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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) F. Baker
2 Request for Comments: 6272 D. Meyer
3 Category: Informational Cisco Systems
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 June 2011
5
6
7 <span class="h1">Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid</span>
8
9 Abstract
10
11 This note identifies the key infrastructure protocols of the Internet
12 Protocol Suite for use in the Smart Grid. The target audience is
13 those people seeking guidance on how to construct an appropriate
14 Internet Protocol Suite profile for the Smart Grid. In practice,
15 such a profile would consist of selecting what is needed for Smart
16 Grid deployment from the picture presented here.
17
18 Status of This Memo
19
20 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
21 published for informational purposes.
22
23 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
24 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
25 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
26 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
27 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
28 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
29
30 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
31 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
32 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6272">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6272</a>.
33
34 Copyright Notice
35
36 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
37 document authors. All rights reserved.
38
39 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
40 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
41 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
42 publication of this document. Please review these documents
43 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
44 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
45 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
46 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
47 described in the Simplified BSD License.
48
49
50
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52 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
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56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
60 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. The Internet Protocol Suite . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
61 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Internet Protocol Layers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
62 <a href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. Application . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
63 <a href="#section-2.1.2">2.1.2</a>. Transport . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
64 <a href="#section-2.1.3">2.1.3</a>. Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
65 <a href="#section-2.1.3.1">2.1.3.1</a>. Internet Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
66 <a href="#section-2.1.3.2">2.1.3.2</a>. Lower-Layer Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
67 <a href="#section-2.1.4">2.1.4</a>. Media Layers: Physical and Link . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
68 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Security Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
69 <a href="#section-2.2.1">2.2.1</a>. Physical and Data Link Layer Security . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
70 <a href="#section-2.2.2">2.2.2</a>. Network, Transport, and Application Layer Security . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
71 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Network Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
72 <a href="#section-2.3.1">2.3.1</a>. Domain Name System (DNS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
73 <a href="#section-2.3.2">2.3.2</a>. Network Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
74 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Specific Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
75 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Security Toolbox . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
76 3.1.1. Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) . 14
77 <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Network Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Transport Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Application Layer Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Secure Shell . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.1.6">3.1.6</a>. Key Management Infrastructures . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
82 <a href="#section-3.1.6.1">3.1.6.1</a>. PKIX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
83 <a href="#section-3.1.6.2">3.1.6.2</a>. Kerberos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
84 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Network Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
85 <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. IPv4/IPv6 Coexistence Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
86 <a href="#section-3.2.1.1">3.2.1.1</a>. Dual Stack Coexistence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
87 <a href="#section-3.2.1.2">3.2.1.2</a>. Tunneling Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
88 <a href="#section-3.2.1.3">3.2.1.3</a>. Translation between IPv4 and IPv6 Networks . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
89 <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Internet Protocol Version 4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
90 <a href="#section-3.2.2.1">3.2.2.1</a>. IPv4 Address Allocation and Assignment . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
91 <a href="#section-3.2.2.2">3.2.2.2</a>. IPv4 Unicast Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
92 <a href="#section-3.2.2.3">3.2.2.3</a>. IPv4 Multicast Forwarding and Routing . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
93 <a href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>. Internet Protocol Version 6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
94 <a href="#section-3.2.3.1">3.2.3.1</a>. IPv6 Address Allocation and Assignment . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
95 <a href="#section-3.2.3.2">3.2.3.2</a>. IPv6 Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
96 <a href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>. Routing for IPv4 and IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
97 <a href="#section-3.2.4.1">3.2.4.1</a>. Routing Information Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
98 <a href="#section-3.2.4.2">3.2.4.2</a>. Open Shortest Path First . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
99 <a href="#section-3.2.4.3">3.2.4.3</a>. ISO Intermediate System to Intermediate System . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
100 <a href="#section-3.2.4.4">3.2.4.4</a>. Border Gateway Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
101 <a href="#section-3.2.4.5">3.2.4.5</a>. Dynamic MANET On-Demand (DYMO) Routing . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
102 <a href="#section-3.2.4.6">3.2.4.6</a>. Optimized Link State Routing Protocol . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
103 <a href="#section-3.2.4.7">3.2.4.7</a>. Routing for Low-Power and Lossy Networks . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
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110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
111
112
113 <a href="#section-3.2.5">3.2.5</a>. IPv6 Multicast Forwarding and Routing . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
114 <a href="#section-3.2.5.1">3.2.5.1</a>. Protocol-Independent Multicast Routing . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
115 3.2.6. Adaptation to Lower-Layer Networks and Link Layer
116 Protocols . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
117 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Transport Layer . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
118 <a href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. User Datagram Protocol (UDP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
119 <a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
120 <a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
121 <a href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a>. Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP) . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
122 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
123 <a href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a>. Domain Name System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
124 <a href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a>. Dynamic Host Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
125 <a href="#section-3.4.3">3.4.3</a>. Network Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
126 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Network Management . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
127 <a href="#section-3.5.1">3.5.1</a>. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
128 <a href="#section-3.5.2">3.5.2</a>. Network Configuration (NETCONF) Protocol . . . . . . . <a href="#page-32">32</a>
129 <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Service and Resource Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
130 <a href="#section-3.6.1">3.6.1</a>. Service Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
131 <a href="#section-3.6.2">3.6.2</a>. Resource Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
132 <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Other Applications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>
133 <a href="#section-3.7.1">3.7.1</a>. Session Initiation Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>
134 <a href="#section-3.7.2">3.7.2</a>. Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol . . . . . . <a href="#page-35">35</a>
135 <a href="#section-3.7.3">3.7.3</a>. Calendaring . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-35">35</a>
136 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. A Simplified View of the Business Architecture . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-35">35</a>
137 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-40">40</a>
138 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-40">40</a>
139 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-40">40</a>
140 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-40">40</a>
141 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-41">41</a>
142 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Example: Advanced Metering Infrastructure . . . . . . <a href="#page-58">58</a>
143 <a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. How to Structure a Network . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-59">59</a>
144 <a href="#appendix-A.1.1">A.1.1</a>. HAN Routing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-62">62</a>
145 <a href="#appendix-A.1.2">A.1.2</a>. HAN Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-62">62</a>
146 <a href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Model 1: AMI with Separated Domains . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-64">64</a>
147 <a href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Model 2: AMI with Neighborhood Access to the Home . . . . <a href="#page-65">65</a>
148 <a href="#appendix-A.4">A.4</a>. Model 3: Collector Is an IP Router . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-66">66</a>
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166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
170
171 This document provides Smart Grid designers with advice on how to
172 best "profile" the Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) for use in Smart
173 Grids. It provides an overview of the IPS and the key infrastructure
174 protocols that are critical in integrating Smart Grid devices into an
175 IP-based infrastructure.
176
177 In the words of Wikipedia [<a href="#ref-SmartGrid" title="&quot;Wikipedia Article: Smart Grid&quot;">SmartGrid</a>]:
178
179 A Smart Grid is a form of electricity network utilizing digital
180 technology. A Smart Grid delivers electricity from suppliers to
181 consumers using two-way digital communications to control
182 appliances at consumers' homes; this saves energy, reduces costs
183 and increases reliability and transparency. It overlays the
184 ordinary electrical Grid with an information and net metering
185 system, that includes smart meters. Smart Grids are being
186 promoted by many governments as a way of addressing energy
187 independence, global warming and emergency resilience issues.
188
189 A Smart Grid is made possible by applying sensing, measurement and
190 control devices with two-way communications to electricity
191 production, transmission, distribution and consumption parts of
192 the power Grid that communicate information about Grid condition
193 to system users, operators and automated devices, making it
194 possible to dynamically respond to changes in Grid condition.
195
196 A Smart Grid includes an intelligent monitoring system that keeps
197 track of all electricity flowing in the system. It also has the
198 capability of integrating renewable electricity such as solar and
199 wind. When power is least expensive the user can allow the smart
200 Grid to turn on selected home appliances such as washing machines
201 or factory processes that can run at arbitrary hours. At peak
202 times it could turn off selected appliances to reduce demand.
203
204 Other names for a Smart Grid (or for similar proposals) include
205 smart electric or power Grid, intelligent Grid (or intelliGrid),
206 futureGrid, and the more modern interGrid and intraGrid.
207
208 That description focuses on the implications of Smart Grid technology
209 in the home of a consumer. In fact, data communications technologies
210 of various kinds are used throughout the Grid, to monitor and
211 maintain power generation, transmission, and distribution, as well as
212 the operations and management of the Grid. One can view the Smart
213 Grid as a collection of interconnected computer networks that
214 connects and serves the needs of public and private electrical
215 utilities and their customers.
216
217
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224
225 At the time of this writing, there is no single document that can be
226 described as comprising an internationally agreed standard for the
227 Smart Grid; that is in part the issue being addressed in its
228 development. The nearest approximations are probably the Smart Grid
229 Interoperability Panel's Conceptual Model [<a href="#ref-Model" title="&quot;Smart Grid Architecture Committee: Conceptual Model White Paper http://collaborate.nist.gov/ twiki-sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/ SGIPConceptualModelDevelopmentSGAC/ Smart_Grid_Conceptual_Model_20100420.doc&quot;">Model</a>] and documents
230 comprising [<a href="#ref-IEC61850" title="&quot;Wikipedia Article: IEC 61850&quot;">IEC61850</a>].
231
232 The Internet Protocol Suite (IPS) provides options for numerous
233 architectural components. For example, the IPS provides several
234 choices for the traditional transport function between two systems:
235 the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>], the Stream Control
236 Transmission Protocol (SCTP) [<a href="./rfc4960" title="&quot;Stream Control Transmission Protocol&quot;">RFC4960</a>], and the Datagram Congestion
237 Control Protocol (DCCP) [<a href="./rfc4340" title="&quot;Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)&quot;">RFC4340</a>]. Another option is to select an
238 encapsulation such as the User Datagram Protocol (UDP) [<a href="./rfc0768" title="&quot;User Datagram Protocol&quot;">RFC0768</a>],
239 which essentially allows an application to implement its own
240 transport service. In practice, a designer will pick a transport
241 protocol that is appropriate to the problem being solved.
242
243 The IPS is standardized by the Internet Engineering Task Force
244 (IETF). IETF protocols are documented in the Request for Comments
245 (RFC) series. Several RFCs have been written describing how the IPS
246 should be implemented. These include:
247
248 o Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers [<a href="./rfc1122" title="&quot;Requirements for Internet Hosts - Communication Layers&quot;">RFC1122</a>],
249
250 o Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support
251 [<a href="./rfc1123" title="&quot;Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support&quot;">RFC1123</a>],
252
253 o Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers [<a href="./rfc1812" title="&quot;Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers&quot;">RFC1812</a>], and
254
255 o IPv6 Node Requirements [<a href="./rfc4294" title="&quot;IPv6 Node Requirements&quot;">RFC4294</a>].
256
257 At the time of this writing, <a href="./rfc4294">RFC 4294</a> is in the process of being
258 updated, in [<a href="#ref-IPv6-NODE-REQ" title="&quot;IPv6 Node Requirements&quot;">IPv6-NODE-REQ</a>].
259
260 This document is intended to provide Smart Grid architects and
261 designers with a compendium of relevant RFCs (and to some extent,
262 Internet Drafts), and is organized as an annotated list of RFCs. To
263 that end, the remainder of this document is organized as follows:
264
265 o <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> describes the Internet Architecture and its protocol
266 suite.
267
268 o <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> outlines a set of protocols that may be useful in Smart
269 Grid deployment. It is not exhaustive.
270
271 o Finally, <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> provides an overview of the business
272 architecture embodied in the design and deployment of the IPS.
273
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280
281 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The Internet Protocol Suite</span>
282
283 Before enumerating the list of Internet protocols relevant to Smart
284 Grid, we discuss the layered architecture of the IPS, the functions
285 of the various layers, and their associated protocols.
286
287 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Internet Protocol Layers</span>
288
289 While Internet architecture uses the definitions and language similar
290 to language used by the ISO Open System Interconnect (ISO-OSI)
291 reference model (Figure 1), it actually predates that model. As a
292 result, there is some skew in terminology. For example, the ISO-OSI
293 model uses "end system" while the Internet architecture uses "host".
294 Similarly, an "intermediate system" in the ISO-OSI model is called an
295 "internet gateway" or "router" in Internet parlance. Notwithstanding
296 these differences, the fundamental concepts are largely the same.
297
298 +--------------------+
299 | Application Layer |
300 +--------------------+
301 | Presentation Layer |
302 +--------------------+
303 | Session Layer |
304 +--------------------+
305 | Transport Layer |
306 +--------------------+
307 | Network Layer |
308 +--------------------+
309 | Data Link Layer |
310 +--------------------+
311 | Physical Layer |
312 +--------------------+
313
314 Figure 1: The ISO OSI Reference Model
315
316 The structure of the Internet reference model is shown in Figure 2.
317
318
319
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336
337 +---------------------------------+
338 |Application |
339 | +---------------------------+ |
340 | | Application Protocol | |
341 | +----------+----------------+ |
342 | | Encoding | Session Control| |
343 | +----------+----------------+ |
344 +---------------------------------+
345 |Transport |
346 | +---------------------------+ |
347 | | Transport Layer | |
348 | +---------------------------+ |
349 +---------------------------------+
350 |Network |
351 | +---------------------------+ |
352 | | Internet Protocol | |
353 | +---------------------------+ |
354 | | Lower Network Layers | |
355 | +---------------------------+ |
356 +---------------------------------+
357 |Media Layers |
358 | +---------------------------+ |
359 | | Data Link Layer | |
360 | +---------------------------+ |
361 | | Physical Layer | |
362 | +---------------------------+ |
363 +---------------------------------+
364
365 Figure 2: The Internet Reference Model
366
367 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.1" href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. Application</span>
368
369 In the Internet model, the Application, Presentation, and Session
370 layers are compressed into a single entity called "the application".
371 For example, the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>]
372 describes an application that encodes its data in an ASN.1 profile
373 and engages in a session to manage a network element. The point here
374 is that in the Internet, the distinction between these layers exists
375 but is not highlighted. Further, note that in Figure 2, these
376 functions are not necessarily cleanly layered: the fact that an
377 application protocol encodes its data in some way and that it manages
378 sessions in some way doesn't imply a hierarchy between those
379 processes. Rather, the application views encoding, session
380 management, and a variety of other services as a tool set that it
381 uses while doing its work.
382
383
384
385
386
387
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391
392
393 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.2" href="#section-2.1.2">2.1.2</a>. Transport</span>
394
395 The term "transport" is perhaps among the most confusing concepts in
396 the communication architecture, to a large extent because people with
397 various backgrounds use it to refer to "the layer below that which I
398 am interested in, which gets my data to my peer". For example,
399 optical network engineers refer to optical fiber and associated
400 electronics as "the transport", while web designers refer to the
401 Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP) [<a href="./rfc2616" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1&quot;">RFC2616</a>] (an application layer
402 protocol) as "the transport".
403
404 In the Internet protocol stack, the "transport" is the lowest
405 protocol layer that travels end-to-end unmodified, and it is
406 responsible for end-to-end data delivery services. In the Internet,
407 the transport layer is the layer above the network layer. Transport
408 layer protocols have a single minimum requirement: the ability to
409 multiplex several applications on one IP address. UDP [<a href="./rfc0768" title="&quot;User Datagram Protocol&quot;">RFC0768</a>], TCP
410 [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>], DCCP [<a href="./rfc4340" title="&quot;Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)&quot;">RFC4340</a>], SCTP [<a href="./rfc4960" title="&quot;Stream Control Transmission Protocol&quot;">RFC4960</a>], and NORM [<a href="./rfc5740" title="&quot;NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) Transport Protocol&quot;">RFC5740</a>] each
411 accomplish this using a pair of port numbers, one for the sender and
412 one for the receiver. A port number identifies an application
413 instance, which might be a general "listener" that peers or clients
414 may open sessions with, or a specific correspondent with such a
415 "listener". The session identification in an IP datagram is often
416 called the "five-tuple", and consists of the source and destination
417 IP addresses, the source and destination ports, and an identifier for
418 the transport protocol in use.
419
420 In addition, the responsibilities of a specific transport layer
421 protocol typically include the delivery of data (either as a stream
422 of messages or a stream of bytes) in a stated sequence with stated
423 expectations regarding delivery rate and loss. For example, TCP will
424 reduce its rate in response to loss, as a congestion control trigger,
425 while DCCP accepts some level of loss if necessary to maintain
426 timeliness.
427
428 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.3" href="#section-2.1.3">2.1.3</a>. Network</span>
429
430 The main function of the network layer is to identify a remote
431 destination and deliver data to it. In connection-oriented networks
432 such as Multi-protocol Label Switching (MPLS) [<a href="./rfc3031" title="&quot;Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture&quot;">RFC3031</a>] or
433 Asynchronous Transfer Mode (ATM), a path is set up once, and data is
434 delivered through it. In connectionless networks such as Ethernet
435 and IP, data is delivered as datagrams. Each datagram contains both
436 the source and destination network layer addresses, and the network
437 is responsible for delivering it. In the Internet Protocol Suite,
438 the Internet Protocol is the network that runs end to end. It may be
439 encapsulated over other LAN and WAN technologies, including both IP
440 networks and networks of other types.
441
442
443
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447
448
449 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.3.1" href="#section-2.1.3.1">2.1.3.1</a>. Internet Protocol</span>
450
451 IPv4 and IPv6, each of which is called the Internet Protocol, are
452 connectionless ("datagram") architectures. They are designed as
453 common elements that interconnect network elements across a network
454 of lower-layer networks. In addition to the basic service of
455 identifying a datagram's source and destination, they offer services
456 to fragment and reassemble datagrams when necessary, assist in
457 diagnosis of network failures, and carry additional information
458 necessary in special cases.
459
460 The Internet layer provides a uniform network abstraction network
461 that hides the differences between various network technologies.
462 This is the layer that allows diverse networks such as Ethernet,
463 802.15.4, etc. to be combined into a uniform IP network. New network
464 technologies can be introduced into the IP Protocol Suite by defining
465 how IP is carried over those technologies, leaving the other layers
466 of the IPS and applications that use those protocol unchanged.
467
468 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.3.2" href="#section-2.1.3.2">2.1.3.2</a>. Lower-Layer Networks</span>
469
470 The network layer can be recursively subdivided as needed. This may
471 be accomplished by tunneling, in which an IP datagram is encapsulated
472 in another IP header for delivery to a decapsulator. IP is
473 frequently carried in Virtual Private Networks (VPNs) across the
474 public Internet using tunneling technologies such as the Tunnel mode
475 of IPsec, IP-in-IP, and Generic Route Encapsulation (GRE) [<a href="./rfc2784" title="&quot;Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)&quot;">RFC2784</a>].
476 In addition, IP is also frequently carried in circuit networks such
477 as MPLS [<a href="./rfc4364" title="&quot;BGP/MPLS IP Virtual Private Networks (VPNs)&quot;">RFC4364</a>], GMPLS, and ATM. Finally, IP is also carried over
478 wireless networks (IEEE 802.11, 802.15.4, or 802.16) and switched
479 Ethernet (IEEE 802.3) networks.
480
481 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.4" href="#section-2.1.4">2.1.4</a>. Media Layers: Physical and Link</span>
482
483 At the lowest layer of the IP architecture, data is encoded in
484 messages and transmitted over the physical media. While the IETF
485 specifies algorithms for carrying IPv4 and IPv6 various media types,
486 it rarely actually defines the media -- it happily uses
487 specifications from IEEE, ITU, and other sources.
488
489 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Security Issues</span>
490
491 While complaining about the security of the Internet is popular, it
492 is important to distinguish between attacks on protocols and attacks
493 on users (e.g., phishing). Attacks on users are largely independent
494 of protocol details, reflecting interface design issues or user
495 education problems, and are out of scope for this document. Security
496 problems with Internet protocols are in scope, of course, and can
497
498
499
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503
504
505 often be mitigated using existing security features already specified
506 for the protocol, or by leveraging the security services offered by
507 other IETF protocols. See the Security Assessment of the
508 Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) [<a href="#ref-TCP-SEC" title="&quot;Security Assessment of the Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)&quot;">TCP-SEC</a>] and the Security
509 Assessment of the Internet Protocol version 4 [<a href="#ref-IP-SEC" title="&quot;Security Assessment of the Internet Protocol Version 4&quot;">IP-SEC</a>] for more
510 information on TCP and IPv4 issues, respectively.
511
512 These solutions do, however, need to get deployed as well. The road
513 to widespread deployment can sometimes be painful since often
514 multiple stakeholders need to take actions. Experience has shown
515 that this takes some time, and very often only happens when the
516 incentives are high enough in relation to the costs.
517
518 Furthermore, it is important to stress that available standards are
519 important, but the range of security problems is larger than a
520 missing standard; many security problems are the result of
521 implementation bugs and the result of certain deployment choices.
522 While these are outside the realm of standards development, they play
523 an important role in the security of the overall system. Security
524 has to be integrated into the entire process.
525
526 The IETF takes security seriously in the design of their protocols
527 and architectures; every IETF specification has to have a Security
528 Considerations section to document the offered security threats and
529 countermeasures. <a href="./rfc3552">RFC 3552</a> [<a href="./rfc3552" title="&quot;Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations&quot;">RFC3552</a>] provides recommendations on
530 writing such a Security Considerations section. It also describes
531 the classical Internet security threat model and lists common
532 security goals.
533
534 In a nutshell, security has to be integrated into every protocol,
535 protocol extension, and consequently, every layer of the protocol
536 stack to be useful. We illustrate this also throughout this document
537 with references to further security discussions. Our experience has
538 shown that dealing with security as an afterthought does not lead to
539 the desired outcome.
540
541 The discussion of security threats and available security mechanisms
542 aims to illustrate some of the design aspects that commonly appear.
543
544 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.1" href="#section-2.2.1">2.2.1</a>. Physical and Data Link Layer Security</span>
545
546 At the physical and data link layers, threats generally center on
547 physical attacks on the network -- the effects of backhoes,
548 deterioration of physical media, and various kinds of environmental
549 noise. Radio-based networks are subject to signal fade due to
550 distance, interference, and environmental factors; it is widely noted
551 that IEEE 802.15.4 networks frequently place a metal ground plate
552 between the meter and the device that manages it. Fiber was at one
553
554
555
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559
560
561 time deployed because it was believed to be untappable; we have since
562 learned to tap it by bending the fiber and collecting incidental
563 light, and we have learned about backhoes. As a result, some
564 installations encase fiber optic cable in a pressurized sheath, both
565 to quickly identify the location of a cut and to make it more
566 difficult to tap.
567
568 While there are protocol behaviors that can detect certain classes of
569 physical faults, such as keep-alive exchanges, physical security is
570 generally not considered to be a protocol problem.
571
572 For wireless transmission technologies, eavesdropping on the
573 transmitted frames is also typically a concern. Additionally, those
574 operating networks may want to ensure that access to their
575 infrastructure is restricted to those who are authenticated and
576 authorized (typically called 'network access authentication'). This
577 procedure is often offered by security primitives at the data link
578 layer.
579
580 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.2" href="#section-2.2.2">2.2.2</a>. Network, Transport, and Application Layer Security</span>
581
582 At the network, transport, and application layers, it is common to
583 demand a few basic security requirements, commonly referred to as CIA
584 (Confidentiality, Integrity, and Availability):
585
586 1. Confidentiality: Protect the transmitted data from unauthorized
587 disclosure (i.e., keep eavesdroppers from learning what was
588 transmitted). For example, for trust in e-commerce applications,
589 credit card transactions are exchanged encrypted between the Web
590 browser and a Web server.
591
592 2. Integrity: Protect against unauthorized changes to exchanges,
593 including both intentional change or destruction and accidental
594 change or loss, by ensuring that changes to exchanges are
595 detectable. It has two parts: one for the data and one for the
596 peers.
597
598 * Peers need to verify that information that appears to be from
599 a trusted peer is really from that peer. This is typically
600 called 'data origin authentication'.
601
602 * Peers need to validate that the content of the data exchanged
603 is unmodified. The term typically used for this property is
604 'data integrity'.
605
606 3. Availability: Ensure that the resource is accessible by
607 mitigating of denial-of-service attacks.
608
609
610
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615
616
617 To this we add authenticity, which requires that the communicating
618 peers prove that they are in fact who they say they are to each other
619 (i.e., mutual authentication). This generally means knowing "who"
620 the peer is, and that they demonstrate the possession of a "secret"
621 as part of the security protocol interaction.
622
623 The following three examples aim to illustrate these security
624 requirements.
625
626 One common attack against a TCP session is to bombard the session
627 with reset messages. Other attacks against TCP include the "SYN
628 flooding" attack, in which an attacker attempts to exhaust the memory
629 of the target by creating TCP state. In particular, the attacker
630 attempts to exhaust the target's memory by opening a large number of
631 unique TCP connections, each of which is represented by a
632 Transmission Control Block (TCB). The attack is successful if the
633 attacker can cause the target to fill its memory with TCBs.
634
635 A number of mechanisms have been developed to deal with these types
636 of denial-of-service attacks. One, "SYN Cookies", delays state
637 establishment on the server side to a later phase in the protocol
638 exchange. Another mechanism, specifically targeting the reset attack
639 cited above, provides authentication services in TCP itself to ensure
640 that fake resets are rejected.
641
642 Another approach would be to offer security protection already at a
643 lower layer, such as IPsec (see <a href="#section-3.1.2">Section 3.1.2</a>) or TLS (see
644 <a href="#section-3.1.3">Section 3.1.3</a>), so that a host can identify legitimate messages and
645 discard the others, thus mitigating any damage that may have been
646 caused by the attack.
647
648 Another common attack involves unauthorized access to resources. For
649 example, an unauthorized party might try to attach to a network. To
650 protect against such an attack, an Internet Service Provider (ISP)
651 typically requires network access authentication of new hosts
652 demanding access to the network and to the Internet prior to offering
653 access. This exchange typically requires authentication of that
654 entity and a check in the ISPs back-end database to determine whether
655 corresponding subscriber records exist and are still valid (e.g.,
656 active subscription and sufficient credits).
657
658 From the discussion above, establishing a secure communication
659 channel is clearly an important concept frequently used to mitigate a
660 range of attacks. Unfortunately, focusing only on channel security
661 may not be enough for a given task. Threat models have evolved and
662 even some of the communication endpoints cannot be considered fully
663 trustworthy, i.e., even trusted peers may act maliciously.
664
665
666
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671
672
673 Furthermore, many protocols are more sophisticated in their protocol
674 interaction and involve more than two parties in the protocol
675 exchange. Many of the application layer protocols, such as email,
676 instant messaging, voice over IP, and presence-based applications,
677 fall into this category. With this class of protocols, secure data,
678 such as DNS records, and secure communications with middleware,
679 intermediate servers, and supporting applications need to be
680 considered as well as the security of the direct communication. A
681 detailed treatment of the security threats and requirements of these
682 multi-party protocols is beyond this specification but the interested
683 reader is referred to the above-mentioned examples for an
684 illustration of what technical mechanisms have been investigated and
685 proposed in the past.
686
687 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Network Infrastructure</span>
688
689 While the following protocols are not critical to the design of a
690 specific system, they are important to running a network, and as such
691 are surveyed here.
692
693 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3.1" href="#section-2.3.1">2.3.1</a>. Domain Name System (DNS)</span>
694
695 The DNS' main function is translating names to numeric IP addresses.
696 While this is not critical to running a network, certain functions
697 are made a lot easier if numeric addresses can be replaced with
698 mnemonic names. This facilitates renumbering of networks and
699 generally improves the manageability and serviceability of the
700 network. DNS has a set of security extensions called DNSSEC, which
701 can be used to provide strong cryptographic authentication to the
702 DNS. DNS and DNSSEC are discussed further in <a href="#section-3.4.1">Section 3.4.1</a>.
703
704 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3.2" href="#section-2.3.2">2.3.2</a>. Network Management</span>
705
706 Network management has proven to be a difficult problem. As such,
707 various solutions have been proposed, implemented, and deployed.
708 Each solution has its proponents, all of whom have solid arguments
709 for their viewpoints. The IETF has two major network management
710 solutions for device operation: SNMP, which is ASN.1-encoded and is
711 primarily used for monitoring of system variables, and NETCONF
712 [<a href="./rfc4741" title="&quot;NETCONF Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC4741</a>], which is XML-encoded and primarily used for device
713 configuration.
714
715 Another aspect of network management is the initial provisioning and
716 configuration of hosts, which is discussed in <a href="#section-3.4.2">Section 3.4.2</a>. Note
717 that Smart Grid deployments may require identity authentication and
718 authorization (as well as other provisioning and configuration) that
719 may not be within the scope of either DHCP or Neighbor Discovery.
720 While the IP Protocol Suite has limited support for secure
721
722
723
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727
728
729 provisioning and configuration, these problems have been solved using
730 IP protocols in specifications such as DOCSIS 3.0 [<a href="#ref-SP-MULPIv3.0" title="&quot;DOCSIS 3.0 MAC and Upper Layer Protocols Interface Specification, CM-SP-MULPIv3.0-I10- 090529&quot;">SP-MULPIv3.0</a>].
731
732 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Specific Protocols</span>
733
734 In this section, having briefly laid out the IP architecture and some
735 of the problems that the architecture tries to address, we introduce
736 specific protocols that might be appropriate to various Smart Grid
737 use cases. Use cases should be analyzed along with privacy,
738 Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA), transport, and
739 network solution dimensions. The following sections provide guidance
740 for such analysis.
741
742 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Security Toolbox</span>
743
744 As noted, a key consideration in security solutions is a good threat
745 analysis coupled with appropriate mitigation strategies at each
746 layer. The IETF has over time developed a number of building blocks
747 for security based on the observation that protocols often demand
748 similar security services. The following sub-sections outline a few
749 of those commonly used security building blocks. Reusing them offers
750 several advantages, such as availability of open source code,
751 experience with existing systems, a number of extensions that have
752 been developed, and the confidence that the listed technologies have
753 been reviewed and analyzed by a number of security experts.
754
755 It is important to highlight that in addition to the mentioned
756 security tools, every protocol often comes with additional, often
757 unique security considerations that are specific to the domain in
758 which the protocol operates. Many protocols include features
759 specifically designed to mitigate these protocol-specific risks. In
760 other cases, the security considerations will identify security-
761 relevant services that are required from other network layers to
762 achieve appropriate levels of security.
763
764 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)</span>
765
766 While the term AAA sounds generic and applicable to all sorts of
767 security protocols, it has been, in the IETF, used in relation to
768 network access authentication and is associated with the RADIUS
769 ([<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>]) and the Diameter protocol ([<a href="./rfc3588" title="&quot;Diameter Base Protocol&quot;">RFC3588</a>], [<a href="#ref-DIME-BASE" title="&quot;Diameter Base Protocol&quot;">DIME-BASE</a>]) in
770 particular.
771
772 The authentication procedure for network access aims to deal with the
773 task of verifying that a peer is authenticated and authorized prior
774 to accessing a particular resource (often connectivity to the
775 Internet). Typically, the authentication architecture for network
776 access consists of the following building blocks: the Extensible
777
778
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783
784
785 Authentication Protocol (EAP [<a href="./rfc4017" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements for Wireless LANs&quot;">RFC4017</a>]) as a container to encapsulate
786 EAP methods, an EAP Method (as a specific way to perform
787 cryptographic authentication and key exchange, such as described in
788 <a href="./rfc5216">RFC 5216</a> [<a href="./rfc5216" title="&quot;The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol&quot;">RFC5216</a>] and <a href="./rfc5433">RFC 5433</a> [<a href="./rfc5433" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method&quot;">RFC5433</a>]), a protocol that carries
789 EAP payloads between the end host and a server-side entity (such as a
790 network access server), and a way to carry EAP payloads to back-end
791 server infrastructure (potentially in a cross-domain scenario) to
792 provide authorization and accounting functionality. The latter part
793 is provided by RADIUS and Diameter. To carry EAP payloads between
794 the end host and a network access server, different mechanisms have
795 been standardized, such as the Protocol for Carrying Authentication
796 for Network Access (PANA) [<a href="./rfc5191" title="&quot;Protocol for Carrying Authentication for Network Access (PANA)&quot;">RFC5191</a>] and IEEE 802.1X [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.1X" title="&quot;IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area Networks - Port based Network Access Control&quot;">IEEE802.1X</a>].
797 For access to remote networks, such as enterprise networks, the
798 ability to utilize EAP within IKEv2 [<a href="./rfc5996" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC5996</a>] has also been
799 developed.
800
801 More recently, the same architecture with EAP and RADIUS/Diameter is
802 being reused for application layer protocols. More details about
803 this architectural variant can be found in [<a href="#ref-ABFAB-ARCH" title="&quot;Application Bridging for Federated Access Beyond Web (ABFAB) Architecture&quot;">ABFAB-ARCH</a>].
804
805 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Network Layer Security</span>
806
807 IP security, as described in [<a href="./rfc4301" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC4301</a>], addresses security at the IP
808 layer, provided through the use of a combination of cryptographic and
809 protocol security mechanisms. It offers a set of security services
810 for traffic at the IP layer, in both the IPv4 and IPv6 environment.
811 The set of security services offered includes access control,
812 connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, detection and
813 rejection of replays (a form of partial sequence integrity),
814 confidentiality (via encryption), and limited traffic-flow
815 confidentiality. These services are provided at the IP layer,
816 offering protection in a standard fashion for all protocols that may
817 be carried over IP (including IP itself).
818
819 The architecture foresees a split between the rather time-consuming
820 (a) authentication and key exchange protocol step that also
821 establishes a security association (a data structure with keying
822 material and security parameters) and (b) the actual data traffic
823 protection.
824
825 For the former step, the Internet Key Exchange protocol version 2
826 (IKEv2 [<a href="./rfc5996" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC5996</a>]) is the most recent edition of the standardized
827 protocol. IKE negotiates each of the cryptographic algorithms that
828 will be used to protect the data independently, somewhat like
829 selecting items a la carte.
830
831 For the actual data protection, two types of protocols have
832 historically been used, namely the IP Authentication Header (AH)
833
834
835
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839
840
841 [<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] and the Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4303</a>].
842 The two differ in the security services they offer; the most
843 important distinction is that ESP offers confidentiality protection
844 while AH does not. Since ESP can also provide authentication
845 services, most recent protocol developments making use of IPsec only
846 specify use of ESP and do not use AH.
847
848 In addition to these base line protocol mechanisms a number of
849 extensions have been developed for IKEv2 (e.g., an extension to
850 perform EAP-only authentication [<a href="./rfc5998" title="&quot;An Extension for EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2&quot;">RFC5998</a>]) and since the architecture
851 supports flexible treatment of cryptographic algorithms a number of
852 them have been specified (e.g., [<a href="./rfc4307" title="&quot;Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC4307</a>] for IKEv2, and [<a href="./rfc4835" title="&quot;Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)&quot;">RFC4835</a>]
853 for AH and ESP).
854
855 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Transport Layer Security</span>
856
857 Transport Layer Security v1.2 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] are security services that
858 protect data above the transport layer. The protocol allows client/
859 server applications to communicate in a way that is designed to
860 prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. TLS is
861 application protocol independent.
862
863 TLS is composed of two layers: the TLS Record protocol and the TLS
864 Handshake protocol. The TLS Record protocol provides connection
865 security that has two basic properties: (a) confidentiality
866 protection and (b) integrity protection.
867
868 The TLS Handshake protocol allows the server and client to
869 authenticate each other and to negotiate an encryption algorithm and
870 cryptographic keys before the application protocol transmits or
871 receives its first byte of data. The negotiated parameters and the
872 derived keying material is then used by the TLS Record protocol to
873 perform its job.
874
875 Unlike IKEv2/IPsec, TLS negotiates these cryptographic parameters in
876 suites, so-called 'cipher suites'. Examples of cipher suites that
877 can be negotiated with TLS include Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
878 [<a href="./rfc4492" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC4492</a>] [<a href="./rfc5289" title="&quot;TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)&quot;">RFC5289</a>] [<a href="#ref-AES-CCM-ECC" title="&quot;AES-CCM ECC Cipher Suites for TLS&quot;">AES-CCM-ECC</a>], Camellia [<a href="./rfc5932" title="&quot;Camellia Cipher Suites for TLS&quot;">RFC5932</a>], and the Suite
879 B Profile [<a href="./rfc5430" title="&quot;Suite B Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5430</a>]. [<a href="#ref-IEC62351-3" title="&quot;POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE. DATA AND COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY -- Part 3: Communication network and system security Profiles including TCP/IP&quot;">IEC62351-3</a>] outlines the use of different TLS
880 cipher suites for use in the Smart Grid. The basic cryptographic
881 mechanisms for ECC have been documented in [<a href="./rfc6090" title="&quot;Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms&quot;">RFC6090</a>].
882
883 TLS must run over a reliable transport channel -- typically TCP. In
884 order to offer the same security services for unreliable datagram
885 traffic, such as UDP, the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS
886 [<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>] [<a href="#ref-DTLS" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security version 1.2&quot;">DTLS</a>]) was developed.
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
895
896
897 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.4" href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Application Layer Security</span>
898
899 In certain cases, the application layer independent security
900 mechanisms described in the previous sub-sections are not sufficient
901 to deal with all the identified threats. For this purpose, a number
902 of security primitives are additionally available at the application
903 layer where the semantic of the application can be considered.
904
905 We will focus our description on a few mechanisms that are commonly
906 used throughout the Internet.
907
908 Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS [<a href="./rfc5652" title="&quot;Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5652</a>]) is an encapsulation
909 syntax to sign, digest, authenticate, or encrypt arbitrary message
910 content. It also allows arbitrary attributes, such as signing time,
911 to be signed along with the message content, and it provides for
912 other attributes such as countersignatures to be associated with a
913 signature. The CMS can support a variety of architectures for
914 certificate-based key management, such as the one defined by the PKIX
915 (Public Key Infrastructure using X.509) working group [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]. The
916 CMS has been leveraged to supply security services in a variety of
917 protocols, including secure email [<a href="./rfc5751" title="&quot;Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification&quot;">RFC5751</a>], key management [<a href="./rfc5958" title="&quot;Asymmetric Key Packages&quot;">RFC5958</a>]
918 [<a href="./rfc6031" title="&quot;Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type&quot;">RFC6031</a>], and firmware updates [<a href="./rfc4108" title="&quot;Using Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) to Protect Firmware Packages&quot;">RFC4108</a>].
919
920 Related work includes the use of digital signatures on XML-encoded
921 documents, which has been jointly standardized by W3C and the IETF
922 [<a href="./rfc3275" title="&quot;(Extensible Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and Processing&quot;">RFC3275</a>]. Digitally signed XML is a good choice where applications
923 natively support XML-encoded data, such as the Extensible Messaging
924 and Presence Protocol (XMPP).
925
926 More recently, the work on delegated authentication and authorization
927 often demanded by Web applications have been developed with the Open
928 Web Authentication (OAuth) protocol [<a href="./rfc5849" title="&quot;The OAuth 1.0 Protocol&quot;">RFC5849</a>] [<a href="#ref-OAUTHv2" title="&quot;The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol&quot;">OAUTHv2</a>]. OAuth is
929 used by third-party applications to gain access to protected
930 resources (such as energy consumption information about a specific
931 household) without having the resource owner share its long-term
932 credentials with that third-party. In OAuth, the third-party
933 application requests access to resources controlled by the resource
934 owner and hosted by the resource server, and is issued a different
935 set of credentials than those of the resource owner. More
936 specifically, the third-party applications obtain an access token
937 during the OAuth protocol exchange. This token denotes a specific
938 scope, duration, and other access attributes. As a result, it
939 securely gains access to the protected resource with the consent of
940 the resource owner.
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
951
952
953 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.5" href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Secure Shell</span>
954
955 The Secure Shell (SSH) protocol [<a href="./rfc4253" title="&quot;The Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol&quot;">RFC4253</a>] has been widely used by
956 administrators and others for secure remote login, but is also usable
957 for secure tunneling. More recently, protocols have chosen to layer
958 on top of SSH for transport security services; for example, the
959 NETCONF network management protocol (see <a href="#section-3.5.2">Section 3.5.2</a>) uses SSH as
960 its main communications security protocol.
961
962 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.6" href="#section-3.1.6">3.1.6</a>. Key Management Infrastructures</span>
963
964 All of the security protocols discussed above depend on cryptography
965 for security, and hence require some form of key management. Most
966 IETF protocols at least nominally require some scalable form of key
967 management to be defined as mandatory to implement; indeed the lack
968 of such key management features has in the past been a reason to
969 delay approval of protocols. There are two generic key management
970 schemes that are widely used by other Internet protocols, PKIX and
971 Kerberos, each of which is briefly described below.
972
973 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.6.1" href="#section-3.1.6.1">3.1.6.1</a>. PKIX</span>
974
975 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) refers to the kind of key management
976 that is based on certification authorities (CAs) issuing public key
977 certificates for other key holders. By chaining from a trust anchor
978 (a locally trusted copy of a CA public key) down to the public key of
979 some protocol peer, PKI allows for secure binding between keys and
980 protocol-specific names, such as email addresses, and hence enables
981 security services such as data and peer authentication, data
982 integrity, and confidentiality (encryption).
983
984 The main Internet standard for PKI is [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>], which is a profile
985 of the X.509 public key certificate format. There are a range of
986 private and commercial CAs operating today providing the ability to
987 manage and securely distribute keys for all protocols that use public
988 key certificates, e.g., TLS and S/MIME. In addition to the profile
989 standard, the PKIX working group has defined a number of management
990 protocols (e.g., [<a href="./rfc5272" title="&quot;Certificate Management over CMS (CMC)&quot;">RFC5272</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4210" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)&quot;">RFC4210</a>]) as well as protocols for
991 handling revocation of public key certificates such as the Online
992 Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP) [<a href="./rfc2560" title="&quot;X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP&quot;">RFC2560</a>].
993
994 PKI is generally perceived to better handle use-cases spanning
995 multiple independent domains when compared to Kerberos.
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1007
1008
1009 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.6.2" href="#section-3.1.6.2">3.1.6.2</a>. Kerberos</span>
1010
1011 The Kerberos Network Authentication System [<a href="./rfc4120" title="&quot;The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)&quot;">RFC4120</a>] is commonly used
1012 within organizations to centralize authentication, authorization, and
1013 policy in one place. Kerberos natively supports usernames and
1014 passwords as the basis of authentication. With Public Key
1015 Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)
1016 [<a href="./rfc4556" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography for Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)&quot;">RFC4556</a>], Kerberos supports certificate or public-key-based
1017 authentication. This may provide an advantage by concentrating
1018 policy about certificate validation and mapping of certificates to
1019 user accounts in one place. Through the GSS-API [<a href="./rfc1964" title="&quot;The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API Mechanism&quot;">RFC1964</a>] [<a href="./rfc2743" title="&quot;Generic Security Service Application Program Interface Version 2, Update 1&quot;">RFC2743</a>]
1020 [<a href="./rfc4121" title="&quot;The Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism: Version 2&quot;">RFC4121</a>], Kerberos can be used to manage authentication for most
1021 applications. While Kerberos works best within organizations and
1022 enterprises, it does have facilities that permit authentication to be
1023 shared between administrative domains.
1024
1025 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Network Layer</span>
1026
1027 The IPS specifies two network layer protocols: IPv4 and IPv6. The
1028 following sections describe the IETF's coexistence and transition
1029 mechanisms for IPv4 and IPv6.
1030
1031 Note that on 3 February 2011, the IANA's IPv4 free pool (the pool of
1032 available, unallocated IPv4 addresses) was exhausted, and the
1033 Regional Internet Registrars' (RIRs') free pools are expected to be
1034 exhausted during the coming year, if not sooner. The IETF, the IANA,
1035 and the RIRs recommend that new deployments use IPv6, and that IPv4
1036 infrastructures be supported via the mechanisms described in
1037 <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section 3.2.1</a>.
1038
1039 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. IPv4/IPv6 Coexistence Advice</span>
1040
1041 The IETF has specified a variety of mechanisms designed to facilitate
1042 IPv4/IPv6 coexistence. The IETF actually recommends relatively few
1043 of them: the current advice to network operators is found in
1044 Guidelines for Using IPv6 Transition Mechanisms [<a href="./rfc6180" title="&quot;Guidelines for Using IPv6 Transition Mechanisms during IPv6 Deployment&quot;">RFC6180</a>]. The
1045 thoughts in that document are replicated here.
1046
1047 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.1" href="#section-3.2.1.1">3.2.1.1</a>. Dual Stack Coexistence</span>
1048
1049 The simplest coexistence approach is to
1050
1051 o provide a network that routes both IPv4 and IPv6,
1052
1053 o ensure that servers and their applications similarly support both
1054 protocols, and
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1063
1064
1065 o require that all new systems and applications purchased or
1066 upgraded support both protocols.
1067
1068 The net result is that over time all systems become protocol
1069 agnostic, and that eventually maintenance of IPv4 support becomes a
1070 business decision. This approach is described in the Basic
1071 Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers [<a href="./rfc4213" title="&quot;Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">RFC4213</a>].
1072
1073 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.2" href="#section-3.2.1.2">3.2.1.2</a>. Tunneling Mechanism</span>
1074
1075 In those places in the network that support only IPv4, the simplest
1076 and most reliable approach to coexistence is to provide virtual
1077 connectivity using tunnels or encapsulations. Early in IPv6
1078 deployment, this was often done using static tunnels. A more dynamic
1079 approach is documented in IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
1080 Infrastructures (6rd) [<a href="./rfc5569" title="&quot;IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4 Infrastructures (6rd)&quot;">RFC5569</a>].
1081
1082 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1.3" href="#section-3.2.1.3">3.2.1.3</a>. Translation between IPv4 and IPv6 Networks</span>
1083
1084 In those cases where an IPv4-only host would like to communicate with
1085 an IPv6-only host (or vice versa), a need for protocol translation
1086 may be indicated. At first blush, protocol translation may appear
1087 trivial; on deeper inspection, it turns out that protocol translation
1088 can be complicated.
1089
1090 The most reliable approach to protocol translation is to provide
1091 application layer proxies or gateways, which natively enable
1092 application-to-application connections using both protocols and can
1093 use whichever is appropriate. For example, a web proxy might use
1094 both protocols and as a result enable an IPv4-only system to run HTTP
1095 across an IPv6-only network or to a web server that implements only
1096 IPv6. Since this approach is a service of a protocol-agnostic
1097 server, it is not the subject of standardization by the IETF.
1098
1099 For those applications in which network layer translation is
1100 indicated, the IETF has designed a translation mechanism, which is
1101 described in the following documents:
1102
1103 o Framework for IPv4/IPv6 Translation [<a href="./rfc6144" title="&quot;Framework for IPv4/IPv6 Translation&quot;">RFC6144</a>]
1104
1105 o IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators [<a href="./rfc6052" title="&quot;IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6 Translators&quot;">RFC6052</a>]
1106
1107 o DNS extensions [<a href="./rfc6147" title="&quot;DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers&quot;">RFC6147</a>]
1108
1109 o IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm [<a href="./rfc6145" title="&quot;IP/ICMP Translation Algorithm&quot;">RFC6145</a>]
1110
1111 o Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers [<a href="./rfc6146" title="&quot;Stateful NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers&quot;">RFC6146</a>]
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1119
1120
1121 As with IPv4/IPv4 Network Address Translation, translation between
1122 IPv4 and IPv6 has limited real world applicability for an application
1123 protocol that carries IP addresses in its payload and expects those
1124 addresses to be meaningful to both client and server. However, for
1125 those protocols that do not, protocol translation can provide a
1126 useful network extension.
1127
1128 Network-based translation provides for two types of services:
1129 stateless (and therefore scalable and load-sharable) translation
1130 between IPv4 and IPv6 addresses that embed an IPv4 address in them,
1131 and stateful translation similar to IPv4/IPv4 translation between
1132 IPv4 addresses. The stateless mode is straightforward to implement,
1133 but due to the embedding, requires IPv4 addresses to be allocated to
1134 an otherwise IPv6-only network, and is primarily useful for IPv4-
1135 accessible servers implemented in the IPv6 network. The stateful
1136 mode allows clients in the IPv6 network to access servers in the IPv4
1137 network, but does not provide such service for IPv4 clients accessing
1138 IPv6 peers or servers with general addresses; it has the advantage
1139 that it does not require that a unique IPv4 address be embedded in
1140 the IPv6 address of hosts using this mechanism.
1141
1142 Finally, note that some site networks are IPv6 only while some
1143 transit networks are IPv4 only. In these cases, it may be necessary
1144 to tunnel IPv6 over IPv4 or translate between IPv6 and IPv4.
1145
1146 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Internet Protocol Version 4</span>
1147
1148 IPv4 [<a href="./rfc0791" title="&quot;Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC0791</a>] and the Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMP)
1149 [<a href="./rfc0792" title="&quot;Internet Control Message Protocol&quot;">RFC0792</a>] comprise the IPv4 network layer. IPv4 provides unreliable
1150 delivery of datagrams.
1151
1152 IPv4 also provides for fragmentation and reassembly of long datagrams
1153 for transmission through networks with small Maximum Transmission
1154 Units (MTU). The MTU is the largest packet size that can be
1155 delivered across the network. In addition, the IPS provides ICMP
1156 [<a href="./rfc0792" title="&quot;Internet Control Message Protocol&quot;">RFC0792</a>], which is a separate protocol that enables the network to
1157 report errors and other issues to hosts that originate problematic
1158 datagrams.
1159
1160 IPv4 originally supported an experimental type of service field that
1161 identified eight levels of operational precedence styled after the
1162 requirements of military telephony, plus three and later four bit
1163 flags that OSI IS-IS for IPv4 (IS-IS) [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>] and OSPF Version 2
1164 [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>] interpreted as control traffic; this control traffic is
1165 assured of not being dropped when queued or upon receipt, even if
1166 other traffic is being dropped. These control bits turned out to be
1167 less useful than the designers had hoped. They were replaced by the
1168 Differentiated Services Architecture [<a href="./rfc2474" title="&quot;Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers&quot;">RFC2474</a>] [<a href="./rfc2475" title="&quot;An Architecture for Differentiated Services&quot;">RFC2475</a>], which
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1175
1176
1177 contains a six-bit code point used to select an algorithm (a "per-hop
1178 behavior") to be applied to the datagram. The IETF has also produced
1179 a set of Configuration Guidelines for DiffServ Service Classes
1180 [<a href="./rfc4594" title="&quot;Configuration Guidelines for DiffServ Service Classes&quot;">RFC4594</a>], which describes a set of service classes that may be
1181 useful to a network operator.
1182
1183 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2.1" href="#section-3.2.2.1">3.2.2.1</a>. IPv4 Address Allocation and Assignment</span>
1184
1185 IPv4 addresses are administratively assigned, usually using automated
1186 methods, using the Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol (DHCP)
1187 [<a href="./rfc2131" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC2131</a>]. On most interface types, neighboring systems identify
1188 each others' addresses using the Address Resolution Protocol (ARP)
1189 [<a href="./rfc0826" title="&quot;Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol: Or converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit Ethernet address for transmission on Ethernet hardware&quot;">RFC0826</a>].
1190
1191 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2.2">3.2.2.2</a>. IPv4 Unicast Routing</span>
1192
1193 Routing for the IPv4 Internet is accomplished by routing applications
1194 that exchange connectivity information and build semi-static
1195 destination routing databases. If a datagram is directed to a given
1196 destination address, the address is looked up in the routing
1197 database, and the most specific ("longest") prefix found that
1198 contains it is used to identify the next-hop router or the end system
1199 to which it will be delivered. This is not generally implemented on
1200 hosts, although it can be; a host normally sends datagrams to a
1201 router on its local network, and the router carries out the intent.
1202
1203 IETF specified routing protocols include RIP Version 2 [<a href="./rfc2453" title="&quot;RIP Version 2&quot;">RFC2453</a>], OSI
1204 IS-IS for IPv4 [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>], OSPF Version 2 [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>], and BGP-4
1205 [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>]. Active research exists in mobile ad hoc routing and other
1206 routing paradigms; these result in new protocols and modified
1207 forwarding paradigms.
1208
1209 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2.3" href="#section-3.2.2.3">3.2.2.3</a>. IPv4 Multicast Forwarding and Routing</span>
1210
1211 IPv4 was originally specified as a unicast (point to point) protocol,
1212 and was extended to support multicast in [<a href="./rfc1112" title="&quot;Host extensions for IP multicasting&quot;">RFC1112</a>]. This uses the
1213 Internet Group Management Protocol [<a href="./rfc3376" title="&quot;Internet Group Management Protocol, Version 3&quot;">RFC3376</a>] [<a href="./rfc4604" title="&quot;Using Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source-Specific Multicast&quot;">RFC4604</a>] to enable
1214 applications to join multicast groups, and for most applications uses
1215 Source-Specific Multicast [<a href="./rfc4607" title="&quot;Source-Specific Multicast for IP&quot;">RFC4607</a>] for routing and delivery of
1216 multicast messages.
1217
1218 An experiment carried out in IPv4 that is not part of the core
1219 Internet architecture but may be of interest in the Smart Grid is the
1220 development of so-called "Reliable Multicast". This is "so-called"
1221 because it is not "reliable" in the strict sense of the word -- it is
1222 perhaps better described as "enhanced reliability". A best effort
1223 network by definition can lose traffic, duplicate it, or reorder it,
1224 something as true for multicast as for unicast. Research in
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
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1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1231
1232
1233 "Reliable Multicast" technology intends to improve the probability of
1234 delivery of multicast traffic.
1235
1236 In that research, the IETF imposed guidelines [<a href="./rfc2357" title="&quot;IETF Criteria for Evaluating Reliable Multicast Transport and Application Protocols&quot;">RFC2357</a>] on the
1237 research community regarding what was desirable. Important results
1238 from that research include a number of papers and several proprietary
1239 protocols including some that have been used in support of business
1240 operations. RFCs in the area include The Use of Forward Error
1241 Correction (FEC) in Reliable Multicast [<a href="./rfc3453" title="&quot;The Use of Forward Error Correction (FEC) in Reliable Multicast&quot;">RFC3453</a>], the Negative-
1242 acknowledgment (NACK)-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) Protocol
1243 [<a href="./rfc5740" title="&quot;NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM) Transport Protocol&quot;">RFC5740</a>], and the Selectively Reliable Multicast Protocol (SRMP)
1244 [<a href="./rfc4410" title="&quot;Selectively Reliable Multicast Protocol (SRMP)&quot;">RFC4410</a>].
1245
1246 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.3" href="#section-3.2.3">3.2.3</a>. Internet Protocol Version 6</span>
1247
1248 IPv6 [<a href="./rfc2460" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">RFC2460</a>], with the Internet Control Message Protocol "v6"
1249 [<a href="./rfc4443" title="&quot;Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">RFC4443</a>], constitutes the next generation protocol for the Internet.
1250 IPv6 provides for transmission of datagrams from source to
1251 destination hosts, which are identified by fixed-length addresses.
1252
1253 IPv6 also provides for fragmentation and reassembly of long datagrams
1254 by the originating host, if necessary, for transmission through
1255 "small packet" networks. ICMPv6, which is a separate protocol
1256 implemented along with IPv6, enables the network to report errors and
1257 other issues to hosts that originate problematic datagrams.
1258
1259 IPv6 adopted the Differentiated Services Architecture [<a href="./rfc2474" title="&quot;Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers&quot;">RFC2474</a>]
1260 [<a href="./rfc2475" title="&quot;An Architecture for Differentiated Services&quot;">RFC2475</a>], which contains a six-bit code point used to select an
1261 algorithm (a "per-hop behavior") to be applied to the datagram.
1262
1263 The IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks RFC [<a href="./rfc4919" title="&quot;IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions, Problem Statement, and Goals&quot;">RFC4919</a>]
1264 and the Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams in 6LoWPAN Networks
1265 document [<a href="#ref-6LOWPAN-HC" title="&quot;Compression Format for IPv6 Datagrams in Low Power and Lossy Networks (6LoWPAN)&quot;">6LOWPAN-HC</a>] addresses IPv6 header compression and subnet
1266 architecture in at least some sensor networks, and may be appropriate
1267 to the Smart Grid Advanced Metering Infrastructure or other sensor
1268 domains.
1269
1270 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.3.1" href="#section-3.2.3.1">3.2.3.1</a>. IPv6 Address Allocation and Assignment</span>
1271
1272 An IPv6 Address [<a href="./rfc4291" title="&quot;IP Version 6 Addressing Architecture&quot;">RFC4291</a>] may be administratively assigned using
1273 DHCPv6 [<a href="./rfc3315" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)&quot;">RFC3315</a>] in a manner similar to the way IPv4 addresses are.
1274 In addition, IPv6 addresses may also be autoconfigured.
1275 Autoconfiguration enables various models of network management that
1276 may be advantageous in different use cases. Autoconfiguration
1277 procedures are defined in [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4941" title="&quot;Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6&quot;">RFC4941</a>]. IPv6 neighbors
1278 identify each others' addresses using Neighbor Discovery (ND)
1279 [<a href="./rfc4861" title="&quot;Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">RFC4861</a>]. SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [<a href="./rfc3971" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">RFC3971</a>] may be used to
1280 secure these operations.
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1287
1288
1289 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.3.2" href="#section-3.2.3.2">3.2.3.2</a>. IPv6 Routing</span>
1290
1291 Routing for the IPv6 Internet is accomplished by routing applications
1292 that exchange connectivity information and build semi-static
1293 destination routing databases. If a datagram is directed to a given
1294 destination address, the address is looked up in the routing
1295 database, and the most specific ("longest") prefix found that
1296 contains it is used to identify the next-hop router or the end system
1297 to which it will be delivered. Routing is not generally implemented
1298 on hosts (although it can be); generally, a host sends datagrams to a
1299 router on its local network, and the router carries out the intent.
1300
1301 IETF-specified routing protocols include RIP for IPv6 [<a href="./rfc2080" title="&quot;RIPng for IPv6&quot;">RFC2080</a>],
1302 IS-IS for IPv6 [<a href="./rfc5308" title="&quot;Routing IPv6 with IS-IS&quot;">RFC5308</a>], OSPF for IPv6 [<a href="./rfc5340" title="&quot;OSPF for IPv6&quot;">RFC5340</a>], and BGP-4 for IPv6
1303 [<a href="./rfc2545" title="&quot;Use of BGP-4 Multiprotocol Extensions for IPv6 Inter-Domain Routing&quot;">RFC2545</a>]. Active research exists in mobile ad hoc routing, routing
1304 in low-power networks (sensors and Smart Grids), and other routing
1305 paradigms; these result in new protocols and modified forwarding
1306 paradigms.
1307
1308 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4" href="#section-3.2.4">3.2.4</a>. Routing for IPv4 and IPv6</span>
1309
1310 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.1" href="#section-3.2.4.1">3.2.4.1</a>. Routing Information Protocol</span>
1311
1312 The prototypical routing protocol used in the Internet has probably
1313 been the Routing Information Protocol [<a href="./rfc1058" title="&quot;Routing Information Protocol&quot;">RFC1058</a>]. People that use it
1314 today tend to deploy RIPng for IPv6 [<a href="./rfc2080" title="&quot;RIPng for IPv6&quot;">RFC2080</a>] and RIP Version 2
1315 [<a href="./rfc2453" title="&quot;RIP Version 2&quot;">RFC2453</a>]. Briefly, RIP is a distance vector routing protocol that
1316 is based on a distributed variant of the widely known Bellman-Ford
1317 algorithm. In distance vector routing protocols, each router
1318 announces the contents of its route table to neighboring routers,
1319 which integrate the results with their route tables and re-announce
1320 them to others. It has been characterized as "routing by rumor", and
1321 suffers many of the ills we find in human gossip -- propagating stale
1322 or incorrect information in certain failure scenarios, and being in
1323 cases unresponsive to changes in topology. [<a href="./rfc1058" title="&quot;Routing Information Protocol&quot;">RFC1058</a>] provides
1324 guidance to algorithm designers to mitigate these issues.
1325
1326 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.2" href="#section-3.2.4.2">3.2.4.2</a>. Open Shortest Path First</span>
1327
1328 The Open Shortest Path First (OSPF) routing protocol is one of the
1329 more widely used protocols in the Internet. OSPF is based on
1330 Dijkstra's well known Shortest Path First (SPF) algorithm. It is
1331 implemented as OSPF Version 2 [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>] for IPv4, OSPF for IPv6
1332 [<a href="./rfc5340" title="&quot;OSPF for IPv6&quot;">RFC5340</a>] for IPv6, and the Support of Address Families in OSPFv3
1333 [<a href="./rfc5838" title="&quot;Support of Address Families in OSPFv3&quot;">RFC5838</a>] to enable [<a href="./rfc5340" title="&quot;OSPF for IPv6&quot;">RFC5340</a>] routing both IPv4 and IPv6.
1334
1335 The advantage of any SPF-based protocol (i.e., OSPF and IS-IS) is
1336 primarily that every router in the network constructs its view of the
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1343
1344
1345 network from first-hand knowledge rather than the "gossip" that
1346 distance vector protocols propagate. As such, the topology is
1347 quickly and easily changed by simply announcing the change. The
1348 disadvantage of SPF-based protocols is that each router must store a
1349 first-person statement of the connectivity of each router in the
1350 domain.
1351
1352 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.3" href="#section-3.2.4.3">3.2.4.3</a>. ISO Intermediate System to Intermediate System</span>
1353
1354 The Intermediate System to Intermediate System (IS-IS) routing
1355 protocol is one of the more widely used protocols in the Internet.
1356 IS-IS is also based on Dijkstra's SPF algorithm. It was originally
1357 specified as ISO DP 10589 for the routing of Connectionless Network
1358 Service (CLNS), and extended for routing in TCP/IP and dual
1359 environments [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>], and more recently for routing of IPv6
1360 [<a href="./rfc5308" title="&quot;Routing IPv6 with IS-IS&quot;">RFC5308</a>].
1361
1362 As with OSPF, the positives of any SPF-based protocol and
1363 specifically IS-IS are primarily that the network is described as a
1364 lattice of routers with connectivity to subnets and isolated hosts.
1365 It's topology is quickly and easily changed by simply announcing the
1366 change, without the issues of "routing by rumor", since every host
1367 within the routing domain has a first-person statement of the
1368 connectivity of each router in the domain. The negatives are a
1369 corollary: each router must store a first-person statement of the
1370 connectivity of each router in the domain.
1371
1372 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.4" href="#section-3.2.4.4">3.2.4.4</a>. Border Gateway Protocol</span>
1373
1374 The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>] is widely used in the
1375 IPv4 Internet to exchange routes between administrative entities --
1376 service providers, their peers, their upstream networks, and their
1377 customers -- while applying specific policy. Multiprotocol
1378 Extensions [<a href="./rfc4760" title="&quot;Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4&quot;">RFC4760</a>] to BGP allow BGP to carry IPv6 Inter-Domain
1379 Routing [<a href="./rfc2545" title="&quot;Use of BGP-4 Multiprotocol Extensions for IPv6 Inter-Domain Routing&quot;">RFC2545</a>], multicast reachability information, and VPN
1380 information, among others.
1381
1382 Considerations that apply with BGP deal with the flexibility and
1383 complexity of the policies that must be defined. Flexibility is a
1384 good thing; in a network that is not run by professionals, the
1385 complexity is burdensome.
1386
1387 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.5" href="#section-3.2.4.5">3.2.4.5</a>. Dynamic MANET On-Demand (DYMO) Routing</span>
1388
1389 The Mobile Ad Hoc working group of the IETF developed, among other
1390 protocols, Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing [<a href="./rfc3561" title="&quot;Ad hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing&quot;">RFC3561</a>].
1391 This protocol captured the minds of some in the embedded devices
1392 industry, but experienced issues in wireless networks such as
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1399
1400
1401 802.15.4 and 802.11's Ad Hoc mode. As a result, it is in the process
1402 of being updated in the Dynamic MANET On-demand (DYMO) Routing
1403 protocol [<a href="#ref-DYMO" title="&quot;Dynamic MANET On- demand (DYMO) Routing&quot;">DYMO</a>].
1404
1405 AODV and DYMO are essentially reactive routing protocols designed for
1406 mobile ad hoc networks, and usable in other forms of ad hoc networks.
1407 They provide connectivity between a device within a distributed
1408 subnet and a few devices (including perhaps a gateway or router to
1409 another subnet) without tracking connectivity to other devices. In
1410 essence, routing is calculated and discovered upon need, and a host
1411 or router need only maintain the routes that currently work and are
1412 needed.
1413
1414 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.6" href="#section-3.2.4.6">3.2.4.6</a>. Optimized Link State Routing Protocol</span>
1415
1416 The Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR) [<a href="./rfc3626" title="&quot;Optimized Link State Routing Protocol (OLSR)&quot;">RFC3626</a>] is a
1417 proactive routing protocol designed for mobile ad hoc networks, and
1418 can be used in other forms of ad hoc networks. It provides arbitrary
1419 connectivity between systems within a distributed subnet. As with
1420 protocols designed for wired networks, routing is calculated whenever
1421 changes are detected, and maintained in each router's tables. The
1422 set of nodes that operate as routers within the subnet, however, are
1423 fairly fluid, and dependent on this instantaneous topology of the
1424 subnet.
1425
1426 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.4.7" href="#section-3.2.4.7">3.2.4.7</a>. Routing for Low-Power and Lossy Networks</span>
1427
1428 The IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks (RPL)
1429 [<a href="#ref-RPL" title="&quot;RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for Low power and Lossy Networks&quot;">RPL</a>] is a reactive routing protocol designed for use in resource
1430 constrained networks. Requirements for resource constrained networks
1431 are defined in [<a href="./rfc5548" title="&quot;Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power and Lossy Networks&quot;">RFC5548</a>], [<a href="./rfc5673" title="&quot;Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks&quot;">RFC5673</a>], [<a href="./rfc5826" title="&quot;Home Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks&quot;">RFC5826</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5867" title="&quot;Building Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and Lossy Networks&quot;">RFC5867</a>].
1432
1433 Briefly, a constrained network is comprised of nodes that:
1434
1435 o Are built with limited processing power and memory, and sometimes
1436 energy when operating on batteries.
1437
1438 o Are interconnected through a low-data-rate network interface and
1439 are potentially vulnerable to communication instability and low
1440 packet delivery rates.
1441
1442 o Potentially have a mix of roles such as being able to act as a
1443 host (i.e., generating traffic) and/or a router (i.e., both
1444 forwarding and generating RPL traffic).
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1455
1456
1457 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.5" href="#section-3.2.5">3.2.5</a>. IPv6 Multicast Forwarding and Routing</span>
1458
1459 IPv6 specifies both unicast and multicast datagram exchange. This
1460 uses the Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol (MLDv2) [<a href="./rfc2710" title="&quot;Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6&quot;">RFC2710</a>]
1461 [<a href="./rfc3590" title="&quot;Source Address Selection for the Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Protocol&quot;">RFC3590</a>] [<a href="./rfc3810" title="&quot;Multicast Listener Discovery Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6&quot;">RFC3810</a>] [<a href="./rfc4604" title="&quot;Using Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source-Specific Multicast&quot;">RFC4604</a>] to enable applications to join
1462 multicast groups, and for most applications uses Source-Specific
1463 Multicast [<a href="./rfc4607" title="&quot;Source-Specific Multicast for IP&quot;">RFC4607</a>] for routing and delivery of multicast messages.
1464
1465 The mechanisms experimentally developed for reliable multicast in
1466 IPv4, discussed in <a href="#section-3.2.2.3">Section 3.2.2.3</a>, can be used in IPv6 as well.
1467
1468 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.5.1" href="#section-3.2.5.1">3.2.5.1</a>. Protocol-Independent Multicast Routing</span>
1469
1470 A multicast routing protocol has two basic functions: building the
1471 multicast distribution tree and forwarding multicast traffic.
1472 Multicast routing protocols generally contain a control plane for
1473 building distribution trees, and a forwarding plane that uses the
1474 distribution tree when forwarding multicast traffic.
1475
1476 The multicast model works as follows: hosts express their interest in
1477 receiving multicast traffic from a source by sending a Join message
1478 to their first-hop router. That router in turn sends a Join message
1479 upstream towards the root of the tree, grafting the router (leaf
1480 node) onto the distribution tree for the group. Data is delivered
1481 down the tree toward the leaf nodes, which forward it onto the local
1482 network for delivery.
1483
1484 The initial multicast model deployed in the Internet was known as
1485 Any-Source Multicast (ASM). In the ASM model, any host could send to
1486 the group and inter-domain multicast was difficult. Protocols such
1487 as Protocol Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol
1488 Specification (Revised) [<a href="./rfc3973" title="&quot;Protocol Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM): Protocol Specification (Revised)&quot;">RFC3973</a>] and Protocol Independent Multicast
1489 - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (Revised) [<a href="./rfc4601" title="&quot;Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (Revised)&quot;">RFC4601</a>]
1490 were designed for the ASM model.
1491
1492 Many modern multicast deployments use Source-Specific Multicast (PIM-
1493 SSM) [<a href="./rfc3569" title="&quot;An Overview of Source-Specific Multicast (SSM)&quot;">RFC3569</a>][RFC4608]. In the SSM model, a host expresses interest
1494 in a "channel", which is comprised of a source (S) and a group (G).
1495 Distribution trees are rooted to the sending host (called an "(S,G)
1496 tree"). Since only the source S can send on to the group, SSM has
1497 inherent anti-jamming capability. In addition, inter-domain
1498 multicast is simplified since finding the (S,G) channel they are
1499 interested in receiving is the responsibility of the receivers
1500 (rather than the networks). This implies that SSM requires some form
1501 of directory service so that receivers can find the (S,G) channels.
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1511
1512
1513 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.6" href="#section-3.2.6">3.2.6</a>. Adaptation to Lower-Layer Networks and Link Layer Protocols</span>
1514
1515 In general, the layered architecture of the Internet enables the IPS
1516 to run over any appropriate layer two architecture. The ability to
1517 change the link or physical layer without having to rethink the
1518 network layer, transports, or applications has been a great benefit
1519 in the Internet.
1520
1521 Examples of link layer adaptation technology include:
1522
1523 Ethernet/IEEE 802.3: IPv4 has run on each link layer environment
1524 that uses the Ethernet header (which is to say 10 and 100 MBPS
1525 wired Ethernet, 1 and 10 GBPS wired Ethernet, and the various
1526 versions of IEEE 802.11) using [<a href="./rfc0894" title="&quot;Standard for the transmission of IP datagrams over Ethernet networks&quot;">RFC0894</a>]. IPv6 does the same
1527 using [<a href="./rfc2464" title="&quot;Transmission of IPv6 Packets over Ethernet Networks&quot;">RFC2464</a>].
1528
1529 PPP: The IETF has defined a serial line protocol, the Point-to-Point
1530 Protocol (PPP) [<a href="./rfc1661" title="&quot;The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)&quot;">RFC1661</a>], that uses High-Level Data Link Control
1531 (bit-synchronous or byte synchronous) framing. The IPv4
1532 adaptation specification is [<a href="./rfc1332" title="&quot;The PPP Internet Protocol Control Protocol (IPCP)&quot;">RFC1332</a>], and the IPv6 adaptation
1533 specification is [<a href="./rfc5072" title="&quot;IP Version 6 over PPP&quot;">RFC5072</a>]. Current use of this protocol is in
1534 traditional serial lines, authentication exchanges in DSL networks
1535 using PPP Over Ethernet (PPPoE) [<a href="./rfc2516" title="&quot;A Method for Transmitting PPP Over Ethernet (PPPoE)&quot;">RFC2516</a>], and the Digital
1536 Signaling Hierarchy (generally referred to as Packet-on-SONET/SDH)
1537 using PPP over SONET/SDH [<a href="./rfc2615" title="&quot;PPP over SONET/SDH&quot;">RFC2615</a>].
1538
1539 IEEE 802.15.4: The adaptation specification for IPv6 transmission
1540 over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks is [<a href="./rfc4944" title="&quot;Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE 802.15.4 Networks&quot;">RFC4944</a>].
1541
1542 Numerous other adaptation specifications exist, including ATM, Frame
1543 Relay, X.25, other standardized and proprietary LAN technologies, and
1544 others.
1545
1546 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Transport Layer</span>
1547
1548 This section outlines the functionality of UDP, TCP, SCTP, and DCCP.
1549 UDP and TCP are best known and most widely used in the Internet
1550 today, while SCTP and DCCP are newer protocols that were built for
1551 specific purposes. Other transport protocols can be built when
1552 required.
1553
1554 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. User Datagram Protocol (UDP)</span>
1555
1556 The User Datagram Protocol [<a href="./rfc0768" title="&quot;User Datagram Protocol&quot;">RFC0768</a>] and the Lightweight User
1557 Datagram Protocol [<a href="./rfc3828" title="&quot;The Lightweight User Datagram Protocol (UDP-Lite)&quot;">RFC3828</a>] are properly not "transport" protocols in
1558 the sense of "a set of rules governing the exchange or transmission
1559 of data electronically between devices". They are labels that
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1567
1568
1569 provide for multiplexing of applications directly on the IP layer,
1570 with transport functionality embedded in the application.
1571
1572 Many exchange designs have been built using UDP, and many of them
1573 have not worked out. As a result, the use of UDP really should be
1574 treated as designing a new transport. Advice on the use of UDP in
1575 new applications can be found in Unicast UDP Usage Guidelines for
1576 Application Designers [<a href="./rfc5405" title="&quot;Unicast UDP Usage Guidelines for Application Designers&quot;">RFC5405</a>].
1577
1578 Datagram Transport Layer Security [<a href="./rfc5238" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)&quot;">RFC5238</a>] can be used to prevent
1579 eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery for applications that
1580 run over UDP. Alternatively, UDP can run over IPsec.
1581
1582 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)</span>
1583
1584 TCP [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] is the predominant transport protocol used in the
1585 Internet. It is "reliable", as the term is used in protocol design:
1586 it delivers data to its peer and provides acknowledgement to the
1587 sender, or it dies trying. It has extensions for Congestion Control
1588 [<a href="./rfc5681" title="&quot;TCP Congestion Control&quot;">RFC5681</a>] and Explicit Congestion Notification [<a href="./rfc3168" title="&quot;The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP&quot;">RFC3168</a>].
1589
1590 The user interface for TCP is a byte stream interface -- an
1591 application using TCP might "write" to it several times only to have
1592 the data compacted into a common segment and delivered as such to its
1593 peer. For message-stream interfaces, ACSE/ROSE uses the ISO
1594 Transport Service on TCP [<a href="./rfc1006" title="&quot;ISO transport services on top of the TCP: Version 3&quot;">RFC1006</a>][RFC2126] in the application.
1595
1596 Transport Layer Security [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] can be used to prevent
1597 eavesdropping, tampering, or message forgery. Alternatively, TCP can
1598 run over IPsec. Additionally, [<a href="./rfc4987" title="&quot;TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common Mitigations&quot;">RFC4987</a>] discusses mechanisms similar
1599 to SCTP's and DCCP's "cookie" approach that may be used to secure TCP
1600 sessions against flooding attacks.
1601
1602 Finally, note that TCP has been the subject of ongoing research and
1603 development since it was written. The Roadmap for TCP Specification
1604 Documents [<a href="./rfc4614" title="&quot;A Roadmap for Transmission Control Protocol (TCP) Specification Documents&quot;">RFC4614</a>] captures this history, and is intended to be a
1605 guide to current and future developers in the area.
1606
1607 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3" href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP)</span>
1608
1609 SCTP [<a href="./rfc4960" title="&quot;Stream Control Transmission Protocol&quot;">RFC4960</a>] is a more recent reliable transport protocol that can
1610 be imagined as a TCP-like context containing multiple separate and
1611 independent message streams (unlike TCP's byte streams). The design
1612 of SCTP includes appropriate congestion avoidance behavior and
1613 resistance to flooding and masquerade attacks. As it uses a message
1614 stream interface, it may also be more appropriate for the ISO
1615 Transport Service than using <a href="./rfc1006">RFC 1006</a>/2126 to turn TCP's octet
1616 streams into a message interface.
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1623
1624
1625 SCTP offers several delivery options. The basic service is
1626 sequential non-duplicated delivery of messages within a stream, for
1627 each stream in use. Since streams are independent, one stream may
1628 pause due to head-of-line blocking while another stream in the same
1629 session continues to deliver data. In addition, SCTP provides a
1630 mechanism for bypassing the sequenced delivery service. User
1631 messages sent using this mechanism are delivered to the SCTP user as
1632 soon as they are received.
1633
1634 SCTP implements a simple "cookie" mechanism intended to limit the
1635 effectiveness of flooding attacks by mutual authentication. This
1636 demonstrates that the application is connected to the same peer, but
1637 does not identify the peer. Mechanisms also exist for Dynamic
1638 Address Reconfiguration [<a href="./rfc5061" title="&quot;Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Dynamic Address Reconfiguration&quot;">RFC5061</a>], enabling peers to change addresses
1639 during the session and yet retain connectivity. Transport Layer
1640 Security [<a href="./rfc3436" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol&quot;">RFC3436</a>] can be used to prevent eavesdropping, tampering,
1641 or message forgery. Alternatively, SCTP can run over IPsec.
1642
1643 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.4" href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a>. Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)</span>
1644
1645 DCCP [<a href="./rfc4340" title="&quot;Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)&quot;">RFC4340</a>] is an "unreliable" transport protocol (e.g., one that
1646 does not guarantee message delivery) that provides bidirectional
1647 unicast connections of congestion-controlled unreliable datagrams.
1648 DCCP is suitable for applications that transfer fairly large amounts
1649 of data and that can benefit from control over the tradeoff between
1650 timeliness and reliability.
1651
1652 DCCP implements a simple "cookie" mechanism intended to limit the
1653 effectiveness of flooding attacks by mutual authentication. This
1654 demonstrates that the application is connected to the same peer, but
1655 does not identify the peer. Datagram Transport Layer Security
1656 [<a href="./rfc5238" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) over the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)&quot;">RFC5238</a>] can be used to prevent eavesdropping, tampering, or message
1657 forgery. Alternatively, DCCP can run over IPsec.
1658
1659 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Infrastructure</span>
1660
1661 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.1" href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a>. Domain Name System</span>
1662
1663 In order to facilitate network management and operations, the
1664 Internet community has defined the Domain Name System (DNS) [<a href="./rfc1034" title="&quot;Domain names - concepts and facilities&quot;">RFC1034</a>]
1665 [<a href="./rfc1035" title="&quot;Domain names - implementation and specification&quot;">RFC1035</a>]. Names are hierarchical: a name like example.com is found
1666 registered with a .com registrar, and within the associated network
1667 other names like baldur.cincinatti.example.com can be defined, with
1668 obvious hierarchy. Security extensions, which allow a registry to
1669 sign the records it contains and in so doing demonstrate their
1670 authenticity, are defined by the DNS Security Extensions [<a href="./rfc4033" title="&quot;DNS Security Introduction and Requirements&quot;">RFC4033</a>]
1671 [<a href="./rfc4034" title="&quot;Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions&quot;">RFC4034</a>] [<a href="./rfc4035" title="&quot;Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions&quot;">RFC4035</a>].
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1679
1680
1681 Devices can also optionally update their own DNS record. For
1682 example, a sensor that is using Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
1683 [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>] to create an address might want to associate it with a name
1684 using DNS Dynamic Update [<a href="./rfc2136" title="&quot;Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS UPDATE)&quot;">RFC2136</a>] or DNS Secure Dynamic Update
1685 [<a href="./rfc3007" title="&quot;Secure Domain Name System (DNS) Dynamic Update&quot;">RFC3007</a>].
1686
1687 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.2" href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a>. Dynamic Host Configuration</span>
1688
1689 As discussed in <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section 3.2.2</a>, IPv4 address assignment is generally
1690 performed using DHCP [<a href="./rfc2131" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC2131</a>]. By contrast, <a href="#section-3.2.3">Section 3.2.3</a> points
1691 out that IPv6 address assignment can be accomplished using either
1692 autoconfiguration [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>] [<a href="./rfc4941" title="&quot;Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6&quot;">RFC4941</a>] or DHCPv6 [<a href="./rfc3315" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)&quot;">RFC3315</a>]. The best
1693 argument for the use of autoconfiguration is a large number of
1694 systems that require little more than a random number as an address;
1695 the argument for DHCP is administrative control.
1696
1697 There are other parameters that may need to be allocated to hosts
1698 requiring administrative configuration; examples include the
1699 addresses of DNS servers, keys for Secure DNS, and Network Time
1700 servers.
1701
1702 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.3" href="#section-3.4.3">3.4.3</a>. Network Time</span>
1703
1704 The Network Time Protocol was originally designed by Dave Mills of
1705 the University of Delaware and CSNET, implementing a temporal metric
1706 in the Fuzzball Routing Protocol and generally coordinating time
1707 experiments. The current versions of the time protocol are the
1708 Network Time Protocol [<a href="./rfc5905" title="&quot;Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and Algorithms Specification&quot;">RFC5905</a>].
1709
1710 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Network Management</span>
1711
1712 The IETF has developed two protocols for network management: SNMP and
1713 NETCONF. SNMP is discussed in <a href="#section-3.5.1">Section 3.5.1</a>, and NETCONF is
1714 discussed in <a href="#section-3.5.2">Section 3.5.2</a>.
1715
1716 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5.1" href="#section-3.5.1">3.5.1</a>. Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)</span>
1717
1718 The Simple Network Management Protocol, originally specified in the
1719 late 1980's and having passed through several revisions, is specified
1720 in several documents:
1721
1722 o An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol
1723 (SNMP) Management Frameworks [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>]
1724
1725 o Message Processing and Dispatching [<a href="./rfc3412" title="&quot;Message Processing and Dispatching for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3412</a>]
1726
1727 o SNMP Applications [<a href="./rfc3413" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications&quot;">RFC3413</a>]
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1735
1736
1737 o User-based Security Model (USM) for SNMP version 3 [<a href="./rfc3414" title="&quot;User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)&quot;">RFC3414</a>]
1738
1739 o View-based Access Control Model (VACM) [<a href="./rfc3415" title="&quot;View- based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3415</a>]
1740
1741 o Version 2 of the SNMP Protocol Operations [<a href="./rfc3416" title="&quot;Version 2 of the Protocol Operations for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3416</a>]
1742
1743 o Transport Mappings [<a href="./rfc3417" title="&quot;Transport Mappings for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3417</a>]
1744
1745 o Management Information Base (MIB) [<a href="./rfc3418" title="&quot;Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3418</a>]
1746
1747 It provides capabilities for polled and event-driven activities, and
1748 for both monitoring and configuration of systems in the field.
1749 Historically, it has been used primarily for monitoring nodes in a
1750 network. Messages and their constituent data are encoded using a
1751 profile of ASN.1.
1752
1753 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5.2" href="#section-3.5.2">3.5.2</a>. Network Configuration (NETCONF) Protocol</span>
1754
1755 The NETCONF Configuration Protocol is specified in one basic
1756 document, with supporting documents for carrying it over the IPS.
1757 These documents include:
1758
1759 o NETCONF Configuration Protocol [<a href="./rfc4741" title="&quot;NETCONF Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC4741</a>]
1760
1761 o Using the NETCONF Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)
1762 [<a href="./rfc4742" title="&quot;Using the NETCONF Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)&quot;">RFC4742</a>]
1763
1764 o Using NETCONF over the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)
1765 [<a href="./rfc4743" title="&quot;Using NETCONF over the Simple Object Access Protocol (SOAP)&quot;">RFC4743</a>]
1766
1767 o Using the NETCONF Protocol over the Blocks Extensible Exchange
1768 Protocol (BEEP) [<a href="./rfc4744" title="&quot;Using the NETCONF Protocol over the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol (BEEP)&quot;">RFC4744</a>]
1769
1770 o NETCONF Event Notifications [<a href="./rfc5277" title="&quot;NETCONF Event Notifications&quot;">RFC5277</a>]
1771
1772 o NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS) [<a href="./rfc5539" title="&quot;NETCONF over Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5539</a>]
1773
1774 o Partial Lock Remote Procedure Call (RPC) for NETCONF [<a href="./rfc5717" title="&quot;Partial Lock Remote Procedure Call (RPC) for NETCONF&quot;">RFC5717</a>]
1775
1776 NETCONF was developed in response to operator requests for a common
1777 configuration protocol based on ASCII text, unlike ASN.1. In
1778 essence, it carries XML-encoded remote procedure call (RPC) data. In
1779 response to Smart Grid requirements, there is consideration of a
1780 variant of the protocol that could be used for polled and event-
1781 driven management activities, and for both monitoring and
1782 configuration of systems in the field.
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1791
1792
1793 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Service and Resource Discovery</span>
1794
1795 Service and resource discovery are among the most important protocols
1796 for constrained resource self-organizing networks. These include
1797 various sensor networks as well as the Home Area Networks (HANs),
1798 Building Area Networks (BANs), and Field Area Networks (FANs)
1799 envisioned by Smart Grid architects.
1800
1801 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6.1" href="#section-3.6.1">3.6.1</a>. Service Discovery</span>
1802
1803 Service discovery protocols are designed for the automatic
1804 configuration and detection of devices, and the services offered by
1805 the discovered devices. In many cases service discovery is performed
1806 by so-called "constrained resource" devices (i.e., those with limited
1807 processing power, memory, and power resources).
1808
1809 In general, service discovery is concerned with the resolution and
1810 distribution of host names via multicast DNS [<a href="#ref-MULTICAST-DNS" title="&quot;Multicast DNS&quot;">MULTICAST-DNS</a>] and the
1811 automatic location of network services via DHCP (<a href="#section-3.4.2">Section 3.4.2</a>), the
1812 DNS Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [<a href="#ref-DNS-SD" title="&quot;DNS-Based Service Discovery&quot;">DNS-SD</a>] (part of Apple's Bonjour
1813 technology), and the Service Location Protocol (SLP) [<a href="./rfc2608" title="&quot;Service Location Protocol, Version 2&quot;">RFC2608</a>].
1814
1815 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6.2" href="#section-3.6.2">3.6.2</a>. Resource Discovery</span>
1816
1817 Resource Discovery is concerned with the discovery of resources
1818 offered by end-points and is extremely important in machine-to-
1819 machine closed-loop applications (i.e., those with no humans in the
1820 loop). The goals of resource discovery protocols include:
1821
1822 o Simplicity of creation and maintenance of resources
1823
1824 o Commonly understood semantics
1825
1826 o Conformance to existing and emerging standards
1827
1828 o International scope and applicability
1829
1830 o Extensibility
1831
1832 o Interoperability among collections and indexing systems
1833
1834 The Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP) [<a href="#ref-COAP" title="&quot;Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)&quot;">COAP</a>] is being developed
1835 in IETF with these goals in mind. In particular, CoAP is designed
1836 for use in constrained resource networks and for machine-to-machine
1837 applications such as smart energy and building automation. It
1838 provides a RESTful transfer protocol [<a href="#ref-RESTFUL" title="&quot;Architectural Styles and the Design of Network-based Software Architectures&quot;">RESTFUL</a>], a built-in resource
1839 discovery protocol, and includes web concepts such as URIs and
1840 content-types. CoAP provides both unicast and multicast resource
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1847
1848
1849 discovery and includes the ability to filter on attributes of
1850 resource descriptions. Finally, CoAP resource discovery can also be
1851 used to discover HTTP resources.
1852
1853 For simplicity, CoAP makes the assumption that all CoAP servers
1854 listen on the default CoAP port or otherwise have been configured or
1855 discovered using some general service discovery mechanism such as DNS
1856 Service Discovery (DNS-SD) [<a href="#ref-DNS-SD" title="&quot;DNS-Based Service Discovery&quot;">DNS-SD</a>].
1857
1858 Resource discovery in CoAP is accomplished through the use of well-
1859 known resources that describe the links offered by a CoAP server.
1860 CoAP defines a well-known URI for discovery: "/.well-known/r"
1861 [<a href="./rfc5785" title="&quot;Defining Well- Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)&quot;">RFC5785</a>]. For example, the query [GET /.well-known/r] returns a
1862 list of links (representing resources) available from the queried
1863 CoAP server. A query such as [GET /.well-known/r?n=Voltage] returns
1864 the resources with the name Voltage.
1865
1866 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Other Applications</span>
1867
1868 There are many applications that rely on the IP infrastructure, but
1869 are not properly thought of as part of the IP infrastructure itself.
1870 These applications may be useful in the context of the Smart Grid.
1871 The choices made when constructing a profile of the Internet Profile
1872 Suite may impact how such applications could be used. Some of them,
1873 not by any means an exhaustive list, are discussed here.
1874
1875 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7.1" href="#section-3.7.1">3.7.1</a>. Session Initiation Protocol</span>
1876
1877 The Session Initiation Protocol [<a href="./rfc3261" title="&quot;SIP: Session Initiation Protocol&quot;">RFC3261</a>] [<a href="./rfc3265" title="&quot;Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)- Specific Event Notification&quot;">RFC3265</a>] [<a href="./rfc3853" title="&quot;S/MIME Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Requirement for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC3853</a>]
1878 [<a href="./rfc4320" title="&quot;Actions Addressing Identified Issues with the Session Initiation Protocol's (SIP) Non- INVITE Transaction&quot;">RFC4320</a>] [<a href="./rfc4916" title="&quot;Connected Identity in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC4916</a>] [<a href="./rfc5393" title="&quot;Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking Proxies&quot;">RFC5393</a>] [<a href="./rfc5621" title="&quot;Message Body Handling in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC5621</a>] is an application layer
1879 control (signaling) protocol for creating, modifying, and terminating
1880 multimedia sessions on the Internet, and is meant to be more scalable
1881 than H.323. Multimedia sessions can be voice, video, instant
1882 messaging, shared data, and/or subscriptions of events. SIP can run
1883 on top of TCP, UDP, SCTP, or TLS over TCP. SIP is independent of the
1884 transport layer, and independent of the underlying IPv4/v6 version.
1885 In fact, the transport protocol used can change as the SIP message
1886 traverses SIP entities from source to destination.
1887
1888 SIP itself does not choose whether a session is voice or video, nor
1889 does it identify the actual endpoints' IP addresses. The Session
1890 Description Protocol (SDP) [<a href="./rfc4566" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">RFC4566</a>] is intended for those purposes.
1891 Within the SDP, which is transported by SIP, codecs are offered and
1892 accepted (or not), and the port number and IP address at which each
1893 endpoint wants to receive their Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP)
1894 [<a href="./rfc3550" title="&quot;RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications&quot;">RFC3550</a>] packets are determined. The introduction of Network
1895 Address Translation (NAT) technology into the profile, whether IPv4/
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1903
1904
1905 IPv4, IPv4/IPv6 as described in <a href="#section-3.2.1.3">Section 3.2.1.3</a>, or IPv6/IPv6,
1906 increases the complexity of SIP/SDP deployment. This is further
1907 discussed in [<a href="./rfc2993" title="&quot;Architectural Implications of NAT&quot;">RFC2993</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5626" title="&quot;Managing Client-Initiated Connections in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC5626</a>].
1908
1909 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7.2" href="#section-3.7.2">3.7.2</a>. Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol</span>
1910
1911 The Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) [<a href="./rfc6120" title="&quot;Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core&quot;">RFC6120</a>] is a
1912 protocol for streaming Extensible Markup Language (XML) elements in
1913 order to exchange structured information in close to real time
1914 between any two network endpoints. Since XMPP provides a
1915 generalized, extensible framework for exchanging XML data, it has
1916 been proposed as an application structure for interchange between
1917 embedded devices and sensors. It is currently used for Instant
1918 Messaging and Presence [<a href="./rfc6121" title="&quot;Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence&quot;">RFC6121</a>] and a wide variety of real-time
1919 communication modes. These include multi-user chat, publish-
1920 subscribe, alerts and notifications, service discovery, multimedia
1921 session management, device configuration, and remote procedure calls.
1922 XMPP supports channel encryption using TLS [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] and strong
1923 authentication (including PKIX certificate authentication) using SASL
1924 [<a href="./rfc4422" title="&quot;Simple Authentication and Security Layer (SASL)&quot;">RFC4422</a>]. It also makes use of Unicode-compliant addresses and
1925 UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc3629" title="&quot;UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646&quot;">RFC3629</a>] data exchange for internationalization.
1926
1927 XMPP allows for End-to-End Signing and Object Encryption [<a href="./rfc3923" title="&quot;End-to-End Signing and Object Encryption for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)&quot;">RFC3923</a>],
1928 access to objects named using Uniform Resource Names (URN) [<a href="./rfc4854" title="&quot;A Uniform Resource Name (URN) Namespace for Extensions to the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)&quot;">RFC4854</a>],
1929 use of Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform
1930 Resource Identifiers (URIs) [<a href="./rfc5122" title="&quot;Internationalized Resource Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)&quot;">RFC5122</a>], and the presentation of
1931 Notifications [<a href="./rfc5437" title="&quot;Sieve Notification Mechanism: Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)&quot;">RFC5437</a>].
1932
1933 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7.3" href="#section-3.7.3">3.7.3</a>. Calendaring</span>
1934
1935 Internet calendaring, as implemented in Apple iCal, Microsoft Outlook
1936 and Entourage, and Google Calendar, is specified in Internet
1937 Calendaring and Scheduling Core Object Specification (iCalendar)
1938 [<a href="./rfc5545" title="&quot;Internet Calendaring and Scheduling Core Object Specification (iCalendar)&quot;">RFC5545</a>] and is in the process of being updated to an XML schema in
1939 iCalendar XML Representation [<a href="#ref-xCAL" title="&quot;xCal: The XML format for iCalendar&quot;">xCAL</a>]. Several protocols exist to
1940 carry calendar events, including the iCalendar Transport-Independent
1941 Interoperability Protocol (iTIP) [<a href="./rfc5546" title="&quot;iCalendar Transport-Independent Interoperability Protocol (iTIP)&quot;">RFC5546</a>], the iCalendar Message-
1942 Based Interoperability Protocol (iMIP) [<a href="./rfc6047" title="&quot;iCalendar Message-Based Interoperability Protocol (iMIP)&quot;">RFC6047</a>], and open source
1943 work on the Atom Publishing Protocol [<a href="./rfc5023" title="&quot;The Atom Publishing Protocol&quot;">RFC5023</a>].
1944
1945 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. A Simplified View of the Business Architecture</span>
1946
1947 The Internet is a network of networks in which networks are
1948 interconnected in specific ways and are independently operated. It
1949 is important to note that the underlying Internet architecture puts
1950 no restrictions on the ways that networks are interconnected;
1951 interconnection is a business decision. As such, the Internet
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
1959
1960
1961 interconnection architecture can be thought of as a "business
1962 structure" for the Internet.
1963
1964 Central to the Internet business structure are the networks that
1965 provide connectivity to other networks, called "transit networks".
1966 These networks sell bulk bandwidth and routing services to each other
1967 and to other networks as customers. Around the periphery of the
1968 transit network are companies, schools, and other networks that
1969 provide services directly to individuals. These might generally be
1970 divided into "enterprise networks" and "access networks"; enterprise
1971 networks provide "free" connectivity to their own employees or
1972 members, and also provide them a set of services including electronic
1973 mail, web services, and so on. Access networks sell broadband
1974 connectivity (DSL, Cable Modem, 802.11 wireless, or 3GPP wireless) or
1975 "dial" services (including PSTN dial-up and ISDN) to subscribers.
1976 The subscribers are typically either residential or small office/home
1977 office (SOHO) customers. Residential customers are generally
1978 entirely dependent on their access provider for all services, while a
1979 SOHO buys some services from the access provider and may provide
1980 others for itself. Networks that sell transit services to nobody
1981 else -- SOHO, residential, and enterprise networks -- are generally
1982 refereed to as "edge networks"; transit networks are considered to be
1983 part of the "core" of the Internet, and access networks are between
1984 the two. This general structure is depicted in Figure 3.
1985
1986 ------ ------
1987 / \ / \
1988 /--\ / \ / \
1989 |SOHO|---+ Access | |Enterprise|
1990 \--/ | Service | | Network |
1991 /--\ | Provider| | |
1992 |Home|---+ | ------ | |
1993 \--/ \ +---+ +---+ /
1994 \ / / \ \ /
1995 ------ | Transit | ------
1996 | Service |
1997 | Provider |
1998 | |
1999 \ /
2000 \ /
2001 ------
2002
2003 Figure 3: Conceptual Model of Internet Businesses
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2015
2016
2017 A specific example is shown in a traceroute from a home to a nearby
2018 school. Internet connectivity in Figure 4 passes through
2019
2020 o the home network,
2021
2022 o Cox Communications, an access network using Cable Modem
2023 technology,
2024
2025 o TransitRail, a commodity peering service for research and
2026 education (R&amp;E) networks,
2027
2028 o Corporation for Education Network Initiatives in California
2029 (CENIC), a transit provider for educational networks, and
2030
2031 o the University of California at Santa Barbara, which in this
2032 context might be viewed as an access network for its students and
2033 faculty or as an enterprise network.
2034
2035 &lt;stealth-10-32-244-218:&gt; fred% traceroute www.ucsb.edu
2036 traceroute to web.ucsb.edu (128.111.24.41),
2037 64 hops max, 40 byte packets
2038 1 fred-vpn (10.32.244.217) 1.560 ms 1.108 ms 1.133 ms
2039 2 wsip-98-173-193-1.sb.sd.cox.net (98.173.193.1) 12.540 ms ...
2040 3 68.6.13.101 ...
2041 4 68.6.13.129 ...
2042 5 langbbr01-as0.r2.la.cox.net ...
2043 6 calren46-cust.lsanca01.transitrail.net ...
2044 7 dc-lax-core1--lax-peer1-ge.cenic.net ...
2045 8 dc-lax-agg1--lax-core1-ge.cenic.net ...
2046 9 dc-ucsb--dc-lax-dc2.cenic.net ...
2047 10 r2--r1--1.commserv.ucsb.edu ...
2048 11 574-c--r2--2.commserv.ucsb.edu ...
2049 12 * * *
2050
2051 Figure 4: Traceroute from Residential Customer to Educational
2052 Institution
2053
2054 Another specific example could be shown in a traceroute from the home
2055 through a Virtual Private Network (VPN tunnel) from the home,
2056 crossing Cox Cable (an access network) and Pacific Bell (a transit
2057 network), and terminating in Cisco Systems (an enterprise network); a
2058 traceroute of the path doesn't show that as it is invisible within
2059 the VPN and the contents of the VPN are invisible, due to encryption,
2060 to the networks on the path. Instead, the traceroute in Figure 5 is
2061 entirely within Cisco's internal network.
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2071
2072
2073 &lt;stealth-10-32-244-218:~&gt; fred% traceroute irp-view13
2074 traceroute to irp-view13.cisco.com (171.70.120.60),
2075 64 hops max, 40 byte packets
2076 1 fred-vpn (10.32.244.217) 2.560 ms 1.100 ms 1.198 ms
2077 &lt;tunneled path through Cox and Pacific Bell&gt;
2078 2 ****
2079 3 sjc24-00a-gw2-ge2-2 (10.34.251.137) 26.298 ms...
2080 4 sjc23-a5-gw2-g2-1 (10.34.250.78) 25.214 ms ...
2081 5 sjc20-a5-gw1 (10.32.136.21) 23.205 ms ...
2082 6 sjc12-abb4-gw1-t2-7 (10.32.0.189) 46.028 ms ...
2083 7 sjc5-sbb4-gw1-ten8-2 (171.*.*.*) 26.700 ms ...
2084 8 sjc12-dc5-gw2-ten3-1 ...
2085 9 sjc5-dc4-gw1-ten8-1 ...
2086 10 irp-view13 ...
2087
2088 Figure 5: Traceroute across VPN
2089
2090 Note that in both cases, the home network uses private address space
2091 [<a href="./rfc1918" title="&quot;Address Allocation for Private Internets&quot;">RFC1918</a>] while other networks generally use public address space,
2092 and that three middleware technologies are in use here. These are
2093 the uses of a firewall, a Network Address Translator (NAT), and a
2094 Virtual Private Network (VPN).
2095
2096 Firewalls are generally sold as and considered by many to be a
2097 security technology. This is based on the fact that a firewall
2098 imposes a border between two administrative domains. Typically, a
2099 firewall will be deployed between a residential, SOHO, or enterprise
2100 network and its access or transit provider. In its essence, a
2101 firewall is a data diode, imposing a policy on what sessions may pass
2102 between a protected domain and the rest of the Internet. Simple
2103 policies generally permit sessions to be originated from the
2104 protected network but not from the outside; more complex policies may
2105 permit additional sessions from the outside, such as electronic mail
2106 to a mail server or a web session to a web server, and may prevent
2107 certain applications from global access even though they are
2108 originated from the inside.
2109
2110 Note that the effectiveness of firewalls remains controversial.
2111 While network managers often insist on deploying firewalls as they
2112 impose a boundary, others point out that their value as a security
2113 solution is debatable. This is because most attacks come from behind
2114 the firewall. In addition, firewalls do not protect against
2115 application layer attacks such as viruses carried in email. Thus, as
2116 a security solution, firewalls are justified as a layer in defense in
2117 depth. That is, while an end system must in the end be responsible
2118 for its own security, a firewall can inhibit or prevent certain kinds
2119 of attacks, for example the consumption of CPU time on a critical
2120 server.
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2127
2128
2129 Key documents describing firewall technology and the issues it poses
2130 include:
2131
2132 o IP Multicast and Firewalls [<a href="./rfc2588" title="&quot;IP Multicast and Firewalls&quot;">RFC2588</a>]
2133
2134 o Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance [<a href="./rfc2647" title="&quot;Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall Performance&quot;">RFC2647</a>]
2135
2136 o Behavior of and Requirements for Internet Firewalls [<a href="./rfc2979" title="&quot;Behavior of and Requirements for Internet Firewalls&quot;">RFC2979</a>]
2137
2138 o Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance [<a href="./rfc3511" title="&quot;Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall Performance&quot;">RFC3511</a>]
2139
2140 o Mobile IPv6 and Firewalls: Problem Statement [<a href="./rfc4487" title="&quot;Mobile IPv6 and Firewalls: Problem Statement&quot;">RFC4487</a>]
2141
2142 o NAT and Firewall Traversal Issues of Host Identity Protocol
2143 Communication [<a href="./rfc5207" title="&quot;NAT and Firewall Traversal Issues of Host Identity Protocol (HIP) Communication&quot;">RFC5207</a>]
2144
2145 Network Address Translation is a technology that was developed in
2146 response to ISP behaviors in the mid-1990's; when [<a href="./rfc1918" title="&quot;Address Allocation for Private Internets&quot;">RFC1918</a>] was
2147 published, many ISPs started handing out single or small numbers of
2148 addresses, and edge networks were forced to translate. In time, this
2149 became considered a good thing, or at least not a bad thing; it
2150 amplified the public address space, and it was sold as if it were a
2151 firewall. It of course is not; while traditional dynamic NATs only
2152 translate between internal and external session address/port tuples
2153 during the detected duration of the session, that session state may
2154 exist in the network much longer than it exists on the end system,
2155 and as a result constitutes an attack vector. The design, value, and
2156 limitations of network address translation are described in:
2157
2158 o IP Network Address Translator Terminology and Considerations
2159 [<a href="./rfc2663" title="&quot;IP Network Address Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations&quot;">RFC2663</a>]
2160
2161 o Traditional IP Network Address Translator [<a href="./rfc3022" title="&quot;Traditional IP Network Address Translator (Traditional NAT)&quot;">RFC3022</a>]
2162
2163 o Protocol Complications with the IP Network Address Translator
2164 [<a href="./rfc3027" title="&quot;Protocol Complications with the IP Network Address Translator&quot;">RFC3027</a>]
2165
2166 o Network Address Translator Friendly Application Design Guidelines
2167 [<a href="./rfc3235" title="&quot;Network Address Translator (NAT)- Friendly Application Design Guidelines&quot;">RFC3235</a>]
2168
2169 o IAB Considerations for Network Address Translation [<a href="./rfc3424" title="&quot;IAB Considerations for UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across Network Address Translation&quot;">RFC3424</a>]
2170
2171 o IPsec-Network Address Translation Compatibility Requirements
2172 [<a href="./rfc3715" title="&quot;IPsec-Network Address Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements&quot;">RFC3715</a>]
2173
2174 o Network Address Translation Behavioral Requirements for Unicast
2175 UDP [<a href="./rfc4787" title="&quot;Network Address Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for Unicast UDP&quot;">RFC4787</a>]
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2183
2184
2185 o State of Peer-to-Peer Communication across Network Address
2186 Translators [<a href="./rfc5128" title="&quot;State of Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Communication across Network Address Translators (NATs)&quot;">RFC5128</a>]
2187
2188 o IP Multicast Requirements for a Network Address Translator and a
2189 Network Address Port Translator [<a href="./rfc5135" title="&quot;IP Multicast Requirements for a Network Address Translator (NAT) and a Network Address Port Translator (NAPT)&quot;">RFC5135</a>]
2190
2191 Virtual Private Networks come in many forms; what they have in common
2192 is that they are generally tunneled over the Internet backbone, so
2193 that as in Figure 5, connectivity appears to be entirely within the
2194 edge network although it is in fact across a service provider's
2195 network. Examples include IPsec tunnel-mode encrypted tunnels, IP-
2196 in-IP or GRE tunnels, and MPLS LSPs [<a href="./rfc3031" title="&quot;Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture&quot;">RFC3031</a>][RFC3032].
2197
2198 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
2199
2200 Security is addressed in some detail in <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a> and <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>.
2201
2202 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
2203
2204 Review comments were made by Adrian Farrel, Andrew Yourtchenko, Ashok
2205 Narayanan, Bernie Volz, Chris Lonvick, Dan Romascanu, Dave McGrew,
2206 Dave Oran, David Harrington, David Su, Don Sturek, Francis Cleveland,
2207 Hemant Singh, James Polk, Jari Arkko, John Meylor, Joseph Salowey,
2208 Julien Abeille, Kerry Lynn, Lars Eggert, Magnus Westerlund, Murtaza
2209 Chiba, Paul Duffy, Paul Hoffman, Peter Saint-Andre, Ralph Droms,
2210 Robert Sparks, Russ White, Sean Turner, Sheila Frankel, Stephen
2211 Farrell, Tim Polk, Toerless Eckert, Tom Herbst, Vint Cerf, and
2212 Yoshihiro Ohba. Several of the individuals suggested text, which was
2213 very useful, as the authors don't claim to know half as much as their
2214 reviewers collectively do.
2215
2216 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
2217
2218 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
2219
2220 [<a id="ref-RFC1122">RFC1122</a>] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
2221 Communication Layers", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1122">RFC 1122</a>,
2222 October 1989.
2223
2224 [<a id="ref-RFC1123">RFC1123</a>] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
2225 Application and Support", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>,
2226 October 1989.
2227
2228 [<a id="ref-RFC1812">RFC1812</a>] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers",
2229 <a href="./rfc1812">RFC 1812</a>, June 1995.
2230
2231 [<a id="ref-RFC4294">RFC4294</a>] Loughney, J., "IPv6 Node Requirements", <a href="./rfc4294">RFC 4294</a>,
2232 April 2006.
2233
2234
2235
2236 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2239
2240
2241 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
2242
2243 [<a id="ref-6LOWPAN-HC">6LOWPAN-HC</a>] Hui, J. and P. Thubert, "Compression Format for IPv6
2244 Datagrams in Low Power and Lossy Networks
2245 (6LoWPAN)", Work in Progress, February 2011.
2246
2247 [<a id="ref-ABFAB-ARCH">ABFAB-ARCH</a>] Howlett, J., Hartman, S., Tschofenig, H., and E.
2248 Lear, "Application Bridging for Federated Access
2249 Beyond Web (ABFAB) Architecture", Work in Progress,
2250 March 2011.
2251
2252 [<a id="ref-AES-CCM-ECC">AES-CCM-ECC</a>] McGrew, D., Bailey, D., Campagna, M., and R. Dugal,
2253 "AES-CCM ECC Cipher Suites for TLS", Work
2254 in Progress, January 2011.
2255
2256 [<a id="ref-COAP">COAP</a>] Shelby, Z., Hartke, K., Bormann, C., and B. Frank,
2257 "Constrained Application Protocol (CoAP)", Work
2258 in Progress, March 2011.
2259
2260 [<a id="ref-DIME-BASE">DIME-BASE</a>] Fajardo, V., Ed., Arkko, J., Loughney, J., and G.
2261 Zorn, "Diameter Base Protocol", Work in Progress,
2262 January 2011.
2263
2264 [<a id="ref-DNS-SD">DNS-SD</a>] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "DNS-Based Service
2265 Discovery", Work in Progress, February 2011.
2266
2267 [<a id="ref-DTLS">DTLS</a>] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport
2268 Layer Security version 1.2", Work in Progress,
2269 March 2011.
2270
2271 [<a id="ref-DYMO">DYMO</a>] Chakeres, I. and C. Perkins, "Dynamic MANET On-
2272 demand (DYMO) Routing", Work in Progress, July 2010.
2273
2274 [<a id="ref-IEC61850">IEC61850</a>] Wikipedia, "Wikipedia Article: IEC 61850",
2275 June 2011, &lt;<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=IEC_61850&amp;oldid=433437827">http://en.wikipedia.org/w/</a>
2276 <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=IEC_61850&amp;oldid=433437827">index.php?title=IEC_61850&amp;oldid=433437827</a>&gt;.
2277
2278 [<a id="ref-IEC62351-3">IEC62351-3</a>] International Electrotechnical Commission Technical
2279 Committee 57, "POWER SYSTEMS MANAGEMENT AND
2280 ASSOCIATED INFORMATION EXCHANGE. DATA AND
2281 COMMUNICATIONS SECURITY -- Part 3: Communication
2282 network and system security Profiles including
2283 TCP/IP", May 2007.
2284
2285 [<a id="ref-IEEE802.1X">IEEE802.1X</a>] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
2286 "IEEE Standard for Local and Metropolitan Area
2287 Networks - Port based Network Access Control",
2288 IEEE Standard 802.1X-2010, February 2010.
2289
2290
2291
2292 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 41]</span></pre>
2293 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span>
2294 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2295
2296
2297 [<a id="ref-IP-SEC">IP-SEC</a>] Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Internet
2298 Protocol Version 4", Work in Progress, April 2011.
2299
2300 [<a id="ref-IPv6-NODE-REQ">IPv6-NODE-REQ</a>] Jankiewicz, E., Loughney, J., and T. Narten, "IPv6
2301 Node Requirements", Work in Progress, May 2011.
2302
2303 [<a id="ref-MULTICAST-DNS">MULTICAST-DNS</a>] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22Multicast+DNS%22'>"Multicast DNS"</a>, Work
2304 in Progress, February 2011.
2305
2306 [<a id="ref-Model">Model</a>] SGIP, "Smart Grid Architecture Committee: Conceptual
2307 Model White Paper <a href="http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/">http://collaborate.nist.gov/</a>
2308 <a href="http://collaborate.nist.gov/twiki-sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/">twiki-sggrid/pub/SmartGrid/</a>
2309 SGIPConceptualModelDevelopmentSGAC/
2310 Smart_Grid_Conceptual_Model_20100420.doc".
2311
2312 [<a id="ref-OAUTHv2">OAUTHv2</a>] Hammer-Lahav, E., Recordon, D., and D. Hardt, "The
2313 OAuth 2.0 Authorization Protocol", Work in Progress,
2314 May 2011.
2315
2316 [<a id="ref-RESTFUL">RESTFUL</a>] Fielding, "Architectural Styles and the Design of
2317 Network-based Software Architectures", 2000.
2318
2319 [<a id="ref-RFC0768">RFC0768</a>] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6,
2320 <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a>, August 1980.
2321
2322 [<a id="ref-RFC0791">RFC0791</a>] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>,
2323 September 1981.
2324
2325 [<a id="ref-RFC0792">RFC0792</a>] Postel, J., "Internet Control Message Protocol",
2326 STD 5, <a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>, September 1981.
2327
2328 [<a id="ref-RFC0793">RFC0793</a>] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
2329 <a href="./rfc793">RFC 793</a>, September 1981.
2330
2331 [<a id="ref-RFC0826">RFC0826</a>] Plummer, D., "Ethernet Address Resolution Protocol:
2332 Or converting network protocol addresses to 48.bit
2333 Ethernet address for transmission on Ethernet
2334 hardware", STD 37, <a href="./rfc826">RFC 826</a>, November 1982.
2335
2336 [<a id="ref-RFC0894">RFC0894</a>] Hornig, C., "Standard for the transmission of IP
2337 datagrams over Ethernet networks", STD 41, <a href="./rfc894">RFC 894</a>,
2338 April 1984.
2339
2340 [<a id="ref-RFC1006">RFC1006</a>] Rose, M. and D. Cass, "ISO transport services on top
2341 of the TCP: Version 3", STD 35, <a href="./rfc1006">RFC 1006</a>, May 1987.
2342
2343 [<a id="ref-RFC1034">RFC1034</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and
2344 facilities", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC 1034</a>, November 1987.
2345
2346
2347
2348 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 42]</span></pre>
2349 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-43" ></span>
2350 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2351
2352
2353 [<a id="ref-RFC1035">RFC1035</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
2354 specification", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1035">RFC 1035</a>, November 1987.
2355
2356 [<a id="ref-RFC1058">RFC1058</a>] Hedrick, C., "Routing Information Protocol",
2357 <a href="./rfc1058">RFC 1058</a>, June 1988.
2358
2359 [<a id="ref-RFC1112">RFC1112</a>] Deering, S., "Host extensions for IP multicasting",
2360 STD 5, <a href="./rfc1112">RFC 1112</a>, August 1989.
2361
2362 [<a id="ref-RFC1195">RFC1195</a>] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP
2363 and dual environments", <a href="./rfc1195">RFC 1195</a>, December 1990.
2364
2365 [<a id="ref-RFC1332">RFC1332</a>] McGregor, G., "The PPP Internet Protocol Control
2366 Protocol (IPCP)", <a href="./rfc1332">RFC 1332</a>, May 1992.
2367
2368 [<a id="ref-RFC1661">RFC1661</a>] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)",
2369 STD 51, <a href="./rfc1661">RFC 1661</a>, July 1994.
2370
2371 [<a id="ref-RFC1918">RFC1918</a>] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., Groot,
2372 G., and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private
2373 Internets", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp5">BCP 5</a>, <a href="./rfc1918">RFC 1918</a>, February 1996.
2374
2375 [<a id="ref-RFC1964">RFC1964</a>] Linn, J., "The Kerberos Version 5 GSS-API
2376 Mechanism", <a href="./rfc1964">RFC 1964</a>, June 1996.
2377
2378 [<a id="ref-RFC2080">RFC2080</a>] Malkin, G. and R. Minnear, "RIPng for IPv6",
2379 <a href="./rfc2080">RFC 2080</a>, January 1997.
2380
2381 [<a id="ref-RFC2126">RFC2126</a>] Pouffary, Y. and A. Young, "ISO Transport Service on
2382 top of TCP (ITOT)", <a href="./rfc2126">RFC 2126</a>, March 1997.
2383
2384 [<a id="ref-RFC2131">RFC2131</a>] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol",
2385 <a href="./rfc2131">RFC 2131</a>, March 1997.
2386
2387 [<a id="ref-RFC2136">RFC2136</a>] Vixie, P., Thomson, S., Rekhter, Y., and J. Bound,
2388 "Dynamic Updates in the Domain Name System (DNS
2389 UPDATE)", <a href="./rfc2136">RFC 2136</a>, April 1997.
2390
2391 [<a id="ref-RFC2328">RFC2328</a>] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>,
2392 April 1998.
2393
2394 [<a id="ref-RFC2357">RFC2357</a>] Mankin, A., Romanov, A., Bradner, S., and V. Paxson,
2395 "IETF Criteria for Evaluating Reliable Multicast
2396 Transport and Application Protocols", <a href="./rfc2357">RFC 2357</a>,
2397 June 1998.
2398
2399 [<a id="ref-RFC2453">RFC2453</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, <a href="./rfc2453">RFC 2453</a>,
2400 November 1998.
2401
2402
2403
2404 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 43]</span></pre>
2405 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-44" ></span>
2406 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2407
2408
2409 [<a id="ref-RFC2460">RFC2460</a>] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol,
2410 Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>,
2411 December 1998.
2412
2413 [<a id="ref-RFC2464">RFC2464</a>] Crawford, M., "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over
2414 Ethernet Networks", <a href="./rfc2464">RFC 2464</a>, December 1998.
2415
2416 [<a id="ref-RFC2474">RFC2474</a>] Nichols, K., Blake, S., Baker, F., and D. Black,
2417 "Definition of the Differentiated Services Field (DS
2418 Field) in the IPv4 and IPv6 Headers", <a href="./rfc2474">RFC 2474</a>,
2419 December 1998.
2420
2421 [<a id="ref-RFC2475">RFC2475</a>] Blake, S., Black, D., Carlson, M., Davies, E., Wang,
2422 Z., and W. Weiss, "An Architecture for
2423 Differentiated Services", <a href="./rfc2475">RFC 2475</a>, December 1998.
2424
2425 [<a id="ref-RFC2516">RFC2516</a>] Mamakos, L., Lidl, K., Evarts, J., Carrel, D.,
2426 Simone, D., and R. Wheeler, "A Method for
2427 Transmitting PPP Over Ethernet (PPPoE)", <a href="./rfc2516">RFC 2516</a>,
2428 February 1999.
2429
2430 [<a id="ref-RFC2545">RFC2545</a>] Marques, P. and F. Dupont, "Use of BGP-4
2431 Multiprotocol Extensions for IPv6 Inter-Domain
2432 Routing", <a href="./rfc2545">RFC 2545</a>, March 1999.
2433
2434 [<a id="ref-RFC2560">RFC2560</a>] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S.,
2435 and C. Adams, "X.509 Internet Public Key
2436 Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol -
2437 OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>, June 1999.
2438
2439 [<a id="ref-RFC2588">RFC2588</a>] Finlayson, R., "IP Multicast and Firewalls",
2440 <a href="./rfc2588">RFC 2588</a>, May 1999.
2441
2442 [<a id="ref-RFC2608">RFC2608</a>] Guttman, E., Perkins, C., Veizades, J., and M. Day,
2443 "Service Location Protocol, Version 2", <a href="./rfc2608">RFC 2608</a>,
2444 June 1999.
2445
2446 [<a id="ref-RFC2615">RFC2615</a>] Malis, A. and W. Simpson, "PPP over SONET/SDH",
2447 <a href="./rfc2615">RFC 2615</a>, June 1999.
2448
2449 [<a id="ref-RFC2616">RFC2616</a>] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
2450 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee,
2451 "Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", <a href="./rfc2616">RFC 2616</a>,
2452 June 1999.
2453
2454 [<a id="ref-RFC2647">RFC2647</a>] Newman, D., "Benchmarking Terminology for Firewall
2455 Performance", <a href="./rfc2647">RFC 2647</a>, August 1999.
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 44]</span></pre>
2461 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-45" ></span>
2462 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2463
2464
2465 [<a id="ref-RFC2663">RFC2663</a>] Srisuresh, P. and M. Holdrege, "IP Network Address
2466 Translator (NAT) Terminology and Considerations",
2467 <a href="./rfc2663">RFC 2663</a>, August 1999.
2468
2469 [<a id="ref-RFC2710">RFC2710</a>] Deering, S., Fenner, W., and B. Haberman, "Multicast
2470 Listener Discovery (MLD) for IPv6", <a href="./rfc2710">RFC 2710</a>,
2471 October 1999.
2472
2473 [<a id="ref-RFC2743">RFC2743</a>] Linn, J., "Generic Security Service Application
2474 Program Interface Version 2, Update 1", <a href="./rfc2743">RFC 2743</a>,
2475 January 2000.
2476
2477 [<a id="ref-RFC2784">RFC2784</a>] Farinacci, D., Li, T., Hanks, S., Meyer, D., and P.
2478 Traina, "Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE)",
2479 <a href="./rfc2784">RFC 2784</a>, March 2000.
2480
2481 [<a id="ref-RFC2865">RFC2865</a>] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
2482 "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service
2483 (RADIUS)", <a href="./rfc2865">RFC 2865</a>, June 2000.
2484
2485 [<a id="ref-RFC2979">RFC2979</a>] Freed, N., "Behavior of and Requirements for
2486 Internet Firewalls", <a href="./rfc2979">RFC 2979</a>, October 2000.
2487
2488 [<a id="ref-RFC2993">RFC2993</a>] Hain, T., "Architectural Implications of NAT",
2489 <a href="./rfc2993">RFC 2993</a>, November 2000.
2490
2491 [<a id="ref-RFC3007">RFC3007</a>] Wellington, B., "Secure Domain Name System (DNS)
2492 Dynamic Update", <a href="./rfc3007">RFC 3007</a>, November 2000.
2493
2494 [<a id="ref-RFC3022">RFC3022</a>] Srisuresh, P. and K. Egevang, "Traditional IP
2495 Network Address Translator (Traditional NAT)",
2496 <a href="./rfc3022">RFC 3022</a>, January 2001.
2497
2498 [<a id="ref-RFC3027">RFC3027</a>] Holdrege, M. and P. Srisuresh, "Protocol
2499 Complications with the IP Network Address
2500 Translator", <a href="./rfc3027">RFC 3027</a>, January 2001.
2501
2502 [<a id="ref-RFC3031">RFC3031</a>] Rosen, E., Viswanathan, A., and R. Callon,
2503 "Multiprotocol Label Switching Architecture",
2504 <a href="./rfc3031">RFC 3031</a>, January 2001.
2505
2506 [<a id="ref-RFC3032">RFC3032</a>] Rosen, E., Tappan, D., Fedorkow, G., Rekhter, Y.,
2507 Farinacci, D., Li, T., and A. Conta, "MPLS Label
2508 Stack Encoding", <a href="./rfc3032">RFC 3032</a>, January 2001.
2509
2510 [<a id="ref-RFC3168">RFC3168</a>] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The
2511 Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN)
2512 to IP", <a href="./rfc3168">RFC 3168</a>, September 2001.
2513
2514
2515
2516 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 45]</span></pre>
2517 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-46" ></span>
2518 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2519
2520
2521 [<a id="ref-RFC3235">RFC3235</a>] Senie, D., "Network Address Translator (NAT)-
2522 Friendly Application Design Guidelines", <a href="./rfc3235">RFC 3235</a>,
2523 January 2002.
2524
2525 [<a id="ref-RFC3261">RFC3261</a>] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G.,
2526 Johnston, A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M.,
2527 and E. Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol",
2528 <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>, June 2002.
2529
2530 [<a id="ref-RFC3265">RFC3265</a>] Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-
2531 Specific Event Notification", <a href="./rfc3265">RFC 3265</a>, June 2002.
2532
2533 [<a id="ref-RFC3275">RFC3275</a>] Eastlake, D., Reagle, J., and D. Solo, "(Extensible
2534 Markup Language) XML-Signature Syntax and
2535 Processing", <a href="./rfc3275">RFC 3275</a>, March 2002.
2536
2537 [<a id="ref-RFC3315">RFC3315</a>] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins,
2538 C., and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration
2539 Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)", <a href="./rfc3315">RFC 3315</a>, July 2003.
2540
2541 [<a id="ref-RFC3376">RFC3376</a>] Cain, B., Deering, S., Kouvelas, I., Fenner, B., and
2542 A. Thyagarajan, "Internet Group Management Protocol,
2543 Version 3", <a href="./rfc3376">RFC 3376</a>, October 2002.
2544
2545 [<a id="ref-RFC3411">RFC3411</a>] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
2546 Architecture for Describing Simple Network
2547 Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks",
2548 STD 62, <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a>, December 2002.
2549
2550 [<a id="ref-RFC3412">RFC3412</a>] Case, J., Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B.
2551 Wijnen, "Message Processing and Dispatching for the
2552 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
2553 <a href="./rfc3412">RFC 3412</a>, December 2002.
2554
2555 [<a id="ref-RFC3413">RFC3413</a>] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
2556 Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
2557 <a href="./rfc3413">RFC 3413</a>, December 2002.
2558
2559 [<a id="ref-RFC3414">RFC3414</a>] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security
2560 Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network
2561 Management Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, <a href="./rfc3414">RFC 3414</a>,
2562 December 2002.
2563
2564 [<a id="ref-RFC3415">RFC3415</a>] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-
2565 based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple
2566 Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
2567 <a href="./rfc3415">RFC 3415</a>, December 2002.
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 46]</span></pre>
2573 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-47" ></span>
2574 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2575
2576
2577 [<a id="ref-RFC3416">RFC3416</a>] Presuhn, R., "Version 2 of the Protocol Operations
2578 for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
2579 STD 62, <a href="./rfc3416">RFC 3416</a>, December 2002.
2580
2581 [<a id="ref-RFC3417">RFC3417</a>] Presuhn, R., "Transport Mappings for the Simple
2582 Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
2583 <a href="./rfc3417">RFC 3417</a>, December 2002.
2584
2585 [<a id="ref-RFC3418">RFC3418</a>] Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for
2586 the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)",
2587 STD 62, <a href="./rfc3418">RFC 3418</a>, December 2002.
2588
2589 [<a id="ref-RFC3424">RFC3424</a>] Daigle, L. and IAB, "IAB Considerations for
2590 UNilateral Self-Address Fixing (UNSAF) Across
2591 Network Address Translation", <a href="./rfc3424">RFC 3424</a>,
2592 November 2002.
2593
2594 [<a id="ref-RFC3436">RFC3436</a>] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E., and M. Tuexen,
2595 "Transport Layer Security over Stream Control
2596 Transmission Protocol", <a href="./rfc3436">RFC 3436</a>, December 2002.
2597
2598 [<a id="ref-RFC3453">RFC3453</a>] Luby, M., Vicisano, L., Gemmell, J., Rizzo, L.,
2599 Handley, M., and J. Crowcroft, "The Use of Forward
2600 Error Correction (FEC) in Reliable Multicast",
2601 <a href="./rfc3453">RFC 3453</a>, December 2002.
2602
2603 [<a id="ref-RFC3511">RFC3511</a>] Hickman, B., Newman, D., Tadjudin, S., and T.
2604 Martin, "Benchmarking Methodology for Firewall
2605 Performance", <a href="./rfc3511">RFC 3511</a>, April 2003.
2606
2607 [<a id="ref-RFC3550">RFC3550</a>] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
2608 Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
2609 Applications", STD 64, <a href="./rfc3550">RFC 3550</a>, July 2003.
2610
2611 [<a id="ref-RFC3552">RFC3552</a>] Rescorla, E. and B. Korver, "Guidelines for Writing
2612 RFC Text on Security Considerations", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp72">BCP 72</a>,
2613 <a href="./rfc3552">RFC 3552</a>, July 2003.
2614
2615 [<a id="ref-RFC3561">RFC3561</a>] Perkins, C., Belding-Royer, E., and S. Das, "Ad hoc
2616 On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) Routing", <a href="./rfc3561">RFC 3561</a>,
2617 July 2003.
2618
2619 [<a id="ref-RFC3569">RFC3569</a>] Bhattacharyya, S., "An Overview of Source-Specific
2620 Multicast (SSM)", <a href="./rfc3569">RFC 3569</a>, July 2003.
2621
2622 [<a id="ref-RFC3588">RFC3588</a>] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G.,
2623 and J. Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", <a href="./rfc3588">RFC 3588</a>,
2624 September 2003.
2625
2626
2627
2628 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 47]</span></pre>
2629 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-48" ></span>
2630 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2631
2632
2633 [<a id="ref-RFC3590">RFC3590</a>] Haberman, B., "Source Address Selection for the
2634 Multicast Listener Discovery (MLD) Protocol",
2635 <a href="./rfc3590">RFC 3590</a>, September 2003.
2636
2637 [<a id="ref-RFC3626">RFC3626</a>] Clausen, T. and P. Jacquet, "Optimized Link State
2638 Routing Protocol (OLSR)", <a href="./rfc3626">RFC 3626</a>, October 2003.
2639
2640 [<a id="ref-RFC3629">RFC3629</a>] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO
2641 10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, November 2003.
2642
2643 [<a id="ref-RFC3715">RFC3715</a>] Aboba, B. and W. Dixon, "IPsec-Network Address
2644 Translation (NAT) Compatibility Requirements",
2645 <a href="./rfc3715">RFC 3715</a>, March 2004.
2646
2647 [<a id="ref-RFC3810">RFC3810</a>] Vida, R. and L. Costa, "Multicast Listener Discovery
2648 Version 2 (MLDv2) for IPv6", <a href="./rfc3810">RFC 3810</a>, June 2004.
2649
2650 [<a id="ref-RFC3828">RFC3828</a>] Larzon, L-A., Degermark, M., Pink, S., Jonsson,
2651 L-E., and G. Fairhurst, "The Lightweight User
2652 Datagram Protocol (UDP-Lite)", <a href="./rfc3828">RFC 3828</a>, July 2004.
2653
2654 [<a id="ref-RFC3853">RFC3853</a>] Peterson, J., "S/MIME Advanced Encryption Standard
2655 (AES) Requirement for the Session Initiation
2656 Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc3853">RFC 3853</a>, July 2004.
2657
2658 [<a id="ref-RFC3923">RFC3923</a>] Saint-Andre, P., "End-to-End Signing and Object
2659 Encryption for the Extensible Messaging and Presence
2660 Protocol (XMPP)", <a href="./rfc3923">RFC 3923</a>, October 2004.
2661
2662 [<a id="ref-RFC3971">RFC3971</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
2663 "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>,
2664 March 2005.
2665
2666 [<a id="ref-RFC3973">RFC3973</a>] Adams, A., Nicholas, J., and W. Siadak, "Protocol
2667 Independent Multicast - Dense Mode (PIM-DM):
2668 Protocol Specification (Revised)", <a href="./rfc3973">RFC 3973</a>,
2669 January 2005.
2670
2671 [<a id="ref-RFC4017">RFC4017</a>] Stanley, D., Walker, J., and B. Aboba, "Extensible
2672 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Method Requirements
2673 for Wireless LANs", <a href="./rfc4017">RFC 4017</a>, March 2005.
2674
2675 [<a id="ref-RFC4033">RFC4033</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
2676 S. Rose, "DNS Security Introduction and
2677 Requirements", <a href="./rfc4033">RFC 4033</a>, March 2005.
2678
2679
2680
2681
2682
2683
2684 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 48]</span></pre>
2685 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-49" ></span>
2686 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2687
2688
2689 [<a id="ref-RFC4034">RFC4034</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
2690 S. Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security
2691 Extensions", <a href="./rfc4034">RFC 4034</a>, March 2005.
2692
2693 [<a id="ref-RFC4035">RFC4035</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and
2694 S. Rose, "Protocol Modifications for the DNS
2695 Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc4035">RFC 4035</a>, March 2005.
2696
2697 [<a id="ref-RFC4108">RFC4108</a>] Housley, R., "Using Cryptographic Message Syntax
2698 (CMS) to Protect Firmware Packages", <a href="./rfc4108">RFC 4108</a>,
2699 August 2005.
2700
2701 [<a id="ref-RFC4120">RFC4120</a>] Neuman, C., Yu, T., Hartman, S., and K. Raeburn,
2702 "The Kerberos Network Authentication Service (V5)",
2703 <a href="./rfc4120">RFC 4120</a>, July 2005.
2704
2705 [<a id="ref-RFC4121">RFC4121</a>] Zhu, L., Jaganathan, K., and S. Hartman, "The
2706 Kerberos Version 5 Generic Security Service
2707 Application Program Interface (GSS-API) Mechanism:
2708 Version 2", <a href="./rfc4121">RFC 4121</a>, July 2005.
2709
2710 [<a id="ref-RFC4210">RFC4210</a>] Adams, C., Farrell, S., Kause, T., and T. Mononen,
2711 "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
2712 Certificate Management Protocol (CMP)", <a href="./rfc4210">RFC 4210</a>,
2713 September 2005.
2714
2715 [<a id="ref-RFC4213">RFC4213</a>] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition
2716 Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers", <a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a>,
2717 October 2005.
2718
2719 [<a id="ref-RFC4253">RFC4253</a>] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, "The Secure Shell (SSH)
2720 Transport Layer Protocol", <a href="./rfc4253">RFC 4253</a>, January 2006.
2721
2722 [<a id="ref-RFC4271">RFC4271</a>] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
2723 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", <a href="./rfc4271">RFC 4271</a>, January 2006.
2724
2725 [<a id="ref-RFC4291">RFC4291</a>] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "IP Version 6 Addressing
2726 Architecture", <a href="./rfc4291">RFC 4291</a>, February 2006.
2727
2728 [<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
2729 Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.
2730
2731 [<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>,
2732 December 2005.
2733
2734 [<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
2735 <a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005.
2736
2737
2738
2739
2740 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 49]</span></pre>
2741 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-50" ></span>
2742 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2743
2744
2745 [<a id="ref-RFC4307">RFC4307</a>] Schiller, J., "Cryptographic Algorithms for Use in
2746 the Internet Key Exchange Version 2 (IKEv2)",
2747 <a href="./rfc4307">RFC 4307</a>, December 2005.
2748
2749 [<a id="ref-RFC4320">RFC4320</a>] Sparks, R., "Actions Addressing Identified Issues
2750 with the Session Initiation Protocol's (SIP) Non-
2751 INVITE Transaction", <a href="./rfc4320">RFC 4320</a>, January 2006.
2752
2753 [<a id="ref-RFC4340">RFC4340</a>] Kohler, E., Handley, M., and S. Floyd, "Datagram
2754 Congestion Control Protocol (DCCP)", <a href="./rfc4340">RFC 4340</a>,
2755 March 2006.
2756
2757 [<a id="ref-RFC4347">RFC4347</a>] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport
2758 Layer Security", <a href="./rfc4347">RFC 4347</a>, April 2006.
2759
2760 [<a id="ref-RFC4364">RFC4364</a>] Rosen, E. and Y. Rekhter, "BGP/MPLS IP Virtual
2761 Private Networks (VPNs)", <a href="./rfc4364">RFC 4364</a>, February 2006.
2762
2763 [<a id="ref-RFC4410">RFC4410</a>] Pullen, M., Zhao, F., and D. Cohen, "Selectively
2764 Reliable Multicast Protocol (SRMP)", <a href="./rfc4410">RFC 4410</a>,
2765 February 2006.
2766
2767 [<a id="ref-RFC4422">RFC4422</a>] Melnikov, A. and K. Zeilenga, "Simple Authentication
2768 and Security Layer (SASL)", <a href="./rfc4422">RFC 4422</a>, June 2006.
2769
2770 [<a id="ref-RFC4443">RFC4443</a>] Conta, A., Deering, S., and M. Gupta, "Internet
2771 Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet
2772 Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc4443">RFC 4443</a>,
2773 March 2006.
2774
2775 [<a id="ref-RFC4487">RFC4487</a>] Le, F., Faccin, S., Patil, B., and H. Tschofenig,
2776 "Mobile IPv6 and Firewalls: Problem Statement",
2777 <a href="./rfc4487">RFC 4487</a>, May 2006.
2778
2779 [<a id="ref-RFC4492">RFC4492</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C.,
2780 and B. Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
2781 Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
2782 <a href="./rfc4492">RFC 4492</a>, May 2006.
2783
2784 [<a id="ref-RFC4556">RFC4556</a>] Zhu, L. and B. Tung, "Public Key Cryptography for
2785 Initial Authentication in Kerberos (PKINIT)",
2786 <a href="./rfc4556">RFC 4556</a>, June 2006.
2787
2788 [<a id="ref-RFC4566">RFC4566</a>] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP:
2789 Session Description Protocol", <a href="./rfc4566">RFC 4566</a>, July 2006.
2790
2791
2792
2793
2794
2795
2796 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 50]</span></pre>
2797 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-51" ></span>
2798 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2799
2800
2801 [<a id="ref-RFC4594">RFC4594</a>] Babiarz, J., Chan, K., and F. Baker, "Configuration
2802 Guidelines for DiffServ Service Classes", <a href="./rfc4594">RFC 4594</a>,
2803 August 2006.
2804
2805 [<a id="ref-RFC4601">RFC4601</a>] Fenner, B., Handley, M., Holbrook, H., and I.
2806 Kouvelas, "Protocol Independent Multicast - Sparse
2807 Mode (PIM-SM): Protocol Specification (Revised)",
2808 <a href="./rfc4601">RFC 4601</a>, August 2006.
2809
2810 [<a id="ref-RFC4604">RFC4604</a>] Holbrook, H., Cain, B., and B. Haberman, "Using
2811 Internet Group Management Protocol Version 3
2812 (IGMPv3) and Multicast Listener Discovery Protocol
2813 Version 2 (MLDv2) for Source-Specific Multicast",
2814 <a href="./rfc4604">RFC 4604</a>, August 2006.
2815
2816 [<a id="ref-RFC4607">RFC4607</a>] Holbrook, H. and B. Cain, "Source-Specific Multicast
2817 for IP", <a href="./rfc4607">RFC 4607</a>, August 2006.
2818
2819 [<a id="ref-RFC4608">RFC4608</a>] Meyer, D., Rockell, R., and G. Shepherd, "Source-
2820 Specific Protocol Independent Multicast in 232/8",
2821 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp120">BCP 120</a>, <a href="./rfc4608">RFC 4608</a>, August 2006.
2822
2823 [<a id="ref-RFC4614">RFC4614</a>] Duke, M., Braden, R., Eddy, W., and E. Blanton, "A
2824 Roadmap for Transmission Control Protocol (TCP)
2825 Specification Documents", <a href="./rfc4614">RFC 4614</a>, September 2006.
2826
2827 [<a id="ref-RFC4741">RFC4741</a>] Enns, R., "NETCONF Configuration Protocol",
2828 <a href="./rfc4741">RFC 4741</a>, December 2006.
2829
2830 [<a id="ref-RFC4742">RFC4742</a>] Wasserman, M. and T. Goddard, "Using the NETCONF
2831 Configuration Protocol over Secure SHell (SSH)",
2832 <a href="./rfc4742">RFC 4742</a>, December 2006.
2833
2834 [<a id="ref-RFC4743">RFC4743</a>] Goddard, T., "Using NETCONF over the Simple Object
2835 Access Protocol (SOAP)", <a href="./rfc4743">RFC 4743</a>, December 2006.
2836
2837 [<a id="ref-RFC4744">RFC4744</a>] Lear, E. and K. Crozier, "Using the NETCONF Protocol
2838 over the Blocks Extensible Exchange Protocol
2839 (BEEP)", <a href="./rfc4744">RFC 4744</a>, December 2006.
2840
2841 [<a id="ref-RFC4760">RFC4760</a>] Bates, T., Chandra, R., Katz, D., and Y. Rekhter,
2842 "Multiprotocol Extensions for BGP-4", <a href="./rfc4760">RFC 4760</a>,
2843 January 2007.
2844
2845 [<a id="ref-RFC4787">RFC4787</a>] Audet, F. and C. Jennings, "Network Address
2846 Translation (NAT) Behavioral Requirements for
2847 Unicast UDP", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp127">BCP 127</a>, <a href="./rfc4787">RFC 4787</a>, January 2007.
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 51]</span></pre>
2853 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-52" ></span>
2854 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2855
2856
2857 [<a id="ref-RFC4835">RFC4835</a>] Manral, V., "Cryptographic Algorithm Implementation
2858 Requirements for Encapsulating Security Payload
2859 (ESP) and Authentication Header (AH)", <a href="./rfc4835">RFC 4835</a>,
2860 April 2007.
2861
2862 [<a id="ref-RFC4854">RFC4854</a>] Saint-Andre, P., "A Uniform Resource Name (URN)
2863 Namespace for Extensions to the Extensible Messaging
2864 and Presence Protocol (XMPP)", <a href="./rfc4854">RFC 4854</a>,
2865 April 2007.
2866
2867 [<a id="ref-RFC4861">RFC4861</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H.
2868 Soliman, "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6
2869 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc4861">RFC 4861</a>, September 2007.
2870
2871 [<a id="ref-RFC4862">RFC4862</a>] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6
2872 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc4862">RFC 4862</a>,
2873 September 2007.
2874
2875 [<a id="ref-RFC4916">RFC4916</a>] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session
2876 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4916">RFC 4916</a>, June 2007.
2877
2878 [<a id="ref-RFC4919">RFC4919</a>] Kushalnagar, N., Montenegro, G., and C. Schumacher,
2879 "IPv6 over Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks
2880 (6LoWPANs): Overview, Assumptions, Problem
2881 Statement, and Goals", <a href="./rfc4919">RFC 4919</a>, August 2007.
2882
2883 [<a id="ref-RFC4941">RFC4941</a>] Narten, T., Draves, R., and S. Krishnan, "Privacy
2884 Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration
2885 in IPv6", <a href="./rfc4941">RFC 4941</a>, September 2007.
2886
2887 [<a id="ref-RFC4944">RFC4944</a>] Montenegro, G., Kushalnagar, N., Hui, J., and D.
2888 Culler, "Transmission of IPv6 Packets over IEEE
2889 802.15.4 Networks", <a href="./rfc4944">RFC 4944</a>, September 2007.
2890
2891 [<a id="ref-RFC4960">RFC4960</a>] Stewart, R., "Stream Control Transmission Protocol",
2892 <a href="./rfc4960">RFC 4960</a>, September 2007.
2893
2894 [<a id="ref-RFC4987">RFC4987</a>] Eddy, W., "TCP SYN Flooding Attacks and Common
2895 Mitigations", <a href="./rfc4987">RFC 4987</a>, August 2007.
2896
2897 [<a id="ref-RFC5023">RFC5023</a>] Gregorio, J. and B. de hOra, "The Atom Publishing
2898 Protocol", <a href="./rfc5023">RFC 5023</a>, October 2007.
2899
2900 [<a id="ref-RFC5061">RFC5061</a>] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Tuexen, M., Maruyama, S., and
2901 M. Kozuka, "Stream Control Transmission Protocol
2902 (SCTP) Dynamic Address Reconfiguration", <a href="./rfc5061">RFC 5061</a>,
2903 September 2007.
2904
2905
2906
2907
2908 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 52]</span></pre>
2909 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-53" ></span>
2910 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2911
2912
2913 [<a id="ref-RFC5072">RFC5072</a>] Varada, S., Ed., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP
2914 Version 6 over PPP", <a href="./rfc5072">RFC 5072</a>, September 2007.
2915
2916 [<a id="ref-RFC5122">RFC5122</a>] Saint-Andre, P., "Internationalized Resource
2917 Identifiers (IRIs) and Uniform Resource Identifiers
2918 (URIs) for the Extensible Messaging and Presence
2919 Protocol (XMPP)", <a href="./rfc5122">RFC 5122</a>, February 2008.
2920
2921 [<a id="ref-RFC5128">RFC5128</a>] Srisuresh, P., Ford, B., and D. Kegel, "State of
2922 Peer-to-Peer (P2P) Communication across Network
2923 Address Translators (NATs)", <a href="./rfc5128">RFC 5128</a>, March 2008.
2924
2925 [<a id="ref-RFC5135">RFC5135</a>] Wing, D. and T. Eckert, "IP Multicast Requirements
2926 for a Network Address Translator (NAT) and a Network
2927 Address Port Translator (NAPT)", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp135">BCP 135</a>, <a href="./rfc5135">RFC 5135</a>,
2928 February 2008.
2929
2930 [<a id="ref-RFC5191">RFC5191</a>] Forsberg, D., Ohba, Y., Patil, B., Tschofenig, H.,
2931 and A. Yegin, "Protocol for Carrying Authentication
2932 for Network Access (PANA)", <a href="./rfc5191">RFC 5191</a>, May 2008.
2933
2934 [<a id="ref-RFC5207">RFC5207</a>] Stiemerling, M., Quittek, J., and L. Eggert, "NAT
2935 and Firewall Traversal Issues of Host Identity
2936 Protocol (HIP) Communication", <a href="./rfc5207">RFC 5207</a>, April 2008.
2937
2938 [<a id="ref-RFC5216">RFC5216</a>] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
2939 Authentication Protocol", <a href="./rfc5216">RFC 5216</a>, March 2008.
2940
2941 [<a id="ref-RFC5238">RFC5238</a>] Phelan, T., "Datagram Transport Layer Security
2942 (DTLS) over the Datagram Congestion Control Protocol
2943 (DCCP)", <a href="./rfc5238">RFC 5238</a>, May 2008.
2944
2945 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
2946 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>,
2947 August 2008.
2948
2949 [<a id="ref-RFC5272">RFC5272</a>] Schaad, J. and M. Myers, "Certificate Management
2950 over CMS (CMC)", <a href="./rfc5272">RFC 5272</a>, June 2008.
2951
2952 [<a id="ref-RFC5277">RFC5277</a>] Chisholm, S. and H. Trevino, "NETCONF Event
2953 Notifications", <a href="./rfc5277">RFC 5277</a>, July 2008.
2954
2955 [<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
2956 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
2957 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
2958 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, May 2008.
2959
2960
2961
2962
2963
2964 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 53]</span></pre>
2965 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-54" ></span>
2966 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
2967
2968
2969 [<a id="ref-RFC5289">RFC5289</a>] Rescorla, E., "TLS Elliptic Curve Cipher Suites with
2970 SHA-256/384 and AES Galois Counter Mode (GCM)",
2971 <a href="./rfc5289">RFC 5289</a>, August 2008.
2972
2973 [<a id="ref-RFC5308">RFC5308</a>] Hopps, C., "Routing IPv6 with IS-IS", <a href="./rfc5308">RFC 5308</a>,
2974 October 2008.
2975
2976 [<a id="ref-RFC5340">RFC5340</a>] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem,
2977 "OSPF for IPv6", <a href="./rfc5340">RFC 5340</a>, July 2008.
2978
2979 [<a id="ref-RFC5393">RFC5393</a>] Sparks, R., Lawrence, S., Hawrylyshen, A., and B.
2980 Campen, "Addressing an Amplification Vulnerability
2981 in Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Forking
2982 Proxies", <a href="./rfc5393">RFC 5393</a>, December 2008.
2983
2984 [<a id="ref-RFC5405">RFC5405</a>] Eggert, L. and G. Fairhurst, "Unicast UDP Usage
2985 Guidelines for Application Designers", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp145">BCP 145</a>,
2986 <a href="./rfc5405">RFC 5405</a>, November 2008.
2987
2988 [<a id="ref-RFC5430">RFC5430</a>] Salter, M., Rescorla, E., and R. Housley, "Suite B
2989 Profile for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
2990 <a href="./rfc5430">RFC 5430</a>, March 2009.
2991
2992 [<a id="ref-RFC5433">RFC5433</a>] Clancy, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Extensible
2993 Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key
2994 (EAP-GPSK) Method", <a href="./rfc5433">RFC 5433</a>, February 2009.
2995
2996 [<a id="ref-RFC5437">RFC5437</a>] Saint-Andre, P. and A. Melnikov, "Sieve Notification
2997 Mechanism: Extensible Messaging and Presence
2998 Protocol (XMPP)", <a href="./rfc5437">RFC 5437</a>, January 2009.
2999
3000 [<a id="ref-RFC5539">RFC5539</a>] Badra, M., "NETCONF over Transport Layer Security
3001 (TLS)", <a href="./rfc5539">RFC 5539</a>, May 2009.
3002
3003 [<a id="ref-RFC5545">RFC5545</a>] Desruisseaux, B., "Internet Calendaring and
3004 Scheduling Core Object Specification (iCalendar)",
3005 <a href="./rfc5545">RFC 5545</a>, September 2009.
3006
3007 [<a id="ref-RFC5546">RFC5546</a>] Daboo, C., "iCalendar Transport-Independent
3008 Interoperability Protocol (iTIP)", <a href="./rfc5546">RFC 5546</a>,
3009 December 2009.
3010
3011 [<a id="ref-RFC5548">RFC5548</a>] Dohler, M., Watteyne, T., Winter, T., and D.
3012 Barthel, "Routing Requirements for Urban Low-Power
3013 and Lossy Networks", <a href="./rfc5548">RFC 5548</a>, May 2009.
3014
3015 [<a id="ref-RFC5569">RFC5569</a>] Despres, R., "IPv6 Rapid Deployment on IPv4
3016 Infrastructures (6rd)", <a href="./rfc5569">RFC 5569</a>, January 2010.
3017
3018
3019
3020 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 54]</span></pre>
3021 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-55" ></span>
3022 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3023
3024
3025 [<a id="ref-RFC5621">RFC5621</a>] Camarillo, G., "Message Body Handling in the Session
3026 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc5621">RFC 5621</a>,
3027 September 2009.
3028
3029 [<a id="ref-RFC5626">RFC5626</a>] Jennings, C., Mahy, R., and F. Audet, "Managing
3030 Client-Initiated Connections in the Session
3031 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc5626">RFC 5626</a>, October 2009.
3032
3033 [<a id="ref-RFC5652">RFC5652</a>] Housley, R., "Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)",
3034 STD 70, <a href="./rfc5652">RFC 5652</a>, September 2009.
3035
3036 [<a id="ref-RFC5673">RFC5673</a>] Pister, K., Thubert, P., Dwars, S., and T. Phinney,
3037 "Industrial Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
3038 Lossy Networks", <a href="./rfc5673">RFC 5673</a>, October 2009.
3039
3040 [<a id="ref-RFC5681">RFC5681</a>] Allman, M., Paxson, V., and E. Blanton, "TCP
3041 Congestion Control", <a href="./rfc5681">RFC 5681</a>, September 2009.
3042
3043 [<a id="ref-RFC5717">RFC5717</a>] Lengyel, B. and M. Bjorklund, "Partial Lock Remote
3044 Procedure Call (RPC) for NETCONF", <a href="./rfc5717">RFC 5717</a>,
3045 December 2009.
3046
3047 [<a id="ref-RFC5740">RFC5740</a>] Adamson, B., Bormann, C., Handley, M., and J.
3048 Macker, "NACK-Oriented Reliable Multicast (NORM)
3049 Transport Protocol", <a href="./rfc5740">RFC 5740</a>, November 2009.
3050
3051 [<a id="ref-RFC5751">RFC5751</a>] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose
3052 Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2
3053 Message Specification", <a href="./rfc5751">RFC 5751</a>, January 2010.
3054
3055 [<a id="ref-RFC5785">RFC5785</a>] Nottingham, M. and E. Hammer-Lahav, "Defining Well-
3056 Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)",
3057 <a href="./rfc5785">RFC 5785</a>, April 2010.
3058
3059 [<a id="ref-RFC5826">RFC5826</a>] Brandt, A., Buron, J., and G. Porcu, "Home
3060 Automation Routing Requirements in Low-Power and
3061 Lossy Networks", <a href="./rfc5826">RFC 5826</a>, April 2010.
3062
3063 [<a id="ref-RFC5838">RFC5838</a>] Lindem, A., Mirtorabi, S., Roy, A., Barnes, M., and
3064 R. Aggarwal, "Support of Address Families in
3065 OSPFv3", <a href="./rfc5838">RFC 5838</a>, April 2010.
3066
3067 [<a id="ref-RFC5849">RFC5849</a>] Hammer-Lahav, E., "The OAuth 1.0 Protocol",
3068 <a href="./rfc5849">RFC 5849</a>, April 2010.
3069
3070
3071
3072
3073
3074
3075
3076 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 55]</span></pre>
3077 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-56" ></span>
3078 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3079
3080
3081 [<a id="ref-RFC5867">RFC5867</a>] Martocci, J., De Mil, P., Riou, N., and W.
3082 Vermeylen, "Building Automation Routing Requirements
3083 in Low-Power and Lossy Networks", <a href="./rfc5867">RFC 5867</a>,
3084 June 2010.
3085
3086 [<a id="ref-RFC5905">RFC5905</a>] Mills, D., Martin, J., Burbank, J., and W. Kasch,
3087 "Network Time Protocol Version 4: Protocol and
3088 Algorithms Specification", <a href="./rfc5905">RFC 5905</a>, June 2010.
3089
3090 [<a id="ref-RFC5932">RFC5932</a>] Kato, A., Kanda, M., and S. Kanno, "Camellia Cipher
3091 Suites for TLS", <a href="./rfc5932">RFC 5932</a>, June 2010.
3092
3093 [<a id="ref-RFC5958">RFC5958</a>] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", <a href="./rfc5958">RFC 5958</a>,
3094 August 2010.
3095
3096 [<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
3097 "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
3098 <a href="./rfc5996">RFC 5996</a>, September 2010.
3099
3100 [<a id="ref-RFC5998">RFC5998</a>] Eronen, P., Tschofenig, H., and Y. Sheffer, "An
3101 Extension for EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2",
3102 <a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a>, September 2010.
3103
3104 [<a id="ref-RFC6031">RFC6031</a>] Turner, S. and R. Housley, "Cryptographic Message
3105 Syntax (CMS) Symmetric Key Package Content Type",
3106 <a href="./rfc6031">RFC 6031</a>, December 2010.
3107
3108 [<a id="ref-RFC6047">RFC6047</a>] Melnikov, A., "iCalendar Message-Based
3109 Interoperability Protocol (iMIP)", <a href="./rfc6047">RFC 6047</a>,
3110 December 2010.
3111
3112 [<a id="ref-RFC6052">RFC6052</a>] Bao, C., Huitema, C., Bagnulo, M., Boucadair, M.,
3113 and X. Li, "IPv6 Addressing of IPv4/IPv6
3114 Translators", <a href="./rfc6052">RFC 6052</a>, October 2010.
3115
3116 [<a id="ref-RFC6090">RFC6090</a>] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental
3117 Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms", <a href="./rfc6090">RFC 6090</a>,
3118 February 2011.
3119
3120 [<a id="ref-RFC6120">RFC6120</a>] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
3121 Protocol (XMPP): Core", <a href="./rfc6120">RFC 6120</a>, March 2011.
3122
3123 [<a id="ref-RFC6121">RFC6121</a>] Saint-Andre, P., "Extensible Messaging and Presence
3124 Protocol (XMPP): Instant Messaging and Presence",
3125 <a href="./rfc6121">RFC 6121</a>, March 2011.
3126
3127 [<a id="ref-RFC6144">RFC6144</a>] Baker, F., Li, X., Bao, C., and K. Yin, "Framework
3128 for IPv4/IPv6 Translation", RFC <a href="./rfc6144">RFC6144</a>, April 2011.
3129
3130
3131
3132 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 56]</span></pre>
3133 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-57" ></span>
3134 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3135
3136
3137 [<a id="ref-RFC6145">RFC6145</a>] Li, X., Bao, C., and F. Baker, "IP/ICMP Translation
3138 Algorithm", <a href="./rfc6145">RFC 6145</a>, April 2011.
3139
3140 [<a id="ref-RFC6146">RFC6146</a>] Bagnulo, M., Matthews, P., and I. Beijnum, "Stateful
3141 NAT64: Network Address and Protocol Translation from
3142 IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers", <a href="./rfc6146">RFC 6146</a>, April 2011.
3143
3144 [<a id="ref-RFC6147">RFC6147</a>] Bagnulo, M., Sullivan, A., Matthews, P., and I.
3145 Beijnum, "DNS64: DNS Extensions for Network Address
3146 Translation from IPv6 Clients to IPv4 Servers",
3147 <a href="./rfc6147">RFC 6147</a>, April 2011.
3148
3149 [<a id="ref-RFC6180">RFC6180</a>] Arkko, J. and F. Baker, "Guidelines for Using IPv6
3150 Transition Mechanisms during IPv6 Deployment",
3151 <a href="./rfc6180">RFC 6180</a>, May 2011.
3152
3153
3154 [<a id="ref-RPL">RPL</a>] Winter, T., Thubert, P., Brandt, A., Clausen, T.,
3155 Hui, J., Kelsey, R., Levis, P., Pister, K., Struik,
3156 R., and J. Vasseur, "RPL: IPv6 Routing Protocol for
3157 Low power and Lossy Networks", Work in Progress,
3158 March 2011.
3159
3160 [<a id="ref-SP-MULPIv3.0">SP-MULPIv3.0</a>] CableLabs, "DOCSIS 3.0 MAC and Upper Layer Protocols
3161 Interface Specification, CM-SP-MULPIv3.0-I10-
3162 090529", May 2009.
3163
3164 [<a id="ref-SmartGrid">SmartGrid</a>] Wikipedia, "Wikipedia Article: Smart Grid",
3165 February 2011, &lt;<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Smart_grid&amp;oldid=415838933">http://en.wikipedia.org/w/</a>
3166 <a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=Smart_grid&amp;oldid=415838933">index.php?title=Smart_grid&amp;oldid=415838933</a>&gt;.
3167
3168 [<a id="ref-TCP-SEC">TCP-SEC</a>] Gont, F., "Security Assessment of the Transmission
3169 Control Protocol (TCP)", Work in Progress,
3170 January 2011.
3171
3172 [<a id="ref-r1822">r1822</a>] Bolt Beranek and Newman Inc., "Interface Message
3173 Processor -- Specifications for the interconnection
3174 of a host and a IMP, Report No. 1822", January 1976.
3175
3176 [<a id="ref-xCAL">xCAL</a>] Daboo, C., Douglass, M., and S. Lees, "xCal: The XML
3177 format for iCalendar", Work in Progress, April 2011.
3178
3179
3180
3181
3182
3183
3184
3185
3186
3187
3188 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 57]</span></pre>
3189 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-58" ></span>
3190 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3191
3192
3193 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Example: Advanced Metering Infrastructure</span>
3194
3195 This appendix provides a worked example of the use of the Internet
3196 Protocol Suite in a network such as the Smart Grid's Advanced
3197 Metering Infrastructure (AMI). There are several possible models.
3198
3199 Figure 6 shows the structure of the AMI as it reaches out towards a
3200 set of residences. In this structure, we have the home itself and
3201 its Home Area Network (HAN), the Neighborhood Area Network (NAN) that
3202 the utility uses to access the meter at the home, and the utility
3203 access network that connects a set of NANs to the utility itself.
3204 For the purposes of this discussion, assume that the NAN contains a
3205 distributed application in a set collectors, which is of course only
3206 one way the application could be implemented.
3207
3208 ---
3209 A thermostats, appliances, etc
3210 | ------+-----------------------------------
3211 | |
3212 |"HAN" | &lt;--- Energy Services Interface (ESI)
3213 | +---+---+
3214 | | Meter | Meter is generally an ALG between the AMI and the HAN
3215 | +---+---+
3216 V \
3217 --- \
3218 A \ | /
3219 | \ | /
3220 | "NAN" +--+-+-+---+ Likely a router but could
3221 | |Collector | be a front-end application
3222 V +----+-----+ gateway for utility
3223 --- \
3224 A \ | /
3225 | \ | /
3226 |"AMI" +--+-+-+--+
3227 | | AMI |
3228 | | Headend |
3229 V +---------+
3230 ---
3231
3232 Figure 6: The HAN, NAN, and Utility in the Advanced Metering
3233 Infrastructure
3234
3235 There are several questions that have to be answered in describing
3236 this picture, which given possible answers yield different possible
3237 models. They include at least:
3238
3239 o How does Demand Response work? Either:
3240
3241
3242
3243
3244 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 58]</span></pre>
3245 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-59" ></span>
3246 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3247
3248
3249 * The utility presents pricing signals to the home,
3250
3251 * The utility presents pricing signals to individual devices
3252 (e.g., a Pluggable Electric Vehicle),
3253
3254 * The utility adjusts settings on individual appliances within
3255 the home.
3256
3257 o How does the utility access meters at the home?
3258
3259 * The AMI Headend manages the interfaces with the meters,
3260 collecting metering data and passing it on to the appropriate
3261 applications over the Enterprise Bus, or
3262
3263 * Distributed application support ("collectors") might access and
3264 summarize the information; this device might be managed by the
3265 utility or by a service between the utility and its customers.
3266
3267 In implementation, these models are idealized; reality may include
3268 some aspects of each model in specified cases.
3269
3270 The examples include:
3271
3272 1. <a href="#appendix-A.2">Appendix A.2</a> presumes that the HAN, the NAN, and the utility's
3273 network are separate administrative domains and speak application
3274 to application across those domains.
3275
3276 2. <a href="#appendix-A.3">Appendix A.3</a> repeats the first example, but presuming that the
3277 utility directly accesses appliances within the HAN from the
3278 collector.
3279
3280 3. <a href="#appendix-A.4">Appendix A.4</a> repeats the first example, but presuming that the
3281 collector directly forwards traffic as a router in addition to
3282 distributed application chores. Note that this case implies
3283 numerous privacy and security concerns and as such is considered
3284 a less likely deployment model.
3285
3286 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. How to Structure a Network</span>
3287
3288 A key consideration in the Internet has been the development of new
3289 link layer technologies over time. The ARPANET originally used a BBN
3290 proprietary link layer called BBN 1822 [<a href="#ref-r1822" title="&quot;Interface Message Processor -- Specifications for the interconnection of a host and a IMP, Report No. 1822&quot;">r1822</a>]. In the late 1970's,
3291 the ARPANET switched to X.25 as an interface to the 1822 network.
3292 With the deployment of the IEEE 802 series technologies in the early
3293 1980's, IP was deployed on Ethernet (IEEE 802.3), Token Ring (IEEE
3294 802.5) and WiFi (IEEE 802.11), as well as Arcnet, serial lines of
3295 various kinds, Frame Relay, and ATM. A key issue in this evolution
3296 was that the applications developed to run on the Internet use APIs
3297
3298
3299
3300 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 59]</span></pre>
3301 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-60" ></span>
3302 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3303
3304
3305 related to the IPS, and as a result require little or no change to
3306 continue operating in a new link layer architecture or a mixture of
3307 them.
3308
3309 The Smart Grid is likely to see a similar evolution over time.
3310 Consider the Home Area Network (HAN) as a readily understandable
3311 small network. At this juncture, technologies proposed for
3312 residential networks include IEEE P1901, various versions of IEEE
3313 802.15.4, and IEEE 802.11. It is reasonable to expect other
3314 technologies to be developed in the future. As the Zigbee Alliance
3315 has learned (and as a resulted incorporated the IPS in Smart Energy
3316 Profile 2.0), there is significant value in providing a virtual
3317 address that is mapped to interfaces or nodes attached to each of
3318 those technologies.
3319
3320
3321
3322
3323
3324
3325
3326
3327
3328
3329
3330
3331
3332
3333
3334
3335
3336
3337
3338
3339
3340
3341
3342
3343
3344
3345
3346
3347
3348
3349
3350
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355
3356 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 60]</span></pre>
3357 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-61" ></span>
3358 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3359
3360
3361 Utility NAN
3362 /
3363 /
3364 +----+-----+ +--+ +--+ +--+
3365 | Meter | |D1| |D2| |D3|
3366 +-----+----+ ++-+ ++-+ ++-+
3367 | | | |
3368 ----+-+-------+----+----+---- IEEE 802.15.4
3369 |
3370 +--+---+
3371 |Router+------/------ Residential Broadband
3372 +--+---+
3373 |
3374 ----+---------+----+----+---- IEEE P1901
3375 | | |
3376 ++-+ ++-+ ++-+
3377 |D4| |D5| |D6|
3378 +--+ +--+ +--+
3379 A thermostats, appliances, etc
3380 | ------+----------------+------------------
3381 |"HAN" | |
3382 | +---+---+ +---+---+
3383 | |Router | | Meter |
3384 | |or EMS | | |
3385 V +---+---+ +---+---+
3386 --- | --- \
3387 | ^ \ | /
3388 | |"NAN" \ | /
3389 ---+--- | +--+-+-+---+
3390 / \ | |"Pole Top"|
3391 | Internet| v +----+-----+
3392 \ / ---
3393 -------
3394
3395 Figure 7: Two Views of a Home Area Network
3396
3397 There are two possible communication models within the HAN, both of
3398 which are likely to be useful. Devices may communicate directly with
3399 each other, or they may be managed by some central controller. An
3400 example of direct communications might be a light switch that
3401 directly commands a lamp to turn on or off. An example of indirect
3402 communications might be a control application in a Customer or
3403 Building that accepts telemetry from a thermostat, applies some form
3404 of policy, and controls the heating and air conditioning systems. In
3405 addition, there are high-end appliances in the market today that use
3406 residential broadband to communicate with their manufacturers, and
3407 obviously the meter needs to communicate with the utility.
3408
3409
3410
3411
3412 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 61]</span></pre>
3413 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-62" ></span>
3414 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3415
3416
3417 Figure 7 shows two simple networks, one of which uses IEEE 802.15.4
3418 and IEEE 1901 domains, and one of which uses an arbitrary LAN within
3419 the home, which could be IEEE 802.3/Ethernet, IEEE 802.15.4, IEEE
3420 1901, IEEE 802.11, or anything else that made sense in context. Both
3421 show the connectivity between them as a router separate from the
3422 energy management system (EMS). This is for clarity; the two could
3423 of course be incorporated into a single system, and one could imagine
3424 appliances that want to communicate with their manufacturers
3425 supporting both a HAN interface and a WiFi interface rather than
3426 depending on the router. These are all manufacturer design
3427 decisions.
3428
3429 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1.1" href="#appendix-A.1.1">A.1.1</a>. HAN Routing</span>
3430
3431 The HAN can be seen as communicating with two kinds of non-HAN
3432 networks. One is the home LAN, which may in turn be attached to the
3433 Internet, and will generally either derive its prefix from the
3434 upstream ISP or use a self-generated Unique Local Addressing (ULA).
3435 Another is the utility's NAN, which through an ESI provides utility
3436 connectivity to the HAN; in this case the HAN will be addressed by a
3437 self-generated ULA (note, however, that in some cases ESI may also
3438 provide a prefix via DHCP [<a href="./rfc3315" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)&quot;">RFC3315</a>]). In addition, the HAN will have
3439 link-local addresses that can be used between neighboring nodes. In
3440 general, an HAN will be comprised of both 802.15.4, 802.11, and
3441 possibly other networks.
3442
3443 The ESI is a node on the user's residential network, and will not
3444 typically provide stateful packet forwarding or firewall services
3445 between the HAN and the utility network(s). In general, the ESI is a
3446 node on the home network; in some cases, the meter may act as the
3447 ESI. However, the ESI must be capable of understanding that most
3448 home networks are not 802.15.4 enabled (rather, they are typically
3449 802.11 networks), and that it must be capable of setting up ad hoc
3450 networks between various sensors in the home (e.g., between the meter
3451 and say, a thermostat) in the event there aren't other networks
3452 available.
3453
3454 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1.2" href="#appendix-A.1.2">A.1.2</a>. HAN Security</span>
3455
3456 In any network, we have a variety of threats and a variety of
3457 possible mitigations. These include, at minimum:
3458
3459 Link Layer: Why is your machine able to talk in my network? The
3460 WiFi SSIDs often use some form of authenticated access control,
3461 which may be a simple encrypted password mechanism or may use a
3462 combination of encryption and IEEE 802.1X+EAP-TLS Authentication/
3463
3464
3465
3466
3467
3468 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 62]</span></pre>
3469 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-63" ></span>
3470 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3471
3472
3473 Authorization to ensure that only authorized communicants can use
3474 it. If a LAN has a router attached, the router may also implement
3475 a firewall to filter remote accesses.
3476
3477 Network Layer: Given that your machine is authorized access to my
3478 network, why is your machine talking with my machine? IPsec is a
3479 way of ensuring that computers that can use a network are allowed
3480 to talk with each other, may also enforce confidentiality, and may
3481 provide VPN services to make a device or network appear to be part
3482 of a remote network.
3483
3484 Application: Given that your machine is authorized access to my
3485 network and my machine, why is your application talking with my
3486 application? The fact that your machine and mine are allowed to
3487 talk for some applications doesn't mean they are allowed to for
3488 all applications. (D)TLS, https, and other such mechanisms enable
3489 an application to impose application-to-application controls
3490 similar to the network layer controls provided by IPsec.
3491
3492 Remote Application: How do I know that the data I received is the
3493 data you sent? Especially in applications like electronic mail,
3494 where data passes through a number of intermediaries that one may
3495 or may not really want munging it (how many times have you seen a
3496 URL broken by a mail server?), we have tools (DKIM, S/MIME, and
3497 W3C XML Signatures to name a few) to provide non-repudiability and
3498 integrity verification. This may also have legal ramifications:
3499 if a record of a meter reading is to be used in billing, and the
3500 bill is disputed in court, one could imagine the court wanting
3501 proof that the record in fact came from that meter at that time
3502 and contained that data.
3503
3504 Application-specific security: In addition, applications often
3505 provide security services of their own. The fact that I can
3506 access a file system, for example, doesn't mean that I am
3507 authorized to access everything in it; the file system may well
3508 prevent my access to some of its contents. Routing protocols like
3509 BGP are obsessed with the question "what statements that my peer
3510 made am I willing to believe", and monitoring protocols like SNMP
3511 may not be willing to answer every question they are asked,
3512 depending on access configuration.
3513
3514 Devices in the HAN want controlled access to the LAN in question for
3515 obvious reasons. In addition, there should be some form of mutual
3516 authentication between devices -- the lamp controller will want to
3517 know that the light switch telling it to change state is the right
3518 light switch, for example. The EMS may well want strong
3519 authentication of accesses -- the parents may not want the children
3520
3521
3522
3523
3524 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 63]</span></pre>
3525 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-64" ></span>
3526 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3527
3528
3529 changing the settings, and while the utility and the customer are
3530 routinely granted access, other parties (especially parties with
3531 criminal intent) need to be excluded.
3532
3533 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Model 1: AMI with Separated Domains</span>
3534
3535 With the background given in <a href="#appendix-A.1">Appendix A.1</a>, we can now discuss the use
3536 of IP (IPv4 or IPv6) in the AMI.
3537
3538 In this first model, consider the three domains in Figure 6 to
3539 literally be separate administrative domains, potentially operated by
3540 different entities. For example, the NAN could be a WiMAX network
3541 operated by a traditional telecom operator, the utility's network
3542 (including the collector) is its own, and the residential network is
3543 operated by the resident. In this model, while communications
3544 between the collector and the Meter are normal, the utility has no
3545 other access to appliances in the home, and the collector doesn't
3546 directly forward messages from the NAN upstream.
3547
3548 In this case, as shown in Figure 7, it would make the most sense to
3549 design the collector, the Meter, and the EMS as hosts on the NAN --
3550 design them as systems whose applications can originate and terminate
3551 exchanges or sessions in the NAN, but not forward traffic from or to
3552 other devices.
3553
3554 In such a configuration, Demand Response has to be performed by
3555 having the EMS accept messages such as price signals from the "pole
3556 top", apply some form of policy, and then orchestrate actions within
3557 the home. Another possibility is to have the EMS communicate with
3558 the ESI located in the meter. If the thermostat has high demand and
3559 low demand (day/night or morning/day/evening/night) settings, Demand
3560 Response might result in it moving to a lower demand setting, and the
3561 EMS might also turn off specified circuits in the home to diminish
3562 lighting.
3563
3564 In this scenario, Quality of Service (QoS) issues reportedly arise
3565 when high precedence messages must be sent through the collector to
3566 the home; if the collector is occupied polling the meters or doing
3567 some other task, the application may not yield control of the
3568 processor to the application that services the message. Clearly,
3569 this is either an application or an Operating System problem;
3570 applications need to be designed in a manner that doesn't block high
3571 precedence messages. The collector also needs to use appropriate NAN
3572 services, if they exist, to provide the NAN QoS it needs. For
3573 example, if WiMax is in use, it might use a routine-level service for
3574 normal exchanges but a higher precedence service for these messages.
3575
3576
3577
3578
3579
3580 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 64]</span></pre>
3581 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-65" ></span>
3582 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3583
3584
3585 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Model 2: AMI with Neighborhood Access to the Home</span>
3586
3587 In this second model, let's imagine that the utility directly
3588 accesses appliances within the HAN. Rather than expect an EMS to
3589 respond to price signals in Demand Response, it directly commands
3590 devices like air conditioners to change state, or throws relays on
3591 circuits to or within the home.
3592
3593 +----------+ +--+ +--+ +--+
3594 | Meter | |D1| |D2| |D3|
3595 +-----+----+ ++-+ ++-+ ++-+
3596 | | | |
3597 ----+-+-------+----+----+---- IEEE 802.15.4
3598 |
3599 +--+---+
3600 | +------/------ NAN
3601 |Router|
3602 | +------/------ Residential Broadband
3603 +--+---+
3604 |
3605 ----+--+------+----+----+---- IEEE P1901
3606 | | | |
3607 +-+-+ ++-+ ++-+ ++-+
3608 |EMS| |D4| |D5| |D6|
3609 +---+ +--+ +--+ +--+
3610
3611
3612 Figure 8: Home Area Network
3613
3614 In this case, as shown in Figure 8, the Meter and EMS act as hosts on
3615 the HAN, and there is a router between the HAN and the NAN.
3616
3617 As one might imagine, there are serious security considerations in
3618 this model. Traffic between the NAN and the residential broadband
3619 network should be filtered, and the issues raised in <a href="#appendix-A.1.2">Appendix A.1.2</a>
3620 take on a new level of meaning. One of the biggest threats may be a
3621 legal or at least a public relations issue; if the utility
3622 intentionally disables a circuit in a manner or at a time that
3623 threatens life (the resident's kidney dialysis machine is on it, or a
3624 respirator, for example), the matter might make the papers.
3625 Unauthorized access could be part of juvenile pranks or other things
3626 as well. So one really wants the appliances to only obey commands
3627 under strict authentication/authorization controls.
3628
3629 In addition to the QoS issues raised in <a href="#appendix-A.2">Appendix A.2</a>, there is the
3630 possibility of queuing issues in the router. In such a case, the IP
3631 datagrams should probably use the Low-Latency Data Service Class
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636 <span class="grey">Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 65]</span></pre>
3637 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-66" ></span>
3638 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6272">RFC 6272</a> Internet Protocols for the Smart Grid June 2011</span>
3639
3640
3641 described in [<a href="./rfc4594" title="&quot;Configuration Guidelines for DiffServ Service Classes&quot;">RFC4594</a>], and let other traffic use the Standard
3642 Service Class or other service classes.
3643
3644 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.4" href="#appendix-A.4">A.4</a>. Model 3: Collector Is an IP Router</span>
3645
3646 In this third model, the relationship between the NAN and the HAN is
3647 either as in <a href="#appendix-A.2">Appendix A.2</a> or <a href="#appendix-A.3">Appendix A.3</a>; what is different is that
3648 the collector may be an IP router. In addition to whatever
3649 autonomous activities it is doing, it forwards traffic as an IP
3650 router in some cases.
3651
3652 Analogous to <a href="#appendix-A.3">Appendix A.3</a>, there are serious security considerations
3653 in this model. Traffic being forwarded should be filtered, and the
3654 issues raised in <a href="#appendix-A.1.2">Appendix A.1.2</a> take on a new level of meaning -- but
3655 this time at the utility mainframe. Unauthorized access is likely
3656 similar to other financially-motivated attacks that happen in the
3657 Internet, but presumably would be coming from devices in the HAN that
3658 have been co-opted in some way. One really wants the appliances to
3659 only obey commands under strict authentication/authorization
3660 controls.
3661
3662 In addition to the QoS issues raised in <a href="#appendix-A.2">Appendix A.2</a>, there is the
3663 possibility of queuing issues in the collector. In such a case, the
3664 IP datagrams should probably use the Low-Latency Data Service Class
3665 described in [<a href="./rfc4594" title="&quot;Configuration Guidelines for DiffServ Service Classes&quot;">RFC4594</a>], and let other traffic use the Standard
3666 Service Class or other service classes.
3667
3668 Authors' Addresses
3669
3670 Fred Baker
3671 Cisco Systems
3672 Santa Barbara, California 93117
3673 USA
3674
3675 EMail: [email protected]
3676
3677
3678 David Meyer
3679 Cisco Systems
3680 Eugene, Oregon 97403
3681 USA
3682
3683 EMail: [email protected]
3684
3685
3686
3687
3688
3689
3690
3691
3692 Baker &amp; Meyer Informational [Page 66]
3693 </pre>