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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Peterson |
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Request for Comments: 8226 Neustar |
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Category: Standards Track S. Turner |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 sn3rd |
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February 2018 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the |
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Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that |
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cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers. This |
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document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority |
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over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for |
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managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226</a>. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology .....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates .................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Certificate Usage with STIR .....................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Enrollment and Authorization Using the TN Authorization List ....<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Constraints on Signing PASSporTs ...........................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure ..................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Provisioning Private Keying Material ............................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures ......................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax ...................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. TN Authorization List Syntax ...................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. Certificate Freshness and Revocation ..........................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Acquiring the TN List by Reference .......................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. IANA Considerations ...........................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. ASN.1 Registrations ......................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Media Type Registrations .................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-12">12</a>. Security Considerations .......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-13">13</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. ASN.1 Module ..........................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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Acknowledgments ...................................................<a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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Authors' Addresses ................................................<a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) problem statement |
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[<a href="./rfc7340" title=""Secure Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements"">RFC7340</a>] identifies the primary enabler of robocalling, vishing |
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(voicemail hacking), swatting, and related attacks as the capability |
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to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest examples of |
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these attacks are cases where automated callees on the Public |
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Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) rely on the calling number as a |
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security measure -- for example, to access a voicemail system. |
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Robocallers use impersonation as a means of obscuring identity. |
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While robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN, block (that is, |
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withhold) their caller identity, callees are less likely to pick up |
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calls from blocked identities; therefore, appearing to call from some |
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number, any number, is preferable. Robocallers, however, prefer not |
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to call from a number that can trace back to the robocaller, and |
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therefore they impersonate numbers that are not assigned to them. |
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One of the most important components of a system to prevent |
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impersonation is the implementation of credentials that identify the |
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parties who control telephone numbers. With these credentials, |
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parties can assert that they are in fact authorized to use telephony |
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numbers (TNs), and thus they distinguish themselves from |
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<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
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impersonators unable to present such credentials. For that reason, |
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the STIR threat model [<a href="./rfc7375" title=""Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model"">RFC7375</a>] stipulates that "The design of the |
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credential system envisioned as a solution to these threats must, for |
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example, limit the scope of the credentials issued to carriers or |
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national authorities to those numbers that fall under their purview." |
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This document describes credential systems for telephone numbers |
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based on [<a href="#ref-X.509" title=""Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks"">X.509</a>] version 3 certificates in accordance with [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]. |
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While telephone numbers have long been part of the X.509 standard |
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(X.509 supports arbitrary naming attributes to be included in a |
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certificate; the telephoneNumber attribute was defined in the 1988 |
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[<a href="#ref-X.520" title=""Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected attribute types"">X.520</a>] specification), this document provides ways to determine |
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authority more aligned with telephone network requirements, including |
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extending X.509 with a Telephony Number Authorization List |
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certificate extension, which binds certificates to asserted authority |
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for particular telephone numbers or, potentially, telephone number |
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blocks or ranges. |
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In the STIR in-band architecture specified in [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>], two basic |
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types of entities need access to these credentials: authentication |
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services and verification services (or verifiers). An authentication |
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service must be operated by an entity enrolled with the certification |
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authority (CA) (see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>), whereas a verifier need only trust |
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the trust anchor of the authority and also have a means to access and |
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validate the public keys associated with these certificates. |
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Although the guidance in this document is written with the STIR |
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in-band architecture in mind, the credential system described in this |
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document could be useful for other protocols that want to make use of |
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certificates to assert authority over telephone numbers on the |
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Internet. |
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|
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This document specifies only the credential syntax and semantics |
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necessary to support this architecture. It does not assume any |
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particular CA or deployment environment. We anticipate that some |
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deployment experience will be necessary to determine optimal |
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operational models. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and |
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title=""Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all |
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capitals, as shown here. |
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<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates</span> |
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At a high level, this specification details two non-exclusive |
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approaches that can be employed to determine authority over telephone |
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numbers with certificates. |
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The first approach is to leverage the existing subject of the |
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certificate to ascertain that the holder of the certificate is |
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authorized to claim authority over a telephone number. The subject |
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might be represented as a domain name in the subjectAltName, such as |
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an "example.net" where that domain is known to relying parties as a |
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carrier, or represented with other identifiers related to the |
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operation of the telephone network, including Service Provider Codes |
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(SPCs) such as Operating Company Numbers (OCNs) or Service Provider |
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Identifiers (SPIDs) via the TN Authorization List specified in this |
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document. A relying party could then employ an external data set or |
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service that determines whether or not a specific telephone number is |
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under the authority of the carrier identified as the subject of the |
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certificate and use that to ascertain whether or not the carrier |
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should have authority over a telephone number. Potentially, a |
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certificate extension to convey the URI of such an information |
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service trusted by the issuer of the certificate could be developed |
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(though this specification does not propose one). Alternatively, |
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some relying parties could form bilateral or multilateral trust |
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relationships with peer carriers, trusting one another's assertions |
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just as telephone carriers in the Signaling System 7 (SS7) network |
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today rely on transitive trust when displaying the calling party |
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telephone number received through SS7 signaling. |
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The second approach is to extend the syntax of certificates to |
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include a new attribute, defined here as the TN Authorization List, |
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which contains a list of telephone numbers defining the scope of |
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authority of the certificate. Relying parties, if they trust the |
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issuer of the certificate as a source of authoritative information on |
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telephone numbers, could therefore use the TN Authorization List |
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instead of the subject of the certificate to make a decision about |
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whether or not the signer has authority over a particular telephone |
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number. The TN Authorization List could be provided in one of two |
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ways: as a literal value in the certificate or as a network service |
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that allows relying parties to query in real time to determine that a |
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telephone number is in the scope of a certificate. Using the TN |
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Authorization List rather than the certificate subject makes sense |
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when, for example, for privacy reasons the certificate owner would |
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prefer not to be identified, or in cases where the holder of the |
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certificate does not participate in the sort of traditional carrier |
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infrastructure that the first approach assumes. |
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<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
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|
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The first approach requires little change to existing Public Key |
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Infrastructure (PKI) certificates; for the second approach, we must |
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define an appropriate enrollment and authorization process. For the |
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purposes of STIR, the over-the-wire format specified in [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>] |
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accommodates either of these approaches: the methods for |
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canonicalizing, for signing, for identifying and accessing the |
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certificate, and so on remain the same; it is only the verifier |
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behavior and authorization decision that will change, depending on |
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the approach to telephone number authority taken by the certificate. |
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For that reason, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and |
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in fact a certificate issued to a traditional telephone network |
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service provider could contain a TN Authorization List or not, were |
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it supported by the CA issuing the credential. Regardless of which |
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approach is used, certificates that assert authority over telephone |
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numbers are subject to the ordinary operational procedures that |
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govern certificate use per [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]. This means that verification |
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services must be mindful of the need to ensure that they trust the |
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trust anchor that issued the certificate and that they have some |
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means to determine the freshness of the certificate (see <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>). |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Certificate Usage with STIR</span> |
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<a href="./rfc8224#section-7.4">[RFC8224], Section 7.4</a> requires that all credential systems used by |
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STIR explain how they address the requirements enumerated below. |
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Certificates as described in this document address the STIR |
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requirements as follows: |
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|
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1. The URI [<a href="./rfc3986" title=""Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"">RFC3986</a>] schemes permitted in the SIP Identity header |
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"info" parameter, as well as any special procedures required to |
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dereference the URIs: while normative text is given below in |
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<a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>, this mechanism permits the HTTP [<a href="./rfc7230" title=""Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing"">RFC7230</a>], CID |
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(Content-ID) [<a href="./rfc2392" title=""Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators"">RFC2392</a>], and SIP URI schemes to appear in the |
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"info" parameter. |
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|
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2. Procedures required to extract keying material from the resources |
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designated by the URI: implementations perform no special |
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procedures beyond dereferencing the "info" URI. See <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>. |
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|
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3. Procedures used by the verification service to determine the |
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scope of the credential: this specification effectively proposes |
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two methods, as outlined in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>: one where the subject (or, |
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more properly, subjectAltName) of the certificate indicates the |
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scope of authority through a domain name, and relying parties |
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either trust the subject entirely or have some direct means of |
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determining whether or not a number falls under a subject's |
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authority; and another where an extension to the certificate as |
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described in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> identifies the scope of authority of the |
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certificate. |
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<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
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4. The cryptographic algorithms required to validate the |
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credentials: for this specification, that means the signature |
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algorithms used to sign certificates. This specification |
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REQUIRES that implementations support both the Elliptic Curve |
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Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with the P-256 curve (see |
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[<a href="#ref-DSS" title=""Digital Signature Standard (DSS)"">DSS</a>]) and RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 ("PKCS" stands for "Public-Key |
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Cryptography Standards") (see <a href="./rfc8017#section-8.2">[RFC8017], Section 8.2</a>) for |
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certificate signatures. Implementers are advised that the latter |
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algorithm is mandated only as a transitional mechanism, due to |
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its widespread use in existing PKIs, but we anticipate that this |
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mechanism will eventually be deprecated. |
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5. Finally, note that all certificates compliant with this |
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specification: |
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* MUST provide cryptographic keying material sufficient to |
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generate the ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 signatures |
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necessary to support the ES256 hashed signatures required by |
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PASSporT [<a href="./rfc8225" title=""PASSporT: Personal Assertion Token"">RFC8225</a>], which in turn follows the JSON Web Token |
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(JWT) [<a href="./rfc7519" title=""JSON Web Token (JWT)"">RFC7519</a>]. |
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* MUST support both ECDSA with P-256 and RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 for |
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certificate signature verification. |
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This document also includes additional certificate-related |
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requirements: |
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o See <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a> for requirements related to the JWT Claim |
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Constraints certificate extension. |
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|
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o See <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> for requirements related to relying parties |
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acquiring credentials. |
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o See Sections <a href="#section-10">10</a> and <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a> for requirements related to certificate |
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freshness and the Authority Information Access (AIA) certificate |
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extension. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Enrollment and Authorization Using the TN Authorization List</span> |
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This document covers three models for enrollment when using the TN |
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Authorization List extension. |
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The first enrollment model is one where the CA acts in concert with |
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national numbering authorities to issue credentials to those parties |
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to whom numbers are assigned. In the United States, for example, |
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telephone number blocks are assigned to Local Exchange Carriers |
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(LECs) by the North American Numbering Plan Administration (NANPA), |
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who is in turn directed by the national regulator. LECs may also |
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<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
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|
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receive numbers in smaller allocations, through number pooling, or |
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via an individual assignment through number portability. LECs assign |
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numbers to customers, who may be private individuals or organizations |
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-- and organizations take responsibility for assigning numbers within |
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their own enterprise. This model requires top-down adoption of the |
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model from regulators through to carriers. Assignees of E.164 |
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numbering resources participating in this enrollment model should |
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take appropriate steps to establish trust anchors. |
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The second enrollment model is a bottom-up approach where a CA |
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requires that an entity prove control by means of some sort of test |
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that, as with certification authorities for web PKI, might either be |
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(1) automated or (2) a manual administrative process. As an example |
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of an automated process, an authority might send a text message to a |
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telephone number containing a URL (which might be dereferenced by the |
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recipient) as a means of verifying that a user has control of a |
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terminal corresponding to that number. Checks of this form are |
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frequently used in commercial systems today to validate telephone |
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numbers provided by users. This is comparable to existing enrollment |
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systems used by some certificate authorities for issuing S/MIME |
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credentials for email by verifying that the party applying for a |
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credential receives mail at the email address in question. |
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The third enrollment model is delegation: that is, the holder of a |
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certificate (assigned by either of the two methods above) might |
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delegate some or all of their authority to another party. In some |
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cases, multiple levels of delegation could occur: a LEC, for example, |
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might delegate authority to a customer organization for a block of |
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100 numbers used by an IP PBX, and the organization might in turn |
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delegate authority for a particular number to an individual employee. |
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This is analogous to delegation of organizational identities in |
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traditional hierarchical PKIs who use the name constraints extension |
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[<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]; the root CA delegates names in sales to the sales |
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department CA, names in development to the development CA, etc. As |
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lengthy certificate delegation chains are brittle, however, and can |
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cause delays in the verification process, this document considers |
| 373 |
optimizations to reduce the complexity of verification. |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
Future work might explore methods of partial delegation, where |
| 376 |
certificate holders delegate only part of their authority. For |
| 377 |
example, individual assignees may want to delegate to a service |
| 378 |
authority for text messages associated with their telephone number |
| 379 |
but not for other functions. |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Constraints on Signing PASSporTs</span> |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
The public key in the certificate is used to validate the signature |
| 396 |
on a JWT [<a href="./rfc7519" title=""JSON Web Token (JWT)"">RFC7519</a>] that conforms to the conventions specified in |
| 397 |
PASSporT [<a href="./rfc8225" title=""PASSporT: Personal Assertion Token"">RFC8225</a>]. This specification supports constraints on the |
| 398 |
JWT claims, thereby allowing the CA to grant different permissions to |
| 399 |
certificate holders -- for example, those enrolled from |
| 400 |
proof-of-possession versus delegation. A Certificate Policy (CP) and |
| 401 |
a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) [<a href="./rfc3647" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework"">RFC3647</a>] are produced as |
| 402 |
part of the normal PKI bootstrapping process (i.e., the CP is written |
| 403 |
first, and then the CA says how it conforms to the CP in the CPS). A |
| 404 |
CA that wishes to place constraints on the JWT claims MUST include |
| 405 |
the JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension in issued |
| 406 |
certificates. See <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a> for information about the certificate |
| 407 |
extension. |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure</span> |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
This specification places no limits on the number of telephone |
| 412 |
numbers that can be associated with any given certificate. Some |
| 413 |
service providers may be assigned millions of numbers and may wish to |
| 414 |
have a single certificate that can be applied to signing for any one |
| 415 |
of those numbers. Others may wish to compartmentalize authority over |
| 416 |
subsets of the numbers they control. |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
Moreover, service providers may wish to have multiple certificates |
| 419 |
with the same scope of authority. For example, a service provider |
| 420 |
with several regional gateway systems may want each system to be |
| 421 |
capable of signing for each of their numbers but not want to have |
| 422 |
each system share the same private key. |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
The set of telephone numbers for which a particular certificate is |
| 425 |
valid is expressed in the certificate through a certificate |
| 426 |
extension; the certificate's extensibility mechanism is defined in |
| 427 |
[<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>], but the TN Authorization List extension is specified in |
| 428 |
this document. |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List |
| 431 |
extension are typically the administrative entities to whom numbers |
| 432 |
are assigned or delegated. For example, a LEC might hold a |
| 433 |
certificate for a range of telephone numbers. In some cases, the |
| 434 |
organization or individual issued such a certificate may not want to |
| 435 |
associate themselves with a certificate; for example, a private |
| 436 |
individual with a certificate for a single telephone number might not |
| 437 |
want to distribute that certificate publicly if every verifier |
| 438 |
immediately knew their name. The certification authorities issuing |
| 439 |
certificates with the TN Authorization List extensions may, in |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
accordance with their policies, obscure the identity of the subject, |
| 450 |
though mechanisms for doing so are outside the scope of this |
| 451 |
document. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Provisioning Private Keying Material</span> |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
In order for authentication services to sign calls via the procedures |
| 456 |
described in [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>], they must hold a private key corresponding to |
| 457 |
a certificate with authority over the calling number. [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>] |
| 458 |
does not require that any particular entity in a SIP deployment |
| 459 |
architecture sign requests, only that it be an entity with an |
| 460 |
appropriate private key; the authentication service role may be |
| 461 |
instantiated by any entity in a SIP network. For a certificate |
| 462 |
granting authority only over a particular number that has been issued |
| 463 |
to an end user, for example, an end-user device might hold the |
| 464 |
private key and generate the signature. In the case of a service |
| 465 |
provider with authority over large blocks of numbers, an intermediary |
| 466 |
might hold the private key and sign calls. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
The specification RECOMMENDS distribution of private keys through |
| 469 |
PKCS #8 objects signed by a trusted entity -- for example, through |
| 470 |
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) package specified in |
| 471 |
[<a href="./rfc5958" title=""Asymmetric Key Packages"">RFC5958</a>]. |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures</span> |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
This specification documents multiple ways that a verifier can gain |
| 476 |
access to the credentials needed to verify a request. As the |
| 477 |
validity of certificates does not depend on the method of their |
| 478 |
acquisition, there is no need to standardize any single mechanism for |
| 479 |
this purpose. All entities that comply with [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>] necessarily |
| 480 |
support SIP, and consequently SIP itself can serve as a way to |
| 481 |
deliver certificates. [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>] provides an "info" parameter of the |
| 482 |
Identity header; this parameter contains a URI for the credential |
| 483 |
used to generate the Identity header. [<a href="./rfc8224" title=""Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC8224</a>] also requires that |
| 484 |
documents that define credential systems list the URI schemes that |
| 485 |
may be present in the "info" parameter. For implementations |
| 486 |
compliant with this specification, three URI schemes are REQUIRED: |
| 487 |
the CID URI, the SIP URI, and the HTTP URI. |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
The simplest way for a verifier to acquire the certificate needed to |
| 490 |
verify a signature is for the certificate to be conveyed in a |
| 491 |
SIP request along with the signature itself. In SIP, for example, a |
| 492 |
certificate could be carried in a multipart MIME body [<a href="./rfc2046" title=""Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types"">RFC2046</a>], and |
| 493 |
the URI in the Identity header "info" parameter could specify that |
| 494 |
body with a CID URI [<a href="./rfc2392" title=""Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators"">RFC2392</a>]. However, in many environments this |
| 495 |
is not feasible due to message size restrictions or lack of necessary |
| 496 |
support for multipart MIME. |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
The Identity header "info" parameter in a SIP request may contain a |
| 506 |
URI that the verifier dereferences. Implementations of this |
| 507 |
specification are REQUIRED to support the use of SIP for this |
| 508 |
function (via the SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY mechanism) as well as HTTP and |
| 509 |
HTTPS. |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
Note well that as an optimization, a verifier may have access to a |
| 512 |
service, a cache, or other local store that grants access to |
| 513 |
certificates for a particular telephone number. However, there may |
| 514 |
be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for |
| 515 |
a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some |
| 516 |
discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials. |
| 517 |
The Identity header "info" parameter itself can serve as such a |
| 518 |
discriminator, provided implementations use that parameter as a key |
| 519 |
when accessing certificates from caches or other sources. |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax</span> |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
Certificate subjects are limited to specific values for PASSporT |
| 524 |
claims with the JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension; issuers |
| 525 |
permit all claims by omitting the JWT Claim Constraints certificate |
| 526 |
extension from the certificate's extension field [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]. The |
| 527 |
extension is non-critical, applicable only to end-entity |
| 528 |
certificates, and defined with ASN.1 [<a href="#ref-X.680" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation"">X.680</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.681" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification"">X.681</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.682" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification"">X.682</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.683" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications"">X.683</a>] |
| 529 |
later in this section. The syntax of the claims is given in |
| 530 |
PASSporT; specifying new claims follows the procedures in <a href="./rfc8225#section-8.3">[RFC8225], |
| 531 |
Section 8.3</a>. |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
This certificate extension is optional, but if present, it constrains |
| 534 |
the claims that authentication services may include in the PASSporT |
| 535 |
objects they sign. Constraints are applied by issuers and enforced |
| 536 |
by verifiers when validating PASSporT claims as follows: |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
1. mustInclude indicates claims that MUST appear in the PASSporT in |
| 539 |
addition to iat, orig, and dest. The baseline claims of PASSporT |
| 540 |
("iat", "orig", and "dest") are considered to be permitted by |
| 541 |
default and SHOULD NOT be included. If mustInclude is absent, |
| 542 |
iat, orig, and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT. |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
2. permittedValues indicates that if the claim name is present, the |
| 545 |
claim MUST contain one of the listed values. |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
Consider two examples with a PASSporT claim called "confidence" with |
| 562 |
values "low", "medium", and "high": |
| 563 |
|
| 564 |
o If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that |
| 565 |
contains the mustInclude JWTClaimName "confidence", then an |
| 566 |
authentication service MUST include the "confidence" claim in all |
| 567 |
PASSporTs it generates; a verification service will treat as |
| 568 |
invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT claim that |
| 569 |
does not include the "confidence" claim. |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
o If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that |
| 572 |
contains the permittedValues JWTClaimName "confidence" and a |
| 573 |
permitted "high" value, then an authentication service will treat |
| 574 |
as invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT claim that |
| 575 |
does not include the "confidence" claim with a "high" value. |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension is identified by the |
| 578 |
following object identifier (OID), which is defined under the id-pe |
| 579 |
OID arc defined in [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>] and managed by IANA (see <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a>): |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 27 } |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension has the following |
| 584 |
syntax: |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 587 |
mustInclude [0] JWTClaimNames OPTIONAL, |
| 588 |
-- The listed claim names MUST appear in the PASSporT |
| 589 |
-- in addition to iat, orig, and dest. If absent, iat, orig, |
| 590 |
-- and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT. |
| 591 |
permittedValues [1] JWTClaimPermittedValuesList OPTIONAL } |
| 592 |
-- If the claim name is present, the claim MUST contain one of |
| 593 |
-- the listed values. |
| 594 |
( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mustInclude PRESENT } | |
| 595 |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedValues PRESENT } ) |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
JWTClaimPermittedValuesList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF |
| 598 |
JWTClaimPermittedValues |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
JWTClaimPermittedValues ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 601 |
claim JWTClaimName, |
| 602 |
permitted SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String } |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
JWTClaimNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimName |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
JWTClaimName ::= IA5String |
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. TN Authorization List Syntax</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List |
| 620 |
extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are |
| 621 |
assigned or delegated. When a verifier is validating a caller's |
| 622 |
identity, local policy always determines the circumstances under |
| 623 |
which any particular subject may be trusted, but the purpose of the |
| 624 |
TN Authorization List extension in particular is to allow a verifier |
| 625 |
to ascertain when the CA has designated that the subject has |
| 626 |
authority over a particular telephone number or number range. The |
| 627 |
non-critical TN Authorization List certificate extension is included |
| 628 |
in the certificate's extension field [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]. The extension is |
| 629 |
defined with ASN.1 [<a href="#ref-X.680" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation"">X.680</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.681" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification"">X.681</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.682" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification"">X.682</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.683" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications"">X.683</a>]. The syntax and |
| 630 |
semantics of the extension are as follows. |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List |
| 633 |
extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are |
| 634 |
assigned or delegated. In an end-entity certificate, the TN |
| 635 |
Authorization List indicates the TNs that it has authorized. In a CA |
| 636 |
certificate, the TN Authorization List limits the set of TNs for |
| 637 |
certification paths that include this certificate. |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
The TN Authorization List certificate extension is identified by the |
| 640 |
following object identifier (OID), which is defined under the id-pe |
| 641 |
OID arc defined in [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>] and managed by IANA (see <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a>): |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 } |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
The TN Authorization List certificate extension has the following |
| 646 |
syntax: |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
TNEntry ::= CHOICE { |
| 651 |
spc [0] ServiceProviderCode, |
| 652 |
range [1] TelephoneNumberRange, |
| 653 |
one [2] TelephoneNumber |
| 654 |
} |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
ServiceProviderCode ::= IA5String |
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
-- SPCs may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other SP identifiers |
| 659 |
-- from the telephone network. |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 674 |
start TelephoneNumber, |
| 675 |
count INTEGER (2..MAX), |
| 676 |
... |
| 677 |
} |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
TelephoneNumber ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789#*")) |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the |
| 682 |
authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one |
| 683 |
or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized |
| 684 |
for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify |
| 685 |
the block: |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
1. SPCs as described in this document are a generic term for the |
| 688 |
identifiers used to designate service providers in telephone |
| 689 |
networks today. In North American context, these would include |
| 690 |
OCNs as specified in [<a href="#ref-ATIS-0300251">ATIS-0300251</a>], related SPIDs, or other |
| 691 |
similar identifiers for service providers. SPCs can be used to |
| 692 |
indirectly name all of the telephone numbers associated with that |
| 693 |
identifier for a service provider. |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range (in the |
| 696 |
TelephoneNumberRange format), which consists of a starting |
| 697 |
telephone number and then an integer count of numbers within the |
| 698 |
range, where the valid boundaries of ranges may vary according to |
| 699 |
national policies. The count field is only applicable to start |
| 700 |
fields whose values do not include "*" or "#" (i.e., a |
| 701 |
TelephoneNumber that does not include "*" or "#"). count |
| 702 |
MUST NOT make the number increase in length (i.e., a |
| 703 |
TelephoneNumberRange with TelephoneNumber=10 and count=91 is |
| 704 |
invalid); formally, given the inputs count and TelephoneNumber of |
| 705 |
length D, TelephoneNumber + count MUST be less than 10^D. |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
3. A single telephone number can be listed (as a TelephoneNumber). |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate |
| 710 |
many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular |
| 711 |
certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent |
| 712 |
the certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the |
| 713 |
TN Authorization List may be given by reference rather than by value, |
| 714 |
through the presence of a separate certificate extension that permits |
| 715 |
verifiers to either (1) securely download the list of numbers |
| 716 |
associated with a certificate or (2) verify that a single number is |
| 717 |
under the authority of this certificate. For more on this |
| 718 |
optimization, see <a href="#section-10.1">Section 10.1</a>. |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Certificate Freshness and Revocation</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
Regardless of which of the approaches in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> is followed for |
| 732 |
using certificates, a certificate verification mechanism is required. |
| 733 |
However, the traditional problem of certificate freshness gains a new |
| 734 |
wrinkle when using the TN Authorization List extension with telephone |
| 735 |
numbers or number ranges (as opposed to SPCs), because verifiers must |
| 736 |
establish not only that a certificate remains valid but also that the |
| 737 |
certificate's scope contains the telephone number that the verifier |
| 738 |
is validating. Dynamic changes to number assignments can occur due |
| 739 |
to number portability, for example. So, even if a verifier has a |
| 740 |
valid cached certificate for a telephone number (or a range |
| 741 |
containing the number), the verifier must determine that the entity |
| 742 |
that created the PASSporT, which includes a digital signature, is |
| 743 |
still a proper authority for that number. |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
To verify the status of such a certificate, the verifier needs to |
| 746 |
acquire the certificate if necessary (via the methods described in |
| 747 |
<a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>) and then would need to either: |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
a. Rely on short-lived certificates and not check the certificate's |
| 750 |
status, or |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
b. Rely on status information from the authority (e.g., the Online |
| 753 |
Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)). |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
The trade-off between short-lived certificates and using status |
| 756 |
information is that the former's burden is on the front end (i.e., |
| 757 |
enrollment) and the latter's burden is on the back end (i.e., |
| 758 |
verification). Both impact call setup time, but some approaches to |
| 759 |
generating a short-lived certificate, like requiring one for each |
| 760 |
call, would incur a greater operational cost than acquiring status |
| 761 |
information. This document makes no particular recommendation for a |
| 762 |
means of determining certificate freshness for STIR, as this requires |
| 763 |
further study and implementation experience. Acquiring online status |
| 764 |
information for certificates has the potential to disclose private |
| 765 |
information [<a href="./rfc7258" title=""Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack"">RFC7258</a>] if proper precautions are not taken. Future |
| 766 |
specifications that define certificate freshness mechanisms for STIR |
| 767 |
MUST note any such risks and provide countermeasures where possible. |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Acquiring the TN List by Reference</span> |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
One alternative to checking certificate status for a particular |
| 788 |
telephone number is simply acquiring the TN Authorization List by |
| 789 |
reference, that is, through dereferencing a URL in the certificate, |
| 790 |
rather than including the value of the TN Authorization List in the |
| 791 |
certificate itself. |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
Acquiring a list of the telephone numbers associated with a |
| 794 |
certificate or its subject lends itself to an application-layer |
| 795 |
query/response interaction outside of certificate status, one that |
| 796 |
could be initiated through a separate URI included in the |
| 797 |
certificate. The AIA extension (see [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]) supports such a |
| 798 |
mechanism: it designates an OID to identify the accessMethod and an |
| 799 |
accessLocation, which would most likely be a URI. A verifier would |
| 800 |
then follow the URI to ascertain whether the TNs in the list are |
| 801 |
authorized for use by the caller. As with the certificate extension |
| 802 |
defined in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>, a URI dereferenced from an end-entity |
| 803 |
certificate will indicate the TNs that the caller has been |
| 804 |
authorized. Verifiers MUST support the AIA extension, and the |
| 805 |
dereferenced URI from a CA certificate limits the set of TNs for |
| 806 |
certification paths that include this certificate. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
HTTPS is the most obvious candidate for a protocol to be used for |
| 809 |
fetching the list of telephone numbers associated with a particular |
| 810 |
certificate. This document defines a new AIA accessMethod, called |
| 811 |
"id-ad-stirTNList", which uses the following AIA OID: |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
id-ad-stirTNList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 14 } |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
When the "id-ad-stirTNList" accessMethod is used, the accessLocation |
| 816 |
MUST be an HTTPS URI. Dereferencing the URI will return the complete |
| 817 |
DER-encoded TN Authorization List (see <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>) for the certificate |
| 818 |
with a Content-Type of application/tnauthlist (see <a href="#section-11.2">Section 11.2</a>). |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
Delivering the entire list of telephone numbers associated with a |
| 821 |
particular certificate will divulge to STIR verifiers information |
| 822 |
about telephone numbers other than the one associated with the |
| 823 |
particular call that the verifier is checking. In some environments, |
| 824 |
where STIR verifiers handle a high volume of calls, maintaining an |
| 825 |
up-to-date and complete cache for the numbers associated with crucial |
| 826 |
certificate holders could give an important boost to performance. |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.1" href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. ASN.1 Registrations</span> |
| 844 |
|
| 845 |
This document makes use of object identifiers for the TN certificate |
| 846 |
extension defined in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>, the "TN List by reference" AIA access |
| 847 |
descriptor defined in <a href="#section-10.1">Section 10.1</a>, and the ASN.1 module identifier |
| 848 |
defined in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Therefore, per this document, IANA has made |
| 849 |
the following assignments, as shown on |
| 850 |
<<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers">https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers</a>>: |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
o TN Authorization List certificate extension in the "SMI Security |
| 853 |
for PKIX Certificate Extension" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1) registry: |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
26 id-pe-TNAuthList |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
o JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension in the "SMI Security |
| 858 |
for PKIX Certificate Extension" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1) registry: |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
27 id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints |
| 861 |
|
| 862 |
o TN List by reference access descriptor in the "SMI Security for |
| 863 |
PKIX Access Descriptor" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48) registry: |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
14 id-ad-stirTNList |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
o The TN ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module |
| 868 |
Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry: |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
89 id-mod-tn-module |
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.2" href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Media Type Registrations</span> |
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
Type name: application |
| 875 |
Subtype name: tnauthlist |
| 876 |
Required parameters: None |
| 877 |
Optional parameters: None |
| 878 |
Encoding considerations: Binary |
| 879 |
Security considerations: See <a href="./rfc8226#section-12">Section 12 of RFC 8226</a> |
| 880 |
Interoperability considerations: |
| 881 |
The TN Authorization List inside this media type MUST be |
| 882 |
DER-encoded TNAuthorizationList. |
| 883 |
Published specification: <a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> |
| 884 |
Applications that use this media type: |
| 885 |
Issuers and relying parties of secure telephone identity |
| 886 |
certificates, to limit the subject's authority to a |
| 887 |
particular telephone number or telephone number range. |
| 888 |
Fragment identifier considerations: None |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
Additional information: |
| 898 |
Deprecated alias names for this type: None |
| 899 |
Magic number(s): None |
| 900 |
File extension(s): None |
| 901 |
Macintosh File Type Code(s): None |
| 902 |
Person & email address to contact for further information: |
| 903 |
Jon Peterson <[email protected]> |
| 904 |
Intended usage: COMMON |
| 905 |
Restrictions on usage: None |
| 906 |
Author: Sean Turner <[email protected]> |
| 907 |
Change controller: The IESG <[email protected]> |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 910 |
|
| 911 |
This document is entirely about security. For further information on |
| 912 |
certificate security and practices, see [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>], in particular its |
| 913 |
Security Considerations section. |
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
If a certification authority issues a certificate attesting authority |
| 916 |
over many telephone numbers, the TNAuthList element can divulge to |
| 917 |
relying parties extraneous telephone numbers associated with the |
| 918 |
certificate that have no bearing on any given call in progress. The |
| 919 |
potential privacy risk can be exacerbated by the use of AIA, as |
| 920 |
described in <a href="#section-10.1">Section 10.1</a>, to link many thousands of numbers to a |
| 921 |
single certificate. Even an SPC in a certificate can be used to link |
| 922 |
a certificate to a particular carrier and, with access to industry |
| 923 |
databases, potentially the set of numbers associated with that SPC. |
| 924 |
While these practices may not cause concern in some environments, in |
| 925 |
other scenarios alternative approaches could minimize the data |
| 926 |
revealed to relying parties. For example, a service provider with |
| 927 |
authority over a large block of numbers could generate short-lived |
| 928 |
certificates for individual TNs that are not so easily linked to the |
| 929 |
service provider or any other numbers that the service provider |
| 930 |
controls. Optimizations to facilitate acquiring short-lived |
| 931 |
certificates are a potential area of future work for STIR. |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
The TN Authorization List returned through a dereferenced URI is |
| 934 |
served over HTTPS; the TN Authorization List is therefore protected |
| 935 |
in transit. But, the TN Authorization List served is not a signed |
| 936 |
object and therefore the server is trusted to faithfully return the |
| 937 |
TN Authorization List provided to it by the list generator. |
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. References</span> |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.1" href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 956 |
|
| 957 |
[<a id="ref-ATIS-0300251">ATIS-0300251</a>] |
| 958 |
ATIS Recommendation 0300251, "Codes for Identification of |
| 959 |
Service Providers for Information Exchange", 2007. |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
[<a id="ref-DSS">DSS</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. |
| 962 |
Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard |
| 963 |
(DSS)", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4, |
| 964 |
July 2013, <<a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf">http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/</a> |
| 965 |
<a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf">NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf</a>>. |
| 966 |
|
| 967 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 968 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 969 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 970 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2392">RFC2392</a>] Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource |
| 973 |
Locators", <a href="./rfc2392">RFC 2392</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2392, August 1998, |
| 974 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2392">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2392</a>>. |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform |
| 977 |
Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, |
| 978 |
<a href="./rfc3986">RFC 3986</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005, |
| 979 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>>. |
| 980 |
|
| 981 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., |
| 982 |
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key |
| 983 |
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List |
| 984 |
(CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, |
| 985 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>>. |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5912">RFC5912</a>] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the |
| 988 |
Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>, |
| 989 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010, |
| 990 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912</a>>. |
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5958">RFC5958</a>] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", <a href="./rfc5958">RFC 5958</a>, |
| 993 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010, |
| 994 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958</a>>. |
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext |
| 997 |
Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing", |
| 998 |
<a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014, |
| 999 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>>. |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7258">RFC7258</a>] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an |
| 1010 |
Attack", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp188">BCP 188</a>, <a href="./rfc7258">RFC 7258</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258, |
| 1011 |
May 2014, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258</a>>. |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7519">RFC7519</a>] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token |
| 1014 |
(JWT)", <a href="./rfc7519">RFC 7519</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015, |
| 1015 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519</a>>. |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8017">RFC8017</a>] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch, |
| 1018 |
"PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2", |
| 1019 |
<a href="./rfc8017">RFC 8017</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016, |
| 1020 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017</a>>. |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in |
| 1023 |
<a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, |
| 1024 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017, |
| 1025 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>>. |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8224">RFC8224</a>] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt, |
| 1028 |
"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session |
| 1029 |
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc8224">RFC 8224</a>, |
| 1030 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018, |
| 1031 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224</a>>. |
| 1032 |
|
| 1033 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8225">RFC8225</a>] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion |
| 1034 |
Token", <a href="./rfc8225">RFC 8225</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018, |
| 1035 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225</a>>. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
[<a id="ref-X.509">X.509</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information |
| 1038 |
technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: |
| 1039 |
Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T |
| 1040 |
Recommendation X.509, ISO/IEC 9594-8, October 2016, |
| 1041 |
<<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509</a>>. |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
[<a id="ref-X.680">X.680</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information |
| 1044 |
Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): |
| 1045 |
Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation |
| 1046 |
X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1, August 2015, |
| 1047 |
<<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680</a>>. |
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
[<a id="ref-X.681">X.681</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information |
| 1050 |
Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): |
| 1051 |
Information object specification", ITU-T Recommendation |
| 1052 |
X.681, ISO/IEC 8824-2, August 2015, |
| 1053 |
<<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.681">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.681</a>>. |
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
[<a id="ref-X.682">X.682</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information |
| 1066 |
Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): |
| 1067 |
Constraint specification", ITU-T Recommendation |
| 1068 |
X.682, ISO/IEC 8824-3, August 2015, |
| 1069 |
<<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.682">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.682</a>>. |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
[<a id="ref-X.683">X.683</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information |
| 1072 |
Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): |
| 1073 |
Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications", ITU-T |
| 1074 |
Recommendation X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4, August 2015, |
| 1075 |
<<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.683">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.683</a>>. |
| 1076 |
|
| 1077 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.2" href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1078 |
|
| 1079 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2046">RFC2046</a>] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail |
| 1080 |
Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", <a href="./rfc2046">RFC 2046</a>, |
| 1081 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996, |
| 1082 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046</a>>. |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3647">RFC3647</a>] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S. |
| 1085 |
Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate |
| 1086 |
Policy and Certification Practices Framework", <a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a>, |
| 1087 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003, |
| 1088 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647</a>>. |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7340">RFC7340</a>] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure |
| 1091 |
Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements", |
| 1092 |
<a href="./rfc7340">RFC 7340</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014, |
| 1093 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340</a>>. |
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7375">RFC7375</a>] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model", |
| 1096 |
<a href="./rfc7375">RFC 7375</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014, |
| 1097 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375</a>>. |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
[<a id="ref-X.520">X.520</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information |
| 1100 |
technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: |
| 1101 |
Selected attribute types", ITU-T Recommendation |
| 1102 |
X.520, ISO/IEC 9594-6, October 2016, |
| 1103 |
<<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.520">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.520</a>>. |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
|
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
|
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
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| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. ASN.1 Module</span> |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [<a href="#ref-X.680" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation"">X.680</a>] definitions for |
| 1124 |
the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as |
| 1125 |
defined in [<a href="#ref-X.680" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation"">X.680</a>], [<a href="#ref-X.681" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification"">X.681</a>], [<a href="#ref-X.682" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification"">X.682</a>], and [<a href="#ref-X.683" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications"">X.683</a>]. |
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 |
The modules defined in this document are compatible with the most |
| 1128 |
current ASN.1 specifications published in 2015 (see [<a href="#ref-X.680" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation"">X.680</a>], [<a href="#ref-X.681" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification"">X.681</a>], |
| 1129 |
[<a href="#ref-X.682" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification"">X.682</a>], and [<a href="#ref-X.683" title=""Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications"">X.683</a>]). None of the newly defined tokens in the 2008 |
| 1130 |
ASN.1 (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI, |
| 1131 |
RELATIVE-OID-IRI, TIME, TIME-OF-DAY) are currently used in any of the |
| 1132 |
ASN.1 specifications referred to here. |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
This ASN.1 module imports ASN.1 from [<a href="./rfc5912" title=""New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)"">RFC5912</a>]. |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
TN-Module-2016 |
| 1137 |
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) |
| 1138 |
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tn-module(89) } |
| 1139 |
|
| 1140 |
DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN |
| 1141 |
|
| 1142 |
IMPORTS |
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 |
id-ad, id-pe |
| 1145 |
FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a> |
| 1146 |
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) |
| 1147 |
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) } |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
EXTENSION |
| 1150 |
FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a> |
| 1151 |
{ iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5) |
| 1152 |
mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) } |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
; |
| 1155 |
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| 1156 |
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| 1157 |
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| 1158 |
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| 1159 |
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| 1160 |
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| 1161 |
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| 1162 |
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| 1163 |
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| 1164 |
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| 1165 |
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| 1166 |
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| 1167 |
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| 1168 |
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| 1169 |
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| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
-- |
| 1178 |
-- JWT Claim Constraints Certificate Extension |
| 1179 |
-- |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
ext-jwtClaimConstraints EXTENSION ::= { |
| 1182 |
SYNTAX JWTClaimConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints |
| 1183 |
} |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 27 } |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1188 |
mustInclude [0] JWTClaimNames OPTIONAL, |
| 1189 |
-- The listed claim names MUST appear in the PASSporT |
| 1190 |
-- in addition to iat, orig, and dest. If absent, iat, orig, |
| 1191 |
-- and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT. |
| 1192 |
permittedValues [1] JWTClaimPermittedValuesList OPTIONAL } |
| 1193 |
-- If the claim name is present, the claim MUST contain one of |
| 1194 |
-- the listed values. |
| 1195 |
( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mustInclude PRESENT } | |
| 1196 |
WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedValues PRESENT } ) |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
JWTClaimPermittedValuesList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) Of |
| 1199 |
JWTClaimPermittedValues |
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
JWTClaimPermittedValues ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1202 |
claim JWTClaimName, |
| 1203 |
permitted SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String } |
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 |
JWTClaimNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimName |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
JWTClaimName ::= IA5String |
| 1208 |
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| 1209 |
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| 1210 |
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| 1211 |
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| 1212 |
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| 1213 |
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| 1214 |
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| 1215 |
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| 1216 |
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| 1217 |
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| 1218 |
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| 1219 |
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| 1220 |
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| 1221 |
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| 1222 |
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| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
-- |
| 1234 |
-- Telephony Number Authorization List Certificate Extension |
| 1235 |
-- |
| 1236 |
|
| 1237 |
ext-tnAuthList EXTENSION ::= { |
| 1238 |
SYNTAX TNAuthorizationList IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-TNAuthList |
| 1239 |
} |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 } |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry |
| 1244 |
|
| 1245 |
TNEntry ::= CHOICE { |
| 1246 |
spc [0] ServiceProviderCode, |
| 1247 |
range [1] TelephoneNumberRange, |
| 1248 |
one [2] TelephoneNumber |
| 1249 |
} |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
ServiceProviderCode ::= IA5String |
| 1252 |
|
| 1253 |
-- SPCs may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other SP identifiers |
| 1254 |
-- from the telephone network. |
| 1255 |
|
| 1256 |
TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 1257 |
start TelephoneNumber, |
| 1258 |
count INTEGER (2..MAX), |
| 1259 |
... |
| 1260 |
} |
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
TelephoneNumber ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789#*")) |
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
-- TN Access Descriptor |
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 |
id-ad-stirTNList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 14 } |
| 1267 |
|
| 1268 |
END |
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 |
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| 1273 |
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| 1274 |
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| 1275 |
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| 1276 |
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| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
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| 1279 |
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| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
Acknowledgments |
| 1290 |
|
| 1291 |
Anders Kristensen, Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings, Dave |
| 1292 |
Crocker, Tony Rutkowski, John Braunberger, Eric Rescorla, and Martin |
| 1293 |
Thomson provided key input to the discussions leading to this |
| 1294 |
document. Russ Housley provided some direct assistance and text |
| 1295 |
surrounding the ASN.1 module. |
| 1296 |
|
| 1297 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1298 |
|
| 1299 |
Jon Peterson |
| 1300 |
Neustar, Inc. |
| 1301 |
|
| 1302 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 1303 |
|
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
Sean Turner |
| 1306 |
sn3rd |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
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| 1311 |
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| 1312 |
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| 1313 |
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| 1314 |
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| 1315 |
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| 1316 |
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| 1317 |
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| 1318 |
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| 1319 |
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| 1320 |
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| 1321 |
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| 1322 |
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| 1323 |
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| 1324 |
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| 1325 |
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| 1326 |
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| 1327 |
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| 1328 |
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| 1329 |
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| 1330 |
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| 1331 |
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| 1332 |
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| 1333 |
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| 1334 |
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| 1335 |
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| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
Peterson & Turner Standards Track [Page 24] |
| 1341 |
</pre> |