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1 <pre>Network Working Group F. Baker
2 Request for Comments: 2082 R. Atkinson
3 Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems
4 January 1997
5
6
7 <span class="h1">RIP-2 MD5 Authentication</span>
8
9 Status of this Memo
10
11 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
12 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
13 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
14 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
15 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
16
17 Table of Contents
18
19 <a href="#section-1">1</a> Use of Imperatives ........................................... <a href="#page-1">1</a>
20 <a href="#section-2">2</a> Introduction ................................................. <a href="#page-2">2</a>
21 <a href="#section-3">3</a> Implementation Approach ...................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a>
22 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> RIP-2 PDU Format ........................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a>
23 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Processing Algorithm ....................................... <a href="#page-5">5</a>
24 <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> Message Generation ....................................... <a href="#page-6">6</a>
25 <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> Message Reception ........................................ <a href="#page-7">7</a>
26 <a href="#section-4">4</a> Management Procedures ........................................ <a href="#page-7">7</a>
27 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Key Management Requirements ................................ <a href="#page-7">7</a>
28 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Key Management Procedures .................................. <a href="#page-8">8</a>
29 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Pathological Cases ......................................... <a href="#page-9">9</a>
30 <a href="#section-5">5</a> Conformance Requirements ..................................... <a href="#page-9">9</a>
31 <a href="#section-6">6</a> Acknowledgments .............................................. <a href="#page-10">10</a>
32 <a href="#section-7">7</a> References ................................................... <a href="#page-10">10</a>
33 <a href="#section-8">8</a> Security Considerations ...................................... <a href="#page-11">11</a>
34 <a href="#section-9">9</a> Chairman's Address ........................................... <a href="#page-11">11</a>
35 <a href="#section-10">10</a> Authors' Addresses .......................................... <a href="#page-12">12</a>
36
37 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Use of Imperatives</span>
38
39 Throughout this document, the words that are used to define the
40 significance of particular requirements are capitalized. These words
41 are:
42
43 MUST
44
45 This word or the adjective "REQUIRED" means that the item is an
46 absolute requirement of this specification.
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
55
56
57 MUST NOT
58
59 This phrase means that the item is an absolute prohibition of this
60 specification.
61
62 SHOULD
63
64 This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED" means that there may
65 exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this
66 item, but the full implications should be understood and the case
67 carefully weighed before choosing a different course.
68
69 SHOULD NOT
70
71 This phrase means that there may exist valid reasons in particular
72 circumstances when the listed behavior is acceptable or even
73 useful, but the full implications should be understood and the
74 case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described
75 with this label.
76
77 MAY
78 This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is
79 truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because
80 a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the
81 product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item.
82
83 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Introduction</span>
84
85 Growth in the Internet has made us aware of the need for improved
86 authentication of routing information. RIP-2 provides for
87 unauthenticated service (as in classical RIP), or password
88 authentication. Both are vulnerable to passive attacks currently
89 widespread in the Internet. Well-understood security issues exist in
90 routing protocols [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite&quot;">4</a>]. Clear text passwords, currently specified for
91 use with RIP-2, are no longer considered sufficient [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Internet Authentication Guidelines&quot;">5</a>].
92
93 If authentication is disabled, then only simple misconfigurations are
94 detected. Simple passwords transmitted in the clear will further
95 protect against the honest neighbor, but are useless in the general
96 case. By simply capturing information on the wire - straightforward
97 even in a remote environment - a hostile process can learn the
98 password and overcome the network.
99
100 We propose that RIP-2 use an authentication algorithm, as was
101 originally proposed for SNMP Version 2, augmented by a sequence
102 number. Keyed MD5 is proposed as the standard authentication
103 algorithm for RIP-2, but the mechanism is intended to be algorithm-
104 independent. While this mechanism is not unbreakable (no known
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
111
112
113 mechanism is), it provides a greatly enhanced probability that a
114 system being attacked will detect and ignore hostile messages. This
115 is because we transmit the output of an authentication algorithm
116 (e.g., Keyed MD5) rather than the secret RIP-2 Authentication Key.
117 This output is a one-way function of a message and a secret RIP-2
118 Authentication Key. This RIP-2 Authentication Key is never sent over
119 the network in the clear, thus providing protection against the
120 passive attacks now commonplace in the Internet.
121
122 In this way, protection is afforded against forgery or message
123 modification. It is possible to replay a message until the sequence
124 number changes, but the sequence number makes replay in the long term
125 less of an issue. The mechanism does not afford confidentiality,
126 since messages stay in the clear; however, the mechanism is also
127 exportable from most countries, which test a privacy algorithm would
128 fail.
129
130 Other relevant rationales for the approach are that Keyed MD5 is
131 being used for OSPF cryptographic authentication, and is therefore
132 present in routers already, as is some form of password management.
133 A similar approach has been standardized for use in IP-layer
134 authentication. [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">7</a>]
135
136 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Implementation Approach</span>
137
138 Implementation requires three issues to be addressed:
139
140 (1) A changed packet format,
141
142 (2) Authentication procedures, and
143
144 (3) Management controls.
145
146 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. RIP-2 PDU Format</span>
147
148 The basic RIP-2 message format provides for an 8 byte header with an
149 array of 20 byte records as its data content. When Keyed MD5 is
150 used, the same header and content are used, except that the 16 byte
151 "authentication key" field is reused to describe a "Keyed Message
152 Digest" trailer. This consists in five fields:
153
154 (1) The "Authentication Type" is Keyed Message Digest Algorithm,
155 indicated by the value 3 (1 and 2 indicate "IP Route" and
156 "Password", respectively).
157
158 (2) A 16 bit offset from the RIP-2 header to the MD5 digest (if no
159 other trailer fields are ever defined, this value equals the
160 RIP-2 Data Length).
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
167
168
169 (3) An unsigned 8-bit field that contains the Key Identifier
170 or Key-ID. This identifies the key used to create the
171 Authentication Data for this RIP-2 message. In
172 implementations supporting more than one authentication
173 algorithm, the Key-ID also indicates the authentication
174 algorithm in use for this message. A key is associated with
175 an interface.
176
177 (4) An unsigned 8-bit field that contains the length in octets of the
178 trailing Authentication Data field. The presence of this field
179 permits other algorithms (e.g., Keyed SHA) to be substituted for
180 Keyed MD5 if desired.
181
182 (5) An unsigned 32 bit sequence number. The sequence number MUST be
183 non-decreasing for all messages sent with the same Key ID.
184
185 The trailer consists of the Authentication Data, which is the output
186 of the Keyed Message Digest Algorithm. When the Authentication
187 Algorithm is Keyed MD5, the output data is 16 bytes; during digest
188 calculation, this is effectively followed by a pad field and a length
189 field as defined by <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>.
190
191
192
193
194
195
196
197
198
199
200
201
202
203
204
205
206
207
208
209
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
223
224
225 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Processing Algorithm</span>
226
227 When the authentication type is "Keyed Message Digest", message
228 processing is changed in message creation and reception.
229
230 0 1 2 3 3
231 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
232 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
233 | Command (1) | Version (1) | Routing Domain (2) |
234 +---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+
235 | 0xFFFF | AuType=Keyed Message Digest |
236 +-------------------------------+-------------------------------+
237 | RIP-2 Packet Length | Key ID | Auth Data Len |
238 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
239 | Sequence Number (non-decreasing) |
240 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
241 | reserved must be zero |
242 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
243 | reserved must be zero |
244 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
245 | |
246 / (RIP-2 Packet Length - 24) bytes of Data /
247 | |
248 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
249 | 0xFFFF | 0x01 |
250 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
251 / Authentication Data (var. length; 16 bytes with Keyed MD5) /
252 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
253
254 In memory, the following trailer is appended by the MD5 algorithm and
255 treated as though it were part of the message.
256
257 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
258 | sixteen octets of MD5 "secret" |
259 / /
260 | |
261 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
262 | zero or more pad bytes (defined by <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a> when MD5 is used) |
263 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
264 | 64 bit message length MSW |
265 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
266 | 64 bit message length LSW |
267 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
279
280
281 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Message Generation</span>
282
283 The RIP-2 Packet is created as usual, with these exceptions:
284
285 (1) The UDP checksum need not be calculated, but MAY be set to
286 zero.
287
288 (2) The authentication type field indicates the Keyed Message Digest
289 Algorithm (3).
290
291 (3) The authentication "password" field is reused to store a packet
292 offset to the Authentication Data, a Key Identifier, the
293 Authentication Data Length, and a non-decreasing sequence number.
294
295 The value used in the sequence number is arbitrary, but two
296 suggestions are the time of the message's creation or a simple
297 message counter.
298
299 The RIP-2 Authentication Key is selected by the sender based on the
300 outgoing interface. Each key has a lifetime associated with it. No
301 key is ever used outside its lifetime. Since the key's algorithm is
302 related to the key itself, stored in the sender and receiver along
303 with it, the Key ID effectively indicates which authentication
304 algorithm is in use if the implementation supports more than one
305 authentication algorithm.
306
307 (1) The RIP-2 header's packet length field indicates the standard
308 RIP-2 portion of the packet.
309
310 (2) The Authentication Data Offset, Key Identifier, and
311 Authentication Data size fields are filled in appropriately.
312
313 (3) The RIP-2 Authentication Key, which is 16 bytes long when the
314 Keyed MD5 algorithm is used, is now appended to the data. For
315 all algorithms, the RIP-2 Authentication Key is never longer than
316 the output of the algorithm in use.
317
318 (4) Trailing pad and length fields are added and the digest
319 calculated using the indicated algorithm. When Keyed MD5 is the
320 algorithm in use, these are calculated per <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>.
321
322 (5) The digest is written over the RIP-2 Authentication Key. When
323 MD5 is used, this digest will be 16 bytes long.
324
325 The trailing pad is not actually transmitted, as it is entirely
326 predictable from the message length and algorithm in use.
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
335
336
337 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Message Reception</span>
338
339 When the message is received, the process is reversed:
340
341 (1) The digest is set aside,
342
343 (2) The appropriate algorithm and key are determined from the value
344 of the Key Identifier field,
345
346 (3) The RIP-2 Authentication Key is written into the appropriate
347 number (16 when Keyed MD5 is used) of bytes starting at the
348 offset indicated,
349
350 (4) Appropriate padding is added as needed, and
351
352 (5) A new digest calculated using the indicated algorithm.
353
354 If the calculated digest does not match the received digest, the
355 message is discarded unprocessed. If the neighbor has been heard
356 from recently enough to have viable routes in the route table and the
357 received sequence number is less than the last one received, the
358 message likewise is discarded unprocessed. When connectivity to the
359 neighbor has been lost, the receiver SHOULD be ready to accept
360 either:
361 - a message with a sequence number of zero
362 - a message with a higher sequence number than the last received
363 sequence number.
364
365 A router that has forgotten its current sequence number but remembers
366 its key and Key-ID MUST send its first packet with a sequence number
367 of zero. This leaves a small opening for a replay attack. Router
368 vendors are encouraged to provide stable storage for keys, key
369 lifetimes, Key-IDs, and the related sequence numbers.
370
371 Acceptable messages are now truncated to RIP-2 message itself and
372 treated normally.
373
374 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Management Procedures</span>
375
376 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Key Management Requirements</span>
377
378 It is strongly desirable that a hypothetical security breach in one
379 Internet protocol not automatically compromise other Internet
380 protocols. The Authentication Key of this specification SHOULD NOT
381 be stored using protocols or algorithms that have known flaws.
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
391
392
393 Implementations MUST support the storage of more than one key at the
394 same time, although it is recognized that only one key will normally
395 be active on an interface. They MUST associate a specific lifetime
396 (i.e., date/time first valid and date/time no longer valid) and a key
397 identifier with each key, and MUST support manual key distribution
398 (e.g., the privileged user manually typing in the key, key lifetime,
399 and key identifier on the router console). The lifetime may be
400 infinite. If more than one algorithm is supported, then the
401 implementation MUST require that the algorithm be specified for each
402 key at the time the other key information is entered. Keys that are
403 out of date MAY be deleted at will by the implementation without
404 requiring human intervention. Manual deletion of active keys SHOULD
405 also be supported.
406
407 It is likely that the IETF will define a standard key management
408 protocol. It is strongly desirable to use that key management
409 protocol to distribute RIP-2 Authentication Keys among communicating
410 RIP-2 implementations. Such a protocol would provide scalability and
411 significantly reduce the human administrative burden. The Key ID can
412 be used as a hook between RIP-2 and such a future protocol. Key
413 management protocols have a long history of subtle flaws that are
414 often discovered long after the protocol was first described in
415 public. To avoid having to change all RIP-2 implementations should
416 such a flaw be discovered, integrated key management protocol
417 techniques were deliberately omitted from this specification.
418
419 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Key Management Procedures</span>
420
421 As with all security methods using keys, it is necessary to change
422 the RIP-2 Authentication Key on a regular basis. To maintain routing
423 stability during such changes, implementations MUST be able to store
424 and use more than one RIP-2 Authentication Key on a given interface
425 at the same time.
426
427 Each key will have its own Key Identifier, which is stored locally.
428 The combination of the Key Identifier and the interface associated
429 with the message uniquely identifies the Authentication Algorithm and
430 RIP-2 Authentication Key in use.
431
432 As noted above in <a href="#section-2.2.1">Section 2.2.1</a>, the party creating the RIP-2 message
433 will select a valid key from the set of valid keys for that
434 interface. The receiver will use the Key Identifier and interface to
435 determine which key to use for authentication of the received
436 message. More than one key may be associated with an interface at
437 the same time.
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
447
448
449 Hence it is possible to have fairly smooth RIP-2 Authentication Key
450 rollovers without losing legitimate RIP-2 messages because the stored
451 key is incorrect and without requiring people to change all the keys
452 at once. To ensure a smooth rollover, each communicating RIP-2
453 system must be updated with the new key several minutes before the
454 current key will expire and several minutes before the new key
455 lifetime begins. The new key should have a lifetime that starts
456 several minutes before the old key expires. This gives time for each
457 system to learn of the new RIP-2 Authentication Key before that key
458 will be used. It also ensures that the new key will begin being used
459 and the current key will go out of use before the current key's
460 lifetime expires. For the duration of the overlap in key lifetimes,
461 a system may receive messages using either key and authenticate the
462 message. The Key-ID in the received message is used to select the
463 appropriate key for authentication.
464
465 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Pathological Cases</span>
466
467 Two pathological cases exist which must be handled, which are
468 failures of the network manager. Both of these should be exceedingly
469 rare.
470
471 During key switchover, devices may exist which have not yet been
472 successfully configured with the new key. Therefore, routers SHOULD
473 implement (and would be well advised to implement) an algorithm that
474 detects the set of keys being used by its neighbors, and transmits
475 its messages using both the new and old keys until all of the
476 neighbors are using the new key or the lifetime of the old key
477 expires. Under normal circumstances, this elevated transmission rate
478 will exist for a single update interval.
479
480 In the event that the last key associated with an interface expires,
481 it is unacceptable to revert to an unauthenticated condition, and not
482 advisable to disrupt routing. Therefore, the router should send a
483 "last authentication key expiration" notification to the network
484 manager and treat the key as having an infinite lifetime until the
485 lifetime is extended, the key is deleted by network management, or a
486 new key is configured.
487
488 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements</span>
489
490 To conform to this specification, an implementation MUST support all
491 of its aspects. The Keyed MD5 authentication algorithm MUST be
492 implemented by all conforming implementations. MD5 is defined in
493 <a href="./rfc1321">RFC-1321</a>. A conforming implementation MAY also support other
494 authentication algorithms such as Keyed Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA).
495 Manual key distribution as described above MUST be supported by all
496 conforming implementations. All implementations MUST support the
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
503
504
505 smooth key rollover described under "Key Change Procedures."
506
507 The user documentation provided with the implementation MUST contain
508 clear instructions on how to ensure that smooth key rollover occurs.
509
510 Implementations SHOULD support a standard key management protocol for
511 secure distribution of RIP-2 Authentication Keys once such a key
512 management protocol is standardized by the IETF.
513
514 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
515
516 This work was done by the RIP-2 Working Group, of which Gary Malkin
517 is the Chair. This suggestion was originally made by Christian
518 Huitema on behalf of the IAB. Jeff Honig (Cornell) and Dennis
519 Ferguson (ANS) built the first operational prototype, proving out the
520 algorithms. The authors gladly acknowledge significant inputs from
521 each of these sources.
522
523 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
524
525 [<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional Information",
526 <a href="./rfc1388">RFC 1388</a>, January 1993.
527
528 [<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, April
529 1992.
530
531 [<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Malkin, G., and F. Baker, "RIP Version 2 MIB Extension",
532 <a href="./rfc1389">RFC 1389</a>, Xylogics, Inc., Advanced Computer Communications,
533 January 1993.
534
535 [<a id="ref-4">4</a>] S. Bellovin, "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite",
536 ACM Computer Communications Review, Volume 19, Number 2,
537 pp.32-48, April 1989.
538
539 [<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Haller, N., and R. Atkinson, "Internet Authentication
540 Guidelines", <a href="./rfc1704">RFC 1704</a>, October 1994.
541
542 [<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Braden, R., Clark, D., Crocker, S., and C. Huitema, "Report
543 of IAB Workshop on Security in the Internet Architecture",
544 <a href="./rfc1636">RFC 1636</a>, June 1994.
545
546 [<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>, August 1995.
547
548 [<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a>,
549 August 1995.
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span>
562
563 This entire memo describes and specifies an authentication mechanism
564 for the RIP-2 routing protocol that is believed to be secure against
565 active and passive attacks. Passive attacks are clearly widespread in
566 the Internet at present. Protection against active attacks is also
567 needed because active attacks are becoming more common.
568
569 Users need to understand that the quality of the security provided by
570 this mechanism depends completely on the strength of the implemented
571 authentication algorithms, the strength of the key being used, and
572 the correct implementation of the security mechanism in all
573 communicating RIP-2 implementations. This mechanism also depends on
574 the RIP-2 Authentication Key being kept confidential by all parties.
575 If any of these incorrect or insufficiently secure, then no real
576 security will be provided to the users of this mechanism.
577
578 Specifically with respect to the use of SNMP, compromise of SNMP
579 security has the necessary result that the various RIP-2
580 configuration parameters (e.g. routing table, RIP-2 Authentication
581 Key) manageable via SNMP could be compromised as well. Changing
582 Authentication Keys using non-encrypted SNMP is no more secure than
583 sending passwords in the clear.
584
585 Confidentiality is not provided by this mechanism. Recent work in
586 the IETF provides a standard mechanism for IP-layer encryption. [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload&quot;">8</a>]
587 That mechanism might be used to provide confidentiality for RIP-2 in
588 the future. Protection against traffic analysis is also not
589 provided. Mechanisms such as bulk link encryption might be used when
590 protection against traffic analysis is required.
591
592 The memo is written to address a security consideration in RIP
593 Version 2 that was raised during the IAB's recent security review
594 [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Report of IAB Workshop on Security in the Internet Architecture&quot;">6</a>].
595
596 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Chairman's Address</span>
597
598 Gary Scott Malkin
599 Xylogics, Inc.
600 53 Third Avenue
601 Burlington, MA 01803
602
603 Phone: (617) 272-8140
604 EMail: [email protected]
605
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612 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Authors' Addresses</span>
618
619 Fred Baker
620 cisco Systems
621 519 Lado Drive
622 Santa Barbara, California 93111
623
624 Phone: (805) 681 0115
625 Email: [email protected]
626
627
628 Randall Atkinson
629 cisco Systems
630 170 West Tasman Drive
631 San Jose, CA 95134-1706
632
633 Phone: (408) 526-6566
634 EMail: [email protected]
635
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668 Baker &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12]
669 </pre>