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<pre>Network Working Group M. Myers |
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Request for Comments: 2511 VeriSign |
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Category: Standards Track C. Adams |
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Entrust Technologies |
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D. Solo |
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Citicorp |
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D. Kemp |
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DoD |
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March 1999 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Internet X.509 Certificate Request Message Format</span> |
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|
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Abstract</span> |
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|
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This document describes the Certificate Request Message Format |
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(CRMF). This syntax is used to convey a request for a certificate to |
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a Certification Authority (CA) (possibly via a Registration Authority |
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(RA)) for the purposes of X.509 certificate production. The request |
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will typically include a public key and associated registration |
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information. |
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|
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The key words "MUST", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "RECOMMENDED", and "MAY" |
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in this document (in uppercase, as shown) are to be interpreted as |
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described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Overview</span> |
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|
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Construction of a certification request involves the following steps: |
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a) A CertRequest value is constructed. This value may include the |
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public key, all or a portion of the end-entity's (EE's) name, |
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other requested certificate fields, and additional control |
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information related to the registration process. |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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|
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b) A proof of possession (of the private key corresponding to the |
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public key for which a certificate is being requested) value may |
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be calculated across the CertRequest value. |
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|
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c) Additional registration information may be combined with the |
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proof of possession value and the CertRequest structure to form a |
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CertReqMessage. |
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|
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d) The CertReqMessage is securely communicated to a CA. Specific |
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means of secure transport are beyond the scope of this |
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specification. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. CertReqMessage Syntax</span> |
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A certificate request message is composed of the certificate request, |
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an optional proof of possession field and an optional registration |
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information field. |
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CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg |
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|
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CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE { |
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certReq CertRequest, |
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pop ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL, |
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-- content depends upon key type |
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regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) of AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL } |
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The proof of possession field is used to demonstrate that the entity |
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to be associated with the certificate is actually in possession of |
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the corresponding private key. This field may be calculated across |
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the contents of the certReq field and varies in structure and content |
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by public key algorithm type and operational mode. |
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The regInfo field SHOULD only contain supplementary information |
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related to the context of the certification request when such |
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information is required to fulfill a certification request. This |
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information MAY include subscriber contact information, billing |
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information or other ancillary information useful to fulfillment of |
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the certification request. |
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Information directly related to certificate content SHOULD be |
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included in the certReq content. However, inclusion of additional |
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certReq content by RAs may invalidate the pop field. Data therefore |
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intended for certificate content MAY be provided in regInfo. |
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See <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a> and <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for example regInfo contents. |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Proof of Possession (POP)</span> |
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In order to prevent certain attacks and to allow a CA/RA to properly |
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check the validity of the binding between an end entity and a key |
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pair, the PKI management operations specified here make it possible |
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for an end entity to prove that it has possession of (i.e., is able |
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to use) the private key corresponding to the public key for which a |
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certificate is requested. A given CA/RA is free to choose how to |
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enforce POP (e.g., out-of-band procedural means versus the CRMF in- |
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band message) in its certification exchanges (i.e., this may be a |
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policy issue). However, it is MANDATED that CAs/RAs MUST enforce POP |
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by some means because there are currently many non-PKIX operational |
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protocols in use (various electronic mail protocols are one example) |
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that do not explicitly check the binding between the end entity and |
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the private key. Until operational protocols that do verify the |
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binding (for signature, encryption, and key agreement key pairs) |
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exist, and are ubiquitous, this binding can only be assumed to have |
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been verified by the CA/RA. Therefore, if the binding is not verified |
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by the CA/RA, certificates in the Internet Public-Key Infrastructure |
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end up being somewhat less meaningful. |
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|
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POP is accomplished in different ways depending on the type of key |
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for which a certificate is requested. If a key can be used for |
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multiple purposes (e.g., an RSA key) then any of the methods MAY be |
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used. |
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This specification allows for cases where POP is validated by the CA, |
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the RA, or both. Some policies may require the CA to verify POP |
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during certification, in which case the RA MUST forward the end |
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entity's CertRequest and ProofOfPossession fields unaltered to the |
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CA, and as an option MAY also verify POP. If the CA is not required |
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by policy to verify POP, then the RA SHOULD forward the end entity's |
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request and proof unaltered to the CA as above. If this is not |
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possible (for example because the RA verifies POP by an out-of-band |
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method), then the RA MAY attest to the CA that the required proof has |
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been validated. If the CA uses an out-of-band method to verify POP |
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(such as physical delivery of CA-generated private keys), then the |
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ProofOfPossession field is not used. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Signature Keys</span> |
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For signature keys, the end entity can sign a value to prove |
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possession of the private key. |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Key Encipherment Keys</span> |
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|
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For key encipherment keys, the end entity can provide the private key |
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to the CA/RA, or can be required to decrypt a value in order to prove |
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possession of the private key. Decrypting a value can be achieved |
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either directly or indirectly. |
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The direct method is for the RA/CA to issue a random challenge to |
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which an immediate response by the end entity is required. |
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The indirect method is to issue a certificate which is encrypted for |
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the end entity (and have the end entity demonstrate its ability to |
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decrypt this certificate in a confirmation message). This allows a CA |
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to issue a certificate in a form which can only be used by the |
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intended end entity. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Key Agreement Keys</span> |
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For key agreement keys, the end entity can use any of the three |
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methods given in <a href="#section-5.2">Section 5.2</a> for encryption keys. For the direct and |
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indirect methods, the end entity and the PKI management entity (i.e., |
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CA or RA) must establish a shared secret key in order to prove that |
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the end entity has possession of the private key (i.e., in order to |
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decrypt the encrypted certificate or to construct the response to the |
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issued challenge). Note that this need not impose any restrictions |
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on the keys that can be certified by a given CA -- in particular, for |
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Diffie-Hellman keys the end entity may freely choose its algorithm |
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parameters -- provided that the CA can generate a short-term (or |
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one-time) key pair with the appropriate parameters when necessary. |
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The end entity may also MAC the certificate request (using a shared |
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secret key derived from a Diffie-Hellman computation) as a fourth |
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alternative for demonstrating POP. This option may be used only if |
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the CA already has a DH certificate that is known to the end entity |
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and if the EE is willing to use the CA's DH parameters. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a> Proof of Possession Syntax</span> |
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|
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ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE { |
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raVerified [0] NULL, |
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-- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in |
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-- possession of the private key |
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signature [1] POPOSigningKey, |
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keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey, |
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keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey } |
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POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { |
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poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL, |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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|
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|
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algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, |
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signature BIT STRING } |
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-- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the |
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-- DER-encoded value of poposkInput. NOTE: If the CertReqMsg |
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-- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values, |
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-- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be |
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-- computed on the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq. If |
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-- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain the public |
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-- key and subject values, then poposkInput MUST be present and |
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-- MUST be signed. This strategy ensures that the public key is |
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-- not present in both the poposkInput and CertReqMsg certReq |
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-- CertTemplate fields. |
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|
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POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { |
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authInfo CHOICE { |
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sender [0] GeneralName, |
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-- used only if an authenticated identity has been |
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-- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a |
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-- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate) |
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publicKeyMAC PKMACValue }, |
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-- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for |
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-- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC |
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-- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey |
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publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo } -- from CertTemplate |
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|
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PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE { |
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algId AlgorithmIdentifier, |
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-- the algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac |
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-- {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} |
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-- the parameter value is PBMParameter |
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value BIT STRING } |
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|
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POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { |
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thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, |
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-- posession is proven in this message (which contains the private |
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-- key itself (encrypted for the CA)) |
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subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, |
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-- possession will be proven in a subsequent message |
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dhMAC [2] BIT STRING } |
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-- for keyAgreement (only), possession is proven in this message |
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-- (which contains a MAC (over the DER-encoded value of the |
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-- certReq parameter in CertReqMsg, which must include both subject |
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-- and publicKey) based on a key derived from the end entity's |
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-- private DH key and the CA's public DH key); |
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-- the dhMAC value MUST be calculated as per the directions given |
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-- in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. |
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SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER { |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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|
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encrCert (0), |
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-- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the |
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-- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a |
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-- confirmation message) |
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challengeResp (1) } |
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-- requests that CA/RA engage in challenge-response exchange with |
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-- end entity in order to prove private key possession |
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It is expected that protocols which incorporate this specification |
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will include the confirmation and challenge-response messages |
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necessary to a complete protocol. |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a> Use of Password-Based MAC</span> |
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The following algorithm SHALL be used when publicKeyMAC is used in |
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POPOSigningKeyInput to prove the authenticity of a request. |
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PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { |
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salt OCTET STRING, |
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owf AlgorithmIdentifier, |
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-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) |
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iterationCount INTEGER, |
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-- number of times the OWF is applied |
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mac AlgorithmIdentifier |
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-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], |
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} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, <a href="./rfc2202">RFC2202</a>]) |
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|
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The process of using PBMParameter to compute publicKeyMAC and so |
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authenticate the origin of a public key certification request |
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consists of two stages. The first stage uses shared secret |
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information to produce a MAC key. The second stage MACs the public |
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key in question using this MAC key to produce an authenticated value. |
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|
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Initialization of the first stage of algorithm assumes the existence |
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of a shared secret distributed in a trusted fashion between CA/RA and |
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end-entity. The salt value is appended to the shared secret and the |
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one way function (owf) is applied iterationCount times, where the |
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salted secret is the input to the first iteration and, for each |
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successive iteration, the input is set to be the output of the |
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previous iteration, yielding a key K. |
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In the second stage, K and the public key are inputs to HMAC as |
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documented in [<a href="#ref-HMAC" title=""HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication"">HMAC</a>] to produce a value for publicKeyMAC as follows: |
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publicKeyMAC = Hash( K XOR opad, Hash( K XOR ipad, public key) ) |
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where ipad and opad are defined in [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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The AlgorithmIdentifier for owf SHALL be SHA-1 {1 3 14 3 2 26} and |
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for mac SHALL be HMAC-SHA1 {1 3 6 1 5 5 8 1 2}. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. CertRequest syntax</span> |
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The CertRequest syntax consists of a request identifier, a template |
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of certificate content, and an optional sequence of control |
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information. |
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CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { |
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certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply |
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certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued |
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controls Controls OPTIONAL } -- Attributes affecting issuance |
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|
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CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { |
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version [0] Version OPTIONAL, |
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serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, |
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signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
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issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL, |
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validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, |
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subject [5] Name OPTIONAL, |
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publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, |
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issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
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subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
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extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL } |
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|
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OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE { |
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notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL, |
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notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL } --at least one must be present |
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|
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Time ::= CHOICE { |
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utcTime UTCTime, |
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generalTime GeneralizedTime } |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Controls Syntax</span> |
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The generator of a CertRequest may include one or more control values |
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pertaining to the processing of the request. |
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Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue |
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The following controls are defined (it is recognized that this list |
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may expand over time): regToken; authenticator; pkiPublicationInfo; |
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pkiArchiveOptions; oldCertID; protocolEncrKey. |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> Registration Token Control</span> |
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|
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A regToken control contains one-time information (either based on a |
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secret value or on knowledge) intended to be used by the CA to verify |
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the identity of the subject prior to issuing a certificate. Upon |
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receipt of a certification request containing a value for regToken, |
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the receiving CA verifies the information in order to confirm the |
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identity claimed in the certification request. |
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|
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The value for regToken may be generated by the CA and provided out of |
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band to the subscriber, or may otherwise be available to both the CA |
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and the subscriber. The security of any out-of-band exchange should |
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be commensurate with the risk of the CA accepting an intercepted |
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value from someone other than the intended subscriber. |
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|
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The regToken control would typically be used only for initialization |
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of an end entity into the PKI, whereas the authenticator control (see |
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<a href="#section-7.2">Section 7.2</a>) would typically be used for initial as well as |
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subsequent certification requests. |
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|
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In some instances of use the value for regToken could be a text |
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string or a numeric quantity such as a random number. The value in |
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the latter case could be encoded either as a binary quantity or as a |
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text string representation of the binary quantity. To ensure a |
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uniform encoding of values regardless of the nature of the quantity, |
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the encoding of regToken SHALL be UTF8. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a> Authenticator Control.</span> |
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|
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An authenticator control contains information used in an ongoing |
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basis to establish a non-cryptographic check of identity in |
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communication with the CA. Examples include: mother's maiden name, |
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last four digits of social security number, or other knowledge-based |
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information shared with the subscriber's CA; a hash of such |
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information; or other information produced for this purpose. The |
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value for an authenticator control may be generated by the subscriber |
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or by the CA. |
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|
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In some instances of use the value for regToken could be a text |
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string or a numeric quantity such as a random number. The value in |
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the latter case could be encoded either as a binary quantity or as a |
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text string representation of the binary quantity. To ensure a |
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uniform encoding of values regardless of the nature of the quantity, |
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the encoding of authenticator SHALL be UTF8. |
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<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a> Publication Information Control</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
The pkiPublicationInfo control enables subscribers to control the |
| 452 |
CA's publication of the certificate. It is defined by the following |
| 453 |
syntax: |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 456 |
action INTEGER { |
| 457 |
dontPublish (0), |
| 458 |
pleasePublish (1) }, |
| 459 |
pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL } |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
-- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish" |
| 463 |
-- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted, |
| 464 |
-- "dontCare" is assumed) |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 467 |
pubMethod INTEGER { |
| 468 |
dontCare (0), |
| 469 |
x500 (1), |
| 470 |
web (2), |
| 471 |
ldap (3) }, |
| 472 |
pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL } |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
If the dontPublish option is chosen, the requester indicates that the |
| 475 |
PKI should not publish the certificate (this may indicate that the |
| 476 |
requester intends to publish the certificate him/herself). |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
If the dontCare method is chosen, or if the PKIPublicationInfo |
| 479 |
control is omitted from the request, the requester indicates that the |
| 480 |
PKI MAY publish the certificate using whatever means it chooses. |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
If the requester wishes the certificate to appear in at least some |
| 483 |
locations but wishes to enable the CA to make the certificate |
| 484 |
available in other repositories, set two values of SinglePubInfo for |
| 485 |
pubInfos: one with x500, web or ldap value and one with dontCare. |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
The pubLocation field, if supplied, indicates where the requester |
| 488 |
would like the certificate to be found (note that the CHOICE within |
| 489 |
GeneralName includes a URL and an IP address, for example). |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a> Archive Options Control</span> |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
The pkiArchiveOptions control enables subscribers to supply |
| 494 |
information needed to establish an archive of the private key |
| 495 |
corresponding to the public key of the certification request. It is |
| 496 |
defined by the following syntax: |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { |
| 506 |
encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey, |
| 507 |
-- the actual value of the private key |
| 508 |
keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, |
| 509 |
-- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated |
| 510 |
archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN } |
| 511 |
-- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private |
| 512 |
-- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to |
| 513 |
-- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired. |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { |
| 516 |
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, |
| 517 |
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } |
| 518 |
-- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData |
| 519 |
-- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 522 |
intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 523 |
-- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used |
| 524 |
symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 525 |
-- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value |
| 526 |
encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL, |
| 527 |
-- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value |
| 528 |
keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 529 |
-- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key |
| 530 |
valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, |
| 531 |
-- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content |
| 532 |
-- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only |
| 533 |
-- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity |
| 534 |
-- in the future) |
| 535 |
encValue BIT STRING } |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
An alternative to sending the key is to send the information about |
| 540 |
how to re-generate the key using the KeyGenParameters choice (e.g., |
| 541 |
for many RSA implementations one could send the first random numbers |
| 542 |
tested for primality). The actual syntax for this parameter may be |
| 543 |
defined in a subsequent version of this document or in another |
| 544 |
standard. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a> OldCert ID Control</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
If present, the OldCertID control specifies the certificate to be |
| 564 |
updated by the current certification request. The syntax of its |
| 565 |
value is: |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
CertId ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 568 |
issuer GeneralName, |
| 569 |
serialNumber INTEGER |
| 570 |
} |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.6" href="#section-6.6">6.6</a> Protocol Encryption Key Control</span> |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
If present, the protocolEncrKey control specifies a key the CA is to |
| 575 |
use in encrypting a response to CertReqMessages. |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
This control can be used when a CA has information to send to the |
| 578 |
subscriber that needs to be encrypted. Such information includes a |
| 579 |
private key generated by the CA for use by the subscriber. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
The encoding of protocolEncrKey SHALL be SubjectPublicKeyInfo. |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Object Identifiers</span> |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
The OID id-pkix has the value |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) |
| 588 |
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) } |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
-- arc for Internet X.509 PKI protocols and their components |
| 591 |
id-pkip OBJECT IDENTIFIER :: { id-pkix pkip(5) } |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
-- Registration Controls in CRMF |
| 594 |
id-regCtrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip regCtrl(1) } |
| 595 |
id-regCtrl-regToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 1 } |
| 596 |
id-regCtrl-authenticator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 2 } |
| 597 |
id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 3 } |
| 598 |
id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 4 } |
| 599 |
id-regCtrl-oldCertID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 5 } |
| 600 |
id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 6 } |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
-- Registration Info in CRMF |
| 603 |
id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip id-regInfo(2) } |
| 604 |
id-regInfo-asciiPairs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 1 } |
| 605 |
--with syntax OCTET STRING |
| 606 |
id-regInfo-certReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 2 } |
| 607 |
--with syntax CertRequest |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
The security of CRMF delivery is reliant upon the security mechanisms |
| 620 |
of the protocol or process used to communicate with CAs. Such |
| 621 |
protocol or process needs to ensure the integrity, data origin |
| 622 |
authenticity, and privacy of the message. Encryption of a CRMF is |
| 623 |
strongly recommended if it contains subscriber-sensitive information |
| 624 |
and if the CA has an encryption certificate that is known to the end |
| 625 |
entity. |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
[<a id="ref-HMAC">HMAC</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- |
| 630 |
Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, February 1997. |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
The authors gratefully acknowledge the contributions of Barbara Fox, |
| 635 |
Warwick Ford, Russ Housley and John Pawling, whose review and |
| 636 |
comments significantly clarified and improved the utility of this |
| 637 |
specification. |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Authors' Addresses</span> |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
Michael Myers |
| 676 |
VeriSign, Inc. |
| 677 |
1390 Shorebird Way |
| 678 |
Mountain View, CA 94019 |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
Carlisle Adams |
| 684 |
Entrust Technologies |
| 685 |
750 Heron Road, Suite E08 |
| 686 |
Ottawa, Canada, K1V 1A7 |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
Dave Solo |
| 692 |
Citicorp |
| 693 |
666 Fifth Ave, 3rd Floor |
| 694 |
New York, Ny 10103 |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
David Kemp |
| 700 |
National Security Agency |
| 701 |
Suite 6734 |
| 702 |
9800 Savage Road |
| 703 |
Fort Meade, MD 20755 |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Constructing "dhMAC"</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
This Appendix describes the method for computing the bit string |
| 732 |
"dhMAC" in the proof-of-possession POPOPrivKey structure for Diffie- |
| 733 |
Hellman certificate requests. |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
1. The entity generates a DH public/private key-pair. |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
The DH parameters used to calculate the public SHOULD be those |
| 738 |
specified in the CA's DH certificate. |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
From CA's DH certificate: |
| 741 |
CApub = g^x mod p (where g and p are the established DH |
| 742 |
parameters and x is the CA's private |
| 743 |
DH component) |
| 744 |
For entity E: |
| 745 |
DH private value = y |
| 746 |
Epub = DH public value = g^y mod p |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
2. The MACing process will then consist of the following steps. |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
a) The value of the certReq field is DER encoded, yielding a binary |
| 751 |
string. This will be the 'text' referred to in [<a href="#ref-HMAC" title=""HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication"">HMAC</a>], the data to |
| 752 |
which HMAC-SHA1 is applied. |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
b) A shared DH secret is computed, as follows, |
| 755 |
shared secret = Kec = g^xy mod p |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
[This is done by the entity E as CApub^y and by the CA as Epub^x, |
| 758 |
where CApub is retrieved from the CA's DH certificate and Epub is |
| 759 |
retrieved from the actual certification request.] |
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
c) A key K is derived from the shared secret Kec and the subject and |
| 762 |
issuer names in the CA's certificate as follows: |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
K = SHA1(DER-encoded-subjectName | Kec | DER-encoded-issuerName) |
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
where "|" means concatenation. If subjectName in the CA |
| 767 |
certificate is an empty SEQUENCE then DER-encoded-subjectAltName |
| 768 |
should be used instead; similarly, if issuerName is an empty |
| 769 |
SEQUENCE then DER-encoded-issuerAltName should be used instead. |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
d) Compute HMAC-SHA1 over the data 'text' as per [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>] as: |
| 772 |
SHA1(K XOR opad, SHA1(K XOR ipad, text)) |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
where, |
| 786 |
opad (outer pad) = the byte 0x36 repeated 64 times |
| 787 |
and |
| 788 |
ipad (inner pad) = the byte 0x5C repeated 64 times. |
| 789 |
|
| 790 |
|
| 791 |
Namely, |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
(1) Append zeros to the end of K to create a 64 byte string |
| 794 |
(e.g., if K is of length 16 bytes it will be appended with |
| 795 |
48 zero bytes 0x00). |
| 796 |
(2) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed in |
| 797 |
step (1) with ipad. |
| 798 |
(3) Append the data stream 'text' to the 64 byte string |
| 799 |
resulting from step (2). |
| 800 |
(4) Apply SHA1 to the stream generated in step (3). |
| 801 |
(5) XOR (bitwise exclusive-OR) the 64 byte string computed in |
| 802 |
step (1) with opad. |
| 803 |
(6) Append the SHA1 result from step (4) to the 64 byte string |
| 804 |
resulting from step (5). |
| 805 |
(7) Apply SHA1 to the stream generated in step (6) and output |
| 806 |
the result. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
Sample code is also provided in [RFC2104, <a href="./rfc2202">RFC2202</a>]. |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
e) The output of (d) is encoded as a BIT STRING (the value "dhMAC"). |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
3. The proof-of-possession process requires the CA to carry out |
| 813 |
steps (a) through (d) and then simply compare the result of step |
| 814 |
(d) with what it received as the "dhMAC" value. If they match then |
| 815 |
the following can be concluded. |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
1) The Entity possesses the private key corresponding to the |
| 818 |
public key in the certification request (because it needed the |
| 819 |
private key to calculate the shared secret). |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
2) Only the intended CA can actually verify the request (because |
| 822 |
the CA requires its own private key to compute the same shared |
| 823 |
secret). This helps to protect from rogue CAs. |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
References |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2104">RFC2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M. and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed |
| 828 |
Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, February |
| 829 |
1997. |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2202">RFC2202</a>] Cheng, P. and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC- |
| 832 |
SHA-1", <a href="./rfc2202">RFC 2202</a>, September 1997. |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
Acknowledgements |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
The details of this Appendix were provided by Hemma Prafullchandra. |
| 844 |
|
| 845 |
<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Use of RegInfo for Name-Value Pairs |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
The "value" field of the id-regInfo-utf8Pairs OCTET STRING (with |
| 848 |
"tag" field equal to 12 and appropriate "length" field) will contain |
| 849 |
a series of UTF8 name/value pairs. |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
This Appendix lists some common examples of such pairs for the |
| 852 |
purpose of promoting interoperability among independent |
| 853 |
implementations of this specification. It is recognized that this |
| 854 |
list is not exhaustive and will grow with time and implementation |
| 855 |
experience. |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.1" href="#appendix-B.1">B.1</a>. Example Name/Value Pairs</span> |
| 858 |
|
| 859 |
When regInfo is used to convey one or more name-value pairs (via id- |
| 860 |
regInfo-utf8Pairs), the first and subsequent pairs SHALL be |
| 861 |
structured as follows: |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
[name?value][%name?value]*% |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
This string is then encoded into an OCTET STRING and placed into the |
| 866 |
regInfo SEQUENCE. |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
Reserved characters are encoded using the %xx mechanism of [<a href="./rfc1738" title=""Uniform Resource Locators (URL)"">RFC1738</a>], |
| 869 |
unless they are used for their reserved purposes. |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
The following table defines a recommended set of named elements. |
| 872 |
The value in the column "Name Value" is the exact text string that |
| 873 |
will appear in the regInfo. |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
Name Value |
| 876 |
---------- |
| 877 |
version -- version of this variation of regInfo use |
| 878 |
corp_company -- company affiliation of subscriber |
| 879 |
org_unit -- organizational unit |
| 880 |
mail_firstName -- personal name component |
| 881 |
mail_middleName -- personal name component |
| 882 |
mail_lastName -- personal name component |
| 883 |
mail_email -- subscriber's email address |
| 884 |
jobTitle -- job title of subscriber |
| 885 |
employeeID -- employee identification number or string |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
mailStop -- mail stop |
| 888 |
issuerName -- name of CA |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
subjectName -- name of Subject |
| 898 |
validity -- validity interval |
| 899 |
|
| 900 |
For example: |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
version?1%corp_company?Acme, Inc.%org_unit?Engineering% |
| 903 |
mail_firstName?John%mail_lastName?Smith%jobTitle?Team Leader% |
| 904 |
[email protected]% |
| 905 |
|
| 906 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.1.1" href="#appendix-B.1.1">B.1.1</a>. IssuerName, SubjectName and Validity Value Encoding</span> |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
When they appear in id-regInfo-utf8Pairs syntax as named elements, |
| 909 |
the encoding of values for issuerName, subjectName and validity SHALL |
| 910 |
use the following syntax. The characters [] indicate an optional |
| 911 |
field, ::= and | have their usual BNF meanings, and all other symbols |
| 912 |
(except spaces which are insignificant) outside non-terminal names |
| 913 |
are terminals. Alphabetics are case-sensitive. |
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
issuerName ::= <names> |
| 916 |
subjectName ::= <names> |
| 917 |
<names> ::= <name> | <names>:<name> |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
<validity> ::= validity ? [<notbefore>]-[<notafter>] |
| 920 |
<notbefore> ::= <time> |
| 921 |
<notafter> ::= <time> |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
Where <time> is UTC time in the form YYYYMMDD[HH[MM[SS]]]. HH, MM, |
| 924 |
and SS default to 00 and are omitted if at the and of value 00. |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
Example validity encoding: |
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
validity?-19991231% |
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
is a validity interval with no value for notBefore and a value of |
| 931 |
December 31, 1999 for notAfter. |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
Each name comprises a single character name form identifier followed |
| 934 |
by a name value of one or UTF8 characters. Within a name value, when |
| 935 |
it is necessary to disambiguate a character which has formatting |
| 936 |
significance at an outer level, the escape sequence %xx SHALL be |
| 937 |
used, where xx represents the hex value for the encoding concerned. |
| 938 |
The percent symbol is represented by %%. |
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
<name> ::= X<xname>|O<oname>|E<ename>|D<dname>|U<uname>|I<iname> |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
Name forms and value formats are as follows: |
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
X.500 directory name form (identifier "X"): |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
<xname> ::= <rdns> |
| 954 |
<rdns> ::= <rdn> | <rdns> , <rdn> |
| 955 |
<rdn> ::= <avas> |
| 956 |
<avas> ::= <ava> | <avas> + <ava> |
| 957 |
<ava> ::= <attyp> = <avalue> |
| 958 |
<attyp> ::= OID.<oid> | <stdat> |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
Standard attribute type <stdat> is an alphabetic attribute type |
| 961 |
identifier from the following set: |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
C (country) |
| 964 |
L (locality) |
| 965 |
ST (state or province) |
| 966 |
O (organization) |
| 967 |
OU (organizational unit) |
| 968 |
CN (common name) |
| 969 |
STREET (street address) |
| 970 |
E (E-mail address). |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
<avalue> is a name component in the form of a UTF8 character string |
| 973 |
of 1 to 64 characters, with the restriction that in the IA5 subset of |
| 974 |
UTF8 only the characters of ASN.1 PrintableString may be used. |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
Other name form (identifier "O"): |
| 977 |
<oname> ::= <oid> , <utf8string> |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
E-mail address (rfc822name) name form (identifier "E"): |
| 980 |
<ename> ::= <ia5string> |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
DNS name form (identifier "D"): |
| 983 |
<dname> ::= <ia5string> |
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
URI name form (identifier "U"): |
| 986 |
<uname> ::= <ia5string> |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
IP address (identifier "I"): |
| 989 |
<iname> ::= <oid> |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
For example: |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
issuerName?XOU=Our CA,O=Acme,C=US% |
| 994 |
subjectName?XCN=John Smith, O=Acme, C=US, [email protected]% |
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
References |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1738">RFC1738</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Masinter, L. and M. McCahill, |
| 999 |
"Uniform Resource Locators (URL)", <a href="./rfc1738">RFC 1738</a>, December 1994. |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. ASN.1 Structures and OIDs</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
PKIXCRMF {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) |
| 1012 |
security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-crmf(5)} |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
CRMF DEFINITIONS IMPLICIT TAGS ::= |
| 1015 |
BEGIN |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
IMPORTS |
| 1018 |
-- Directory Authentication Framework (X.509) |
| 1019 |
Version, AlgorithmIdentifier, Name, Time, |
| 1020 |
SubjectPublicKeyInfo, Extensions, UniqueIdentifier |
| 1021 |
FROM PKIX1Explicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) |
| 1022 |
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) |
| 1023 |
id-pkix1-explicit-88(1)} |
| 1024 |
|
| 1025 |
-- Certificate Extensions (X.509) |
| 1026 |
GeneralName |
| 1027 |
FROM PKIX1Implicit88 {iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) |
| 1028 |
internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) |
| 1029 |
id-pkix1-implicit-88(2)} |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
-- Cryptographic Message Syntax |
| 1032 |
EnvelopedData |
| 1033 |
FROM CryptographicMessageSyntax { iso(1) member-body(2) |
| 1034 |
us(840) rsadsi(113549) pkcs(1) pkcs-9(9) smime(16) |
| 1035 |
modules(0) cms(1) }; |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
CertReqMessages ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF CertReqMsg |
| 1038 |
|
| 1039 |
CertReqMsg ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1040 |
certReq CertRequest, |
| 1041 |
pop ProofOfPossession OPTIONAL, |
| 1042 |
-- content depends upon key type |
| 1043 |
regInfo SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue OPTIONAL } |
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 |
CertRequest ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1046 |
certReqId INTEGER, -- ID for matching request and reply |
| 1047 |
certTemplate CertTemplate, -- Selected fields of cert to be issued |
| 1048 |
controls Controls OPTIONAL } -- Attributes affecting issuance |
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
CertTemplate ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1051 |
version [0] Version OPTIONAL, |
| 1052 |
serialNumber [1] INTEGER OPTIONAL, |
| 1053 |
signingAlg [2] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 1054 |
issuer [3] Name OPTIONAL, |
| 1055 |
validity [4] OptionalValidity OPTIONAL, |
| 1056 |
subject [5] Name OPTIONAL, |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
publicKey [6] SubjectPublicKeyInfo OPTIONAL, |
| 1066 |
issuerUID [7] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 1067 |
subjectUID [8] UniqueIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 1068 |
extensions [9] Extensions OPTIONAL } |
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 |
OptionalValidity ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1071 |
notBefore [0] Time OPTIONAL, |
| 1072 |
notAfter [1] Time OPTIONAL } --at least one MUST be present |
| 1073 |
|
| 1074 |
Controls ::= SEQUENCE SIZE(1..MAX) OF AttributeTypeAndValue |
| 1075 |
|
| 1076 |
AttributeTypeAndValue ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1077 |
type OBJECT IDENTIFIER, |
| 1078 |
value ANY DEFINED BY type } |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
ProofOfPossession ::= CHOICE { |
| 1081 |
raVerified [0] NULL, |
| 1082 |
-- used if the RA has already verified that the requester is in |
| 1083 |
-- possession of the private key |
| 1084 |
signature [1] POPOSigningKey, |
| 1085 |
keyEncipherment [2] POPOPrivKey, |
| 1086 |
keyAgreement [3] POPOPrivKey } |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
POPOSigningKey ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1089 |
poposkInput [0] POPOSigningKeyInput OPTIONAL, |
| 1090 |
algorithmIdentifier AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| 1091 |
signature BIT STRING } |
| 1092 |
-- The signature (using "algorithmIdentifier") is on the |
| 1093 |
-- DER-encoded value of poposkInput. NOTE: If the CertReqMsg |
| 1094 |
-- certReq CertTemplate contains the subject and publicKey values, |
| 1095 |
-- then poposkInput MUST be omitted and the signature MUST be |
| 1096 |
-- computed on the DER-encoded value of CertReqMsg certReq. If |
| 1097 |
-- the CertReqMsg certReq CertTemplate does not contain the public |
| 1098 |
-- key and subject values, then poposkInput MUST be present and |
| 1099 |
-- MUST be signed. This strategy ensures that the public key is |
| 1100 |
-- not present in both the poposkInput and CertReqMsg certReq |
| 1101 |
-- CertTemplate fields. |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
POPOSigningKeyInput ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1104 |
authInfo CHOICE { |
| 1105 |
sender [0] GeneralName, |
| 1106 |
-- used only if an authenticated identity has been |
| 1107 |
-- established for the sender (e.g., a DN from a |
| 1108 |
-- previously-issued and currently-valid certificate |
| 1109 |
publicKeyMAC PKMACValue }, |
| 1110 |
-- used if no authenticated GeneralName currently exists for |
| 1111 |
-- the sender; publicKeyMAC contains a password-based MAC |
| 1112 |
-- on the DER-encoded value of publicKey |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
publicKey SubjectPublicKeyInfo } -- from CertTemplate |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
PKMACValue ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1124 |
algId AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| 1125 |
-- algorithm value shall be PasswordBasedMac {1 2 840 113533 7 66 13} |
| 1126 |
-- parameter value is PBMParameter |
| 1127 |
value BIT STRING } |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
PBMParameter ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1130 |
salt OCTET STRING, |
| 1131 |
owf AlgorithmIdentifier, |
| 1132 |
-- AlgId for a One-Way Function (SHA-1 recommended) |
| 1133 |
iterationCount INTEGER, |
| 1134 |
-- number of times the OWF is applied |
| 1135 |
mac AlgorithmIdentifier |
| 1136 |
-- the MAC AlgId (e.g., DES-MAC, Triple-DES-MAC [PKCS11], |
| 1137 |
} -- or HMAC [RFC2104, <a href="./rfc2202">RFC2202</a>]) |
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 |
POPOPrivKey ::= CHOICE { |
| 1140 |
thisMessage [0] BIT STRING, |
| 1141 |
-- posession is proven in this message (which contains the private |
| 1142 |
-- key itself (encrypted for the CA)) |
| 1143 |
subsequentMessage [1] SubsequentMessage, |
| 1144 |
-- possession will be proven in a subsequent message |
| 1145 |
dhMAC [2] BIT STRING } |
| 1146 |
-- for keyAgreement (only), possession is proven in this message |
| 1147 |
-- (which contains a MAC (over the DER-encoded value of the |
| 1148 |
-- certReq parameter in CertReqMsg, which MUST include both subject |
| 1149 |
-- and publicKey) based on a key derived from the end entity's |
| 1150 |
-- private DH key and the CA's public DH key); |
| 1151 |
-- the dhMAC value MUST be calculated as per the directions given |
| 1152 |
-- in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
SubsequentMessage ::= INTEGER { |
| 1155 |
encrCert (0), |
| 1156 |
-- requests that resulting certificate be encrypted for the |
| 1157 |
-- end entity (following which, POP will be proven in a |
| 1158 |
-- confirmation message) |
| 1159 |
challengeResp (1) } |
| 1160 |
-- requests that CA engage in challenge-response exchange with |
| 1161 |
-- end entity in order to prove private key possession |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
-- Object identifier assignments -- |
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
id-pkix OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { iso(1) identified-organization(3) |
| 1166 |
dod(6) internet(1) security(5) mechanisms(5) 7 } |
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
-- arc for Internet X.509 PKI protocols and their components |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
id-pkip OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkix 5 } |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
-- Registration Controls in CRMF |
| 1180 |
id-regCtrl OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 1 } |
| 1181 |
|
| 1182 |
-- The following definition may be uncommented for use with |
| 1183 |
-- ASN.1 compilers which do not understand UTF8String. |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
-- UTF8String ::= [UNIVERSAL 12] IMPLICIT OCTET STRING |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
id-regCtrl-regToken OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 1 } |
| 1188 |
--with syntax: |
| 1189 |
RegToken ::= UTF8String |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
id-regCtrl-authenticator OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 2 } |
| 1192 |
--with syntax: |
| 1193 |
Authenticator ::= UTF8String |
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 |
id-regCtrl-pkiPublicationInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 3 } |
| 1196 |
--with syntax: |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
PKIPublicationInfo ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1199 |
action INTEGER { |
| 1200 |
dontPublish (0), |
| 1201 |
pleasePublish (1) }, |
| 1202 |
pubInfos SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF SinglePubInfo OPTIONAL } |
| 1203 |
-- pubInfos MUST NOT be present if action is "dontPublish" |
| 1204 |
-- (if action is "pleasePublish" and pubInfos is omitted, |
| 1205 |
-- "dontCare" is assumed) |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
SinglePubInfo ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1208 |
pubMethod INTEGER { |
| 1209 |
dontCare (0), |
| 1210 |
x500 (1), |
| 1211 |
web (2), |
| 1212 |
ldap (3) }, |
| 1213 |
pubLocation GeneralName OPTIONAL } |
| 1214 |
|
| 1215 |
id-regCtrl-pkiArchiveOptions OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 4 } |
| 1216 |
--with syntax: |
| 1217 |
PKIArchiveOptions ::= CHOICE { |
| 1218 |
encryptedPrivKey [0] EncryptedKey, |
| 1219 |
-- the actual value of the private key |
| 1220 |
keyGenParameters [1] KeyGenParameters, |
| 1221 |
-- parameters which allow the private key to be re-generated |
| 1222 |
archiveRemGenPrivKey [2] BOOLEAN } |
| 1223 |
-- set to TRUE if sender wishes receiver to archive the private |
| 1224 |
-- key of a key pair which the receiver generates in response to |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
-- this request; set to FALSE if no archival is desired. |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
EncryptedKey ::= CHOICE { |
| 1236 |
encryptedValue EncryptedValue, |
| 1237 |
envelopedData [0] EnvelopedData } |
| 1238 |
-- The encrypted private key MUST be placed in the envelopedData |
| 1239 |
-- encryptedContentInfo encryptedContent OCTET STRING. |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
|
| 1242 |
EncryptedValue ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1243 |
intendedAlg [0] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 1244 |
-- the intended algorithm for which the value will be used |
| 1245 |
symmAlg [1] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 1246 |
-- the symmetric algorithm used to encrypt the value |
| 1247 |
encSymmKey [2] BIT STRING OPTIONAL, |
| 1248 |
-- the (encrypted) symmetric key used to encrypt the value |
| 1249 |
keyAlg [3] AlgorithmIdentifier OPTIONAL, |
| 1250 |
-- algorithm used to encrypt the symmetric key |
| 1251 |
valueHint [4] OCTET STRING OPTIONAL, |
| 1252 |
-- a brief description or identifier of the encValue content |
| 1253 |
-- (may be meaningful only to the sending entity, and used only |
| 1254 |
-- if EncryptedValue might be re-examined by the sending entity |
| 1255 |
-- in the future) |
| 1256 |
encValue BIT STRING } |
| 1257 |
-- the encrypted value itself |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
KeyGenParameters ::= OCTET STRING |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
id-regCtrl-oldCertID OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 5 } |
| 1262 |
--with syntax: |
| 1263 |
OldCertId ::= CertId |
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
CertId ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1266 |
issuer GeneralName, |
| 1267 |
serialNumber INTEGER } |
| 1268 |
|
| 1269 |
id-regCtrl-protocolEncrKey OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regCtrl 6 } |
| 1270 |
--with syntax: |
| 1271 |
ProtocolEncrKey ::= SubjectPublicKeyInfo |
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 |
-- Registration Info in CRMF |
| 1274 |
id-regInfo OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pkip 2 } |
| 1275 |
|
| 1276 |
id-regInfo-utf8Pairs OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 1 } |
| 1277 |
--with syntax |
| 1278 |
UTF8Pairs ::= UTF8String |
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
id-regInfo-certReq OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-regInfo 2 } |
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
--with syntax |
| 1290 |
CertReq ::= CertRequest |
| 1291 |
|
| 1292 |
END |
| 1293 |
|
| 1294 |
|
| 1295 |
|
| 1296 |
|
| 1297 |
|
| 1298 |
|
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
|
| 1301 |
|
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 |
|
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
|
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
|
| 1311 |
|
| 1312 |
|
| 1313 |
|
| 1314 |
|
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 |
|
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 |
|
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 |
|
| 1321 |
|
| 1322 |
|
| 1323 |
|
| 1324 |
|
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
|
| 1331 |
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2511">RFC 2511</a> Internet X.509 CRMF March 1999</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1999). All Rights Reserved. |
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 |
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
| 1350 |
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
| 1351 |
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published |
| 1352 |
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
| 1353 |
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
| 1354 |
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
| 1355 |
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
| 1356 |
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
| 1357 |
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
| 1358 |
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
| 1359 |
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
| 1360 |
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
| 1361 |
English. |
| 1362 |
|
| 1363 |
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
| 1364 |
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
| 1365 |
|
| 1366 |
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
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"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
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BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
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MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
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Myers, et. al. Standards Track [Page 25] |
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</pre> |