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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Popov, Ed.
2 Request for Comments: 8471 M. Nystroem
3 Category: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Balfanz
5 Google Inc.
6 J. Hodges
7 Kings Mountain Systems
8 October 2018
9
10
11 <span class="h1">The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0</span>
12
13 Abstract
14
15 This document specifies version 1.0 of the Token Binding protocol.
16 The Token Binding protocol allows client/server applications to
17 create long-lived, uniquely identifiable TLS bindings spanning
18 multiple TLS sessions and connections. Applications are then enabled
19 to cryptographically bind security tokens to the TLS layer,
20 preventing token export and replay attacks. To protect privacy, the
21 Token Binding identifiers are only conveyed over TLS and can be reset
22 by the user at any time.
23
24 Status of This Memo
25
26 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
27
28 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
29 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
30 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
31 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
32 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
33
34 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
35 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
36 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8471">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8471</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
76 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Token Binding Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Token Binding Protocol Message . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbindingid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. TokenBinding.signature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. TokenBinding.extensions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
82 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Establishing a Token Binding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
83 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Client Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
84 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Server Processing Rules . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
85 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Bound Security Token Creation and Validation . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
86 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
87 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Token Binding Key Parameters Registry . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
88 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Token Binding Types Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
89 <a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Token Binding Extensions Registry . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
90 <a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Registration of Token Binding TLS Exporter Label . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
91 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
92 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
93 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Downgrade Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
94 <a href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Token Binding Key-Sharing between Applications . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
95 7.4. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS
96 Versions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
97 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
98 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
99 <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
100 <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
101 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
102 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
103
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107
108 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 Servers often generate various security tokens (e.g., HTTP cookies,
116 OAuth tokens [<a href="./rfc6749" title="&quot;The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework&quot;">RFC6749</a>]) for applications to present when accessing
117 protected resources. In general, any party in possession of bearer
118 security tokens gains access to certain protected resource(s).
119 Attackers take advantage of this by exporting bearer tokens from a
120 user's application connections or machines, presenting them to
121 application servers, and impersonating authenticated users. The idea
122 of Token Binding is to prevent such attacks by cryptographically
123 binding application security tokens to the underlying TLS layer
124 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>]. (Note: This document deals with TLS 1.2 and therefore
125 refers to <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a> (which has been obsoleted by <a href="./rfc8446">RFC 8446</a>);
126 [<a href="#ref-TOKENBIND-TLS13">TOKENBIND-TLS13</a>] addresses Token Binding in TLS 1.3.)
127
128 A Token Binding is established by a User Agent generating a
129 private-public key pair (possibly within a secure hardware module,
130 such as a Trusted Platform Module) per target server, providing the
131 public key to the server, and proving possession of the corresponding
132 private key, on every TLS connection to the server. The proof of
133 possession involves signing the Exported Keying Material (EKM)
134 [<a href="./rfc5705" title="&quot;Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5705</a>] from the TLS connection with the private key. The
135 corresponding public key is included in the Token Binding identifier
136 structure (described in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a> ("TokenBinding.tokenbindingid")).
137 Token Bindings are long-lived, i.e., they encompass multiple TLS
138 connections and TLS sessions between a given client and server. To
139 protect privacy, Token Binding IDs are never conveyed over insecure
140 connections and can be reset by the user at any time, e.g., when
141 clearing browser cookies.
142
143 When issuing a security token to a client that supports Token
144 Binding, a server includes the client's Token Binding ID (or its
145 cryptographic hash) in the token. Later on, when a client presents a
146 security token containing a Token Binding ID, the server verifies
147 that the ID in the token matches the ID of the Token Binding
148 established with the client. In the case of a mismatch, the server
149 rejects the token (details are application specific).
150
151 In order to successfully export and replay a bound security token, an
152 attacker needs to also be able to use the client's private key; this
153 is hard to do if the key is specially protected, e.g., generated in a
154 secure hardware module.
155
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164 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
170
171 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
172 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
173 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
174 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
175 capitals, as shown here.
176
177 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Token Binding Protocol Overview</span>
178
179 In the course of a TLS handshake, a client and server can use the
180 Token Binding negotiation TLS extension [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] to negotiate the
181 Token Binding protocol version and the parameters (signature
182 algorithm, length) of the Token Binding key. This negotiation does
183 not require additional round trips.
184
185 Version 1.0 of the Token Binding protocol is represented by
186 TB_ProtocolVersion.major = 1 and TB_ProtocolVersion.minor = 0 in the
187 Token Binding negotiation TLS extension; see [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] ("Transport
188 Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol
189 Negotiation").
190
191 The Token Binding protocol consists of one message sent by the client
192 to the server, proving possession of one or more client-generated
193 asymmetric private keys. This message is not sent if the Token
194 Binding negotiation has been unsuccessful. The Token Binding message
195 is sent with the application protocol data over TLS.
196
197 A server receiving the Token Binding message verifies that the key
198 parameters in the message match the Token Binding parameters
199 negotiated (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>]) and then validates the signatures
200 contained in the Token Binding message. If either of these checks
201 fails, the server rejects the binding, along with all associated
202 bound tokens. Otherwise, the Token Binding is successfully
203 established with the ID contained in the Token Binding message.
204
205 When a server supporting the Token Binding protocol receives a bound
206 token, the server compares the Token Binding ID in the token with the
207 Token Binding ID established with the client. If the bound token is
208 received on a TLS connection without a Token Binding or if the Token
209 Binding IDs do not match, the token is rejected.
210
211 This document defines the format of the Token Binding protocol
212 message, the process of establishing a Token Binding, the format of
213 the Token Binding ID, and the process of validating a bound token.
214 [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] describes the negotiation of the Token Binding protocol and
215 key parameters. [<a href="./rfc8473" title="&quot;Token Binding over HTTP&quot;">RFC8473</a>] ("Token Binding over HTTP") explains how
216 the Token Binding message is encapsulated within HTTP/1.1 messages
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
223
224
225 [<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] or HTTP/2 messages [<a href="./rfc7540" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)&quot;">RFC7540</a>]. [<a href="./rfc8473" title="&quot;Token Binding over HTTP&quot;">RFC8473</a>] also describes
226 Token Binding between multiple communicating parties: User Agent,
227 Identity Provider, and Relying Party.
228
229 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Token Binding Protocol Message</span>
230
231 The Token Binding message is sent by the client to prove possession
232 of one or more private keys held by the client. This message MUST be
233 sent if the client and server successfully negotiated the use of the
234 Token Binding protocol (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] or a different mechanism)
235 and MUST NOT be sent otherwise. This message MUST be sent in the
236 client's first application protocol message. This message MAY also
237 be sent in subsequent application protocol messages, proving
238 possession of additional private keys held by the same client; this
239 information can be used to facilitate Token Binding between more than
240 two communicating parties. For example, [<a href="./rfc8473" title="&quot;Token Binding over HTTP&quot;">RFC8473</a>] specifies an
241 encapsulation of the Token Binding message in HTTP application
242 protocol messages, as well as scenarios involving more than two
243 communicating parties.
244
245 The Token Binding message format is defined using the TLS
246 presentation language (see <a href="./rfc5246#section-4">Section&nbsp;4 of [RFC5246]</a>):
247
248 enum {
249 rsa2048_pkcs1.5(0), rsa2048_pss(1), ecdsap256(2), (255)
250 } TokenBindingKeyParameters;
251
252 struct {
253 opaque modulus&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
254 opaque publicexponent&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
255 } RSAPublicKey;
256
257 struct {
258 opaque point &lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
259 } TB_ECPoint;
260
261 struct {
262 TokenBindingKeyParameters key_parameters;
263 uint16 key_length; /* Length (in bytes) of the following
264 TokenBindingID.TokenBindingPublicKey */
265 select (key_parameters) {
266 case rsa2048_pkcs1.5:
267 case rsa2048_pss:
268 RSAPublicKey rsapubkey;
269 case ecdsap256:
270 TB_ECPoint point;
271 } TokenBindingPublicKey;
272 } TokenBindingID;
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
279
280
281 enum {
282 (255) /* No initial TB_ExtensionType registrations */
283 } TB_ExtensionType;
284
285 struct {
286 TB_ExtensionType extension_type;
287 opaque extension_data&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;
288 } TB_Extension;
289
290 enum {
291 provided_token_binding(0), referred_token_binding(1), (255)
292 } TokenBindingType;
293
294 struct {
295 TokenBindingType tokenbinding_type;
296 TokenBindingID tokenbindingid;
297 opaque signature&lt;64..2^16-1&gt;; /* Signature over the concatenation
298 of tokenbinding_type,
299 key_parameters, and EKM */
300 TB_Extension extensions&lt;0..2^16-1&gt;;
301 } TokenBinding;
302
303 struct {
304 TokenBinding tokenbindings&lt;132..2^16-1&gt;;
305 } TokenBindingMessage;
306
307 The Token Binding message consists of a series of TokenBinding
308 structures, each containing the type of the Token Binding, the
309 TokenBindingID, and a signature using the Token Binding key,
310 optionally followed by TB_Extension structures.
311
312 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type</span>
313
314 This document defines two Token Binding types:
315
316 o provided_token_binding - used to establish a Token Binding when
317 connecting to a server.
318
319 o referred_token_binding - used when requesting tokens that are
320 intended to be presented to a different server.
321
322 [<a id="ref-RFC8473">RFC8473</a>] describes a use case for referred_token_binding where Token
323 Bindings are established between multiple communicating parties:
324 User Agent, Identity Provider, and Relying Party. The User Agent
325 sends referred_token_binding to the Identity Provider in order to
326 prove possession of the Token Binding key it uses with the Relying
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
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336
337 Party. The Identity Provider can then bind the token it is supplying
338 (for presentation to the Relying Party) to the Token Binding ID
339 contained in referred_token_binding.
340
341 An implementation MUST ignore any unknown Token Binding types.
342
343 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. TokenBinding.tokenbindingid</span>
344
345 The ID of the Token Binding established as a result of Token Binding
346 message processing contains the identifier of the negotiated key
347 parameters, the length (in bytes) of the Token Binding public key,
348 and the Token Binding public key itself. The Token Binding ID can be
349 obtained from the TokenBinding structure by discarding the Token
350 Binding type, signature, and extensions.
351
352 When rsa2048_pkcs1.5 or rsa2048_pss is used, RSAPublicKey.modulus and
353 RSAPublicKey.publicexponent contain the modulus and exponent of a
354 2048-bit RSA public key represented in big-endian format, with
355 leading zero bytes omitted.
356
357 When ecdsap256 is used, TB_ECPoint.point contains the X coordinate
358 followed by the Y coordinate of a Curve P-256 key. The X and Y
359 coordinates are unsigned 32-byte integers encoded in big-endian
360 format, preserving any leading zero bytes. Future specifications may
361 define Token Binding keys using other elliptic curves with their
362 corresponding signature and point formats.
363
364 Token Binding protocol implementations SHOULD make Token Binding IDs
365 available to the application as opaque byte sequences, so that
366 applications do not rely on a particular Token Binding ID structure.
367 For example, server applications will use Token Binding IDs when
368 generating and verifying bound tokens.
369
370 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. TokenBinding.signature</span>
371
372 When rsa2048_pkcs1.5 is used, TokenBinding.signature contains the
373 signature generated using the RSASSA-PKCS1-v1_5 signature scheme
374 defined in [<a href="./rfc8017" title="&quot;PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2&quot;">RFC8017</a>] with SHA256 [<a href="#ref-FIPS.180-4.2015">FIPS.180-4.2015</a>] as the hash
375 function.
376
377 When rsa2048_pss is used, TokenBinding.signature contains the
378 signature generated using the RSA Probabilistic Signature Scheme
379 (RSASSA-PSS) defined in [<a href="./rfc8017" title="&quot;PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2&quot;">RFC8017</a>] with SHA256 as the hash function.
380 MGF1 with SHA256 MUST be used as the mask generation function (MGF),
381 and the salt length MUST equal 32 bytes.
382
383 When ecdsap256 is used, TokenBinding.signature contains a pair of
384 32-byte integers, R followed by S, generated with the Elliptic Curve
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
391
392
393 Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) using Curve P-256 and SHA256 as
394 defined in [<a href="#ref-FIPS.186-4.2013">FIPS.186-4.2013</a>] and [<a href="#ref-ANSI.X9-62.2005">ANSI.X9-62.2005</a>]. R and S are
395 encoded in big-endian format, preserving any leading zero bytes.
396
397 The signature is computed over the byte string representing the
398 concatenation of:
399
400 o The TokenBindingType value contained in the
401 TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type field,
402
403 o The TokenBindingKeyParameters value contained in the
404 TokenBindingID.key_parameters field, and
405
406 o The EKM value obtained from the current TLS connection.
407
408 Please note that TLS 1.2 and earlier versions support renegotiation,
409 which produces a new TLS master secret for the same connection, with
410 the associated session keys and EKM value. TokenBinding.signature
411 MUST be a signature of the EKM value derived from the TLS master
412 secret that produced the session keys encrypting the TLS
413 application_data record(s) containing this TokenBinding. Such use of
414 the current EKM for the TLS connection makes replay of bound tokens
415 within renegotiated TLS sessions detectable but requires the
416 application to synchronize Token Binding message generation and
417 verification with the TLS handshake state.
418
419 Specifications defining the use of Token Binding with application
420 protocols, such as Token Binding over HTTP [<a href="./rfc8473" title="&quot;Token Binding over HTTP&quot;">RFC8473</a>], MAY prohibit
421 the use of TLS renegotiation in combination with Token Binding,
422 obviating the need for such synchronization. Alternatively, such
423 specifications need to define (1) a way to determine which EKM value
424 corresponds to a given TokenBindingMessage and (2) a mechanism that
425 prevents a TokenBindingMessage from being split across TLS
426 renegotiation boundaries due to TLS message fragmentation; see
427 <a href="./rfc5246#section-6.2.1">Section&nbsp;6.2.1 of [RFC5246]</a>. Note that application-layer messages
428 conveying a TokenBindingMessage may cross renegotiation boundaries in
429 ways that make processing difficult.
430
431 The EKM is obtained using the keying material exporters for TLS as
432 defined in [<a href="./rfc5705" title="&quot;Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5705</a>], by supplying the following input values:
433
434 o Label: The ASCII string "EXPORTER-Token-Binding" with no
435 terminating NUL.
436
437 o Context value: No application context supplied.
438
439 o Length: 32 bytes.
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. TokenBinding.extensions</span>
450
451 A Token Binding message may optionally contain a series of
452 TB_Extension structures, each consisting of an extension_type and
453 extension_data. The structure and meaning of extension_data depends
454 on the specific extension_type.
455
456 Initially, no extension types are defined (see <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a>
457 ("Token Binding Extensions Registry")). One of the possible uses of
458 extensions envisioned at the time of this writing is attestation:
459 cryptographic proof that allows the server to verify that the Token
460 Binding key is hardware bound. The definitions of such Token Binding
461 protocol extensions are outside the scope of this specification.
462
463 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Establishing a Token Binding</span>
464
465 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Client Processing Rules</span>
466
467 The client MUST include at least one TokenBinding structure in the
468 Token Binding message. When a provided_token_binding is included,
469 the key parameters used in a provided_token_binding MUST match those
470 negotiated with the server (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] or a different
471 mechanism).
472
473 The client MUST generate and store Token Binding keys in a secure
474 manner that prevents key export. In order to prevent cooperating
475 servers from linking user identities, the scope of the Token Binding
476 keys MUST NOT be broader than the scope of the tokens, as defined by
477 the application protocol.
478
479 When the client needs to send a referred_token_binding to the
480 Identity Provider, the client SHALL construct the referred
481 TokenBinding structure in the following manner:
482
483 o Set TokenBinding.tokenbinding_type to referred_token_binding.
484
485 o Set TokenBinding.tokenbindingid to the Token Binding ID used with
486 the Relying Party.
487
488 o Generate TokenBinding.signature, using the EKM value of the TLS
489 connection to the Identity Provider, the Token Binding key
490 established with the Relying Party, and the signature algorithm
491 indicated by the associated key parameters. Note that these key
492 parameters may differ from the key parameters negotiated with the
493 Identity Provider.
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
503
504
505 Conveying referred Token Bindings in this fashion allows the Identity
506 Provider to verify that the client controls the Token Binding key
507 used with the Relying Party.
508
509 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Server Processing Rules</span>
510
511 The triple handshake vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and older TLS versions
512 affects the security of the Token Binding protocol, as described in
513 <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> ("Security Considerations"). Therefore, the server
514 MUST NOT negotiate the use of the Token Binding protocol with these
515 TLS versions, unless the server also negotiates the extended master
516 secret TLS extension [<a href="./rfc7627" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension&quot;">RFC7627</a>] and the renegotiation indication TLS
517 extension [<a href="./rfc5746" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension&quot;">RFC5746</a>].
518
519 If the use of the Token Binding protocol was not negotiated but the
520 client sends a Token Binding message, the server MUST reject any
521 contained bindings.
522
523 If the Token Binding type is "provided_token_binding", the server
524 MUST verify that the signature algorithm (including an elliptic curve
525 in the case of ECDSA) and key length in the Token Binding message
526 match those negotiated with this client (e.g., via [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] or a
527 different mechanism). In the case of a mismatch, the server MUST
528 reject the binding. Token Bindings of type "referred_token_binding"
529 may use different key parameters than those negotiated with this
530 client.
531
532 If the Token Binding message does not contain at least one
533 TokenBinding structure or if a signature contained in any
534 TokenBinding structure is invalid, the server MUST reject the
535 binding.
536
537 Servers MUST ignore any unknown extensions. Initially, no extension
538 types are defined (see <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a> ("Token Binding Extensions
539 Registry")).
540
541 If all checks defined above have passed successfully, the Token
542 Binding between this client and server is established. The Token
543 Binding ID(s) conveyed in the Token Binding message can be provided
544 to the server-side application. The application may then use the
545 Token Binding IDs for bound security token creation and validation;
546 see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
547
548 If a Token Binding is rejected, any associated bound tokens presented
549 on the current TLS connection MUST also be rejected by the server.
550 The effect of this is application specific, e.g., failing requests, a
551 requirement for the client to re-authenticate and present a different
552 token, or connection termination.
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Bound Security Token Creation and Validation</span>
562
563 Security tokens can be bound to the TLS layer in a variety of ways,
564 e.g., by embedding the Token Binding ID or its cryptographic hash in
565 the token or by maintaining a database mapping tokens to Token
566 Binding IDs. The specific method of generating bound security tokens
567 is defined by the application and is beyond the scope of this
568 document. Note that applicable security considerations are outlined
569 in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>.
570
571 Either or both clients and servers MAY create bound security tokens.
572 For example, HTTPS servers employing Token Binding for securing their
573 HTTP cookies will bind these cookies. In the case of a server-
574 initiated challenge-response protocol employing Token Binding and
575 TLS, the client can, for example, incorporate the Token Binding ID
576 within the signed object it returns, thus binding the object.
577
578 Upon receipt of a security token, the server attempts to retrieve
579 Token Binding ID information from the token and from the TLS
580 connection with the client. Application-provided policy determines
581 whether to honor non-bound (bearer) tokens. If the token is bound
582 and a Token Binding has not been established for the client
583 connection, the server MUST reject the token. If the Token Binding
584 ID for the token does not match the Token Binding ID established for
585 the client connection, the server MUST reject the token.
586
587 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
588
589 This section establishes a new IANA registry titled "Token Binding
590 Protocol" with subregistries "Token Binding Key Parameters", "Token
591 Binding Types", and "Token Binding Extensions". It also registers a
592 new TLS exporter label in the "TLS Exporter Labels" registry.
593
594 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Token Binding Key Parameters Registry</span>
595
596 This document establishes a subregistry for identifiers of Token
597 Binding key parameters titled "Token Binding Key Parameters" under
598 the "Token Binding Protocol" registry.
599
600 Entries in this registry require the following fields:
601
602 o Value: The octet value that identifies a set of Token Binding key
603 parameters (0-255).
604
605 o Description: The description of the Token Binding key parameters.
606
607 o Reference: A reference to a specification that defines the Token
608 Binding key parameters.
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
615
616
617 This registry operates under the "Specification Required" policy as
618 defined in [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>]. The designated expert will require the
619 inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available
620 specification that enables the creation of interoperable
621 implementations using the identified set of Token Binding key
622 parameters.
623
624 An initial set of registrations for this registry follows:
625
626 Value: 0
627 Description: rsa2048_pkcs1.5
628 Specification: This document
629
630 Value: 1
631 Description: rsa2048_pss
632 Specification: This document
633
634 Value: 2
635 Description: ecdsap256
636 Specification: This document
637
638 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Token Binding Types Registry</span>
639
640 This document establishes a subregistry for Token Binding type
641 identifiers titled "Token Binding Types" under the "Token Binding
642 Protocol" registry.
643
644 Entries in this registry require the following fields:
645
646 o Value: The octet value that identifies the Token Binding type
647 (0-255).
648
649 o Description: The description of the Token Binding type.
650
651 o Reference: A reference to a specification that defines the Token
652 Binding type.
653
654 This registry operates under the "Specification Required" policy as
655 defined in [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>]. The designated expert will require the
656 inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available
657 specification that enables the creation of interoperable
658 implementations using the identified Token Binding type.
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
671
672
673 An initial set of registrations for this registry follows:
674
675 Value: 0
676 Description: provided_token_binding
677 Specification: This document
678
679 Value: 1
680 Description: referred_token_binding
681 Specification: This document
682
683 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Token Binding Extensions Registry</span>
684
685 This document establishes a subregistry for Token Binding extensions
686 titled "Token Binding Extensions" under the "Token Binding Protocol"
687 registry.
688
689 Entries in this registry require the following fields:
690
691 o Value: The octet value that identifies the Token Binding extension
692 (0-255).
693
694 o Description: The description of the Token Binding extension.
695
696 o Reference: A reference to a specification that defines the Token
697 Binding extension.
698
699 This registry operates under the "Specification Required" policy as
700 defined in [<a href="./rfc8126" title="">RFC8126</a>]. The designated expert will require the
701 inclusion of a reference to a permanent and readily available
702 specification that enables the creation of interoperable
703 implementations using the identified Token Binding extension. This
704 document creates no initial registrations in the "Token Binding
705 Extensions" registry.
706
707 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Registration of Token Binding TLS Exporter Label</span>
708
709 This document adds the following registration in the "TLS Exporter
710 Labels" registry:
711
712 Value: EXPORTER-Token-Binding
713 DTLS-OK: Y
714 Recommended: Y
715 Reference: This document
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
730
731 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Security Token Replay</span>
732
733 The goal of the Token Binding protocol is to prevent attackers from
734 exporting and replaying security tokens and from thereby
735 impersonating legitimate users and gaining access to protected
736 resources. Bound tokens can be replayed by malware present in
737 User Agents; this may be undetectable to a server. However, in order
738 to export bound tokens to other machines and successfully replay
739 them, attackers also need to export corresponding Token Binding
740 private keys. Token Binding private keys are therefore high-value
741 assets and SHOULD be strongly protected, ideally by generating them
742 in a hardware security module that prevents key export.
743
744 The manner in which a token is bound to the TLS layer is defined by
745 the application and is beyond the scope of this document. However,
746 the resulting bound token needs to be integrity-protected, so that an
747 attacker cannot remove the binding or substitute a Token Binding ID
748 of their choice without detection.
749
750 The Token Binding protocol does not prevent cooperating clients from
751 sharing a bound token. A client could intentionally export a bound
752 token with the corresponding Token Binding private key or perform
753 signatures using this key on behalf of another client.
754
755 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Downgrade Attacks</span>
756
757 The Token Binding protocol MUST be negotiated using a mechanism that
758 prevents downgrade attacks. For example, [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>] specifies a TLS
759 extension for Token Binding negotiation. TLS detects handshake
760 message modification by active attackers; therefore, it is not
761 possible for an attacker to remove or modify the "token_binding"
762 extension without breaking the TLS handshake. The signature
763 algorithm and key length used in the TokenBinding of type
764 "provided_token_binding" MUST match the negotiated parameters.
765
766 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3" href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Token Binding Key-Sharing between Applications</span>
767
768 Existing systems provide a variety of platform-specific mechanisms
769 for certain applications to share tokens, e.g., to enable "single
770 sign-on" scenarios. For these scenarios to keep working with bound
771 tokens, the applications that are allowed to share tokens will need
772 to also share Token Binding keys. Care must be taken to restrict the
773 sharing of Token Binding keys to the same group(s) of applications
774 that shares the same tokens.
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
783
784
785 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.4" href="#section-7.4">7.4</a>. Triple Handshake Vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and Older TLS Versions</span>
786
787 The Token Binding protocol relies on the TLS exporters [<a href="./rfc5705" title="&quot;Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5705</a>] to
788 associate a TLS connection with a Token Binding. The triple
789 handshake attack [<a href="#ref-TRIPLE-HS">TRIPLE-HS</a>] is a known vulnerability in TLS 1.2 and
790 older TLS versions, allowing the attacker to synchronize keying
791 material between TLS connections. The attacker can then successfully
792 replay bound tokens. For this reason, the Token Binding protocol
793 MUST NOT be negotiated with these TLS versions, unless the extended
794 master secret TLS extension [<a href="./rfc7627" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension&quot;">RFC7627</a>] and the renegotiation
795 indication TLS extension [<a href="./rfc5746" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension&quot;">RFC5746</a>] have also been negotiated.
796
797 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Privacy Considerations</span>
798
799 The Token Binding protocol uses persistent, long-lived Token Binding
800 IDs. To protect privacy, Token Binding IDs are never transmitted in
801 clear text and can be reset by the user at any time, e.g., when
802 clearing browser cookies. Some applications offer a special privacy
803 mode where they don't store or use tokens supplied by the server,
804 e.g., "in private" browsing. When operating in this special privacy
805 mode, applications SHOULD use newly generated Token Binding keys and
806 delete them when exiting this mode; otherwise, they SHOULD NOT
807 negotiate Token Binding at all.
808
809 In order to prevent cooperating servers from linking user identities,
810 the scope of the Token Binding keys MUST NOT be broader than the
811 scope of the tokens, as defined by the application protocol.
812
813 A server can use tokens and Token Binding IDs to track clients.
814 Client applications that automatically limit the lifetime or scope of
815 tokens to maintain user privacy SHOULD apply the same validity time
816 and scope limits to Token Binding keys.
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
842
843 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
844
845 [<a id="ref-ANSI.X9-62.2005">ANSI.X9-62.2005</a>]
846 American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
847 Cryptography for the Financial Services Industry: The
848 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
849 ANSI X9.62, November 2005.
850
851 [<a id="ref-FIPS.180-4.2015">FIPS.180-4.2015</a>]
852 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure
853 Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS 180-4,
854 DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, August 2015,
855 &lt;<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/</a>
856 <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf</a>&gt;.
857
858 [<a id="ref-FIPS.186-4.2013">FIPS.186-4.2013</a>]
859 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
860 Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS 186-4,
861 DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, July 2013,
862 &lt;<a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.186-4.pdf">https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/</a>
863 <a href="https://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/fips/nist.fips.186-4.pdf">nist.fips.186-4.pdf</a>&gt;.
864
865 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
866 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
867 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
868 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
869
870 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
871 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>,
872 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
873 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246</a>&gt;.
874
875 [<a id="ref-RFC5705">RFC5705</a>] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
876 Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc5705">RFC 5705</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
877 March 2010, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705</a>&gt;.
878
879 [<a id="ref-RFC5746">RFC5746</a>] Rescorla, E., Ray, M., Dispensa, S., and N. Oskov,
880 "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication
881 Extension", <a href="./rfc5746">RFC 5746</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5746, February 2010,
882 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5746</a>&gt;.
883
884 [<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
885 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
886 <a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
887 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>&gt;.
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
895
896
897 [<a id="ref-RFC7540">RFC7540</a>] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
898 Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", <a href="./rfc7540">RFC 7540</a>,
899 DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
900 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540</a>&gt;.
901
902 [<a id="ref-RFC7627">RFC7627</a>] Bhargavan, K., Ed., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Pironti, A.,
903 Langley, A., and M. Ray, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
904 Session Hash and Extended Master Secret Extension",
905 <a href="./rfc7627">RFC 7627</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7627, September 2015,
906 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7627</a>&gt;.
907
908 [<a id="ref-RFC8126">RFC8126</a>] Cotton, M., Leiba, B., and T. Narten, "Guidelines for
909 Writing an IANA Considerations Section in RFCs", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp26">BCP 26</a>,
910 <a href="./rfc8126">RFC 8126</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8126, June 2017,
911 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8126</a>&gt;.
912
913 [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
914 <a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
915 May 2017, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.
916
917 [<a id="ref-RFC8472">RFC8472</a>] Popov, A., Ed., Nystroem, M., and D. Balfanz, "Transport
918 Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol
919 Negotiation", <a href="./rfc8472">RFC 8472</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8472, October
920 2018, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8472">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8472</a>&gt;.
921
922 [<a id="ref-RFC8473">RFC8473</a>] Popov, A., Nystroem, M., Balfanz, D., Ed., Harper, N., and
923 J. Hodges, "Token Binding over HTTP", <a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a>,
924 DOI 10.17487/RFC8473, October 2018,
925 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8473">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8473</a>&gt;.
926
927 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
928
929 [<a id="ref-RFC6749">RFC6749</a>] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
930 <a href="./rfc6749">RFC 6749</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
931 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749</a>&gt;.
932
933 [<a id="ref-RFC8017">RFC8017</a>] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
934 "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
935 <a href="./rfc8017">RFC 8017</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
936 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017</a>&gt;.
937
938 [<a id="ref-TOKENBIND-TLS13">TOKENBIND-TLS13</a>]
939 Harper, N., "Token Binding for Transport Layer Security
940 (TLS) Version 1.3 Connections", Work in Progress,
941 <a href="./draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-01">draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-01</a>, May 2018.
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a> The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0 October 2018</span>
951
952
953 [<a id="ref-TRIPLE-HS">TRIPLE-HS</a>]
954 Bhargavan, K., Delignat-Lavaud, A., Fournet, C., Pironti,
955 A., and P. Strub, "Triple Handshakes and Cookie Cutters:
956 Breaking and Fixing Authentication over TLS",
957 IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy,
958 DOI 10.1109/SP.2014.14, May 2014.
959
960 Acknowledgements
961
962 This document incorporates comments and suggestions offered by Eric
963 Rescorla, Gabriel Montenegro, Martin Thomson, Vinod Anupam, Anthony
964 Nadalin, Michael B. Jones, Bill Cox, Nick Harper, Brian Campbell,
965 Benjamin Kaduk, Alexey Melnikov, and others.
966
967 This document was produced under the chairmanship of John Bradley and
968 Leif Johansson. The area directors included Eric Rescorla, Kathleen
969 Moriarty, and Stephen Farrell.
970
971 Authors' Addresses
972
973 Andrei Popov (editor)
974 Microsoft Corp.
975 United States of America
976
977 Email: [email protected]
978
979
980 Magnus Nystroem
981 Microsoft Corp.
982 United States of America
983
984 Email: [email protected]
985
986
987 Dirk Balfanz
988 Google Inc.
989 United States of America
990
991 Email: [email protected]
992
993
994 Jeff Hodges
995 Kings Mountain Systems
996 United States of America
997
998 Email: [email protected]
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]
1005 </pre>