this can be consolidated so that style settings occur only in one place, but
58 for now the contents of this file consists first of the initial CSS work as
59 provided to the RFC Formatter (xml2rfc) work, followed by itemized and
60 commented changes found necssary during the development of the v3
61 formatters.
62
63 */
64
65 /* fonts */
66 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Sans'); /* Sans-serif */
67 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Serif'); /* Serif (print) */
68 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto+Mono'); /* Monospace */
69
70 @viewport {
71 zoom: 1.0;
72 width: extend-to-zoom;
73 }
74 @-ms-viewport {
75 width: extend-to-zoom;
76 zoom: 1.0;
77 }
78 /* general and mobile first */
79 html {
80 }
81 body {
82 max-width: 90%;
83 margin: 1.5em auto;
84 color: #222;
85 background-color: #fff;
86 font-size: 14px;
87 font-family: 'Noto Sans', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
88 line-height: 1.6;
89 scroll-behavior: smooth;
90 }
91 .ears {
92 display: none;
93 }
94
95 /* headings */
96 #title, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
97 margin: 1em 0 0.5em;
98 font-weight: bold;
99 line-height: 1.3;
100 }
101 #title {
102 clear: both;
103 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
104 margin: 0 0 0.5em 0;
105 padding: 1em 0 0.5em;
106 }
107 .author {
108 padding-bottom: 4px;
109 }
110 h1 {
111 font-size: 26px;
112 margin: 1em 0;
113 }
114 h2 {
115 font-size: 22px;
116 margin-top: -20px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
117 padding-top: 33px;
118 }
119 h3 {
120 font-size: 18px;
121 margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
122 padding-top: 42px;
123 }
124 h4 {
125 font-size: 16px;
126 margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
127 padding-top: 42px;
128 }
129 h5, h6 {
130 font-size: 14px;
131 }
132 #n-copyright-notice {
133 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
134 padding-bottom: 1em;
135 margin-bottom: 1em;
136 }
137 /* general structure */
138 p {
139 padding: 0;
140 margin: 0 0 1em 0;
141 text-align: left;
142 }
143 div, span {
144 position: relative;
145 }
146 div {
147 margin: 0;
148 }
149 .alignRight.art-text {
150 background-color: #f9f9f9;
151 border: 1px solid #eee;
152 border-radius: 3px;
153 padding: 1em 1em 0;
154 margin-bottom: 1.5em;
155 }
156 .alignRight.art-text pre {
157 padding: 0;
158 }
159 .alignRight {
160 margin: 1em 0;
161 }
162 .alignRight > *:first-child {
163 border: none;
164 margin: 0;
165 float: right;
166 clear: both;
167 }
168 .alignRight > *:nth-child(2) {
169 clear: both;
170 display: block;
171 border: none;
172 }
173 svg {
174 display: block;
175 }
176 .alignCenter.art-text {
177 background-color: #f9f9f9;
178 border: 1px solid #eee;
179 border-radius: 3px;
180 padding: 1em 1em 0;
181 margin-bottom: 1.5em;
182 }
183 .alignCenter.art-text pre {
184 padding: 0;
185 }
186 .alignCenter {
187 margin: 1em 0;
188 }
189 .alignCenter > *:first-child {
190 display: table;
191 border: none;
192 margin: 0 auto;
193 }
194
195 /* lists */
196 ol, ul {
197 padding: 0;
198 margin: 0 0 1em 2em;
199 }
200 ol ol, ul ul, ol ul, ul ol {
201 margin-left: 1em;
202 }
203 li {
204 margin: 0 0 0.25em 0;
205 }
206 .ulCompact li {
207 margin: 0;
208 }
209 ul.empty, .ulEmpty {
210 list-style-type: none;
211 }
212 ul.empty li, .ulEmpty li {
213 margin-top: 0.5em;
214 }
215 ul.ulBare, li.ulBare {
216 margin-left: 0em !important;
217 }
218 ul.compact, .ulCompact,
219 ol.compact, .olCompact {
220 line-height: 100%;
221 margin: 0 0 0 2em;
222 }
223
224 /* definition lists */
225 dl {
226 }
227 dl > dt {
228 float: left;
229 margin-right: 1em;
230 }
231 /*
232 dl.nohang > dt {
233 float: none;
234 }
235 */
236 dl > dd {
237 margin-bottom: .8em;
238 min-height: 1.3em;
239 }
240 dl.compact > dd, .dlCompact > dd {
241 margin-bottom: 0em;
242 }
243 dl > dd > dl {
244 margin-top: 0.5em;
245 margin-bottom: 0em;
246 }
247
248 /* links */
249 a {
250 text-decoration: none;
251 }
252 a[href] {
253 color: #22e; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
254 }
255 a[href]:hover {
256 background-color: #f2f2f2;
257 }
258 figcaption a[href],
259 a[href].selfRef {
260 color: #222;
261 }
262 /* XXX probably not this:
263 a.selfRef:hover {
264 background-color: transparent;
265 cursor: default;
266 } */
267
268 /* Figures */
269 tt, code, pre, code {
270 background-color: #f9f9f9;
271 font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace;
272 }
273 pre {
274 border: 1px solid #eee;
275 margin: 0;
276 padding: 1em;
277 }
278 img {
279 max-width: 100%;
280 }
281 figure {
282 margin: 0;
283 }
284 figure blockquote {
285 margin: 0.8em 0.4em 0.4em;
286 }
287 figcaption {
288 font-style: italic;
289 margin: 0 0 1em 0;
290 }
291 @media screen {
292 pre {
293 overflow-x: auto;
294 max-width: 100%;
295 max-width: calc(100% - 22px);
296 }
297 }
298
299 /* aside, blockquote */
300 aside, blockquote {
301 margin-left: 0;
302 padding: 1.2em 2em;
303 }
304 blockquote {
305 background-color: #f9f9f9;
306 color: #111; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
307 border: 1px solid #ddd;
308 border-radius: 3px;
309 margin: 1em 0;
310 }
311 cite {
312 display: block;
313 text-align: right;
314 font-style: italic;
315 }
316
317 /* tables */
318 table {
319 width: 100%;
320 margin: 0 0 1em;
321 border-collapse: collapse;
322 border: 1px solid #eee;
323 }
324 th, td {
325 text-align: left;
326 vertical-align: top;
327 padding: 0.5em 0.75em;
328 }
329 th {
330 text-align: left;
331 background-color: #e9e9e9;
332 }
333 tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
334 background-color: #f5f5f5;
335 }
336 table caption {
337 font-style: italic;
338 margin: 0;
339 padding: 0;
340 text-align: left;
341 }
342 table p {
343 /* XXX to avoid bottom margin on table row signifiers. If paragraphs should
344 be allowed within tables more generally, it would be far better to select on a class. */
345 margin: 0;
346 }
347
348 /* pilcrow */
349 a.pilcrow {
350 color: #666; /* Arlen: AHDJ 2019 */
351 text-decoration: none;
352 visibility: hidden;
353 user-select: none;
354 -ms-user-select: none;
355 -o-user-select:none;
356 -moz-user-select: none;
357 -khtml-user-select: none;
358 -webkit-user-select: none;
359 -webkit-touch-callout: none;
360 }
361 @media screen {
362 aside:hover > a.pilcrow,
363 p:hover > a.pilcrow,
364 blockquote:hover > a.pilcrow,
365 div:hover > a.pilcrow,
366 li:hover > a.pilcrow,
367 pre:hover > a.pilcrow {
368 visibility: visible;
369 }
370 a.pilcrow:hover {
371 background-color: transparent;
372 }
373 }
374
375 /* misc */
376 hr {
377 border: 0;
378 border-top: 1px solid #eee;
379 }
380 .bcp14 {
381 font-variant: small-caps;
382 }
383
384 .role {
385 font-variant: all-small-caps;
386 }
387
388 /* info block */
389 #identifiers {
390 margin: 0;
391 font-size: 0.9em;
392 }
393 #identifiers dt {
394 width: 3em;
395 clear: left;
396 }
397 #identifiers dd {
398 float: left;
399 margin-bottom: 0;
400 }
401 /* Fix PDF info block run off issue */
402 @media print {
403 #identifiers dd {
404 float: none;
405 }
406 }
407 #identifiers .authors .author {
408 display: inline-block;
409 margin-right: 1.5em;
410 }
411 #identifiers .authors .org {
412 font-style: italic;
413 }
414
415 /* The prepared/rendered info at the very bottom of the page */
416 .docInfo {
417 color: #666; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
418 font-size: 0.9em;
419 font-style: italic;
420 margin-top: 2em;
421 }
422 .docInfo .prepared {
423 float: left;
424 }
425 .docInfo .prepared {
426 float: right;
427 }
428
429 /* table of contents */
430 #toc {
431 padding: 0.75em 0 2em 0;
432 margin-bottom: 1em;
433 }
434 nav.toc ul {
435 margin: 0 0.5em 0 0;
436 padding: 0;
437 list-style: none;
438 }
439 nav.toc li {
440 line-height: 1.3em;
441 margin: 0.75em 0;
442 padding-left: 1.2em;
443 text-indent: -1.2em;
444 }
445 /* references */
446 .references dt {
447 text-align: right;
448 font-weight: bold;
449 min-width: 7em;
450 }
451 .references dd {
452 margin-left: 8em;
453 overflow: auto;
454 }
455
456 .refInstance {
457 margin-bottom: 1.25em;
458 }
459
460 .references .ascii {
461 margin-bottom: 0.25em;
462 }
463
464 /* index */
465 .index ul {
466 margin: 0 0 0 1em;
467 padding: 0;
468 list-style: none;
469 }
470 .index ul ul {
471 margin: 0;
472 }
473 .index li {
474 margin: 0;
475 text-indent: -2em;
476 padding-left: 2em;
477 padding-bottom: 5px;
478 }
479 .indexIndex {
480 margin: 0.5em 0 1em;
481 }
482 .index a {
483 font-weight: 700;
484 }
485 /* make the index two-column on all but the smallest screens */
486 @media (min-width: 600px) {
487 .index ul {
488 -moz-column-count: 2;
489 -moz-column-gap: 20px;
490 }
491 .index ul ul {
492 -moz-column-count: 1;
493 -moz-column-gap: 0;
494 }
495 }
496
497 /* authors */
498 address.vcard {
499 font-style: normal;
500 margin: 1em 0;
501 }
502
503 address.vcard .nameRole {
504 font-weight: 700;
505 margin-left: 0;
506 }
507 address.vcard .label {
508 font-family: "Noto Sans",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
509 margin: 0.5em 0;
510 }
511 address.vcard .type {
512 display: none;
513 }
514 .alternative-contact {
515 margin: 1.5em 0 1em;
516 }
517 hr.addr {
518 border-top: 1px dashed;
519 margin: 0;
520 color: #ddd;
521 max-width: calc(100% - 16px);
522 }
523
524 /* temporary notes */
525 .rfcEditorRemove::before {
526 position: absolute;
527 top: 0.2em;
528 right: 0.2em;
529 padding: 0.2em;
530 content: "The RFC Editor will remove this note";
531 color: #9e2a00; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
532 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
533 }
534 .rfcEditorRemove {
535 position: relative;
536 padding-top: 1.8em;
537 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
538 border-radius: 3px;
539 }
540 .cref {
541 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
542 padding: 2px 4px;
543 }
544 .crefSource {
545 font-style: italic;
546 }
547 /* alternative layout for smaller screens */
548 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
549 body {
550 padding-top: 2em;
551 }
552 #title {
553 padding: 1em 0;
554 }
555 h1 {
556 font-size: 24px;
557 }
558 h2 {
559 font-size: 20px;
560 margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
561 padding-top: 38px;
562 }
563 #identifiers dd {
564 max-width: 60%;
565 }
566 #toc {
567 position: fixed;
568 z-index: 2;
569 top: 0;
570 right: 0;
571 padding: 0;
572 margin: 0;
573 background-color: inherit;
574 border-bottom: 1px solid #ccc;
575 }
576 #toc h2 {
577 margin: -1px 0 0 0;
578 padding: 4px 0 4px 6px;
579 padding-right: 1em;
580 min-width: 190px;
581 font-size: 1.1em;
582 text-align: right;
583 background-color: #444;
584 color: white;
585 cursor: pointer;
586 }
587 #toc h2::before { /* css hamburger */
588 float: right;
589 position: relative;
590 width: 1em;
591 height: 1px;
592 left: -164px;
593 margin: 6px 0 0 0;
594 background: white none repeat scroll 0 0;
595 box-shadow: 0 4px 0 0 white, 0 8px 0 0 white;
596 content: "";
597 }
598 #toc nav {
599 display: none;
600 padding: 0.5em 1em 1em;
601 overflow: auto;
602 height: calc(100vh - 48px);
603 border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
604 }
605 }
606
607 /* alternative layout for wide screens */
608 @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
609 body {
610 max-width: 724px;
611 margin: 42px auto;
612 padding-left: 1.5em;
613 padding-right: 29em;
614 }
615 #toc {
616 position: fixed;
617 top: 42px;
618 right: 42px;
619 width: 25%;
620 margin: 0;
621 padding: 0 1em;
622 z-index: 1;
623 }
624 #toc h2 {
625 border-top: none;
626 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
627 font-size: 1em;
628 font-weight: normal;
629 margin: 0;
630 padding: 0.25em 1em 1em 0;
631 }
632 #toc nav {
633 display: block;
634 height: calc(90vh - 84px);
635 bottom: 0;
636 padding: 0.5em 0 0;
637 overflow: auto;
638 }
639 img { /* future proofing */
640 max-width: 100%;
641 height: auto;
642 }
643 }
644
645 /* pagination */
646 @media print {
647 body {
648
649 width: 100%;
650 }
651 p {
652 orphans: 3;
653 widows: 3;
654 }
655 #n-copyright-notice {
656 border-bottom: none;
657 }
658 #toc, #n-introduction {
659 page-break-before: always;
660 }
661 #toc {
662 border-top: none;
663 padding-top: 0;
664 }
665 figure, pre {
666 page-break-inside: avoid;
667 }
668 figure {
669 overflow: scroll;
670 }
671 pre.breakable {
672 break-inside: auto;
673 }
674 h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
675 page-break-after: avoid;
676 }
677 h2+*, h3+*, h4+*, h5+*, h6+* {
678 page-break-before: avoid;
679 }
680 pre {
681 white-space: pre-wrap;
682 word-wrap: break-word;
683 font-size: 10pt;
684 }
685 table {
686 border: 1px solid #ddd;
687 }
688 td {
689 border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
690 }
691 }
692
693 /* This is commented out here, as the string-set: doesn't
694 pass W3C validation currently */
695 /*
696 .ears thead .left {
697 string-set: ears-top-left content();
698 }
699
700 .ears thead .center {
701 string-set: ears-top-center content();
702 }
703
704 .ears thead .right {
705 string-set: ears-top-right content();
706 }
707
708 .ears tfoot .left {
709 string-set: ears-bottom-left content();
710 }
711
712 .ears tfoot .center {
713 string-set: ears-bottom-center content();
714 }
715
716 .ears tfoot .right {
717 string-set: ears-bottom-right content();
718 }
719 */
720
721 @page :first {
722 padding-top: 0;
723 @top-left {
724 content: normal;
725 border: none;
726 }
727 @top-center {
728 content: normal;
729 border: none;
730 }
731 @top-right {
732 content: normal;
733 border: none;
734 }
735 }
736
737 @page {
738 size: A4;
739 margin-bottom: 45mm;
740 padding-top: 20px;
741 /* The follwing is commented out here, but set appropriately by in code, as
742 the content depends on the document */
743 /*
744 @top-left {
745 content: 'Internet-Draft';
746 vertical-align: bottom;
747 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
748 }
749 @top-left {
750 content: string(ears-top-left);
751 vertical-align: bottom;
752 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
753 }
754 @top-center {
755 content: string(ears-top-center);
756 vertical-align: bottom;
757 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
758 }
759 @top-right {
760 content: string(ears-top-right);
761 vertical-align: bottom;
762 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
763 }
764 @bottom-left {
765 content: string(ears-bottom-left);
766 vertical-align: top;
767 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
768 }
769 @bottom-center {
770 content: string(ears-bottom-center);
771 vertical-align: top;
772 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
773 }
774 @bottom-right {
775 content: '[Page ' counter(page) ']';
776 vertical-align: top;
777 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
778 }
779 */
780
781 }
782
783 /* Changes introduced to fix issues found during implementation */
784 /* Make sure links are clickable even if overlapped by following H* */
785 a {
786 z-index: 2;
787 }
788 /* Separate body from document info even without intervening H1 */
789 section {
790 clear: both;
791 }
792
793
794 /* Top align author divs, to avoid names without organization dropping level with org names */
795 .author {
796 vertical-align: top;
797 }
798
799 /* Leave room in document info to show Internet-Draft on one line */
800 #identifiers dt {
801 width: 8em;
802 }
803
804 /* Don't waste quite as much whitespace between label and value in doc info */
805 #identifiers dd {
806 margin-left: 1em;
807 }
808
809 /* Give floating toc a background color (needed when it's a div inside section */
810 #toc {
811 background-color: white;
812 }
813
814 /* Make the collapsed ToC header render white on gray also when it's a link */
815 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
816 #toc h2 a,
817 #toc h2 a:link,
818 #toc h2 a:focus,
819 #toc h2 a:hover,
820 #toc a.toplink,
821 #toc a.toplink:hover {
822 color: white;
823 background-color: #444;
824 text-decoration: none;
825 }
826 }
827
828 /* Give the bottom of the ToC some whitespace */
829 @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
830 #toc {
831 padding: 0 0 1em 1em;
832 }
833 }
834
835 /* Style section numbers with more space between number and title */
836 .section-number {
837 padding-right: 0.5em;
838 }
839
840 /* prevent monospace from becoming overly large */
841 tt, code, pre, code {
842 font-size: 95%;
843 }
844
845 /* Fix the height/width aspect for ascii art*/
846 pre.sourcecode,
847 .art-text pre {
848 line-height: 1.12;
849 }
850
851
852 /* Add styling for a link in the ToC that points to the top of the document */
853 a.toplink {
854 float: right;
855 margin-right: 0.5em;
856 }
857
858 /* Fix the dl styling to match the RFC 7992 attributes */
859 dl > dt,
860 dl.dlParallel > dt {
861 float: left;
862 margin-right: 1em;
863 }
864 dl.dlNewline > dt {
865 float: none;
866 }
867
868 /* Provide styling for table cell text alignment */
869 table td.text-left,
870 table th.text-left {
871 text-align: left;
872 }
873 table td.text-center,
874 table th.text-center {
875 text-align: center;
876 }
877 table td.text-right,
878 table th.text-right {
879 text-align: right;
880 }
881
882 /* Make the alternative author contact informatio look less like just another
883 author, and group it closer with the primary author contact information */
884 .alternative-contact {
885 margin: 0.5em 0 0.25em 0;
886 }
887 address .non-ascii {
888 margin: 0 0 0 2em;
889 }
890
891 /* With it being possible to set tables with alignment
892 left, center, and right, { width: 100%; } does not make sense */
893 table {
894 width: auto;
895 }
896
897 /* Avoid reference text that sits in a block with very wide left margin,
898 because of a long floating dt label.*/
899 .references dd {
900 overflow: visible;
901 }
902
903 /* Control caption placement */
904 caption {
905 caption-side: bottom;
906 }
907
908 /* Limit the width of the author address vcard, so names in right-to-left
909 script don't end up on the other side of the page. */
910
911 address.vcard {
912 max-width: 30em;
913 margin-right: auto;
914 }
915
916 /* For address alignment dependent on LTR or RTL scripts */
917 address div.left {
918 text-align: left;
919 }
920 address div.right {
921 text-align: right;
922 }
923
924 /* Provide table alignment support. We can't use the alignX classes above
925 since they do unwanted things with caption and other styling. */
926 table.right {
927 margin-left: auto;
928 margin-right: 0;
929 }
930 table.center {
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951 padding-top: 1px;
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953
954 /* Avoid page breaks inside dl and author address entries */
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958
959 }
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978 }
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985 }
986 }
987 /* Make pilcrows on dd visible */
988 @media screen {
989 dd:hover > a.pilcrow {
990 visibility: visible;
991 }
992 }
993 /* Make the placement of figcaption match that of a table's caption
994 by removing the figure's added bottom margin */
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999 }
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1003 margin: 1em 0 0 0;
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1020 padding: 0.5em; /* to match the external-metadata padding */
1021 }
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1023 h1#rfcnum {
1024 clear: both;
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1026 padding: 1em 0 0 0;
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1038 }
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1060 }
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1063 .artwork,
1064 .sourcecode {
1065 margin-bottom: 1em;
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1067 }
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1069 table {
1070 min-width: 20em;
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1079 table {
1080 border: 1px solid #ddd;
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1092 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
1093 #toc nav { display: none; }
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1128 break-before: auto;
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1150 }
1151 /* The tt and code background above interferes with for instance table cell
1152 backgrounds. Changed to something a bit more selective. */
1153 tt, code {
1154 background-color: transparent;
1155 }
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1157 background-color: #f8f8f8;
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1160 pre {
1161 margin-top: 0.5px;
1162 }
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1165 ol.compact, .olCompact,
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1167 line-height: normal;
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1171 dd > ul, dd > ol, dd > dl,
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1176 /* This should match the element list in writer.text.TextWriter.render_dl() */
1177 dd > div.artwork:first-child,
1178 dd > aside:first-child,
1179 dd > figure:first-child,
1180 dd > ol:first-child,
1181 dd > div:first-child > pre.sourcecode,
1182 dd > table:first-child,
1183 dd > ul:first-child {
1184 clear: left;
1185 }
1186 /* fix for weird browser behaviour when <dd/> is empty */
1187 dt+dd:empty::before{
1188 content: "\00a0";
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1192 margin-bottom: 0.5em
1193 }
1194 /* Don't let p margin spill out from inside list items */
1195 li > p:last-of-type {
1196 margin-bottom: 0;
1197 }
1198 </style>
1199 <link href="rfc-local.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
1200 <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9200" rel="alternate">
1201 <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate">
1202 <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-ace-oauth-authz-45" rel="prev">
1203 </head>
1204 <body>
1205 <script src="https://www.rfc-editor.org/js/metadata.min.js"></script>
1206 <table class="ears">
1207 <thead><tr>
1208 <td class="left">RFC 9200</td>
1209 <td class="center">ACE-OAuth</td>
1210 <td class="right">August 2022</td>
1211 </tr></thead>
1212 <tfoot><tr>
1213 <td class="left">Seitz, et al.</td>
1214 <td class="center">Standards Track</td>
1215 <td class="right">[Page]</td>
1216 </tr></tfoot>
1217 </table>
1218 <div id="external-metadata" class="document-information"></div>
1219 <div id="internal-metadata" class="document-information">
1220 <dl id="identifiers">
1221 <dt class="label-stream">Stream:</dt>
1222 <dd class="stream">Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)</dd>
1223 <dt class="label-rfc">RFC:</dt>
1224 <dd class="rfc"><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9200" class="eref">9200</a></dd>
1225 <dt class="label-category">Category:</dt>
1226 <dd class="category">Standards Track</dd>
1227 <dt class="label-published">Published:</dt>
1228 <dd class="published">
1229 <time datetime="2022-08" class="published">August 2022</time>
1230 </dd>
1231 <dt class="label-issn">ISSN:</dt>
1232 <dd class="issn">2070-1721</dd>
1233 <dt class="label-authors">Authors:</dt>
1234 <dd class="authors">
1235 <div class="author">
1236 <div class="author-name">L. Seitz</div>
1237 <div class="org">Combitech</div>
1238 </div>
1239 <div class="author">
1240 <div class="author-name">G. Selander</div>
1241 <div class="org">Ericsson</div>
1242 </div>
1243 <div class="author">
1244 <div class="author-name">E. Wahlstroem</div>
1245 </div>
1246 <div class="author">
1247 <div class="author-name">S. Erdtman</div>
1248 <div class="org">Spotify AB</div>
1249 </div>
1250 <div class="author">
1251 <div class="author-name">H. Tschofenig</div>
1252 <div class="org">Arm Ltd.</div>
1253 </div>
1254 </dd>
1255 </dl>
1256 </div>
1257 <h1 id="rfcnum">RFC 9200</h1>
1258 <h1 id="title">Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments Using the OAuth 2.0 Framework (ACE-OAuth)</h1>
1259 <section id="section-abstract">
1260 <h2 id="abstract"><a href="#abstract" class="selfRef">Abstract</a></h2>
1261 <p id="section-abstract-1">This specification defines a framework for authentication and
1262 authorization in Internet of Things (IoT) environments called ACE‑OAuth.
1263 The framework is based on a set of building blocks including OAuth 2.0
1264 and the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP), thus transforming a
1265 well-known and widely used authorization solution into a form suitable
1266 for IoT devices. Existing specifications are used where possible, but
1267 extensions are added and profiles are defined to better serve the IoT use
1268 cases.<a href="#section-abstract-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1269 </section>
1270 <div id="status-of-memo">
1271 <section id="section-boilerplate.1">
1272 <h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo">
1273 <a href="#name-status-of-this-memo" class="section-name selfRef">Status of This Memo</a>
1274 </h2>
1275 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-1">
1276 This is an Internet Standards Track document.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1277 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-2">
1278 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
1279 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
1280 received public review and has been approved for publication by
1281 the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further
1282 information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of
1283 RFC 7841.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1284 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-3">
1285 Information about the current status of this document, any
1286 errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
1287 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9200</a></span>.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1288 </section>
1289 </div>
1290 <div id="copyright">
1291 <section id="section-boilerplate.2">
1292 <h2 id="name-copyright-notice">
1293 <a href="#name-copyright-notice" class="section-name selfRef">Copyright Notice</a>
1294 </h2>
1295 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-1">
1296 Copyright (c) 2022 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
1297 document authors. All rights reserved.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1298 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-2">
1299 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
1300 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
1301 (<span><a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a></span>) in effect on the date of
1302 publication of this document. Please review these documents
1303 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
1304 respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
1305 document must include Revised BSD License text as described in
1306 Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
1307 warranty as described in the Revised BSD License.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1308 </section>
1309 </div>
1310 <div id="toc">
1311 <section id="section-toc.1">
1312 <a href="#" onclick="scroll(0,0)" class="toplink">▲</a><h2 id="name-table-of-contents">
1313 <a href="#name-table-of-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Table of Contents</a>
1314 </h2>
1315 <nav class="toc"><ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1316 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1">
1317 <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1" class="xref">1</a>.  <a href="#name-introduction" class="xref">Introduction</a></p>
1318 </li>
1319 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.2">
1320 <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-2" class="xref">2</a>.  <a href="#name-terminology" class="xref">Terminology</a></p>
1321 </li>
1322 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3">
1323 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><a href="#section-3" class="xref">3</a>.  <a href="#name-overview" class="xref">Overview</a></p>
1324 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1325 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1">
1326 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-3.1" class="xref">3.1</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-20" class="xref">OAuth 2.0</a></p>
1327 </li>
1328 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2">
1329 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1"><a href="#section-3.2" class="xref">3.2</a>.  <a href="#name-coap" class="xref">CoAP</a></p>
1330 </li>
1331 </ul>
1332 </li>
1333 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4">
1334 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><a href="#section-4" class="xref">4</a>.  <a href="#name-protocol-interactions" class="xref">Protocol Interactions</a></p>
1335 </li>
1336 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5">
1337 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><a href="#section-5" class="xref">5</a>.  <a href="#name-framework" class="xref">Framework</a></p>
1338 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1339 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
1340 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1" class="xref">5.1</a>.  <a href="#name-discovering-authorization-s" class="xref">Discovering Authorization Servers</a></p>
1341 </li>
1342 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2">
1343 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.2" class="xref">5.2</a>.  <a href="#name-unauthorized-resource-reque" class="xref">Unauthorized Resource Request Message</a></p>
1344 </li>
1345 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3">
1346 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.3" class="xref">5.3</a>.  <a href="#name-as-request-creation-hints" class="xref">AS Request Creation Hints</a></p>
1347 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1348 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3.2.1">
1349 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.3.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.3.1" class="xref">5.3.1</a>.  <a href="#name-the-client-nonce-parameter" class="xref">The Client-Nonce Parameter</a></p>
1350 </li>
1351 </ul>
1352 </li>
1353 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.4">
1354 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.4" class="xref">5.4</a>.  <a href="#name-authorization-grants" class="xref">Authorization Grants</a></p>
1355 </li>
1356 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.5">
1357 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.5.1"><a href="#section-5.5" class="xref">5.5</a>.  <a href="#name-client-credentials" class="xref">Client Credentials</a></p>
1358 </li>
1359 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.6">
1360 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.6.1"><a href="#section-5.6" class="xref">5.6</a>.  <a href="#name-as-authentication" class="xref">AS Authentication</a></p>
1361 </li>
1362 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.7">
1363 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.7.1"><a href="#section-5.7" class="xref">5.7</a>.  <a href="#name-the-authorization-endpoint" class="xref">The Authorization Endpoint</a></p>
1364 </li>
1365 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8">
1366 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.1"><a href="#section-5.8" class="xref">5.8</a>.  <a href="#name-the-token-endpoint" class="xref">The Token Endpoint</a></p>
1367 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1368 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.1">
1369 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.8.1" class="xref">5.8.1</a>.  <a href="#name-client-to-as-request" class="xref">Client-to-AS Request</a></p>
1370 </li>
1371 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.2">
1372 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.8.2" class="xref">5.8.2</a>.  <a href="#name-as-to-client-response" class="xref">AS-to-Client Response</a></p>
1373 </li>
1374 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.3">
1375 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.8.3" class="xref">5.8.3</a>.  <a href="#name-error-response" class="xref">Error Response</a></p>
1376 </li>
1377 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4">
1378 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.8.4" class="xref">5.8.4</a>.  <a href="#name-request-and-response-parame" class="xref">Request and Response Parameters</a></p>
1379 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1380 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.1">
1381 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.8.4.1" class="xref">5.8.4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-grant-type" class="xref">Grant Type</a></p>
1382 </li>
1383 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.2">
1384 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.8.4.2" class="xref">5.8.4.2</a>.  <a href="#name-token-type" class="xref">Token Type</a></p>
1385 </li>
1386 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.3">
1387 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.8.4.3" class="xref">5.8.4.3</a>.  <a href="#name-profile" class="xref">Profile</a></p>
1388 </li>
1389 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.4">
1390 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.4.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.8.4.4" class="xref">5.8.4.4</a>.  <a href="#name-client-nonce" class="xref">Client-Nonce</a></p>
1391 </li>
1392 </ul>
1393 </li>
1394 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.5">
1395 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.8.2.5.1"><a href="#section-5.8.5" class="xref">5.8.5</a>.  <a href="#name-mapping-parameters-to-cbor" class="xref">Mapping Parameters to CBOR</a></p>
1396 </li>
1397 </ul>
1398 </li>
1399 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9">
1400 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.1"><a href="#section-5.9" class="xref">5.9</a>.  <a href="#name-the-introspection-endpoint" class="xref">The Introspection Endpoint</a></p>
1401 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1402 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.1">
1403 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.9.1" class="xref">5.9.1</a>.  <a href="#name-introspection-request" class="xref">Introspection Request</a></p>
1404 </li>
1405 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.2">
1406 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.9.2" class="xref">5.9.2</a>.  <a href="#name-introspection-response" class="xref">Introspection Response</a></p>
1407 </li>
1408 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.3">
1409 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.9.3" class="xref">5.9.3</a>.  <a href="#name-error-response-2" class="xref">Error Response</a></p>
1410 </li>
1411 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.4">
1412 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.9.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.9.4" class="xref">5.9.4</a>.  <a href="#name-mapping-introspection-param" class="xref">Mapping Introspection Parameters to CBOR</a></p>
1413 </li>
1414 </ul>
1415 </li>
1416 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10">
1417 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.1"><a href="#section-5.10" class="xref">5.10</a>. <a href="#name-the-access-token" class="xref">The Access Token</a></p>
1418 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1419 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.1">
1420 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.10.1" class="xref">5.10.1</a>.  <a href="#name-the-authorization-informati" class="xref">The Authorization Information Endpoint</a></p>
1421 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1422 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.1.2.1">
1423 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.1.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.10.1.1" class="xref">5.10.1.1</a>.  <a href="#name-verifying-an-access-token" class="xref">Verifying an Access Token</a></p>
1424 </li>
1425 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.1.2.2">
1426 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.1.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.10.1.2" class="xref">5.10.1.2</a>.  <a href="#name-protecting-the-authorizatio" class="xref">Protecting the Authorization Information Endpoint</a></p>
1427 </li>
1428 </ul>
1429 </li>
1430 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.2">
1431 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.10.2" class="xref">5.10.2</a>.  <a href="#name-client-requests-to-the-rs" class="xref">Client Requests to the RS</a></p>
1432 </li>
1433 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.3">
1434 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.10.3" class="xref">5.10.3</a>.  <a href="#name-token-expiration" class="xref">Token Expiration</a></p>
1435 </li>
1436 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.4">
1437 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.10.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.10.4" class="xref">5.10.4</a>.  <a href="#name-key-expiration" class="xref">Key Expiration</a></p>
1438 </li>
1439 </ul>
1440 </li>
1441 </ul>
1442 </li>
1443 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6">
1444 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><a href="#section-6" class="xref">6</a>.  <a href="#name-security-considerations" class="xref">Security Considerations</a></p>
1445 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1446 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1">
1447 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><a href="#section-6.1" class="xref">6.1</a>.  <a href="#name-protecting-tokens" class="xref">Protecting Tokens</a></p>
1448 </li>
1449 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2">
1450 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><a href="#section-6.2" class="xref">6.2</a>.  <a href="#name-communication-security" class="xref">Communication Security</a></p>
1451 </li>
1452 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3">
1453 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1"><a href="#section-6.3" class="xref">6.3</a>.  <a href="#name-long-term-credentials" class="xref">Long-Term Credentials</a></p>
1454 </li>
1455 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4">
1456 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1"><a href="#section-6.4" class="xref">6.4</a>.  <a href="#name-unprotected-as-request-crea" class="xref">Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints</a></p>
1457 </li>
1458 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5">
1459 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1"><a href="#section-6.5" class="xref">6.5</a>.  <a href="#name-minimal-security-requiremen" class="xref">Minimal Security Requirements for Communication</a></p>
1460 </li>
1461 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.6">
1462 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.6.1"><a href="#section-6.6" class="xref">6.6</a>.  <a href="#name-token-freshness-and-expirat" class="xref">Token Freshness and Expiration</a></p>
1463 </li>
1464 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.7">
1465 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.7.1"><a href="#section-6.7" class="xref">6.7</a>.  <a href="#name-combining-profiles" class="xref">Combining Profiles</a></p>
1466 </li>
1467 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8">
1468 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.8.1"><a href="#section-6.8" class="xref">6.8</a>.  <a href="#name-unprotected-information" class="xref">Unprotected Information</a></p>
1469 </li>
1470 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9">
1471 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.9.1"><a href="#section-6.9" class="xref">6.9</a>.  <a href="#name-identifying-audiences" class="xref">Identifying Audiences</a></p>
1472 </li>
1473 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.10">
1474 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.10.1"><a href="#section-6.10" class="xref">6.10</a>. <a href="#name-denial-of-service-against-o" class="xref">Denial of Service Against or with Introspection</a></p>
1475 </li>
1476 </ul>
1477 </li>
1478 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7">
1479 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><a href="#section-7" class="xref">7</a>.  <a href="#name-privacy-considerations" class="xref">Privacy Considerations</a></p>
1480 </li>
1481 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8">
1482 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><a href="#section-8" class="xref">8</a>.  <a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="xref">IANA Considerations</a></p>
1483 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1484 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1">
1485 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><a href="#section-8.1" class="xref">8.1</a>.  <a href="#name-ace-authorization-server-re" class="xref">ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints</a></p>
1486 </li>
1487 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2">
1488 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.2.1"><a href="#section-8.2" class="xref">8.2</a>.  <a href="#name-core-resource-types" class="xref">CoRE Resource Types</a></p>
1489 </li>
1490 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.3">
1491 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.3.1"><a href="#section-8.3" class="xref">8.3</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-extensions-errors" class="xref">OAuth Extensions Errors</a></p>
1492 </li>
1493 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.4">
1494 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.4.1"><a href="#section-8.4" class="xref">8.4</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-error-code-cbor-mappi" class="xref">OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings</a></p>
1495 </li>
1496 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.5">
1497 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.5.1"><a href="#section-8.5" class="xref">8.5</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-grant-type-cbor-mappi" class="xref">OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings</a></p>
1498 </li>
1499 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.6">
1500 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.6.1"><a href="#section-8.6" class="xref">8.6</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-access-token-types" class="xref">OAuth Access Token Types</a></p>
1501 </li>
1502 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.7">
1503 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.7.1"><a href="#section-8.7" class="xref">8.7</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-access-token-type-cbo" class="xref">OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings</a></p>
1504 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1505 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.7.2.1">
1506 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.7.2.1.1"><a href="#section-8.7.1" class="xref">8.7.1</a>.  <a href="#name-initial-registry-contents" class="xref">Initial Registry Contents</a></p>
1507 </li>
1508 </ul>
1509 </li>
1510 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.8">
1511 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.8.1"><a href="#section-8.8" class="xref">8.8</a>.  <a href="#name-ace-profiles" class="xref">ACE Profiles</a></p>
1512 </li>
1513 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.9">
1514 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.9.1"><a href="#section-8.9" class="xref">8.9</a>.  <a href="#name-oauth-parameters" class="xref">OAuth Parameters</a></p>
1515 </li>
1516 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.10">
1517 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.10.1"><a href="#section-8.10" class="xref">8.10</a>. <a href="#name-oauth-parameters-cbor-mappi" class="xref">OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings</a></p>
1518 </li>
1519 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.11">
1520 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.11.1"><a href="#section-8.11" class="xref">8.11</a>. <a href="#name-oauth-introspection-respons" class="xref">OAuth Introspection Response Parameters</a></p>
1521 </li>
1522 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.12">
1523 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.12.1"><a href="#section-8.12" class="xref">8.12</a>. <a href="#name-oauth-token-introspection-r" class="xref">OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings</a></p>
1524 </li>
1525 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.13">
1526 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.13.1"><a href="#section-8.13" class="xref">8.13</a>. <a href="#name-json-web-token-claims" class="xref">JSON Web Token Claims</a></p>
1527 </li>
1528 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.14">
1529 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.14.1"><a href="#section-8.14" class="xref">8.14</a>. <a href="#name-cbor-web-token-claims" class="xref">CBOR Web Token Claims</a></p>
1530 </li>
1531 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.15">
1532 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.15.1"><a href="#section-8.15" class="xref">8.15</a>. <a href="#name-media-type-registration" class="xref">Media Type Registration</a></p>
1533 </li>
1534 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.16">
1535 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.16.1"><a href="#section-8.16" class="xref">8.16</a>. <a href="#name-coap-content-formats" class="xref">CoAP Content-Formats</a></p>
1536 </li>
1537 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.17">
1538 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.17.1"><a href="#section-8.17" class="xref">8.17</a>. <a href="#name-expert-review-instructions" class="xref">Expert Review Instructions</a></p>
1539 </li>
1540 </ul>
1541 </li>
1542 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9">
1543 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><a href="#section-9" class="xref">9</a>.  <a href="#name-references" class="xref">References</a></p>
1544 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1545 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1">
1546 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.1" class="xref">9.1</a>.  <a href="#name-normative-references" class="xref">Normative References</a></p>
1547 </li>
1548 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2">
1549 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.2" class="xref">9.2</a>.  <a href="#name-informative-references" class="xref">Informative References</a></p>
1550 </li>
1551 </ul>
1552 </li>
1553 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.10">
1554 <p id="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><a href="#appendix-A" class="xref">Appendix A</a>.  <a href="#name-design-justification" class="xref">Design Justification</a></p>
1555 </li>
1556 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11">
1557 <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><a href="#appendix-B" class="xref">Appendix B</a>.  <a href="#name-roles-and-responsibilities" class="xref">Roles and Responsibilities</a></p>
1558 </li>
1559 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12">
1560 <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><a href="#appendix-C" class="xref">Appendix C</a>.  <a href="#name-requirements-on-profiles" class="xref">Requirements on Profiles</a></p>
1561 </li>
1562 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.13">
1563 <p id="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><a href="#appendix-D" class="xref">Appendix D</a>.  <a href="#name-assumptions-on-as-knowledge" class="xref">Assumptions on AS Knowledge about the C and RS</a></p>
1564 </li>
1565 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.14">
1566 <p id="section-toc.1-1.14.1"><a href="#appendix-E" class="xref">Appendix E</a>.  <a href="#name-differences-to-oauth-20" class="xref">Differences to OAuth 2.0</a></p>
1567 </li>
1568 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.15">
1569 <p id="section-toc.1-1.15.1"><a href="#appendix-F" class="xref">Appendix F</a>.  <a href="#name-deployment-examples" class="xref">Deployment Examples</a></p>
1570 <ul class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty">
1571 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.15.2.1">
1572 <p id="section-toc.1-1.15.2.1.1"><a href="#appendix-F.1" class="xref">F.1</a>.  <a href="#name-local-token-validation" class="xref">Local Token Validation</a></p>
1573 </li>
1574 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.15.2.2">
1575 <p id="section-toc.1-1.15.2.2.1"><a href="#appendix-F.2" class="xref">F.2</a>.  <a href="#name-introspection-aided-token-v" class="xref">Introspection Aided Token Validation</a></p>
1576 </li>
1577 </ul>
1578 </li>
1579 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.16">
1580 <p id="section-toc.1-1.16.1"><a href="#appendix-G" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-acknowledgments" class="xref">Acknowledgments</a></p>
1581 </li>
1582 <li class="compact toc ulBare ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.17">
1583 <p id="section-toc.1-1.17.1"><a href="#appendix-H" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-authors-addresses" class="xref">Authors' Addresses</a></p>
1584 </li>
1585 </ul>
1586 </nav>
1587 </section>
1588 </div>
1589 <div id="intro">
1590 <section id="section-1">
1591 <h2 id="name-introduction">
1592 <a href="#section-1" class="section-number selfRef">1. </a><a href="#name-introduction" class="section-name selfRef">Introduction</a>
1593 </h2>
1594 <p id="section-1-1">Authorization is the process for granting approval to an entity to
1595 access a generic resource <span>[<a href="#RFC4949" class="xref">RFC4949</a>]</span>. The authorization
1596 task itself can best be described as granting access to a requesting client for
1597 a resource hosted on a device, i.e., the resource server (RS). This exchange is
1598 mediated by one or multiple authorization servers (ASes). Managing
1599 authorization for a large number of devices and users can be a complex task.<a href="#section-1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1600 <p id="section-1-2">While prior work on authorization solutions for the Web and for the mobile
1601 environment also applies to the Internet of Things (IoT) environment, many
1602 IoT devices are constrained, for example, in terms of processing
1603 capabilities, available memory, etc. For such devices, the Constrained
1604 Application Protocol (CoAP) <span>[<a href="#RFC7252" class="xref">RFC7252</a>]</span> can alleviate some
1605 resource concerns when used instead of HTTP to implement the communication
1606 flows of this specification.<a href="#section-1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1607 <p id="section-1-3"><a href="#constraints" class="xref">Appendix A</a> gives an overview of the constraints
1608 considered in this design, and a more detailed treatment of constraints can
1609 be found in <span>[<a href="#RFC7228" class="xref">RFC7228</a>]</span>. This design aims to accommodate
1610 different IoT deployments as well as a continuous range of device and network
1611 capabilities. Taking energy consumption as an example, at one end, there are
1612 energy-harvesting or battery-powered devices that have a tight power
1613 budget; on the other end, there are mains-powered devices; and all levels exist in
1614 between.<a href="#section-1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1615 <p id="section-1-4">Hence, IoT devices may be very different in terms of available processing
1616 and message exchange capabilities, and there is a need to support many
1617 different authorization use cases <span>[<a href="#RFC7744" class="xref">RFC7744</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1618 <p id="section-1-5">This specification describes a framework for Authentication and Authorization
1619 for Constrained Environments (ACE) built on reuse of OAuth 2.0
1620 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>, thereby extending authorization to Internet of Things
1621 devices. This specification contains the necessary building blocks
1622 for adjusting OAuth 2.0 to IoT environments.<a href="#section-1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1623 <p id="section-1-6">Profiles of this framework are available in separate specifications, such as
1624 <span>[<a href="#RFC9202" class="xref">RFC9202</a>]</span> or <span>[<a href="#RFC9203" class="xref">RFC9203</a>]</span>.
1625 Such profiles may specify the use of the framework for a specific security protocol
1626 and the underlying transports for use in a specific deployment environment to improve interoperability.
1627 Implementations may claim conformance with a specific profile, whereby
1628 implementations utilizing the same profile interoperate, while
1629 implementations of different profiles are not expected to be interoperable.
1630 More powerful devices, such as mobile phones and tablets, may implement multiple
1631 profiles and will therefore be able to interact with a wider range of constrained devices.
1632 Requirements on profiles are described at contextually
1633 appropriate places throughout this specification and also summarized in
1634 <a href="#app_profileRequirements" class="xref">Appendix C</a>.<a href="#section-1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1635 </section>
1636 </div>
1637 <div id="terminology">
1638 <section id="section-2">
1639 <h2 id="name-terminology">
1640 <a href="#section-2" class="section-number selfRef">2. </a><a href="#name-terminology" class="section-name selfRef">Terminology</a>
1641 </h2>
1642 <p id="section-2-1">The key words "<span class="bcp14">MUST</span>", "<span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>", "<span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHALL</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHALL NOT</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span>", "<span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">NOT RECOMMENDED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">MAY</span>", and
1643 "<span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>" in this document are to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <span>[<a href="#RFC2119" class="xref">RFC2119</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC8174" class="xref">RFC8174</a>]</span> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, as shown here.<a href="#section-2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1644 <p id="section-2-2">Certain security-related terms, such as "authentication",
1645 "authorization", "confidentiality", "(data) integrity", "message
1646 authentication code", and "verify", are taken from <span>[<a href="#RFC4949" class="xref">RFC4949</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1647 <p id="section-2-3">Since exchanges in this specification are described as RESTful protocol
1648 interactions, HTTP <span>[<a href="#RFC9110" class="xref">RFC9110</a>]</span> offers useful terminology.
1649 (Note that "RESTful" refers to the Representational State Transfer (REST) architecture.)<a href="#section-2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1650 <p id="section-2-4">Terminology for entities in the architecture is defined in OAuth
1651 2.0 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>, such as client (C), resource server (RS),
1652 and authorization server (AS).<a href="#section-2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1653 <p id="section-2-5">Note that the term "endpoint" is used here following its OAuth
1654 definition, which is to denote resources, such as token and
1655 introspection at the AS and authz-info at the RS (see <a href="#tokenAuthInfoEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.10.1</a> for a definition of the authz-info endpoint).
1656 The CoAP definition, which is "[a]n entity
1657 participating in the CoAP protocol" <span>[<a href="#RFC7252" class="xref">RFC7252</a>]</span>, is not used in this specification.<a href="#section-2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1658 <p id="section-2-6">The specification in this document is called the "framework" or "ACE framework".
1659 When referring to "profiles of this framework", it refers to additional specifications that
1660 define the use of this specification with concrete transport and communication
1661 security protocols (e.g., CoAP over DTLS).<a href="#section-2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1662 <p id="section-2-7">The term "Access Information" is used for parameters, other than the access token, provided to the client by the AS to enable it to access the RS
1663 (e.g., public key of the RS or profile supported by RS).<a href="#section-2-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1664 <p id="section-2-8">The term "authorization information" is used to denote all information,
1665 including the claims of relevant access tokens, that an RS uses to determine whether an access request should be granted.<a href="#section-2-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1666 <p id="section-2-9">Throughout this document, examples for CBOR data items are expressed in CBOR extended diagnostic notation as defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8949#section-8" class="relref">Section 8</a> of [<a href="#RFC8949" class="xref">RFC8949</a>]</span> and <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8610#appendix-G" class="relref">Appendix G</a> of [<a href="#RFC8610" class="xref">RFC8610</a>]</span> ("diagnostic notation"), unless noted otherwise. We often use diagnostic notation comments to provide a textual representation of the numeric parameter names and values.<a href="#section-2-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1667 </section>
1668 </div>
1669 <div id="overview">
1670 <section id="section-3">
1671 <h2 id="name-overview">
1672 <a href="#section-3" class="section-number selfRef">3. </a><a href="#name-overview" class="section-name selfRef">Overview</a>
1673 </h2>
1674 <p id="section-3-1">This specification defines the ACE framework for authorization in the Internet
1675 of Things environment. It consists of a set of building blocks.<a href="#section-3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1676 <p id="section-3-2">
1677 The basic block is the OAuth 2.0 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
1678 framework, which enjoys widespread deployment. Many IoT devices can support
1679 OAuth 2.0 without any additional extensions, but for certain constrained
1680 settings, additional profiling is needed.<a href="#section-3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1681 <p id="section-3-3">Another building block is the lightweight web transfer protocol CoAP
1682 <span>[<a href="#RFC7252" class="xref">RFC7252</a>]</span>, for those communication environments where HTTP is
1683 not appropriate. CoAP typically runs on top of UDP, which further reduces
1684 overhead and message exchanges. While this specification defines extensions
1685 for the use of OAuth over CoAP, other underlying protocols are not prohibited
1686 from being supported in the future, such as HTTP/2 <span>[<a href="#RFC9113" class="xref">RFC9113</a>]</span>,
1687 Message Queuing Telemetry Transport (MQTT) <span>[<a href="#MQTT5.0" class="xref">MQTT5.0</a>]</span>,
1688 Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE) <span>[<a href="#BLE" class="xref">BLE</a>]</span>, and QUIC <span>[<a href="#RFC9000" class="xref">RFC9000</a>]</span>. Note that this document specifies
1689 protocol exchanges in terms of RESTful verbs, such as GET and POST.
1690 Future profiles using protocols that do not support these verbs <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
1691 specify how the corresponding protocol messages are transmitted instead.<a href="#section-3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1692 <p id="section-3-4">A third building block is the Concise Binary Object Representation
1693 (CBOR) <span>[<a href="#RFC8949" class="xref">RFC8949</a>]</span>, for encodings where JSON
1694 <span>[<a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">RFC8259</a>]</span> is not sufficiently compact. CBOR is a binary
1695 encoding designed for small code and message size. Self-contained tokens
1696 and protocol message payloads are encoded in CBOR when CoAP is used. When CoAP
1697 is not used, the use of CBOR remains <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>.<a href="#section-3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1698 <p id="section-3-5">A fourth building block is CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)
1699 <span>[<a href="#RFC8152" class="xref">RFC8152</a>]</span>, which enables object-level layer security as an
1700 alternative or complement to transport layer security (DTLS
1701 <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC9147" class="xref">RFC9147</a>]</span> or TLS <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>). COSE is used to
1702 secure self-contained tokens, such as proof-of-possession (PoP) tokens,
1703 which are an extension to the OAuth bearer tokens. The default token format
1704 is defined in CBOR Web Token (CWT) <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>.
1705 Application-layer security for CoAP using COSE can be provided with Object Security for
1706 Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)
1707 <span>[<a href="#RFC8613" class="xref">RFC8613</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1708 <p id="section-3-6">With the building blocks listed above, solutions satisfying various
1709 IoT device and network constraints are possible. A list of constraints is
1710 described in detail in <span>[<a href="#RFC7228" class="xref">RFC7228</a>]</span>, and a description
1711 of how the building blocks mentioned above relate to the various constraints
1712 can be found in <a href="#constraints" class="xref">Appendix A</a>.<a href="#section-3-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1713 <p id="section-3-7">Luckily, not every IoT device suffers from all constraints. Nevertheless, the ACE
1714 framework takes all these aspects into account and allows
1715 several different deployment variants to coexist, rather than mandating a
1716 one-size-fits-all solution. It is important to cover the wide
1717 range of possible interworking use cases and the different requirements from
1718 a security point of view. Once IoT deployments mature, popular deployment
1719 variants will be documented in the form of ACE profiles.<a href="#section-3-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1720 <div id="oauth2Overview">
1721 <section id="section-3.1">
1722 <h3 id="name-oauth-20">
1723 <a href="#section-3.1" class="section-number selfRef">3.1. </a><a href="#name-oauth-20" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth 2.0</a>
1724 </h3>
1725 <p id="section-3.1-1">The OAuth 2.0 authorization framework enables a client to obtain
1726 scoped access to a resource with the permission of a resource
1727 owner. Authorization information, or references to it, is passed between the nodes
1728 using access tokens. These access tokens are issued to clients by an
1729 authorization server with the approval of the resource owner. The client
1730 uses the access token to access the protected resources hosted by the
1731 resource server.<a href="#section-3.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1732 <p id="section-3.1-2">A number of OAuth 2.0 terms are used within this specification:<a href="#section-3.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1733 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-3.1-3">
1734 <dt id="section-3.1-3.1">Access Tokens:</dt>
1735 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.2">
1736 <p id="section-3.1-3.2.1">
1737 Access tokens are credentials needed to access protected resources. An
1738 access token is a data structure representing authorization permissions
1739 issued by the AS to the client. Access tokens are generated by the AS
1740 and consumed by the RS. The access token content is opaque
1741 to the client.<a href="#section-3.1-3.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1742 <p id="section-3.1-3.2.2">
1743 Access tokens can have different formats and various methods
1744 of utilization (e.g., cryptographic properties) based on the security
1745 requirements of the given deployment.<a href="#section-3.1-3.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1746 </dd>
1747 <dd class="break"></dd>
1748 <dt id="section-3.1-3.3">Introspection:</dt>
1749 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.4">
1750 Introspection is a method for a resource server, or potentially a client,
1751 to query the authorization server for the active state and content of a
1752 received access token. This is particularly useful in those cases where
1753 the authorization decisions are very dynamic and/or where the received
1754 access token itself is an opaque reference, rather than a self-contained
1755 token. More information about introspection in OAuth 2.0 can be
1756 found in <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.1-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1757 </dd>
1758 <dd class="break"></dd>
1759 <dt id="section-3.1-3.5">Refresh Tokens:</dt>
1760 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.6">
1761 <p id="section-3.1-3.6.1">
1762 Refresh tokens are credentials used to obtain access tokens.
1763 Refresh tokens are issued to the client by the authorization
1764 server and are used to obtain a new access token when the current
1765 access token expires or to obtain additional access tokens with
1766 identical or narrower scope (such access tokens may have a shorter
1767 lifetime and fewer permissions than authorized by the resource owner).
1768 Issuing a refresh token is optional at the discretion of the
1769 authorization server. If the authorization server issues a refresh
1770 token, it is included when issuing an access token (i.e., step (B) in
1771 <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>).<a href="#section-3.1-3.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1772 <p id="section-3.1-3.6.2">
1773 A refresh token in OAuth 2.0 is a string representing the authorization
1774 granted to the client by the resource owner. The string is usually
1775 opaque to the client. The token denotes an identifier used to retrieve
1776 the authorization information. Unlike access tokens, refresh
1777 tokens are intended for use only with authorization servers and
1778 are never sent to resource servers. In this framework, refresh
1779 tokens are encoded in binary instead of strings, if used.<a href="#section-3.1-3.6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1780 </dd>
1781 <dd class="break"></dd>
1782 <dt id="section-3.1-3.7">Proof-of-Possession Tokens:</dt>
1783 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.8">
1784 <p id="section-3.1-3.8.1">
1785 A token may be bound to a cryptographic key, which is then used
1786 to bind the token to a request authorized by the token. Such tokens
1787 are called proof-of-possession tokens (or PoP tokens).<a href="#section-3.1-3.8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1788 <p id="section-3.1-3.8.2">
1789 The proof-of-possession security concept used here assumes that
1790 the AS acts as a trusted third party that binds keys to tokens.
1791 In the case of access tokens, these so-called PoP keys are then used by
1792 the client to demonstrate the possession of the secret to the RS when
1793 accessing the resource. The RS, when receiving an access token, needs
1794 to verify that the key used by the client matches the one bound to the
1795 access token. When this specification uses the term "access token", it
1796 is assumed to be a PoP access token unless specifically stated
1797 otherwise.<a href="#section-3.1-3.8.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1798 <p id="section-3.1-3.8.3">
1799 The key bound to the token (the PoP key) may use either symmetric or
1800 asymmetric cryptography. The appropriate choice of the kind of
1801 cryptography depends on the constraints of the IoT devices as well as
1802 on the security requirements of the use case.<a href="#section-3.1-3.8.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1803 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-3.1-3.8.4">
1804 <dt id="section-3.1-3.8.4.1">Symmetric PoP key:</dt>
1805 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.8.4.2">
1806 <p id="section-3.1-3.8.4.2.1">
1807 The AS generates a random, symmetric PoP key. The key is either
1808 stored to be returned on introspection calls or included in the
1809 token. Either the whole token or only the key <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encrypted
1810 in the latter case. The PoP key is also returned to
1811 client together with the token, protected by the secure channel.<a href="#section-3.1-3.8.4.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1812 </dd>
1813 <dd class="break"></dd>
1814 <dt id="section-3.1-3.8.4.3">Asymmetric PoP key:</dt>
1815 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.8.4.4">
1816 An asymmetric key pair is generated by the client and the public key
1817 is sent to the AS (if it does not already have knowledge of the
1818 client's public key). Information about the public key, which is the
1819 PoP key in this case, is either stored to be returned on
1820 introspection calls or included inside the token and sent
1821 back to the client. The resource server consuming the token can
1822 identify the public key from the information in the token, which
1823 allows the client to use the corresponding private key for the
1824 proof of possession.<a href="#section-3.1-3.8.4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1825 </dd>
1826 <dd class="break"></dd>
1827 </dl>
1828 <p id="section-3.1-3.8.5"> The token is either a simple reference
1829 or a structured information object (e.g., CWT <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>)
1830 protected by a cryptographic wrapper (e.g., COSE <span>[<a href="#RFC8152" class="xref">RFC8152</a>]</span>). The choice of PoP key does not necessarily imply
1831 a specific credential type for the integrity protection of the
1832 token.<a href="#section-3.1-3.8.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1833 </dd>
1834 <dd class="break"></dd>
1835 <dt id="section-3.1-3.9">Scopes and Permissions:</dt>
1836 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.10">
1837 <p id="section-3.1-3.10.1">
1838 In OAuth 2.0, the client specifies the type of permissions it is
1839 seeking to obtain (via the <code>scope</code> parameter) in the access token
1840 request. In turn, the AS may use the <code>scope</code> response parameter to
1841 inform the client of the scope of the access token issued. As the
1842 client could be a constrained device as well, this specification
1843 defines the use of CBOR encoding (see <a href="#oauthProfile" class="xref">Section 5</a>) for such requests and responses.<a href="#section-3.1-3.10.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1844 <p id="section-3.1-3.10.2">
1845 The values of the <code>scope</code> parameter in OAuth 2.0 are expressed as a list
1846 of space-delimited, case-sensitive strings with a semantic that is
1847 well known to the AS and the RS.
1848 More details about the concept of scopes are found under
1849 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-3.3" class="relref">Section 3.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.1-3.10.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1850 </dd>
1851 <dd class="break"></dd>
1852 <dt id="section-3.1-3.11">Claims:</dt>
1853 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.12">
1854 <p id="section-3.1-3.12.1">
1855 Information carried in the access token or returned from introspection, called claims, is in the form of
1856 name-value pairs. An access token may, for example, include a claim
1857 identifying the AS that issued the token (via the <code>iss</code> claim) and
1858 what audience the access token is intended for (via the <code>aud</code> claim).
1859 The audience of an access token can be a specific resource, one resource, or
1860 many resource servers. The resource owner policies influence what
1861 claims are put into the access token by the authorization server.<a href="#section-3.1-3.12.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1862 <p id="section-3.1-3.12.2">
1863 While the structure and encoding of the access token varies throughout
1864 deployments, a standardized format has been defined with the JSON Web
1865 Token (JWT) <span>[<a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">RFC7519</a>]</span>, where claims are encoded as a
1866 JSON object. In <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>, the CBOR Web Token (CWT)
1867 has been defined as an equivalent format using CBOR encoding.<a href="#section-3.1-3.12.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1868 </dd>
1869 <dd class="break"></dd>
1870 <dt id="section-3.1-3.13">Token and Introspection Endpoints:</dt>
1871 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-3.14">
1872 <p id="section-3.1-3.14.1">
1873 The AS hosts the token endpoint that allows a client to request access
1874 tokens. The client makes a POST request to the token endpoint on the AS
1875 and receives the access token in the response (if the request was
1876 successful).<a href="#section-3.1-3.14.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1877 <p id="section-3.1-3.14.2">
1878 In some deployments, a token introspection endpoint is provided by
1879 the AS, which can be used by the RS and potentially the client, if they
1880 need to request additional information regarding a received access
1881 token. The requesting entity makes a POST request to the introspection
1882 endpoint on the AS and receives information about the access token in
1883 the response. (See "Introspection" above.)<a href="#section-3.1-3.14.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1884 </dd>
1885 <dd class="break"></dd>
1886 </dl>
1887 </section>
1888 </div>
1889 <div id="coap">
1890 <section id="section-3.2">
1891 <h3 id="name-coap">
1892 <a href="#section-3.2" class="section-number selfRef">3.2. </a><a href="#name-coap" class="section-name selfRef">CoAP</a>
1893 </h3>
1894 <p id="section-3.2-1">
1895 CoAP is an application-layer protocol similar to HTTP but specifically
1896 designed for constrained environments. CoAP typically uses
1897 datagram-oriented transport, such as UDP, where reordering and loss
1898 of packets can occur. A security solution needs to take the latter aspects
1899 into account.<a href="#section-3.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1900 <p id="section-3.2-2">While HTTP uses headers and query strings to convey additional
1901 information about a request, CoAP encodes such information into header
1902 parameters called 'options'.<a href="#section-3.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1903 <p id="section-3.2-3">CoAP supports application-layer fragmentation of the CoAP payloads
1904 through block-wise transfers <span>[<a href="#RFC7959" class="xref">RFC7959</a>]</span>. However,
1905 block-wise transfer does not increase the size limits of CoAP options;
1906 therefore, data encoded in options has to be kept small.<a href="#section-3.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1907 <p id="section-3.2-4">Transport layer security for CoAP can be provided by DTLS or TLS
1908 <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>
1909 <span>[<a href="#RFC9147" class="xref">RFC9147</a>]</span>.
1910 CoAP defines a number of proxy operations that require transport layer
1911 security to be terminated at the proxy. One approach for protecting CoAP communication
1912 end-to-end through proxies, and also to support security for CoAP over
1913 a different transport in a uniform way, is to provide security at the application
1914 layer using an object-based security mechanism, such as COSE <span>[<a href="#RFC8152" class="xref">RFC8152</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-3.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1915 <p id="section-3.2-5">
1916 One application of COSE is OSCORE
1917 <span>[<a href="#RFC8613" class="xref">RFC8613</a>]</span>, which provides end-to-end confidentiality,
1918 integrity and replay protection, and a secure binding between CoAP request
1919 and response messages. In OSCORE, the CoAP messages are wrapped in COSE
1920 objects and sent using CoAP.<a href="#section-3.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1921 <p id="section-3.2-6">In this framework, the use of CoAP as replacement for HTTP is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>
1922 for use in constrained environments. For communication security, this
1923 framework does not make an explicit protocol recommendation, since the choice
1924 depends on the requirements of the specific application. DTLS
1925 <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC9147" class="xref">RFC9147</a>]</span> and OSCORE
1926 <span>[<a href="#RFC8613" class="xref">RFC8613</a>]</span> are mentioned as examples; other protocols fulfilling
1927 the requirements from <a href="#minimalCommSecReq" class="xref">Section 6.5</a> are also
1928 applicable.<a href="#section-3.2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1929 </section>
1930 </div>
1931 </section>
1932 </div>
1933 <div id="specs">
1934 <section id="section-4">
1935 <h2 id="name-protocol-interactions">
1936 <a href="#section-4" class="section-number selfRef">4. </a><a href="#name-protocol-interactions" class="section-name selfRef">Protocol Interactions</a>
1937 </h2>
1938 <p id="section-4-1">
1939 The ACE framework is based on the OAuth 2.0 protocol interactions using
1940 the token endpoint and optionally the introspection endpoint.
1941 A client obtains an access token, and optionally a refresh token, from an
1942 AS using the token endpoint and subsequently presents the access token to
1943 an RS to gain access to a protected resource. In most deployments, the RS can
1944 process the access token locally; however, in some cases, the RS may present
1945 it to the AS via the introspection endpoint to get fresh information.
1946 These interactions are shown in <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>. An
1947 overview of various OAuth concepts is provided in <a href="#oauth2Overview" class="xref">Section 3.1</a>.<a href="#section-4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1948 <span id="name-basic-protocol-flow"></span><div id="fig_protocolFlow">
1949 <figure id="figure-1">
1950 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="section-4-2.1">
1951 <pre>
1952 +--------+ +---------------+
1953 | |---(A)-- Token Request -------&gt;| |
1954 | | | Authorization |
1955 | |&lt;--(B)-- Access Token ---------| Server |
1956 | | + Access Information | |
1957 | | + Refresh Token (optional) +---------------+
1958 | | ^ |
1959 | | Introspection Request (D)| |
1960 | Client | Response | |(E)
1961 | | (optional exchange) | |
1962 | | | v
1963 | | +--------------+
1964 | |---(C)-- Token + Request -----&gt;| |
1965 | | | Resource |
1966 | |&lt;--(F)-- Protected Resource ---| Server |
1967 | | | |
1968 +--------+ +--------------+
1969 </pre>
1970 </div>
1971 <figcaption><a href="#figure-1" class="selfRef">Figure 1</a>:
1972 <a href="#name-basic-protocol-flow" class="selfRef">Basic Protocol Flow</a>
1973 </figcaption></figure>
1974 </div>
1975 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-4-3">
1976 <dt id="section-4-3.1">Requesting an Access Token (A):</dt>
1977 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-4-3.2">
1978 <p id="section-4-3.2.1">
1979 The client makes an access token request to the token endpoint at the AS.
1980 This framework assumes the use of PoP access tokens (see <a href="#oauth2Overview" class="xref">Section 3.1</a> for a short description) wherein the AS binds a
1981 key to an access token. The client may include permissions it seeks to
1982 obtain and information about the credentials it wants to use for
1983 proof of possession (e.g., symmetric/asymmetric cryptography or a
1984 reference to a specific key) of the access token.<a href="#section-4-3.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1985 </dd>
1986 <dd class="break"></dd>
1987 <dt id="section-4-3.3">Access Token Response (B):</dt>
1988 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-4-3.4">
1989 <p id="section-4-3.4.1">
1990 If the request from the client has been successfully verified,
1991 authenticated, and authorized, the AS returns an access token and optionally a refresh
1992 token. Note that only certain grant types support refresh tokens. The AS
1993 can also return additional parameters, referred to as "Access
1994 Information". In addition to the response parameters defined by OAuth
1995 2.0 and the PoP access token extension, this framework defines parameters
1996 that can be used to inform the client about capabilities of the RS, e.g.,
1997 the profile the RS supports. More information about these parameters
1998 can be found in <a href="#tokenParams" class="xref">Section 5.8.4</a>.<a href="#section-4-3.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1999 </dd>
2000 <dd class="break"></dd>
2001 <dt id="section-4-3.5">Resource Request (C):</dt>
2002 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-4-3.6">
2003 <p id="section-4-3.6.1">
2004 The client interacts with the RS to request access to the protected
2005 resource and provides the access token. The protocol to use
2006 between the client and the RS is not restricted to CoAP. HTTP, HTTP/2
2007 <span>[<a href="#RFC9113" class="xref">RFC9113</a>]</span>, QUIC <span>[<a href="#RFC9000" class="xref">RFC9000</a>]</span>,
2008 MQTT <span>[<a href="#MQTT5.0" class="xref">MQTT5.0</a>]</span>, Bluetooth Low Energy <span>[<a href="#BLE" class="xref">BLE</a>]</span>,
2009 etc., are also viable candidates.<a href="#section-4-3.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2010 <p id="section-4-3.6.2">
2011 Depending on the device limitations and the selected protocol, this
2012 exchange may be split up into two parts:<a href="#section-4-3.6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2013 <span class="break"></span><dl class="olPercent" id="section-4-3.6.3">
2014 <dt>(1)</dt>
2015 <dd id="section-4-3.6.3.1">the client sends the access token containing, or referencing, the
2016 authorization information to the RS that will be used for subsequent
2017 resource requests by the client, and<a href="#section-4-3.6.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2018 </dd>
2019 <dd class="break"></dd>
2020 <dt>(2)</dt>
2021 <dd id="section-4-3.6.3.2">the client makes the resource access request using the communication
2022 security protocol and other Access Information obtained from the AS.<a href="#section-4-3.6.3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2023 </dd>
2024 <dd class="break"></dd>
2025 </dl>
2026 <p id="section-4-3.6.4">
2027 The client and the RS mutually authenticate using the security protocol
2028 specified in the profile (see step (B)) and the keys obtained in the access
2029 token or the Access Information. The RS verifies that the token is
2030 integrity protected and originated by the AS. It then compares the claims
2031 contained in the access token with the resource request. If the RS is
2032 online, validation can be handed over to the AS using token introspection
2033 (see messages (D) and (E)) over HTTP or CoAP.<a href="#section-4-3.6.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2034 </dd>
2035 <dd class="break"></dd>
2036 <dt id="section-4-3.7">Token Introspection Request (D):</dt>
2037 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-4-3.8">
2038 <p id="section-4-3.8.1">
2039 A resource server may be configured to introspect the access token by
2040 including it in a request to the introspection endpoint at that AS.
2041 Token introspection over
2042 CoAP is defined in <a href="#introspectionEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.9</a> and for HTTP in
2043 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-4-3.8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2044 <p id="section-4-3.8.2">
2045 Note that token introspection is an optional step and can be omitted if
2046 the token is self-contained and the resource server is prepared to
2047 perform the token validation on its own.<a href="#section-4-3.8.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2048 </dd>
2049 <dd class="break"></dd>
2050 <dt id="section-4-3.9">Token Introspection Response (E):</dt>
2051 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-4-3.10">
2052 <p id="section-4-3.10.1">
2053 The AS validates the token and returns the most recent parameters, such
2054 as <code>scope</code>, <code>audience</code>, validity, etc., associated with it back to the RS. The
2055 RS then uses the received parameters to process the request to either
2056 accept or to deny it.<a href="#section-4-3.10.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2057 </dd>
2058 <dd class="break"></dd>
2059 <dt id="section-4-3.11">Protected Resource (F):</dt>
2060 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-4-3.12">
2061 If the request from the client is authorized, the RS fulfills the request
2062 and returns a response with the appropriate response code. The RS uses
2063 the dynamically established keys to protect the response according to
2064 the communication security protocol used.<a href="#section-4-3.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2065 </dd>
2066 <dd class="break"></dd>
2067 </dl>
2068 <p id="section-4-4">The OAuth 2.0 framework defines a number of "protocol flows" via grant types,
2069 which have been extended
2070 further with extensions to OAuth 2.0 (such as <span>[<a href="#RFC7521" class="xref">RFC7521</a>]</span> and <span>[<a href="#RFC8628" class="xref">RFC8628</a>]</span>).
2071 What grant type works best depends on the usage scenario; <span>[<a href="#RFC7744" class="xref">RFC7744</a>]</span> describes many different IoT use cases, but
2072 there are two grant types that cover a majority of these scenarios, namely the
2073 authorization code grant (described in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1" class="relref">Section 4.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>) and
2074 the client credentials grant (described
2075 in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.4" class="relref">Section 4.4</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>). The authorization
2076 code grant is a good fit for use with apps running on smartphones and tablets that request access to IoT devices, a common scenario in the smart home environment, where users need to go through an authentication and authorization phase (at least during the initial setup phase). The native apps guidelines described in <span>[<a href="#RFC8252" class="xref">RFC8252</a>]</span> are applicable to this use case. The client credentials grant is a good fit for use with IoT devices where the OAuth client itself is constrained. In such a case, the resource owner has prearranged access rights for the client with the authorization server, which is often accomplished using a commissioning tool.<a href="#section-4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2077 <p id="section-4-5">
2078 The consent of the resource owner, for giving a client access to a protected
2079 resource, can be provided dynamically as in the classical OAuth flows, or it
2080 could be preconfigured by the resource owner as authorization policies at
2081 the AS, which the AS evaluates when a token request arrives. The resource
2082 owner and the requesting party (i.e., client owner) are not shown in <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>.<a href="#section-4-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2083 <p id="section-4-6">
2084 This framework supports a wide variety of communication security mechanisms
2085 between the ACE entities, such as the client,
2086 AS, and RS. It is assumed that the client has been
2087 registered (also called enrolled or onboarded) to an AS using a mechanism defined
2088 outside the scope of this document.
2089 In practice, various techniques for onboarding have been used, such as
2090 factory-based provisioning or the use of
2091 commissioning tools. Regardless of the onboarding technique, this provisioning
2092 procedure implies that the client and the AS exchange credentials and
2093 configuration parameters. These credentials are used to mutually authenticate each
2094 other and to protect messages exchanged between the client and the AS.<a href="#section-4-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2095 <p id="section-4-7">It is also assumed that the RS has been registered with the AS, potentially in a similar way as the client has been registered with the AS.
2096 Established keying material between the AS and the RS allows the AS to apply
2097 cryptographic protection to the access token to ensure that its content cannot
2098 be modified and, if needed, that the content is confidentiality protected. Confidentiality protection of the access token content would be provided on top of
2099 confidentiality protection via a communication security protocol.<a href="#section-4-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2100 <p id="section-4-8">The keying material necessary for establishing communication security
2101 between the C and RS is dynamically established as part of the protocol described
2102 in this document.<a href="#section-4-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2103 <p id="section-4-9">
2104 At the start of the protocol, there is an optional discovery step where the
2105 client discovers the resource server and the resources this server hosts.
2106 In this step, the client might also determine what permissions are needed to
2107 access the protected resource. A generic procedure is described in <a href="#asDiscovery" class="xref">Section 5.1</a>; profiles <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> define other procedures for
2108 discovery.<a href="#section-4-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2109 <p id="section-4-10">In Bluetooth Low Energy, for example, advertisements are broadcast by
2110 a peripheral, including information about the primary services. In CoAP,
2111 as a second example, a client can make a request to "/.well-known/core" to
2112 obtain information about available resources, which are returned in a
2113 standardized format, as described in <span>[<a href="#RFC6690" class="xref">RFC6690</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-4-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2114 </section>
2115 </div>
2116 <div id="oauthProfile">
2117 <section id="section-5">
2118 <h2 id="name-framework">
2119 <a href="#section-5" class="section-number selfRef">5. </a><a href="#name-framework" class="section-name selfRef">Framework</a>
2120 </h2>
2121 <p id="section-5-1">The following sections detail the profiling and extensions of OAuth 2.0
2122 for constrained environments, which constitutes the ACE framework.<a href="#section-5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2123 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-5-2">
2124 <dt id="section-5-2.1">Credential Provisioning</dt>
2125 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-2.2">
2126 <p id="section-5-2.2.1">
2127 In constrained environments, it cannot be assumed that the client and the RS
2128 are part of a common key infrastructure. Therefore, the AS provisions
2129 credentials and associated information to allow mutual authentication
2130 between the client and the RS. The resulting security association between the client
2131 and the RS may then also be used to bind these credentials to the
2132 access tokens the client uses.<a href="#section-5-2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2133 </dd>
2134 <dd class="break"></dd>
2135 <dt id="section-5-2.3">Proof of Possession</dt>
2136 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-2.4">
2137 <p id="section-5-2.4.1">
2138 The ACE framework, by default, implements proof of possession for
2139 access tokens, i.e., that the token holder can prove being a holder of
2140 the key bound to the token. The binding is provided by the <code>cnf</code> (confirmation)
2141 claim
2142 <span>[<a href="#RFC8747" class="xref">RFC8747</a>]</span>, indicating what key is used for
2143 proof of possession. If a client needs to submit a new access token,
2144 e.g., to obtain additional access rights, they can request
2145 that the AS binds this token to the same key as the previous one.<a href="#section-5-2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2146 </dd>
2147 <dd class="break"></dd>
2148 <dt id="section-5-2.5">ACE Profiles</dt>
2149 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-2.6">
2150 The client or RS may be limited in the encodings or protocols it
2151 supports. To support a variety of different deployment settings,
2152 specific interactions between the client and RS are defined in an ACE
2153 profile. In the ACE framework, the AS is expected to manage the matching
2154 of compatible profile choices between a client and an RS. The AS
2155 informs the client of the selected profile using the <code>ace_profile</code>
2156 parameter in the token response.<a href="#section-5-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2157 </dd>
2158 <dd class="break"></dd>
2159 </dl>
2160 <p id="section-5-3">OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS to protect the communication
2161 between the AS and client when requesting an access token between the client and RS
2162 when accessing a resource and between the AS and RS if introspection is used.
2163 In constrained settings, TLS is not always feasible or desirable.
2164 Nevertheless, it is <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> that the communications named above are
2165 encrypted, integrity protected, and protected against message replay. It is
2166 also <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> that the communicating endpoints perform mutual authentication.
2167 Furthermore, it <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be assured that responses are bound to the requests in
2168 the sense that the receiver of a response can be certain that the response
2169 actually belongs to a certain request. Note that setting up such a secure
2170 communication may require some unprotected messages to be exchanged first
2171 (e.g., sending the token from the client to the RS).<a href="#section-5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2172 <p id="section-5-4">Profiles <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify a communication security protocol between the
2173 client and RS that provides the features required above. Profiles
2174 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify a
2175 communication security protocol <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to be used between the
2176 client and AS that provides the features required above. Profiles <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2177 specify, for introspection, a communication security protocol
2178 <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to be used
2179 between the RS and AS that provides the features required above. These
2180 recommendations enable interoperability between different implementations
2181 without the need to define a new profile if the communication between the C and
2182 AS, or between the RS and AS, is protected with a different security protocol
2183 complying with the security requirements above.<a href="#section-5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2184 <p id="section-5-5">In OAuth 2.0, the communication with the Token and the Introspection
2185 endpoints at the AS is assumed to be via HTTP and may use Uri-query
2186 parameters. When profiles of this framework use CoAP instead, it is
2187 <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> to use of the following alternative instead of Uri-query
2188 parameters: The sender (client or RS) encodes the parameters of its request
2189 as a CBOR map and submits that map as the payload of the POST request.
2190 The CBOR encoding for a number of OAuth 2.0 parameters is specified in this
2191 document; if a profile needs to use other OAuth 2.0 parameters with CoAP, it
2192 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify their CBOR encoding.<a href="#section-5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2193 <p id="section-5-6">Profiles that use CBOR encoding of protocol message parameters at the
2194 outermost encoding layer <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> use the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor".
2195 If CoAP is used for communication, the Content-Format <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be abbreviated
2196 with the ID: 19 (see <a href="#IANAcoapContentFormat" class="xref">Section 8.16</a>).<a href="#section-5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2197 <p id="section-5-7">The OAuth 2.0 AS uses a JSON structure in the payload of its responses
2198 both to the client and RS. If CoAP is used, it is <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> to use
2199 CBOR <span>[<a href="#RFC8949" class="xref">RFC8949</a>]</span> instead of JSON. Depending on the profile,
2200 the CBOR payload <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be enclosed in a non-CBOR cryptographic wrapper.<a href="#section-5-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2201 <div id="asDiscovery">
2202 <section id="section-5.1">
2203 <h3 id="name-discovering-authorization-s">
2204 <a href="#section-5.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1. </a><a href="#name-discovering-authorization-s" class="section-name selfRef">Discovering Authorization Servers</a>
2205 </h3>
2206 <p id="section-5.1-1">The C must discover the AS in charge of the RS to determine where to request the
2207 access token. To do so, the C 1) must find out the AS URI to which the token
2208 request message must be sent and 2) <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> validate that the AS with this
2209 URI is authorized to provide access tokens for this RS.<a href="#section-5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2210 <p id="section-5.1-2"> In order to determine the AS URI, the C <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> send an initial Unauthorized
2211 Resource Request message to the RS. The RS then denies the request and sends
2212 the address of its AS back to the C (see <a href="#rreq" class="xref">Section 5.2</a>). How the C validates the
2213 AS authorization is not in scope for this document. The C may, for example, ask
2214 its owner if this AS is authorized for this RS. The C may also use a
2215 mechanism that addresses both problems at once (e.g., by querying a dedicated secure service provided by the client owner) .<a href="#section-5.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2216 </section>
2217 </div>
2218 <div id="rreq">
2219 <section id="section-5.2">
2220 <h3 id="name-unauthorized-resource-reque">
2221 <a href="#section-5.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.2. </a><a href="#name-unauthorized-resource-reque" class="section-name selfRef">Unauthorized Resource Request Message</a>
2222 </h3>
2223 <p id="section-5.2-1">An Unauthorized Resource Request message is a request for any
2224 resource hosted by the RS for which the client does not have authorization granted.
2225 The RSs <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2226 treat any request for a protected resource as an Unauthorized Resource
2227 Request message when any of the following hold:<a href="#section-5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2228 <ul class="normal">
2229 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-2.1">The request has been received on an unsecured channel.<a href="#section-5.2-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2230 </li>
2231 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-2.2">The RS has no valid access token for the sender of the request
2232 regarding the requested action on that resource.<a href="#section-5.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2233 </li>
2234 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-2.3">The RS has a valid access token for the sender of the request, but
2235 that token does not authorize the requested action on the requested
2236 resource.<a href="#section-5.2-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2237 </li>
2238 </ul>
2239 <p id="section-5.2-3">Note: These conditions ensure that the RS can handle requests autonomously
2240 once access was granted and a secure channel has been established between the C
2241 and RS. The authz-info endpoint, as part of the process for authorizing
2242 to protected resources, is not itself a protected resource and <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be protected as specified above (cf. <a href="#tokenAuthInfoEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.10.1</a>).<a href="#section-5.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2243 <p id="section-5.2-4">Unauthorized Resource Request messages <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be denied with an
2244 "unauthorized_client" error response. In this response, the resource server
2245 <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> provide proper
2246 AS Request Creation Hints to enable the client to request an access token
2247 from the RS's AS, as described in <a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a>.<a href="#section-5.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2248 <p id="section-5.2-5">The handling of all client requests (including unauthorized ones)
2249 by the RS is described in <a href="#requestC2RS" class="xref">Section 5.10.2</a>.<a href="#section-5.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2250 </section>
2251 </div>
2252 <div id="asInfo">
2253 <section id="section-5.3">
2254 <h3 id="name-as-request-creation-hints">
2255 <a href="#section-5.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.3. </a><a href="#name-as-request-creation-hints" class="section-name selfRef">AS Request Creation Hints</a>
2256 </h3>
2257 <p id="section-5.3-1">The AS Request Creation Hints are sent by an RS as a response to
2258 an Unauthorized Resource Request message (see <a href="#rreq" class="xref">Section 5.2</a>) to help
2259 the sender of the Unauthorized Resource Request message acquire a valid
2260 access token. The AS Request Creation Hints are a CBOR or JSON map,
2261 with an <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span> element <code>AS</code> specifying an absolute URI (see
2262 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-4.3" class="relref">Section 4.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span>) that identifies the
2263 appropriate AS for the RS.<a href="#section-5.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2264 <p id="section-5.3-2">The message can also contain the following <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>
2265 parameters:<a href="#section-5.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2266 <ul class="normal">
2267 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3-3.1">An <code>audience</code> element contains an identifier the client
2268 should request at the AS, as suggested by the RS. With this parameter,
2269 when included in the access token request to the AS, the AS is able to
2270 restrict the use of the access token to specific RSs. See
2271 <a href="#audience" class="xref">Section 6.9</a> for a discussion of this parameter.<a href="#section-5.3-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2272 </li>
2273 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3-3.2">A <code>kid</code> (key identifier) element contains the key identifier of a key used in
2274 an existing security association between the client and the RS.
2275 The RS expects the client to request an access token bound to this
2276 key in order to avoid having to reestablish the security
2277 association.<a href="#section-5.3-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2278 </li>
2279 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3-3.3">A <code>cnonce</code> element contains a client-nonce. See <a href="#cnonceParam" class="xref">Section 5.3.1</a>.<a href="#section-5.3-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2280 </li>
2281 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3-3.4">A <code>scope</code> element contains the suggested scope that the client
2282 should request towards the AS.<a href="#section-5.3-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2283 </li>
2284 </ul>
2285 <p id="section-5.3-4"><a href="#table_asinfo" class="xref">Table 1</a> summarizes the parameters that may
2286 be part of the AS Request Creation Hints.<a href="#section-5.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2287 <span id="name-as-request-creation-hints-2"></span><div id="table_asinfo">
2288 <table class="center" id="table-1">
2289 <caption>
2290 <a href="#table-1" class="selfRef">Table 1</a>:
2291 <a href="#name-as-request-creation-hints-2" class="selfRef">AS Request Creation Hints</a>
2292 </caption>
2293 <thead>
2294 <tr>
2295 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Name</th>
2296 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">CBOR Key</th>
2297 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Value Type</th>
2298 </tr>
2299 </thead>
2300 <tbody>
2301 <tr>
2302 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">AS</td>
2303 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">1</td>
2304 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
2305 </tr>
2306 <tr>
2307 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">kid</td>
2308 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">2</td>
2309 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
2310 </tr>
2311 <tr>
2312 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">audience</td>
2313 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">5</td>
2314 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
2315 </tr>
2316 <tr>
2317 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">scope</td>
2318 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">9</td>
2319 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text or byte string</td>
2320 </tr>
2321 <tr>
2322 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">cnonce</td>
2323 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">39</td>
2324 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
2325 </tr>
2326 </tbody>
2327 </table>
2328 </div>
2329 <p id="section-5.3-6">Note that the schema part of the AS parameter may need to be
2330 adapted to the security protocol that is used between the client
2331 and the AS. Thus, the example AS value "coap://as.example.com/token"
2332 might need to be transformed to "coaps://as.example.com/token".
2333 It is assumed that the client can determine the correct schema part on
2334 its own depending on the way it communicates with the AS.<a href="#section-5.3-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2335 <p id="section-5.3-7"><a href="#fig_as-info-payload" class="xref">Figure 2</a> shows an example for an AS
2336 Request Creation Hints payload using
2337 diagnostic notation.<a href="#section-5.3-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2338 <span id="name-as-request-creation-hints-p"></span><div id="fig_as-info-payload">
2339 <figure id="figure-2">
2340 <div id="section-5.3-8.1">
2341 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
2342 4.01 Unauthorized
2343 Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
2344 Payload :
2345 {
2346 / AS / 1 : "coaps://as.example.com/token",
2347 / audience / 5 : "coaps://rs.example.com",
2348 / scope / 9 : "rTempC",
2349 / cnonce / 39 : h'e0a156bb3f'
2350 }
2351 </pre>
2352 </div>
2353 <figcaption><a href="#figure-2" class="selfRef">Figure 2</a>:
2354 <a href="#name-as-request-creation-hints-p" class="selfRef">AS Request Creation Hints Payload Example</a>
2355 </figcaption></figure>
2356 </div>
2357 <p id="section-5.3-9">In the example above, the response parameter <code>AS</code> points the receiver of
2358 this message to the URI "coaps://as.example.com/token" to request access
2359 tokens. The RS sending this response uses an internal clock
2360 that is not synchronized with the clock of the AS. Therefore, it
2361 cannot reliably verify the expiration time of access tokens it receives.
2362 Nevertheless, to ensure a certain level of access token freshness, the RS has
2363 included a <code>cnonce</code> parameter (see <a href="#cnonceParam" class="xref">Section 5.3.1</a>) in the response. (The hex sequence of the <code>cnonce</code> parameter
2364 is encoded in CBOR-based notation in this example.)<a href="#section-5.3-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2365 <p id="section-5.3-10"><a href="#fig_as-info-cbor" class="xref">Figure 3</a> illustrates the mandatory use
2366 of binary encoding of the message payload shown in
2367 <a href="#fig_as-info-payload" class="xref">Figure 2</a>.<a href="#section-5.3-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2368 <span id="name-as-request-creation-hints-e"></span><div id="fig_as-info-cbor">
2369 <figure id="figure-3">
2370 <div id="section-5.3-11.1">
2371 <pre class="lang-cbor-pretty sourcecode">
2372 a4 # map(4)
2373 01 # unsigned(1) (=AS)
2374 78 1c # text(28)
2375 636f6170733a2f2f61732e657861
2376 6d706c652e636f6d2f746f6b656e # "coaps://as.example.com/token"
2377 05 # unsigned(5) (=audience)
2378 76 # text(22)
2379 636f6170733a2f2f72732e657861
2380 6d706c652e636f6d # "coaps://rs.example.com"
2381 09 # unsigned(9) (=scope)
2382 66 # text(6)
2383 7254656d7043 # "rTempC"
2384 18 27 # unsigned(39) (=cnonce)
2385 45 # bytes(5)
2386 e0a156bb3f #
2387 </pre>
2388 </div>
2389 <figcaption><a href="#figure-3" class="selfRef">Figure 3</a>:
2390 <a href="#name-as-request-creation-hints-e" class="selfRef">AS Request Creation Hints Example Encoded in CBOR</a>
2391 </figcaption></figure>
2392 </div>
2393 <div id="cnonceParam">
2394 <section id="section-5.3.1">
2395 <h4 id="name-the-client-nonce-parameter">
2396 <a href="#section-5.3.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.3.1. </a><a href="#name-the-client-nonce-parameter" class="section-name selfRef">The Client-Nonce Parameter</a>
2397 </h4>
2398 <p id="section-5.3.1-1">If the RS does not synchronize its clock with the AS, it could be
2399 tricked into accepting old access tokens that are either expired or have
2400 been compromised. In order to ensure some level of token freshness
2401 in that case, the RS can use the <code>cnonce</code> (client-nonce) parameter.
2402 The processing requirements for this parameter are as follows:<a href="#section-5.3.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2403 <ul class="normal">
2404 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3.1-2.1">An RS sending a <code>cnonce</code> parameter in an AS Request Creation
2405 Hints message <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> store information to validate that a given
2406 cnonce is fresh. How this is implemented internally is out of scope
2407 for this specification. Expiration of client-nonces should be based
2408 roughly on the time it would take a client to obtain an access token
2409 after receiving the AS Request Creation Hints, with some
2410 allowance for unexpected delays.<a href="#section-5.3.1-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2411 </li>
2412 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3.1-2.2">A client receiving a <code>cnonce</code> parameter in an AS Request Creation
2413 Hints message <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include this in the parameters when
2414 requesting an access token at the AS, using the <code>cnonce</code> parameter from
2415 <a href="#cnonceParamToken" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.4</a>.<a href="#section-5.3.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2416 </li>
2417 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3.1-2.3">If an AS grants an access token request containing a <code>cnonce</code>
2418 parameter, it <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include this value in the access token, using
2419 the <code>cnonce</code> claim specified in <a href="#accessToken" class="xref">Section 5.10</a>.<a href="#section-5.3.1-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2420 </li>
2421 <li class="normal" id="section-5.3.1-2.4">An RS that is using the client-nonce mechanism and that receives an
2422 access token <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify that this token contains a <code>cnonce</code>
2423 claim, with
2424 a client-nonce value that is fresh according to the information stored
2425 at the first step above. If the <code>cnonce</code> claim is not present or if the
2426 <code>cnonce</code> claim value is not fresh, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the access
2427 token. If this was an interaction with the authz-info endpoint, the RS
2428 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also
2429 respond with an error message using a response code equivalent to the
2430 CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized).<a href="#section-5.3.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2431 </li>
2432 </ul>
2433 </section>
2434 </div>
2435 </section>
2436 </div>
2437 <div id="authorizationGrants">
2438 <section id="section-5.4">
2439 <h3 id="name-authorization-grants">
2440 <a href="#section-5.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.4. </a><a href="#name-authorization-grants" class="section-name selfRef">Authorization Grants</a>
2441 </h3>
2442 <p id="section-5.4-1">To request an access token, the client obtains authorization from the
2443 resource owner or uses its client credentials as a grant. The authorization
2444 is expressed in the form of an authorization grant.<a href="#section-5.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2445 <p id="section-5.4-2">The OAuth framework <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> defines four grant types. The grant types can
2446 be split up into two groups: those granted on behalf of the resource
2447 owner (password, authorization code, implicit) and those for the client
2448 (client credentials). Further grant types have been added later, such as an assertion-based authorization grant defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC7521" class="xref">RFC7521</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2449 <p id="section-5.4-3">The grant type is selected depending on the use case. In cases where
2450 the client acts on behalf of the resource owner, the authorization code
2451 grant is recommended. If the client acts on behalf of the resource owner
2452 but does not have any display or has very limited interaction possibilities, it is
2453 recommended to use the device code grant defined in
2454 <span>[<a href="#RFC8628" class="xref">RFC8628</a>]</span>. In cases where the client
2455 acts autonomously, the client credentials grant is recommended.<a href="#section-5.4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2456 <p id="section-5.4-4">For details on the different grant types, see <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-1.3" class="relref">Section 1.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>. The OAuth 2.0 framework provides an extension
2457 mechanism for defining additional grant types, so profiles of this framework
2458 <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> define additional grant types, if needed.<a href="#section-5.4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2459 </section>
2460 </div>
2461 <div id="clientCredentials">
2462 <section id="section-5.5">
2463 <h3 id="name-client-credentials">
2464 <a href="#section-5.5" class="section-number selfRef">5.5. </a><a href="#name-client-credentials" class="section-name selfRef">Client Credentials</a>
2465 </h3>
2466 <p id="section-5.5-1">Authentication of the client is mandatory independent of the grant type
2467 when requesting an access token from the token endpoint. In the case of
2468 the client credentials grant type, the authentication and grant coincide.<a href="#section-5.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2469 <p id="section-5.5-2">Client registration and provisioning of client credentials to the client
2470 is out of scope for this specification.<a href="#section-5.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2471 <p id="section-5.5-3">The OAuth framework defines one client credential type in
2472 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-2.3.1" class="relref">Section 2.3.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> that comprises the client_id and client_secret values. <span>[<a href="#I-D.erdtman-oauth-rpcc" class="xref">OAUTH-RPCC</a>]</span> adds raw public key and pre-shared key to the
2473 client credentials type. Profiles of this framework <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> extend it with
2474 an additional client credentials type using client certificates.<a href="#section-5.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2475 </section>
2476 </div>
2477 <div id="ASAuthentication">
2478 <section id="section-5.6">
2479 <h3 id="name-as-authentication">
2480 <a href="#section-5.6" class="section-number selfRef">5.6. </a><a href="#name-as-authentication" class="section-name selfRef">AS Authentication</a>
2481 </h3>
2482 <p id="section-5.6-1">The client credentials grant does not, by default, authenticate the AS that the client
2483 connects to. In classic OAuth, the AS is authenticated with a TLS server
2484 certificate.<a href="#section-5.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2485 <p id="section-5.6-2">Profiles of this framework <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify how clients authenticate the AS
2486 and how communication security is implemented. By default, server side TLS
2487 certificates, as defined by OAuth 2.0, are required.<a href="#section-5.6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2488 </section>
2489 </div>
2490 <div id="authorizeEndpoint">
2491 <section id="section-5.7">
2492 <h3 id="name-the-authorization-endpoint">
2493 <a href="#section-5.7" class="section-number selfRef">5.7. </a><a href="#name-the-authorization-endpoint" class="section-name selfRef">The Authorization Endpoint</a>
2494 </h3>
2495 <p id="section-5.7-1">The OAuth 2.0 authorization endpoint is used to interact with the resource owner
2496 and obtain an authorization grant in certain grant flows. The primary use
2497 case for the ACE-OAuth framework is for machine-to-machine interactions that do not involve
2498 the resource owner in the authorization flow; therefore, this endpoint is
2499 out of scope here. Future profiles may define constrained adaptation
2500 mechanisms for this endpoint as well. Nonconstrained clients interacting
2501 with constrained resource servers can use the specification in
2502 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-3.1" class="relref">Section 3.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> and the attack countermeasures suggested in
2503 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6819#section-4.2" class="relref">Section 4.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6819" class="xref">RFC6819</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2504 </section>
2505 </div>
2506 <div id="tokenEndpoint">
2507 <section id="section-5.8">
2508 <h3 id="name-the-token-endpoint">
2509 <a href="#section-5.8" class="section-number selfRef">5.8. </a><a href="#name-the-token-endpoint" class="section-name selfRef">The Token Endpoint</a>
2510 </h3>
2511 <p id="section-5.8-1">In standard OAuth 2.0, the AS provides the token endpoint for submitting
2512 access token requests. This framework extends the functionality of the
2513 token endpoint, giving the AS the possibility to help the client and RS
2514 establish shared keys or exchange their public keys. Furthermore,
2515 this framework defines encodings using CBOR as a substitute for JSON.<a href="#section-5.8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2516 <p id="section-5.8-2">The endpoint may also be exposed over HTTPS, as in classical OAuth or
2517 even other transports. A profile <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> define the details of the mapping
2518 between the fields described below and these transports.
2519 If HTTPS with JSON is used,
2520 the semantics of Sections <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1.3" class="relref">4.1.3</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1.4" class="relref">4.1.4</a> of the OAuth 2.0 specification <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2521 be followed (with additions as described below). If CBOR is used as the payload format, the semantics described in this
2522 section <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be followed.<a href="#section-5.8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2523 <p id="section-5.8-3">For the AS to be able to issue a token, the client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be authenticated
2524 and present a valid grant for the scopes requested. Profiles of this
2525 framework <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify how the AS authenticates the client and how the
2526 communication between the client and AS is protected, fulfilling the
2527 requirements specified in <a href="#oauthProfile" class="xref">Section 5</a>.<a href="#section-5.8-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2528 <p id="section-5.8-4">The default name of this endpoint in a url-path <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be '/token'.
2529 However, implementations are not required to use this name and can define
2530 their own instead.<a href="#section-5.8-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2531 <div id="tokenRequest">
2532 <section id="section-5.8.1">
2533 <h4 id="name-client-to-as-request">
2534 <a href="#section-5.8.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.1. </a><a href="#name-client-to-as-request" class="section-name selfRef">Client-to-AS Request</a>
2535 </h4>
2536 <p id="section-5.8.1-1">The client sends a POST request to the token endpoint
2537 at the AS. The profile <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify how the communication is protected.
2538 The content of the request consists of the parameters specified
2539 in the relevant subsection of Section <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4" class="relref">4</a> of the OAuth 2.0 specification
2540 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>, depending on the grant type, with the following
2541 exceptions and additions:<a href="#section-5.8.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2542 <ul class="normal">
2543 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.1-2.1">The <code>grant_type</code> parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span> in the context
2544 of this framework (as opposed to <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> in <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>). If that parameter is
2545 missing, the default value "client_credentials" is implied.<a href="#section-5.8.1-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2546 </li>
2547 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.1-2.2">The <code>audience</code> parameter from <span>[<a href="#RFC8693" class="xref">RFC8693</a>]</span> is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span> to
2548 request an access token bound to a specific audience.<a href="#section-5.8.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2549 </li>
2550 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.1-2.3">The <code>cnonce</code> parameter defined in <a href="#cnonceParamToken" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.4</a> is
2551 <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> if the RS provided a client-nonce in the AS
2552 Request Creation Hints message (<a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a>).<a href="#section-5.8.1-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2553 </li>
2554 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.1-2.4">The <code>scope</code> parameter <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be encoded as a byte string
2555 instead of the string encoding specified in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-3.3" class="relref">Section 3.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> or
2556 in order to allow compact encoding of complex scopes. The syntax of
2557 such a binary encoding is explicitly not specified here and left
2558 to profiles or applications. Note specifically that a binary encoded
2559 scope does not necessarily use the space character '0x20' to delimit
2560 scope-tokens.<a href="#section-5.8.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2561 </li>
2562 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.1-2.5">The client can send an empty (null value) <code>ace_profile</code> parameter to
2563 indicate that it wants the AS to include the <code>ace_profile</code> parameter in
2564 the response. See <a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.3</a>.<a href="#section-5.8.1-2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2565 </li>
2566 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.1-2.6">A client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be able to use the parameters from <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span> in an access token request to the
2567 token endpoint, and the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be able to process these additional
2568 parameters.<a href="#section-5.8.1-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2569 </li>
2570 </ul>
2571 <p id="section-5.8.1-3">The default behavior is that the AS generates a symmetric
2572 proof-of-possession key for the client. In order to use an asymmetric key
2573 pair or to reuse a key previously established with the RS, the client is
2574 supposed to use the <code>req_cnf</code> parameter from <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2575 <p id="section-5.8.1-4">If CoAP is used, then these parameters <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be provided in a CBOR map
2576 (see <a href="#table_cborTokenParameters" class="xref">Table 5</a>).<a href="#section-5.8.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2577 <p id="section-5.8.1-5">When HTTP is used as a transport, then the client makes a
2578 request to the token endpoint; the parameters <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encoded as defined
2579 in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#appendix-B" class="relref">Appendix B</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2580 <p id="section-5.8.1-6">The following examples illustrate different types of requests
2581 for proof-of-possession tokens.<a href="#section-5.8.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2582 <p id="section-5.8.1-7"><a href="#fig_symmATreq" class="xref">Figure 4</a> shows a request for a token
2583 with a symmetric proof-of-possession key, using diagnostic notation.<a href="#section-5.8.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2584 <span id="name-example-request-for-an-acce"></span><div id="fig_symmATreq">
2585 <figure id="figure-4">
2586 <div id="section-5.8.1-8.1">
2587 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
2588 Header: POST (Code=0.02)
2589 Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
2590 Uri-Path: "token"
2591 Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
2592 Payload:
2593 {
2594 / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
2595 / audience / 5 : "tempSensor4711"
2596 }
2597 </pre>
2598 </div>
2599 <figcaption><a href="#figure-4" class="selfRef">Figure 4</a>:
2600 <a href="#name-example-request-for-an-acce" class="selfRef">Example Request for an Access Token Bound to a Symmetric Key</a>
2601 </figcaption></figure>
2602 </div>
2603 <p id="section-5.8.1-9"><a href="#fig_asymmATreq" class="xref">Figure 5</a> shows a request for a token
2604 with an
2605 asymmetric proof-of-possession key. Note that, in this example, OSCORE
2606 <span>[<a href="#RFC8613" class="xref">RFC8613</a>]</span> is used
2607 to provide object-security; therefore, the Content-Format is
2608 "application/oscore" wrapping the "application/ace+cbor" type content.
2609 The OSCORE option has a decoded interpretation appended in parentheses
2610 for the reader's convenience. Also note that, in this example, the audience
2611 is implicitly known by both the client and AS. Furthermore, note that this
2612 example uses the <code>req_cnf</code> parameter from <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.1-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2613 <span id="name-example-token-request-bound"></span><div id="fig_asymmATreq">
2614 <figure id="figure-5">
2615 <div id="section-5.8.1-10.1">
2616 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
2617 Header: POST (Code=0.02)
2618 Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
2619 Uri-Path: "token"
2620 OSCORE: 0x09, 0x05, 0x44, 0x6C
2621 (h=0, k=1, n=001, partialIV= 0x05, kid=[0x44, 0x6C])
2622 Content-Format: application/oscore
2623 Payload:
2624 0x44025d1/ ... (full payload omitted for brevity) ... /68b3825e
2625
2626 Decrypted payload:
2627 {
2628 / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
2629 / req_cnf / 4 : {
2630 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
2631 / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
2632 / kid / 2 : h'11',
2633 / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
2634 / x / -2 : b64'usWxHK2PmfnHKwXPS54m0kTcGJ90UiglWiGahtagnv8',
2635 / y / -3 : b64'IBOL+C3BttVivg+lSreASjpkttcsz+1rb7btKLv8EX4'
2636 }
2637 }
2638 }
2639 </pre>
2640 </div>
2641 <figcaption><a href="#figure-5" class="selfRef">Figure 5</a>:
2642 <a href="#name-example-token-request-bound" class="selfRef">Example Token Request Bound to an Asymmetric Key</a>
2643 </figcaption></figure>
2644 </div>
2645 <p id="section-5.8.1-11"><a href="#fig_kidATreq" class="xref">Figure 6</a> shows a request for a token
2646 where a previously communicated proof-of-possession key is only
2647 referenced using the <code>req_cnf</code> parameter from
2648 <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.1-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2649 <span id="name-example-request-for-an-acces"></span><div id="fig_kidATreq">
2650 <figure id="figure-6">
2651 <div id="section-5.8.1-12.1">
2652 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
2653 Header: POST (Code=0.02)
2654 Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
2655 Uri-Path: "token"
2656 Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
2657 Payload:
2658 {
2659 / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
2660 / audience / 5 : "valve424",
2661 / scope / 9 : "read",
2662 / req_cnf / 4 : {
2663 / kid / 3 : b64'6kg0dXJM13U'
2664 }
2665 }
2666 </pre>
2667 </div>
2668 <figcaption><a href="#figure-6" class="selfRef">Figure 6</a>:
2669 <a href="#name-example-request-for-an-acces" class="selfRef">Example Request for an Access Token Bound to a Key Reference</a>
2670 </figcaption></figure>
2671 </div>
2672 <p id="section-5.8.1-13">Refresh tokens are typically not stored as securely as
2673 proof-of-possession keys in requesting clients. Proof-of-possession-based
2674 refresh token requests <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> request different
2675 proof-of-possession keys
2676 or different audiences in token requests. Refresh token requests can only be
2677 used to request access tokens bound to the same proof-of-possession key and
2678 the same audience as access tokens issued in the initial token request.<a href="#section-5.8.1-13" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2679 </section>
2680 </div>
2681 <div id="tokenResponse">
2682 <section id="section-5.8.2">
2683 <h4 id="name-as-to-client-response">
2684 <a href="#section-5.8.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.2. </a><a href="#name-as-to-client-response" class="section-name selfRef">AS-to-Client Response</a>
2685 </h4>
2686 <p id="section-5.8.2-1">If the access token request has been successfully verified by the
2687 AS and the client is authorized to obtain an access token corresponding
2688 to its access token request, the AS sends a response with the response
2689 code equivalent to the CoAP response code 2.01 (Created). If the client
2690 request was invalid, or not authorized, the AS returns an error response, as
2691 described in <a href="#errorsToken" class="xref">Section 5.8.3</a>.<a href="#section-5.8.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2692 <p id="section-5.8.2-2">Note that the AS decides which token type and profile to use when
2693 issuing a successful response. It is assumed that the AS has prior
2694 knowledge of the capabilities of the client and the RS (see <a href="#app_registration" class="xref">Appendix D</a>). This prior knowledge may,
2695 for example, be set
2696 by the use of a dynamic client registration protocol exchange
2697 <span>[<a href="#RFC7591" class="xref">RFC7591</a>]</span>. If the client has requested a
2698 specific
2699 proof-of-possession key using the <code>req_cnf</code> parameter from
2700 <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>, this may also influence which
2701 profile the AS selects, as it needs to support the use of the key type
2702 requested by the client.<a href="#section-5.8.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2703 <p id="section-5.8.2-3">The content of the successful reply is the Access Information.
2704 When using CoAP, the payload <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encoded as a CBOR map;
2705 when using
2706 HTTP, the encoding is a JSON map, as specified in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.1" class="relref">Section 5.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>. In both cases, the parameters specified
2707 in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.1" class="relref">Section 5.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> are used, with
2708 the following additions and changes:<a href="#section-5.8.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2709 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-5.8.2-4">
2710 <dt id="section-5.8.2-4.1">ace_profile:</dt>
2711 <dd style="margin-left: 3.0em" id="section-5.8.2-4.2">This parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span> unless the request included an
2712 empty <code>ace_profile</code> parameter,
2713 in which case it is MANDATORY. This indicates the profile that the
2714 client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> use towards the RS. See <a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.3</a> for
2715 the formatting of this parameter. If this parameter is absent, the AS
2716 assumes that the client implicitly knows which profile to use towards
2717 the RS.<a href="#section-5.8.2-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2718 </dd>
2719 <dd class="break"></dd>
2720 <dt id="section-5.8.2-4.3">
2721 <code>token_type</code>:</dt>
2722 <dd style="margin-left: 3.0em" id="section-5.8.2-4.4">This parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>, as opposed to
2723 <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span> in
2724 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>. By default, implementations of
2725 this framework
2726 <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> assume that the <code>token_type</code> is "PoP". If a specific
2727 use case
2728 requires another <code>token_type</code> (e.g., "Bearer") to be used, then this
2729 parameter is <span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.2-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2730 </dd>
2731 <dd class="break"></dd>
2732 </dl>
2733 <p id="section-5.8.2-5">Furthermore, <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span> defines
2734 additional parameters that the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be able to use when
2735 responding to a request to the token endpoint.<a href="#section-5.8.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2736 <p id="section-5.8.2-6"><a href="#table_rsinfo" class="xref">Table 2</a> summarizes the parameters that
2737 can currently be part of the Access Information. Future extensions
2738 may define additional parameters.<a href="#section-5.8.2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2739 <span id="name-access-information-paramete"></span><div id="table_rsinfo">
2740 <table class="center" id="table-2">
2741 <caption>
2742 <a href="#table-2" class="selfRef">Table 2</a>:
2743 <a href="#name-access-information-paramete" class="selfRef">Access Information Parameters</a>
2744 </caption>
2745 <thead>
2746 <tr>
2747 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Parameter name</th>
2748 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Specified in</th>
2749 </tr>
2750 </thead>
2751 <tbody>
2752 <tr>
2753 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2754 <code>access_token</code>
2755 </td>
2756 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2757 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2758 </td>
2759 </tr>
2760 <tr>
2761 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2762 <code>token_type</code>
2763 </td>
2764 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2765 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2766 </td>
2767 </tr>
2768 <tr>
2769 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2770 <code>expires_in</code>
2771 </td>
2772 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2773 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2774 </td>
2775 </tr>
2776 <tr>
2777 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2778 <code>refresh_token</code>
2779 </td>
2780 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2781 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2782 </td>
2783 </tr>
2784 <tr>
2785 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2786 <code>scope</code>
2787 </td>
2788 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2789 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2790 </td>
2791 </tr>
2792 <tr>
2793 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2794 <code>state</code>
2795 </td>
2796 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2797 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2798 </td>
2799 </tr>
2800 <tr>
2801 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2802 <code>error</code>
2803 </td>
2804 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2805 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2806 </td>
2807 </tr>
2808 <tr>
2809 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2810 <code>error_description</code>
2811 </td>
2812 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2813 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2814 </td>
2815 </tr>
2816 <tr>
2817 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2818 <code>error_uri</code>
2819 </td>
2820 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2821 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2822 </td>
2823 </tr>
2824 <tr>
2825 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2826 <code>ace_profile</code>
2827 </td>
2828 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
2829 </tr>
2830 <tr>
2831 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2832 <code>cnf</code>
2833 </td>
2834 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2835 <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>
2836 </td>
2837 </tr>
2838 <tr>
2839 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2840 <code>rs_cnf</code>
2841 </td>
2842 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2843 <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>
2844 </td>
2845 </tr>
2846 </tbody>
2847 </table>
2848 </div>
2849 <p id="section-5.8.2-8"><a href="#fig_symmATres" class="xref">Figure 7</a> shows a response containing a token
2850 and a <code>cnf</code> parameter with a symmetric proof-of-possession key, which
2851 is defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>. Note that
2852 the key identifier <code>kid</code> is only used to simplify indexing and
2853 retrieving the key, and no assumptions should be made that it is
2854 unique in the domains of either the client or the RS.<a href="#section-5.8.2-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2855 <span id="name-example-as-response-with-an"></span><div id="fig_symmATres">
2856 <figure id="figure-7">
2857 <div id="section-5.8.2-9.1">
2858 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
2859 Header: Created (Code=2.01)
2860 Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
2861 Payload:
2862 {
2863 / access_token / 1 : b64'SlAV32hk'/ ...
2864 (remainder of CWT omitted for brevity;
2865 CWT contains COSE_Key in the cnf claim)/,
2866 / ace_profile / 38 : "coap_dtls",
2867 / expires_in / 2 : 3600,
2868 / cnf / 8 : {
2869 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
2870 / kty / 1 : 4 / Symmetric /,
2871 / kid / 2 : b64'39Gqlw',
2872 / k / -1 : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxC'
2873 }
2874 }
2875 }
2876 </pre>
2877 </div>
2878 <figcaption><a href="#figure-7" class="selfRef">Figure 7</a>:
2879 <a href="#name-example-as-response-with-an" class="selfRef">Example AS Response with an Access Token Bound to a Symmetric Key</a>
2880 </figcaption></figure>
2881 </div>
2882 </section>
2883 </div>
2884 <div id="errorsToken">
2885 <section id="section-5.8.3">
2886 <h4 id="name-error-response">
2887 <a href="#section-5.8.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.3. </a><a href="#name-error-response" class="section-name selfRef">Error Response</a>
2888 </h4>
2889 <p id="section-5.8.3-1">The error responses for interactions with the AS are generally
2890 equivalent to the ones defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>,
2891 with the following exceptions:<a href="#section-5.8.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2892 <ul class="normal">
2893 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.3-2.1">When using CoAP, the payload <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encoded as a CBOR
2894 map, with
2895 the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor". When using HTTP, the
2896 payload is encoded in JSON, as specified in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.3-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2897 </li>
2898 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.3-2.2">A response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request)
2899 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2900 be used for all error responses, except for invalid_client, where a
2901 response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized)
2902 <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be
2903 used under the same conditions as specified in
2904 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.3-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2905 </li>
2906 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.3-2.3">The parameters <code>error</code>, <code>error_description</code>, and <code>error_uri</code> <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2907 be abbreviated using the codes specified in <a href="#table_cborTokenParameters" class="xref">Table 5</a>, when a CBOR encoding is used.<a href="#section-5.8.3-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2908 </li>
2909 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.3-2.4">The error code (i.e., value of the <code>error</code> parameter) <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
2910 abbreviated, as specified in <a href="#table_cborErrorCodes" class="xref">Table 3</a>, when a CBOR encoding is used.<a href="#section-5.8.3-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2911 </li>
2912 </ul>
2913 <span id="name-cbor-abbreviations-for-comm"></span><div id="table_cborErrorCodes">
2914 <table class="center" id="table-3">
2915 <caption>
2916 <a href="#table-3" class="selfRef">Table 3</a>:
2917 <a href="#name-cbor-abbreviations-for-comm" class="selfRef">CBOR Abbreviations for Common Error Codes</a>
2918 </caption>
2919 <thead>
2920 <tr>
2921 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Name</th>
2922 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">CBOR Values</th>
2923 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Original Specification</th>
2924 </tr>
2925 </thead>
2926 <tbody>
2927 <tr>
2928 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2929 <code>invalid_request</code>
2930 </td>
2931 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">1</td>
2932 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2933 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2934 </td>
2935 </tr>
2936 <tr>
2937 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2938 <code>invalid_client</code>
2939 </td>
2940 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">2</td>
2941 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2942 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2943 </td>
2944 </tr>
2945 <tr>
2946 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2947 <code>invalid_grant</code>
2948 </td>
2949 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">3</td>
2950 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2951 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2952 </td>
2953 </tr>
2954 <tr>
2955 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2956 <code>unauthorized_client</code>
2957 </td>
2958 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">4</td>
2959 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2960 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2961 </td>
2962 </tr>
2963 <tr>
2964 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2965 <code>unsupported_grant_type</code>
2966 </td>
2967 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">5</td>
2968 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2969 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2970 </td>
2971 </tr>
2972 <tr>
2973 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2974 <code>invalid_scope</code>
2975 </td>
2976 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">6</td>
2977 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2978 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
2979 </td>
2980 </tr>
2981 <tr>
2982 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2983 <code>unsupported_pop_key</code>
2984 </td>
2985 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">7</td>
2986 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
2987 </tr>
2988 <tr>
2989 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
2990 <code>incompatible_ace_profiles</code>
2991 </td>
2992 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">8</td>
2993 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
2994 </tr>
2995 </tbody>
2996 </table>
2997 </div>
2998 <p id="section-5.8.3-4">In addition to the error responses defined in OAuth 2.0, the following
2999 behavior <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be implemented by the AS:<a href="#section-5.8.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3000 <ul class="normal">
3001 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.3-5.1">If the client submits an asymmetric key in the token request that the
3002 RS cannot process, the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject that request with a
3003 response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request), including the
3004 error code "unsupported_pop_key" specified in
3005 <a href="#table_cborErrorCodes" class="xref">Table 3</a>.<a href="#section-5.8.3-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3006 </li>
3007 <li class="normal" id="section-5.8.3-5.2">If the client and the RS it has requested an access token for do
3008 not share a common profile, the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject that request with
3009 a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request), including
3010 the error code "incompatible_ace_profiles" specified in
3011 <a href="#table_cborErrorCodes" class="xref">Table 3</a>.<a href="#section-5.8.3-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3012 </li>
3013 </ul>
3014 </section>
3015 </div>
3016 <div id="tokenParams">
3017 <section id="section-5.8.4">
3018 <h4 id="name-request-and-response-parame">
3019 <a href="#section-5.8.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.4. </a><a href="#name-request-and-response-parame" class="section-name selfRef">Request and Response Parameters</a>
3020 </h4>
3021 <p id="section-5.8.4-1">This section provides more detail about the new parameters that can be
3022 used in access token requests and responses, as well as abbreviations for
3023 more compact encoding of existing parameters and common parameter
3024 values.<a href="#section-5.8.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3025 <div id="paramGrantType">
3026 <section id="section-5.8.4.1">
3027 <h5 id="name-grant-type">
3028 <a href="#section-5.8.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.4.1. </a><a href="#name-grant-type" class="section-name selfRef">Grant Type</a>
3029 </h5>
3030 <p id="section-5.8.4.1-1">The abbreviations specified in the registry defined in
3031 <a href="#IANAGrantTypeMappings" class="xref">Section 8.5</a> <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
3032 used in CBOR encodings instead of the string values defined
3033 in <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> if CBOR payloads are used.<a href="#section-5.8.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3034 <span id="name-cbor-abbreviations-for-commo"></span><div id="table_grant_types">
3035 <table class="center" id="table-4">
3036 <caption>
3037 <a href="#table-4" class="selfRef">Table 4</a>:
3038 <a href="#name-cbor-abbreviations-for-commo" class="selfRef">CBOR Abbreviations for Common Grant Types</a>
3039 </caption>
3040 <thead>
3041 <tr>
3042 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Name</th>
3043 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">CBOR Value</th>
3044 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Original Specification</th>
3045 </tr>
3046 </thead>
3047 <tbody>
3048 <tr>
3049 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3050 <code>password</code>
3051 </td>
3052 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">0</td>
3053 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3054 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.3.2" class="relref">Section 4.3.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3055 </td>
3056 </tr>
3057 <tr>
3058 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3059 <code>authorization_code</code>
3060 </td>
3061 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">1</td>
3062 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3063 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.1.3" class="relref">Section 4.1.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3064 </td>
3065 </tr>
3066 <tr>
3067 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3068 <code>client_credentials</code>
3069 </td>
3070 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">2</td>
3071 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3072 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-4.4.2" class="relref">Section 4.4.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3073 </td>
3074 </tr>
3075 <tr>
3076 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3077 <code>refresh_token</code>
3078 </td>
3079 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">3</td>
3080 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3081 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-6" class="relref">Section 6</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3082 </td>
3083 </tr>
3084 </tbody>
3085 </table>
3086 </div>
3087 </section>
3088 </div>
3089 <div id="paramTokenType">
3090 <section id="section-5.8.4.2">
3091 <h5 id="name-token-type">
3092 <a href="#section-5.8.4.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.4.2. </a><a href="#name-token-type" class="section-name selfRef">Token Type</a>
3093 </h5>
3094 <p id="section-5.8.4.2-1">The <code>token_type</code> parameter, defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.1" class="relref">Section 5.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>, allows the AS to indicate to the
3095 client which type of
3096 access token it is receiving (e.g., a bearer token).<a href="#section-5.8.4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3097 <p id="section-5.8.4.2-2">This document registers the new value "PoP" for the "OAuth Access
3098 Token Types" registry, specifying a proof-of-possession token. How the
3099 proof of possession by the client to the RS is performed
3100 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be specified by the profiles.<a href="#section-5.8.4.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3101 <p id="section-5.8.4.2-3">The values in the <code>token_type</code> parameter <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> use the
3102 CBOR abbreviations defined in the registry specified by
3103 <a href="#IANATokenTypeMappings" class="xref">Section 8.7</a> if a CBOR
3104 encoding is used.<a href="#section-5.8.4.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3105 <p id="section-5.8.4.2-4">In this framework, the "pop" value for the <code>token_type</code> parameter is
3106 the default. The AS may, however, provide a different value from those
3107 registered in <span>[<a href="#IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes" class="xref">IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.4.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3108 </section>
3109 </div>
3110 <div id="paramProfile">
3111 <section id="section-5.8.4.3">
3112 <h5 id="name-profile">
3113 <a href="#section-5.8.4.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.4.3. </a><a href="#name-profile" class="section-name selfRef">Profile</a>
3114 </h5>
3115 <p id="section-5.8.4.3-1">Profiles of this framework <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> define the communication
3116 protocol and the communication security protocol between the client
3117 and the RS. The security protocol <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide encryption,
3118 integrity, and
3119 replay protection. It <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also provide a binding between
3120 requests and
3121 responses. Furthermore, profiles <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> define a list of
3122 allowed proof-of-possession methods if they support proof-of-possession
3123 tokens.<a href="#section-5.8.4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3124 <p id="section-5.8.4.3-2">A profile <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify an identifier that <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be used to uniquely
3125 identify itself in the <code>ace_profile</code> parameter. The textual
3126 representation of the profile identifier is intended for human
3127 readability and for JSON-based interactions; it <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be used for
3128 CBOR-based interactions. Profiles <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> register their identifier in the
3129 registry defined in <a href="#IANAProfile" class="xref">Section 8.8</a>.<a href="#section-5.8.4.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3130 <p id="section-5.8.4.3-3">Profiles <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> define additional parameters for both the token request
3131 and the Access Information in the access token response in order to
3132 support negotiation or signaling of profile-specific parameters.<a href="#section-5.8.4.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3133 <p id="section-5.8.4.3-4">Clients that want the AS to provide them with the <code>ace_profile</code>
3134 parameter in the access token response can indicate that by sending an
3135 <code>ace_profile</code> parameter with a null value for CBOR-based interactions,
3136 or an empty string if CBOR is not used, in the access token
3137 request.<a href="#section-5.8.4.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3138 </section>
3139 </div>
3140 <div id="cnonceParamToken">
3141 <section id="section-5.8.4.4">
3142 <h5 id="name-client-nonce">
3143 <a href="#section-5.8.4.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.4.4. </a><a href="#name-client-nonce" class="section-name selfRef">Client-Nonce</a>
3144 </h5>
3145 <p id="section-5.8.4.4-1">This parameter <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be sent from the client to the AS
3146 if it previously received a <code>cnonce</code> parameter in the AS Request
3147 Creation Hints (<a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a>). The parameter
3148 is encoded as a byte string for CBOR-based interactions and as a
3149 string (base64url without padding encoded binary <span>[<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>) if CBOR is not used.
3150 It <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> copy the value from the <code>cnonce</code> parameter in the AS
3151 Request Creation Hints.<a href="#section-5.8.4.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3152 </section>
3153 </div>
3154 </section>
3155 </div>
3156 <div id="tokenCborParams">
3157 <section id="section-5.8.5">
3158 <h4 id="name-mapping-parameters-to-cbor">
3159 <a href="#section-5.8.5" class="section-number selfRef">5.8.5. </a><a href="#name-mapping-parameters-to-cbor" class="section-name selfRef">Mapping Parameters to CBOR</a>
3160 </h4>
3161 <p id="section-5.8.5-1">If CBOR encoding is used, all OAuth parameters in access token requests
3162 and responses <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be mapped to CBOR types, as specified in the registry
3163 defined by <a href="#IANAOAuthParameterMappingsRegistry" class="xref">Section 8.10</a>, using the
3164 given integer abbreviation for the map keys.<a href="#section-5.8.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3165 <p id="section-5.8.5-2">Note that we have aligned the abbreviations corresponding to claims
3166 with the abbreviations defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.8.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3167 <p id="section-5.8.5-3">Note also that abbreviations from -24 to 23 have a 1-byte encoding
3168 size in CBOR. We have thus chosen to assign abbreviations in that
3169 range to parameters we expect to be used most frequently in constrained
3170 scenarios.<a href="#section-5.8.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3171 <span id="name-cbor-mappings-used-in-token"></span><div id="table_cborTokenParameters">
3172 <table class="center" id="table-5">
3173 <caption>
3174 <a href="#table-5" class="selfRef">Table 5</a>:
3175 <a href="#name-cbor-mappings-used-in-token" class="selfRef">CBOR Mappings Used in Token Requests and Responses</a>
3176 </caption>
3177 <thead>
3178 <tr>
3179 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Name</th>
3180 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">CBOR Key</th>
3181 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Value Type</th>
3182 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Original Specification</th>
3183 </tr>
3184 </thead>
3185 <tbody>
3186 <tr>
3187 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3188 <code>access_token</code>
3189 </td>
3190 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">1</td>
3191 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3192 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3193 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3194 </td>
3195 </tr>
3196 <tr>
3197 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3198 <code>expires_in</code>
3199 </td>
3200 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">2</td>
3201 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">unsigned integer</td>
3202 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3203 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3204 </td>
3205 </tr>
3206 <tr>
3207 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3208 <code>audience</code>
3209 </td>
3210 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">5</td>
3211 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3212 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3213 <span>[<a href="#RFC8693" class="xref">RFC8693</a>]</span>
3214 </td>
3215 </tr>
3216 <tr>
3217 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3218 <code>scope</code>
3219 </td>
3220 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">9</td>
3221 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text or byte string</td>
3222 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3223 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3224 </td>
3225 </tr>
3226 <tr>
3227 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3228 <code>client_id</code>
3229 </td>
3230 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">24</td>
3231 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3232 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3233 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3234 </td>
3235 </tr>
3236 <tr>
3237 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3238 <code>client_secret</code>
3239 </td>
3240 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">25</td>
3241 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3242 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3243 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3244 </td>
3245 </tr>
3246 <tr>
3247 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3248 <code>response_type</code>
3249 </td>
3250 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">26</td>
3251 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3252 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3253 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3254 </td>
3255 </tr>
3256 <tr>
3257 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3258 <code>redirect_uri</code>
3259 </td>
3260 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">27</td>
3261 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3262 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3263 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3264 </td>
3265 </tr>
3266 <tr>
3267 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3268 <code>state</code>
3269 </td>
3270 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">28</td>
3271 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3272 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3273 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3274 </td>
3275 </tr>
3276 <tr>
3277 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3278 <code>code</code>
3279 </td>
3280 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">29</td>
3281 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3282 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3283 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3284 </td>
3285 </tr>
3286 <tr>
3287 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3288 <code>error</code>
3289 </td>
3290 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">30</td>
3291 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer</td>
3292 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3293 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3294 </td>
3295 </tr>
3296 <tr>
3297 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3298 <code>error_description</code>
3299 </td>
3300 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">31</td>
3301 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3302 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3303 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3304 </td>
3305 </tr>
3306 <tr>
3307 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3308 <code>error_uri</code>
3309 </td>
3310 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">32</td>
3311 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3312 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3313 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3314 </td>
3315 </tr>
3316 <tr>
3317 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3318 <code>grant_type</code>
3319 </td>
3320 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">33</td>
3321 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">unsigned integer</td>
3322 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3323 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3324 </td>
3325 </tr>
3326 <tr>
3327 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3328 <code>token_type</code>
3329 </td>
3330 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">34</td>
3331 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer</td>
3332 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3333 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3334 </td>
3335 </tr>
3336 <tr>
3337 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3338 <code>username</code>
3339 </td>
3340 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">35</td>
3341 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3342 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3343 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3344 </td>
3345 </tr>
3346 <tr>
3347 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3348 <code>password</code>
3349 </td>
3350 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">36</td>
3351 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3352 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3353 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3354 </td>
3355 </tr>
3356 <tr>
3357 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3358 <code>refresh_token</code>
3359 </td>
3360 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">37</td>
3361 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3362 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3363 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>
3364 </td>
3365 </tr>
3366 <tr>
3367 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3368 <code>ace_profile</code>
3369 </td>
3370 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">38</td>
3371 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer</td>
3372 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
3373 </tr>
3374 <tr>
3375 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3376 <code>cnonce</code>
3377 </td>
3378 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">39</td>
3379 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3380 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
3381 </tr>
3382 </tbody>
3383 </table>
3384 </div>
3385 </section>
3386 </div>
3387 </section>
3388 </div>
3389 <div id="introspectionEndpoint">
3390 <section id="section-5.9">
3391 <h3 id="name-the-introspection-endpoint">
3392 <a href="#section-5.9" class="section-number selfRef">5.9. </a><a href="#name-the-introspection-endpoint" class="section-name selfRef">The Introspection Endpoint</a>
3393 </h3>
3394 <p id="section-5.9-1">Token introspection <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span> <span class="bcp14">MAY</span>
3395 be implemented by the AS and the RS. When implemented, it <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be
3396 used by the RS and to query the
3397 AS for metadata about a given token, e.g., validity or scope. Analogous to the
3398 protocol defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span> for HTTP and JSON,
3399 this section defines adaptations to more constrained environments using CBOR and
3400 leaving the choice of the application protocol to the profile. The client <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> also implement and use introspection analogously to the RS to obtain information about a given token.<a href="#section-5.9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3401 <p id="section-5.9-2">Communication between the requesting entity and the introspection endpoint
3402 at the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be integrity protected and encrypted. The communication
3403 security protocol <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also provide a binding between requests and
3404 responses. Furthermore, the two interacting parties <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> perform mutual
3405 authentication. Finally, the AS <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> verify that the requesting entity has
3406 the right to access introspection information about the provided token.
3407 Profiles of this framework that support introspection <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify how
3408 authentication and communication security between the requesting
3409 entity and the AS is implemented.<a href="#section-5.9-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3410 <p id="section-5.9-3"> The default name of this endpoint in a url-path <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be '/introspect'.
3411 However, implementations are not required to use this name and can define
3412 their own instead.<a href="#section-5.9-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3413 <div id="introReq">
3414 <section id="section-5.9.1">
3415 <h4 id="name-introspection-request">
3416 <a href="#section-5.9.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.9.1. </a><a href="#name-introspection-request" class="section-name selfRef">Introspection Request</a>
3417 </h4>
3418 <p id="section-5.9.1-1">The requesting entity sends a POST request to the introspection endpoint
3419 at the AS. The profile <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify how the communication is protected.
3420 If CoAP is used, the payload <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encoded as a CBOR map with a <code>token</code>
3421 entry containing the access token. Further optional parameters
3422 representing additional context that is known by the requesting entity to
3423 aid the AS in its response <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be included.<a href="#section-5.9.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3424 <p id="section-5.9.1-2">For CoAP-based interaction, all messages <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> use the content
3425 type "application/ace+cbor". For HTTP, the encoding defined in
3426 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-2.1" class="relref">Section 2.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span> is used.<a href="#section-5.9.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3427 <p id="section-5.9.1-3">The same parameters are required and optional as in
3428 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-2.1" class="relref">Section 2.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.9.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3429 <p id="section-5.9.1-4">For example, <a href="#fig_introReq" class="xref">Figure 8</a> shows an RS
3430 calling the token
3431 introspection endpoint at the AS to query about an OAuth 2.0
3432 proof-of-possession token. Note that object security based on OSCORE
3433 <span>[<a href="#RFC8613" class="xref">RFC8613</a>]</span> is assumed in this example;
3434 therefore, the Content-Format is "application/oscore". <a href="#fig_introReq-payl" class="xref">Figure 9</a> shows the decoded payload.<a href="#section-5.9.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3435 <span id="name-example-introspection-reque"></span><div id="fig_introReq">
3436 <figure id="figure-8">
3437 <div id="section-5.9.1-5.1">
3438 <pre class="sourcecode">
3439 Header: POST (Code=0.02)
3440 Uri-Host: "as.example.com"
3441 Uri-Path: "introspect"
3442 OSCORE: 0x09, 0x05, 0x25
3443 Content-Format: application/oscore
3444 Payload:
3445 ... COSE content ...
3446 </pre>
3447 </div>
3448 <figcaption><a href="#figure-8" class="selfRef">Figure 8</a>:
3449 <a href="#name-example-introspection-reque" class="selfRef">Example Introspection Request</a>
3450 </figcaption></figure>
3451 </div>
3452 <span id="name-decoded-payload"></span><div id="fig_introReq-payl">
3453 <figure id="figure-9">
3454 <div id="section-5.9.1-6.1">
3455 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
3456 {
3457 / token / 11 : b64'7gj0dXJQ43U',
3458 / token_type_hint / 33 : 2 / PoP /
3459 }
3460 </pre>
3461 </div>
3462 <figcaption><a href="#figure-9" class="selfRef">Figure 9</a>:
3463 <a href="#name-decoded-payload" class="selfRef">Decoded Payload</a>
3464 </figcaption></figure>
3465 </div>
3466 </section>
3467 </div>
3468 <div id="introRes">
3469 <section id="section-5.9.2">
3470 <h4 id="name-introspection-response">
3471 <a href="#section-5.9.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.9.2. </a><a href="#name-introspection-response" class="section-name selfRef">Introspection Response</a>
3472 </h4>
3473 <p id="section-5.9.2-1">If the introspection request is authorized and successfully processed,
3474 the AS sends a response with the response code equivalent to the CoAP code
3475 2.01 (Created). If the introspection request was invalid, not authorized,
3476 or couldn't be processed, the AS returns an error response, as described in
3477 <a href="#errorsIntro" class="xref">Section 5.9.3</a>.<a href="#section-5.9.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3478 <p id="section-5.9.2-2">In a successful response, the AS encodes the response parameters in
3479 a map. If CoAP is used, this <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encoded as a CBOR map; if
3480 HTTP is used, the JSON encoding specified in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-2.2" class="relref">Section 2.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3481 is used. The map containing the response payload includes the same
3482 required and optional parameters as in
3483 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-2.2" class="relref">Section 2.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>, with the following
3484 additions:<a href="#section-5.9.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3485 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-5.9.2-3">
3486 <dt id="section-5.9.2-3.1"><code>ace_profile</code></dt>
3487 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.9.2-3.2">This parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>. This indicates the profile that
3488 the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> use with the
3489 client. See <a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.3</a> for more details on
3490 the formatting of this parameter. If this parameter is absent, the AS
3491 assumes that the RS implicitly knows which profile to use towards
3492 the client.<a href="#section-5.9.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3493 </dd>
3494 <dd class="break"></dd>
3495 <dt id="section-5.9.2-3.3"><code>cnonce</code></dt>
3496 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.9.2-3.4">This parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>. This is a
3497 client-nonce provided to the AS by the client.
3498 The RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify that this corresponds to the
3499 client-nonce
3500 previously provided to the client in the AS Request Creation
3501 Hints. See Sections <a href="#asInfo" class="xref">5.3</a> and
3502 <a href="#cnonceParamToken" class="xref">5.8.4.4</a>. Its value is a
3503 byte string when encoded in CBOR and is the base64url encoding of this
3504 byte string without padding when encoded in JSON <span>[<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.9.2-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3505 </dd>
3506 <dd class="break"></dd>
3507 <dt id="section-5.9.2-3.5"><code>cti</code></dt>
3508 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.9.2-3.6">This parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>. This is the <code>cti</code> claim
3509 associated to this access token.
3510 This parameter has the same meaning and processing rules as the
3511 <code>jti</code> parameter defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-3.1.2" class="relref">Section 3.1.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span> except that its value is a byte string when encoded
3512 in CBOR and is the base64url encoding of this byte string without
3513 padding when encoded in JSON <span>[<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.9.2-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3514 </dd>
3515 <dd class="break"></dd>
3516 <dt id="section-5.9.2-3.7"><code>exi</code></dt>
3517 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.9.2-3.8">This parameter is <span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>. This is the
3518 <code>expires_in</code> claim associated to this access token.
3519 See <a href="#tokenExpiration" class="xref">Section 5.10.3</a>.<a href="#section-5.9.2-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3520 </dd>
3521 <dd class="break"></dd>
3522 </dl>
3523 <p id="section-5.9.2-4">Furthermore, <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span> defines
3524 more parameters that the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be able to use when responding to a
3525 request to the introspection endpoint.<a href="#section-5.9.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3526 <p id="section-5.9.2-5">For example, <a href="#fig_introRes" class="xref">Figure 10</a> shows an AS
3527 response to the introspection request in <a href="#fig_introReq" class="xref">Figure 8</a>.
3528 Note that this example contains the <code>cnf</code> parameter defined in
3529 <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.9.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3530 <span id="name-example-introspection-respo"></span><div id="fig_introRes">
3531 <figure id="figure-10">
3532 <div id="section-5.9.2-6.1">
3533 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
3534 Header: Created (Code=2.01)
3535 Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
3536 Payload:
3537 {
3538 / active / 10 : true,
3539 / scope / 9 : "read",
3540 / ace_profile / 38 : 1 / coap_dtls /,
3541 / cnf / 8 : {
3542 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
3543 / kty / 1 : 4 / Symmetric /,
3544 / kid / 2 : b64'39Gqlw',
3545 / k / -1 : b64'hJtXhkV8FJG+Onbc6mxC'
3546 }
3547 }
3548 }
3549 </pre>
3550 </div>
3551 <figcaption><a href="#figure-10" class="selfRef">Figure 10</a>:
3552 <a href="#name-example-introspection-respo" class="selfRef">Example Introspection Response</a>
3553 </figcaption></figure>
3554 </div>
3555 </section>
3556 </div>
3557 <div id="errorsIntro">
3558 <section id="section-5.9.3">
3559 <h4 id="name-error-response-2">
3560 <a href="#section-5.9.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.9.3. </a><a href="#name-error-response-2" class="section-name selfRef">Error Response</a>
3561 </h4>
3562 <p id="section-5.9.3-1">The error responses for CoAP-based interactions with the AS
3563 are equivalent to the ones for HTTP-based interactions, as defined in
3564 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-2.3" class="relref">Section 2.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>, with the
3565 following differences:<a href="#section-5.9.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3566 <ul class="normal">
3567 <li class="normal" id="section-5.9.3-2.1">If content is sent and CoAP is used, the payload <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
3568 encoded as a
3569 CBOR map and the Content-Format "application/ace+cbor" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
3570 be used.
3571 For HTTP, the encoding defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-2.3" class="relref">Section 2.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> is used.<a href="#section-5.9.3-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3572 </li>
3573 <li class="normal" id="section-5.9.3-2.2">If the credentials used by the requesting entity (usually the RS)
3574 are invalid, the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> respond with the response code
3575 equivalent to the
3576 CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized) and use the required and optional
3577 parameters from <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7662#section-2.3" class="relref">Section 2.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.9.3-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3578 </li>
3579 <li class="normal" id="section-5.9.3-2.3">If the requesting entity does not have the right to perform this
3580 introspection request, the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> respond with a response code
3581 equivalent to the CoAP code 4.03 (Forbidden). In this case, no payload is
3582 returned.<a href="#section-5.9.3-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3583 </li>
3584 <li class="normal" id="section-5.9.3-2.4">The parameters <code>error</code>, <code>error_description</code>, and <code>error_uri</code> <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
3585 be abbreviated using the codes specified in <a href="#table_cborTokenParameters" class="xref">Table 5</a>.<a href="#section-5.9.3-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3586 </li>
3587 <li class="normal" id="section-5.9.3-2.5">The error codes <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be abbreviated using the codes specified in
3588 the registry defined by <a href="#IANAErrorCBORMappings" class="xref">Section 8.4</a>.<a href="#section-5.9.3-2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3589 </li>
3590 </ul>
3591 <p id="section-5.9.3-3">Note that a properly formed and authorized query for an inactive or
3592 otherwise invalid token does not warrant an error response by this
3593 specification. In these cases, the authorization server <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> instead
3594 respond with an introspection response with the <code>active</code> field set to
3595 "false".<a href="#section-5.9.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3596 </section>
3597 </div>
3598 <div id="introParamsCbor">
3599 <section id="section-5.9.4">
3600 <h4 id="name-mapping-introspection-param">
3601 <a href="#section-5.9.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.9.4. </a><a href="#name-mapping-introspection-param" class="section-name selfRef">Mapping Introspection Parameters to CBOR</a>
3602 </h4>
3603 <p id="section-5.9.4-1">If CBOR is used, the introspection request and response parameters <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
3604 be mapped to CBOR types, as specified in the registry defined by <a href="#IANAIntrospectionEndpointCBORMappingsRegistry" class="xref">Section 8.12</a>, using the given
3605 integer abbreviation for the map key.<a href="#section-5.9.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3606 <p id="section-5.9.4-2">Note that we have aligned abbreviations that correspond to a
3607 claim with the abbreviations defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>
3608 and the abbreviations of parameters with the same name from
3609 <a href="#tokenCborParams" class="xref">Section 5.8.5</a>.<a href="#section-5.9.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3610 <span id="name-cbor-mappings-for-token-int"></span><div id="table_cborIntrospectionParameters">
3611 <table class="center" id="table-6">
3612 <caption>
3613 <a href="#table-6" class="selfRef">Table 6</a>:
3614 <a href="#name-cbor-mappings-for-token-int" class="selfRef">CBOR Mappings for Token Introspection Parameters</a>
3615 </caption>
3616 <thead>
3617 <tr>
3618 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Parameter name</th>
3619 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">CBOR Key</th>
3620 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Value Type</th>
3621 <th class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">Original Specification</th>
3622 </tr>
3623 </thead>
3624 <tbody>
3625 <tr>
3626 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3627 <code>iss</code>
3628 </td>
3629 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">1</td>
3630 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3631 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3632 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3633 </td>
3634 </tr>
3635 <tr>
3636 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3637 <code>sub</code>
3638 </td>
3639 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">2</td>
3640 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3641 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3642 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3643 </td>
3644 </tr>
3645 <tr>
3646 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3647 <code>aud</code>
3648 </td>
3649 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">3</td>
3650 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3651 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3652 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3653 </td>
3654 </tr>
3655 <tr>
3656 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3657 <code>exp</code>
3658 </td>
3659 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">4</td>
3660 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer or floating-point number</td>
3661 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3662 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3663 </td>
3664 </tr>
3665 <tr>
3666 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3667 <code>nbf</code>
3668 </td>
3669 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">5</td>
3670 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer or floating-point number</td>
3671 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3672 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3673 </td>
3674 </tr>
3675 <tr>
3676 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3677 <code>iat</code>
3678 </td>
3679 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">6</td>
3680 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer or floating-point number</td>
3681 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3682 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3683 </td>
3684 </tr>
3685 <tr>
3686 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3687 <code>cti</code>
3688 </td>
3689 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">7</td>
3690 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3691 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
3692 </tr>
3693 <tr>
3694 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3695 <code>scope</code>
3696 </td>
3697 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">9</td>
3698 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text or byte string</td>
3699 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3700 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3701 </td>
3702 </tr>
3703 <tr>
3704 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3705 <code>active</code>
3706 </td>
3707 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">10</td>
3708 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">True or False</td>
3709 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3710 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3711 </td>
3712 </tr>
3713 <tr>
3714 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3715 <code>token</code>
3716 </td>
3717 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">11</td>
3718 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3719 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3720 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3721 </td>
3722 </tr>
3723 <tr>
3724 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3725 <code>client_id</code>
3726 </td>
3727 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">24</td>
3728 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3729 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3730 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3731 </td>
3732 </tr>
3733 <tr>
3734 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3735 <code>error</code>
3736 </td>
3737 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">30</td>
3738 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer</td>
3739 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3740 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3741 </td>
3742 </tr>
3743 <tr>
3744 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3745 <code>error_description</code>
3746 </td>
3747 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">31</td>
3748 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3749 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3750 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3751 </td>
3752 </tr>
3753 <tr>
3754 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3755 <code>error_uri</code>
3756 </td>
3757 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">32</td>
3758 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3759 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3760 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3761 </td>
3762 </tr>
3763 <tr>
3764 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3765 <code>token_type_hint</code>
3766 </td>
3767 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">33</td>
3768 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3769 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3770 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3771 </td>
3772 </tr>
3773 <tr>
3774 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3775 <code>token_type</code>
3776 </td>
3777 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">34</td>
3778 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer</td>
3779 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3780 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3781 </td>
3782 </tr>
3783 <tr>
3784 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3785 <code>username</code>
3786 </td>
3787 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">35</td>
3788 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">text string</td>
3789 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3790 <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span>
3791 </td>
3792 </tr>
3793 <tr>
3794 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3795 <code>ace_profile</code>
3796 </td>
3797 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">38</td>
3798 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">integer</td>
3799 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
3800 </tr>
3801 <tr>
3802 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">
3803 <code>cnonce</code>
3804 </td>
3805 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">39</td>
3806 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">byte string</td>
3807 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
3808 </tr>
3809 <tr>
3810 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">exi</td>
3811 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">40</td>
3812 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">unsigned integer</td>
3813 <td class="text-left" rowspan="1" colspan="1">RFC 9200</td>
3814 </tr>
3815 </tbody>
3816 </table>
3817 </div>
3818 </section>
3819 </div>
3820 </section>
3821 </div>
3822 <div id="accessToken">
3823 <section id="section-5.10">
3824 <h3 id="name-the-access-token">
3825 <a href="#section-5.10" class="section-number selfRef">5.10. </a><a href="#name-the-access-token" class="section-name selfRef">The Access Token</a>
3826 </h3>
3827 <p id="section-5.10-1">In this framework, the use of CBOR Web Token (CWT) as
3828 specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span> is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>.<a href="#section-5.10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3829 <p id="section-5.10-2">In order to facilitate offline processing of access tokens,
3830 this document uses the <code>cnf</code> claim from <span>[<a href="#RFC8747" class="xref">RFC8747</a>]</span>
3831 and the <code>scope</code> claim from <span>[<a href="#RFC8693" class="xref">RFC8693</a>]</span> for
3832 JWT- and CWT-encoded tokens. In addition to string encoding specified for
3833 the <code>scope</code> claim, a binary encoding <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be used. The syntax of such an
3834 encoding is explicitly not specified here and left to profiles or
3835 applications, specifically note that a binary encoded scope does not
3836 necessarily use the space character '0x20' to delimit scope-tokens.<a href="#section-5.10-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3837 <p id="section-5.10-3">If the AS needs to convey a hint to the RS about which profile it
3838 should use to communicate with the client, the AS <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> include an
3839 <code>ace_profile</code> claim in the access token, with the same syntax and semantics
3840 as defined in <a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.3</a>.<a href="#section-5.10-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3841 <p id="section-5.10-4">If the client submitted a <code>cnonce</code> parameter in the access token
3842 request (<a href="#cnonceParamToken" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.4</a>), the AS
3843 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include the value of
3844 this parameter in the <code>cnonce</code> claim specified here. The <code>cnonce</code> claim
3845 uses binary encoding.<a href="#section-5.10-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3846 <div id="tokenAuthInfoEndpoint">
3847 <section id="section-5.10.1">
3848 <h4 id="name-the-authorization-informati">
3849 <a href="#section-5.10.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.10.1. </a><a href="#name-the-authorization-informati" class="section-name selfRef">The Authorization Information Endpoint</a>
3850 </h4>
3851 <p id="section-5.10.1-1">The access token, containing authorization information and information
3852 about the proof-of-possession method used by the client, needs to be
3853 transported to the RS so that the RS can authenticate and authorize the
3854 client request.<a href="#section-5.10.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3855 <p id="section-5.10.1-2">This section defines a method for transporting the access token to the RS
3856 using a RESTful protocol, such as CoAP. Profiles of this framework <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> define
3857 other methods for token transport.<a href="#section-5.10.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3858 <p id="section-5.10.1-3">The method consists of an authz-info endpoint, implemented by the
3859 RS. A client using this method <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> make a POST request to the authz-info
3860 endpoint at the RS with the access token in the payload. The CoAP
3861 Content-Format or HTTP media type <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reflect the format of the token,
3862 e.g., "application/cwt", for CBOR Web Tokens; if no Content-Format or media
3863 type is defined for the token format, "application/octet-stream" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
3864 used.<a href="#section-5.10.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3865 <p id="section-5.10.1-4">The RS receiving the token <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify the validity of the
3866 token. If the
3867 token is valid, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> respond to the POST request with a
3868 response code equivalent to CoAP code 2.01 (Created).
3869 <a href="#verifyToken" class="xref">Section 5.10.1.1</a> outlines how an RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> proceed to verify the
3870 validity of an access token.<a href="#section-5.10.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3871 <p id="section-5.10.1-5">The RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be prepared to store at least one access token for future
3872 use. This is a difference as to how access tokens are handled in OAuth 2.0,
3873 where the access token is typically sent along with each request and
3874 therefore not stored at the RS.<a href="#section-5.10.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3875 <p id="section-5.10.1-6">When using this framework, it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> that an RS stores
3876 only one token per proof-of-possession key. This means that an additional token
3877 linked to the same key will supersede any existing token at the RS by replacing
3878 the corresponding authorization information. The reason is that
3879 this greatly simplifies (constrained) implementations, with respect to
3880 required storage and resolving a request to the applicable token. The use of
3881 multiple access tokens for a single client increases the strain on the
3882 resource server, as it must consider every access token and calculate the
3883 actual permissions of the client. Also, tokens may contradict each other,
3884 which may lead the server to enforce wrong permissions. If one of the access
3885 tokens expires earlier than others, the resulting permissions may offer
3886 insufficient protection.<a href="#section-5.10.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3887 <p id="section-5.10.1-7">If the payload sent to the authz-info endpoint does not parse
3888 to a token, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> respond with a response code equivalent to the CoAP
3889 code 4.00 (Bad Request).<a href="#section-5.10.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3890 <p id="section-5.10.1-8">The RS <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> make an introspection request to validate the token before
3891 responding to the POST request to the authz-info endpoint, e.g., if the
3892 token is an opaque reference. Some transport protocols may provide a way to
3893 indicate that the RS is busy and the client should retry after an interval;
3894 this type of status update would be appropriate while the RS is waiting for
3895 an introspection response.<a href="#section-5.10.1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3896 <p id="section-5.10.1-9">Profiles <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify whether the authz-info endpoint is protected,
3897 including whether error responses from this endpoint are protected. Note that
3898 since the token contains information that allows the client and the RS to
3899 establish a security context in the first place, mutual authentication may
3900 not be possible at this point.<a href="#section-5.10.1-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3901 <p id="section-5.10.1-10">The default name of this endpoint in a url-path is '/authz-info';
3902 however, implementations are not required to use this name and can define
3903 their own instead.<a href="#section-5.10.1-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3904 <div id="verifyToken">
3905 <section id="section-5.10.1.1">
3906 <h5 id="name-verifying-an-access-token">
3907 <a href="#section-5.10.1.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.10.1.1. </a><a href="#name-verifying-an-access-token" class="section-name selfRef">Verifying an Access Token</a>
3908 </h5>
3909 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-1">When an RS receives an access token, it <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify it before storing
3910 it. The details of token verification depends on various aspects, including
3911 the token encoding, the type of token, the security protection applied to
3912 the token, and the claims. The token encoding matters since the security
3913 protection differs between the token encodings. For example, a CWT token
3914 uses COSE, while a JWT token uses JSON Object Signing and Encryption (JOSE).
3915 The type of token also has an
3916 influence on the verification procedure since tokens may be self-contained,
3917 whereby token verification may happen locally at the RS, while a
3918 reference token requires further interaction with the authorization
3919 server, for example, using token introspection, to obtain the claims
3920 associated with the token reference. Self-contained tokens <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> at
3921 least be integrity protected, but they <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> also be encrypted.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3922 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-2">For self-contained tokens, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> process the security
3923 protection of the token first, as specified by the respective token format.
3924 For CWT, the description can be found in <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>; for
3925 JWT, the relevant specification is <span>[<a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">RFC7519</a>]</span>.
3926 This <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
3927 include a verification that security protection (and thus the token) was
3928 generated by an AS that has the right to issue access tokens for this
3929 RS.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3930 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-3">In case the token is communicated by reference, the RS needs to obtain
3931 the claims first. When the RS uses token introspection, the relevant
3932 specification is <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span> with CoAP transport specified in
3933 <a href="#introspectionEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.9</a>.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3934 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-4">Errors may happen during this initial processing stage:<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3935 <ul class="normal">
3936 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.1.1-5.1">If the verification of the security wrapper fails, or the token
3937 was issued by an AS that does not have the right to issue tokens
3938 for the receiving RS, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the token
3939 and, if this was an interaction with authz-info, return an error
3940 message with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01
3941 (Unauthorized).<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3942 </li>
3943 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.1.1-5.2">If the claims cannot be obtained, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the token and,
3944 in case of an interaction via the authz-info endpoint, return an error
3945 message with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad
3946 Request).<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3947 </li>
3948 </ul>
3949 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-6">Next, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify claims, if present, contained in the
3950 access
3951 token. Errors are returned when claim checks fail, in the order of
3952 priority of this list:<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3953 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-5.10.1.1-7">
3954 <dt id="section-5.10.1.1-7.1"><code>iss</code></dt>
3955 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.10.1.1-7.2">The <code>iss</code> claim (if present) must identify the AS that
3956 has produced the security protection for the access token. If that is
3957 not the case, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the token. If this was an
3958 interaction with authz-info, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also respond with a
3959 response code equivalent
3960 to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized).<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3961 </dd>
3962 <dd class="break"></dd>
3963 <dt id="section-5.10.1.1-7.3"><code>exp</code></dt>
3964 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.10.1.1-7.4">The expiration date must be in the future.
3965 If that is not the case, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the token. If
3966 this was an
3967 interaction with authz-info, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also respond with a
3968 response code
3969 equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01 (Unauthorized). Note that the RS has to
3970 terminate access rights to the protected resources at the time when the
3971 tokens expire.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-7.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3972 </dd>
3973 <dd class="break"></dd>
3974 <dt id="section-5.10.1.1-7.5"><code>aud</code></dt>
3975 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.10.1.1-7.6">The <code>aud</code> claim must refer to an audience that
3976 the RS identifies with. If that is not the case, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
3977 discard the
3978 token. If this was an interaction with authz-info, the RS
3979 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also
3980 respond with a response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.03
3981 (Forbidden).<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-7.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3982 </dd>
3983 <dd class="break"></dd>
3984 <dt id="section-5.10.1.1-7.7"><code>scope</code></dt>
3985 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5.10.1.1-7.8">The RS must recognize value of the <code>scope</code> claim.
3986 If that is not the case, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the token. If
3987 this was an
3988 interaction with authz-info, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also respond with a
3989 response code
3990 equivalent to the CoAP code 4.00 (Bad Request). The RS <span class="bcp14">MAY</span>
3991 provide
3992 additional information in the error response to clarify what
3993 went wrong.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-7.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3994 </dd>
3995 <dd class="break"></dd>
3996 </dl>
3997 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-8">Additional processing may be needed for other claims in a way
3998 specific to a profile or the underlying application.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3999 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-9">Note that the <code>sub</code> (Subject) claim cannot always be verified when
4000 the token is submitted to the RS since the client may not have
4001 authenticated yet. Also note that a counter for the <code>exi</code> (expires in) claim
4002 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be initialized when the RS first verifies this token.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4003 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-10">Also note that profiles of this framework may define access token
4004 transport mechanisms that do not allow for error responses. Therefore, the
4005 error messages specified here only apply if the token was sent to the
4006 authz-info endpoint.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4007 <p id="section-5.10.1.1-11">When sending error responses, the RS <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> use the error
4008 codes from <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6750#section-3.1" class="relref">Section 3.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC6750" class="xref">RFC6750</a>]</span> to
4009 provide additional details to the client.<a href="#section-5.10.1.1-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4010 </section>
4011 </div>
4012 <div id="protAuthzInfo">
4013 <section id="section-5.10.1.2">
4014 <h5 id="name-protecting-the-authorizatio">
4015 <a href="#section-5.10.1.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.10.1.2. </a><a href="#name-protecting-the-authorizatio" class="section-name selfRef">Protecting the Authorization Information Endpoint</a>
4016 </h5>
4017 <p id="section-5.10.1.2-1">As this framework can be used in RESTful environments, it is important
4018 to make sure that attackers cannot perform unauthorized requests on the
4019 authz-info endpoints, other than submitting access tokens.<a href="#section-5.10.1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4020 <p id="section-5.10.1.2-2">Specifically, it <span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span> be possible to perform GET,
4021 DELETE, or PUT on the authz-info endpoint.<a href="#section-5.10.1.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4022 <p id="section-5.10.1.2-3">The RS <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> implement rate-limiting measures to mitigate
4023 attacks aiming
4024 to overload the processing capacity of the RS by repeatedly submitting
4025 tokens. For CoAP-based communication, the RS could use the mechanisms from
4026 <span>[<a href="#RFC8516" class="xref">RFC8516</a>]</span> to indicate that it is overloaded.<a href="#section-5.10.1.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4027 </section>
4028 </div>
4029 </section>
4030 </div>
4031 <div id="requestC2RS">
4032 <section id="section-5.10.2">
4033 <h4 id="name-client-requests-to-the-rs">
4034 <a href="#section-5.10.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.10.2. </a><a href="#name-client-requests-to-the-rs" class="section-name selfRef">Client Requests to the RS</a>
4035 </h4>
4036 <p id="section-5.10.2-1">Before sending a request to an RS, the client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify that the keys
4037 used to protect this communication are still valid. See <a href="#keyExpiration" class="xref">Section 5.10.4</a> for details on how the client determines the
4038 validity of the keys used.<a href="#section-5.10.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4039 <p id="section-5.10.2-2">If an RS receives a request from a client and the target resource
4040 requires authorization, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> first verify that it has an access token
4041 that authorizes this request and that the client has performed the
4042 proof-of-possession binding for that token to the request.<a href="#section-5.10.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4043 <p id="section-5.10.2-3">The response code <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be 4.01 (Unauthorized) in case the client has
4044 not performed the proof of possession or if the RS has no valid access token for
4045 the client. If the RS has an access token for the client but the token does not
4046 authorize access for the resource that was requested, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject the
4047 request with a 4.03 (Forbidden). If the RS has an access token for the client but
4048 it does not cover the action that was requested on the resource, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
4049 reject the request with a 4.05 (Method Not Allowed).<a href="#section-5.10.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4050 <p id="section-5.10.2-4">Note: The use of the response codes 4.03 and 4.05 is intended to prevent
4051 infinite loops where a client optimistically tries to access a
4052 requested resource with any access token received from AS. As malicious
4053 clients could pretend to be the C to determine the C's privileges, these detailed
4054 response codes must be used only when a certain level of security is
4055 already available, which can be achieved only when the client is
4056 authenticated.<a href="#section-5.10.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4057 <p id="section-5.10.2-5">Note: The RS <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> use introspection for timely validation of an
4058 access token at the time when a request is presented.<a href="#section-5.10.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4059 <p id="section-5.10.2-6">Note: Matching the claims of the access token (e.g., <code>scope</code>) to a specific
4060 request is application specific.<a href="#section-5.10.2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4061 <p id="section-5.10.2-7">If the request matches a valid token and the client has performed the
4062 proof of possession for that token, the RS continues to process the request
4063 as specified by the underlying application.<a href="#section-5.10.2-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4064 </section>
4065 </div>
4066 <div id="tokenExpiration">
4067 <section id="section-5.10.3">
4068 <h4 id="name-token-expiration">
4069 <a href="#section-5.10.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.10.3. </a><a href="#name-token-expiration" class="section-name selfRef">Token Expiration</a>
4070 </h4>
4071 <p id="section-5.10.3-1">Depending on the capabilities of the RS, there are various ways in
4072 which it can verify the expiration of a received access token. The following is
4073 a list of the possibilities including what functionality they require of the
4074 RS.<a href="#section-5.10.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4075 <ul class="normal">
4076 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.1">The token is a CWT and includes an <code>exp</code> claim and possibly the
4077 <code>nbf</code> claim. The RS verifies these by comparing them to values from
4078 its internal clock, as defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">RFC7519</a>]</span>. In
4079 this case, the RS's internal clock must reflect the current date and time or
4080 at least be synchronized with the AS's clock. How this clock
4081 synchronization would be performed is out of scope for this
4082 specification.<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4083 </li>
4084 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.2">The RS verifies the validity of the token by performing an
4085 introspection request, as specified in <a href="#introspectionEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.9</a>. This requires the RS to have a
4086 reliable network connection to the AS and to be able to handle two
4087 secure sessions in parallel (C to RS and RS to AS).<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4088 </li>
4089 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.3">In order to support token expiration for devices that have no reliable
4090 way of synchronizing their internal clocks, this specification defines the
4091 following approach: The claim <code>exi</code> (expires in) can be used to provide
4092 the RS with the lifetime of the token in seconds from the time the RS first
4093 receives the token. This mechanism only works for self-contained tokens,
4094 i.e., CWTs and JWTs. For CWTs, this parameter is encoded as an unsigned integer,
4095 while JWTs encode this as JSON number.<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4096 </li>
4097 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.4">
4098 <p id="section-5.10.3-2.4.1"> Processing this claim requires that the RS does the following:<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4099 <ul class="normal">
4100 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.4.2.1">For each token the RS receives that contains an <code>exi</code> claim,
4101 keep track of the time it received that token and revisit that list
4102 regularly to expunge expired tokens.<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.4.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4103 </li>
4104 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2">
4105 <p id="section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2.1">Keep track of the identifiers of tokens containing the <code>exi</code>
4106 claim that have expired (in order to avoid accepting them again).
4107 In order to avoid an unbounded memory usage growth, this <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
4108 implemented in the following way when the <code>exi</code> claim is used:<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4109 <ul class="normal">
4110 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2.2.1">When creating the token, the AS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> add a <code>cti</code> claim (or <code>jti</code> for JWTs) to the access token. The value of this claim
4111 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be created as the binary representation of the concatenation
4112 of the identifier of the RS with a sequence number counting the
4113 tokens containing an <code>exi</code> claim, issued by this AS for the
4114 RS.<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4115 </li>
4116 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2.2.2">The RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> store the highest sequence number of an expired
4117 token containing the <code>exi</code> claim that it has seen and treat
4118 tokens with lower sequence numbers as expired. Note that
4119 this could lead to discarding valid tokens with lower sequence numbers
4120 if the AS where to issue tokens of different validity time for the same
4121 RS. The assumption is that typically tokens in such a scenario would
4122 all have the same validity time.<a href="#section-5.10.3-2.4.2.2.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4123 </li>
4124 </ul>
4125 </li>
4126 </ul>
4127 </li>
4128 </ul>
4129 <p id="section-5.10.3-3">If a token that authorizes a long-running request, such as a CoAP
4130 Observe <span>[<a href="#RFC7641" class="xref">RFC7641</a>]</span>, expires, the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> send an error
4131 response with the response code equivalent to the CoAP code 4.01
4132 (Unauthorized) to the client and then terminate processing the long-running
4133 request.<a href="#section-5.10.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4134 </section>
4135 </div>
4136 <div id="keyExpiration">
4137 <section id="section-5.10.4">
4138 <h4 id="name-key-expiration">
4139 <a href="#section-5.10.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.10.4. </a><a href="#name-key-expiration" class="section-name selfRef">Key Expiration</a>
4140 </h4>
4141 <p id="section-5.10.4-1">The AS provides the client with key material that the RS uses. This can
4142 either be a common symmetric PoP key or an asymmetric key used by the RS to
4143 authenticate towards the client. Since there is currently no expiration
4144 metadata associated to those keys, the client has no way of knowing if these
4145 keys are still valid. This may lead to situations where the client sends
4146 requests containing sensitive information to the RS using a key that is
4147 expired and possibly in the hands of an attacker or where the client accepts responses from
4148 the RS that are not properly protected and could possibly have been forged by
4149 an attacker.<a href="#section-5.10.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4150 <p id="section-5.10.4-2">In order to prevent this, the client must assume that those keys are
4151 only valid as long as the related access token is. Since the access token
4152 is opaque to the client, one of the following methods <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be used to
4153 inform the client about the validity of an access token:<a href="#section-5.10.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4154 <ul class="normal">
4155 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.4-3.1">The client knows a default validity time for all tokens it is
4156 using (i.e., how long a token is valid after being issued). This
4157 information could be provisioned to the client when it is registered at the
4158 AS or published by the AS in a way that the client can query.<a href="#section-5.10.4-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4159 </li>
4160 <li class="normal" id="section-5.10.4-3.2">The AS informs the client about the token validity using the
4161 <code>expires_in</code> parameter in the Access Information.<a href="#section-5.10.4-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4162 </li>
4163 </ul>
4164 <p id="section-5.10.4-4">A client that is not able to obtain information about the expiration of a
4165 token <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> use this token.<a href="#section-5.10.4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4166 </section>
4167 </div>
4168 </section>
4169 </div>
4170 </section>
4171 </div>
4172 <div id="security">
4173 <section id="section-6">
4174 <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
4175 <a href="#section-6" class="section-number selfRef">6. </a><a href="#name-security-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Security Considerations</a>
4176 </h2>
4177 <p id="section-6-1">Security considerations applicable to authentication and authorization
4178 in RESTful environments provided in OAuth 2.0 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span> apply
4179 to this work. Furthermore, <span>[<a href="#RFC6819" class="xref">RFC6819</a>]</span>
4180 provides additional security considerations for OAuth, which apply to IoT
4181 deployments as well. If the introspection endpoint is used,
4182 the security considerations from <span>[<a href="#RFC7662" class="xref">RFC7662</a>]</span> also apply.<a href="#section-6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4183 <p id="section-6-2">The following subsections address issues specific to this document and
4184 its use in constrained environments.<a href="#section-6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4185 <div id="tokenProtection">
4186 <section id="section-6.1">
4187 <h3 id="name-protecting-tokens">
4188 <a href="#section-6.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1. </a><a href="#name-protecting-tokens" class="section-name selfRef">Protecting Tokens</a>
4189 </h3>
4190 <p id="section-6.1-1">A large range of threats can be mitigated by protecting the contents
4191 of the access token by using a digital signature or a keyed message
4192 digest, e.g., a Message Authentication Code (MAC) or an Authenticated
4193 Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD)
4194 algorithm. Consequently, the token integrity protection <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
4195 applied to prevent the token from being modified, particularly since it contains
4196 a reference to the symmetric key or the asymmetric key used for
4197 proof of possession. If the access token contains the symmetric key,
4198 this symmetric key <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encrypted by the authorization server so
4199 that only the resource server can decrypt it. Note that using an AEAD
4200 algorithm is preferable over using a MAC unless the token needs to be
4201 publicly readable.<a href="#section-6.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4202 <p id="section-6.1-2">If the token is intended for multiple recipients (i.e., an audience
4203 that is a group), integrity protection of the token with a symmetric key,
4204 shared between the AS and the recipients, is not sufficient, since any of
4205 the recipients could modify the token undetected by the other recipients.
4206 Therefore, a token with a multirecipient audience <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be protected
4207 with an asymmetric signature.<a href="#section-6.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4208 <p id="section-6.1-3">It is important for the authorization server to include the identity
4209 of the intended recipient (the audience), typically a single resource
4210 server (or a list of resource servers), in the token. The same
4211 shared secret <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be used as a proof-of-possession key with
4212 multiple resource servers, since the benefit from using the proof-of-possession
4213 concept is then significantly reduced.<a href="#section-6.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4214 <p id="section-6.1-4">If clients are capable of doing so, they should frequently request
4215 fresh access tokens, as this allows the AS to keep the lifetime of the
4216 tokens short. This allows the AS to use shorter proof-of-possession key
4217 sizes, which translate to a performance benefit for the client and for
4218 the resource server. Shorter keys also lead to shorter messages
4219 (particularly with asymmetric keying material).<a href="#section-6.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4220 <p id="section-6.1-5">When authorization servers bind symmetric keys to access tokens,
4221 they <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> scope these access tokens to a specific permission.<a href="#section-6.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4222 <p id="section-6.1-6">In certain situations, it may be necessary to revoke an access
4223 token that is still valid. Client-initiated revocation is specified
4224 in <span>[<a href="#RFC7009" class="xref">RFC7009</a>]</span> for OAuth 2.0. Other revocation
4225 mechanisms
4226 are currently not specified, as the underlying assumption in OAuth
4227 is that access tokens are issued with a relatively short lifetime.
4228 This may not hold true for disconnected constrained devices needing
4229 access tokens with relatively long lifetimes and would therefore
4230 necessitate further standardization work that is out of scope for
4231 this document.<a href="#section-6.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4232 </section>
4233 </div>
4234 <div id="commSec">
4235 <section id="section-6.2">
4236 <h3 id="name-communication-security">
4237 <a href="#section-6.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.2. </a><a href="#name-communication-security" class="section-name selfRef">Communication Security</a>
4238 </h3>
4239 <p id="section-6.2-1">Communication with the authorization server <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> use confidentiality
4240 protection. This step is extremely important since the client or the
4241 RS may obtain the proof-of-possession key from the authorization server
4242 for use with a specific access token. Not using confidentiality
4243 protection exposes this secret (and the access token) to an eavesdropper,
4244 thereby completely negating proof-of-possession security.
4245 The requirements for communication security of profiles are specified
4246 in <a href="#oauthProfile" class="xref">Section 5</a>.<a href="#section-6.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4247 <p id="section-6.2-2">Additional protection for the access token can be applied by
4248 encrypting it, for example, encryption of CWTs is specified in
4249 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8392#section-7.1" class="relref">Section 7.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>. Such additional
4250 protection can be necessary
4251 if the token is later transferred over an insecure connection
4252 (e.g., when it is sent to the authz-info endpoint).<a href="#section-6.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4253 <p id="section-6.2-3">Care must be taken by developers to prevent leakage of the PoP
4254 credentials (i.e., the private key or the symmetric key). An
4255 adversary in possession of the PoP credentials bound to the access
4256 token will be able to impersonate the client. Be aware that this is a
4257 real risk with many constrained environments, since adversaries may
4258 get physical access to the devices and can therefore use physical
4259 extraction techniques to gain access to memory contents. This risk can
4260 be mitigated to some extent by making sure that keys are refreshed
4261 frequently, by using software isolation techniques, and by using hardware
4262 security.<a href="#section-6.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4263 </section>
4264 </div>
4265 <div id="keys">
4266 <section id="section-6.3">
4267 <h3 id="name-long-term-credentials">
4268 <a href="#section-6.3" class="section-number selfRef">6.3. </a><a href="#name-long-term-credentials" class="section-name selfRef">Long-Term Credentials</a>
4269 </h3>
4270 <p id="section-6.3-1">Both the clients and RSs have long-term credentials that are used to
4271 secure communications and authenticate to the AS. These credentials
4272 need to be protected against unauthorized access. In constrained
4273 devices deployed in publicly accessible places, such protection can
4274 be difficult to achieve without specialized hardware (e.g., secure
4275 key storage memory).<a href="#section-6.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4276 <p id="section-6.3-2">If credentials are lost or compromised, the operator of the affected
4277 devices needs to have procedures to invalidate any access these
4278 credentials give and needs to revoke tokens linked to such credentials. The
4279 loss of a credential linked to a specific device <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> lead to a
4280 compromise of other credentials not linked to that device; therefore,
4281 secret keys used for authentication <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be shared between more than
4282 two parties.<a href="#section-6.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4283 <p id="section-6.3-3">Operators of the clients or RSs <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> have procedures in place to
4284 replace credentials that are suspected to have been compromised or that
4285 have been lost.<a href="#section-6.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4286 <p id="section-6.3-4">Operators also <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> have procedures for decommissioning devices
4287 that include securely erasing credentials and other security-critical
4288 material in the devices being decommissioned.<a href="#section-6.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4289 </section>
4290 </div>
4291 <div id="unprotected-as-information">
4292 <section id="section-6.4">
4293 <h3 id="name-unprotected-as-request-crea">
4294 <a href="#section-6.4" class="section-number selfRef">6.4. </a><a href="#name-unprotected-as-request-crea" class="section-name selfRef">Unprotected AS Request Creation Hints</a>
4295 </h3>
4296 <p id="section-6.4-1">Initially, no secure channel exists to protect the communication
4297 between the C and RS. Thus, the C cannot determine if the AS Request
4298 Creation Hints contained in an unprotected response from the RS to an
4299 unauthorized request (see <a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a>) are
4300 authentic. Therefore, the C
4301 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> determine if an AS is authorized to provide
4302 access
4303 tokens for a certain RS. How this determination is implemented is out
4304 of scope for this document and left to the applications.<a href="#section-6.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4305 </section>
4306 </div>
4307 <div id="minimalCommSecReq">
4308 <section id="section-6.5">
4309 <h3 id="name-minimal-security-requiremen">
4310 <a href="#section-6.5" class="section-number selfRef">6.5. </a><a href="#name-minimal-security-requiremen" class="section-name selfRef">Minimal Security Requirements for Communication</a>
4311 </h3>
4312 <p id="section-6.5-1">This section summarizes the minimal requirements for the
4313 communication security of the different protocol interactions.<a href="#section-6.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4314 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-6.5-2">
4315 <dt id="section-6.5-2.1">C-AS</dt>
4316 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-2.2">All communication between the client and the
4317 authorization server <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encrypted and integrity and
4318 replay
4319 protected. Furthermore, responses from the AS to the client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be
4320 bound to the client's request to avoid attacks where the attacker
4321 swaps the intended response for an older one valid for a previous
4322 request. This requires that the client and the authorization server
4323 have previously exchanged either a shared secret or their public
4324 keys in order to negotiate a secure communication. Furthermore, the
4325 client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be able to determine whether an AS has the authority
4326 to issue access tokens for a certain RS. This can, for example, be
4327 done through preconfigured lists or through an online lookup
4328 mechanism that in turn also must be secured.<a href="#section-6.5-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4329 </dd>
4330 <dd class="break"></dd>
4331 <dt id="section-6.5-2.3">RS-AS</dt>
4332 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-2.4">The communication between the resource
4333 server and the authorization server via the introspection endpoint
4334 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be encrypted and integrity and replay protected. Furthermore,
4335 responses from the AS to the RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be bound to the RS's request.
4336 This requires that the RS and the authorization server
4337 have previously exchanged either a shared secret or their public
4338 keys in order to negotiate a secure communication. Furthermore, the
4339 RS <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be able to determine whether an AS has the authority
4340 to issue access tokens itself. This is usually configured out of
4341 band but could also be performed through an online lookup mechanism,
4342 provided that it is also secured in the same way.<a href="#section-6.5-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4343 </dd>
4344 <dd class="break"></dd>
4345 <dt id="section-6.5-2.5">C-RS</dt>
4346 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-2.6">The initial communication between the client
4347 and the resource server cannot be secured in general, since
4348 the RS is not in possession of on access token for that client,
4349 which would carry the necessary parameters. If both parties
4350 support DTLS without client authentication, it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to use
4351 this mechanism for protecting the initial communication.
4352 After the client has successfully transmitted the access token to the
4353 RS, a secure communication protocol <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be established between the
4354 client and RS for the actual resource request. This protocol <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
4355 provide confidentiality, integrity, and replay protection, as well as a
4356 binding between requests and responses. This requires that the
4357 client learned either the RS's public key or received a symmetric
4358 proof-of-possession key bound to the access token from the AS.
4359 The RS must have learned either the client's public key, a shared
4360 symmetric key from the claims in the token, or an introspection
4361 request. Since ACE does not provide profile negotiation between the
4362 C and RS, the client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> have learned what profile the RS
4363 supports (e.g., from the AS or preconfigured) and initiated the
4364 communication accordingly.<a href="#section-6.5-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4365 </dd>
4366 <dd class="break"></dd>
4367 </dl>
4368 </section>
4369 </div>
4370 <div id="nonce">
4371 <section id="section-6.6">
4372 <h3 id="name-token-freshness-and-expirat">
4373 <a href="#section-6.6" class="section-number selfRef">6.6. </a><a href="#name-token-freshness-and-expirat" class="section-name selfRef">Token Freshness and Expiration</a>
4374 </h3>
4375 <p id="section-6.6-1">An RS that is offline faces the problem of clock drift. Since it
4376 cannot synchronize its clock with the AS, it may be tricked
4377 into accepting old access tokens that are no longer valid or have been
4378 compromised. In order to prevent this, an RS may use the nonce-based
4379 mechanism (<code>cnonce</code>) defined in <a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a> to ensure
4380 freshness of an Access Token subsequently presented to this RS.<a href="#section-6.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4381 <p id="section-6.6-2">Another problem with clock drift is that evaluating the
4382 standard token expiration claim <code>exp</code> can give unpredictable results.<a href="#section-6.6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4383 <p id="section-6.6-3">Acceptable ranges of clock drift are highly dependent on the
4384 concrete application. Important factors are how long access tokens
4385 are valid and how critical timely expiration of the access token is.<a href="#section-6.6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4386 <p id="section-6.6-4">The expiration mechanism implemented by the <code>exi</code> claim, based on
4387 the first time the RS sees the token, was defined to provide a more
4388 predictable alternative. The <code>exi</code> approach has some drawbacks that
4389 need to be considered:<a href="#section-6.6-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4390 <ul class="normal">
4391 <li class="normal" id="section-6.6-5.1">A malicious client may hold back tokens with the <code>exi</code> claim in
4392 order to prolong their lifespan.<a href="#section-6.6-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4393 </li>
4394 <li class="normal" id="section-6.6-5.2">
4395 If an RS loses state (e.g., due to an unscheduled reboot), it
4396 may lose the current values of counters tracking the <code>exi</code> claims of
4397 tokens it is storing.<a href="#section-6.6-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4398 </li>
4399 </ul>
4400 <p id="section-6.6-6">
4401 The first drawback is inherent to the deployment scenario and the <code>exi</code>
4402 solution. It can therefore not be mitigated without requiring the
4403 RS be online at times. The second drawback can be mitigated by
4404 regularly storing the value of <code>exi</code> counters to persistent memory.<a href="#section-6.6-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4405 </section>
4406 </div>
4407 <div id="mixnmatch">
4408 <section id="section-6.7">
4409 <h3 id="name-combining-profiles">
4410 <a href="#section-6.7" class="section-number selfRef">6.7. </a><a href="#name-combining-profiles" class="section-name selfRef">Combining Profiles</a>
4411 </h3>
4412 <p id="section-6.7-1">There may be use cases where different transport and security
4413 protocols are allowed for the different interactions, and, if that is
4414 not explicitly covered by an existing profile, it corresponds to
4415 combining profiles into a new one. For example, a new profile could
4416 specify that a previously defined MQTT-TLS profile is used between
4417 the client and the RS in combination with a previously defined
4418 CoAP-DTLS profile for interactions between the client and the AS. The
4419 new profile that combines existing profiles <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> specify how the
4420 existing profiles' security requirements remain satisfied. Therefore, any profile
4421 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> clearly specify its security requirements and <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
4422 document if its security depends on the combination of various
4423 protocol interactions.<a href="#section-6.7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4424 </section>
4425 </div>
4426 <div id="infoLeak">
4427 <section id="section-6.8">
4428 <h3 id="name-unprotected-information">
4429 <a href="#section-6.8" class="section-number selfRef">6.8. </a><a href="#name-unprotected-information" class="section-name selfRef">Unprotected Information</a>
4430 </h3>
4431 <p id="section-6.8-1">Communication with the authz-info endpoint, as well as the
4432 various error responses defined in this framework, potentially
4433 includes sending information over an unprotected channel.
4434 These messages may leak information to an adversary or may be
4435 manipulated by active attackers to induce incorrect behavior. For
4436 example, error responses for requests to the authorization information
4437 endpoint can reveal information about an otherwise opaque access token
4438 to an adversary who has intercepted this token.<a href="#section-6.8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4439 <p id="section-6.8-2">As far as error messages are concerned, this framework is written
4440 under the assumption that, in general, the benefits of detailed error
4441 messages outweigh the risk due to information leakage. For particular
4442 use cases where this assessment does not apply, detailed error
4443 messages can be replaced by more generic ones.<a href="#section-6.8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4444 <p id="section-6.8-3">In some scenarios, it may be possible to protect the
4445 communication with the authz-info endpoint (e.g., through
4446 DTLS with only server-side authentication). In cases where
4447 this is not possible, it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to use encrypted
4448 CWTs or tokens that are opaque references and need to be subjected to
4449 introspection by the RS.<a href="#section-6.8-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4450 <p id="section-6.8-4">If the initial Unauthorized Resource Request message (see <a href="#rreq" class="xref">Section 5.2</a>) is used, the client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> make sure that it is
4451 not sending sensitive content in this request. While GET and DELETE
4452 requests only reveal the target URI of the resource, POST and PUT
4453 requests would reveal the whole payload of the intended operation.<a href="#section-6.8-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4454 <p id="section-6.8-5">Since the client is not authenticated at the point when
4455 it is submitting an access token to the authz-info endpoint,
4456 attackers may be pretending to be a client and trying to trick
4457 an RS to use an obsolete profile that in turn specifies a
4458 vulnerable security mechanism via the authz-info endpoint. Such an
4459 attack would require a valid access token containing an <code>ace_profile</code>
4460 claim requesting the use of said obsolete profile. Resource owners
4461 should update the configuration of their RSs to prevent them from
4462 using such obsolete profiles.<a href="#section-6.8-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4463 </section>
4464 </div>
4465 <div id="audience">
4466 <section id="section-6.9">
4467 <h3 id="name-identifying-audiences">
4468 <a href="#section-6.9" class="section-number selfRef">6.9. </a><a href="#name-identifying-audiences" class="section-name selfRef">Identifying Audiences</a>
4469 </h3>
4470 <p id="section-6.9-1">The <code>aud</code> claim, as defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC7519" class="xref">RFC7519</a>]</span>,
4471 and the equivalent <code>audience</code> parameter from
4472 <span>[<a href="#RFC8693" class="xref">RFC8693</a>]</span> are intentionally vague
4473 on how to match the audience value to a specific RS. This is intended
4474 to allow application-specific semantics to be used. This section
4475 attempts to give some general guidance for the use of audiences in
4476 constrained environments.<a href="#section-6.9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4477 <p id="section-6.9-2">URLs are not a good way of identifying mobile devices that can
4478 switch networks and thus be associated with new URLs. If the
4479 audience represents a single RS and asymmetric keys are used,
4480 the RS can be uniquely identified by a hash of its public key.
4481 If this approach is used, it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to apply the
4482 procedure from <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6920#section-3" class="relref">Section 3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6920" class="xref">RFC6920</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.9-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4483 <p id="section-6.9-3">If the audience addresses a group of resource servers, the mapping
4484 of a group identifier to an individual RS has to be provisioned to each RS
4485 before the group-audience is usable. Managing dynamic groups could be
4486 an issue if any RS is not always reachable when the groups' memberships
4487 change. Furthermore, issuing access tokens bound to symmetric
4488 proof-of-possession keys that apply to a group-audience is problematic,
4489 as an RS that is in possession of the access token can impersonate the
4490 client towards the other RSs that are part of the group. It is
4491 therefore <span class="bcp14">NOT RECOMMENDED</span> to issue access tokens bound
4492 to a group-audience and symmetric proof-of possession keys.<a href="#section-6.9-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4493 <p id="section-6.9-4">Even the client must be able to determine the correct values to put
4494 into the <code>audience</code> parameter in order to obtain a token for the
4495 intended RS. Errors in this process can lead to the client
4496 inadvertently obtaining a token for the wrong RS. The correct values
4497 for <code>audience</code> can either be provisioned to the client as part of its
4498 configuration or dynamically looked up by the client in some
4499 directory. In the latter case, the integrity and correctness of the
4500 directory data must be assured. Note that the <code>audience</code> hint
4501 provided by the RS as part of the AS Request Creation Hints (<a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a>) is not typically source authenticated and
4502 integrity protected and should therefore not be treated a trusted value.<a href="#section-6.9-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4503 </section>
4504 </div>
4505 <div id="introDos">
4506 <section id="section-6.10">
4507 <h3 id="name-denial-of-service-against-o">
4508 <a href="#section-6.10" class="section-number selfRef">6.10. </a><a href="#name-denial-of-service-against-o" class="section-name selfRef">Denial of Service Against or with Introspection</a>
4509 </h3>
4510 <p id="section-6.10-1">
4511 The optional introspection mechanism provided by OAuth and supported
4512 in the ACE framework allows for two types of attacks that need
4513 to be considered by implementers.<a href="#section-6.10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4514 <p id="section-6.10-2">First, an attacker could perform a denial-of-service attack against
4515 the introspection endpoint at the AS in order to prevent validation of
4516 access tokens. To maintain the security of the system, an RS that is
4517 configured to use introspection <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> allow access based on a token
4518 for which it couldn't reach the introspection endpoint.<a href="#section-6.10-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4519 <p id="section-6.10-3">Second, an attacker could use the fact that an RS performs
4520 introspection to perform a denial-of-service attack against that RS by
4521 repeatedly sending tokens to its authz-info endpoint that require an
4522 introspection call. The RS can mitigate such attacks by implementing rate
4523 limits on how many introspection requests they perform in a given time
4524 interval for a certain client IP address submitting tokens to
4525 /authz-info. When that limit has been reached, incoming requests from
4526 that address are rejected for a certain amount of time. A general rate
4527 limit on the introspection requests should also be considered in order to
4528 mitigate distributed attacks.<a href="#section-6.10-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4529 </section>
4530 </div>
4531 </section>
4532 </div>
4533 <div id="privacy">
4534 <section id="section-7">
4535 <h2 id="name-privacy-considerations">
4536 <a href="#section-7" class="section-number selfRef">7. </a><a href="#name-privacy-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Privacy Considerations</a>
4537 </h2>
4538 <p id="section-7-1">Implementers and users should be aware of the privacy implications
4539 of the different possible deployments of this framework.<a href="#section-7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4540 <p id="section-7-2">The AS is in a very central position and can potentially learn sensitive
4541 information about the clients requesting access tokens. If the client
4542 credentials grant is used, the AS can track what kind of access
4543 the client intends to perform. With other grants, this can be prevented
4544 by the resource owner. To do so, the resource owner needs to bind the
4545 grants it issues to anonymous, ephemeral credentials that do not allow
4546 the AS to link different grants and thus different access token requests
4547 by the same client.<a href="#section-7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4548 <p id="section-7-3">The claims contained in a token can reveal privacy-sensitive
4549 information about the client and the RS to any party having access to
4550 them (whether by processing the content of a self-contained token or by
4551 introspection). The AS <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be configured to minimize the information
4552 about clients and RSs disclosed in the tokens it issues.<a href="#section-7-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4553 <p id="section-7-4">If tokens are only integrity protected and not encrypted, they
4554 may reveal information to attackers listening on the wire or be able to
4555 acquire the access tokens in some other way. In the case of CWTs,
4556 the token may, e.g., reveal the audience, the scope, and the confirmation
4557 method used by the client. The latter may reveal the identity of the
4558 device or application running the client. This may be linkable to
4559 the identity of the person using the client (if there is a person and
4560 not a machine-to-machine interaction).<a href="#section-7-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4561 <p id="section-7-5">Clients using asymmetric keys for proof of possession should be aware
4562 of the consequences of using the same key pair for proof of possession
4563 towards different RSs. A set of colluding RSs or an attacker able to
4564 obtain the access tokens will be able to link the requests or even
4565 to determine the client's identity.<a href="#section-7-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4566 <p id="section-7-6">An unprotected response to an unauthorized request (see
4567 <a href="#asInfo" class="xref">Section 5.3</a>) may disclose information about the RS
4568 and/or its
4569 existing relationship with the C. It is advisable to include as little
4570 information as possible in an unencrypted response. Even the absolute URI of the AS may reveal sensitive information about the service that the RS provides. Developers must ensure that the RS does not disclose information that has an impact on the privacy of the stakeholders in the AS Request Creation Hints. They may choose to use a different mechanism for the discovery of the AS if necessary. If means of encrypting
4571 communication between the C and RS already exist, more detailed information
4572 may be included with an error response to provide the C with sufficient
4573 information to react on that particular error.<a href="#section-7-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4574 </section>
4575 </div>
4576 <div id="iana">
4577 <section id="section-8">
4578 <h2 id="name-iana-considerations">
4579 <a href="#section-8" class="section-number selfRef">8. </a><a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">IANA Considerations</a>
4580 </h2>
4581 <p id="section-8-1">This document creates several registries with a registration policy of
4582 Expert Review; guidelines to the experts are given in
4583 <a href="#IANAinstructions" class="xref">Section 8.17</a>.<a href="#section-8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4584 <div id="IANAASInformation">
4585 <section id="section-8.1">
4586 <h3 id="name-ace-authorization-server-re">
4587 <a href="#section-8.1" class="section-number selfRef">8.1. </a><a href="#name-ace-authorization-server-re" class="section-name selfRef">ACE Authorization Server Request Creation Hints</a>
4588 </h3>
4589 <p id="section-8.1-1">This specification establishes the IANA "ACE Authorization Server
4590 Request Creation Hints" registry.<a href="#section-8.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4591 <p id="section-8.1-2">The columns of the registry are:<a href="#section-8.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4592 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.1-3">
4593 <dt id="section-8.1-3.1">Name:</dt>
4594 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.1-3.2">The name of the parameter.<a href="#section-8.1-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4595 </dd>
4596 <dd class="break"></dd>
4597 <dt id="section-8.1-3.3">CBOR Key:</dt>
4598 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.1-3.4">CBOR map key for the parameter. Different ranges
4599 of values use different registration policies <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>.
4600 Integer values from -256 to 255 are designated as Standards
4601 Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256 to 65535
4602 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater than
4603 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than -65536
4604 are marked as Private Use.<a href="#section-8.1-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4605 </dd>
4606 <dd class="break"></dd>
4607 <dt id="section-8.1-3.5">Value Type:</dt>
4608 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.1-3.6">The CBOR data types allowable for the values of
4609 this parameter.<a href="#section-8.1-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4610 </dd>
4611 <dd class="break"></dd>
4612 <dt id="section-8.1-3.7">Reference:</dt>
4613 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.1-3.8">This contains a pointer to the public
4614 specification of the Request Creation Hint abbreviation, if one
4615 exists.<a href="#section-8.1-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4616 </dd>
4617 <dd class="break"></dd>
4618 </dl>
4619 <p id="section-8.1-4">This registry has been initially populated by the values in <a href="#table_asinfo" class="xref">Table 1</a>. The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.<a href="#section-8.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4620 </section>
4621 </div>
4622 <div id="IANAcoreRT">
4623 <section id="section-8.2">
4624 <h3 id="name-core-resource-types">
4625 <a href="#section-8.2" class="section-number selfRef">8.2. </a><a href="#name-core-resource-types" class="section-name selfRef">CoRE Resource Types</a>
4626 </h3>
4627 <p id="section-8.2-1">IANA has registered a new Resource Type (rt=) Link Target
4628 Attribute in the "Resource Type (rt=) Link Target Attribute Values"
4629 subregistry under the "Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE)
4630 Parameters" <span>[<a href="#IANA.CoreParameters" class="xref">IANA.CoreParameters</a>]</span> registry:<a href="#section-8.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4631 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.2-2">
4632 <dt id="section-8.2-2.1">Value:</dt>
4633 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.2-2.2">
4634 <code>ace.ai</code><a href="#section-8.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4635 </dd>
4636 <dd class="break"></dd>
4637 <dt id="section-8.2-2.3">Description:</dt>
4638 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.2-2.4">ACE-OAuth authz-info endpoint resource.<a href="#section-8.2-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4639 </dd>
4640 <dd class="break"></dd>
4641 <dt id="section-8.2-2.5">Reference:</dt>
4642 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.2-2.6">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.2-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4643 </dd>
4644 <dd class="break"></dd>
4645 </dl>
4646 <p id="section-8.2-3">Specific ACE-OAuth profiles can use this common resource type for
4647 defining their profile-specific discovery processes.<a href="#section-8.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4648 </section>
4649 </div>
4650 <div id="IANAOAuthErrorCodes">
4651 <section id="section-8.3">
4652 <h3 id="name-oauth-extensions-errors">
4653 <a href="#section-8.3" class="section-number selfRef">8.3. </a><a href="#name-oauth-extensions-errors" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Extensions Errors</a>
4654 </h3>
4655 <p id="section-8.3-1">This specification registers the following error values in the
4656 "OAuth Extensions Error Registry"
4657 <span>[<a href="#IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry" class="xref">IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4658 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.3-2">
4659 <dt id="section-8.3-2.1">Name:</dt>
4660 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-2.2">
4661 <code>unsupported_pop_key</code><a href="#section-8.3-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4662 </dd>
4663 <dd class="break"></dd>
4664 <dt id="section-8.3-2.3">Usage Location:</dt>
4665 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-2.4">token error response<a href="#section-8.3-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4666 </dd>
4667 <dd class="break"></dd>
4668 <dt id="section-8.3-2.5">Protocol Extension:</dt>
4669 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-2.6">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.3-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4670 </dd>
4671 <dd class="break"></dd>
4672 <dt id="section-8.3-2.7">Change Controller:</dt>
4673 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-2.8">IETF<a href="#section-8.3-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4674 </dd>
4675 <dd class="break"></dd>
4676 <dt id="section-8.3-2.9">Reference:</dt>
4677 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-2.10">
4678 <a href="#errorsToken" class="xref">Section 5.8.3</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.3-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4679 </dd>
4680 <dd class="break"></dd>
4681 </dl>
4682 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.3-3">
4683 <dt id="section-8.3-3.1">Name:</dt>
4684 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-3.2">
4685 <code>incompatible_ace_profiles</code><a href="#section-8.3-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4686 </dd>
4687 <dd class="break"></dd>
4688 <dt id="section-8.3-3.3">Usage Location:</dt>
4689 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-3.4">token error response<a href="#section-8.3-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4690 </dd>
4691 <dd class="break"></dd>
4692 <dt id="section-8.3-3.5">Protocol Extension:</dt>
4693 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-3.6">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.3-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4694 </dd>
4695 <dd class="break"></dd>
4696 <dt id="section-8.3-3.7">Change Controller:</dt>
4697 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-3.8">IETF<a href="#section-8.3-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4698 </dd>
4699 <dd class="break"></dd>
4700 <dt id="section-8.3-3.9">Reference:</dt>
4701 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.3-3.10">
4702 <a href="#errorsToken" class="xref">Section 5.8.3</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.3-3.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4703 </dd>
4704 <dd class="break"></dd>
4705 </dl>
4706 </section>
4707 </div>
4708 <div id="IANAErrorCBORMappings">
4709 <section id="section-8.4">
4710 <h3 id="name-oauth-error-code-cbor-mappi">
4711 <a href="#section-8.4" class="section-number selfRef">8.4. </a><a href="#name-oauth-error-code-cbor-mappi" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Error Code CBOR Mappings</a>
4712 </h3>
4713 <p id="section-8.4-1">This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Error Code
4714 CBOR Mappings" registry.<a href="#section-8.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4715 <p id="section-8.4-2">The columns of the registry are:<a href="#section-8.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4716 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.4-3">
4717 <dt id="section-8.4-3.1">Name:</dt>
4718 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.4-3.2">The OAuth Error Code name, refers to the name in
4719 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-5.2" class="relref">Section 5.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>, e.g.,
4720 "invalid_request".<a href="#section-8.4-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4721 </dd>
4722 <dd class="break"></dd>
4723 <dt id="section-8.4-3.3">CBOR Value:</dt>
4724 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.4-3.4">CBOR abbreviation for this error code.
4725 Integer values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
4726 the registration policy Expert Review <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.4-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4727 </dd>
4728 <dd class="break"></dd>
4729 <dt id="section-8.4-3.5">Reference:</dt>
4730 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.4-3.6">This contains a pointer to the public
4731 specification of the error code abbreviation, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.4-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4732 </dd>
4733 <dd class="break"></dd>
4734 <dt id="section-8.4-3.7">Original Specification:</dt>
4735 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.4-3.8">This contains a pointer to the public
4736 specification of the error code, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.4-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4737 </dd>
4738 <dd class="break"></dd>
4739 </dl>
4740 <p id="section-8.4-4">This registry has been initially populated by the values in <a href="#table_cborErrorCodes" class="xref">Table 3</a>. The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.<a href="#section-8.4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4741 </section>
4742 </div>
4743 <div id="IANAGrantTypeMappings">
4744 <section id="section-8.5">
4745 <h3 id="name-oauth-grant-type-cbor-mappi">
4746 <a href="#section-8.5" class="section-number selfRef">8.5. </a><a href="#name-oauth-grant-type-cbor-mappi" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings</a>
4747 </h3>
4748 <p id="section-8.5-1">This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Grant Type CBOR Mappings"
4749 registry.<a href="#section-8.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4750 <p id="section-8.5-2">The columns of this registry are:<a href="#section-8.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4751 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.5-3">
4752 <dt id="section-8.5-3.1">Name:</dt>
4753 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.5-3.2">The name of the grant type, as specified in
4754 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6749#section-1.3" class="relref">Section 1.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.5-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4755 </dd>
4756 <dd class="break"></dd>
4757 <dt id="section-8.5-3.3">CBOR Value:</dt>
4758 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.5-3.4">CBOR abbreviation for this grant type. Integer
4759 values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
4760 the registration policy Expert Review <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.5-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4761 </dd>
4762 <dd class="break"></dd>
4763 <dt id="section-8.5-3.5">Reference:</dt>
4764 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.5-3.6">This contains a pointer to the public
4765 specification of the grant type abbreviation, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.5-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4766 </dd>
4767 <dd class="break"></dd>
4768 <dt id="section-8.5-3.7">Original Specification:</dt>
4769 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.5-3.8">This contains a pointer to
4770 the public specification of the grant type, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.5-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4771 </dd>
4772 <dd class="break"></dd>
4773 </dl>
4774 <p id="section-8.5-4">This registry has been initially populated by the values in <a href="#table_grant_types" class="xref">Table 4</a>. The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.<a href="#section-8.5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4775 </section>
4776 </div>
4777 <div id="IANAOAuthTokenType">
4778 <section id="section-8.6">
4779 <h3 id="name-oauth-access-token-types">
4780 <a href="#section-8.6" class="section-number selfRef">8.6. </a><a href="#name-oauth-access-token-types" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Access Token Types</a>
4781 </h3>
4782 <p id="section-8.6-1">This section registers the following new token type in the
4783 "OAuth Access Token Types" registry <span>[<a href="#IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes" class="xref">IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4784 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.6-2">
4785 <dt id="section-8.6-2.1">Name:</dt>
4786 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.6-2.2">
4787 <code>PoP</code><a href="#section-8.6-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4788 </dd>
4789 <dd class="break"></dd>
4790 <dt id="section-8.6-2.3">Additional Token Endpoint Response Parameters:</dt>
4791 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.6-2.4">
4792 <code>cnf</code>, <code>rs_cnf</code> (see <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8747#section-3.1" class="relref">Section 3.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC8747" class="xref">RFC8747</a>]</span> and <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9201#section-3.2" class="relref">Section 3.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span>).<a href="#section-8.6-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4793 </dd>
4794 <dd class="break"></dd>
4795 <dt id="section-8.6-2.5">HTTP Authentication Scheme(s):</dt>
4796 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.6-2.6">N/A<a href="#section-8.6-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4797 </dd>
4798 <dd class="break"></dd>
4799 <dt id="section-8.6-2.7">Change Controller:</dt>
4800 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.6-2.8">IETF<a href="#section-8.6-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4801 </dd>
4802 <dd class="break"></dd>
4803 <dt id="section-8.6-2.9">Reference:</dt>
4804 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.6-2.10">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.6-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4805 </dd>
4806 <dd class="break"></dd>
4807 </dl>
4808 </section>
4809 </div>
4810 <div id="IANATokenTypeMappings">
4811 <section id="section-8.7">
4812 <h3 id="name-oauth-access-token-type-cbo">
4813 <a href="#section-8.7" class="section-number selfRef">8.7. </a><a href="#name-oauth-access-token-type-cbo" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Access Token Type CBOR Mappings</a>
4814 </h3>
4815 <p id="section-8.7-1">This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Access Token Type CBOR
4816 Mappings" registry.<a href="#section-8.7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4817 <p id="section-8.7-2">The columns of this registry are:<a href="#section-8.7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4818 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.7-3">
4819 <dt id="section-8.7-3.1">Name:</dt>
4820 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7-3.2">The name of the token type, as registered in the
4821 "OAuth Access Token Types" registry, e.g., "Bearer".<a href="#section-8.7-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4822 </dd>
4823 <dd class="break"></dd>
4824 <dt id="section-8.7-3.3">CBOR Value:</dt>
4825 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7-3.4">CBOR abbreviation for this token type. Integer
4826 values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
4827 the registration policy Expert Review <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.7-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4828 </dd>
4829 <dd class="break"></dd>
4830 <dt id="section-8.7-3.5">Reference:</dt>
4831 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7-3.6">This contains a pointer to the public
4832 specification of the OAuth token type abbreviation, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.7-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4833 </dd>
4834 <dd class="break"></dd>
4835 <dt id="section-8.7-3.7">Original Specification:</dt>
4836 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7-3.8">This contains a pointer to
4837 the public specification of the OAuth token type, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.7-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4838 </dd>
4839 <dd class="break"></dd>
4840 </dl>
4841 <div id="IANATokenTypeMappingsInitial">
4842 <section id="section-8.7.1">
4843 <h4 id="name-initial-registry-contents">
4844 <a href="#section-8.7.1" class="section-number selfRef">8.7.1. </a><a href="#name-initial-registry-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Initial Registry Contents</a>
4845 </h4>
4846 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.7.1-1">
4847 <dt id="section-8.7.1-1.1">Name:</dt>
4848 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-1.2">
4849 <code>Bearer</code><a href="#section-8.7.1-1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4850 </dd>
4851 <dd class="break"></dd>
4852 <dt id="section-8.7.1-1.3">CBOR Value:</dt>
4853 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-1.4">1<a href="#section-8.7.1-1.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4854 </dd>
4855 <dd class="break"></dd>
4856 <dt id="section-8.7.1-1.5">Reference:</dt>
4857 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-1.6">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.7.1-1.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4858 </dd>
4859 <dd class="break"></dd>
4860 <dt id="section-8.7.1-1.7">Original Specification:</dt>
4861 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-1.8">
4862 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span><a href="#section-8.7.1-1.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4863 </dd>
4864 <dd class="break"></dd>
4865 </dl>
4866 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.7.1-2">
4867 <dt id="section-8.7.1-2.1">Name:</dt>
4868 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-2.2">
4869 <code>PoP</code><a href="#section-8.7.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4870 </dd>
4871 <dd class="break"></dd>
4872 <dt id="section-8.7.1-2.3">CBOR Value:</dt>
4873 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-2.4">2<a href="#section-8.7.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4874 </dd>
4875 <dd class="break"></dd>
4876 <dt id="section-8.7.1-2.5">Reference:</dt>
4877 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-2.6">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.7.1-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4878 </dd>
4879 <dd class="break"></dd>
4880 <dt id="section-8.7.1-2.7">Original Specification:</dt>
4881 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.7.1-2.8">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.7.1-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4882 </dd>
4883 <dd class="break"></dd>
4884 </dl>
4885 </section>
4886 </div>
4887 </section>
4888 </div>
4889 <div id="IANAProfile">
4890 <section id="section-8.8">
4891 <h3 id="name-ace-profiles">
4892 <a href="#section-8.8" class="section-number selfRef">8.8. </a><a href="#name-ace-profiles" class="section-name selfRef">ACE Profiles</a>
4893 </h3>
4894 <p id="section-8.8-1">This specification establishes the IANA "ACE Profile" registry.<a href="#section-8.8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4895 <p id="section-8.8-2">The columns of this registry are:<a href="#section-8.8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4896 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.8-3">
4897 <dt id="section-8.8-3.1">Name:</dt>
4898 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.8-3.2"> The name of the profile to be used as the value of
4899 the profile attribute.<a href="#section-8.8-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4900 </dd>
4901 <dd class="break"></dd>
4902 <dt id="section-8.8-3.3">Description:</dt>
4903 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.8-3.4"> Text giving an overview of the profile and
4904 the context it is developed for.<a href="#section-8.8-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4905 </dd>
4906 <dd class="break"></dd>
4907 <dt id="section-8.8-3.5">CBOR Value:</dt>
4908 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.8-3.6">CBOR abbreviation for this profile name. Different ranges of values use different registration policies <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>. Integer values from -256 to 255 are
4909 designated as Standards Action. Integer values from -65536 to -257 and from 256
4910 to 65535 are designated as Specification Required. Integer values greater
4911 than 65535 are designated as Expert Review. Integer values less than
4912 -65536 are marked as Private Use.<a href="#section-8.8-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4913 </dd>
4914 <dd class="break"></dd>
4915 <dt id="section-8.8-3.7">Reference:</dt>
4916 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.8-3.8">This contains a pointer to the public
4917 specification of the profile abbreviation, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.8-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4918 </dd>
4919 <dd class="break"></dd>
4920 </dl>
4921 </section>
4922 </div>
4923 <div id="IANAOAuthParameter">
4924 <section id="section-8.9">
4925 <h3 id="name-oauth-parameters">
4926 <a href="#section-8.9" class="section-number selfRef">8.9. </a><a href="#name-oauth-parameters" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Parameters</a>
4927 </h3>
4928 <p id="section-8.9-1">This specification registers the following parameter in the "OAuth
4929 Parameters" registry <span>[<a href="#IANA.OAuthParameters" class="xref">IANA.OAuthParameters</a>]</span>:<a href="#section-8.9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4930 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.9-2">
4931 <dt id="section-8.9-2.1">Name:</dt>
4932 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.9-2.2">
4933 <code>ace_profile</code><a href="#section-8.9-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4934 </dd>
4935 <dd class="break"></dd>
4936 <dt id="section-8.9-2.3">Parameter Usage Location:</dt>
4937 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.9-2.4">token response<a href="#section-8.9-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4938 </dd>
4939 <dd class="break"></dd>
4940 <dt id="section-8.9-2.5">Change Controller:</dt>
4941 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.9-2.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.9-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4942 </dd>
4943 <dd class="break"></dd>
4944 <dt id="section-8.9-2.7">Reference:</dt>
4945 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.9-2.8">Sections <a href="#tokenResponse" class="xref">5.8.2</a> and
4946 <a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">5.8.4.3</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.9-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4947 </dd>
4948 <dd class="break"></dd>
4949 </dl>
4950 </section>
4951 </div>
4952 <div id="IANAOAuthParameterMappingsRegistry">
4953 <section id="section-8.10">
4954 <h3 id="name-oauth-parameters-cbor-mappi">
4955 <a href="#section-8.10" class="section-number selfRef">8.10. </a><a href="#name-oauth-parameters-cbor-mappi" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings</a>
4956 </h3>
4957 <p id="section-8.10-1">This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Parameters CBOR Mappings"
4958 registry.<a href="#section-8.10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4959 <p id="section-8.10-2">The columns of this registry are:<a href="#section-8.10-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4960 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.10-3">
4961 <dt id="section-8.10-3.1">Name:</dt>
4962 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.10-3.2">The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in
4963 the OAuth parameter registry, e.g., <code>client_id</code>.<a href="#section-8.10-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4964 </dd>
4965 <dd class="break"></dd>
4966 <dt id="section-8.10-3.3">CBOR Key:</dt>
4967 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.10-3.4">CBOR map key for this parameter. Integer
4968 values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
4969 the registration policy Expert Review <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.10-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4970 </dd>
4971 <dd class="break"></dd>
4972 <dt id="section-8.10-3.5">Value Type:</dt>
4973 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.10-3.6">The allowable CBOR data types for values
4974 of this parameter.<a href="#section-8.10-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4975 </dd>
4976 <dd class="break"></dd>
4977 <dt id="section-8.10-3.7">Reference:</dt>
4978 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.10-3.8">This contains a pointer to the public
4979 specification of the OAuth parameter abbreviation, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.10-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4980 </dd>
4981 <dd class="break"></dd>
4982 <dt id="section-8.10-3.9">Original Specification</dt>
4983 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.10-3.10">This contains a pointer to the public
4984 specification of the OAuth parameter, if one exists.<a href="#section-8.10-3.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
4985 </dd>
4986 <dd class="break"></dd>
4987 </dl>
4988 <p id="section-8.10-4">This registry has been initially populated by the values in <a href="#table_cborTokenParameters" class="xref">Table 5</a>. The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.<a href="#section-8.10-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4989 </section>
4990 </div>
4991 <div id="IANAOAuthIntrospectionResponseParameterRegistration">
4992 <section id="section-8.11">
4993 <h3 id="name-oauth-introspection-respons">
4994 <a href="#section-8.11" class="section-number selfRef">8.11. </a><a href="#name-oauth-introspection-respons" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Introspection Response Parameters</a>
4995 </h3>
4996 <p id="section-8.11-1">This specification registers the following parameters in the "OAuth
4997 Token Introspection Response" registry <span>[<a href="#IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse" class="xref">IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.11-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
4998 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.11-2">
4999 <dt id="section-8.11-2.1">Name:</dt>
5000 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-2.2">
5001 <code>ace_profile</code><a href="#section-8.11-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5002 </dd>
5003 <dd class="break"></dd>
5004 <dt id="section-8.11-2.3">Description:</dt>
5005 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-2.4">The ACE profile used between the client and RS.<a href="#section-8.11-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5006 </dd>
5007 <dd class="break"></dd>
5008 <dt id="section-8.11-2.5">Change Controller:</dt>
5009 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-2.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.11-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5010 </dd>
5011 <dd class="break"></dd>
5012 <dt id="section-8.11-2.7">Reference:</dt>
5013 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-2.8">
5014 <a href="#introRes" class="xref">Section 5.9.2</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.11-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5015 </dd>
5016 <dd class="break"></dd>
5017 </dl>
5018 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.11-3">
5019 <dt id="section-8.11-3.1">Name:</dt>
5020 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-3.2">
5021 <code>cnonce</code><a href="#section-8.11-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5022 </dd>
5023 <dd class="break"></dd>
5024 <dt id="section-8.11-3.3">Description:</dt>
5025 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-3.4">"client-nonce". A nonce previously provided
5026 to the AS by the RS via the client. Used to verify token freshness
5027 when the RS cannot synchronize its clock with the AS.<a href="#section-8.11-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5028 </dd>
5029 <dd class="break"></dd>
5030 <dt id="section-8.11-3.5">Change Controller:</dt>
5031 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-3.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.11-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5032 </dd>
5033 <dd class="break"></dd>
5034 <dt id="section-8.11-3.7">Reference:</dt>
5035 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-3.8">
5036 <a href="#introRes" class="xref">Section 5.9.2</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.11-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5037 </dd>
5038 <dd class="break"></dd>
5039 </dl>
5040 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.11-4">
5041 <dt id="section-8.11-4.1">Name</dt>
5042 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-4.2">
5043 <code>cti</code><a href="#section-8.11-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5044 </dd>
5045 <dd class="break"></dd>
5046 <dt id="section-8.11-4.3">Description</dt>
5047 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-4.4">"CWT ID". The identifier of a CWT as defined in
5048 <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.11-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5049 </dd>
5050 <dd class="break"></dd>
5051 <dt id="section-8.11-4.5">Change Controller</dt>
5052 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-4.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.11-4.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5053 </dd>
5054 <dd class="break"></dd>
5055 <dt id="section-8.11-4.7">Reference</dt>
5056 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-4.8">
5057 <a href="#introRes" class="xref">Section 5.9.2</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.11-4.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5058 </dd>
5059 <dd class="break"></dd>
5060 </dl>
5061 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.11-5">
5062 <dt id="section-8.11-5.1">Name:</dt>
5063 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-5.2">
5064 <code>exi</code><a href="#section-8.11-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5065 </dd>
5066 <dd class="break"></dd>
5067 <dt id="section-8.11-5.3">Description:</dt>
5068 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-5.4">"Expires in". Lifetime of the token in seconds
5069 from the time the RS first sees it. Used to implement a weaker form of
5070 token expiration for devices that cannot synchronize their internal
5071 clocks.<a href="#section-8.11-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5072 </dd>
5073 <dd class="break"></dd>
5074 <dt id="section-8.11-5.5">Change Controller:</dt>
5075 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-5.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.11-5.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5076 </dd>
5077 <dd class="break"></dd>
5078 <dt id="section-8.11-5.7">Reference:</dt>
5079 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.11-5.8">
5080 <a href="#introRes" class="xref">Section 5.9.2</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.11-5.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5081 </dd>
5082 <dd class="break"></dd>
5083 </dl>
5084 </section>
5085 </div>
5086 <div id="IANAIntrospectionEndpointCBORMappingsRegistry">
5087 <section id="section-8.12">
5088 <h3 id="name-oauth-token-introspection-r">
5089 <a href="#section-8.12" class="section-number selfRef">8.12. </a><a href="#name-oauth-token-introspection-r" class="section-name selfRef">OAuth Token Introspection Response CBOR Mappings</a>
5090 </h3>
5091 <p id="section-8.12-1">This specification establishes the IANA "OAuth Token Introspection
5092 Response CBOR Mappings" registry.<a href="#section-8.12-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5093 <p id="section-8.12-2">The columns of this registry are:<a href="#section-8.12-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5094 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.12-3">
5095 <dt id="section-8.12-3.1">Name:</dt>
5096 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.12-3.2">The OAuth Parameter name, refers to the name in
5097 the OAuth parameter registry, e.g., <code>client_id</code>.<a href="#section-8.12-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5098 </dd>
5099 <dd class="break"></dd>
5100 <dt id="section-8.12-3.3">CBOR Key:</dt>
5101 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.12-3.4">CBOR map key for this parameter. Integer
5102 values less than -65536 are marked as Private Use; all other values use
5103 the registration policy Expert Review <span>[<a href="#RFC8126" class="xref">RFC8126</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.12-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5104 </dd>
5105 <dd class="break"></dd>
5106 <dt id="section-8.12-3.5">Value Type:</dt>
5107 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.12-3.6">The allowable CBOR data types for values
5108 of this parameter.<a href="#section-8.12-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5109 </dd>
5110 <dd class="break"></dd>
5111 <dt id="section-8.12-3.7">Reference:</dt>
5112 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.12-3.8">This contains a pointer to the public
5113 specification of the introspection response parameter abbreviation, if
5114 one exists.<a href="#section-8.12-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5115 </dd>
5116 <dd class="break"></dd>
5117 <dt id="section-8.12-3.9">Original Specification</dt>
5118 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.12-3.10">This contains a pointer to the public
5119 specification of the OAuth Token Introspection parameter, if one
5120 exists.<a href="#section-8.12-3.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5121 </dd>
5122 <dd class="break"></dd>
5123 </dl>
5124 <p id="section-8.12-4">
5125 This registry has been initially populated by the values in <a href="#table_cborIntrospectionParameters" class="xref">Table 6</a>. The Reference column for all of these entries is this document.<a href="#section-8.12-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5126 <p id="section-8.12-5">Note that the mappings of parameters corresponding to claim names
5127 intentionally coincide with the CWT claim name mappings from <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.12-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5128 </section>
5129 </div>
5130 <div id="IANAJWTClaims">
5131 <section id="section-8.13">
5132 <h3 id="name-json-web-token-claims">
5133 <a href="#section-8.13" class="section-number selfRef">8.13. </a><a href="#name-json-web-token-claims" class="section-name selfRef">JSON Web Token Claims</a>
5134 </h3>
5135 <p id="section-8.13-1">This specification registers the following new claims in the "JSON
5136 Web Token Claims" subregistry under the "JSON
5137 Web Token (JWT)" registry <span>[<a href="#IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims" class="xref">IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims</a>]</span>:<a href="#section-8.13-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5138 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.13-2">
5139 <dt id="section-8.13-2.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5140 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-2.2">
5141 <code>ace_profile</code><a href="#section-8.13-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5142 </dd>
5143 <dd class="break"></dd>
5144 <dt id="section-8.13-2.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5145 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-2.4">The ACE profile a token is supposed to be used with.<a href="#section-8.13-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5146 </dd>
5147 <dd class="break"></dd>
5148 <dt id="section-8.13-2.5">Change Controller:</dt>
5149 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-2.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.13-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5150 </dd>
5151 <dd class="break"></dd>
5152 <dt id="section-8.13-2.7">Reference:</dt>
5153 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-2.8">
5154 <a href="#accessToken" class="xref">Section 5.10</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.13-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5155 </dd>
5156 <dd class="break"></dd>
5157 </dl>
5158 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.13-3">
5159 <dt id="section-8.13-3.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5160 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-3.2">
5161 <code>cnonce</code><a href="#section-8.13-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5162 </dd>
5163 <dd class="break"></dd>
5164 <dt id="section-8.13-3.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5165 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-3.4">"client-nonce". A nonce previously provided
5166 to the AS by the RS via the client. Used to verify token freshness
5167 when the RS cannot synchronize its clock with the AS.<a href="#section-8.13-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5168 </dd>
5169 <dd class="break"></dd>
5170 <dt id="section-8.13-3.5">Change Controller:</dt>
5171 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-3.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.13-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5172 </dd>
5173 <dd class="break"></dd>
5174 <dt id="section-8.13-3.7">Reference:</dt>
5175 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-3.8">
5176 <a href="#accessToken" class="xref">Section 5.10</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.13-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5177 </dd>
5178 <dd class="break"></dd>
5179 </dl>
5180 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.13-4">
5181 <dt id="section-8.13-4.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5182 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-4.2">
5183 <code>exi</code><a href="#section-8.13-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5184 </dd>
5185 <dd class="break"></dd>
5186 <dt id="section-8.13-4.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5187 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-4.4">"Expires in". Lifetime of the token in seconds
5188 from the time the RS first sees it. Used to implement a weaker form of
5189 token expiration for devices that cannot synchronize their internal
5190 clocks.<a href="#section-8.13-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5191 </dd>
5192 <dd class="break"></dd>
5193 <dt id="section-8.13-4.5">Change Controller:</dt>
5194 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-4.6">IETF<a href="#section-8.13-4.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5195 </dd>
5196 <dd class="break"></dd>
5197 <dt id="section-8.13-4.7">Reference:</dt>
5198 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.13-4.8">
5199 <a href="#tokenExpiration" class="xref">Section 5.10.3</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.13-4.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5200 </dd>
5201 <dd class="break"></dd>
5202 </dl>
5203 </section>
5204 </div>
5205 <div id="IANACWTClaims">
5206 <section id="section-8.14">
5207 <h3 id="name-cbor-web-token-claims">
5208 <a href="#section-8.14" class="section-number selfRef">8.14. </a><a href="#name-cbor-web-token-claims" class="section-name selfRef">CBOR Web Token Claims</a>
5209 </h3>
5210 <p id="section-8.14-1">This specification registers the following new claims in the "CBOR
5211 Web Token (CWT) Claims" registry <span>[<a href="#IANA.CborWebTokenClaims" class="xref">IANA.CborWebTokenClaims</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.14-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5212 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.14-2">
5213 <dt id="section-8.14-2.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5214 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.2">
5215 <code>ace_profile</code><a href="#section-8.14-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5216 </dd>
5217 <dd class="break"></dd>
5218 <dt id="section-8.14-2.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5219 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.4">The ACE profile a token is supposed to be used with.<a href="#section-8.14-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5220 </dd>
5221 <dd class="break"></dd>
5222 <dt id="section-8.14-2.5">JWT Claim Name:</dt>
5223 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.6">
5224 <code>ace_profile</code><a href="#section-8.14-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5225 </dd>
5226 <dd class="break"></dd>
5227 <dt id="section-8.14-2.7">Claim Key:</dt>
5228 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.8">38<a href="#section-8.14-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5229 </dd>
5230 <dd class="break"></dd>
5231 <dt id="section-8.14-2.9">Claim Value Type:</dt>
5232 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.10">integer<a href="#section-8.14-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5233 </dd>
5234 <dd class="break"></dd>
5235 <dt id="section-8.14-2.11">Change Controller:</dt>
5236 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.12">IETF<a href="#section-8.14-2.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5237 </dd>
5238 <dd class="break"></dd>
5239 <dt id="section-8.14-2.13">Reference:</dt>
5240 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-2.14">
5241 <a href="#accessToken" class="xref">Section 5.10</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.14-2.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5242 </dd>
5243 <dd class="break"></dd>
5244 </dl>
5245 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.14-3">
5246 <dt id="section-8.14-3.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5247 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.2">
5248 <code>cnonce</code><a href="#section-8.14-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5249 </dd>
5250 <dd class="break"></dd>
5251 <dt id="section-8.14-3.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5252 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.4">The client-nonce sent to the AS by the RS via the client.<a href="#section-8.14-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5253 </dd>
5254 <dd class="break"></dd>
5255 <dt id="section-8.14-3.5">JWT Claim Name:</dt>
5256 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.6">
5257 <code>cnonce</code><a href="#section-8.14-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5258 </dd>
5259 <dd class="break"></dd>
5260 <dt id="section-8.14-3.7">Claim Key:</dt>
5261 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.8">39<a href="#section-8.14-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5262 </dd>
5263 <dd class="break"></dd>
5264 <dt id="section-8.14-3.9">Claim Value Type:</dt>
5265 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.10">byte string<a href="#section-8.14-3.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5266 </dd>
5267 <dd class="break"></dd>
5268 <dt id="section-8.14-3.11">Change Controller:</dt>
5269 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.12">IETF<a href="#section-8.14-3.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5270 </dd>
5271 <dd class="break"></dd>
5272 <dt id="section-8.14-3.13">Reference:</dt>
5273 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-3.14">
5274 <a href="#accessToken" class="xref">Section 5.10</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.14-3.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5275 </dd>
5276 <dd class="break"></dd>
5277 </dl>
5278 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.14-4">
5279 <dt id="section-8.14-4.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5280 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.2">
5281 <code>exi</code><a href="#section-8.14-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5282 </dd>
5283 <dd class="break"></dd>
5284 <dt id="section-8.14-4.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5285 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.4">The expiration time of a token measured from when it was received at the RS
5286 in seconds.<a href="#section-8.14-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5287 </dd>
5288 <dd class="break"></dd>
5289 <dt id="section-8.14-4.5">JWT Claim Name:</dt>
5290 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.6">
5291 <code>exi</code><a href="#section-8.14-4.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5292 </dd>
5293 <dd class="break"></dd>
5294 <dt id="section-8.14-4.7">Claim Key:</dt>
5295 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.8">40<a href="#section-8.14-4.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5296 </dd>
5297 <dd class="break"></dd>
5298 <dt id="section-8.14-4.9">Claim Value Type:</dt>
5299 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.10">unsigned integer<a href="#section-8.14-4.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5300 </dd>
5301 <dd class="break"></dd>
5302 <dt id="section-8.14-4.11">Change Controller:</dt>
5303 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.12">IETF<a href="#section-8.14-4.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5304 </dd>
5305 <dd class="break"></dd>
5306 <dt id="section-8.14-4.13">Reference:</dt>
5307 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-4.14">
5308 <a href="#tokenExpiration" class="xref">Section 5.10.3</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.14-4.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5309 </dd>
5310 <dd class="break"></dd>
5311 </dl>
5312 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.14-5">
5313 <dt id="section-8.14-5.1">Claim Name:</dt>
5314 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.2">
5315 <code>scope</code><a href="#section-8.14-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5316 </dd>
5317 <dd class="break"></dd>
5318 <dt id="section-8.14-5.3">Claim Description:</dt>
5319 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.4">The scope of an access token, as defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.14-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5320 </dd>
5321 <dd class="break"></dd>
5322 <dt id="section-8.14-5.5">JWT Claim Name:</dt>
5323 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.6">
5324 <code>scope</code><a href="#section-8.14-5.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5325 </dd>
5326 <dd class="break"></dd>
5327 <dt id="section-8.14-5.7">Claim Key:</dt>
5328 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.8">9<a href="#section-8.14-5.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5329 </dd>
5330 <dd class="break"></dd>
5331 <dt id="section-8.14-5.9">Claim Value Type:</dt>
5332 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.10">byte string or text string<a href="#section-8.14-5.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5333 </dd>
5334 <dd class="break"></dd>
5335 <dt id="section-8.14-5.11">Change Controller:</dt>
5336 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.12">IETF<a href="#section-8.14-5.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5337 </dd>
5338 <dd class="break"></dd>
5339 <dt id="section-8.14-5.13">Reference:</dt>
5340 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.14-5.14">
5341 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8693#section-4.2" class="relref">Section 4.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC8693" class="xref">RFC8693</a>]</span><a href="#section-8.14-5.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5342 </dd>
5343 <dd class="break"></dd>
5344 </dl>
5345 </section>
5346 </div>
5347 <div id="IANAmediaType">
5348 <section id="section-8.15">
5349 <h3 id="name-media-type-registration">
5350 <a href="#section-8.15" class="section-number selfRef">8.15. </a><a href="#name-media-type-registration" class="section-name selfRef">Media Type Registration</a>
5351 </h3>
5352 <p id="section-8.15-1">This specification registers the "application/ace+cbor" media type for
5353 messages of the protocols defined in this document carrying parameters
5354 encoded in CBOR. This registration follows the procedures specified in
5355 <span>[<a href="#RFC6838" class="xref">RFC6838</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.15-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5356 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8.15-2">
5357 <dt id="section-8.15-2.1">Type name:</dt>
5358 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.2">application<a href="#section-8.15-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5359 </dd>
5360 <dd class="break"></dd>
5361 <dt id="section-8.15-2.3">Subtype name:</dt>
5362 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.4">ace+cbor<a href="#section-8.15-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5363 </dd>
5364 <dd class="break"></dd>
5365 <dt id="section-8.15-2.5">Required parameters:</dt>
5366 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.6">N/A<a href="#section-8.15-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5367 </dd>
5368 <dd class="break"></dd>
5369 <dt id="section-8.15-2.7">Optional parameters:</dt>
5370 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.8">N/A<a href="#section-8.15-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5371 </dd>
5372 <dd class="break"></dd>
5373 <dt id="section-8.15-2.9">Encoding considerations:</dt>
5374 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.10">Must be encoded as a CBOR map containing
5375 the protocol parameters defined in RFC 9200.<a href="#section-8.15-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5376 </dd>
5377 <dd class="break"></dd>
5378 <dt id="section-8.15-2.11">Security considerations:</dt>
5379 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.12">See <a href="#security" class="xref">Section 6</a> of RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.15-2.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5380 </dd>
5381 <dd class="break"></dd>
5382 <dt id="section-8.15-2.13">Interoperability considerations:</dt>
5383 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.14">N/A<a href="#section-8.15-2.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5384 </dd>
5385 <dd class="break"></dd>
5386 <dt id="section-8.15-2.15">Published specification:</dt>
5387 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.16">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.15-2.16" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5388 </dd>
5389 <dd class="break"></dd>
5390 <dt id="section-8.15-2.17">Applications that use this media type:</dt>
5391 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.18">The type is used by
5392 authorization servers, clients, and resource servers that support the ACE
5393 framework with CBOR encoding, as specified in RFC 9200.<a href="#section-8.15-2.18" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5394 </dd>
5395 <dd class="break"></dd>
5396 <dt id="section-8.15-2.19">Fragment identifier considerations:</dt>
5397 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.20">N/A<a href="#section-8.15-2.20" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5398 </dd>
5399 <dd class="break"></dd>
5400 <dt id="section-8.15-2.21">Additional information:</dt>
5401 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.22">N/A<a href="#section-8.15-2.22" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5402 </dd>
5403 <dd class="break"></dd>
5404 <dt id="section-8.15-2.23">Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:</dt>
5405 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.24">
5406 <br>IESG &lt;[email protected]&gt;<a href="#section-8.15-2.24" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5407 </dd>
5408 <dd class="break"></dd>
5409 <dt id="section-8.15-2.25">Intended usage:</dt>
5410 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.26">COMMON<a href="#section-8.15-2.26" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5411 </dd>
5412 <dd class="break"></dd>
5413 <dt id="section-8.15-2.27">Restrictions on usage:</dt>
5414 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.28">none<a href="#section-8.15-2.28" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5415 </dd>
5416 <dd class="break"></dd>
5417 <dt id="section-8.15-2.29">Author:</dt>
5418 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.30">Ludwig Seitz &lt;[email protected]&gt;<a href="#section-8.15-2.30" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5419 </dd>
5420 <dd class="break"></dd>
5421 <dt id="section-8.15-2.31">Change controller:</dt>
5422 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.15-2.32">IETF<a href="#section-8.15-2.32" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5423 </dd>
5424 <dd class="break"></dd>
5425 </dl>
5426 </section>
5427 </div>
5428 <div id="IANAcoapContentFormat">
5429 <section id="section-8.16">
5430 <h3 id="name-coap-content-formats">
5431 <a href="#section-8.16" class="section-number selfRef">8.16. </a><a href="#name-coap-content-formats" class="section-name selfRef">CoAP Content-Formats</a>
5432 </h3>
5433 <p id="section-8.16-1">The following entry has been registered in the "CoAP
5434 Content-Formats" registry:<a href="#section-8.16-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5435 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlCompact dlParallel" id="section-8.16-2">
5436 <dt id="section-8.16-2.1">Media Type:</dt>
5437 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.16-2.2">application/ace+cbor<a href="#section-8.16-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5438 </dd>
5439 <dd class="break"></dd>
5440 <dt id="section-8.16-2.3">Encoding:</dt>
5441 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.16-2.4">-<a href="#section-8.16-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5442 </dd>
5443 <dd class="break"></dd>
5444 <dt id="section-8.16-2.5">ID:</dt>
5445 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.16-2.6">19<a href="#section-8.16-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5446 </dd>
5447 <dd class="break"></dd>
5448 <dt id="section-8.16-2.7">Reference:</dt>
5449 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8.16-2.8">RFC 9200<a href="#section-8.16-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5450 </dd>
5451 <dd class="break"></dd>
5452 </dl>
5453 </section>
5454 </div>
5455 <div id="IANAinstructions">
5456 <section id="section-8.17">
5457 <h3 id="name-expert-review-instructions">
5458 <a href="#section-8.17" class="section-number selfRef">8.17. </a><a href="#name-expert-review-instructions" class="section-name selfRef">Expert Review Instructions</a>
5459 </h3>
5460 <p id="section-8.17-1">All of the IANA registries established in this document are defined
5461 to use a registration policy of Expert Review. This section gives some general guidelines for
5462 what the experts should be looking for, but they are being designated
5463 as experts for a reason, so they should be given substantial
5464 latitude.<a href="#section-8.17-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5465 <p id="section-8.17-2">Expert Reviewers should take into consideration the following points:<a href="#section-8.17-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5466 <ul class="normal">
5467 <li class="normal" id="section-8.17-3.1">Point squatting should be discouraged. Reviewers are encouraged
5468 to get sufficient information for registration requests to ensure
5469 that the usage is not going to duplicate one that is already
5470 registered and that the point is likely to be used in deployments. The
5471 zones tagged as Private Use are intended for testing purposes and closed
5472 environments; code points in other ranges should not be assigned for
5473 testing.<a href="#section-8.17-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5474 </li>
5475 <li class="normal" id="section-8.17-3.2">Specifications are needed for the first-come, first-serve range if
5476 they are expected to be used outside of closed environments in an
5477 interoperable way. When specifications are not provided, the description
5478 provided needs to have sufficient information to identify what the point
5479 is being used for.<a href="#section-8.17-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5480 </li>
5481 <li class="normal" id="section-8.17-3.3">Experts should take into account the expected usage of fields when
5482 approving point assignment. The fact that there is a range for
5483 Standards Track documents does not mean that a Standards Track
5484 document cannot have points assigned outside of that range. The
5485 length of the encoded value should be weighed against how many
5486 code points of that length are left, i.e., the size of device it will be
5487 used on.<a href="#section-8.17-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5488 </li>
5489 <li class="normal" id="section-8.17-3.4">Since a high degree of overlap is expected between these registries
5490 and the contents of the OAuth parameters <span>[<a href="#IANA.OAuthParameters" class="xref">IANA.OAuthParameters</a>]</span> registries, experts should require new
5491 registrations to maintain alignment with parameters from OAuth that have
5492 comparable functionality. Deviation from this alignment should only
5493 be allowed if there are functional differences that are motivated by
5494 the use case and that cannot be easily or efficiently addressed by
5495 comparable OAuth parameters.<a href="#section-8.17-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5496 </li>
5497 </ul>
5498 </section>
5499 </div>
5500 </section>
5501 </div>
5502 <section id="section-9">
5503 <h2 id="name-references">
5504 <a href="#section-9" class="section-number selfRef">9. </a><a href="#name-references" class="section-name selfRef">References</a>
5505 </h2>
5506 <section id="section-9.1">
5507 <h3 id="name-normative-references">
5508 <a href="#section-9.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.1. </a><a href="#name-normative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Normative References</a>
5509 </h3>
5510 <dl class="references">
5511 <dt id="IANA.CborWebTokenClaims">[IANA.CborWebTokenClaims]</dt>
5512 <dd>
5513 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"CBOR Web Token (CWT) Claims"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt">https://www.iana.org/assignments/cwt</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5514 <dd class="break"></dd>
5515 <dt id="IANA.CoreParameters">[IANA.CoreParameters]</dt>
5516 <dd>
5517 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Parameters"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters">https://www.iana.org/assignments/core-parameters</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5518 <dd class="break"></dd>
5519 <dt id="IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims">[IANA.JsonWebTokenClaims]</dt>
5520 <dd>
5521 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JSON Web Token Claims"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt">https://www.iana.org/assignments/jwt</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5522 <dd class="break"></dd>
5523 <dt id="IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes">[IANA.OAuthAccessTokenTypes]</dt>
5524 <dd>
5525 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth Access Token Types"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5526 <dd class="break"></dd>
5527 <dt id="IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry">[IANA.OAuthExtensionsErrorRegistry]</dt>
5528 <dd>
5529 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth Extensions Error Registry"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5530 <dd class="break"></dd>
5531 <dt id="IANA.OAuthParameters">[IANA.OAuthParameters]</dt>
5532 <dd>
5533 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth Parameters"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5534 <dd class="break"></dd>
5535 <dt id="IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse">[IANA.TokenIntrospectionResponse]</dt>
5536 <dd>
5537 <span class="refAuthor">IANA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth Token Introspection Response"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters">https://www.iana.org/assignments/oauth-parameters</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5538 <dd class="break"></dd>
5539 <dt id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</dt>
5540 <dd>
5541 <span class="refAuthor">Bradner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2119</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2119</span>, <time datetime="1997-03" class="refDate">March 1997</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5542 <dd class="break"></dd>
5543 <dt id="RFC3986">[RFC3986]</dt>
5544 <dd>
5545 <span class="refAuthor">Berners-Lee, T.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Fielding, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">L. Masinter</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 66</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3986</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3986</span>, <time datetime="2005-01" class="refDate">January 2005</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5546 <dd class="break"></dd>
5547 <dt id="RFC4648">[RFC4648]</dt>
5548 <dd>
5549 <span class="refAuthor">Josefsson, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4648</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4648</span>, <time datetime="2006-10" class="refDate">October 2006</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5550 <dd class="break"></dd>
5551 <dt id="RFC6347">[RFC6347]</dt>
5552 <dd>
5553 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">N. Modadugu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6347</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6347</span>, <time datetime="2012-01" class="refDate">January 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5554 <dd class="break"></dd>
5555 <dt id="RFC6749">[RFC6749]</dt>
5556 <dd>
5557 <span class="refAuthor">Hardt, D., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6749</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6749</span>, <time datetime="2012-10" class="refDate">October 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5558 <dd class="break"></dd>
5559 <dt id="RFC6750">[RFC6750]</dt>
5560 <dd>
5561 <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">D. Hardt</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework: Bearer Token Usage"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6750</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6750</span>, <time datetime="2012-10" class="refDate">October 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6750</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5562 <dd class="break"></dd>
5563 <dt id="RFC6838">[RFC6838]</dt>
5564 <dd>
5565 <span class="refAuthor">Freed, N.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Klensin, J.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">T. Hansen</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 13</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6838</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6838</span>, <time datetime="2013-01" class="refDate">January 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5566 <dd class="break"></dd>
5567 <dt id="RFC6920">[RFC6920]</dt>
5568 <dd>
5569 <span class="refAuthor">Farrell, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Kutscher, D.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Dannewitz, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Ohlman, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Keranen, A.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Hallam-Baker</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Naming Things with Hashes"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6920</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6920</span>, <time datetime="2013-04" class="refDate">April 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6920</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5570 <dd class="break"></dd>
5571 <dt id="RFC7252">[RFC7252]</dt>
5572 <dd>
5573 <span class="refAuthor">Shelby, Z.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Hartke, K.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">C. Bormann</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7252</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7252</span>, <time datetime="2014-06" class="refDate">June 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7252</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5574 <dd class="break"></dd>
5575 <dt id="RFC7519">[RFC7519]</dt>
5576 <dd>
5577 <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bradley, J.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">N. Sakimura</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JSON Web Token (JWT)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7519</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7519</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5578 <dd class="break"></dd>
5579 <dt id="RFC7662">[RFC7662]</dt>
5580 <dd>
5581 <span class="refAuthor">Richer, J., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Token Introspection"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7662</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7662</span>, <time datetime="2015-10" class="refDate">October 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7662</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5582 <dd class="break"></dd>
5583 <dt id="RFC8126">[RFC8126]</dt>
5584 <dd>
5585 <span class="refAuthor">Cotton, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Leiba, B.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">T. Narten</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Guidelines for Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 26</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8126</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8126</span>, <time datetime="2017-06" class="refDate">June 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5586 <dd class="break"></dd>
5587 <dt id="RFC8152">[RFC8152]</dt>
5588 <dd>
5589 <span class="refAuthor">Schaad, J.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"CBOR Object Signing and Encryption (COSE)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8152</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8152</span>, <time datetime="2017-07" class="refDate">July 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8152</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5590 <dd class="break"></dd>
5591 <dt id="RFC8174">[RFC8174]</dt>
5592 <dd>
5593 <span class="refAuthor">Leiba, B.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8174</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8174</span>, <time datetime="2017-05" class="refDate">May 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5594 <dd class="break"></dd>
5595 <dt id="RFC8392">[RFC8392]</dt>
5596 <dd>
5597 <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Wahlstroem, E.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Erdtman, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">H. Tschofenig</span>, <span class="refTitle">"CBOR Web Token (CWT)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8392</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8392</span>, <time datetime="2018-05" class="refDate">May 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8392</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5598 <dd class="break"></dd>
5599 <dt id="RFC8610">[RFC8610]</dt>
5600 <dd>
5601 <span class="refAuthor">Birkholz, H.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Vigano, C.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">C. Bormann</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Concise Data Definition Language (CDDL): A Notational Convention to Express Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR) and JSON Data Structures"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8610</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8610</span>, <time datetime="2019-06" class="refDate">June 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8610</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5602 <dd class="break"></dd>
5603 <dt id="RFC8693">[RFC8693]</dt>
5604 <dd>
5605 <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Nadalin, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Campbell, B., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bradley, J.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">C. Mortimore</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Token Exchange"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8693</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8693</span>, <time datetime="2020-01" class="refDate">January 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8693</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5606 <dd class="break"></dd>
5607 <dt id="RFC8747">[RFC8747]</dt>
5608 <dd>
5609 <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Seitz, L.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Selander, G.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Erdtman, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">H. Tschofenig</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Proof-of-Possession Key Semantics for CBOR Web Tokens (CWTs)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8747</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8747</span>, <time datetime="2020-03" class="refDate">March 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8747</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5610 <dd class="break"></dd>
5611 <dt id="RFC8949">[RFC8949]</dt>
5612 <dd>
5613 <span class="refAuthor">Bormann, C.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">P. Hoffman</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Concise Binary Object Representation (CBOR)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 94</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8949</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8949</span>, <time datetime="2020-12" class="refDate">December 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8949</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5614 <dd class="break"></dd>
5615 <dt id="RFC9201">[RFC9201]</dt>
5616 <dd>
5617 <span class="refAuthor">Seitz, L.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Additional OAuth Parameters for Authentication and Authorization in Constrained Environments (ACE)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9201</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9201</span>, <time datetime="2022-08" class="refDate">August 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9201">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9201</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5618 <dd class="break"></dd>
5619 </dl>
5620 </section>
5621 <section id="section-9.2">
5622 <h3 id="name-informative-references">
5623 <a href="#section-9.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.2. </a><a href="#name-informative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Informative References</a>
5624 </h3>
5625 <dl class="references">
5626 <dt id="BLE">[BLE]</dt>
5627 <dd>
5628 <span class="refAuthor">Bluetooth Special Interest Group</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Core Specification 5.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Section 4.4</span>, <time datetime="2021-07" class="refDate">July 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/bluetooth-core-specification/">https://www.bluetooth.com/specifications/bluetooth-core-specification/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5629 <dd class="break"></dd>
5630 <dt id="I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize">[DCAF]</dt>
5631 <dd>
5632 <span class="refAuthor">Gerdes, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bergmann, O.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">C. Bormann</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-04</span>, <time datetime="2015-10-19" class="refDate">19 October 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-04">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize-04</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5633 <dd class="break"></dd>
5634 <dt id="Margi10impact">[Margi10impact]</dt>
5635 <dd>
5636 <span class="refAuthor">Margi, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">de Oliveira, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">de Sousa, G.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Simplicio Jr, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Barreto, P.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Carvalho, T.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Naeslund, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">R. Gold</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Impact of Operating Systems on Wireless Sensor Networks (Security) Applications and Testbeds"</span>, <span class="refContent">Proceedings of the 19th International Conference on Computer
5637 Communications and Networks</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1109/ICCCN.2010.5560028</span>, <time datetime="2010-08" class="refDate">August 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCN.2010.5560028">https://doi.org/10.1109/ICCCN.2010.5560028</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5638 <dd class="break"></dd>
5639 <dt id="MQTT5.0">[MQTT5.0]</dt>
5640 <dd>
5641 <span class="refAuthor">Banks, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Briggs, E.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Borgendale, K.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">R. Gupta</span>, <span class="refTitle">"MQTT Version 5.0"</span>, <span class="refContent">OASIS Standard</span>, <time datetime="2019-03" class="refDate">March 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v5.0/mqtt-v5.0.html">https://docs.oasis-open.org/mqtt/mqtt/v5.0/mqtt-v5.0.html</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5642 <dd class="break"></dd>
5643 <dt id="I-D.erdtman-oauth-rpcc">[OAUTH-RPCC]</dt>
5644 <dd>
5645 <span class="refAuthor">Seitz, L.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Erdtman, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">M. Tiloca</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Raw-Public-Key and Pre-Shared-Key as OAuth client credentials"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-erdtman-oauth-rpcc-00</span>, <time datetime="2017-11-21" class="refDate">21 November 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-erdtman-oauth-rpcc-00">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-erdtman-oauth-rpcc-00</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5646 <dd class="break"></dd>
5647 <dt id="I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution">[POP-KEY-DIST]</dt>
5648 <dd>
5649 <span class="refAuthor">Bradley, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Hunt, P.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Tschofenig, H.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">M. Meszaros</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07</span>, <time datetime="2019-03-27" class="refDate">27 March 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution-07</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5650 <dd class="break"></dd>
5651 <dt id="RFC4949">[RFC4949]</dt>
5652 <dd>
5653 <span class="refAuthor">Shirey, R.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Internet Security Glossary, Version 2"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">FYI 36</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4949</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4949</span>, <time datetime="2007-08" class="refDate">August 2007</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4949</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5654 <dd class="break"></dd>
5655 <dt id="RFC6690">[RFC6690]</dt>
5656 <dd>
5657 <span class="refAuthor">Shelby, Z.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Constrained RESTful Environments (CoRE) Link Format"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6690</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6690</span>, <time datetime="2012-08" class="refDate">August 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6690</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5658 <dd class="break"></dd>
5659 <dt id="RFC6819">[RFC6819]</dt>
5660 <dd>
5661 <span class="refAuthor">Lodderstedt, T., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">McGloin, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Hunt</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Threat Model and Security Considerations"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6819</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6819</span>, <time datetime="2013-01" class="refDate">January 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6819</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5662 <dd class="break"></dd>
5663 <dt id="RFC7009">[RFC7009]</dt>
5664 <dd>
5665 <span class="refAuthor">Lodderstedt, T., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Dronia, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">M. Scurtescu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Token Revocation"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7009</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7009</span>, <time datetime="2013-08" class="refDate">August 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7009</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5666 <dd class="break"></dd>
5667 <dt id="RFC7228">[RFC7228]</dt>
5668 <dd>
5669 <span class="refAuthor">Bormann, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Ersue, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">A. Keranen</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Terminology for Constrained-Node Networks"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7228</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7228</span>, <time datetime="2014-05" class="refDate">May 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7228</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5670 <dd class="break"></dd>
5671 <dt id="RFC7521">[RFC7521]</dt>
5672 <dd>
5673 <span class="refAuthor">Campbell, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Mortimore, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">Y. Goland</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Assertion Framework for OAuth 2.0 Client Authentication and Authorization Grants"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7521</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7521</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7521</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5674 <dd class="break"></dd>
5675 <dt id="RFC7591">[RFC7591]</dt>
5676 <dd>
5677 <span class="refAuthor">Richer, J., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bradley, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Machulak, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Hunt</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Dynamic Client Registration Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7591</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7591</span>, <time datetime="2015-07" class="refDate">July 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7591</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5678 <dd class="break"></dd>
5679 <dt id="RFC7641">[RFC7641]</dt>
5680 <dd>
5681 <span class="refAuthor">Hartke, K.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Observing Resources in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7641</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7641</span>, <time datetime="2015-09" class="refDate">September 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7641</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5682 <dd class="break"></dd>
5683 <dt id="RFC7744">[RFC7744]</dt>
5684 <dd>
5685 <span class="refAuthor">Seitz, L., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Gerdes, S., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Selander, G.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Mani, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">S. Kumar</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Use Cases for Authentication and Authorization in Constrained Environments"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7744</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7744</span>, <time datetime="2016-01" class="refDate">January 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7744">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7744</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5686 <dd class="break"></dd>
5687 <dt id="RFC7959">[RFC7959]</dt>
5688 <dd>
5689 <span class="refAuthor">Bormann, C.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">Z. Shelby, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Block-Wise Transfers in the Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7959</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7959</span>, <time datetime="2016-08" class="refDate">August 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7959</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5690 <dd class="break"></dd>
5691 <dt id="RFC8252">[RFC8252]</dt>
5692 <dd>
5693 <span class="refAuthor">Denniss, W.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">J. Bradley</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 for Native Apps"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 212</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8252</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8252</span>, <time datetime="2017-10" class="refDate">October 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8252</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5694 <dd class="break"></dd>
5695 <dt id="RFC8259">[RFC8259]</dt>
5696 <dd>
5697 <span class="refAuthor">Bray, T., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 90</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8259</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8259</span>, <time datetime="2017-12" class="refDate">December 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5698 <dd class="break"></dd>
5699 <dt id="RFC8414">[RFC8414]</dt>
5700 <dd>
5701 <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Sakimura, N.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">J. Bradley</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Authorization Server Metadata"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8414</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8414</span>, <time datetime="2018-06" class="refDate">June 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8414</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5702 <dd class="break"></dd>
5703 <dt id="RFC8446">[RFC8446]</dt>
5704 <dd>
5705 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8446</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8446</span>, <time datetime="2018-08" class="refDate">August 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5706 <dd class="break"></dd>
5707 <dt id="RFC8516">[RFC8516]</dt>
5708 <dd>
5709 <span class="refAuthor">Keranen, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">""Too Many Requests" Response Code for the Constrained Application Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8516</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8516</span>, <time datetime="2019-01" class="refDate">January 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8516">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8516</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5710 <dd class="break"></dd>
5711 <dt id="RFC8613">[RFC8613]</dt>
5712 <dd>
5713 <span class="refAuthor">Selander, G.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Mattsson, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Palombini, F.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">L. Seitz</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8613</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8613</span>, <time datetime="2019-07" class="refDate">July 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8613</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5714 <dd class="break"></dd>
5715 <dt id="RFC8628">[RFC8628]</dt>
5716 <dd>
5717 <span class="refAuthor">Denniss, W.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bradley, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Jones, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">H. Tschofenig</span>, <span class="refTitle">"OAuth 2.0 Device Authorization Grant"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8628</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8628</span>, <time datetime="2019-08" class="refDate">August 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8628</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5718 <dd class="break"></dd>
5719 <dt id="RFC9000">[RFC9000]</dt>
5720 <dd>
5721 <span class="refAuthor">Iyengar, J., Ed.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">M. Thomson, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9000</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9000</span>, <time datetime="2021-05" class="refDate">May 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5722 <dd class="break"></dd>
5723 <dt id="RFC9110">[RFC9110]</dt>
5724 <dd>
5725 <span class="refAuthor">Fielding, R., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Nottingham, M., Ed.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">J. Reschke, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP Semantics"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 97</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9110</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9110</span>, <time datetime="2022-06" class="refDate">June 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9110</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5726 <dd class="break"></dd>
5727 <dt id="RFC9113">[RFC9113]</dt>
5728 <dd>
5729 <span class="refAuthor">Thomson, M., Ed.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">C. Benfield, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP/2"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9113</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9113</span>, <time datetime="2022-06" class="refDate">June 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9113</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5730 <dd class="break"></dd>
5731 <dt id="RFC9147">[RFC9147]</dt>
5732 <dd>
5733 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Tschofenig, H.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">N. Modadugu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9147</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9147</span>, <time datetime="2022-04" class="refDate">April 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9147</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5734 <dd class="break"></dd>
5735 <dt id="RFC9202">[RFC9202]</dt>
5736 <dd>
5737 <span class="refAuthor">Gerdes, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bergmann, O.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Bormann, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Selander, G.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">L. Seitz</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Profile for Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9202</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9202</span>, <time datetime="2022-08" class="refDate">August 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9202">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9202</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5738 <dd class="break"></dd>
5739 <dt id="RFC9203">[RFC9203]</dt>
5740 <dd>
5741 <span class="refAuthor">Palombini, F.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Seitz, L.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Selander, G.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">M. Gunnarsson</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Object Security for Constrained RESTful Environments (OSCORE) Profile of the Authentication and Authorization for Constrained Environments (ACE) Framework"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9203</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9203</span>, <time datetime="2022-08" class="refDate">August 2022</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9203">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9203</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
5742 <dd class="break"></dd>
5743 </dl>
5744 </section>
5745 </section>
5746 <div id="constraints">
5747 <section id="appendix-A">
5748 <h2 id="name-design-justification">
5749 <a href="#appendix-A" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix A. </a><a href="#name-design-justification" class="section-name selfRef">Design Justification</a>
5750 </h2>
5751 <p id="appendix-A-1">This section provides further insight into the design decisions
5752 of the solution documented in this document. <a href="#overview" class="xref">Section 3</a>
5753 lists several building blocks and briefly summarizes their importance.
5754 The justification for offering some of those building blocks, as opposed
5755 to using OAuth 2.0 as is, is given below.<a href="#appendix-A-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5756 <p id="appendix-A-2">Common IoT constraints are:<a href="#appendix-A-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5757 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="appendix-A-3">
5758 <dt id="appendix-A-3.1">Low Power Radio:</dt>
5759 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-3.2">
5760 Many IoT devices are equipped with a small battery that needs
5761 to last for a long time. For many constrained wireless devices, the
5762 highest energy cost is associated to transmitting or receiving
5763 messages (roughly by a factor of 10 compared to AES)
5764 <span>[<a href="#Margi10impact" class="xref">Margi10impact</a>]</span>. It is therefore important
5765 to keep
5766 the total communication overhead low, including minimizing the number
5767 and size of messages sent and received, which has an impact of choice
5768 on the message format and protocol. By using CoAP over UDP and
5769 CBOR-encoded messages, some of these aspects are addressed. Security
5770 protocols contribute to the communication overhead and can, in some
5771 cases, be optimized. For example, authentication and key
5772 establishment may, in certain cases where security requirements
5773 allow, be replaced by the provisioning of security context by a trusted
5774 third party, using transport or application-layer security.<a href="#appendix-A-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5775 </dd>
5776 <dd class="break"></dd>
5777 <dt id="appendix-A-3.3">Low CPU Speed:</dt>
5778 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-3.4">
5779 Some IoT devices are equipped with processors that are significantly
5780 slower than those found in most current devices on the Internet.
5781 This typically has implications on what timely cryptographic
5782 operations a device is capable of performing, which in turn impacts,
5783 e.g., protocol latency. Symmetric key cryptography may be used
5784 instead of the computationally more expensive public key cryptography
5785 where the security requirements so allow, but this may also require
5786 support for trusted, third-party-assisted secret key establishment
5787 using transport- or application-layer security.<a href="#appendix-A-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5788 </dd>
5789 <dd class="break"></dd>
5790 <dt id="appendix-A-3.5">Small Amount of Memory:</dt>
5791 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-3.6">
5792 Microcontrollers embedded in IoT devices are often equipped with
5793 only a small amount of RAM and flash memory, which places limitations on what
5794 kind of processing can be performed and how much code can be put on
5795 those devices. To reduce code size, fewer and smaller protocol
5796 implementations can be put on the firmware of such a device. In
5797 this case, CoAP may be used instead of HTTP, symmetric-key
5798 cryptography may be used instead of public-key cryptography, and CBOR may be used
5799 instead of
5800 JSON. An authentication and key establishment protocol, e.g., the DTLS
5801 handshake, in comparison with assisted key establishment, also has
5802 an impact on memory and code footprints.<a href="#appendix-A-3.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5803 </dd>
5804 <dd class="break"></dd>
5805 <dt id="appendix-A-3.7">User Interface Limitations:</dt>
5806 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-3.8">
5807 Protecting access to resources is both an important security as well
5808 as privacy feature. End users and enterprise customers may not want
5809 to give access to the data collected by their IoT device or to
5810 functions it may offer to third parties. Since the classical
5811 approach of requesting permissions from end users via a rich user
5812 interface does not work in many IoT deployment scenarios, these
5813 functions need to be delegated to user-controlled devices that are
5814 better suitable for such tasks, such as smartphones and tablets.<a href="#appendix-A-3.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5815 </dd>
5816 <dd class="break"></dd>
5817 <dt id="appendix-A-3.9">Communication Constraints:</dt>
5818 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-3.10">
5819 <p id="appendix-A-3.10.1">
5820 In certain constrained settings, an IoT device may not be able to
5821 communicate with a given device at all times. Devices may be
5822 sleeping or just disconnected from the Internet because of general
5823 lack of connectivity in the area, cost reasons, or security
5824 reasons, e.g., to avoid an entry point for denial-of-service attacks.<a href="#appendix-A-3.10.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5825 <p id="appendix-A-3.10.2">
5826 The communication interactions this framework builds upon (as shown
5827 graphically in <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>) may be
5828 accomplished
5829 using a variety of different protocols, and not all parts of the
5830 message flow are used in all applications due to the communication
5831 constraints. Deployments making use of CoAP are expected, but this
5832 framework is not
5833 limited to them. Other protocols, such as HTTP or
5834 Bluetooth Smart communication, that do not
5835 necessarily use IP could also be used. The latter raises the need
5836 for application-layer security over the various interfaces.<a href="#appendix-A-3.10.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5837 </dd>
5838 <dd class="break"></dd>
5839 </dl>
5840 <p id="appendix-A-4">In the light of these constraints, we have made the following design
5841 decisions:<a href="#appendix-A-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
5842 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="appendix-A-5">
5843 <dt id="appendix-A-5.1">CBOR, COSE, CWT:</dt>
5844 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.2">
5845 When using this framework, it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to use CBOR
5846 <span>[<a href="#RFC8949" class="xref">RFC8949</a>]</span> as the data format. Where CBOR data
5847 needs to be
5848 protected, the use of COSE <span>[<a href="#RFC8152" class="xref">RFC8152</a>]</span> is
5849 <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>.
5850 Furthermore, where self-contained tokens are needed, it is
5851 <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>
5852 to use CWT <span>[<a href="#RFC8392" class="xref">RFC8392</a>]</span>. These measures aim
5853 at reducing
5854 the size of messages sent over the wire, the RAM size of data objects
5855 that need to be kept in memory, and the size of libraries that devices
5856 need to support.<a href="#appendix-A-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5857 </dd>
5858 <dd class="break"></dd>
5859 <dt id="appendix-A-5.3">CoAP:</dt>
5860 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.4">
5861 When using this framework, it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to use CoAP
5862 <span>[<a href="#RFC7252" class="xref">RFC7252</a>]</span> instead of HTTP. This does not
5863 preclude the
5864 use of other protocols specifically aimed at constrained devices,
5865 e.g., Bluetooth Low Energy (see <a href="#coap" class="xref">Section 3.2</a>).
5866 This aims
5867 again at reducing the size of messages sent over the wire, the RAM size
5868 of data objects that need to be kept in memory, and the size of
5869 libraries that devices need to support.<a href="#appendix-A-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5870 </dd>
5871 <dd class="break"></dd>
5872 <dt id="appendix-A-5.5">Access Information:</dt>
5873 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.6">
5874 This framework defines the name "Access Information" for data
5875 concerning the RS that the AS returns to the client in an access
5876 token response (see <a href="#tokenResponse" class="xref">Section 5.8.2</a>). This
5877 aims at
5878 enabling scenarios where a powerful client supporting multiple
5879 profiles needs to interact with an RS for which it does not know the
5880 supported profiles and the raw public key.<a href="#appendix-A-5.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5881 </dd>
5882 <dd class="break"></dd>
5883 <dt id="appendix-A-5.7">Proof of Possession:</dt>
5884 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.8">
5885 This framework makes use of proof-of-possession tokens, using
5886 the <code>cnf</code> claim <span>[<a href="#RFC8747" class="xref">RFC8747</a>]</span>. A request
5887 parameter <code>cnf</code> and a Response parameter <code>cnf</code>, both having a
5888 value space semantically and syntactically identical to the <code>cnf</code>
5889 claim, are defined for the token endpoint to allow requesting and
5890 stating confirmation keys. This aims at making token theft harder.
5891 Token theft is specifically relevant in constrained use cases, as
5892 communication often passes through middleboxes, which could be able
5893 to steal bearer tokens and use them to gain unauthorized access.<a href="#appendix-A-5.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5894 </dd>
5895 <dd class="break"></dd>
5896 <dt id="appendix-A-5.9">Authz-Info endpoint:</dt>
5897 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.10">
5898 This framework introduces a new way of providing access tokens
5899 to an RS by exposing an authz-info endpoint to which access tokens
5900 can be POSTed. This aims at reducing the size of the request
5901 message and the code complexity at the RS. The size of the request
5902 message is problematic, since many constrained protocols have severe
5903 message size limitations at the physical layer (e.g., in the order of
5904 100 bytes). This means that larger packets get fragmented, which in
5905 turn combines badly with the high rate of packet loss and the
5906 need to retransmit the whole message if one packet gets lost.
5907 Thus, separating sending of the request and sending of the access
5908 tokens helps to reduce fragmentation.<a href="#appendix-A-5.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5909 </dd>
5910 <dd class="break"></dd>
5911 <dt id="appendix-A-5.11">Client Credentials Grant:</dt>
5912 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.12">
5913 In this framework, the use of the client credentials grant is
5914 <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> for machine-to-machine communication use cases,
5915 where
5916 manual intervention of the resource owner to produce a grant token is
5917 not feasible. The intention is that the resource owner would instead
5918 prearrange authorization with the AS based on the client's own
5919 credentials. The client can then (without manual intervention) obtain
5920 access tokens from the AS.<a href="#appendix-A-5.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5921 </dd>
5922 <dd class="break"></dd>
5923 <dt id="appendix-A-5.13">Introspection:</dt>
5924 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-A-5.14">
5925 In this framework, the use of access token introspection is
5926 <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>
5927 in cases where the client is constrained in a way that it cannot
5928 easily obtain new access tokens (i.e., it has connectivity issues
5929 that prevent it from communicating with the AS). In that case,
5930 it is <span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span> to use a long-term token that could be a
5931 simple reference. The RS is assumed to be able to communicate
5932 with the AS and can therefore perform introspection in order to
5933 learn the claims associated with the token reference. The advantage
5934 of such an approach is that the resource owner can change the claims
5935 associated to the token reference without having to be in contact
5936 with the client, thus granting or revoking access rights.<a href="#appendix-A-5.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5937 </dd>
5938 <dd class="break"></dd>
5939 </dl>
5940 </section>
5941 </div>
5942 <div id="app_rolesAndResponsibilities">
5943 <section id="appendix-B">
5944 <h2 id="name-roles-and-responsibilities">
5945 <a href="#appendix-B" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix B. </a><a href="#name-roles-and-responsibilities" class="section-name selfRef">Roles and Responsibilities</a>
5946 </h2>
5947 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="appendix-B-1">
5948 <dt id="appendix-B-1.1">Resource Owner</dt>
5949 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-B-1.2">
5950 <ul class="normal">
5951 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.2.1.1">Make sure that the RS is registered at the AS. This includes
5952 making known to the AS which profiles, token_type, scopes, and
5953 key types (symmetric/asymmetric) the RS supports. Also making
5954 it known to the AS which audience(s) the RS identifies itself
5955 with.<a href="#appendix-B-1.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5956 </li>
5957 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.2.1.2">Make sure that clients can discover the AS that is in charge
5958 of the RS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.2.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5959 </li>
5960 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.2.1.3">If the client-credentials grant is used, make sure that the AS
5961 has the necessary, up-to-date access control policies for the
5962 RS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.2.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5963 </li>
5964 </ul>
5965 </dd>
5966 <dd class="break"></dd>
5967 <dt id="appendix-B-1.3">Requesting Party</dt>
5968 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-B-1.4">
5969 <ul class="normal">
5970 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.4.1.1">Make sure that the client is provisioned the necessary
5971 credentials to authenticate to the AS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.4.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5972 </li>
5973 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.4.1.2">Make sure that the client is configured to follow the security
5974 requirements of the requesting party when issuing requests
5975 (e.g., minimum communication security requirements or trust
5976 anchors).<a href="#appendix-B-1.4.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5977 </li>
5978 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.4.1.3">Register the client at the AS. This includes making known to
5979 the AS which profiles, token_types, and key types
5980 (symmetric/asymmetric) for the client.<a href="#appendix-B-1.4.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5981 </li>
5982 </ul>
5983 </dd>
5984 <dd class="break"></dd>
5985 <dt id="appendix-B-1.5">Authorization Server</dt>
5986 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-B-1.6">
5987 <ul class="normal">
5988 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.1">Register the RS and manage corresponding security contexts.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5989 </li>
5990 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.2">Register clients and authentication credentials.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5991 </li>
5992 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.3">Allow resource owners to configure and update access control
5993 policies related to their registered RSs.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5994 </li>
5995 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.4">Expose the token endpoint to allow clients to request
5996 tokens.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5997 </li>
5998 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.5">Authenticate clients that wish to request a token.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
5999 </li>
6000 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.6">Process a token request using the authorization
6001 policies configured for the RS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6002 </li>
6003 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.7">Optionally, expose the introspection endpoint that allows
6004 RSs to submit token introspection requests.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.7" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6005 </li>
6006 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.8">If providing an introspection endpoint, authenticate RSs that
6007 wish to get an introspection response.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6008 </li>
6009 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.9">If providing an introspection endpoint, process token
6010 introspection requests.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.9" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6011 </li>
6012 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.10">Optionally, handle token revocation.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6013 </li>
6014 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.11">Optionally, provide discovery metadata. See <span>[<a href="#RFC8414" class="xref">RFC8414</a>]</span>.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.11" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6015 </li>
6016 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.6.1.12">Optionally, handle refresh tokens.<a href="#appendix-B-1.6.1.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6017 </li>
6018 </ul>
6019 </dd>
6020 <dd class="break"></dd>
6021 <dt id="appendix-B-1.7">Client</dt>
6022 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-B-1.8">
6023 <ul class="normal">
6024 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.1">Discover the AS in charge of the RS that is to be targeted with
6025 a request.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6026 </li>
6027 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.2">
6028 <p id="appendix-B-1.8.1.2.1">Submit the token request (see step (A) of
6029 <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6030 <ul class="normal">
6031 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.2.2.1">Authenticate to the AS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6032 </li>
6033 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.2.2.2">Optionally (if not preconfigured), specify which RS, which
6034 resource(s), and which action(s) the request(s) will
6035 target.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.2.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6036 </li>
6037 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.2.2.3">If raw public keys (RPKs) or certificates are used, make sure
6038 the AS has the right RPK or certificate for this client.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.2.2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6039 </li>
6040 </ul>
6041 </li>
6042 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.3">
6043 <p id="appendix-B-1.8.1.3.1">Process the access token and Access Information (see step (B)
6044 of <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6045 <ul class="normal">
6046 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.3.2.1">Check that the Access Information provides the necessary
6047 security parameters (e.g., PoP key or information on
6048 communication security protocols supported by the RS).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.3.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6049 </li>
6050 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.3.2.2">Safely store the proof-of-possession key.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.3.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6051 </li>
6052 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.3.2.3">If provided by the AS, safely store the refresh token.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.3.2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6053 </li>
6054 </ul>
6055 </li>
6056 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.4">
6057 <p id="appendix-B-1.8.1.4.1">Send the token and request to the RS (see step (C) of
6058 <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6059 <ul class="normal">
6060 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.4.2.1">Authenticate towards the RS (this could coincide with the
6061 proof-of-possession process).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.4.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6062 </li>
6063 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.4.2.2">Transmit the token as specified by the AS (default is to the
6064 authz-info endpoint; alternative options are specified by
6065 profiles).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.4.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6066 </li>
6067 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.4.2.3">Perform the proof-of-possession procedure as specified by
6068 the profile in use (this may already have been taken care
6069 of through the authentication procedure).<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.4.2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6070 </li>
6071 </ul>
6072 </li>
6073 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.8.1.5">Process the RS response (see step (F) of
6074 <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>) of the RS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.8.1.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6075 </li>
6076 </ul>
6077 </dd>
6078 <dd class="break"></dd>
6079 <dt id="appendix-B-1.9">Resource Server</dt>
6080 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-B-1.10">
6081 <ul class="normal">
6082 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.1">Expose a way to submit access tokens. By default, this is
6083 the authz-info endpoint.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6084 </li>
6085 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2">
6086 <p id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.1">Process an access token.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6087 <ul class="normal">
6088 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.1">Verify the token is from a recognized AS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6089 </li>
6090 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.2">Check the token's integrity.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6091 </li>
6092 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.3">Verify that the token applies to this RS.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6093 </li>
6094 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.4">Check that the token has not expired (if the token provides
6095 expiration information).<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6096 </li>
6097 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.5">Store the token so that it can be retrieved in the context
6098 of a matching request.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6099 </li>
6100 </ul>
6101 <p id="appendix-B-1.10.1.2.3">
6102 Note: The order proposed here is not normative; any process
6103 that arrives at an equivalent result can be used. A noteworthy
6104 consideration is whether one can use cheap operations early on to
6105 quickly discard nonapplicable or invalid tokens before
6106 performing expensive cryptographic operations (e.g., doing an
6107 expiration check before verifying a signature).<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6108 </li>
6109 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3">
6110 <p id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3.1">Process a request.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6111 <ul class="normal">
6112 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.1">Set up communication security with the client.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6113 </li>
6114 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.2">Authenticate the client.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6115 </li>
6116 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.3">Match the client against existing tokens.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6117 </li>
6118 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.4">Check that tokens belonging to the client actually
6119 authorize the requested action.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6120 </li>
6121 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.5">Optionally, check that the matching tokens are still valid,
6122 using introspection (if this is possible.)<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.3.2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6123 </li>
6124 </ul>
6125 </li>
6126 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.4">Send a response following the agreed upon communication
6127 security mechanism(s).<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6128 </li>
6129 <li class="normal" id="appendix-B-1.10.1.5">Safely store credentials, such as raw public keys, for
6130 authentication or proof-of-possession keys linked to access
6131 tokens.<a href="#appendix-B-1.10.1.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6132 </li>
6133 </ul>
6134 </dd>
6135 <dd class="break"></dd>
6136 </dl>
6137 </section>
6138 </div>
6139 <div id="app_profileRequirements">
6140 <section id="appendix-C">
6141 <h2 id="name-requirements-on-profiles">
6142 <a href="#appendix-C" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix C. </a><a href="#name-requirements-on-profiles" class="section-name selfRef">Requirements on Profiles</a>
6143 </h2>
6144 <p id="appendix-C-1">This section lists the requirements on profiles of this framework
6145 for the convenience of profile designers.<a href="#appendix-C-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6146 <ul class="normal">
6147 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.1">Optionally, define new methods for the client to discover the
6148 necessary permissions and AS for accessing a resource different from
6149 the one proposed in Sections <a href="#asDiscovery" class="xref">5.1</a> and <a href="#specs" class="xref">4</a><a href="#appendix-C-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6150 </li>
6151 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.2">Optionally, specify new grant types
6152 (<a href="#authorizationGrants" class="xref">Section 5.4</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6153 </li>
6154 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.3">Optionally, define the use of client certificates as client credential
6155 type (<a href="#clientCredentials" class="xref">Section 5.5</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6156 </li>
6157 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.4">Specify the communication protocol the client and RS must use
6158 (e.g., CoAP) (Sections <a href="#oauthProfile" class="xref">5</a> and <a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">5.8.4.3</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6159 </li>
6160 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.5">Specify the security protocol the client and RS must use to protect
6161 their communication (e.g., OSCORE or DTLS). This must provide
6162 encryption and integrity and replay protection (<a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.3</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6163 </li>
6164 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.6">Specify how the client and the RS mutually authenticate (<a href="#specs" class="xref">Section 4</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6165 </li>
6166 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.7">Specify the proof-of-possession protocol(s) and how to select one
6167 if several are available. Also specify which key types
6168 (e.g., symmetric/asymmetric) are supported by a specific proof-of-possession
6169 protocol (<a href="#paramTokenType" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.2</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.7" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6170 </li>
6171 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.8">Specify a unique <code>ace_profile</code> identifier (<a href="#paramProfile" class="xref">Section 5.8.4.3</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6172 </li>
6173 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.9">If introspection is supported, specify the communication and security
6174 protocol for introspection (<a href="#introspectionEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.9</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.9" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6175 </li>
6176 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.10">Specify the communication and security protocol for interactions between
6177 the client and AS. This must provide encryption, integrity protection,
6178 replay protection, and a binding between requests and responses (Sections <a href="#oauthProfile" class="xref">5</a> and <a href="#tokenEndpoint" class="xref">5.8</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6179 </li>
6180 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.11">Specify how/if the authz-info endpoint is protected, including
6181 how error responses are protected (<a href="#tokenAuthInfoEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.10.1</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.11" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6182 </li>
6183 <li class="normal" id="appendix-C-2.12">Optionally, define other methods of token transport than the authz-info
6184 endpoint (<a href="#tokenAuthInfoEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.10.1</a>).<a href="#appendix-C-2.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6185 </li>
6186 </ul>
6187 </section>
6188 </div>
6189 <div id="app_registration">
6190 <section id="appendix-D">
6191 <h2 id="name-assumptions-on-as-knowledge">
6192 <a href="#appendix-D" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix D. </a><a href="#name-assumptions-on-as-knowledge" class="section-name selfRef">Assumptions on AS Knowledge about the C and RS</a>
6193 </h2>
6194 <p id="appendix-D-1">This section lists the assumptions on what an AS should know about a
6195 client and an RS in order to be able to respond to requests to the token
6196 and introspection endpoints. How this information is established is out of
6197 scope for this document.<a href="#appendix-D-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6198 <ul class="normal">
6199 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.1">The identifier of the client or RS.<a href="#appendix-D-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6200 </li>
6201 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.2">The profiles that the client or RS supports.<a href="#appendix-D-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6202 </li>
6203 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.3">The scopes that the RS supports.<a href="#appendix-D-2.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6204 </li>
6205 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.4">The audiences that the RS identifies with.<a href="#appendix-D-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6206 </li>
6207 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.5">The key types (e.g., pre-shared symmetric key, raw public key,
6208 key length, and other key parameters) that the client or RS supports.<a href="#appendix-D-2.5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6209 </li>
6210 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.6">The types of access tokens the RS supports (e.g., CWT).<a href="#appendix-D-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6211 </li>
6212 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.7">If the RS supports CWTs, the COSE parameters for the crypto wrapper
6213 (e.g., algorithm, key-wrap algorithm, and key-length) that the RS supports.<a href="#appendix-D-2.7" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6214 </li>
6215 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.8">The expiration time for access tokens issued to this RS
6216 (unless the RS accepts a default time chosen by the AS).<a href="#appendix-D-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6217 </li>
6218 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.9">The symmetric key shared between the client and AS (if any).<a href="#appendix-D-2.9" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6219 </li>
6220 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.10">The symmetric key shared between the RS and AS (if any).<a href="#appendix-D-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6221 </li>
6222 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.11">The raw public key of the client or RS (if any).<a href="#appendix-D-2.11" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6223 </li>
6224 <li class="normal" id="appendix-D-2.12">Whether the RS has synchronized time (and thus is able to use the <code>exp</code>
6225 claim) or not.<a href="#appendix-D-2.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6226 </li>
6227 </ul>
6228 </section>
6229 </div>
6230 <div id="app_diffOAuth">
6231 <section id="appendix-E">
6232 <h2 id="name-differences-to-oauth-20">
6233 <a href="#appendix-E" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix E. </a><a href="#name-differences-to-oauth-20" class="section-name selfRef">Differences to OAuth 2.0</a>
6234 </h2>
6235 <p id="appendix-E-1">This document adapts OAuth 2.0 to be suitable for constrained environments.
6236 This section lists the main differences from the normative requirements of
6237 OAuth 2.0.<a href="#appendix-E-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6238 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="appendix-E-2">
6239 <dt id="appendix-E-2.1">Use of TLS</dt>
6240 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-E-2.2">OAuth 2.0 requires the use of TLS to protect the
6241 communication between the AS and client when requesting an access token,
6242 between the client and RS when accessing a resource, and between the AS and RS if
6243 introspection is used. This framework requires similar security
6244 properties but does not require that they be realized with TLS.
6245 See <a href="#oauthProfile" class="xref">Section 5</a>.<a href="#appendix-E-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6246 </dd>
6247 <dd class="break"></dd>
6248 <dt id="appendix-E-2.3">Cardinality of <code>grant_type</code> parameter</dt>
6249 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-E-2.4">In client-to-AS requests
6250 using OAuth 2.0, the <code>grant_type</code> parameter is required (per
6251 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>). In this framework, this parameter
6252 is optional. See <a href="#tokenRequest" class="xref">Section 5.8.1</a>.<a href="#appendix-E-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6253 </dd>
6254 <dd class="break"></dd>
6255 <dt id="appendix-E-2.5">Encoding of <code>scope</code> parameter</dt>
6256 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-E-2.6">In client-to-AS requests using OAuth
6257 2.0, the <code>scope</code> parameter is string encoded (per
6258 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>). In this framework, this parameter
6259 may also be
6260 encoded as a byte string. See <a href="#tokenRequest" class="xref">Section 5.8.1</a>.<a href="#appendix-E-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6261 </dd>
6262 <dd class="break"></dd>
6263 <dt id="appendix-E-2.7">Cardinality of <code>token_type</code> parameter</dt>
6264 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-E-2.8">In AS-to-client responses
6265 using OAuth 2.0, the <code>token_type</code> parameter is required (per
6266 <span>[<a href="#RFC6749" class="xref">RFC6749</a>]</span>). In this framework, this parameter
6267 is
6268 optional. See <a href="#tokenResponse" class="xref">Section 5.8.2</a>.<a href="#appendix-E-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6269 </dd>
6270 <dd class="break"></dd>
6271 <dt id="appendix-E-2.9">Access token retention</dt>
6272 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-E-2.10">In OAuth 2.0, the access token may be sent with
6273 every request to the RS. The exact use of access tokens depends on the
6274 semantics
6275 of the application and the session management concept it uses. In this
6276 framework,
6277 the RS must be able to store these tokens for later use. See
6278 <a href="#tokenAuthInfoEndpoint" class="xref">Section 5.10.1</a>.<a href="#appendix-E-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6279 </dd>
6280 <dd class="break"></dd>
6281 </dl>
6282 </section>
6283 </div>
6284 <div id="app_options">
6285 <section id="appendix-F">
6286 <h2 id="name-deployment-examples">
6287 <a href="#appendix-F" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix F. </a><a href="#name-deployment-examples" class="section-name selfRef">Deployment Examples</a>
6288 </h2>
6289 <p id="appendix-F-1">There is a large variety of IoT deployments, as is indicated in
6290 <a href="#constraints" class="xref">Appendix A</a>, and this section highlights a few common
6291 variants. This section is not normative but illustrates how the
6292 framework can be applied.<a href="#appendix-F-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6293 <p id="appendix-F-2">For each of the deployment variants, there are a number of possible
6294 security setups between clients, resource servers, and authorization
6295 servers. The main focus in the following subsections is on how
6296 authorization of a client request for a resource hosted by an RS is
6297 performed. This requires the security of the requests and
6298 responses between the clients and the RS to be considered.<a href="#appendix-F-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6299 <p id="appendix-F-3">Note: CBOR diagnostic notation is used for examples of requests
6300 and responses.<a href="#appendix-F-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6301 <div id="localTokenValidation">
6302 <section id="appendix-F.1">
6303 <h3 id="name-local-token-validation">
6304 <a href="#appendix-F.1" class="section-number selfRef">F.1. </a><a href="#name-local-token-validation" class="section-name selfRef">Local Token Validation</a>
6305 </h3>
6306 <p id="appendix-F.1-1">In this scenario, the case where the resource server is offline is considered,
6307 i.e., it is not connected to the AS at the time of the access request.
6308 This access procedure involves steps (A), (B), (C), and (F) of <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6309 <p id="appendix-F.1-2">Since the resource server must be able to verify the access token locally,
6310 self-contained access tokens must be used.<a href="#appendix-F.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6311 <p id="appendix-F.1-3">This example shows the interactions between a client, the
6312 authorization server, and a temperature sensor acting as a resource server. Message
6313 exchanges A and B are shown in <a href="#fig_RSOffline" class="xref">Figure 11</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6314 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="appendix-F.1-4">
6315 <dt id="appendix-F.1-4.1">A:</dt>
6316 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.1-4.2">
6317 <p id="appendix-F.1-4.2.1">The client first generates a public-private key pair used for
6318 communication security with the RS.<a href="#appendix-F.1-4.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6319 <p id="appendix-F.1-4.2.2">The client sends a CoAP POST request to the token endpoint at the AS.
6320 The security
6321 of this request can be transport or application layer. It is up the
6322 communication security profile to define. In the example, it is
6323 assumed that both the client and AS have performed mutual authentication,
6324 e.g., via DTLS. The request contains the public key of the client and
6325 the <code>audience</code> parameter set to "tempSensorInLivingRoom", a value that
6326 the temperature sensor identifies itself with. The AS evaluates the
6327 request and authorizes the client to access the resource.<a href="#appendix-F.1-4.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6328 </dd>
6329 <dd class="break"></dd>
6330 <dt id="appendix-F.1-4.3">B:</dt>
6331 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.1-4.4">
6332 <p id="appendix-F.1-4.4.1">The AS responds with a 2.05 (Content) response containing the
6333 Access Information, including the access token.
6334 The PoP access token contains the public key of the client, and the
6335 Access Information contains the public key of the RS. For communication
6336 security, this example uses DTLS RawPublicKey between the client and the
6337 RS. The issued token will have a short validity time, i.e., <code>exp</code> close
6338 to <code>iat</code>, in order to mitigate attacks using stolen client credentials.
6339 The token includes claims, such as <code>scope</code>, with the authorized access
6340 that an owner of the temperature device can enjoy. In this example, the
6341 <code>scope</code> claim issued by the AS informs the RS that the owner of the
6342 token that can prove the possession of a key is authorized to make a GET
6343 request against the /temperature resource and a POST request on the
6344 /firmware resource. Note that the syntax and semantics of the <code>scope</code> claim
6345 are application specific.<a href="#appendix-F.1-4.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6346 <p id="appendix-F.1-4.4.2">Note: In this example, it is assumed that the client knows what resource
6347 it wants to access and is therefore able to request specific
6348 <code>audience</code> and <code>scope</code> claims for the access token.<a href="#appendix-F.1-4.4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6349 </dd>
6350 <dd class="break"></dd>
6351 </dl>
6352 <span id="name-token-request-and-response-"></span><div id="fig_RSOffline">
6353 <figure id="figure-11">
6354 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="appendix-F.1-5.1">
6355 <pre>
6356 Authorization
6357 Client Server
6358 | |
6359 |&lt;=======&gt;| DTLS Connection Establishment
6360 | | and mutual authentication
6361 | |
6362 A: +--------&gt;| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
6363 | POST | Uri-Path:"token"
6364 | | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
6365 | | Payload: &lt;Request-Payload&gt;
6366 | |
6367 B: |&lt;--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
6368 | 2.05 | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
6369 | | Payload: &lt;Response-Payload&gt;
6370 | |
6371 </pre>
6372 </div>
6373 <figcaption><a href="#figure-11" class="selfRef">Figure 11</a>:
6374 <a href="#name-token-request-and-response-" class="selfRef">Token Request and Response Using Client Credentials</a>
6375 </figcaption></figure>
6376 </div>
6377 <p id="appendix-F.1-6">The information contained in the Request-Payload and the
6378 Response-Payload is shown in <a href="#fig_RSOfflineReq" class="xref">Figure 12</a>.
6379 Note that the parameter <code>rs_cnf</code> from
6380 <span>[<a href="#RFC9201" class="xref">RFC9201</a>]</span> is used to inform
6381 the client about the resource server's public key.<a href="#appendix-F.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6382 <span id="name-request-and-response-payloa"></span><div id="fig_RSOfflineReq">
6383 <figure id="figure-12">
6384 <div id="appendix-F.1-7.1">
6385 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
6386 Request-Payload :
6387 {
6388 / audience / 5 : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
6389 / client_id / 24 : "myclient",
6390 / req_cnf / 4 : {
6391 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
6392 / kid / 2 : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e',
6393 / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
6394 / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
6395 / x / -2 : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
6396 / y / -3 : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
6397 }
6398 }
6399 }
6400
6401 Response-Payload :
6402 {
6403 / access_token / 1 : b64'0INDoQEKoQVNKkXfb7xaWqMT'/ .../,
6404 / rs_cnf / 41 : {
6405 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
6406 / kid / 2 : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
6407 / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
6408 / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
6409 / x / -2 : b64'MKBCTNIcKUSDii11ySs3526iDZ8AiTo7Tu6KPAqv7D4',
6410 / y / -3 : b64'4Etl6SRW2YiLUrN5vfvVHuhp7x8PxltmWWlbbM4IFyM'
6411 }
6412 }
6413 }
6414 </pre>
6415 </div>
6416 <figcaption><a href="#figure-12" class="selfRef">Figure 12</a>:
6417 <a href="#name-request-and-response-payloa" class="selfRef">Request and Response Payload Details</a>
6418 </figcaption></figure>
6419 </div>
6420 <p id="appendix-F.1-8">The content of the access token is shown
6421 in <a href="#fig_BothcborMappingValueAsymmetricCWT" class="xref">Figure 13</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6422 <span id="name-access-token-including-publ"></span><div id="fig_BothcborMappingValueAsymmetricCWT">
6423 <figure id="figure-13">
6424 <div id="appendix-F.1-9.1">
6425 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
6426 {
6427 / aud / 3 : "tempSensorInLivingRoom",
6428 / iat / 6 : 1563451500,
6429 / exp / 4 : 1563453000,
6430 / scope / 9 : "temperature_g firmware_p",
6431 / cnf / 8 : {
6432 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
6433 / kid / 2 : b64'1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e',
6434 / kty / 1 : 2 / EC2 /,
6435 / crv / -1 : 1 / P-256 /,
6436 / x / -2 : b64'f83OJ3D2xF1Bg8vub9tLe1gHMzV76e8Tus9uPHvRVEU',
6437 / y / -3 : b64'x_FEzRu9m36HLN_tue659LNpXW6pCyStikYjKIWI5a0'
6438 }
6439 }
6440 }
6441 </pre>
6442 </div>
6443 <figcaption><a href="#figure-13" class="selfRef">Figure 13</a>:
6444 <a href="#name-access-token-including-publ" class="selfRef">Access Token Including Public Key of the Client</a>
6445 </figcaption></figure>
6446 </div>
6447 <p id="appendix-F.1-10">Messages C and F are shown in Figures
6448 <a href="#fig_RSOfflinePostAccessTokenAsymmetric" class="xref">14</a> and
6449 <a href="#fig_RSOfflineDTLSRequestAndResponse" class="xref">15</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.1-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6450 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="appendix-F.1-11">
6451 <dt id="appendix-F.1-11.1">C:</dt>
6452 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.1-11.2">
6453 The client then sends the PoP access token to the authz-info endpoint at
6454 the RS. This is a plain CoAP POST request, i.e., no transport or
6455 application-layer security is used between the client and RS since the token is
6456 integrity protected
6457 between the AS and RS. The RS verifies that the PoP access token was
6458 created by a
6459 known and trusted AS, which it applies to this RS, and that it is valid.
6460 The RS caches
6461 the security context together with authorization information about this
6462 client contained in the PoP access token.<a href="#appendix-F.1-11.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6463 </dd>
6464 <dd class="break"></dd>
6465 </dl>
6466 <span id="name-access-token-provisioning-t"></span><div id="fig_RSOfflinePostAccessTokenAsymmetric">
6467 <figure id="figure-14">
6468 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="appendix-F.1-12.1">
6469 <pre>
6470 Resource
6471 Client Server
6472 | |
6473 C: +--------&gt;| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
6474 | POST | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
6475 | | Payload: 0INDoQEKoQVN ...
6476 | |
6477 |&lt;--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
6478 | 2.04 |
6479 | |
6480 </pre>
6481 </div>
6482 <figcaption><a href="#figure-14" class="selfRef">Figure 14</a>:
6483 <a href="#name-access-token-provisioning-t" class="selfRef">Access Token Provisioning to the RS</a>
6484 </figcaption></figure>
6485 </div>
6486 <p id="appendix-F.1-13">The client and the RS runs the DTLS handshake using the raw
6487 public keys established in steps B and C.<a href="#appendix-F.1-13" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6488 <p id="appendix-F.1-14">The client sends a CoAP GET request to /temperature on the RS over
6489 DTLS. The RS verifies that the request is authorized based on
6490 previously established security context.<a href="#appendix-F.1-14" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6491 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="appendix-F.1-15">
6492 <dt id="appendix-F.1-15.1">F:</dt>
6493 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="appendix-F.1-15.2">The RS responds over the same DTLS channel with a CoAP 2.05 Content response
6494 containing a resource representation as payload.<a href="#appendix-F.1-15.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6495 </dd>
6496 <dd class="break"></dd>
6497 </dl>
6498 <span id="name-resource-request-and-respon"></span><div id="fig_RSOfflineDTLSRequestAndResponse">
6499 <figure id="figure-15">
6500 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="appendix-F.1-16.1">
6501 <pre>
6502 Resource
6503 Client Server
6504 | |
6505 |&lt;=======&gt;| DTLS Connection Establishment
6506 | | using Raw Public Keys
6507 | |
6508 +--------&gt;| Header: GET (Code=0.01)
6509 | GET | Uri-Path: "temperature"
6510 | |
6511 | |
6512 | |
6513 F: |&lt;--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
6514 | 2.05 | Payload: &lt;sensor value&gt;
6515 | |
6516 </pre>
6517 </div>
6518 <figcaption><a href="#figure-15" class="selfRef">Figure 15</a>:
6519 <a href="#name-resource-request-and-respon" class="selfRef">Resource Request and Response Protected by DTLS</a>
6520 </figcaption></figure>
6521 </div>
6522 </section>
6523 </div>
6524 <div id="introspectionAidedTokenValidation">
6525 <section id="appendix-F.2">
6526 <h3 id="name-introspection-aided-token-v">
6527 <a href="#appendix-F.2" class="section-number selfRef">F.2. </a><a href="#name-introspection-aided-token-v" class="section-name selfRef">Introspection Aided Token Validation</a>
6528 </h3>
6529 <p id="appendix-F.2-1">In this deployment scenario, it is assumed that a client is not able to
6530 access the AS at the time of the access request, whereas the RS is assumed
6531 to be connected to the back-end infrastructure. Thus, the RS can make use of
6532 token introspection. This access procedure involves steps (A)-(F) of
6533 <a href="#fig_protocolFlow" class="xref">Figure 1</a> but assumes steps (A) and (B) have been
6534 carried out during a phase when the client had connectivity to the AS.<a href="#appendix-F.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6535 <p id="appendix-F.2-2">Since the client is assumed to be offline, at least for a certain period of
6536 time, a preprovisioned access token has to be long lived. Since the client
6537 is constrained, the token will not be self-contained (i.e., not a CWT) but
6538 instead just a reference. The resource server uses its connectivity to
6539 learn about the claims associated to the access token by using introspection,
6540 which is shown in the example below.<a href="#appendix-F.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6541 <p id="appendix-F.2-3">In the example, interactions between an offline client
6542 (key fob), an RS (online lock), and an AS is shown. It is
6543 assumed that there is a provisioning step where the client has access to the
6544 AS. This corresponds to message exchanges A and B, which are shown in
6545 <a href="#fig_cOffline" class="xref">Figure 16</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6546 <p id="appendix-F.2-4">Authorization consent from the resource owner can be preconfigured,
6547 but it can also be provided via an interactive flow with the resource
6548 owner. An example of this for the key fob case could be that the
6549 resource owner has a connected car and buys a generic key to use with the
6550 car. To authorize the key fob, the owner connects it to a computer that
6551 then provides the UI for the device. After that, OAuth 2.0 implicit flow
6552 can be used to authorize the key for the car at the car manufacturer's
6553 AS.<a href="#appendix-F.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6554 <p id="appendix-F.2-5">Note: In this example, the client does not know the exact door it
6555 will be used to access since the token request is not sent at the
6556 time of access. So the <code>scope</code> and <code>audience</code> parameters are set quite
6557 wide to start with, while tailored values narrowing down the claims to
6558 the specific RS being accessed can be provided to that RS during
6559 an introspection step.<a href="#appendix-F.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6560 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="appendix-F.2-6">
6561 <dt id="appendix-F.2-6.1">A:</dt>
6562 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.2-6.2">The client sends a CoAP POST request to the token endpoint at the
6563 AS. The request contains the <code>audience</code> parameter set to "PACS1337"
6564 (Physical Access System (PACS)), a value that identifies the
6565 physical access control system to which the individual doors are
6566 connected. The AS generates an access token as an opaque string, which
6567 it can match to the specific client and the targeted audience. It
6568 furthermore generates a symmetric proof-of-possession key. The
6569 communication security and authentication between the client and AS
6570 is assumed to have been provided at the transport layer (e.g., via DTLS)
6571 using a pre-shared security context (pre-shared key (PSK), RPK, or
6572 certificate).<a href="#appendix-F.2-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6573 </dd>
6574 <dd class="break"></dd>
6575 <dt id="appendix-F.2-6.3">B:</dt>
6576 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.2-6.4">The AS responds with a CoAP 2.05 Content response, containing as
6577 payload the Access Information, including the access token and the
6578 symmetric proof-of-possession key. Communication security between the C
6579 and RS will be DTLS and PreSharedKey. The PoP key is used as the
6580 PreSharedKey.<a href="#appendix-F.2-6.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6581 </dd>
6582 <dd class="break"></dd>
6583 </dl>
6584 <p id="appendix-F.2-7">Note: In this example, we are using a symmetric key for a multi-RS
6585 audience, which is not recommended normally (see <a href="#audience" class="xref">Section 6.9</a>).
6586 However, in this case, the risk is deemed to be acceptable, since
6587 all the doors are part of the same physical access control system;
6588 therefore, the risk of a malicious RS impersonating the client towards
6589 another RS is low.<a href="#appendix-F.2-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6590 <span id="name-token-request-and-response-u"></span><div id="fig_cOffline">
6591 <figure id="figure-16">
6592 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="appendix-F.2-8.1">
6593 <pre>
6594 Authorization
6595 Client Server
6596 | |
6597 |&lt;=======&gt;| DTLS Connection Establishment
6598 | | and mutual authentication
6599 | |
6600 A: +--------&gt;| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
6601 | POST | Uri-Path:"token"
6602 | | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
6603 | | Payload: &lt;Request-Payload&gt;
6604 | |
6605 B: |&lt;--------+ Header: 2.05 Content
6606 | | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
6607 | 2.05 | Payload: &lt;Response-Payload&gt;
6608 | |
6609 </pre>
6610 </div>
6611 <figcaption><a href="#figure-16" class="selfRef">Figure 16</a>:
6612 <a href="#name-token-request-and-response-u" class="selfRef">Token Request and Response Using Client Credentials</a>
6613 </figcaption></figure>
6614 </div>
6615 <p id="appendix-F.2-9">The information contained in the Request-Payload and the
6616 Response-Payload is shown in <a href="#fig_cOfflineReq" class="xref">Figure 17</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.2-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6617 <span id="name-request-and-response-payload"></span><div id="fig_cOfflineReq">
6618 <figure id="figure-17">
6619 <div id="appendix-F.2-10.1">
6620 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
6621 Request-Payload:
6622 {
6623 / client_id / 24 : "keyfob",
6624 / audience / 5 : "PACS1337"
6625 }
6626
6627 Response-Payload:
6628 {
6629 / access_token / 1 : b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg',
6630 / cnf / 8 : {
6631 / COSE_Key / 1 : {
6632 / kid / 2 : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk',
6633 / kty / 1 : 4 / Symmetric /,
6634 / k / -1 : b64'ZoRSOrFzN_FzUA5XKMYoVHyzff5oRJxl-IXRtztJ6uE'
6635 }
6636 }
6637 }
6638 </pre>
6639 </div>
6640 <figcaption><a href="#figure-17" class="selfRef">Figure 17</a>:
6641 <a href="#name-request-and-response-payload" class="selfRef">Request and Response Payload for the C Offline</a>
6642 </figcaption></figure>
6643 </div>
6644 <p id="appendix-F.2-11">In this case, the access token is just an opaque byte string referencing
6645 the authorization information at the AS.<a href="#appendix-F.2-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6646 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="appendix-F.2-12">
6647 <dt id="appendix-F.2-12.1">C:</dt>
6648 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.2-12.2">Next, the client POSTs the access token to the authz-info
6649 endpoint in the RS. This is a plain CoAP request, i.e., no
6650 DTLS between the client and RS. Since the token is an opaque string,
6651 the RS cannot verify it on its own, and thus defers to respond to the
6652 client with a status code until after step E.<a href="#appendix-F.2-12.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6653 </dd>
6654 <dd class="break"></dd>
6655 <dt id="appendix-F.2-12.3">D:</dt>
6656 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.2-12.4">The RS sends the token to the introspection
6657 endpoint on the AS using a CoAP POST request. In this example, the RS and
6658 AS are assumed to have performed mutual authentication using a pre-shared security
6659 context (PSK, RPK, or certificate) with the RS acting as the DTLS client.<a href="#appendix-F.2-12.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6660 </dd>
6661 <dd class="break"></dd>
6662 <dt id="appendix-F.2-12.5">E:</dt>
6663 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.2-12.6">
6664 <p id="appendix-F.2-12.6.1">The AS provides the introspection response (2.05 Content)
6665 containing parameters about the token. This includes the confirmation
6666 key (<code>cnf</code>) parameter that allows the RS to verify the client's proof of
6667 possession in step F. Note that our example in <a href="#fig_cOfflineIntroReq" class="xref">Figure 19</a> assumes a preestablished key
6668 (e.g., one
6669 used by the client and the RS for a previous token) that is now only
6670 referenced by its key identifier <code>kid</code>.<a href="#appendix-F.2-12.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6671 <p id="appendix-F.2-12.6.2">After receiving message E, the RS responds to the client's POST in
6672 step C with the CoAP response code 2.01 (Created).<a href="#appendix-F.2-12.6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6673 </dd>
6674 <dd class="break"></dd>
6675 </dl>
6676 <span id="name-token-introspection-for-the"></span><div id="fig_cOfflineIntrospection">
6677 <figure id="figure-18">
6678 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="appendix-F.2-13.1">
6679 <pre>
6680 Resource
6681 Client Server
6682 | |
6683 C: +--------&gt;| Header: POST (T=CON, Code=0.02)
6684 | POST | Uri-Path:"authz-info"
6685 | | Payload: b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg'
6686 | |
6687 | | Authorization
6688 | | Server
6689 | | |
6690 | D: +---------&gt;| Header: POST (Code=0.02)
6691 | | POST | Uri-Path: "introspect"
6692 | | | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
6693 | | | Payload: &lt;Request-Payload&gt;
6694 | | |
6695 | E: |&lt;---------+ Header: 2.05 Content
6696 | | 2.05 | Content-Format: application/ace+cbor
6697 | | | Payload: &lt;Response-Payload&gt;
6698 | | |
6699 | |
6700 |&lt;--------+ Header: 2.01 Created
6701 | 2.01 |
6702 | |
6703 </pre>
6704 </div>
6705 <figcaption><a href="#figure-18" class="selfRef">Figure 18</a>:
6706 <a href="#name-token-introspection-for-the" class="selfRef">Token Introspection for the C Offline</a>
6707 </figcaption></figure>
6708 </div>
6709 <p id="appendix-F.2-14">The information contained in the Request-Payload and the
6710 Response-Payload is shown in <a href="#fig_cOfflineIntroReq" class="xref">Figure 19</a>.<a href="#appendix-F.2-14" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6711 <span id="name-request-and-response-payload-"></span><div id="fig_cOfflineIntroReq">
6712 <figure id="figure-19">
6713 <div id="appendix-F.2-15.1">
6714 <pre class="lang-cbor-diag sourcecode">
6715 Request-Payload:
6716 {
6717 / token / 11 : b64'VGVzdCB0b2tlbg',
6718 / client_id / 24 : "FrontDoor"
6719 }
6720
6721 Response-Payload:
6722 {
6723 / active / 10 : true,
6724 / aud / 3 : "lockOfDoor4711",
6725 / scope / 9 : "open close",
6726 / iat / 6 : 1563454000,
6727 / cnf / 8 : {
6728 / kid / 3 : b64'c29tZSBwdWJsaWMga2V5IGlk'
6729 }
6730 }
6731 </pre>
6732 </div>
6733 <figcaption><a href="#figure-19" class="selfRef">Figure 19</a>:
6734 <a href="#name-request-and-response-payload-" class="selfRef">Request and Response Payload for Introspection</a>
6735 </figcaption></figure>
6736 </div>
6737 <p id="appendix-F.2-16">The client uses the symmetric PoP key to establish a DTLS
6738 PreSharedKey secure connection to the RS. The CoAP request PUT is
6739 sent to the uri-path /state on the RS, changing the state of the door to
6740 locked.<a href="#appendix-F.2-16" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6741 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="appendix-F.2-17">
6742 <dt id="appendix-F.2-17.1">F:</dt>
6743 <dd style="margin-left: 2.0em" id="appendix-F.2-17.2">The RS responds with an appropriate response over the secure DTLS channel.<a href="#appendix-F.2-17.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
6744 </dd>
6745 <dd class="break"></dd>
6746 </dl>
6747 <span id="name-resource-request-and-respons"></span><div id="fig_cOfflineDTLSRequestAndResponse">
6748 <figure id="figure-20">
6749 <div class="alignLeft art-text artwork" id="appendix-F.2-18.1">
6750 <pre>
6751 Resource
6752 Client Server
6753 | |
6754 |&lt;=======&gt;| DTLS Connection Establishment
6755 | | using Pre Shared Key
6756 | |
6757 +--------&gt;| Header: PUT (Code=0.03)
6758 | PUT | Uri-Path: "state"
6759 | | Payload: &lt;new state for the lock&gt;
6760 | |
6761 F: |&lt;--------+ Header: 2.04 Changed
6762 | 2.04 | Payload: &lt;new state for the lock&gt;
6763 | |
6764 </pre>
6765 </div>
6766 <figcaption><a href="#figure-20" class="selfRef">Figure 20</a>:
6767 <a href="#name-resource-request-and-respons" class="selfRef">Resource Request and Response Protected by OSCORE</a>
6768 </figcaption></figure>
6769 </div>
6770 </section>
6771 </div>
6772 </section>
6773 </div>
6774 <div id="Acknowledgments">
6775 <section id="appendix-G">
6776 <h2 id="name-acknowledgments">
6777 <a href="#name-acknowledgments" class="section-name selfRef">Acknowledgments</a>
6778 </h2>
6779 <p id="appendix-G-1">This document is a product of the ACE Working Group of the IETF.<a href="#appendix-G-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6780 <p id="appendix-G-2">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Eve Maler</span> for her contributions to the use of
6781 OAuth 2.0 and Unlicensed Mobile Access (UMA) in IoT scenarios,
6782 <span class="contact-name">Robert Taylor</span> for his
6783 discussion input, and <span class="contact-name">Mališa Vučinić</span> for his input on the
6784 predecessors of this proposal.<a href="#appendix-G-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6785 <p id="appendix-G-3">Thanks to the authors of "<span>[<a href="#I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution" class="xref">POP-KEY-DIST</a>]</span><a href="#I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution" class="xref">OAuth 2.0 Proof-of-Possession: Authorization Server to Client Key Distribution</a>" <span>[<a href="#I-D.ietf-oauth-pop-key-distribution" class="xref">POP-KEY-DIST</a>]</span>, from where
6786 parts of the security considerations where copied.<a href="#appendix-G-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6787 <p id="appendix-G-4">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Stefanie Gerdes</span>, <span class="contact-name">Olaf Bergmann</span>, and <span class="contact-name">Carsten Bormann</span> for contributing their work on AS discovery from
6788 "<a href="#I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize" class="xref">Delegated CoAP Authentication and Authorization Framework (DCAF)</a>" <span>[<a href="#I-D.gerdes-ace-dcaf-authorize" class="xref">DCAF</a>]</span> (see <a href="#asDiscovery" class="xref">Section 5.1</a>) and the considerations on multiple access tokens.<a href="#appendix-G-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6789 <p id="appendix-G-5">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Jim Schaad</span> and <span class="contact-name">Mike Jones</span> for their comprehensive reviews.<a href="#appendix-G-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6790 <p id="appendix-G-6">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Benjamin Kaduk</span> for his input on various
6791 questions related to this work.<a href="#appendix-G-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6792 <p id="appendix-G-7">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Cigdem Sengul</span> for some very useful review
6793 comments.<a href="#appendix-G-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6794 <p id="appendix-G-8">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Carsten Bormann</span> for contributing the text for
6795 the CoRE Resource Type registry.<a href="#appendix-G-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6796 <p id="appendix-G-9">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Roman Danyliw</span> for suggesting <a href="#app_diffOAuth" class="xref">Appendix E</a>
6797 (including its contents).<a href="#appendix-G-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6798 <p id="appendix-G-10"><span class="contact-name">Ludwig Seitz</span> and <span class="contact-name">Göran Selander</span>
6799 worked on this document as part of the CelticPlus project CyberWI, with funding
6800 from Vinnova. <span class="contact-name">Ludwig Seitz</span>
6801 has also received further funding for this work by Vinnova in the context of
6802 the CelticNext project CRITISEC.<a href="#appendix-G-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
6803 </section>
6804 </div>
6805 <div id="authors-addresses">
6806 <section id="appendix-H">
6807 <h2 id="name-authors-addresses">
6808 <a href="#name-authors-addresses" class="section-name selfRef">Authors' Addresses</a>
6809 </h2>
6810 <address class="vcard">
6811 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Ludwig Seitz</span></div>
6812 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Combitech</span></div>
6813 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="street-address">Djäknegatan 31</span></div>
6814 <div dir="auto" class="left">SE-<span class="postal-code">211 35</span> <span class="locality">Malmö</span>
6815 </div>
6816 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="country-name">Sweden</span></div>
6817 <div class="email">
6818 <span>Email:</span>
6819 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
6820 </div>
6821 </address>
6822 <address class="vcard">
6823 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Göran Selander</span></div>
6824 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Ericsson</span></div>
6825 <div dir="auto" class="left">SE-<span class="postal-code">164 80</span> <span class="locality">Kista</span>
6826 </div>
6827 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="country-name">Sweden</span></div>
6828 <div class="email">
6829 <span>Email:</span>
6830 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
6831 </div>
6832 </address>
6833 <address class="vcard">
6834 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Erik Wahlstroem</span></div>
6835 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="country-name">Sweden</span></div>
6836 <div class="email">
6837 <span>Email:</span>
6838 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
6839 </div>
6840 </address>
6841 <address class="vcard">
6842 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Samuel Erdtman</span></div>
6843 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Spotify AB</span></div>
6844 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="street-address">Birger Jarlsgatan 61, 4tr</span></div>
6845 <div dir="auto" class="left">SE-<span class="postal-code">113 56</span> <span class="locality">Stockholm</span>
6846 </div>
6847 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="country-name">Sweden</span></div>
6848 <div class="email">
6849 <span>Email:</span>
6850 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
6851 </div>
6852 </address>
6853 <address class="vcard">
6854 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Hannes Tschofenig</span></div>
6855 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Arm Ltd.</span></div>
6856 <div dir="auto" class="left">
6857 <span class="postal-code">6067</span> <span class="locality">Absam</span>
6858 </div>
6859 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="country-name">Austria</span></div>
6860 <div class="email">
6861 <span>Email:</span>
6862 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
6863 </div>
6864 </address>
6865 </section>
6866 </div>
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