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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Popov
2 Request for Comments: 8473 M. Nystroem
3 Category: Standards Track Microsoft Corp.
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 D. Balfanz, Ed.
5 N. Harper
6 Google Inc.
7 J. Hodges
8 Kings Mountain Systems
9 October 2018
10
11
12 <span class="h1">Token Binding over HTTP</span>
13
14 Abstract
15
16 This document describes a collection of mechanisms that allow HTTP
17 servers to cryptographically bind security tokens (such as cookies
18 and OAuth tokens) to TLS connections.
19
20 We describe both first-party and federated scenarios. In a first-
21 party scenario, an HTTP server is able to cryptographically bind the
22 security tokens that it issues to a client -- and that the client
23 subsequently returns to the server -- to the TLS connection between
24 the client and the server. Such bound security tokens are protected
25 from misuse, since the server can generally detect if they are
26 replayed inappropriately, e.g., over other TLS connections.
27
28 Federated Token Bindings, on the other hand, allow servers to
29 cryptographically bind security tokens to a TLS connection that the
30 client has with a different server than the one issuing the token.
31
32 This document is a companion document to "The Token Binding Protocol
33 Version 1.0" (<a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a>).
34
35 Status of This Memo
36
37 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
38
39 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
40 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
41 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
42 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
43 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
44
45 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
46 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
47 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8473">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8473</a>.
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
76 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. The Sec-Token-Binding HTTP Request Header Field . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. HTTPS Token Binding Key-Pair Scoping . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. TLS Renegotiation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
79 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. First-Party Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
80 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Federation Use Cases . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
81 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
82 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
83 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. HTTP Redirects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
84 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Negotiated Key Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
85 <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Federation Example . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
86 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
87 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
88 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Security Token Replay . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
89 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
90 <a href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
91 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Privacy Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
92 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
93 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Lifetime of Token Binding Key Pairs . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
94 <a href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>. Correlation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
95 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
96 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
97 <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
98 <a href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
99 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
100 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
101
102
103
104
105
106
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110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 The Token Binding protocol [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>] defines a Token Binding ID for a
116 TLS connection between a client and a server. The Token Binding ID
117 of a TLS connection is constructed using the public key of a
118 private-public key pair. The client proves possession of the
119 corresponding private key. This Token Binding key pair is
120 long-lived. That is, subsequent TLS connections between the same
121 client and server have the same Token Binding ID, unless specifically
122 reset, e.g., by the user. When issuing a security token (e.g., an
123 HTTP cookie or an OAuth token [<a href="./rfc6749" title="&quot;The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework&quot;">RFC6749</a>]) to a client, the server can
124 include the Token Binding ID in the token, thus cryptographically
125 binding the token to TLS connections between that particular client
126 and server, and inoculating the token against abuse (reuse, attempted
127 impersonation, etc.) by attackers.
128
129 While the Token Binding protocol [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>] defines a message format
130 for establishing a Token Binding ID, it does not specify how this
131 message is embedded in higher-level protocols. The purpose of this
132 specification is to define how TokenBindingMessages are embedded in
133 HTTP (both versions 1.1 [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>] and 2 [<a href="./rfc7540" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)&quot;">RFC7540</a>]). Note that
134 TokenBindingMessages are only defined if the underlying transport
135 uses TLS. This means that Token Binding over HTTP is only defined
136 when HTTP is layered on top of TLS (commonly referred to as HTTPS
137 [<a href="./rfc2818" title="&quot;HTTP Over TLS&quot;">RFC2818</a>]).
138
139 HTTP clients establish a Token Binding ID with a server by including
140 a special HTTP header field in HTTP requests. The HTTP header field
141 value is a base64url-encoded TokenBindingMessage.
142
143 A TokenBindingMessage allows a client to establish multiple Token
144 Binding IDs with the server by including multiple TokenBinding
145 structures. By default, a client will establish a Provided Token
146 Binding ID with the server, indicating a Token Binding ID that the
147 client will persistently use with the server. Under certain
148 conditions, the client can also include a Referred Token Binding ID
149 in the TokenBindingMessage, indicating a Token Binding ID that the
150 client is using with a different server than the one that the
151 TokenBindingMessage is sent to. This is useful in federation
152 scenarios.
153
154 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
155
156 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
157 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
158 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
159 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
160 capitals, as shown here.
161
162
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168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The Sec-Token-Binding HTTP Request Header Field</span>
170
171 Once a client and server have negotiated the Token Binding protocol
172 with HTTP/1.1 or HTTP/2 (see [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>] and [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>]), clients MUST
173 include a Sec-Token-Binding header field in their HTTP requests and
174 MUST include only one such header field per HTTP request. Also, the
175 Sec-Token-Binding header field MUST NOT be included in HTTP
176 responses. The ABNF of the Sec-Token-Binding header field is (per
177 the style of [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>]; see also <a href="./rfc7231#section-8.3">Section&nbsp;8.3 of [RFC7231]</a>):
178
179 Sec-Token-Binding = EncodedTokenBindingMessage
180
181 The header field name is Sec-Token-Binding, and its single value,
182 EncodedTokenBindingMessage, is a base64url encoding of a single
183 TokenBindingMessage, as defined in [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>]. The base64url encoding
184 uses the URL and filename safe character set described in <a href="./rfc4648#section-5">Section&nbsp;5
185 of [RFC4648]</a>, with all trailing padding characters (i.e., "=")
186 omitted and without the inclusion of any line breaks, whitespace, or
187 other additional characters.
188
189 For example:
190
191 Sec-Token-Binding: AIkAAgBBQFzK4_bhAqLDwRQxqJWte33d7hZ0hZWHwk-miKPg4E\
192 9fcgs7gBPoz-9RfuDfN9WCw6keHEw1ZPQMGs9CxpuHm-YAQM_j\
193 aOwwej6a-cQBGU7CJpUHOvXG4VvjNq8jDsvta9Y8_bPEPj25Gg\
194 mKiPjhJEtZA6mJ_9SNifLvVBTi7fR9wSAAAA
195
196 (Note that the backslashes and line breaks are provided to ease
197 readability; they are not part of the actual encoded message.)
198
199 If the server receives more than one Sec-Token-Binding header field
200 in an HTTP request, then the server MUST reject the message with a
201 400 (Bad Request) HTTP status code. Additionally, the
202 Sec-Token-Binding header field:
203
204 o SHOULD NOT be stored by origin servers on PUT requests,
205
206 o MAY be listed by a server in a Vary response header field, and
207
208 o MUST NOT be used in HTTP trailers.
209
210 The TokenBindingMessage MUST contain exactly one TokenBinding
211 structure with a TokenBindingType value of provided_token_binding,
212 which MUST be signed with the Token Binding private key used by the
213 client for connections between itself and the server that the HTTP
214 request is sent to (clients use different Token Binding key pairs for
215 different servers; see <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a> below). The Token Binding ID
216
217
218
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224
225 established by this TokenBinding is called a "Provided Token
226 Binding ID".
227
228 The TokenBindingMessage MAY also contain exactly one TokenBinding
229 structure with a TokenBindingType value of referred_token_binding, as
230 specified in <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>. In addition to the latter, or rather than
231 the latter, the TokenBindingMessage MAY contain other TokenBinding
232 structures. This is specific to the use case in question; such use
233 cases are outside the scope of this specification.
234
235 A TokenBindingMessage is validated by the server as described in
236 <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a> ("Server Processing Rules") of [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>]. If validation
237 fails and a Token Binding is rejected, any associated bound tokens
238 MUST also be rejected by the server. HTTP requests containing
239 invalid tokens MUST be rejected. In this case, the server
240 application MAY return HTTP status code 400 (Bad Request) or proceed
241 with an application-specific "invalid token" response (e.g.,
242 directing the client to re-authenticate and present a different
243 token), or terminate the connection.
244
245 In HTTP/2, the client SHOULD use header compression [<a href="./rfc7541" title="&quot;HPACK: Header Compression for HTTP/2&quot;">RFC7541</a>] to
246 avoid the overhead of repeating the same header field in subsequent
247 HTTP requests.
248
249 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. HTTPS Token Binding Key-Pair Scoping</span>
250
251 HTTPS is used in conjunction with various application protocols and
252 application contexts, in various ways. For example, general-purpose
253 web browsing is one such HTTP-based application context. Within that
254 context, HTTP cookies [<a href="./rfc6265" title="&quot;HTTP State Management Mechanism&quot;">RFC6265</a>] are typically utilized for state
255 management, including client authentication. A related, though
256 distinct, example of other HTTP-based application contexts is where
257 OAuth tokens [<a href="./rfc6749" title="&quot;The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework&quot;">RFC6749</a>] are utilized to manage authorization for
258 third-party application access to resources. The token-scoping rules
259 of these two examples can differ: the scoping rules for cookies are
260 concisely specified in [<a href="./rfc6265" title="&quot;HTTP State Management Mechanism&quot;">RFC6265</a>], whereas OAuth is a framework and
261 defines various token types with various scopings, some of which are
262 determined by the encompassing application.
263
264 The scoping of Token Binding key pairs generated by web browsers for
265 the purpose of binding HTTP cookies MUST be no wider than the
266 granularity of a "registered domain" (also known as "effective
267 top-level domain + 1", or "eTLD+1"). An origin's "registered domain"
268 is the origin's host's public suffix plus the label to its left
269 (where the term "public suffix" is defined in the "NOTE:" paragraph
270 in <a href="./rfc6265#section-5.3">Section&nbsp;5.3 of [RFC6265]</a> as "a domain that is controlled by a
271 public registry"). For example, for "https://www.example.com", the
272 public suffix (eTLD) is "com", and the registered domain (eTLD+1) is
273
274
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280
281 "example.com". User Agents SHOULD use an up-to-date public suffix
282 list, such as the one maintained by Mozilla [<a href="#ref-PSL" title="&quot;Public Suffix List&quot;">PSL</a>].
283
284 This means that in practice the scope of a Token Binding key pair is
285 no larger than the scope of a cookie allowed by a web browser. If a
286 web browser restricts cookies to a narrower scope than registered
287 domains, the scope of Token Binding key pairs MAY also be narrower.
288 This applies to the use of Token Binding key pairs in first-party use
289 cases, as well as in federation use cases defined in this
290 specification (<a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>).
291
292 Key pairs used to bind other application tokens, such as OAuth tokens
293 or "OpenID Connect" ID Tokens [<a href="#ref-OpenID.Core">OpenID.Core</a>], SHOULD adhere to the
294 above eTLD+1 scoping requirement for those tokens being employed in
295 first-party or federation scenarios. Applications other than web
296 browsers MAY use different key-pair scoping rules. See also
297 <a href="#section-8.1">Section 8.1</a> below.
298
299 Scoping rules for other HTTP-based application contexts are outside
300 the scope of this specification.
301
302 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. TLS Renegotiation</span>
303
304 Token Binding over HTTP/1.1 [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>] can be performed in combination
305 with TLS renegotiation. In this case, renegotiation MUST only occur
306 between a client's HTTP request and the server's response, the client
307 MUST NOT send any pipelined requests, and the client MUST NOT
308 initiate renegotiation. (That is, the client may only send a
309 renegotiation ClientHello in response to the server's HelloRequest.)
310 These conditions ensure that both the client and the server can
311 clearly identify which TLS Exported Keying Material value [<a href="./rfc5705" title="&quot;Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5705</a>]
312 to use when generating or verifying the TokenBindingMessage. This
313 also prevents a TokenBindingMessage from being split across TLS
314 renegotiation boundaries due to TLS message fragmentation; see
315 <a href="./rfc5246#section-6.2.1">Section&nbsp;6.2.1 of [RFC5246]</a>.
316
317 (Note: This document deals with TLS 1.2 and therefore refers to
318 <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a> (which has been obsoleted by <a href="./rfc8446">RFC 8446</a>); [<a href="#ref-TOKENBIND-TLS13">TOKENBIND-TLS13</a>]
319 addresses Token Binding in TLS 1.3.)
320
321
322
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336
337 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. First-Party Use Cases</span>
338
339 In a first-party use case (also known as a "same-site" use case), an
340 HTTP server issues a security token such as a cookie (or similar) to
341 a client and expects the client to return the security token at a
342 later time, e.g., in order to authenticate. Binding the security
343 token to the TLS connection between the client and the server
344 protects the security token from misuse, since the server can detect
345 if the security token is replayed inappropriately, e.g., over other
346 TLS connections.
347
348 See <a href="./rfc8471#section-5">Section&nbsp;5 of [RFC8471]</a> for general guidance regarding the binding
349 of security tokens and their subsequent validation.
350
351 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Federation Use Cases</span>
352
353 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Introduction</span>
354
355 For privacy reasons, clients use different Token Binding key pairs to
356 establish Provided Token Binding IDs with different servers. As a
357 result, a server cannot bind a security token (such as an OAuth token
358 or an OpenID Connect ID Token [<a href="#ref-OpenID.Core">OpenID.Core</a>]) to a TLS connection that
359 the client has with a different server. This is, however, a common
360 requirement in federation scenarios: for example, an Identity
361 Provider may wish to issue an identity token to a client and
362 cryptographically bind that token to the TLS connection between the
363 client and a Relying Party.
364
365 In this section, we describe mechanisms to achieve this. The common
366 idea among these mechanisms is that a server (called the "Token
367 Consumer" in this document) signals to the client that it should
368 reveal the Provided Token Binding ID that is used between the client
369 and itself to another server (called the "Token Provider" in this
370 document). Also common across the mechanisms is how the Token
371 Binding ID is revealed to the Token Provider: the client uses the
372 Token Binding protocol [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>] and includes a TokenBinding
373 structure in the Sec-Token-Binding HTTP header field defined above.
374 What differs between the various mechanisms is how the Token Consumer
375 signals to the client that it should reveal the Token Binding ID to
376 the Token Provider. Below, we specify one such mechanism, which is
377 suitable for redirect-based interactions between Token Consumers and
378 Token Providers.
379
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
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390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
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392
393 Client Token Consumer Token Provider
394 +--------+ +----+ +-----+
395 | Client | | TC | | TP |
396 +--------+ +----+ +-----+
397 | | |
398 | | |
399 | | |
400 | Client interacts w/TC | |
401 | using TokenBindingID TBID1: | |
402 | TBMSG[[provided_token_binding,| |
403 | TBID1, signature]] | |
404 |------------------------------&gt;| |
405 | | |
406 | Client interacts w/TP |
407 | using TokenBindingID TBID2: |
408 | TBMSG[[provided_token_binding, |
409 | TBID2, signature]] |
410 |-----------------------------------------------------&gt;|
411 | |
412 | | |
413 | TC signals permission to | |
414 | reveal TBID1 to TP | |
415 |&lt;------------------------------| |
416 | | |
417 | |
418 | Client interacts w/TP |
419 | using TokenBindingID TBID1 and TBID2: |
420 | TBMSG[[provided_token_binding, |
421 | TBID2, signature], |
422 | [referred_token_binding, |
423 | TBID1, signature]] |
424 |-----------------------------------------------------&gt;|
425 | |
426 | | |
427 | | |
428
429 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Overview</span>
430
431 In a federated sign-on protocol, an Identity Provider issues an
432 identity token to a client, which sends the identity token to a
433 Relying Party to authenticate itself. Examples of this include
434 OpenID Connect (in which the identity token is called an "ID Token")
435 and the Security Assertion Markup Language (SAML)
436 [<a href="#ref-OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os">OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os</a>] (in which the identity token is a SAML
437 assertion).
438
439
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448
449 To better protect the security of the identity token, the Identity
450 Provider may wish to bind the identity token to the TLS connection
451 between the client and the Relying Party, thus ensuring that only
452 said client can use the identity token. The Relying Party will
453 compare the Token Binding ID (or a cryptographic hash of it) in the
454 identity token with the Token Binding ID (or a hash thereof) of the
455 TLS connection between this Relying Party and the client.
456
457 This is an example of a federation scenario, which more generally can
458 be described as follows:
459
460 o A Token Consumer causes the client to issue a token request to the
461 Token Provider. The goal is for the client to obtain a token and
462 then use it with the Token Consumer.
463
464 o The client delivers the token request to the Token Provider.
465
466 o The Token Provider issues the token. The token is issued for the
467 specific Token Consumer who requested it (thus preventing
468 malicious Token Consumers from using tokens with other Token
469 Consumers). The token is, however, typically a bearer token,
470 meaning that any client can use it with the Token Consumer -- not
471 just the client to which it was issued.
472
473 o Therefore, in the previous step, the Token Provider may want to
474 include in the token the Token Binding ID (or a cryptographic hash
475 of it) that the client uses when communicating with the Token
476 Consumer, thus binding the token to the client's Token Binding key
477 pair. The client proves possession of the private key when
478 communicating with the Token Consumer through the Token Binding
479 protocol [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>] and uses the corresponding public key of this
480 key pair as a component of the Token Binding ID. Comparing the
481 Token Binding ID from the token to the Token Binding ID
482 established with the client allows the Token Consumer to verify
483 that the token was sent to it by the legitimate client.
484
485 o To allow the Token Provider to include the Token Binding ID in the
486 token, the Token Binding ID between the client and the Token
487 Consumer must therefore be communicated to the Token Provider
488 along with the token request. Communicating a Token Binding ID
489 involves proving possession of a private key and is described in
490 the Token Binding protocol [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>].
491
492 The client will perform this last operation only if the Token
493 Consumer requests the client to do so.
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
503
504
505 Below, we specify how Token Consumers can signal this request in
506 redirect-based federation protocols. Note that this assumes that the
507 federated sign-on flow starts at the Token Consumer or, at the very
508 least, includes a redirect from the Token Consumer to the Token
509 Provider. It is outside the scope of this document to specify
510 similar mechanisms for flows that do not include such redirects.
511
512 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. HTTP Redirects</span>
513
514 When a Token Consumer redirects the client to a Token Provider as a
515 means to deliver the token request, it SHOULD include an
516 Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID HTTP response header field in its
517 HTTP response. The ABNF of the Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID
518 header is (per the style of [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>]; see also <a href="./rfc7231#section-8.3">Section&nbsp;8.3 of
519 [RFC7231]</a>):
520
521 Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID = "true"
522
523 Where the header field name is "Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID"
524 and the field value of "true" is case insensitive. For example:
525
526 Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID: true
527
528 Including this response header field signals to the client that it
529 should reveal, to the Token Provider, the Token Binding ID used
530 between itself and the Token Consumer. In the absence of this
531 response header field, the client will not disclose any information
532 about the Token Binding used between the client and the Token
533 Consumer to the Token Provider.
534
535 As illustrated in <a href="#section-5.5">Section 5.5</a>, when a client receives this header
536 field, it should take the TokenBindingID [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>] of the provided
537 TokenBinding from the referrer and create a referred TokenBinding
538 with it to include in the TokenBindingMessage in the redirect
539 request. In other words, the Token Binding message in the redirect
540 request to the Token Provider now includes one provided binding and
541 one referred binding, the latter constructed from the binding between
542 the client and the Token Consumer.
543
544 When a client receives the Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID header,
545 it includes the referred Token Binding even if both the Token
546 Provider and the Token Consumer fall under the same eTLD+1 and the
547 provided and Referred Token Binding IDs are the same.
548
549 The referred Token Binding is sent only in the initial request
550 resulting from the HTTP response that included the
551 Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID header. Should the response to
552 that initial request be a further redirect, the original referred
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
559
560
561 Token Binding is no longer included in subsequent requests. (A new
562 referred Token Binding may be included if the redirecting endpoint
563 itself responded with an Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID response
564 header.)
565
566 If the Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID header field is
567 received in response to a request that did not include the
568 Sec-Token-Binding header field, the client MUST ignore the
569 Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID header field.
570
571 This header field only has meaning if the HTTP status code is a
572 redirection code (300-399) and MUST be ignored by the client for any
573 other status codes. As described in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, if the client
574 supports the Token Binding protocol and has negotiated the Token
575 Binding protocol with both the Token Consumer and the Token Provider,
576 it sends the Sec-Token-Binding header field to the Token Provider
577 with each HTTP request.
578
579 The TokenBindingMessage included in the redirect request to the Token
580 Provider SHOULD contain a TokenBinding with a TokenBindingType value
581 of referred_token_binding. If included, this TokenBinding MUST be
582 signed with the Token Binding private key used by the client for
583 connections between itself and the Token Consumer (more specifically,
584 the server that issued the Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID response
585 header field). The Token Binding ID established by this TokenBinding
586 is called a "Referred Token Binding ID".
587
588 As described above, the TokenBindingMessage MUST additionally contain
589 a Provided Token Binding ID, i.e., a TokenBinding structure with a
590 TokenBindingType value of provided_token_binding, which MUST be
591 signed with the Token Binding private key used by the client for
592 connections between itself and the Token Provider (more specifically,
593 the server that the token request is being sent to).
594
595 If, for some deployment-specific reason, the initial Token Provider
596 ("TP1") needs to redirect the client to another Token Provider
597 ("TP2") rather than directly back to the Token Consumer, it can be
598 accommodated using the header fields defined in this specification in
599 the following fashion ("the redirect-chain approach"):
600
601 Initially, the client is redirected to TP1 by the Token Consumer
602 ("TC"), as described above. Upon receiving a client's request
603 that contains a TokenBindingMessage that in turn contains both
604 provided and referred TokenBindings (for TP1 and TC,
605 respectively), TP1 responds to the client with a redirect response
606 that (1) contains the Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID header
607 field and (2) directs the client to send a request to TP2. This
608 causes the client to follow the same pattern and send a request
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
615
616
617 containing a TokenBindingMessage that contains both provided and
618 referred TokenBindings (for TP2 and TP1, respectively) to TP2.
619 Note that this pattern can continue to additional Token Providers.
620 In this case, TP2 issues a security token, bound to the client's
621 TokenBinding with TP1, and sends a redirect response to the client
622 pointing to TP1. TP1 in turn constructs a security token for the
623 Token Consumer, bound to the TC's referred TokenBinding that had
624 been conveyed earlier, and sends a redirect response pointing to
625 the TC, containing the bound security token, to the client.
626
627 The above is intended as only a non-normative example. Details are
628 specific to deployment contexts. Other approaches are possible but
629 are outside the scope of this specification.
630
631 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Negotiated Key Parameters</span>
632
633 The TLS extension for Token Binding protocol negotiation [<a href="./rfc8472" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol Negotiation&quot;">RFC8472</a>]
634 allows the server and client to negotiate the parameters (signature
635 algorithm, length) of the Token Binding key pair. It is possible
636 that the Token Binding ID used between the client and the Token
637 Consumer, and the Token Binding ID used between the client and the
638 Token Provider, use different key parameters. The client MUST use
639 the key parameters negotiated with the Token Consumer in the
640 referred_token_binding TokenBinding of the TokenBindingMessage, even
641 if those key parameters are different from the ones negotiated with
642 the server that the header field is sent to.
643
644 Token Providers SHOULD support all the Token Binding key parameters
645 specified in [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>]. If a Token Provider does not support the key
646 parameters specified in the referred_token_binding TokenBinding in
647 the TokenBindingMessage, it MUST NOT issue a bound token.
648
649
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
671
672
673 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Federation Example</span>
674
675 The diagram below shows a typical HTTP redirect-based web browser
676 single sign-on (SSO) profile (Section 4.1 of
677 [<a href="#ref-OASIS.saml-prof-2.0-os">OASIS.saml-prof-2.0-os</a>]) (no artifact, no callbacks), featuring the
678 binding of, for example, a TLS Token Binding ID into an OpenID
679 Connect ID Token.
680
681 Legend:
682
683 +------------+------------------------------------------------------+
684 | EKM: | TLS Exported Keying Material [<a href="./rfc5705" title="&quot;Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC5705</a>] |
685 | | |
686 | {EKMn}Ksm: | EKM for server "n", signed by the private key of |
687 | | TBID "m", where "n" must represent the server |
688 | | receiving the ETBMSG. If a conveyed TB's type is |
689 | | provided_token_binding, then m = n, else if TB's |
690 | | type is referred_token_binding, then m != n. For |
691 | | example, see step 1b in the diagram below. |
692 | | |
693 | ETBMSG: | "Sec-Token-Binding" HTTP header field conveying an |
694 | | EncodedTokenBindingMessage, in turn conveying |
695 | | TokenBinding (TB)struct(s), e.g., ETBMSG[[TB]] or |
696 | | ETBMSG[[TB1],[TB2]] |
697 | | |
698 | ID Token: | the ID Token in OpenID Connect. It is the semantic |
699 | | equivalent of a SAML "authentication assertion". |
700 | | "ID Token w/TBIDn" denotes a "token bound" ID Token |
701 | | containing TBIDn. |
702 | | |
703 | Ks and Kp: | private (aka secret) key and public key, |
704 | | respectively, of the client-side Token Binding key |
705 | | pair |
706 | | |
707 | OIDC: | OpenID Connect |
708 | | |
709 | TB: | TokenBinding struct containing a signed EKM, TBID, |
710 | | and TB type, e.g., |
711 | | [{EKM1}Ks1,TBID1,provided_token_binding] |
712 | | |
713 | TBIDn: | Token Binding ID for client and server n's token- |
714 | | bound TLS association. TBIDn contains Kpn. |
715 +------------+------------------------------------------------------+
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
727
728
729 Client, aka Token Consumer, aka Token Provider, aka
730 User Agent OpenID Client, OpenID Provider,
731 OIDC Relying Party, OIDC Provider,
732 SAML Relying Party SAML Identity Provider
733 [ server "1" ] [ server "2" ]
734 +--------+ +----+ +-----+
735 | Client | | TC | | TP |
736 +--------+ +----+ +-----+
737 | | |
738 | | |
739 | | |
740 | 0. Client interacts w/TC | |
741 | over HTTPS, establishes Ks1 and Kp1, TBID1 |
742 | ETBMSG[[{EKM1}Ks1,TBID1,provided_token_binding]] |
743 |------------------------------&gt;| |
744 | | |
745 | | |
746 | | |
747 | 1a. OIDC ID Token request, aka| |
748 | "Authentication Request", conveyed with |
749 | an HTTP response header field of |
750 | Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID:true. |
751 | Any security-relevant cookies | |
752 | should contain TBID1. | |
753 +&lt;- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - | |
754 . | (redirect to TP via 301, 302, | |
755 . | 303, 307, or 308) | |
756 . | | |
757 +-------------------------------------------------------&gt;|
758 | 1b. opens HTTPS w/TP, |
759 | establishes Ks2, Kp2, TBID2; |
760 | sends a GET or POST with |
761 | ETBMSG[[{EKM2}Ks2,TBID2,provided_token_binding], |
762 | [{EKM2}Ks1,TBID1,referred_token_binding]] |
763 | as well as the ID Token request |
764 | | |
765 | | |
766 | | |
767 | 2. user authentication (if applicable; |
768 | methods vary; particulars are out of scope) |
769 |&lt;====================================================&gt;|
770 | (TP generates ID Token for TC containing TBID1; may |
771 | also set cookie(s) containing TBID2 and/or TBID1; |
772 | details vary; particulars are out of scope) |
773 | | |
774 | | |
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
783
784
785 | | |
786 | 3a. ID Token containing Kp1, issued for TC, |
787 | conveyed via OIDC "Authentication Response" |
788 +&lt;- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -|
789 . | (redirect to TC) | |
790 . | | |
791 . | | |
792 +--------------------------------&gt;| |
793 | 3b. HTTPS GET or POST with |
794 | ETBMSG[[{EKM1}Ks1,TBID1,provided_token_binding]] |
795 | conveying an Authentication Response containing |
796 | an ID Token w/TBID1, issued for TC |
797 | | |
798 | | |
799 | | |
800 | 4. user is signed on; any security-relevant cookie(s)|
801 | that is set SHOULD contain TBID1 |
802 |&lt;------------------------------| |
803 | | |
804 | | |
805
806 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Implementation Considerations</span>
807
808 HTTPS-based applications may have multi-party use cases other than,
809 or in addition to, the HTTP redirect-based signaling and conveyance
810 of referred Token Bindings, as presented above in <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>.
811
812 Thus, Token Binding implementations should provide APIs for such
813 applications to generate Token Binding messages containing Token
814 Binding IDs of various application-specified Token Binding types, to
815 be conveyed by the Sec-Token-Binding header field.
816
817 However, Token Binding implementations MUST only convey Token Binding
818 IDs to servers if signaled to do so by an application. Signaling
819 mechanisms other than the Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID HTTP
820 response header field are possible, but these mechanisms are outside
821 the scope of this specification.
822
823 NOTE: See <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a> ("Privacy Considerations") for privacy guidance
824 regarding the use of this functionality.
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
842
843 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Security Token Replay</span>
844
845 The goal of the federated Token Binding mechanisms is to prevent
846 attackers from exporting and replaying tokens used in protocols
847 between the client and the Token Consumer, thereby impersonating
848 legitimate users and gaining access to protected resources. Although
849 bound tokens can still be replayed by any malware present in clients
850 (which may be undetectable to a server), in order to export bound
851 tokens to other machines and successfully replay them, attackers also
852 need to export the corresponding Token Binding private keys. Token
853 Binding private keys are therefore high-value assets and SHOULD be
854 strongly protected, ideally by generating them in a hardware security
855 module that prevents key export.
856
857 This consideration is a special case of the scenario described in
858 <a href="#section-7.1">Section 7.1</a> ("Security Token Replay") of [<a href="./rfc8471" title="&quot;The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">RFC8471</a>].
859
860 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Sensitivity of the Sec-Token-Binding Header</span>
861
862 The purpose of the Token Binding protocol is to convince the server
863 that the client that initiated the TLS connection controls a certain
864 key pair. For the server to correctly draw this conclusion after
865 processing the Sec-Token-Binding header field, certain secrecy and
866 integrity requirements must be met.
867
868 For example, the client must keep its Token Binding private key
869 secret. If the private key is not secret, then another actor in the
870 system could create a valid Token Binding header field and thereby
871 impersonate the client. This can render the main purpose of the
872 protocol -- to bind bearer tokens to certain clients -- moot.
873 Consider, for example, an attacker who obtained (perhaps through a
874 network intrusion) an authentication cookie that a client uses with a
875 certain server. Consider further that the server bound that cookie
876 to the client's Token Binding ID precisely to thwart misuse of the
877 cookie. If the attacker were to come into possession of the client's
878 private key, they could then establish a TLS connection with the
879 server and craft a Sec-Token-Binding header field that matches the
880 binding present in the cookie, thus successfully authenticating as
881 the client and gaining access to the client's data at the server.
882 The Token Binding protocol, in this case, did not successfully bind
883 the cookie to the client.
884
885 Likewise, we need integrity protection of the Sec-Token-Binding
886 header field. A client should not be tricked into sending to a
887 server a Sec-Token-Binding header field that contains Token Bindings
888 signed with any Token Binding keys that the client does not control.
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
895
896
897 Consider an attacker A that somehow has knowledge of the Exported
898 Keying Material (EKM) for a TLS connection between a client C and a
899 server S. (While that is somewhat unlikely, it is also not entirely
900 out of the question, since the client might not treat the EKM as a
901 secret -- after all, a pre-image-resistant hash function has been
902 applied to the TLS master secret, making it impossible for someone
903 knowing the EKM to recover the TLS master secret. Such
904 considerations might lead some clients to not treat the EKM as a
905 secret.) Such an attacker A could craft a Sec-Token-Binding header
906 field with A's key pair over C's EKM. If the attacker could now
907 trick C into sending such a header field to S, it would appear to S
908 as if C controls a certain key pair, when in fact it does not (the
909 attacker A controls the key pair).
910
911 If A has a pre-existing relationship with S (e.g., perhaps has an
912 account on S), it now appears to the server S as if A is connecting
913 to it, even though it is really C. (If the server S does not simply
914 use Token Binding IDs to identify clients but also uses bound
915 authentication cookies, then A would also have to trick C into
916 sending one of A's cookies to S, which it can do through a variety of
917 means -- inserting cookies through JavaScript APIs, setting cookies
918 through related-domain attacks, etc.) In other words, in this
919 scenario, A can trick C into logging into A's account on S. This
920 could lead to a loss of privacy for C, since A presumably has some
921 other way to also access the account and can thus indirectly observe
922 C's behavior (for example, if S has a feature that lets account
923 holders see their activity history on S).
924
925 Therefore, we need to protect the integrity of the Sec-Token-Binding
926 header field. One eTLD+1 should not be able to set the
927 Sec-Token-Binding header field (through a Document Object Model (DOM)
928 API [<a href="#ref-W3C.REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407">W3C.REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407</a>] or otherwise) that the User
929 Agent uses with another eTLD+1. Employing the "Sec-" header field
930 prefix helps to meet this requirement by denoting the header field
931 name as a "forbidden header name"; see [<a href="#ref-fetch-spec">fetch-spec</a>].
932
933 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3" href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Securing Federated Sign-On Protocols</span>
934
935 As explained above, in a federated sign-on scenario, a client will
936 prove possession of two different Token Binding private keys to a
937 Token Provider: one private key corresponds to the "provided" Token
938 Binding ID (which the client normally uses with the Token Provider),
939 and the other is the Token Binding private key corresponding to the
940 "referred" Token Binding ID (which the client normally uses with the
941 Token Consumer). The Token Provider is expected to issue a token
942 that is bound to the Referred Token Binding ID.
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
951
952
953 Both proofs (that of the provided Token Binding private key and that
954 of the referred Token Binding private key) are necessary. To show
955 this, consider the following scenario:
956
957 o The client has an authentication token with the Token Provider
958 that is bound to the client's Token Binding ID used with that
959 Token Provider.
960
961 o The client wants to establish a secure (i.e., free of men-in-the-
962 middle) authenticated session with the Token Consumer but has not
963 yet done so (in other words, we are about to run the federated
964 sign-on protocol).
965
966 o A man-in-the-middle is allowed to intercept the connection between
967 the client and the Token Consumer or between the client and the
968 Token Provider (or both).
969
970 The goal is to detect the presence of the man-in-the-middle in these
971 scenarios.
972
973 First, consider a man-in-the-middle between the client and the Token
974 Provider. Recall that we assume that the client possesses a bound
975 authentication token (e.g., cookie) for the Token Provider. The
976 man-in-the-middle can intercept and modify any message sent by the
977 client to the Token Provider and any message sent by the Token
978 Provider to the client. (This means, among other things, that the
979 man-in-the-middle controls the JavaScript running at the client in
980 the origin of the Token Provider.) It is not, however, in possession
981 of the client's Token Binding private key. Therefore, it can choose
982 to either (1) replace the Token Binding ID in requests from the
983 client to the Token Provider and create a Sec-Token-Binding header
984 field that matches the TLS connection between the man-in-the-middle
985 and the Token Provider or (2) leave the Sec-Token-Binding header
986 field unchanged. If it chooses the latter, the signature in the
987 Token Binding message (created by the original client on the EKM for
988 the connection between the client and the man-in-the-middle) will not
989 match a signature on the EKM between the man-in-the-middle and the
990 Token Provider. If it chooses the former (and creates its own
991 signature, using its own Token Binding private key, over the EKM for
992 the connection between itself, the man-in-the-middle, and the Token
993 Provider), then the Token Binding message will match the connection
994 between the man-in-the-middle and the Token Provider, but the Token
995 Binding ID in the message will not match the Token Binding ID that
996 the client's authentication token is bound to. Either way, the
997 man-in-the-middle is detected by the Token Provider, but only if the
998 proof of possession of the provided Token Binding private key is
999 required in the protocol (as is done above).
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1007
1008
1009 Next, consider the presence of a man-in-the-middle between the client
1010 and the Token Consumer. That man-in-the-middle can intercept and
1011 modify any message sent by the client to the Token Consumer and any
1012 message sent by the Token Consumer to the client. The Token Consumer
1013 is the party that redirects the client to the Token Provider. In
1014 this case, the man-in-the-middle controls the redirect URL and can
1015 tamper with any redirect URL issued by the Token Consumer (as well as
1016 with any JavaScript running in the origin of the Token Consumer).
1017 The goal of the man-in-the-middle is to trick the Token Provider into
1018 issuing a token bound to its Token Binding ID and not to the Token
1019 Binding ID of the legitimate client. To thwart this goal of the
1020 man-in-the-middle, the client's Referred Token Binding ID must be
1021 communicated to the Token Provider in a manner that cannot be
1022 affected by the man-in-the-middle (who, as mentioned above, can
1023 modify redirect URLs and JavaScript at the client). Including the
1024 referred TokenBinding structure in the Sec-Token-Binding header field
1025 (as opposed to, say, including the Referred Token Binding ID in an
1026 application-level message as part of the redirect URL) is one way to
1027 assure that the man-in-the-middle between the client and the Token
1028 Consumer cannot affect the communication of the Referred Token
1029 Binding ID to the Token Provider.
1030
1031 Therefore, the Sec-Token-Binding header field in the federated
1032 sign-on use case contains both a proof of possession of the provided
1033 Token Binding key and a proof of possession of the referred Token
1034 Binding key.
1035
1036 Note that the presence of Token Binding does not relieve the Token
1037 Provider and Token Consumer from performing various checks to ensure
1038 the security of clients during the use of federated sign-on
1039 protocols. These include the following:
1040
1041 o The Token Provider should not issue tokens to Token Consumers that
1042 have been shown to act maliciously. To aid in this, the
1043 federation protocol should identify the Token Consumer to the
1044 Token Provider (e.g., through OAuth client IDs or similar
1045 mechanisms), and the Token Provider should ensure that tokens are
1046 indeed issued to the Token Consumer identified in the token
1047 request (e.g., by verifying that the redirect URI is associated
1048 with the OAuth client ID).
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1063
1064
1065 o The Token Consumer should verify that the tokens were issued for
1066 it and not for some other Token Consumer. To aid in this, the
1067 federation protocol should include an audience parameter in the
1068 token response or apply equivalent mechanisms (the implicit OAuth
1069 flow requires Token Consumers to identify themselves when they
1070 exchange OAuth authorization codes for OAuth refresh tokens,
1071 leaving it up to the Token Provider to verify that the OAuth
1072 authorization was delivered to the correct Token Consumer).
1073
1074 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Privacy Considerations</span>
1075
1076 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Scoping of Token Binding Key Pairs</span>
1077
1078 Clients use different Token Binding key pairs for different servers,
1079 so as to not allow Token Binding to become a tracking tool across
1080 different servers. However, the scoping of the Token Binding key
1081 pairs to servers varies according to the scoping rules of the
1082 application protocol (<a href="./rfc8471#section-4.1">Section&nbsp;4.1 of [RFC8471]</a>).
1083
1084 In the case of HTTP cookies, servers may use Token Binding to secure
1085 their cookies. These cookies can be attached to any subdomain of
1086 effective top-level domains (eTLDs), and clients therefore should use
1087 the same Token Binding key pair across such subdomains. This will
1088 ensure that any server capable of receiving the cookie will see the
1089 same Token Binding ID from the client and thus be able to verify the
1090 Token Binding of the cookie. See <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a> above.
1091
1092 If the client application is not a web browser, it may have
1093 additional knowledge about the relationship between different
1094 servers. For example, the client application might be aware of the
1095 fact that two servers play the roles of Relying Party and Identity
1096 Provider, respectively, in a federated sign-on protocol and that they
1097 therefore share the identity of the user. In such cases, it is
1098 permissible to use different Token Binding key-pair scoping rules,
1099 such as using the same Token Binding key pair for both the Relying
1100 Party and the Identity Provider. Absent such special knowledge,
1101 conservative key-pair scoping rules should be used, assuring that
1102 clients use different Token Binding key pairs with different servers.
1103
1104 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Lifetime of Token Binding Key Pairs</span>
1105
1106 Token Binding key pairs do not have an expiration time. This means
1107 that they can potentially be used by a server to track a user for an
1108 extended period of time (similar to a long-lived cookie). HTTPS
1109 clients such as web User Agents SHOULD therefore provide a user
1110 interface for discarding Token Binding key pairs (similar to the
1111 controls provided for deleting cookies).
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1119
1120
1121 If a User Agent provides modes such as private browsing mode in which
1122 the user is promised that browsing state such as cookies are
1123 discarded after the session is over, the User Agent MUST also discard
1124 Token Binding key pairs from such modes after the session is over.
1125 Generally speaking, users should be given the same level of control
1126 over the lifetime of Token Binding key pairs as they have over
1127 cookies or other potential tracking mechanisms.
1128
1129 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.3" href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>. Correlation</span>
1130
1131 An application's various communicating endpoints that receive Token
1132 Binding IDs for TLS connections other than their own obtain
1133 information about the application's other TLS connections. (In this
1134 context, "an application" is a combination of client-side and
1135 server-side components, communicating over HTTPS, where the client
1136 side may be web-browser-based, native-application-based, or both.)
1137 These other Token Binding IDs can serve as correlation handles for
1138 the endpoints of the other connections. If the receiving endpoints
1139 are otherwise aware of these other connections, then no additional
1140 information is being exposed. For instance, if in a redirect-based
1141 federation protocol the Identity Provider and Relying Party already
1142 possess URLs for one another, then also having Token Binding IDs for
1143 these connections does not provide additional correlation
1144 information. If not, by providing the other Token Binding IDs,
1145 additional information is then exposed that can be used to correlate
1146 the other endpoints. In such cases, a privacy analysis of enabled
1147 correlations and their potential privacy impacts should be performed
1148 as part of the application design decisions of how, and whether, to
1149 utilize Token Binding.
1150
1151 Also, Token Binding implementations must take care to only reveal
1152 Token Binding IDs to other endpoints if signaled to do so by the
1153 application associated with a Token Binding ID; see <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>
1154 ("Implementation Considerations").
1155
1156 Finally, care should be taken to ensure that unrelated applications
1157 do not obtain information about each other's Token Bindings. For
1158 instance, a Token Binding implementation shared between multiple
1159 applications on a given system should prevent unrelated applications
1160 from obtaining each other's Token Binding information. This may be
1161 accomplished by using techniques such as application isolation and
1162 key segregation, depending upon system capabilities.
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1175
1176
1177 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
1178
1179 Below is the Internet Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) "Permanent
1180 Message Header Field Names" registration information per [<a href="./rfc3864" title="&quot;Registration Procedures for Message Header Fields&quot;">RFC3864</a>].
1181
1182 Header Field name: Sec-Token-Binding
1183 Protocol: HTTP
1184 Status: standard
1185 Reference: This document
1186
1187 Header Field name: Include-Referred-Token-Binding-ID
1188 Protocol: HTTP
1189 Status: standard
1190 Reference: This document
1191
1192 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. References</span>
1193
1194 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References</span>
1195
1196 [<a id="ref-PSL">PSL</a>] Mozilla, "Public Suffix List",
1197 &lt;<a href="https://publicsuffix.org/">https://publicsuffix.org/</a>&gt;.
1198
1199 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1200 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
1201 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
1202 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
1203
1204 [<a id="ref-RFC2818">RFC2818</a>] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", <a href="./rfc2818">RFC 2818</a>,
1205 DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, May 2000,
1206 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>&gt;.
1207
1208 [<a id="ref-RFC3864">RFC3864</a>] Klyne, G., Nottingham, M., and J. Mogul, "Registration
1209 Procedures for Message Header Fields", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp90">BCP 90</a>, <a href="./rfc3864">RFC 3864</a>,
1210 DOI 10.17487/RFC3864, September 2004,
1211 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3864</a>&gt;.
1212
1213 [<a id="ref-RFC4648">RFC4648</a>] Josefsson, S., "The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data
1214 Encodings", <a href="./rfc4648">RFC 4648</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4648, October 2006,
1215 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648</a>&gt;.
1216
1217 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
1218 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>,
1219 DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August 2008,
1220 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246</a>&gt;.
1221
1222 [<a id="ref-RFC5705">RFC5705</a>] Rescorla, E., "Keying Material Exporters for Transport
1223 Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc5705">RFC 5705</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5705,
1224 March 2010, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705</a>&gt;.
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1231
1232
1233 [<a id="ref-RFC6265">RFC6265</a>] Barth, A., "HTTP State Management Mechanism", <a href="./rfc6265">RFC 6265</a>,
1234 DOI 10.17487/RFC6265, April 2011,
1235 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265</a>&gt;.
1236
1237 [<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
1238 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
1239 <a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
1240 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>&gt;.
1241
1242 [<a id="ref-RFC7231">RFC7231</a>] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
1243 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Semantics and Content", <a href="./rfc7231">RFC 7231</a>,
1244 DOI 10.17487/RFC7231, June 2014,
1245 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7231</a>&gt;.
1246
1247 [<a id="ref-RFC7541">RFC7541</a>] Peon, R. and H. Ruellan, "HPACK: Header Compression for
1248 HTTP/2", <a href="./rfc7541">RFC 7541</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7541, May 2015,
1249 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7541</a>&gt;.
1250
1251 [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
1252 <a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
1253 May 2017, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.
1254
1255 [<a id="ref-RFC8471">RFC8471</a>] Popov, A., Ed., Nystroem, M., Balfanz, D., and J. Hodges,
1256 "The Token Binding Protocol Version 1.0", <a href="./rfc8471">RFC 8471</a>,
1257 DOI 10.17487/RFC8471, October 2018,
1258 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8471">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8471</a>&gt;.
1259
1260 [<a id="ref-RFC8472">RFC8472</a>] Popov, A., Ed., Nystroem, M., and D. Balfanz, "Transport
1261 Layer Security (TLS) Extension for Token Binding Protocol
1262 Negotiation", <a href="./rfc8472">RFC 8472</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8472, October
1263 2018, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8472">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8472</a>&gt;.
1264
1265 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.2" href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1266
1267 [<a id="ref-fetch-spec">fetch-spec</a>]
1268 WhatWG, "Fetch", Living Standard,
1269 &lt;<a href="https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/">https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/</a>&gt;.
1270
1271 [<a id="ref-OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os">OASIS.saml-core-2.0-os</a>]
1272 Cantor, S., Kemp, J., Philpott, R., and E. Maler,
1273 "Assertions and Protocols for the OASIS Security Assertion
1274 Markup Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard
1275 saml-core-2.0-os, March 2005, &lt;<a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf">http://docs.oasis-open.org/</a>
1276 <a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf">security/saml/v2.0/saml-core-2.0-os.pdf</a>&gt;.
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1287
1288
1289 [<a id="ref-OASIS.saml-prof-2.0-os">OASIS.saml-prof-2.0-os</a>]
1290 Hughes, J., Ed., Cantor, S., Ed., Hodges, J., Ed., Hirsch,
1291 F., Ed., Mishra, P., Ed., Philpott, R., Ed., and E. Maler,
1292 Ed., "Profiles for the OASIS Security Assertion Markup
1293 Language (SAML) V2.0", OASIS Standard
1294 OASIS.saml-profiles-2.0-os, March 2005,
1295 &lt;<a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf">http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/</a>
1296 <a href="http://docs.oasis-open.org/security/saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf">saml/v2.0/saml-profiles-2.0-os.pdf</a>&gt;.
1297
1298 [<a id="ref-OpenID.Core">OpenID.Core</a>]
1299 Sakimura, N., Bradley, J., Jones, M., de Medeiros, B., and
1300 C. Mortimore, "OpenID Connect Core 1.0 incorporating
1301 errata set 1", November 2014,
1302 &lt;<a href="http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html">http://openid.net/specs/openid-connect-core-1_0.html</a>&gt;.
1303
1304 [<a id="ref-RFC6749">RFC6749</a>] Hardt, D., Ed., "The OAuth 2.0 Authorization Framework",
1305 <a href="./rfc6749">RFC 6749</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6749, October 2012,
1306 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6749</a>&gt;.
1307
1308 [<a id="ref-RFC7540">RFC7540</a>] Belshe, M., Peon, R., and M. Thomson, Ed., "Hypertext
1309 Transfer Protocol Version 2 (HTTP/2)", <a href="./rfc7540">RFC 7540</a>,
1310 DOI 10.17487/RFC7540, May 2015,
1311 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7540</a>&gt;.
1312
1313 [<a id="ref-TOKENBIND-TLS13">TOKENBIND-TLS13</a>]
1314 Harper, N., "Token Binding for Transport Layer Security
1315 (TLS) Version 1.3 Connections", Work in Progress,
1316 <a href="./draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-01">draft-ietf-tokbind-tls13-01</a>, May 2018.
1317
1318 [<a id="ref-W3C.REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407">W3C.REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407</a>]
1319 Le Hors, A., Ed., Le Hegaret, P., Ed., Wood, L., Ed.,
1320 Nicol, G., Ed., Robie, J., Ed., Champion, M., Ed., and S.
1321 Byrne, Ed., "Document Object Model (DOM) Level 3 Core
1322 Specification", World Wide Web Consortium Recommendation
1323 REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407, April 2004,
1324 &lt;<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407">https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/</a>
1325 <a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2004/REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407">REC-DOM-Level-3-Core-20040407</a>&gt;.
1326
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8473">RFC 8473</a> Token Binding over HTTP October 2018</span>
1343
1344
1345 Acknowledgements
1346
1347 This document incorporates comments and suggestions offered by Eric
1348 Rescorla, Gabriel Montenegro, Martin Thomson, Vinod Anupam, Anthony
1349 Nadalin, Michael B. Jones, Bill Cox, Brian Campbell, and others.
1350
1351 This document was produced under the chairmanship of John Bradley and
1352 Leif Johansson. The area directors included Eric Rescorla, Kathleen
1353 Moriarty, and Stephen Farrell.
1354
1355 Authors' Addresses
1356
1357 Andrei Popov
1358 Microsoft Corp.
1359 United States of America
1360
1361 Email: [email protected]
1362
1363
1364 Magnus Nystroem
1365 Microsoft Corp.
1366 United States of America
1367
1368 Email: [email protected]
1369
1370
1371 Dirk Balfanz (editor)
1372 Google Inc.
1373 United States of America
1374
1375 Email: [email protected]
1376
1377
1378 Nick Harper
1379 Google Inc.
1380 United States of America
1381
1382 Email: [email protected]
1383
1384
1385 Jeff Hodges
1386 Kings Mountain Systems
1387 United States of America
1388
1389 Email: [email protected]
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 Popov, et al. Standards Track [Page 25]
1397 </pre>