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1 <pre>Network Working Group M. Myers
2 Request for Comments: 2511 VeriSign
3 Category: Standards Track C. Adams
4 Entrust Technologies
5 D. Solo
6 Citicorp
7 D. Kemp
8 DoD
9 March 1999
10
11
12 <span class="h1">Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format</span>
13
14 Status of this Memo
15
16 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
17 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
18 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
19 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
20 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
21
22 Copyright Notice
23
24 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
25
26 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Abstract</span>
27
28 This document describes the Certificate Request Message Format
29 (CRMF). This syntax is used to convey a request for a certificate to
30 a Certification Authority (CA) (possibly via a Registration Authority
31 (RA)) for the purposes of X.509 certificate production. The request
32 will typically include a public key and associated registration
33 information.
34
35 The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY"
36 in this document (in uppercase, as shown) are to be interpreted as
37 described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>.
38
39 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Overview</span>
40
41 Construction of a certification request involves the following steps:
42
43 a) A CertRequest value is constructed. This value may include the
44 public key, all or a portion of the end-entity's (EE's) name,
45 other requested certificate fields, and additional control
46 information related to the registration process.
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
55
56
57 b) A proof of possession (of the private key corresponding to the
58 public key for which a certificate is being requested) value may
59 be calculated across the CertRequest value.
60
61 c) Additional registration information may be combined with the
62 proof of possession value and the CertRequest structure to form a
63 CertReqMessage.
64
65 d) The CertReqMessage is securely communicated to a CA. Specific
66 means of secure transport are beyond the scope of this
67 specification.
68
69 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. CertReqMessage Syntax</span>
70
71 A certificate request message is composed of the certificate request,
72 an optional proof of possession field and an optional registration
73 information field.
74
75 CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg
76
77 CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
78 certReq CertRequest,
79 pop ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL,
80 -- content depends upon key type
81 regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) of AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL }
82
83 The proof of possession field is used to demonstrate that the entity
84 to be associated with the certificate is actually in possession of
85 the corresponding private key. This field may be calculated across
86 the contents of the certReq field and varies in structure and content
87 by public key algorithm type and operational mode.
88
89 The regInfo field SHOULD only contain supplementary information
90 related to the context of the certification request when such
91 information is required to fulfill a certification request. This
92 information MAY include subscriber contact information, billing
93 information or other ancillary information useful to fulfillment of
94 the certification request.
95
96 Information directly related to certificate content SHOULD be
97 included in the certReq content. However, inclusion of additional
98 certReq content by RAs may invalidate the pop field. Data therefore
99 intended for certificate content MAY be provided in regInfo.
100
101 See <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a> and <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for example regInfo contents.
102
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Proof of Possession (POP)</span>
114
115 In order to prevent certain attacks and to allow a CA/RA to properly
116 check the validity of the binding between an end entity and a key
117 pair, the PKI management operations specified here make it possible
118 for an end entity to prove that it has possession of (i.e., is able
119 to use) the private key corresponding to the public key for which a
120 certificate is requested. A given CA/RA is free to choose how to
121 enforce POP (e.g., out-of-band procedural means versus the CRMF in-
122 band message) in its certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a
123 policy issue). However, it is MANDATED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP
124 by some means because there are currently many non-PKIX operational
125 protocols in use (various electronic mail protocols are one example)
126 that do not explicitly check the binding between the end entity and
127 the private key. Until operational protocols that do verify the
128 binding (for signature, encryption, and key agreement key pairs)
129 exist, and are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed to have
130 been verified by the CA/RA. Therefore, if the binding is not verified
131 by the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public-Key Infrastructure
132 end up being somewhat less meaningful.
133
134 POP is accomplished in different ways depending on the type of key
135 for which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for
136 multiple purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any of the methods MAY be
137 used.
138
139 This specification allows for cases where POP is validated by the CA,
140 the RA, or both. Some policies may require the CA to verify POP
141 during certification, in which case the RA MUST forward the end
142 entity's CertRequest and ProofOfPossession fields unaltered to the
143 CA, and as an option MAY also verify POP. If the CA is not required
144 by policy to verify POP, then the RA SHOULD forward the end entity's
145 request and proof unaltered to the CA as above. If this is not
146 possible (for example because the RA verifies POP by an out-of-band
147 method), then the RA MAY attest to the CA that the required proof has
148 been validated. If the CA uses an out-of-band method to verify POP
149 (such as physical delivery of CA-generated private keys), then the
150 ProofOfPossession field is not used.
151
152 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Signature Keys</span>
153
154 For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove
155 possession of the private key.
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Key Encipherment Keys</span>
170
171 For key encipherment keys, the end entity can provide the private key
172 to the CA/RA, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to prove
173 possession of the private key. Decrypting a value can be achieved
174 either directly or indirectly.
175
176 The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to
177 which an immediate response by the end entity is required.
178
179 The indirect method is to issue a certificate which is encrypted for
180 the end entity (and have the end entity demonstrate its ability to
181 decrypt this certificate in a confirmation message). This allows a CA
182 to issue a certificate in a form which can only be used by the
183 intended end entity.
184
185 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Key Agreement Keys</span>
186
187 For key agreement keys, the end entity can use any of the three
188 methods given in <a href="#section-5.2">Section 5.2</a> for encryption keys. For the direct and
189 indirect methods, the end entity and the PKI management entity (i.e.,
190 CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove that
191 the end entity has possession of the private key (i.e., in order to
192 decrypt the encrypted certificate or to construct the response to the
193 issued challenge). Note that this need not impose any restrictions
194 on the keys that can be certified by a given CA -- in particular, for
195 Diffie-Hellman keys the end entity may freely choose its algorithm
196 parameters -- provided that the CA can generate a short-term (or
197 one-time) key pair with the appropriate parameters when necessary.
198
199 The end entity may also MAC the certificate request (using a shared
200 secret key derived from a Diffie-Hellman computation) as a fourth
201 alternative for demonstrating POP. This option may be used only if
202 the CA already has a DH certificate that is known to the end entity
203 and if the EE is willing to use the CA's DH parameters.
204
205 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a> Proof of Possession Syntax</span>
206
207 ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE {
208 raVerified [0] NULL,
209 -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in
210 -- possession of the private key
211 signature [1] POPOSigningKey,
212 keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey,
213 keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey }
214
215 POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
216 poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
223
224
225 algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
226 signature BIT STRING }
227 -- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
228 -- DER-encoded value of poposkInput. NOTE: If the CertReqMsg
229 -- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values,
230 -- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be
231 -- computed on the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq. If
232 -- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain the public
233 -- key and subject values, then poposkInput MUST be present and
234 -- MUST be signed. This strategy ensures that the public key is
235 -- not present in both the poposkInput and CertReqMsg certReq
236 -- CertTemplate fields.
237
238 POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
239 authInfo CHOICE {
240 sender [0] GeneralName,
241 -- used only if an authenticated identity has been
242 -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a
243 -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate)
244 publicKeyMAC PKMACValue },
245 -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for
246 -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC
247 -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
248 publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo } -- from CertTemplate
249
250 PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE {
251 algId AlgorithmIdentifier,
252 -- the algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac
253 -- {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
254 -- the parameter value is PBMParameter
255 value BIT STRING }
256
257 POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
258 thisMessage [0] BIT STRING,
259 -- posession is proven in this message (which contains the private
260 -- key itself (encrypted for the CA))
261 subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
262 -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message
263 dhMAC [2] BIT STRING }
264 -- for keyAgreement (only), possession is proven in this message
265 -- (which contains a MAC (over the DER-encoded value of the
266 -- certReq parameter in CertReqMsg, which must include both subject
267 -- and publicKey) based on a key derived from the end entity's
268 -- private DH key and the CA's public DH key);
269 -- the dhMAC value MUST be calculated as per the directions given
270 -- in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.
271
272 SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER {
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
279
280
281 encrCert (0),
282 -- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the
283 -- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a
284 -- confirmation message)
285 challengeResp (1) }
286 -- requests that CA/RA engage in challenge-response exchange with
287 -- end entity in order to prove private key possession
288
289 It is expected that protocols which incorporate this specification
290 will include the confirmation and challenge-response messages
291 necessary to a complete protocol.
292
293 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a> Use of Password-Based MAC</span>
294
295 The following algorithm SHALL be used when publicKeyMAC is used in
296 POPOSigningKeyInput to prove the authenticity of a request.
297
298 PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
299 salt OCTET STRING,
300 owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
301 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
302 iterationCount INTEGER,
303 -- number of times the OWF is applied
304 mac AlgorithmIdentifier
305 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
306 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, <a href="./rfc2202">RFC2202</a>])
307
308 The process of using PBMParameter to compute publicKeyMAC and so
309 authenticate the origin of a public key certification request
310 consists of two stages. The first stage uses shared secret
311 information to produce a MAC key. The second stage MACs the public
312 key in question using this MAC key to produce an authenticated value.
313
314 Initialization of the first stage of algorithm assumes the existence
315 of a shared secret distributed in a trusted fashion between CA/RA and
316 end-entity. The salt value is appended to the shared secret and the
317 one way function (owf) is applied iterationCount times, where the
318 salted secret is the input to the first iteration and, for each
319 successive iteration, the input is set to be the output of the
320 previous iteration, yielding a key K.
321
322 In the second stage, K and the public key are inputs to HMAC as
323 documented in [<a href="#ref-HMAC" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">HMAC</a>] to produce a value for publicKeyMAC as follows:
324
325 publicKeyMAC = Hash( K XOR opad, Hash( K XOR ipad, public key) )
326
327 where ipad and opad are defined in [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC2104</a>].
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
335
336
337 The AlgorithmIdentifier for owf SHALL be SHA-1 {1 3 14 3 2 26} and
338 for mac SHALL be HMAC-SHA1 {1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2}.
339
340 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. CertRequest syntax</span>
341
342 The CertRequest syntax consists of a request identifier, a template
343 of certificate content, and an optional sequence of control
344 information.
345
346 CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
347 certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply
348 certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued
349 controls Controls OPTIONAL } -- Attributes affecting issuance
350
351 CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
352 version [0] Version OPTIONAL,
353 serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
354 signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
355 issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL,
356 validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL,
357 subject [5] Name OPTIONAL,
358 publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
359 issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
360 subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
361 extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL }
362
363 OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE {
364 notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL,
365 notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL } --at least one must be present
366
367 Time ::= CHOICE {
368 utcTime UTCTime,
369 generalTime GeneralizedTime }
370
371 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Controls Syntax</span>
372
373 The generator of a CertRequest may include one or more control values
374 pertaining to the processing of the request.
375
376 Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
377
378 The following controls are defined (it is recognized that this list
379 may expand over time): regToken; authenticator; pkiPublicationInfo;
380 pkiArchiveOptions; oldCertID; protocolEncrKey.
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> Registration Token Control</span>
394
395 A regToken control contains one-time information (either based on a
396 secret value or on knowledge) intended to be used by the CA to verify
397 the identity of the subject prior to issuing a certificate. Upon
398 receipt of a certification request containing a value for regToken,
399 the receiving CA verifies the information in order to confirm the
400 identity claimed in the certification request.
401
402 The value for regToken may be generated by the CA and provided out of
403 band to the subscriber, or may otherwise be available to both the CA
404 and the subscriber. The security of any out-of-band exchange should
405 be commensurate with the risk of the CA accepting an intercepted
406 value from someone other than the intended subscriber.
407
408 The regToken control would typically be used only for initialization
409 of an end entity into the PKI, whereas the authenticator control (see
410 <a href="#section-7.2">Section 7.2</a>) would typically be used for initial as well as
411 subsequent certification requests.
412
413 In some instances of use the value for regToken could be a text
414 string or a numeric quantity such as a random number. The value in
415 the latter case could be encoded either as a binary quantity or as a
416 text string representation of the binary quantity. To ensure a
417 uniform encoding of values regardless of the nature of the quantity,
418 the encoding of regToken SHALL be UTF8.
419
420 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a> Authenticator Control.</span>
421
422 An authenticator control contains information used in an ongoing
423 basis to establish a non-cryptographic check of identity in
424 communication with the CA. Examples include: mother's maiden name,
425 last four digits of social security number, or other knowledge-based
426 information shared with the subscriber's CA; a hash of such
427 information; or other information produced for this purpose. The
428 value for an authenticator control may be generated by the subscriber
429 or by the CA.
430
431 In some instances of use the value for regToken could be a text
432 string or a numeric quantity such as a random number. The value in
433 the latter case could be encoded either as a binary quantity or as a
434 text string representation of the binary quantity. To ensure a
435 uniform encoding of values regardless of the nature of the quantity,
436 the encoding of authenticator SHALL be UTF8.
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a> Publication Information Control</span>
450
451 The pkiPublicationInfo control enables subscribers to control the
452 CA's publication of the certificate. It is defined by the following
453 syntax:
454
455 PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
456 action INTEGER {
457 dontPublish (0),
458 pleasePublish (1) },
459 pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL }
460
461
462 -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish"
463 -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted,
464 -- "dontCare" is assumed)
465
466 SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
467 pubMethod INTEGER {
468 dontCare (0),
469 x500 (1),
470 web (2),
471 ldap (3) },
472 pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL }
473
474 If the dontPublish option is chosen, the requester indicates that the
475 PKI should not publish the certificate (this may indicate that the
476 requester intends to publish the certificate him/herself).
477
478 If the dontCare method is chosen, or if the PKIPublicationInfo
479 control is omitted from the request, the requester indicates that the
480 PKI MAY publish the certificate using whatever means it chooses.
481
482 If the requester wishes the certificate to appear in at least some
483 locations but wishes to enable the CA to make the certificate
484 available in other repositories, set two values of SinglePubInfo for
485 pubInfos: one with x500, web or ldap value and one with dontCare.
486
487 The pubLocation field, if supplied, indicates where the requester
488 would like the certificate to be found (note that the CHOICE within
489 GeneralName includes a URL and an IP address, for example).
490
491 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a> Archive Options Control</span>
492
493 The pkiArchiveOptions control enables subscribers to supply
494 information needed to establish an archive of the private key
495 corresponding to the public key of the certification request. It is
496 defined by the following syntax:
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
503
504
505 PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE {
506 encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey,
507 -- the actual value of the private key
508 keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters,
509 -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated
510 archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN }
511 -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private
512 -- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to
513 -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired.
514
515 EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
516 encryptedValue EncryptedValue,
517 envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
518 -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData
519 -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING.
520
521 EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE {
522 intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
523 -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used
524 symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
525 -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value
526 encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
527 -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value
528 keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
529 -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key
530 valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
531 -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content
532 -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only
533 -- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity
534 -- in the future)
535 encValue BIT STRING }
536
537 KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING
538
539 An alternative to sending the key is to send the information about
540 how to re-generate the key using the KeyGenParameters choice (e.g.,
541 for many RSA implementations one could send the first random numbers
542 tested for primality). The actual syntax for this parameter may be
543 defined in a subsequent version of this document or in another
544 standard.
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a> OldCert ID Control</span>
562
563 If present, the OldCertID control specifies the certificate to be
564 updated by the current certification request. The syntax of its
565 value is:
566
567 CertId ::= SEQUENCE {
568 issuer GeneralName,
569 serialNumber INTEGER
570 }
571
572 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.6" href="#section-6.6">6.6</a> Protocol Encryption Key Control</span>
573
574 If present, the protocolEncrKey control specifies a key the CA is to
575 use in encrypting a response to CertReqMessages.
576
577 This control can be used when a CA has information to send to the
578 subscriber that needs to be encrypted. Such information includes a
579 private key generated by the CA for use by the subscriber.
580
581 The encoding of protocolEncrKey SHALL be SubjectPublicKeyInfo.
582
583 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Object Identifiers</span>
584
585 The OID id-pkix has the value
586
587 id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
588 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) }
589
590 -- arc for Internet X.509 PKI protocols and their components
591 id-pkip OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { id-pkix pkip(5) }
592
593 -- Registration Controls in CRMF
594 id-regCtrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip regCtrl(1) }
595 id-regCtrl-regToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 1 }
596 id-regCtrl-authenticator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 2 }
597 id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 3 }
598 id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 4 }
599 id-regCtrl-oldCertID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 5 }
600 id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 6 }
601
602 -- Registration Info in CRMF
603 id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip id-regInfo(2) }
604 id-regInfo-asciiPairs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 1 }
605 --with syntax OCTET STRING
606 id-regInfo-certReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 2 }
607 --with syntax CertRequest
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span>
618
619 The security of CRMF delivery is reliant upon the security mechanisms
620 of the protocol or process used to communicate with CAs. Such
621 protocol or process needs to ensure the integrity, data origin
622 authenticity, and privacy of the message. Encryption of a CRMF is
623 strongly recommended if it contains subscriber-sensitive information
624 and if the CA has an encryption certificate that is known to the end
625 entity.
626
627 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
628
629 [<a id="ref-HMAC">HMAC</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
630 Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, February 1997.
631
632 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
633
634 The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Barbara Fox,
635 Warwick Ford, Russ Housley and John Pawling, whose review and
636 comments significantly clarified and improved the utility of this
637 specification.
638
639
640
641
642
643
644
645
646
647
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
671
672
673 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Authors' Addresses</span>
674
675 Michael Myers
676 VeriSign, Inc.
677 1390 Shorebird Way
678 Mountain View, CA 94019
679
680 EMail: [email protected]
681
682
683 Carlisle Adams
684 Entrust Technologies
685 750 Heron Road, Suite E08
686 Ottawa, Canada, K1V 1A7
687
688 EMail: [email protected]
689
690
691 Dave Solo
692 Citicorp
693 666 Fifth Ave, 3rd Floor
694 New York, Ny 10103
695
696 EMail: [email protected]
697
698
699 David Kemp
700 National Security Agency
701 Suite 6734
702 9800 Savage Road
703 Fort Meade, MD 20755
704
705 EMail: [email protected]
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Constructing "dhMAC"</span>
730
731 This Appendix describes the method for computing the bit string
732 "dhMAC" in the proof-of-possession POPOPrivKey structure for Diffie-
733 Hellman certificate requests.
734
735 1. The entity generates a DH public/private key-pair.
736
737 The DH parameters used to calculate the public SHOULD be those
738 specified in the CA's DH certificate.
739
740 From CA's DH certificate:
741 CApub = g^x mod p (where g and p are the established DH
742 parameters and x is the CA's private
743 DH component)
744 For entity E:
745 DH private value = y
746 Epub = DH public value = g^y mod p
747
748 2. The MACing process will then consist of the following steps.
749
750 a) The value of the certReq field is DER encoded, yielding a binary
751 string. This will be the 'text' referred to in [<a href="#ref-HMAC" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">HMAC</a>], the data to
752 which HMAC-SHA1 is applied.
753
754 b) A shared DH secret is computed, as follows,
755 shared secret = Kec = g^xy mod p
756
757 [This is done by the entity E as CApub^y and by the CA as Epub^x,
758 where CApub is retrieved from the CA's DH certificate and Epub is
759 retrieved from the actual certification request.]
760
761 c) A key K is derived from the shared secret Kec and the subject and
762 issuer names in the CA's certificate as follows:
763
764 K = SHA1(DER-encoded-subjectName | Kec | DER-encoded-issuerName)
765
766 where "|" means concatenation. If subjectName in the CA
767 certificate is an empty SEQUENCE then DER-encoded-subjectAltName
768 should be used instead; similarly, if issuerName is an empty
769 SEQUENCE then DER-encoded-issuerAltName should be used instead.
770
771 d) Compute HMAC-SHA1 over the data 'text' as per [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC2104</a>] as:
772 SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, text))
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
783
784
785 where,
786 opad (outer pad) = the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times
787 and
788 ipad (inner pad) = the byte 0x5C repeated 64 times.
789
790
791 Namely,
792
793 (1) Append zeros to the end of K to create a 64 byte string
794 (e.g., if K is of length 16 bytes it will be appended with
795 48 zero bytes 0x00).
796 (2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed in
797 step (1) with ipad.
798 (3) Append the data stream 'text' to the 64 byte string
799 resulting from step (2).
800 (4) Apply SHA1 to the stream generated in step (3).
801 (5) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed in
802 step (1) with opad.
803 (6) Append the SHA1 result from step (4) to the 64 byte string
804 resulting from step (5).
805 (7) Apply SHA1 to the stream generated in step (6) and output
806 the result.
807
808 Sample code is also provided in [RFC2104, <a href="./rfc2202">RFC2202</a>].
809
810 e) The output of (d) is encoded as a BIT STRING (the value "dhMAC").
811
812 3. The proof-of-possession process requires the CA to carry out
813 steps (a) through (d) and then simply compare the result of step
814 (d) with what it received as the "dhMAC" value. If they match then
815 the following can be concluded.
816
817 1) The Entity possesses the private key corresponding to the
818 public key in the certification request (because it needed the
819 private key to calculate the shared secret).
820
821 2) Only the intended CA can actually verify the request (because
822 the CA requires its own private key to compute the same shared
823 secret). This helps to protect from rogue CAs.
824
825 References
826
827 [<a id="ref-RFC2104">RFC2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed
828 Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, February
829 1997.
830
831 [<a id="ref-RFC2202">RFC2202</a>] Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-
832 SHA-1", <a href="./rfc2202">RFC 2202</a>, September 1997.
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
839
840
841 Acknowledgements
842
843 The details of this Appendix were provided by Hemma Prafullchandra.
844
845 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Use of RegInfo for Name-Value Pairs
846
847 The "value" field of the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs OCTET STRING (with
848 "tag" field equal to 12 and appropriate "length" field) will contain
849 a series of UTF8 name/value pairs.
850
851 This Appendix lists some common examples of such pairs for the
852 purpose of promoting interoperability among independent
853 implementations of this specification. It is recognized that this
854 list is not exhaustive and will grow with time and implementation
855 experience.
856
857 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.1" href="#appendix-B.1">B.1</a>. Example Name/Value Pairs</span>
858
859 When regInfo is used to convey one or more name-value pairs (via id-
860 regInfo-utf8Pairs), the first and subsequent pairs SHALL be
861 structured as follows:
862
863 [name?value][%name?value]*%
864
865 This string is then encoded into an OCTET STRING and placed into the
866 regInfo SEQUENCE.
867
868 Reserved characters are encoded using the %xx mechanism of [<a href="./rfc1738" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Locators (URL)&quot;">RFC1738</a>],
869 unless they are used for their reserved purposes.
870
871 The following table defines a recommended set of named elements.
872 The value in the column "Name Value" is the exact text string that
873 will appear in the regInfo.
874
875 Name Value
876 ----------
877 version -- version of this variation of regInfo use
878 corp_company -- company affiliation of subscriber
879 org_unit -- organizational unit
880 mail_firstName -- personal name component
881 mail_middleName -- personal name component
882 mail_lastName -- personal name component
883 mail_email -- subscriber's email address
884 jobTitle -- job title of subscriber
885 employeeID -- employee identification number or string
886
887 mailStop -- mail stop
888 issuerName -- name of CA
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
895
896
897 subjectName -- name of Subject
898 validity -- validity interval
899
900 For example:
901
902 version?1%corp_company?Acme, Inc.%org_unit?Engineering%
903 mail_firstName?John%mail_lastName?Smith%jobTitle?Team Leader%
904 [email protected]%
905
906 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.1.1" href="#appendix-B.1.1">B.1.1</a>. IssuerName, SubjectName and Validity Value Encoding</span>
907
908 When they appear in id-regInfo-utf8Pairs syntax as named elements,
909 the encoding of values for issuerName, subjectName and validity SHALL
910 use the following syntax. The characters [] indicate an optional
911 field, ::= and | have their usual BNF meanings, and all other symbols
912 (except spaces which are insignificant) outside non-terminal names
913 are terminals. Alphabetics are case-sensitive.
914
915 issuerName ::= &lt;names&gt;
916 subjectName ::= &lt;names&gt;
917 &lt;names&gt; ::= &lt;name&gt; | &lt;names&gt;:&lt;name&gt;
918
919 &lt;validity&gt; ::= validity ? [&lt;notbefore&gt;]-[&lt;notafter&gt;]
920 &lt;notbefore&gt; ::= &lt;time&gt;
921 &lt;notafter&gt; ::= &lt;time&gt;
922
923 Where &lt;time&gt; is UTC time in the form YYYYMMDD[HH[MM[SS]]]. HH, MM,
924 and SS default to 00 and are omitted if at the and of value 00.
925
926 Example validity encoding:
927
928 validity?-19991231%
929
930 is a validity interval with no value for notBefore and a value of
931 December 31, 1999 for notAfter.
932
933 Each name comprises a single character name form identifier followed
934 by a name value of one or UTF8 characters. Within a name value, when
935 it is necessary to disambiguate a character which has formatting
936 significance at an outer level, the escape sequence %xx SHALL be
937 used, where xx represents the hex value for the encoding concerned.
938 The percent symbol is represented by %%.
939
940 &lt;name&gt; ::= X&lt;xname&gt;|O&lt;oname&gt;|E&lt;ename&gt;|D&lt;dname&gt;|U&lt;uname&gt;|I&lt;iname&gt;
941
942 Name forms and value formats are as follows:
943
944 X.500 directory name form (identifier "X"):
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
951
952
953 &lt;xname&gt; ::= &lt;rdns&gt;
954 &lt;rdns&gt; ::= &lt;rdn&gt; | &lt;rdns&gt; , &lt;rdn&gt;
955 &lt;rdn&gt; ::= &lt;avas&gt;
956 &lt;avas&gt; ::= &lt;ava&gt; | &lt;avas&gt; + &lt;ava&gt;
957 &lt;ava&gt; ::= &lt;attyp&gt; = &lt;avalue&gt;
958 &lt;attyp&gt; ::= OID.&lt;oid&gt; | &lt;stdat&gt;
959
960 Standard attribute type &lt;stdat&gt; is an alphabetic attribute type
961 identifier from the following set:
962
963 C (country)
964 L (locality)
965 ST (state or province)
966 O (organization)
967 OU (organizational unit)
968 CN (common name)
969 STREET (street address)
970 E (E-mail address).
971
972 &lt;avalue&gt; is a name component in the form of a UTF8 character string
973 of 1 to 64 characters, with the restriction that in the IA5 subset of
974 UTF8 only the characters of ASN.1 PrintableString may be used.
975
976 Other name form (identifier "O"):
977 &lt;oname&gt; ::= &lt;oid&gt; , &lt;utf8string&gt;
978
979 E-mail address (rfc822name) name form (identifier "E"):
980 &lt;ename&gt; ::= &lt;ia5string&gt;
981
982 DNS name form (identifier "D"):
983 &lt;dname&gt; ::= &lt;ia5string&gt;
984
985 URI name form (identifier "U"):
986 &lt;uname&gt; ::= &lt;ia5string&gt;
987
988 IP address (identifier "I"):
989 &lt;iname&gt; ::= &lt;oid&gt;
990
991 For example:
992
993 issuerName?XOU=Our CA,O=Acme,C=US%
994 subjectName?XCN=John Smith, O=Acme, C=US, [email protected]%
995
996 References
997
998 [<a id="ref-RFC1738">RFC1738</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Masinter, L. and M. McCahill,
999 "Uniform Resource Locators (URL)", <a href="./rfc1738">RFC 1738</a>, December 1994.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1007
1008
1009 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs</span>
1010
1011 PKIXCRMF {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1)
1012 security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf(5)}
1013
1014 CRMF DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::=
1015 BEGIN
1016
1017 IMPORTS
1018 -- Directory Authentication Framework (X.509)
1019 Version, AlgorithmIdentifier, Name, Time,
1020 SubjectPublicKeyInfo, Extensions, UniqueIdentifier
1021 FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
1022 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
1023 id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)}
1024
1025 -- Certificate Extensions (X.509)
1026 GeneralName
1027 FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6)
1028 internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0)
1029 id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)}
1030
1031 -- Cryptographic Message Syntax
1032 EnvelopedData
1033 FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2)
1034 us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16)
1035 modules(0) cms(1) };
1036
1037 CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg
1038
1039 CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE {
1040 certReq CertRequest,
1041 pop ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL,
1042 -- content depends upon key type
1043 regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL }
1044
1045 CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE {
1046 certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply
1047 certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued
1048 controls Controls OPTIONAL } -- Attributes affecting issuance
1049
1050 CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE {
1051 version [0] Version OPTIONAL,
1052 serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL,
1053 signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1054 issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL,
1055 validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL,
1056 subject [5] Name OPTIONAL,
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1063
1064
1065 publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL,
1066 issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1067 subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1068 extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL }
1069
1070 OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE {
1071 notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL,
1072 notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL } --at least one MUST be present
1073
1074 Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue
1075
1076 AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE {
1077 type OBJECT IDENTIFIER,
1078 value ANY DEFINED BY type }
1079
1080 ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE {
1081 raVerified [0] NULL,
1082 -- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in
1083 -- possession of the private key
1084 signature [1] POPOSigningKey,
1085 keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey,
1086 keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey }
1087
1088 POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE {
1089 poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL,
1090 algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier,
1091 signature BIT STRING }
1092 -- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the
1093 -- DER-encoded value of poposkInput. NOTE: If the CertReqMsg
1094 -- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values,
1095 -- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be
1096 -- computed on the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq. If
1097 -- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain the public
1098 -- key and subject values, then poposkInput MUST be present and
1099 -- MUST be signed. This strategy ensures that the public key is
1100 -- not present in both the poposkInput and CertReqMsg certReq
1101 -- CertTemplate fields.
1102
1103 POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE {
1104 authInfo CHOICE {
1105 sender [0] GeneralName,
1106 -- used only if an authenticated identity has been
1107 -- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a
1108 -- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate
1109 publicKeyMAC PKMACValue },
1110 -- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for
1111 -- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC
1112 -- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1119
1120
1121 publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo } -- from CertTemplate
1122
1123 PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE {
1124 algId AlgorithmIdentifier,
1125 -- algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13}
1126 -- parameter value is PBMParameter
1127 value BIT STRING }
1128
1129 PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE {
1130 salt OCTET STRING,
1131 owf AlgorithmIdentifier,
1132 -- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended)
1133 iterationCount INTEGER,
1134 -- number of times the OWF is applied
1135 mac AlgorithmIdentifier
1136 -- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11],
1137 } -- or HMAC [RFC2104, <a href="./rfc2202">RFC2202</a>])
1138
1139 POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE {
1140 thisMessage [0] BIT STRING,
1141 -- posession is proven in this message (which contains the private
1142 -- key itself (encrypted for the CA))
1143 subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage,
1144 -- possession will be proven in a subsequent message
1145 dhMAC [2] BIT STRING }
1146 -- for keyAgreement (only), possession is proven in this message
1147 -- (which contains a MAC (over the DER-encoded value of the
1148 -- certReq parameter in CertReqMsg, which MUST include both subject
1149 -- and publicKey) based on a key derived from the end entity's
1150 -- private DH key and the CA's public DH key);
1151 -- the dhMAC value MUST be calculated as per the directions given
1152 -- in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.
1153
1154 SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER {
1155 encrCert (0),
1156 -- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the
1157 -- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a
1158 -- confirmation message)
1159 challengeResp (1) }
1160 -- requests that CA engage in challenge-response exchange with
1161 -- end entity in order to prove private key possession
1162
1163 -- Object identifier assignments --
1164
1165 id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3)
1166 dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) 7 }
1167
1168 -- arc for Internet X.509 PKI protocols and their components
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1175
1176
1177 id-pkip OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 5 }
1178
1179 -- Registration Controls in CRMF
1180 id-regCtrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 1 }
1181
1182 -- The following definition may be uncommented for use with
1183 -- ASN.1 compilers which do not understand UTF8String.
1184
1185 -- UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING
1186
1187 id-regCtrl-regToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 1 }
1188 --with syntax:
1189 RegToken ::= UTF8String
1190
1191 id-regCtrl-authenticator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 2 }
1192 --with syntax:
1193 Authenticator ::= UTF8String
1194
1195 id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 3 }
1196 --with syntax:
1197
1198 PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
1199 action INTEGER {
1200 dontPublish (0),
1201 pleasePublish (1) },
1202 pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL }
1203 -- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish"
1204 -- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted,
1205 -- "dontCare" is assumed)
1206
1207 SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE {
1208 pubMethod INTEGER {
1209 dontCare (0),
1210 x500 (1),
1211 web (2),
1212 ldap (3) },
1213 pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL }
1214
1215 id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 4 }
1216 --with syntax:
1217 PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE {
1218 encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey,
1219 -- the actual value of the private key
1220 keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters,
1221 -- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated
1222 archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN }
1223 -- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private
1224 -- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1231
1232
1233 -- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired.
1234
1235 EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE {
1236 encryptedValue EncryptedValue,
1237 envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData }
1238 -- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData
1239 -- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING.
1240
1241
1242 EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE {
1243 intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1244 -- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used
1245 symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1246 -- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value
1247 encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL,
1248 -- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value
1249 keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL,
1250 -- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key
1251 valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL,
1252 -- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content
1253 -- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only
1254 -- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity
1255 -- in the future)
1256 encValue BIT STRING }
1257 -- the encrypted value itself
1258
1259 KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING
1260
1261 id-regCtrl-oldCertID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 5 }
1262 --with syntax:
1263 OldCertId ::= CertId
1264
1265 CertId ::= SEQUENCE {
1266 issuer GeneralName,
1267 serialNumber INTEGER }
1268
1269 id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 6 }
1270 --with syntax:
1271 ProtocolEncrKey ::= SubjectPublicKeyInfo
1272
1273 -- Registration Info in CRMF
1274 id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 2 }
1275
1276 id-regInfo-utf8Pairs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 1 }
1277 --with syntax
1278 UTF8Pairs ::= UTF8String
1279
1280 id-regInfo-certReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 2 }
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1287
1288
1289 --with syntax
1290 CertReq ::= CertRequest
1291
1292 END
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1340 <span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span>
1343
1344
1345 Full Copyright Statement
1346
1347 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved.
1348
1349 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
1350 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
1351 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
1352 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
1353 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
1354 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
1355 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
1356 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
1357 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
1358 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
1359 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
1360 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
1361 English.
1362
1363 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
1364 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
1365
1366 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
1367 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
1368 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
1369 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
1370 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
1371 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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1396 Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 25]
1397 </pre>