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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Peterson
2 Request for Comments: 8226 Neustar
3 Category: Standards Track S. Turner
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 sn3rd
5 February 2018
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Secure Telephone Identity Credentials: Certificates</span>
9
10 Abstract
11
12 In order to prevent the impersonation of telephone numbers on the
13 Internet, some kind of credential system needs to exist that
14 cryptographically asserts authority over telephone numbers. This
15 document describes the use of certificates in establishing authority
16 over telephone numbers, as a component of a broader architecture for
17 managing telephone numbers as identities in protocols like SIP.
18
19 Status of This Memo
20
21 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
22
23 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
24 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
25 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
26 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
27 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
28
29 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
30 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
31 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8226</a>.
32
33 Copyright Notice
34
35 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
36 document authors. All rights reserved.
37
38 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
39 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
40 (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
41 publication of this document. Please review these documents
42 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
43 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
44 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
45 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
46 described in the Simplified BSD License.
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a>
60 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology .....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
61 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates .................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
62 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Certificate Usage with STIR .....................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
63 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Enrollment and Authorization Using the TN Authorization List ....<a href="#page-6">6</a>
64 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Constraints on Signing PASSporTs ...........................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
65 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure ..................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
66 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Provisioning Private Keying Material ............................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
67 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures ......................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
68 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax ...................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
69 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. TN Authorization List Syntax ...................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
70 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. Certificate Freshness and Revocation ..........................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
71 <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Acquiring the TN List by Reference .......................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
72 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. IANA Considerations ...........................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
73 <a href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. ASN.1 Registrations ......................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
74 <a href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Media Type Registrations .................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
75 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. Security Considerations .......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
76 <a href="#section-13">13</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
77 <a href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
78 <a href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
79 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. ASN.1 Module ..........................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
80 Acknowledgments ...................................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
81 Authors' Addresses ................................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
82
83 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
84
85 The Secure Telephone Identity Revisited (STIR) problem statement
86 [<a href="./rfc7340" title="&quot;Secure Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements&quot;">RFC7340</a>] identifies the primary enabler of robocalling, vishing
87 (voicemail hacking), swatting, and related attacks as the capability
88 to impersonate a calling party number. The starkest examples of
89 these attacks are cases where automated callees on the Public
90 Switched Telephone Network (PSTN) rely on the calling number as a
91 security measure -- for example, to access a voicemail system.
92 Robocallers use impersonation as a means of obscuring identity.
93 While robocallers can, in the ordinary PSTN, block (that is,
94 withhold) their caller identity, callees are less likely to pick up
95 calls from blocked identities; therefore, appearing to call from some
96 number, any number, is preferable. Robocallers, however, prefer not
97 to call from a number that can trace back to the robocaller, and
98 therefore they impersonate numbers that are not assigned to them.
99
100 One of the most important components of a system to prevent
101 impersonation is the implementation of credentials that identify the
102 parties who control telephone numbers. With these credentials,
103 parties can assert that they are in fact authorized to use telephony
104 numbers (TNs), and thus they distinguish themselves from
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
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110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
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112
113 impersonators unable to present such credentials. For that reason,
114 the STIR threat model [<a href="./rfc7375" title="&quot;Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model&quot;">RFC7375</a>] stipulates that "The design of the
115 credential system envisioned as a solution to these threats must, for
116 example, limit the scope of the credentials issued to carriers or
117 national authorities to those numbers that fall under their purview."
118 This document describes credential systems for telephone numbers
119 based on [<a href="#ref-X.509" title="&quot;Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks&quot;">X.509</a>] version 3 certificates in accordance with [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>].
120 While telephone numbers have long been part of the X.509 standard
121 (X.509 supports arbitrary naming attributes to be included in a
122 certificate; the telephoneNumber attribute was defined in the 1988
123 [<a href="#ref-X.520" title="&quot;Information technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory: Selected attribute types&quot;">X.520</a>] specification), this document provides ways to determine
124 authority more aligned with telephone network requirements, including
125 extending X.509 with a Telephony Number Authorization List
126 certificate extension, which binds certificates to asserted authority
127 for particular telephone numbers or, potentially, telephone number
128 blocks or ranges.
129
130 In the STIR in-band architecture specified in [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>], two basic
131 types of entities need access to these credentials: authentication
132 services and verification services (or verifiers). An authentication
133 service must be operated by an entity enrolled with the certification
134 authority (CA) (see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>), whereas a verifier need only trust
135 the trust anchor of the authority and also have a means to access and
136 validate the public keys associated with these certificates.
137 Although the guidance in this document is written with the STIR
138 in-band architecture in mind, the credential system described in this
139 document could be useful for other protocols that want to make use of
140 certificates to assert authority over telephone numbers on the
141 Internet.
142
143 This document specifies only the credential syntax and semantics
144 necessary to support this architecture. It does not assume any
145 particular CA or deployment environment. We anticipate that some
146 deployment experience will be necessary to determine optimal
147 operational models.
148
149 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology</span>
150
151 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
152 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
153 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
154 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
155 capitals, as shown here.
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
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166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
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168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Authority for Telephone Numbers in Certificates</span>
170
171 At a high level, this specification details two non-exclusive
172 approaches that can be employed to determine authority over telephone
173 numbers with certificates.
174
175 The first approach is to leverage the existing subject of the
176 certificate to ascertain that the holder of the certificate is
177 authorized to claim authority over a telephone number. The subject
178 might be represented as a domain name in the subjectAltName, such as
179 an "example.net" where that domain is known to relying parties as a
180 carrier, or represented with other identifiers related to the
181 operation of the telephone network, including Service Provider Codes
182 (SPCs) such as Operating Company Numbers (OCNs) or Service Provider
183 Identifiers (SPIDs) via the TN Authorization List specified in this
184 document. A relying party could then employ an external data set or
185 service that determines whether or not a specific telephone number is
186 under the authority of the carrier identified as the subject of the
187 certificate and use that to ascertain whether or not the carrier
188 should have authority over a telephone number. Potentially, a
189 certificate extension to convey the URI of such an information
190 service trusted by the issuer of the certificate could be developed
191 (though this specification does not propose one). Alternatively,
192 some relying parties could form bilateral or multilateral trust
193 relationships with peer carriers, trusting one another's assertions
194 just as telephone carriers in the Signaling System 7 (SS7) network
195 today rely on transitive trust when displaying the calling party
196 telephone number received through SS7 signaling.
197
198 The second approach is to extend the syntax of certificates to
199 include a new attribute, defined here as the TN Authorization List,
200 which contains a list of telephone numbers defining the scope of
201 authority of the certificate. Relying parties, if they trust the
202 issuer of the certificate as a source of authoritative information on
203 telephone numbers, could therefore use the TN Authorization List
204 instead of the subject of the certificate to make a decision about
205 whether or not the signer has authority over a particular telephone
206 number. The TN Authorization List could be provided in one of two
207 ways: as a literal value in the certificate or as a network service
208 that allows relying parties to query in real time to determine that a
209 telephone number is in the scope of a certificate. Using the TN
210 Authorization List rather than the certificate subject makes sense
211 when, for example, for privacy reasons the certificate owner would
212 prefer not to be identified, or in cases where the holder of the
213 certificate does not participate in the sort of traditional carrier
214 infrastructure that the first approach assumes.
215
216
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
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224
225 The first approach requires little change to existing Public Key
226 Infrastructure (PKI) certificates; for the second approach, we must
227 define an appropriate enrollment and authorization process. For the
228 purposes of STIR, the over-the-wire format specified in [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>]
229 accommodates either of these approaches: the methods for
230 canonicalizing, for signing, for identifying and accessing the
231 certificate, and so on remain the same; it is only the verifier
232 behavior and authorization decision that will change, depending on
233 the approach to telephone number authority taken by the certificate.
234 For that reason, the two approaches are not mutually exclusive, and
235 in fact a certificate issued to a traditional telephone network
236 service provider could contain a TN Authorization List or not, were
237 it supported by the CA issuing the credential. Regardless of which
238 approach is used, certificates that assert authority over telephone
239 numbers are subject to the ordinary operational procedures that
240 govern certificate use per [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]. This means that verification
241 services must be mindful of the need to ensure that they trust the
242 trust anchor that issued the certificate and that they have some
243 means to determine the freshness of the certificate (see <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>).
244
245 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Certificate Usage with STIR</span>
246
247 <a href="./rfc8224#section-7.4">[RFC8224], Section&nbsp;7.4</a> requires that all credential systems used by
248 STIR explain how they address the requirements enumerated below.
249 Certificates as described in this document address the STIR
250 requirements as follows:
251
252 1. The URI [<a href="./rfc3986" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;">RFC3986</a>] schemes permitted in the SIP Identity header
253 "info" parameter, as well as any special procedures required to
254 dereference the URIs: while normative text is given below in
255 <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>, this mechanism permits the HTTP [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>], CID
256 (Content-ID) [<a href="./rfc2392" title="&quot;Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators&quot;">RFC2392</a>], and SIP URI schemes to appear in the
257 "info" parameter.
258
259 2. Procedures required to extract keying material from the resources
260 designated by the URI: implementations perform no special
261 procedures beyond dereferencing the "info" URI. See <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>.
262
263 3. Procedures used by the verification service to determine the
264 scope of the credential: this specification effectively proposes
265 two methods, as outlined in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>: one where the subject (or,
266 more properly, subjectAltName) of the certificate indicates the
267 scope of authority through a domain name, and relying parties
268 either trust the subject entirely or have some direct means of
269 determining whether or not a number falls under a subject's
270 authority; and another where an extension to the certificate as
271 described in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> identifies the scope of authority of the
272 certificate.
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
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278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
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280
281 4. The cryptographic algorithms required to validate the
282 credentials: for this specification, that means the signature
283 algorithms used to sign certificates. This specification
284 REQUIRES that implementations support both the Elliptic Curve
285 Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) with the P-256 curve (see
286 [<a href="#ref-DSS" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">DSS</a>]) and RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 ("PKCS" stands for "Public-Key
287 Cryptography Standards") (see <a href="./rfc8017#section-8.2">[RFC8017], Section&nbsp;8.2</a>) for
288 certificate signatures. Implementers are advised that the latter
289 algorithm is mandated only as a transitional mechanism, due to
290 its widespread use in existing PKIs, but we anticipate that this
291 mechanism will eventually be deprecated.
292
293 5. Finally, note that all certificates compliant with this
294 specification:
295
296 * MUST provide cryptographic keying material sufficient to
297 generate the ECDSA using P-256 and SHA-256 signatures
298 necessary to support the ES256 hashed signatures required by
299 PASSporT [<a href="./rfc8225" title="&quot;PASSporT: Personal Assertion Token&quot;">RFC8225</a>], which in turn follows the JSON Web Token
300 (JWT) [<a href="./rfc7519" title="&quot;JSON Web Token (JWT)&quot;">RFC7519</a>].
301
302 * MUST support both ECDSA with P-256 and RSA PKCS #1 v1.5 for
303 certificate signature verification.
304
305 This document also includes additional certificate-related
306 requirements:
307
308 o See <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a> for requirements related to the JWT Claim
309 Constraints certificate extension.
310
311 o See <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> for requirements related to relying parties
312 acquiring credentials.
313
314 o See Sections <a href="#section-10">10</a> and <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a> for requirements related to certificate
315 freshness and the Authority Information Access (AIA) certificate
316 extension.
317
318 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Enrollment and Authorization Using the TN Authorization List</span>
319
320 This document covers three models for enrollment when using the TN
321 Authorization List extension.
322
323 The first enrollment model is one where the CA acts in concert with
324 national numbering authorities to issue credentials to those parties
325 to whom numbers are assigned. In the United States, for example,
326 telephone number blocks are assigned to Local Exchange Carriers
327 (LECs) by the North American Numbering Plan Administration (NANPA),
328 who is in turn directed by the national regulator. LECs may also
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
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336
337 receive numbers in smaller allocations, through number pooling, or
338 via an individual assignment through number portability. LECs assign
339 numbers to customers, who may be private individuals or organizations
340 -- and organizations take responsibility for assigning numbers within
341 their own enterprise. This model requires top-down adoption of the
342 model from regulators through to carriers. Assignees of E.164
343 numbering resources participating in this enrollment model should
344 take appropriate steps to establish trust anchors.
345
346 The second enrollment model is a bottom-up approach where a CA
347 requires that an entity prove control by means of some sort of test
348 that, as with certification authorities for web PKI, might either be
349 (1) automated or (2) a manual administrative process. As an example
350 of an automated process, an authority might send a text message to a
351 telephone number containing a URL (which might be dereferenced by the
352 recipient) as a means of verifying that a user has control of a
353 terminal corresponding to that number. Checks of this form are
354 frequently used in commercial systems today to validate telephone
355 numbers provided by users. This is comparable to existing enrollment
356 systems used by some certificate authorities for issuing S/MIME
357 credentials for email by verifying that the party applying for a
358 credential receives mail at the email address in question.
359
360 The third enrollment model is delegation: that is, the holder of a
361 certificate (assigned by either of the two methods above) might
362 delegate some or all of their authority to another party. In some
363 cases, multiple levels of delegation could occur: a LEC, for example,
364 might delegate authority to a customer organization for a block of
365 100 numbers used by an IP PBX, and the organization might in turn
366 delegate authority for a particular number to an individual employee.
367 This is analogous to delegation of organizational identities in
368 traditional hierarchical PKIs who use the name constraints extension
369 [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]; the root CA delegates names in sales to the sales
370 department CA, names in development to the development CA, etc. As
371 lengthy certificate delegation chains are brittle, however, and can
372 cause delays in the verification process, this document considers
373 optimizations to reduce the complexity of verification.
374
375 Future work might explore methods of partial delegation, where
376 certificate holders delegate only part of their authority. For
377 example, individual assignees may want to delegate to a service
378 authority for text messages associated with their telephone number
379 but not for other functions.
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
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392
393 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Constraints on Signing PASSporTs</span>
394
395 The public key in the certificate is used to validate the signature
396 on a JWT [<a href="./rfc7519" title="&quot;JSON Web Token (JWT)&quot;">RFC7519</a>] that conforms to the conventions specified in
397 PASSporT [<a href="./rfc8225" title="&quot;PASSporT: Personal Assertion Token&quot;">RFC8225</a>]. This specification supports constraints on the
398 JWT claims, thereby allowing the CA to grant different permissions to
399 certificate holders -- for example, those enrolled from
400 proof-of-possession versus delegation. A Certificate Policy (CP) and
401 a Certification Practice Statement (CPS) [<a href="./rfc3647" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework&quot;">RFC3647</a>] are produced as
402 part of the normal PKI bootstrapping process (i.e., the CP is written
403 first, and then the CA says how it conforms to the CP in the CPS). A
404 CA that wishes to place constraints on the JWT claims MUST include
405 the JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension in issued
406 certificates. See <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a> for information about the certificate
407 extension.
408
409 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Certificate Extension Scope and Structure</span>
410
411 This specification places no limits on the number of telephone
412 numbers that can be associated with any given certificate. Some
413 service providers may be assigned millions of numbers and may wish to
414 have a single certificate that can be applied to signing for any one
415 of those numbers. Others may wish to compartmentalize authority over
416 subsets of the numbers they control.
417
418 Moreover, service providers may wish to have multiple certificates
419 with the same scope of authority. For example, a service provider
420 with several regional gateway systems may want each system to be
421 capable of signing for each of their numbers but not want to have
422 each system share the same private key.
423
424 The set of telephone numbers for which a particular certificate is
425 valid is expressed in the certificate through a certificate
426 extension; the certificate's extensibility mechanism is defined in
427 [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>], but the TN Authorization List extension is specified in
428 this document.
429
430 The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List
431 extension are typically the administrative entities to whom numbers
432 are assigned or delegated. For example, a LEC might hold a
433 certificate for a range of telephone numbers. In some cases, the
434 organization or individual issued such a certificate may not want to
435 associate themselves with a certificate; for example, a private
436 individual with a certificate for a single telephone number might not
437 want to distribute that certificate publicly if every verifier
438 immediately knew their name. The certification authorities issuing
439 certificates with the TN Authorization List extensions may, in
440
441
442
443
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448
449 accordance with their policies, obscure the identity of the subject,
450 though mechanisms for doing so are outside the scope of this
451 document.
452
453 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Provisioning Private Keying Material</span>
454
455 In order for authentication services to sign calls via the procedures
456 described in [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>], they must hold a private key corresponding to
457 a certificate with authority over the calling number. [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>]
458 does not require that any particular entity in a SIP deployment
459 architecture sign requests, only that it be an entity with an
460 appropriate private key; the authentication service role may be
461 instantiated by any entity in a SIP network. For a certificate
462 granting authority only over a particular number that has been issued
463 to an end user, for example, an end-user device might hold the
464 private key and generate the signature. In the case of a service
465 provider with authority over large blocks of numbers, an intermediary
466 might hold the private key and sign calls.
467
468 The specification RECOMMENDS distribution of private keys through
469 PKCS #8 objects signed by a trusted entity -- for example, through
470 the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) package specified in
471 [<a href="./rfc5958" title="&quot;Asymmetric Key Packages&quot;">RFC5958</a>].
472
473 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acquiring Credentials to Verify Signatures</span>
474
475 This specification documents multiple ways that a verifier can gain
476 access to the credentials needed to verify a request. As the
477 validity of certificates does not depend on the method of their
478 acquisition, there is no need to standardize any single mechanism for
479 this purpose. All entities that comply with [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>] necessarily
480 support SIP, and consequently SIP itself can serve as a way to
481 deliver certificates. [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>] provides an "info" parameter of the
482 Identity header; this parameter contains a URI for the credential
483 used to generate the Identity header. [<a href="./rfc8224" title="&quot;Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC8224</a>] also requires that
484 documents that define credential systems list the URI schemes that
485 may be present in the "info" parameter. For implementations
486 compliant with this specification, three URI schemes are REQUIRED:
487 the CID URI, the SIP URI, and the HTTP URI.
488
489 The simplest way for a verifier to acquire the certificate needed to
490 verify a signature is for the certificate to be conveyed in a
491 SIP request along with the signature itself. In SIP, for example, a
492 certificate could be carried in a multipart MIME body [<a href="./rfc2046" title="&quot;Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types&quot;">RFC2046</a>], and
493 the URI in the Identity header "info" parameter could specify that
494 body with a CID URI [<a href="./rfc2392" title="&quot;Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource Locators&quot;">RFC2392</a>]. However, in many environments this
495 is not feasible due to message size restrictions or lack of necessary
496 support for multipart MIME.
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
503
504
505 The Identity header "info" parameter in a SIP request may contain a
506 URI that the verifier dereferences. Implementations of this
507 specification are REQUIRED to support the use of SIP for this
508 function (via the SUBSCRIBE/NOTIFY mechanism) as well as HTTP and
509 HTTPS.
510
511 Note well that as an optimization, a verifier may have access to a
512 service, a cache, or other local store that grants access to
513 certificates for a particular telephone number. However, there may
514 be multiple valid certificates that can sign a call setup request for
515 a telephone number, and as a consequence, there needs to be some
516 discriminator that the signer uses to identify their credentials.
517 The Identity header "info" parameter itself can serve as such a
518 discriminator, provided implementations use that parameter as a key
519 when accessing certificates from caches or other sources.
520
521 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. JWT Claim Constraints Syntax</span>
522
523 Certificate subjects are limited to specific values for PASSporT
524 claims with the JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension; issuers
525 permit all claims by omitting the JWT Claim Constraints certificate
526 extension from the certificate's extension field [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]. The
527 extension is non-critical, applicable only to end-entity
528 certificates, and defined with ASN.1 [<a href="#ref-X.680" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation&quot;">X.680</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.681" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification&quot;">X.681</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.682" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification&quot;">X.682</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.683" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications&quot;">X.683</a>]
529 later in this section. The syntax of the claims is given in
530 PASSporT; specifying new claims follows the procedures in <a href="./rfc8225#section-8.3">[RFC8225],
531 Section&nbsp;8.3</a>.
532
533 This certificate extension is optional, but if present, it constrains
534 the claims that authentication services may include in the PASSporT
535 objects they sign. Constraints are applied by issuers and enforced
536 by verifiers when validating PASSporT claims as follows:
537
538 1. mustInclude indicates claims that MUST appear in the PASSporT in
539 addition to iat, orig, and dest. The baseline claims of PASSporT
540 ("iat", "orig", and "dest") are considered to be permitted by
541 default and SHOULD NOT be included. If mustInclude is absent,
542 iat, orig, and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT.
543
544 2. permittedValues indicates that if the claim name is present, the
545 claim MUST contain one of the listed values.
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
559
560
561 Consider two examples with a PASSporT claim called "confidence" with
562 values "low", "medium", and "high":
563
564 o If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that
565 contains the mustInclude JWTClaimName "confidence", then an
566 authentication service MUST include the "confidence" claim in all
567 PASSporTs it generates; a verification service will treat as
568 invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT claim that
569 does not include the "confidence" claim.
570
571 o If a CA issues to an authentication service a certificate that
572 contains the permittedValues JWTClaimName "confidence" and a
573 permitted "high" value, then an authentication service will treat
574 as invalid any PASSporT it receives with a PASSporT claim that
575 does not include the "confidence" claim with a "high" value.
576
577 The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension is identified by the
578 following object identifier (OID), which is defined under the id-pe
579 OID arc defined in [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>] and managed by IANA (see <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a>):
580
581 id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 27 }
582
583 The JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension has the following
584 syntax:
585
586 JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
587 mustInclude [0] JWTClaimNames OPTIONAL,
588 -- The listed claim names MUST appear in the PASSporT
589 -- in addition to iat, orig, and dest. If absent, iat, orig,
590 -- and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT.
591 permittedValues [1] JWTClaimPermittedValuesList OPTIONAL }
592 -- If the claim name is present, the claim MUST contain one of
593 -- the listed values.
594 ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mustInclude PRESENT } |
595 WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedValues PRESENT } )
596
597 JWTClaimPermittedValuesList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF
598 JWTClaimPermittedValues
599
600 JWTClaimPermittedValues ::= SEQUENCE {
601 claim JWTClaimName,
602 permitted SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String }
603
604 JWTClaimNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimName
605
606 JWTClaimName ::= IA5String
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. TN Authorization List Syntax</span>
618
619 The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List
620 extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are
621 assigned or delegated. When a verifier is validating a caller's
622 identity, local policy always determines the circumstances under
623 which any particular subject may be trusted, but the purpose of the
624 TN Authorization List extension in particular is to allow a verifier
625 to ascertain when the CA has designated that the subject has
626 authority over a particular telephone number or number range. The
627 non-critical TN Authorization List certificate extension is included
628 in the certificate's extension field [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]. The extension is
629 defined with ASN.1 [<a href="#ref-X.680" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation&quot;">X.680</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.681" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification&quot;">X.681</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.682" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification&quot;">X.682</a>] [<a href="#ref-X.683" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications&quot;">X.683</a>]. The syntax and
630 semantics of the extension are as follows.
631
632 The subjects of certificates containing the TN Authorization List
633 extension are the administrative entities to whom numbers are
634 assigned or delegated. In an end-entity certificate, the TN
635 Authorization List indicates the TNs that it has authorized. In a CA
636 certificate, the TN Authorization List limits the set of TNs for
637 certification paths that include this certificate.
638
639 The TN Authorization List certificate extension is identified by the
640 following object identifier (OID), which is defined under the id-pe
641 OID arc defined in [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>] and managed by IANA (see <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a>):
642
643 id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 }
644
645 The TN Authorization List certificate extension has the following
646 syntax:
647
648 TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry
649
650 TNEntry ::= CHOICE {
651 spc [0] ServiceProviderCode,
652 range [1] TelephoneNumberRange,
653 one [2] TelephoneNumber
654 }
655
656 ServiceProviderCode ::= IA5String
657
658 -- SPCs may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other SP identifiers
659 -- from the telephone network.
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
671
672
673 TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE {
674 start TelephoneNumber,
675 count INTEGER (2..MAX),
676 ...
677 }
678
679 TelephoneNumber ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789#*"))
680
681 The TN Authorization List certificate extension indicates the
682 authorized phone numbers for the call setup signer. It indicates one
683 or more blocks of telephone number entries that have been authorized
684 for use by the call setup signer. There are three ways to identify
685 the block:
686
687 1. SPCs as described in this document are a generic term for the
688 identifiers used to designate service providers in telephone
689 networks today. In North American context, these would include
690 OCNs as specified in [<a href="#ref-ATIS-0300251">ATIS-0300251</a>], related SPIDs, or other
691 similar identifiers for service providers. SPCs can be used to
692 indirectly name all of the telephone numbers associated with that
693 identifier for a service provider.
694
695 2. Telephone numbers can be listed in a range (in the
696 TelephoneNumberRange format), which consists of a starting
697 telephone number and then an integer count of numbers within the
698 range, where the valid boundaries of ranges may vary according to
699 national policies. The count field is only applicable to start
700 fields whose values do not include "*" or "#" (i.e., a
701 TelephoneNumber that does not include "*" or "#"). count
702 MUST NOT make the number increase in length (i.e., a
703 TelephoneNumberRange with TelephoneNumber=10 and count=91 is
704 invalid); formally, given the inputs count and TelephoneNumber of
705 length D, TelephoneNumber + count MUST be less than 10^D.
706
707 3. A single telephone number can be listed (as a TelephoneNumber).
708
709 Note that because large-scale service providers may want to associate
710 many numbers, possibly millions of numbers, with a particular
711 certificate, optimizations are required for those cases to prevent
712 the certificate size from becoming unmanageable. In these cases, the
713 TN Authorization List may be given by reference rather than by value,
714 through the presence of a separate certificate extension that permits
715 verifiers to either (1) securely download the list of numbers
716 associated with a certificate or (2) verify that a single number is
717 under the authority of this certificate. For more on this
718 optimization, see <a href="#section-10.1">Section 10.1</a>.
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Certificate Freshness and Revocation</span>
730
731 Regardless of which of the approaches in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> is followed for
732 using certificates, a certificate verification mechanism is required.
733 However, the traditional problem of certificate freshness gains a new
734 wrinkle when using the TN Authorization List extension with telephone
735 numbers or number ranges (as opposed to SPCs), because verifiers must
736 establish not only that a certificate remains valid but also that the
737 certificate's scope contains the telephone number that the verifier
738 is validating. Dynamic changes to number assignments can occur due
739 to number portability, for example. So, even if a verifier has a
740 valid cached certificate for a telephone number (or a range
741 containing the number), the verifier must determine that the entity
742 that created the PASSporT, which includes a digital signature, is
743 still a proper authority for that number.
744
745 To verify the status of such a certificate, the verifier needs to
746 acquire the certificate if necessary (via the methods described in
747 <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>) and then would need to either:
748
749 a. Rely on short-lived certificates and not check the certificate's
750 status, or
751
752 b. Rely on status information from the authority (e.g., the Online
753 Certificate Status Protocol (OCSP)).
754
755 The trade-off between short-lived certificates and using status
756 information is that the former's burden is on the front end (i.e.,
757 enrollment) and the latter's burden is on the back end (i.e.,
758 verification). Both impact call setup time, but some approaches to
759 generating a short-lived certificate, like requiring one for each
760 call, would incur a greater operational cost than acquiring status
761 information. This document makes no particular recommendation for a
762 means of determining certificate freshness for STIR, as this requires
763 further study and implementation experience. Acquiring online status
764 information for certificates has the potential to disclose private
765 information [<a href="./rfc7258" title="&quot;Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack&quot;">RFC7258</a>] if proper precautions are not taken. Future
766 specifications that define certificate freshness mechanisms for STIR
767 MUST note any such risks and provide countermeasures where possible.
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
783
784
785 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Acquiring the TN List by Reference</span>
786
787 One alternative to checking certificate status for a particular
788 telephone number is simply acquiring the TN Authorization List by
789 reference, that is, through dereferencing a URL in the certificate,
790 rather than including the value of the TN Authorization List in the
791 certificate itself.
792
793 Acquiring a list of the telephone numbers associated with a
794 certificate or its subject lends itself to an application-layer
795 query/response interaction outside of certificate status, one that
796 could be initiated through a separate URI included in the
797 certificate. The AIA extension (see [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]) supports such a
798 mechanism: it designates an OID to identify the accessMethod and an
799 accessLocation, which would most likely be a URI. A verifier would
800 then follow the URI to ascertain whether the TNs in the list are
801 authorized for use by the caller. As with the certificate extension
802 defined in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>, a URI dereferenced from an end-entity
803 certificate will indicate the TNs that the caller has been
804 authorized. Verifiers MUST support the AIA extension, and the
805 dereferenced URI from a CA certificate limits the set of TNs for
806 certification paths that include this certificate.
807
808 HTTPS is the most obvious candidate for a protocol to be used for
809 fetching the list of telephone numbers associated with a particular
810 certificate. This document defines a new AIA accessMethod, called
811 "id-ad-stirTNList", which uses the following AIA OID:
812
813 id-ad-stirTNList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 14 }
814
815 When the "id-ad-stirTNList" accessMethod is used, the accessLocation
816 MUST be an HTTPS URI. Dereferencing the URI will return the complete
817 DER-encoded TN Authorization List (see <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>) for the certificate
818 with a Content-Type of application/tnauthlist (see <a href="#section-11.2">Section 11.2</a>).
819
820 Delivering the entire list of telephone numbers associated with a
821 particular certificate will divulge to STIR verifiers information
822 about telephone numbers other than the one associated with the
823 particular call that the verifier is checking. In some environments,
824 where STIR verifiers handle a high volume of calls, maintaining an
825 up-to-date and complete cache for the numbers associated with crucial
826 certificate holders could give an important boost to performance.
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
842
843 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.1" href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. ASN.1 Registrations</span>
844
845 This document makes use of object identifiers for the TN certificate
846 extension defined in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>, the "TN List by reference" AIA access
847 descriptor defined in <a href="#section-10.1">Section 10.1</a>, and the ASN.1 module identifier
848 defined in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Therefore, per this document, IANA has made
849 the following assignments, as shown on
850 &lt;<a href="https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers">https://www.iana.org/assignments/smi-numbers</a>&gt;:
851
852 o TN Authorization List certificate extension in the "SMI Security
853 for PKIX Certificate Extension" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1) registry:
854
855 26 id-pe-TNAuthList
856
857 o JWT Claim Constraints certificate extension in the "SMI Security
858 for PKIX Certificate Extension" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.1) registry:
859
860 27 id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints
861
862 o TN List by reference access descriptor in the "SMI Security for
863 PKIX Access Descriptor" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.48) registry:
864
865 14 id-ad-stirTNList
866
867 o The TN ASN.1 module in the "SMI Security for PKIX Module
868 Identifier" (1.3.6.1.5.5.7.0) registry:
869
870 89 id-mod-tn-module
871
872 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.2" href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Media Type Registrations</span>
873
874 Type name: application
875 Subtype name: tnauthlist
876 Required parameters: None
877 Optional parameters: None
878 Encoding considerations: Binary
879 Security considerations: See <a href="./rfc8226#section-12">Section&nbsp;12 of RFC 8226</a>
880 Interoperability considerations:
881 The TN Authorization List inside this media type MUST be
882 DER-encoded TNAuthorizationList.
883 Published specification: <a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a>
884 Applications that use this media type:
885 Issuers and relying parties of secure telephone identity
886 certificates, to limit the subject's authority to a
887 particular telephone number or telephone number range.
888 Fragment identifier considerations: None
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
895
896
897 Additional information:
898 Deprecated alias names for this type: None
899 Magic number(s): None
900 File extension(s): None
901 Macintosh File Type Code(s): None
902 Person &amp; email address to contact for further information:
903 Jon Peterson &lt;[email protected]&gt;
904 Intended usage: COMMON
905 Restrictions on usage: None
906 Author: Sean Turner &lt;[email protected]&gt;
907 Change controller: The IESG &lt;[email protected]&gt;
908
909 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Security Considerations</span>
910
911 This document is entirely about security. For further information on
912 certificate security and practices, see [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>], in particular its
913 Security Considerations section.
914
915 If a certification authority issues a certificate attesting authority
916 over many telephone numbers, the TNAuthList element can divulge to
917 relying parties extraneous telephone numbers associated with the
918 certificate that have no bearing on any given call in progress. The
919 potential privacy risk can be exacerbated by the use of AIA, as
920 described in <a href="#section-10.1">Section 10.1</a>, to link many thousands of numbers to a
921 single certificate. Even an SPC in a certificate can be used to link
922 a certificate to a particular carrier and, with access to industry
923 databases, potentially the set of numbers associated with that SPC.
924 While these practices may not cause concern in some environments, in
925 other scenarios alternative approaches could minimize the data
926 revealed to relying parties. For example, a service provider with
927 authority over a large block of numbers could generate short-lived
928 certificates for individual TNs that are not so easily linked to the
929 service provider or any other numbers that the service provider
930 controls. Optimizations to facilitate acquiring short-lived
931 certificates are a potential area of future work for STIR.
932
933 The TN Authorization List returned through a dereferenced URI is
934 served over HTTPS; the TN Authorization List is therefore protected
935 in transit. But, the TN Authorization List served is not a signed
936 object and therefore the server is trusted to faithfully return the
937 TN Authorization List provided to it by the list generator.
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
951
952
953 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. References</span>
954
955 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.1" href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>. Normative References</span>
956
957 [<a id="ref-ATIS-0300251">ATIS-0300251</a>]
958 ATIS Recommendation 0300251, "Codes for Identification of
959 Service Providers for Information Exchange", 2007.
960
961 [<a id="ref-DSS">DSS</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S.
962 Department of Commerce, "Digital Signature Standard
963 (DSS)", NIST FIPS PUB 186-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4,
964 July 2013, &lt;<a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf">http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/</a>
965 <a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf">NIST.FIPS.186-4.pdf</a>&gt;.
966
967 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
968 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
969 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
970 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
971
972 [<a id="ref-RFC2392">RFC2392</a>] Levinson, E., "Content-ID and Message-ID Uniform Resource
973 Locators", <a href="./rfc2392">RFC 2392</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2392, August 1998,
974 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2392">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2392</a>&gt;.
975
976 [<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
977 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
978 <a href="./rfc3986">RFC 3986</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
979 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;.
980
981 [<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
982 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
983 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
984 (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
985 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>&gt;.
986
987 [<a id="ref-RFC5912">RFC5912</a>] Hoffman, P. and J. Schaad, "New ASN.1 Modules for the
988 Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)", <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>,
989 DOI 10.17487/RFC5912, June 2010,
990 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5912</a>&gt;.
991
992 [<a id="ref-RFC5958">RFC5958</a>] Turner, S., "Asymmetric Key Packages", <a href="./rfc5958">RFC 5958</a>,
993 DOI 10.17487/RFC5958, August 2010,
994 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5958</a>&gt;.
995
996 [<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] Fielding, R., Ed., and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext
997 Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
998 <a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
999 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>&gt;.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
1007
1008
1009 [<a id="ref-RFC7258">RFC7258</a>] Farrell, S. and H. Tschofenig, "Pervasive Monitoring Is an
1010 Attack", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp188">BCP 188</a>, <a href="./rfc7258">RFC 7258</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7258,
1011 May 2014, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258</a>&gt;.
1012
1013 [<a id="ref-RFC7519">RFC7519</a>] Jones, M., Bradley, J., and N. Sakimura, "JSON Web Token
1014 (JWT)", <a href="./rfc7519">RFC 7519</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7519, May 2015,
1015 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7519</a>&gt;.
1016
1017 [<a id="ref-RFC8017">RFC8017</a>] Moriarty, K., Ed., Kaliski, B., Jonsson, J., and A. Rusch,
1018 "PKCS #1: RSA Cryptography Specifications Version 2.2",
1019 <a href="./rfc8017">RFC 8017</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8017, November 2016,
1020 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8017</a>&gt;.
1021
1022 [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in
1023 <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>,
1024 DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, May 2017,
1025 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.
1026
1027 [<a id="ref-RFC8224">RFC8224</a>] Peterson, J., Jennings, C., Rescorla, E., and C. Wendt,
1028 "Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
1029 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc8224">RFC 8224</a>,
1030 DOI 10.17487/RFC8224, February 2018,
1031 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224</a>&gt;.
1032
1033 [<a id="ref-RFC8225">RFC8225</a>] Wendt, C. and J. Peterson, "PASSporT: Personal Assertion
1034 Token", <a href="./rfc8225">RFC 8225</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8225, February 2018,
1035 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8225</a>&gt;.
1036
1037 [<a id="ref-X.509">X.509</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
1038 technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
1039 Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", ITU-T
1040 Recommendation X.509, ISO/IEC 9594-8, October 2016,
1041 &lt;<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.509</a>&gt;.
1042
1043 [<a id="ref-X.680">X.680</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
1044 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
1045 Specification of basic notation", ITU-T Recommendation
1046 X.680, ISO/IEC 8824-1, August 2015,
1047 &lt;<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.680</a>&gt;.
1048
1049 [<a id="ref-X.681">X.681</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
1050 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
1051 Information object specification", ITU-T Recommendation
1052 X.681, ISO/IEC 8824-2, August 2015,
1053 &lt;<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.681">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.681</a>&gt;.
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
1063
1064
1065 [<a id="ref-X.682">X.682</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
1066 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
1067 Constraint specification", ITU-T Recommendation
1068 X.682, ISO/IEC 8824-3, August 2015,
1069 &lt;<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.682">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.682</a>&gt;.
1070
1071 [<a id="ref-X.683">X.683</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
1072 Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1):
1073 Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications", ITU-T
1074 Recommendation X.683, ISO/IEC 8824-4, August 2015,
1075 &lt;<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.683">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.683</a>&gt;.
1076
1077 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.2" href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1078
1079 [<a id="ref-RFC2046">RFC2046</a>] Freed, N. and N. Borenstein, "Multipurpose Internet Mail
1080 Extensions (MIME) Part Two: Media Types", <a href="./rfc2046">RFC 2046</a>,
1081 DOI 10.17487/RFC2046, November 1996,
1082 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2046</a>&gt;.
1083
1084 [<a id="ref-RFC3647">RFC3647</a>] Chokhani, S., Ford, W., Sabett, R., Merrill, C., and S.
1085 Wu, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate
1086 Policy and Certification Practices Framework", <a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a>,
1087 DOI 10.17487/RFC3647, November 2003,
1088 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3647</a>&gt;.
1089
1090 [<a id="ref-RFC7340">RFC7340</a>] Peterson, J., Schulzrinne, H., and H. Tschofenig, "Secure
1091 Telephone Identity Problem Statement and Requirements",
1092 <a href="./rfc7340">RFC 7340</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7340, September 2014,
1093 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7340</a>&gt;.
1094
1095 [<a id="ref-RFC7375">RFC7375</a>] Peterson, J., "Secure Telephone Identity Threat Model",
1096 <a href="./rfc7375">RFC 7375</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7375, October 2014,
1097 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7375</a>&gt;.
1098
1099 [<a id="ref-X.520">X.520</a>] International Telecommunication Union, "Information
1100 technology - Open Systems Interconnection - The Directory:
1101 Selected attribute types", ITU-T Recommendation
1102 X.520, ISO/IEC 9594-6, October 2016,
1103 &lt;<a href="https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.520">https://www.itu.int/rec/T-REC-X.520</a>&gt;.
1104
1105
1106
1107
1108
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
1119
1120
1121 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. ASN.1 Module</span>
1122
1123 This appendix provides the normative ASN.1 [<a href="#ref-X.680" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation&quot;">X.680</a>] definitions for
1124 the structures described in this specification using ASN.1, as
1125 defined in [<a href="#ref-X.680" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation&quot;">X.680</a>], [<a href="#ref-X.681" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification&quot;">X.681</a>], [<a href="#ref-X.682" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification&quot;">X.682</a>], and [<a href="#ref-X.683" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications&quot;">X.683</a>].
1126
1127 The modules defined in this document are compatible with the most
1128 current ASN.1 specifications published in 2015 (see [<a href="#ref-X.680" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Specification of basic notation&quot;">X.680</a>], [<a href="#ref-X.681" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Information object specification&quot;">X.681</a>],
1129 [<a href="#ref-X.682" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Constraint specification&quot;">X.682</a>], and [<a href="#ref-X.683" title="&quot;Information Technology - Abstract Syntax Notation One (ASN.1): Parameterization of ASN.1 specifications&quot;">X.683</a>]). None of the newly defined tokens in the 2008
1130 ASN.1 (DATE, DATE-TIME, DURATION, NOT-A-NUMBER, OID-IRI,
1131 RELATIVE-OID-IRI, TIME, TIME-OF-DAY) are currently used in any of the
1132 ASN.1 specifications referred to here.
1133
1134 This ASN.1 module imports ASN.1 from [<a href="./rfc5912" title="&quot;New ASN.1 Modules for the Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 (PKIX)&quot;">RFC5912</a>].
1135
1136 TN-Module-2016
1137 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
1138 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-tn-module(89) }
1139
1140 DEFINITIONS EXPLICIT TAGS ::= BEGIN
1141
1142 IMPORTS
1143
1144 id-ad, id-pe
1145 FROM PKIX1Explicit-2009 -- From <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>
1146 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
1147 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkix1-explicit-02(51) }
1148
1149 EXTENSION
1150 FROM PKIX-CommonTypes-2009 -- From <a href="./rfc5912">RFC 5912</a>
1151 { iso(1) identified-organization(3) dod(6) internet(1) security(5)
1152 mechanisms(5) pkix(7) id-mod(0) id-mod-pkixCommon-02(57) }
1153
1154 ;
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
1175
1176
1177 --
1178 -- JWT Claim Constraints Certificate Extension
1179 --
1180
1181 ext-jwtClaimConstraints EXTENSION ::= {
1182 SYNTAX JWTClaimConstraints IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints
1183 }
1184
1185 id-pe-JWTClaimConstraints OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 27 }
1186
1187 JWTClaimConstraints ::= SEQUENCE {
1188 mustInclude [0] JWTClaimNames OPTIONAL,
1189 -- The listed claim names MUST appear in the PASSporT
1190 -- in addition to iat, orig, and dest. If absent, iat, orig,
1191 -- and dest MUST appear in the PASSporT.
1192 permittedValues [1] JWTClaimPermittedValuesList OPTIONAL }
1193 -- If the claim name is present, the claim MUST contain one of
1194 -- the listed values.
1195 ( WITH COMPONENTS { ..., mustInclude PRESENT } |
1196 WITH COMPONENTS { ..., permittedValues PRESENT } )
1197
1198 JWTClaimPermittedValuesList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) Of
1199 JWTClaimPermittedValues
1200
1201 JWTClaimPermittedValues ::= SEQUENCE {
1202 claim JWTClaimName,
1203 permitted SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF UTF8String }
1204
1205 JWTClaimNames ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF JWTClaimName
1206
1207 JWTClaimName ::= IA5String
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
1231
1232
1233 --
1234 -- Telephony Number Authorization List Certificate Extension
1235 --
1236
1237 ext-tnAuthList EXTENSION ::= {
1238 SYNTAX TNAuthorizationList IDENTIFIED BY id-pe-TNAuthList
1239 }
1240
1241 id-pe-TNAuthList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-pe 26 }
1242
1243 TNAuthorizationList ::= SEQUENCE SIZE (1..MAX) OF TNEntry
1244
1245 TNEntry ::= CHOICE {
1246 spc [0] ServiceProviderCode,
1247 range [1] TelephoneNumberRange,
1248 one [2] TelephoneNumber
1249 }
1250
1251 ServiceProviderCode ::= IA5String
1252
1253 -- SPCs may be OCNs, various SPIDs, or other SP identifiers
1254 -- from the telephone network.
1255
1256 TelephoneNumberRange ::= SEQUENCE {
1257 start TelephoneNumber,
1258 count INTEGER (2..MAX),
1259 ...
1260 }
1261
1262 TelephoneNumber ::= IA5String (SIZE (1..15)) (FROM ("0123456789#*"))
1263
1264 -- TN Access Descriptor
1265
1266 id-ad-stirTNList OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { id-ad 14 }
1267
1268 END
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8226">RFC 8226</a> STIR Certs February 2018</span>
1287
1288
1289 Acknowledgments
1290
1291 Anders Kristensen, Russ Housley, Brian Rosen, Cullen Jennings, Dave
1292 Crocker, Tony Rutkowski, John Braunberger, Eric Rescorla, and Martin
1293 Thomson provided key input to the discussions leading to this
1294 document. Russ Housley provided some direct assistance and text
1295 surrounding the ASN.1 module.
1296
1297 Authors' Addresses
1298
1299 Jon Peterson
1300 Neustar, Inc.
1301
1302 Email: [email protected]
1303
1304
1305 Sean Turner
1306 sn3rd
1307
1308 Email: [email protected]
1309
1310
1311
1312
1313
1314
1315
1316
1317
1318
1319
1320
1321
1322
1323
1324
1325
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 Peterson &amp; Turner Standards Track [Page 24]
1341 </pre>