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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Popov, Ed. |
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Request for Comments: 8471 M. Nystroem |
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Category: Standards Track Microsoft Corp. |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Balfanz |
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Google Inc. |
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J. Hodges |
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Kings Mountain Systems |
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October 2018 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document specifies version 1.0 of the Token Binding protocol. |
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The Token Binding protocol allows client/server applications to |
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create long-lived, uniquely identifiable TLS bindings spanning |
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multiple TLS sessions and connections. Applications are then enabled |
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to cryptographically bind security tokens to the TLS layer, |
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preventing token export and replay attacks. To protect privacy, the |
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Token Binding identifiers are only conveyed over TLS and can be reset |
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by the user at any time. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8471">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8471</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Token Binding Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Token Binding Protocol Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbindingid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. TokenBinding.signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. TokenBinding.extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Establishing a Token Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Client Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Server Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Bound Security Token Creation and Validation . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Token Binding Key Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Token Binding Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Token Binding Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Registration of Token Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Token Binding Key-Sharing between Applications . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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7.4. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS |
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Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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Servers often generate various security tokens (e.g., HTTP cookies, |
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OAuth tokens [<a href="./rfc6749" title=""The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework"">RFC6749</a>]) for applications to present when accessing |
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protected resources. In general, any party in possession of bearer |
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security tokens gains access to certain protected resource(s). |
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Attackers take advantage of this by exporting bearer tokens from a |
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user's application connections or machines, presenting them to |
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application servers, and impersonating authenticated users. The idea |
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of Token Binding is to prevent such attacks by cryptographically |
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binding application security tokens to the underlying TLS layer |
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[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>]. (Note: This document deals with TLS 1.2 and therefore |
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refers to <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a> (which has been obsoleted by <a href="./rfc8446">RFC 8446</a>); |
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[<a href="#ref-TOKENBIND-TLS13">TOKENBIND-TLS13</a>] addresses Token Binding in TLS 1.3.) |
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A Token Binding is established by a User Agent generating a |
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private-public key pair (possibly within a secure hardware module, |
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such as a Trusted Platform Module) per target server, providing the |
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public key to the server, and proving possession of the corresponding |
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private key, on every TLS connection to the server. The proof of |
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possession involves signing the Exported Keying Material (EKM) |
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[<a href="./rfc5705" title=""Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC5705</a>] from the TLS connection with the private key. The |
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corresponding public key is included in the Token Binding identifier |
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structure (described in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a> ("TokenBinding.tokenbindingid")). |
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Token Bindings are long-lived, i.e., they encompass multiple TLS |
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connections and TLS sessions between a given client and server. To |
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protect privacy, Token Binding IDs are never conveyed over insecure |
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connections and can be reset by the user at any time, e.g., when |
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clearing browser cookies. |
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When issuing a security token to a client that supports Token |
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Binding, a server includes the client's Token Binding ID (or its |
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cryptographic hash) in the token. Later on, when a client presents a |
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security token containing a Token Binding ID, the server verifies |
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that the ID in the token matches the ID of the Token Binding |
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established with the client. In the case of a mismatch, the server |
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rejects the token (details are application specific). |
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In order to successfully export and replay a bound security token, an |
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attacker needs to also be able to use the client's private key; this |
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is hard to do if the key is specially protected, e.g., generated in a |
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secure hardware module. |
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<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and |
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title=""Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all |
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capitals, as shown here. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Token Binding Protocol Overview</span> |
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In the course of a TLS handshake, a client and server can use the |
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Token Binding negotiation TLS extension [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] to negotiate the |
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Token Binding protocol version and the parameters (signature |
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algorithm, length) of the Token Binding key. This negotiation does |
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not require additional round trips. |
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Version 1.0 of the Token Binding protocol is represented by |
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TB_ProtocolVersion.major = 1 and TB_ProtocolVersion.minor = 0 in the |
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Token Binding negotiation TLS extension; see [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] ("Transport |
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Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol |
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Negotiation"). |
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The Token Binding protocol consists of one message sent by the client |
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to the server, proving possession of one or more client-generated |
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asymmetric private keys. This message is not sent if the Token |
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Binding negotiation has been unsuccessful. The Token Binding message |
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is sent with the application protocol data over TLS. |
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A server receiving the Token Binding message verifies that the key |
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parameters in the message match the Token Binding parameters |
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negotiated (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>]) and then validates the signatures |
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contained in the Token Binding message. If either of these checks |
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fails, the server rejects the binding, along with all associated |
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bound tokens. Otherwise, the Token Binding is successfully |
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established with the ID contained in the Token Binding message. |
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When a server supporting the Token Binding protocol receives a bound |
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token, the server compares the Token Binding ID in the token with the |
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Token Binding ID established with the client. If the bound token is |
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received on a TLS connection without a Token Binding or if the Token |
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Binding IDs do not match, the token is rejected. |
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This document defines the format of the Token Binding protocol |
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message, the process of establishing a Token Binding, the format of |
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the Token Binding ID, and the process of validating a bound token. |
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[<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] describes the negotiation of the Token Binding protocol and |
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key parameters. [<a href="./rfc8473" title=""Token Binding over HTTP"">RFC8473</a>] ("Token Binding over HTTP") explains how |
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the Token Binding message is encapsulated within HTTP/1.1 messages |
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<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
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[<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] or HTTP/2 messages [<a href="./rfc7540" title=""Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)"">RFC7540</a>]. [<a href="./rfc8473" title=""Token Binding over HTTP"">RFC8473</a>] also describes |
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Token Binding between multiple communicating parties: User Agent, |
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Identity Provider, and Relying Party. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Token Binding Protocol Message</span> |
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The Token Binding message is sent by the client to prove possession |
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of one or more private keys held by the client. This message MUST be |
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sent if the client and server successfully negotiated the use of the |
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Token Binding protocol (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] or a different mechanism) |
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and MUST NOT be sent otherwise. This message MUST be sent in the |
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client's first application protocol message. This message MAY also |
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be sent in subsequent application protocol messages, proving |
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possession of additional private keys held by the same client; this |
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information can be used to facilitate Token Binding between more than |
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two communicating parties. For example, [<a href="./rfc8473" title=""Token Binding over HTTP"">RFC8473</a>] specifies an |
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encapsulation of the Token Binding message in HTTP application |
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protocol messages, as well as scenarios involving more than two |
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communicating parties. |
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The Token Binding message format is defined using the TLS |
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presentation language (see <a href="./rfc5246#section-4">Section 4 of [RFC5246]</a>): |
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enum { |
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rsa2048_pkcs1.5(0), rsa2048_pss(1), ecdsap256(2), (255) |
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} TokenBindingKeyParameters; |
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struct { |
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opaque modulus<1..2^16-1>; |
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opaque publicexponent<1..2^8-1>; |
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} RSAPublicKey; |
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struct { |
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opaque point <1..2^8-1>; |
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} TB_ECPoint; |
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struct { |
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TokenBindingKeyParameters key_parameters; |
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uint16 key_length; /* Length (in bytes) of the following |
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TokenBindingID.TokenBindingPublicKey */ |
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select (key_parameters) { |
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case rsa2048_pkcs1.5: |
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case rsa2048_pss: |
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RSAPublicKey rsapubkey; |
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case ecdsap256: |
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TB_ECPoint point; |
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} TokenBindingPublicKey; |
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} TokenBindingID; |
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<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
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enum { |
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(255) /* No initial TB_ExtensionType registrations */ |
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} TB_ExtensionType; |
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struct { |
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TB_ExtensionType extension_type; |
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opaque extension_data<0..2^16-1>; |
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} TB_Extension; |
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enum { |
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provided_token_binding(0), referred_token_binding(1), (255) |
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} TokenBindingType; |
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struct { |
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TokenBindingType tokenbinding_type; |
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TokenBindingID tokenbindingid; |
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opaque signature<64..2^16-1>; /* Signature over the concatenation |
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of tokenbinding_type, |
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key_parameters, and EKM */ |
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TB_Extension extensions<0..2^16-1>; |
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} TokenBinding; |
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struct { |
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TokenBinding tokenbindings<132..2^16-1>; |
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} TokenBindingMessage; |
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The Token Binding message consists of a series of TokenBinding |
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structures, each containing the type of the Token Binding, the |
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TokenBindingID, and a signature using the Token Binding key, |
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optionally followed by TB_Extension structures. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type</span> |
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This document defines two Token Binding types: |
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o provided_token_binding - used to establish a Token Binding when |
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connecting to a server. |
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o referred_token_binding - used when requesting tokens that are |
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intended to be presented to a different server. |
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[<a id="ref-RFC8473">RFC8473</a>] describes a use case for referred_token_binding where Token |
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Bindings are established between multiple communicating parties: |
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User Agent, Identity Provider, and Relying Party. The User Agent |
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sends referred_token_binding to the Identity Provider in order to |
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prove possession of the Token Binding key it uses with the Relying |
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<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
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Party. The Identity Provider can then bind the token it is supplying |
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(for presentation to the Relying Party) to the Token Binding ID |
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contained in referred_token_binding. |
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An implementation MUST ignore any unknown Token Binding types. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbindingid</span> |
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The ID of the Token Binding established as a result of Token Binding |
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message processing contains the identifier of the negotiated key |
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parameters, the length (in bytes) of the Token Binding public key, |
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and the Token Binding public key itself. The Token Binding ID can be |
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obtained from the TokenBinding structure by discarding the Token |
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Binding type, signature, and extensions. |
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When rsa2048_pkcs1.5 or rsa2048_pss is used, RSAPublicKey.modulus and |
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RSAPublicKey.publicexponent contain the modulus and exponent of a |
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2048-bit RSA public key represented in big-endian format, with |
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leading zero bytes omitted. |
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When ecdsap256 is used, TB_ECPoint.point contains the X coordinate |
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followed by the Y coordinate of a Curve P-256 key. The X and Y |
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coordinates are unsigned 32-byte integers encoded in big-endian |
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format, preserving any leading zero bytes. Future specifications may |
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define Token Binding keys using other elliptic curves with their |
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corresponding signature and point formats. |
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Token Binding protocol implementations SHOULD make Token Binding IDs |
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available to the application as opaque byte sequences, so that |
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applications do not rely on a particular Token Binding ID structure. |
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For example, server applications will use Token Binding IDs when |
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generating and verifying bound tokens. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. TokenBinding.signature</span> |
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When rsa2048_pkcs1.5 is used, TokenBinding.signature contains the |
| 373 |
signature generated using the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme |
| 374 |
defined in [<a href="./rfc8017" title=""PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"">RFC8017</a>] with SHA256 [<a href="#ref-FIPS.180-4.2015">FIPS.180-4.2015</a>] as the hash |
| 375 |
function. |
| 376 |
|
| 377 |
When rsa2048_pss is used, TokenBinding.signature contains the |
| 378 |
signature generated using the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme |
| 379 |
(RSASSA-PSS) defined in [<a href="./rfc8017" title=""PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2"">RFC8017</a>] with SHA256 as the hash function. |
| 380 |
MGF1 with SHA256 MUST be used as the mask generation function (MGF), |
| 381 |
and the salt length MUST equal 32 bytes. |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
When ecdsap256 is used, TokenBinding.signature contains a pair of |
| 384 |
32-byte integers, R followed by S, generated with the Elliptic Curve |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using Curve P-256 and SHA256 as |
| 394 |
defined in [<a href="#ref-FIPS.186-4.2013">FIPS.186-4.2013</a>] and [<a href="#ref-ANSI.X9-62.2005">ANSI.X9-62.2005</a>]. R and S are |
| 395 |
encoded in big-endian format, preserving any leading zero bytes. |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
The signature is computed over the byte string representing the |
| 398 |
concatenation of: |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
o The TokenBindingType value contained in the |
| 401 |
TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type field, |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
o The TokenBindingKeyParameters value contained in the |
| 404 |
TokenBindingID.key_parameters field, and |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
o The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection. |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
Please note that TLS 1.2 and earlier versions support renegotiation, |
| 409 |
which produces a new TLS master secret for the same connection, with |
| 410 |
the associated session keys and EKM value. TokenBinding.signature |
| 411 |
MUST be a signature of the EKM value derived from the TLS master |
| 412 |
secret that produced the session keys encrypting the TLS |
| 413 |
application_data record(s) containing this TokenBinding. Such use of |
| 414 |
the current EKM for the TLS connection makes replay of bound tokens |
| 415 |
within renegotiated TLS sessions detectable but requires the |
| 416 |
application to synchronize Token Binding message generation and |
| 417 |
verification with the TLS handshake state. |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
Specifications defining the use of Token Binding with application |
| 420 |
protocols, such as Token Binding over HTTP [<a href="./rfc8473" title=""Token Binding over HTTP"">RFC8473</a>], MAY prohibit |
| 421 |
the use of TLS renegotiation in combination with Token Binding, |
| 422 |
obviating the need for such synchronization. Alternatively, such |
| 423 |
specifications need to define (1) a way to determine which EKM value |
| 424 |
corresponds to a given TokenBindingMessage and (2) a mechanism that |
| 425 |
prevents a TokenBindingMessage from being split across TLS |
| 426 |
renegotiation boundaries due to TLS message fragmentation; see |
| 427 |
<a href="./rfc5246#section-6.2.1">Section 6.2.1 of [RFC5246]</a>. Note that application-layer messages |
| 428 |
conveying a TokenBindingMessage may cross renegotiation boundaries in |
| 429 |
ways that make processing difficult. |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
The EKM is obtained using the keying material exporters for TLS as |
| 432 |
defined in [<a href="./rfc5705" title=""Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC5705</a>], by supplying the following input values: |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
o Label: The ASCII string "EXPORTER-Token-Binding" with no |
| 435 |
terminating NUL. |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
o Context value: No application context supplied. |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
o Length: 32 bytes. |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. TokenBinding.extensions</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
A Token Binding message may optionally contain a series of |
| 452 |
TB_Extension structures, each consisting of an extension_type and |
| 453 |
extension_data. The structure and meaning of extension_data depends |
| 454 |
on the specific extension_type. |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
Initially, no extension types are defined (see <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a> |
| 457 |
("Token Binding Extensions Registry")). One of the possible uses of |
| 458 |
extensions envisioned at the time of this writing is attestation: |
| 459 |
cryptographic proof that allows the server to verify that the Token |
| 460 |
Binding key is hardware bound. The definitions of such Token Binding |
| 461 |
protocol extensions are outside the scope of this specification. |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Establishing a Token Binding</span> |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Client Processing Rules</span> |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
The client MUST include at least one TokenBinding structure in the |
| 468 |
Token Binding message. When a provided_token_binding is included, |
| 469 |
the key parameters used in a provided_token_binding MUST match those |
| 470 |
negotiated with the server (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] or a different |
| 471 |
mechanism). |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
The client MUST generate and store Token Binding keys in a secure |
| 474 |
manner that prevents key export. In order to prevent cooperating |
| 475 |
servers from linking user identities, the scope of the Token Binding |
| 476 |
keys MUST NOT be broader than the scope of the tokens, as defined by |
| 477 |
the application protocol. |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
When the client needs to send a referred_token_binding to the |
| 480 |
Identity Provider, the client SHALL construct the referred |
| 481 |
TokenBinding structure in the following manner: |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
o Set TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type to referred_token_binding. |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
o Set TokenBinding.tokenbindingid to the Token Binding ID used with |
| 486 |
the Relying Party. |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
o Generate TokenBinding.signature, using the EKM value of the TLS |
| 489 |
connection to the Identity Provider, the Token Binding key |
| 490 |
established with the Relying Party, and the signature algorithm |
| 491 |
indicated by the associated key parameters. Note that these key |
| 492 |
parameters may differ from the key parameters negotiated with the |
| 493 |
Identity Provider. |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
Conveying referred Token Bindings in this fashion allows the Identity |
| 506 |
Provider to verify that the client controls the Token Binding key |
| 507 |
used with the Relying Party. |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Server Processing Rules</span> |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
The triple handshake vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and older TLS versions |
| 512 |
affects the security of the Token Binding protocol, as described in |
| 513 |
<a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> ("Security Considerations"). Therefore, the server |
| 514 |
MUST NOT negotiate the use of the Token Binding protocol with these |
| 515 |
TLS versions, unless the server also negotiates the extended master |
| 516 |
secret TLS extension [<a href="./rfc7627" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension"">RFC7627</a>] and the renegotiation indication TLS |
| 517 |
extension [<a href="./rfc5746" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension"">RFC5746</a>]. |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
If the use of the Token Binding protocol was not negotiated but the |
| 520 |
client sends a Token Binding message, the server MUST reject any |
| 521 |
contained bindings. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
If the Token Binding type is "provided_token_binding", the server |
| 524 |
MUST verify that the signature algorithm (including an elliptic curve |
| 525 |
in the case of ECDSA) and key length in the Token Binding message |
| 526 |
match those negotiated with this client (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] or a |
| 527 |
different mechanism). In the case of a mismatch, the server MUST |
| 528 |
reject the binding. Token Bindings of type "referred_token_binding" |
| 529 |
may use different key parameters than those negotiated with this |
| 530 |
client. |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
If the Token Binding message does not contain at least one |
| 533 |
TokenBinding structure or if a signature contained in any |
| 534 |
TokenBinding structure is invalid, the server MUST reject the |
| 535 |
binding. |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
Servers MUST ignore any unknown extensions. Initially, no extension |
| 538 |
types are defined (see <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a> ("Token Binding Extensions |
| 539 |
Registry")). |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
If all checks defined above have passed successfully, the Token |
| 542 |
Binding between this client and server is established. The Token |
| 543 |
Binding ID(s) conveyed in the Token Binding message can be provided |
| 544 |
to the server-side application. The application may then use the |
| 545 |
Token Binding IDs for bound security token creation and validation; |
| 546 |
see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
If a Token Binding is rejected, any associated bound tokens presented |
| 549 |
on the current TLS connection MUST also be rejected by the server. |
| 550 |
The effect of this is application specific, e.g., failing requests, a |
| 551 |
requirement for the client to re-authenticate and present a different |
| 552 |
token, or connection termination. |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Bound Security Token Creation and Validation</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
Security tokens can be bound to the TLS layer in a variety of ways, |
| 564 |
e.g., by embedding the Token Binding ID or its cryptographic hash in |
| 565 |
the token or by maintaining a database mapping tokens to Token |
| 566 |
Binding IDs. The specific method of generating bound security tokens |
| 567 |
is defined by the application and is beyond the scope of this |
| 568 |
document. Note that applicable security considerations are outlined |
| 569 |
in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>. |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
Either or both clients and servers MAY create bound security tokens. |
| 572 |
For example, HTTPS servers employing Token Binding for securing their |
| 573 |
HTTP cookies will bind these cookies. In the case of a server- |
| 574 |
initiated challenge-response protocol employing Token Binding and |
| 575 |
TLS, the client can, for example, incorporate the Token Binding ID |
| 576 |
within the signed object it returns, thus binding the object. |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
Upon receipt of a security token, the server attempts to retrieve |
| 579 |
Token Binding ID information from the token and from the TLS |
| 580 |
connection with the client. Application-provided policy determines |
| 581 |
whether to honor non-bound (bearer) tokens. If the token is bound |
| 582 |
and a Token Binding has not been established for the client |
| 583 |
connection, the server MUST reject the token. If the Token Binding |
| 584 |
ID for the token does not match the Token Binding ID established for |
| 585 |
the client connection, the server MUST reject the token. |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
This section establishes a new IANA registry titled "Token Binding |
| 590 |
Protocol" with subregistries "Token Binding Key Parameters", "Token |
| 591 |
Binding Types", and "Token Binding Extensions". It also registers a |
| 592 |
new TLS exporter label in the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry. |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Token Binding Key Parameters Registry</span> |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
This document establishes a subregistry for identifiers of Token |
| 597 |
Binding key parameters titled "Token Binding Key Parameters" under |
| 598 |
the "Token Binding Protocol" registry. |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
Entries in this registry require the following fields: |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
o Value: The octet value that identifies a set of Token Binding key |
| 603 |
parameters (0-255). |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
o Description: The description of the Token Binding key parameters. |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
o Reference: A reference to a specification that defines the Token |
| 608 |
Binding key parameters. |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
This registry operates under the "Specification Required" policy as |
| 618 |
defined in [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>]. The designated expert will require the |
| 619 |
inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available |
| 620 |
specification that enables the creation of interoperable |
| 621 |
implementations using the identified set of Token Binding key |
| 622 |
parameters. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
An initial set of registrations for this registry follows: |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
Value: 0 |
| 627 |
Description: rsa2048_pkcs1.5 |
| 628 |
Specification: This document |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
Value: 1 |
| 631 |
Description: rsa2048_pss |
| 632 |
Specification: This document |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
Value: 2 |
| 635 |
Description: ecdsap256 |
| 636 |
Specification: This document |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Token Binding Types Registry</span> |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
This document establishes a subregistry for Token Binding type |
| 641 |
identifiers titled "Token Binding Types" under the "Token Binding |
| 642 |
Protocol" registry. |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
Entries in this registry require the following fields: |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
o Value: The octet value that identifies the Token Binding type |
| 647 |
(0-255). |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
o Description: The description of the Token Binding type. |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
o Reference: A reference to a specification that defines the Token |
| 652 |
Binding type. |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
This registry operates under the "Specification Required" policy as |
| 655 |
defined in [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>]. The designated expert will require the |
| 656 |
inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available |
| 657 |
specification that enables the creation of interoperable |
| 658 |
implementations using the identified Token Binding type. |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
An initial set of registrations for this registry follows: |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
Value: 0 |
| 676 |
Description: provided_token_binding |
| 677 |
Specification: This document |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
Value: 1 |
| 680 |
Description: referred_token_binding |
| 681 |
Specification: This document |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Token Binding Extensions Registry</span> |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
This document establishes a subregistry for Token Binding extensions |
| 686 |
titled "Token Binding Extensions" under the "Token Binding Protocol" |
| 687 |
registry. |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
Entries in this registry require the following fields: |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
o Value: The octet value that identifies the Token Binding extension |
| 692 |
(0-255). |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
o Description: The description of the Token Binding extension. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
o Reference: A reference to a specification that defines the Token |
| 697 |
Binding extension. |
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
This registry operates under the "Specification Required" policy as |
| 700 |
defined in [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>]. The designated expert will require the |
| 701 |
inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available |
| 702 |
specification that enables the creation of interoperable |
| 703 |
implementations using the identified Token Binding extension. This |
| 704 |
document creates no initial registrations in the "Token Binding |
| 705 |
Extensions" registry. |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Registration of Token Binding TLS Exporter Label</span> |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
This document adds the following registration in the "TLS Exporter |
| 710 |
Labels" registry: |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
Value: EXPORTER-Token-Binding |
| 713 |
DTLS-OK: Y |
| 714 |
Recommended: Y |
| 715 |
Reference: This document |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Security Token Replay</span> |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
The goal of the Token Binding protocol is to prevent attackers from |
| 734 |
exporting and replaying security tokens and from thereby |
| 735 |
impersonating legitimate users and gaining access to protected |
| 736 |
resources. Bound tokens can be replayed by malware present in |
| 737 |
User Agents; this may be undetectable to a server. However, in order |
| 738 |
to export bound tokens to other machines and successfully replay |
| 739 |
them, attackers also need to export corresponding Token Binding |
| 740 |
private keys. Token Binding private keys are therefore high-value |
| 741 |
assets and SHOULD be strongly protected, ideally by generating them |
| 742 |
in a hardware security module that prevents key export. |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
The manner in which a token is bound to the TLS layer is defined by |
| 745 |
the application and is beyond the scope of this document. However, |
| 746 |
the resulting bound token needs to be integrity-protected, so that an |
| 747 |
attacker cannot remove the binding or substitute a Token Binding ID |
| 748 |
of their choice without detection. |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
The Token Binding protocol does not prevent cooperating clients from |
| 751 |
sharing a bound token. A client could intentionally export a bound |
| 752 |
token with the corresponding Token Binding private key or perform |
| 753 |
signatures using this key on behalf of another client. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Downgrade Attacks</span> |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
The Token Binding protocol MUST be negotiated using a mechanism that |
| 758 |
prevents downgrade attacks. For example, [<a href="./rfc8472" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation"">RFC8472</a>] specifies a TLS |
| 759 |
extension for Token Binding negotiation. TLS detects handshake |
| 760 |
message modification by active attackers; therefore, it is not |
| 761 |
possible for an attacker to remove or modify the "token_binding" |
| 762 |
extension without breaking the TLS handshake. The signature |
| 763 |
algorithm and key length used in the TokenBinding of type |
| 764 |
"provided_token_binding" MUST match the negotiated parameters. |
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3" href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Token Binding Key-Sharing between Applications</span> |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
Existing systems provide a variety of platform-specific mechanisms |
| 769 |
for certain applications to share tokens, e.g., to enable "single |
| 770 |
sign-on" scenarios. For these scenarios to keep working with bound |
| 771 |
tokens, the applications that are allowed to share tokens will need |
| 772 |
to also share Token Binding keys. Care must be taken to restrict the |
| 773 |
sharing of Token Binding keys to the same group(s) of applications |
| 774 |
that shares the same tokens. |
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.4" href="#section-7.4">7.4</a>. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS Versions</span> |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
The Token Binding protocol relies on the TLS exporters [<a href="./rfc5705" title=""Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC5705</a>] to |
| 788 |
associate a TLS connection with a Token Binding. The triple |
| 789 |
handshake attack [<a href="#ref-TRIPLE-HS">TRIPLE-HS</a>] is a known vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and |
| 790 |
older TLS versions, allowing the attacker to synchronize keying |
| 791 |
material between TLS connections. The attacker can then successfully |
| 792 |
replay bound tokens. For this reason, the Token Binding protocol |
| 793 |
MUST NOT be negotiated with these TLS versions, unless the extended |
| 794 |
master secret TLS extension [<a href="./rfc7627" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension"">RFC7627</a>] and the renegotiation |
| 795 |
indication TLS extension [<a href="./rfc5746" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension"">RFC5746</a>] have also been negotiated. |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Privacy Considerations</span> |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
The Token Binding protocol uses persistent, long-lived Token Binding |
| 800 |
IDs. To protect privacy, Token Binding IDs are never transmitted in |
| 801 |
clear text and can be reset by the user at any time, e.g., when |
| 802 |
clearing browser cookies. Some applications offer a special privacy |
| 803 |
mode where they don't store or use tokens supplied by the server, |
| 804 |
e.g., "in private" browsing. When operating in this special privacy |
| 805 |
mode, applications SHOULD use newly generated Token Binding keys and |
| 806 |
delete them when exiting this mode; otherwise, they SHOULD NOT |
| 807 |
negotiate Token Binding at all. |
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
In order to prevent cooperating servers from linking user identities, |
| 810 |
the scope of the Token Binding keys MUST NOT be broader than the |
| 811 |
scope of the tokens, as defined by the application protocol. |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
A server can use tokens and Token Binding IDs to track clients. |
| 814 |
Client applications that automatically limit the lifetime or scope of |
| 815 |
tokens to maintain user privacy SHOULD apply the same validity time |
| 816 |
and scope limits to Token Binding keys. |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 844 |
|
| 845 |
[<a id="ref-ANSI.X9-62.2005">ANSI.X9-62.2005</a>] |
| 846 |
American National Standards Institute, "Public Key |
| 847 |
Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The |
| 848 |
Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", |
| 849 |
ANSI X9.62, November 2005. |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
[<a id="ref-FIPS.180-4.2015">FIPS.180-4.2015</a>] |
| 852 |
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure |
| 853 |
Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS 180-4, |
| 854 |
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015, |
| 855 |
<<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/</a> |
| 856 |
<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf</a>>. |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
[<a id="ref-FIPS.186-4.2013">FIPS.186-4.2013</a>] |
| 859 |
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital |
| 860 |
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-4, |
| 861 |
DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013, |
| 862 |
<<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.186-4.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/</a> |
| 863 |
<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.186-4.pdf">nist.fips.186-4.pdf</a>>. |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 866 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 867 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 868 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
| 871 |
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, |
| 872 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008, |
| 873 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246</a>>. |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5705">RFC5705</a>] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport |
| 876 |
Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc5705">RFC 5705</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705, |
| 877 |
March 2010, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705</a>>. |
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5746">RFC5746</a>] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov, |
| 880 |
"Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication |
| 881 |
Extension", <a href="./rfc5746">RFC 5746</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010, |
| 882 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746</a>>. |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer |
| 885 |
Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", |
| 886 |
<a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, |
| 887 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>>. |
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7540">RFC7540</a>] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext |
| 898 |
Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", <a href="./rfc7540">RFC 7540</a>, |
| 899 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015, |
| 900 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540</a>>. |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7627">RFC7627</a>] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A., |
| 903 |
Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 904 |
Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension", |
| 905 |
<a href="./rfc7627">RFC 7627</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015, |
| 906 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627</a>>. |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8126">RFC8126</a>] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for |
| 909 |
Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp26">BCP 26</a>, |
| 910 |
<a href="./rfc8126">RFC 8126</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017, |
| 911 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126</a>>. |
| 912 |
|
| 913 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a> |
| 914 |
<a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, |
| 915 |
May 2017, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>>. |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8472">RFC8472</a>] Popov, A., Ed., Nystroem, M., and D. Balfanz, "Transport |
| 918 |
Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol |
| 919 |
Negotiation", <a href="./rfc8472">RFC 8472</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8472, October |
| 920 |
2018, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8472">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8472</a>>. |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8473">RFC8473</a>] Popov, A., Nystroem, M., Balfanz, D., Ed., Harper, N., and |
| 923 |
J. Hodges, "Token Binding over HTTP", <a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a>, |
| 924 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC8473, October 2018, |
| 925 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8473">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8473</a>>. |
| 926 |
|
| 927 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6749">RFC6749</a>] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework", |
| 930 |
<a href="./rfc6749">RFC 6749</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012, |
| 931 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749</a>>. |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8017">RFC8017</a>] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, |
| 934 |
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", |
| 935 |
<a href="./rfc8017">RFC 8017</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, |
| 936 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017</a>>. |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
[<a id="ref-TOKENBIND-TLS13">TOKENBIND-TLS13</a>] |
| 939 |
Harper, N., "Token Binding for Transport Layer Security |
| 940 |
(TLS) Version 1.3 Connections", Work in Progress, |
| 941 |
<a href="./draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-01">draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-01</a>, May 2018. |
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
[<a id="ref-TRIPLE-HS">TRIPLE-HS</a>] |
| 954 |
Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti, |
| 955 |
A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters: |
| 956 |
Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS", |
| 957 |
IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy, |
| 958 |
DOI 10.1109/SP.2014.14, May 2014. |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
Acknowledgements |
| 961 |
|
| 962 |
This document incorporates comments and suggestions offered by Eric |
| 963 |
Rescorla, Gabriel Montenegro, Martin Thomson, Vinod Anupam, Anthony |
| 964 |
Nadalin, Michael B. Jones, Bill Cox, Nick Harper, Brian Campbell, |
| 965 |
Benjamin Kaduk, Alexey Melnikov, and others. |
| 966 |
|
| 967 |
This document was produced under the chairmanship of John Bradley and |
| 968 |
Leif Johansson. The area directors included Eric Rescorla, Kathleen |
| 969 |
Moriarty, and Stephen Farrell. |
| 970 |
|
| 971 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
Andrei Popov (editor) |
| 974 |
Microsoft Corp. |
| 975 |
United States of America |
| 976 |
|
| 977 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
|
| 980 |
Magnus Nystroem |
| 981 |
Microsoft Corp. |
| 982 |
United States of America |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
Dirk Balfanz |
| 988 |
Google Inc. |
| 989 |
United States of America |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
Jeff Hodges |
| 995 |
Kings Mountain Systems |
| 996 |
United States of America |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 18] |
| 1005 |
</pre> |