| 1 |
<pre>Network Working Group F. Baker |
| 2 |
Request for Comments: 2082 R. Atkinson |
| 3 |
Category: Standards Track Cisco Systems |
| 4 |
January 1997 |
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
|
| 7 |
<span class="h1">RIP-2 MD5 Authentication</span> |
| 8 |
|
| 9 |
Status of this Memo |
| 10 |
|
| 11 |
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
| 12 |
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
| 13 |
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
| 14 |
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
| 15 |
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
| 16 |
|
| 17 |
Table of Contents |
| 18 |
|
| 19 |
<a href="#section-1">1</a> Use of Imperatives ........................................... <a href="#page-1">1</a> |
| 20 |
<a href="#section-2">2</a> Introduction ................................................. <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
| 21 |
<a href="#section-3">3</a> Implementation Approach ...................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 22 |
<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> RIP-2 PDU Format ........................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 23 |
<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Processing Algorithm ....................................... <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 24 |
<a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> Message Generation ....................................... <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
| 25 |
<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> Message Reception ........................................ <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 26 |
<a href="#section-4">4</a> Management Procedures ........................................ <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 27 |
<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Key Management Requirements ................................ <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 28 |
<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Key Management Procedures .................................. <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 29 |
<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Pathological Cases ......................................... <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
| 30 |
<a href="#section-5">5</a> Conformance Requirements ..................................... <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
| 31 |
<a href="#section-6">6</a> Acknowledgments .............................................. <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
| 32 |
<a href="#section-7">7</a> References ................................................... <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
| 33 |
<a href="#section-8">8</a> Security Considerations ...................................... <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
| 34 |
<a href="#section-9">9</a> Chairman's Address ........................................... <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
| 35 |
<a href="#section-10">10</a> Authors' Addresses .......................................... <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
| 36 |
|
| 37 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Use of Imperatives</span> |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
Throughout this document, the words that are used to define the |
| 40 |
significance of particular requirements are capitalized. These words |
| 41 |
are: |
| 42 |
|
| 43 |
MUST |
| 44 |
|
| 45 |
This word or the adjective "REQUIRED" means that the item is an |
| 46 |
absolute requirement of this specification. |
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
| 53 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
| 54 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
MUST NOT |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
This phrase means that the item is an absolute prohibition of this |
| 60 |
specification. |
| 61 |
|
| 62 |
SHOULD |
| 63 |
|
| 64 |
This word or the adjective "RECOMMENDED" means that there may |
| 65 |
exist valid reasons in particular circumstances to ignore this |
| 66 |
item, but the full implications should be understood and the case |
| 67 |
carefully weighed before choosing a different course. |
| 68 |
|
| 69 |
SHOULD NOT |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
This phrase means that there may exist valid reasons in particular |
| 72 |
circumstances when the listed behavior is acceptable or even |
| 73 |
useful, but the full implications should be understood and the |
| 74 |
case carefully weighed before implementing any behavior described |
| 75 |
with this label. |
| 76 |
|
| 77 |
MAY |
| 78 |
This word or the adjective "OPTIONAL" means that this item is |
| 79 |
truly optional. One vendor may choose to include the item because |
| 80 |
a particular marketplace requires it or because it enhances the |
| 81 |
product, for example; another vendor may omit the same item. |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Introduction</span> |
| 84 |
|
| 85 |
Growth in the Internet has made us aware of the need for improved |
| 86 |
authentication of routing information. RIP-2 provides for |
| 87 |
unauthenticated service (as in classical RIP), or password |
| 88 |
authentication. Both are vulnerable to passive attacks currently |
| 89 |
widespread in the Internet. Well-understood security issues exist in |
| 90 |
routing protocols [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite"">4</a>]. Clear text passwords, currently specified for |
| 91 |
use with RIP-2, are no longer considered sufficient [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Internet Authentication Guidelines"">5</a>]. |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
If authentication is disabled, then only simple misconfigurations are |
| 94 |
detected. Simple passwords transmitted in the clear will further |
| 95 |
protect against the honest neighbor, but are useless in the general |
| 96 |
case. By simply capturing information on the wire - straightforward |
| 97 |
even in a remote environment - a hostile process can learn the |
| 98 |
password and overcome the network. |
| 99 |
|
| 100 |
We propose that RIP-2 use an authentication algorithm, as was |
| 101 |
originally proposed for SNMP Version 2, augmented by a sequence |
| 102 |
number. Keyed MD5 is proposed as the standard authentication |
| 103 |
algorithm for RIP-2, but the mechanism is intended to be algorithm- |
| 104 |
independent. While this mechanism is not unbreakable (no known |
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
| 109 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
| 110 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
mechanism is), it provides a greatly enhanced probability that a |
| 114 |
system being attacked will detect and ignore hostile messages. This |
| 115 |
is because we transmit the output of an authentication algorithm |
| 116 |
(e.g., Keyed MD5) rather than the secret RIP-2 Authentication Key. |
| 117 |
This output is a one-way function of a message and a secret RIP-2 |
| 118 |
Authentication Key. This RIP-2 Authentication Key is never sent over |
| 119 |
the network in the clear, thus providing protection against the |
| 120 |
passive attacks now commonplace in the Internet. |
| 121 |
|
| 122 |
In this way, protection is afforded against forgery or message |
| 123 |
modification. It is possible to replay a message until the sequence |
| 124 |
number changes, but the sequence number makes replay in the long term |
| 125 |
less of an issue. The mechanism does not afford confidentiality, |
| 126 |
since messages stay in the clear; however, the mechanism is also |
| 127 |
exportable from most countries, which test a privacy algorithm would |
| 128 |
fail. |
| 129 |
|
| 130 |
Other relevant rationales for the approach are that Keyed MD5 is |
| 131 |
being used for OSPF cryptographic authentication, and is therefore |
| 132 |
present in routers already, as is some form of password management. |
| 133 |
A similar approach has been standardized for use in IP-layer |
| 134 |
authentication. [<a href="#ref-7" title=""IP Authentication Header"">7</a>] |
| 135 |
|
| 136 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Implementation Approach</span> |
| 137 |
|
| 138 |
Implementation requires three issues to be addressed: |
| 139 |
|
| 140 |
(1) A changed packet format, |
| 141 |
|
| 142 |
(2) Authentication procedures, and |
| 143 |
|
| 144 |
(3) Management controls. |
| 145 |
|
| 146 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. RIP-2 PDU Format</span> |
| 147 |
|
| 148 |
The basic RIP-2 message format provides for an 8 byte header with an |
| 149 |
array of 20 byte records as its data content. When Keyed MD5 is |
| 150 |
used, the same header and content are used, except that the 16 byte |
| 151 |
"authentication key" field is reused to describe a "Keyed Message |
| 152 |
Digest" trailer. This consists in five fields: |
| 153 |
|
| 154 |
(1) The "Authentication Type" is Keyed Message Digest Algorithm, |
| 155 |
indicated by the value 3 (1 and 2 indicate "IP Route" and |
| 156 |
"Password", respectively). |
| 157 |
|
| 158 |
(2) A 16 bit offset from the RIP-2 header to the MD5 digest (if no |
| 159 |
other trailer fields are ever defined, this value equals the |
| 160 |
RIP-2 Data Length). |
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
| 165 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
| 166 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
(3) An unsigned 8-bit field that contains the Key Identifier |
| 170 |
or Key-ID. This identifies the key used to create the |
| 171 |
Authentication Data for this RIP-2 message. In |
| 172 |
implementations supporting more than one authentication |
| 173 |
algorithm, the Key-ID also indicates the authentication |
| 174 |
algorithm in use for this message. A key is associated with |
| 175 |
an interface. |
| 176 |
|
| 177 |
(4) An unsigned 8-bit field that contains the length in octets of the |
| 178 |
trailing Authentication Data field. The presence of this field |
| 179 |
permits other algorithms (e.g., Keyed SHA) to be substituted for |
| 180 |
Keyed MD5 if desired. |
| 181 |
|
| 182 |
(5) An unsigned 32 bit sequence number. The sequence number MUST be |
| 183 |
non-decreasing for all messages sent with the same Key ID. |
| 184 |
|
| 185 |
The trailer consists of the Authentication Data, which is the output |
| 186 |
of the Keyed Message Digest Algorithm. When the Authentication |
| 187 |
Algorithm is Keyed MD5, the output data is 16 bytes; during digest |
| 188 |
calculation, this is effectively followed by a pad field and a length |
| 189 |
field as defined by <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>. |
| 190 |
|
| 191 |
|
| 192 |
|
| 193 |
|
| 194 |
|
| 195 |
|
| 196 |
|
| 197 |
|
| 198 |
|
| 199 |
|
| 200 |
|
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
|
| 203 |
|
| 204 |
|
| 205 |
|
| 206 |
|
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
|
| 209 |
|
| 210 |
|
| 211 |
|
| 212 |
|
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
|
| 215 |
|
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
|
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
| 221 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
| 222 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Processing Algorithm</span> |
| 226 |
|
| 227 |
When the authentication type is "Keyed Message Digest", message |
| 228 |
processing is changed in message creation and reception. |
| 229 |
|
| 230 |
0 1 2 3 3 |
| 231 |
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 |
| 232 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 233 |
| Command (1) | Version (1) | Routing Domain (2) | |
| 234 |
+---------------+---------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 235 |
| 0xFFFF | AuType=Keyed Message Digest | |
| 236 |
+-------------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 237 |
| RIP-2 Packet Length | Key ID | Auth Data Len | |
| 238 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 239 |
| Sequence Number (non-decreasing) | |
| 240 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 241 |
| reserved must be zero | |
| 242 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 243 |
| reserved must be zero | |
| 244 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 245 |
| | |
| 246 |
/ (RIP-2 Packet Length - 24) bytes of Data / |
| 247 |
| | |
| 248 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 249 |
| 0xFFFF | 0x01 | |
| 250 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 251 |
/ Authentication Data (var. length; 16 bytes with Keyed MD5) / |
| 252 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 253 |
|
| 254 |
In memory, the following trailer is appended by the MD5 algorithm and |
| 255 |
treated as though it were part of the message. |
| 256 |
|
| 257 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 258 |
| sixteen octets of MD5 "secret" | |
| 259 |
/ / |
| 260 |
| | |
| 261 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 262 |
| zero or more pad bytes (defined by <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a> when MD5 is used) | |
| 263 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 264 |
| 64 bit message length MSW | |
| 265 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 266 |
| 64 bit message length LSW | |
| 267 |
+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
| 268 |
|
| 269 |
|
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
|
| 272 |
|
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
| 277 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
| 278 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 279 |
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Message Generation</span> |
| 282 |
|
| 283 |
The RIP-2 Packet is created as usual, with these exceptions: |
| 284 |
|
| 285 |
(1) The UDP checksum need not be calculated, but MAY be set to |
| 286 |
zero. |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
(2) The authentication type field indicates the Keyed Message Digest |
| 289 |
Algorithm (3). |
| 290 |
|
| 291 |
(3) The authentication "password" field is reused to store a packet |
| 292 |
offset to the Authentication Data, a Key Identifier, the |
| 293 |
Authentication Data Length, and a non-decreasing sequence number. |
| 294 |
|
| 295 |
The value used in the sequence number is arbitrary, but two |
| 296 |
suggestions are the time of the message's creation or a simple |
| 297 |
message counter. |
| 298 |
|
| 299 |
The RIP-2 Authentication Key is selected by the sender based on the |
| 300 |
outgoing interface. Each key has a lifetime associated with it. No |
| 301 |
key is ever used outside its lifetime. Since the key's algorithm is |
| 302 |
related to the key itself, stored in the sender and receiver along |
| 303 |
with it, the Key ID effectively indicates which authentication |
| 304 |
algorithm is in use if the implementation supports more than one |
| 305 |
authentication algorithm. |
| 306 |
|
| 307 |
(1) The RIP-2 header's packet length field indicates the standard |
| 308 |
RIP-2 portion of the packet. |
| 309 |
|
| 310 |
(2) The Authentication Data Offset, Key Identifier, and |
| 311 |
Authentication Data size fields are filled in appropriately. |
| 312 |
|
| 313 |
(3) The RIP-2 Authentication Key, which is 16 bytes long when the |
| 314 |
Keyed MD5 algorithm is used, is now appended to the data. For |
| 315 |
all algorithms, the RIP-2 Authentication Key is never longer than |
| 316 |
the output of the algorithm in use. |
| 317 |
|
| 318 |
(4) Trailing pad and length fields are added and the digest |
| 319 |
calculated using the indicated algorithm. When Keyed MD5 is the |
| 320 |
algorithm in use, these are calculated per <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>. |
| 321 |
|
| 322 |
(5) The digest is written over the RIP-2 Authentication Key. When |
| 323 |
MD5 is used, this digest will be 16 bytes long. |
| 324 |
|
| 325 |
The trailing pad is not actually transmitted, as it is entirely |
| 326 |
predictable from the message length and algorithm in use. |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Message Reception</span> |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
When the message is received, the process is reversed: |
| 340 |
|
| 341 |
(1) The digest is set aside, |
| 342 |
|
| 343 |
(2) The appropriate algorithm and key are determined from the value |
| 344 |
of the Key Identifier field, |
| 345 |
|
| 346 |
(3) The RIP-2 Authentication Key is written into the appropriate |
| 347 |
number (16 when Keyed MD5 is used) of bytes starting at the |
| 348 |
offset indicated, |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
(4) Appropriate padding is added as needed, and |
| 351 |
|
| 352 |
(5) A new digest calculated using the indicated algorithm. |
| 353 |
|
| 354 |
If the calculated digest does not match the received digest, the |
| 355 |
message is discarded unprocessed. If the neighbor has been heard |
| 356 |
from recently enough to have viable routes in the route table and the |
| 357 |
received sequence number is less than the last one received, the |
| 358 |
message likewise is discarded unprocessed. When connectivity to the |
| 359 |
neighbor has been lost, the receiver SHOULD be ready to accept |
| 360 |
either: |
| 361 |
- a message with a sequence number of zero |
| 362 |
- a message with a higher sequence number than the last received |
| 363 |
sequence number. |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
A router that has forgotten its current sequence number but remembers |
| 366 |
its key and Key-ID MUST send its first packet with a sequence number |
| 367 |
of zero. This leaves a small opening for a replay attack. Router |
| 368 |
vendors are encouraged to provide stable storage for keys, key |
| 369 |
lifetimes, Key-IDs, and the related sequence numbers. |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
Acceptable messages are now truncated to RIP-2 message itself and |
| 372 |
treated normally. |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Management Procedures</span> |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Key Management Requirements</span> |
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
It is strongly desirable that a hypothetical security breach in one |
| 379 |
Internet protocol not automatically compromise other Internet |
| 380 |
protocols. The Authentication Key of this specification SHOULD NOT |
| 381 |
be stored using protocols or algorithms that have known flaws. |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Implementations MUST support the storage of more than one key at the |
| 394 |
same time, although it is recognized that only one key will normally |
| 395 |
be active on an interface. They MUST associate a specific lifetime |
| 396 |
(i.e., date/time first valid and date/time no longer valid) and a key |
| 397 |
identifier with each key, and MUST support manual key distribution |
| 398 |
(e.g., the privileged user manually typing in the key, key lifetime, |
| 399 |
and key identifier on the router console). The lifetime may be |
| 400 |
infinite. If more than one algorithm is supported, then the |
| 401 |
implementation MUST require that the algorithm be specified for each |
| 402 |
key at the time the other key information is entered. Keys that are |
| 403 |
out of date MAY be deleted at will by the implementation without |
| 404 |
requiring human intervention. Manual deletion of active keys SHOULD |
| 405 |
also be supported. |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
It is likely that the IETF will define a standard key management |
| 408 |
protocol. It is strongly desirable to use that key management |
| 409 |
protocol to distribute RIP-2 Authentication Keys among communicating |
| 410 |
RIP-2 implementations. Such a protocol would provide scalability and |
| 411 |
significantly reduce the human administrative burden. The Key ID can |
| 412 |
be used as a hook between RIP-2 and such a future protocol. Key |
| 413 |
management protocols have a long history of subtle flaws that are |
| 414 |
often discovered long after the protocol was first described in |
| 415 |
public. To avoid having to change all RIP-2 implementations should |
| 416 |
such a flaw be discovered, integrated key management protocol |
| 417 |
techniques were deliberately omitted from this specification. |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Key Management Procedures</span> |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
As with all security methods using keys, it is necessary to change |
| 422 |
the RIP-2 Authentication Key on a regular basis. To maintain routing |
| 423 |
stability during such changes, implementations MUST be able to store |
| 424 |
and use more than one RIP-2 Authentication Key on a given interface |
| 425 |
at the same time. |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
Each key will have its own Key Identifier, which is stored locally. |
| 428 |
The combination of the Key Identifier and the interface associated |
| 429 |
with the message uniquely identifies the Authentication Algorithm and |
| 430 |
RIP-2 Authentication Key in use. |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
As noted above in <a href="#section-2.2.1">Section 2.2.1</a>, the party creating the RIP-2 message |
| 433 |
will select a valid key from the set of valid keys for that |
| 434 |
interface. The receiver will use the Key Identifier and interface to |
| 435 |
determine which key to use for authentication of the received |
| 436 |
message. More than one key may be associated with an interface at |
| 437 |
the same time. |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
Hence it is possible to have fairly smooth RIP-2 Authentication Key |
| 450 |
rollovers without losing legitimate RIP-2 messages because the stored |
| 451 |
key is incorrect and without requiring people to change all the keys |
| 452 |
at once. To ensure a smooth rollover, each communicating RIP-2 |
| 453 |
system must be updated with the new key several minutes before the |
| 454 |
current key will expire and several minutes before the new key |
| 455 |
lifetime begins. The new key should have a lifetime that starts |
| 456 |
several minutes before the old key expires. This gives time for each |
| 457 |
system to learn of the new RIP-2 Authentication Key before that key |
| 458 |
will be used. It also ensures that the new key will begin being used |
| 459 |
and the current key will go out of use before the current key's |
| 460 |
lifetime expires. For the duration of the overlap in key lifetimes, |
| 461 |
a system may receive messages using either key and authenticate the |
| 462 |
message. The Key-ID in the received message is used to select the |
| 463 |
appropriate key for authentication. |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Pathological Cases</span> |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
Two pathological cases exist which must be handled, which are |
| 468 |
failures of the network manager. Both of these should be exceedingly |
| 469 |
rare. |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
During key switchover, devices may exist which have not yet been |
| 472 |
successfully configured with the new key. Therefore, routers SHOULD |
| 473 |
implement (and would be well advised to implement) an algorithm that |
| 474 |
detects the set of keys being used by its neighbors, and transmits |
| 475 |
its messages using both the new and old keys until all of the |
| 476 |
neighbors are using the new key or the lifetime of the old key |
| 477 |
expires. Under normal circumstances, this elevated transmission rate |
| 478 |
will exist for a single update interval. |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
In the event that the last key associated with an interface expires, |
| 481 |
it is unacceptable to revert to an unauthenticated condition, and not |
| 482 |
advisable to disrupt routing. Therefore, the router should send a |
| 483 |
"last authentication key expiration" notification to the network |
| 484 |
manager and treat the key as having an infinite lifetime until the |
| 485 |
lifetime is extended, the key is deleted by network management, or a |
| 486 |
new key is configured. |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements</span> |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
To conform to this specification, an implementation MUST support all |
| 491 |
of its aspects. The Keyed MD5 authentication algorithm MUST be |
| 492 |
implemented by all conforming implementations. MD5 is defined in |
| 493 |
<a href="./rfc1321">RFC-1321</a>. A conforming implementation MAY also support other |
| 494 |
authentication algorithms such as Keyed Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA). |
| 495 |
Manual key distribution as described above MUST be supported by all |
| 496 |
conforming implementations. All implementations MUST support the |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
smooth key rollover described under "Key Change Procedures." |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
The user documentation provided with the implementation MUST contain |
| 508 |
clear instructions on how to ensure that smooth key rollover occurs. |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
Implementations SHOULD support a standard key management protocol for |
| 511 |
secure distribution of RIP-2 Authentication Keys once such a key |
| 512 |
management protocol is standardized by the IETF. |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
This work was done by the RIP-2 Working Group, of which Gary Malkin |
| 517 |
is the Chair. This suggestion was originally made by Christian |
| 518 |
Huitema on behalf of the IAB. Jeff Honig (Cornell) and Dennis |
| 519 |
Ferguson (ANS) built the first operational prototype, proving out the |
| 520 |
algorithms. The authors gladly acknowledge significant inputs from |
| 521 |
each of these sources. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span> |
| 524 |
|
| 525 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional Information", |
| 526 |
<a href="./rfc1388">RFC 1388</a>, January 1993. |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, April |
| 529 |
1992. |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Malkin, G., and F. Baker, "RIP Version 2 MIB Extension", |
| 532 |
<a href="./rfc1389">RFC 1389</a>, Xylogics, Inc., Advanced Computer Communications, |
| 533 |
January 1993. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] S. Bellovin, "Security Problems in the TCP/IP Protocol Suite", |
| 536 |
ACM Computer Communications Review, Volume 19, Number 2, |
| 537 |
pp.32-48, April 1989. |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Haller, N., and R. Atkinson, "Internet Authentication |
| 540 |
Guidelines", <a href="./rfc1704">RFC 1704</a>, October 1994. |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Braden, R., Clark, D., Crocker, S., and C. Huitema, "Report |
| 543 |
of IAB Workshop on Security in the Internet Architecture", |
| 544 |
<a href="./rfc1636">RFC 1636</a>, June 1994. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>, August 1995. |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a>, |
| 549 |
August 1995. |
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
This entire memo describes and specifies an authentication mechanism |
| 564 |
for the RIP-2 routing protocol that is believed to be secure against |
| 565 |
active and passive attacks. Passive attacks are clearly widespread in |
| 566 |
the Internet at present. Protection against active attacks is also |
| 567 |
needed because active attacks are becoming more common. |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
Users need to understand that the quality of the security provided by |
| 570 |
this mechanism depends completely on the strength of the implemented |
| 571 |
authentication algorithms, the strength of the key being used, and |
| 572 |
the correct implementation of the security mechanism in all |
| 573 |
communicating RIP-2 implementations. This mechanism also depends on |
| 574 |
the RIP-2 Authentication Key being kept confidential by all parties. |
| 575 |
If any of these incorrect or insufficiently secure, then no real |
| 576 |
security will be provided to the users of this mechanism. |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
Specifically with respect to the use of SNMP, compromise of SNMP |
| 579 |
security has the necessary result that the various RIP-2 |
| 580 |
configuration parameters (e.g. routing table, RIP-2 Authentication |
| 581 |
Key) manageable via SNMP could be compromised as well. Changing |
| 582 |
Authentication Keys using non-encrypted SNMP is no more secure than |
| 583 |
sending passwords in the clear. |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
Confidentiality is not provided by this mechanism. Recent work in |
| 586 |
the IETF provides a standard mechanism for IP-layer encryption. [<a href="#ref-8" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload"">8</a>] |
| 587 |
That mechanism might be used to provide confidentiality for RIP-2 in |
| 588 |
the future. Protection against traffic analysis is also not |
| 589 |
provided. Mechanisms such as bulk link encryption might be used when |
| 590 |
protection against traffic analysis is required. |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
The memo is written to address a security consideration in RIP |
| 593 |
Version 2 that was raised during the IAB's recent security review |
| 594 |
[<a href="#ref-6" title=""Report of IAB Workshop on Security in the Internet Architecture"">6</a>]. |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Chairman's Address</span> |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
Gary Scott Malkin |
| 599 |
Xylogics, Inc. |
| 600 |
53 Third Avenue |
| 601 |
Burlington, MA 01803 |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
Phone: (617) 272-8140 |
| 604 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a> RIP-2 MD5 Authentication January 1997</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Authors' Addresses</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
Fred Baker |
| 620 |
cisco Systems |
| 621 |
519 Lado Drive |
| 622 |
Santa Barbara, California 93111 |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
Phone: (805) 681 0115 |
| 625 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
Randall Atkinson |
| 629 |
cisco Systems |
| 630 |
170 West Tasman Drive |
| 631 |
San Jose, CA 95134-1706 |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
Phone: (408) 526-6566 |
| 634 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 635 |
|
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
Baker & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12] |
| 669 |
</pre> |