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1 <pre>Independent Submission M. Lochter
2 Request for Comments: 5639 BSI
3 Category: Informational J. Merkle
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 secunet Security Networks
5 March 2010
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Brainpool Standard</span>
9 <span class="h1">Curves and Curve Generation</span>
10
11 Abstract
12
13 This memo proposes several elliptic curve domain parameters over
14 finite prime fields for use in cryptographic applications. The
15 domain parameters are consistent with the relevant international
16 standards, and can be used in X.509 certificates and certificate
17 revocation lists (CRLs), for Internet Key Exchange (IKE), Transport
18 Layer Security (TLS), XML signatures, and all applications or
19 protocols based on the cryptographic message syntax (CMS).
20
21 Status of This Memo
22
23 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
24 published for informational purposes.
25
26 This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
27 RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
28 its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
29 implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
30 the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet
31 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
32
33 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
34 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
35 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5639">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5639</a>.
36
37 Copyright Notice
38
39 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
40 document authors. All rights reserved.
41
42 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
43 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
44 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
45 publication of this document. Please review these documents
46 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
47 to this document.
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52 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Scope and Relation to Other Specifications .................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
61 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Requirements Language ......................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
62 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements on the Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters ............<a href="#page-4">4</a>
63 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Security Requirements ......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
64 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Technical Requirements .....................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
65 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Domain Parameter Specification ..................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
66 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Domain Parameters for 160-Bit Curves .......................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
67 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Domain Parameters for 192-Bit Curves .......................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
68 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Domain Parameters for 224-Bit Curves ......................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
69 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Domain Parameters for 256-Bit Curves ......................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
70 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Domain Parameters for 320-Bit Curves ......................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
71 <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Domain Parameters for 384-Bit Curves ......................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
72 <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Domain Parameters for 512-Bit Curves ......................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
73 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Object Identifiers and ASN.1 Syntax ............................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
74 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Object Identifiers ........................................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
75 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. ASN.1 Syntax for Usage with X.509 Certificates ............<a href="#page-16">16</a>
76 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
77 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Intellectual Property Rights ...................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
78 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
79 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
80 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
81 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Pseudo-Random Generation of Parameters ................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
82 <a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Generation of Prime Numbers ................................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
83 <a href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Generation of Pseudo-Random Curves .........................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
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108 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 Although several standards for elliptic curves and domain parameters
116 exist (e.g., [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>], [<a href="#ref-FIPS" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">FIPS</a>], or [<a href="#ref-SEC2" title="&quot;Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters&quot;">SEC2</a>]), some major issues have
117 still not been addressed:
118
119 o Not all parameters have been generated in a verifiably pseudo-
120 random way. In particular, the seeds from which the curve
121 parameters were derived have been chosen ad hoc, leaving out an
122 essential part of the security proof.
123
124 o The primes selected for the base fields have a very special form
125 facilitating efficient implementation. This does not only
126 contradict the approach of pseudo-random parameters, but also
127 increases the risk of implementations violating one of the
128 numerous patents for fast modular arithmetic with special primes.
129
130 o No proofs are provided that the proposed parameters do not belong
131 to those classes of parameters that are susceptible to
132 cryptanalytic attacks with sub-exponential complexity.
133
134 o Recent research results seem to indicate a potential for new
135 attacks on elliptic curve cryptosystems. At least for
136 applications with the highest security demands or under
137 circumstances that complicate a change of parameters in response
138 to new attacks, the inclusion of a corresponding security
139 requirement for domain parameters (the class group condition, see
140 <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>) is justified.
141
142 o Some of the proposed subgroups have a non-trivial cofactor, which
143 demands additional checks by cryptographic applications to prevent
144 small subgroup attacks (see [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>] or [<a href="#ref-SEC1" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">SEC1</a>]).
145
146 o The domain parameters specified do not cover all bit lengths that
147 correspond to the commonly used key lengths for symmetric
148 cryptographic algorithms. In particular, there is no 512-bit
149 curve defined, but only one with a 521-bit length, which may be
150 disadvantageous for some implementations.
151
152 Furthermore, many of the parameters specified by the existing
153 standards are identical (see [<a href="#ref-SEC2" title="&quot;Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters&quot;">SEC2</a>] for a comparison). Thus, there
154 is still a need for additional elliptic curve domain parameters that
155 overcome the above limitations.
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160
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164 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Scope and Relation to Other Specifications</span>
170
171 This RFC specifies elliptic curve domain parameters over prime fields
172 GF(p) with p having a length of 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, and 512
173 bits. These parameters were generated in a pseudo-random, yet
174 completely systematic and reproducible, way and have been verified to
175 resist current cryptanalytic approaches. The parameters are
176 compliant with ANSI X9.62 [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>] and ANSI X9.63 [<a href="#ref-ANSI2" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using The Elliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">ANSI2</a>], ISO/IEC
177 14888 [<a href="#ref-ISO1" title="">ISO1</a>] and ISO/IEC 15946 [<a href="#ref-ISO2" title="&quot;Information Technology - Security Techniques - Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves - Part 2: Digital signatures&quot;">ISO2</a>], ETSI TS 102 176-1 [<a href="#ref-ETSI" title="&quot;Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic Signatures, Part 1: Hash Functions and Asymmetric Algorithms&quot;">ETSI</a>], as
178 well as with FIPS-186-2 [<a href="#ref-FIPS" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">FIPS</a>], and the Efficient Cryptography Group
179 (SECG) specifications ([<a href="#ref-SEC1" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">SEC1</a>] and [<a href="#ref-SEC2" title="&quot;Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters&quot;">SEC2</a>]).
180
181 Furthermore, this document identifies the security and implementation
182 requirements for the parameters, and describes the methods used for
183 the pseudo-random generation of the parameters.
184
185 Finally, this RFC defines ASN.1 object identifiers for all elliptic
186 curve domain parameter sets specified herein, e.g., for use in X.509
187 certificates.
188
189 This document does neither address the cryptographic algorithms to be
190 used with the specified parameters nor their application in other
191 standards. However, it is consistent with the following RFCs that
192 specify the usage of elliptic curve cryptography in protocols and
193 applications:
194
195 o [<a href="./rfc5753" title="&quot;Use of Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5753</a>] for the cryptographic message syntax (CMS)
196
197 o [<a href="./rfc3279" title="&quot;Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC3279</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5480" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information&quot;">RFC5480</a>] for X.509 certificates and CRLs
198
199 o [<a href="./rfc4050" title="&quot;Using the Elliptic Curve Signature Algorithm (ECDSA) for XML Digital Signatures&quot;">RFC4050</a>] for XML signatures
200
201 o [<a href="./rfc4492" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC4492</a>] for TLS
202
203 o [<a href="./rfc4754" title="&quot;IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">RFC4754</a>] for IKE
204
205 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Requirements Language</span>
206
207 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
208 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
209 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
210
211 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements on the Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters</span>
212
213 Throughout this memo, let p &gt; 3 be a prime and GF(p) a finite field
214 (sometimes also referred to as Galois Field or GF(p)) with p
215 elements. For given A and B with non-zero 4*A^3 + 27*B^2 mod p, the
216 set of solutions (x,y) for the equation E: y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B mod p
217
218
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220 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
223
224
225 over GF(p) together with a neutral element O and well-defined laws
226 for addition and inversion define a group E(GF(p)) -- the group of
227 GF(p) rational points on E. Typically, for cryptographic
228 applications, an element G of prime order q is chosen in E(GF(p)).
229
230 A comprehensive introduction to elliptic curve cryptography can be
231 found in [<a href="#ref-CFDA" title="&quot;Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">CFDA</a>] and [<a href="#ref-BSS" title="&quot;Elliptic Curves in Cryptography&quot;">BSS</a>].
232
233 Note 1: We choose {0,...,p-1} as a set of representatives for the
234 elements of GF(p). This choice induces a natural ordering on GF(p).
235
236 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Security Requirements</span>
237
238 The following security requirements are either motivated by known
239 cryptographic analysis or aim to enhance trust in the recommended
240 curves. As this specification aims at a particularly high level of
241 security, a restrictive position is taken here. Nevertheless, it may
242 be sensible to slightly deviate from these requirements for certain
243 applications (e.g., in order to achieve higher computational
244 performance). More details on requirements for cryptographically
245 strong elliptic curves can be found in [<a href="#ref-CFDA" title="&quot;Handbook of Elliptic and Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">CFDA</a>] and [<a href="#ref-BSS" title="&quot;Elliptic Curves in Cryptography&quot;">BSS</a>].
246
247 1. Immunity to attacks using the Weil or Tate Pairing. These
248 attacks allow the embedding of the cyclic subgroup generated by G
249 into the group of units of a degree-l extension GF(p^l) of GF(p),
250 where sub-exponential attacks on the discrete logarithm problem
251 (DLP) exist. Here we have l = min{t | q divides p^t - 1}, i.e.,
252 l is the order of p mod q. By Fermat's Little Theorem, l divides
253 q-1. We require (q-1)/l &lt; 100, which means that l is close to
254 the maximum possible value. This requirement is considerably
255 stronger than those of [<a href="#ref-SEC2" title="&quot;Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters&quot;">SEC2</a>] and [<a href="#ref-ANSI2" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Key Agreement and Key Transport Using The Elliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">ANSI2</a>] and also excludes
256 supersingular curves, as those are the curves of order p+1.
257
258 2. The trace is not equal to one. Trace one curves (or anomalous
259 curves) are curves with #E(GF(p)) = p. Satoh and Araki [<a href="#ref-SA" title="&quot;Fermat Quotients and the Polynomial Time Discrete Log Algorithm for Anomalous Elliptic Curves&quot;">SA</a>],
260 Semaev [<a href="#ref-Sem" title="&quot;Evaluation of Discrete Logarithms on Some Elliptic Curves&quot;">Sem</a>], and Smart [<a href="#ref-Sma" title="&quot;The Discrete Logarithm Problem on Elliptic Curves of Trace One&quot;">Sma</a>] independently proposed efficient
261 solutions to the elliptic curve discrete logarithm problem
262 (ECDLP) on trace one curves. Note that these curves are also
263 excluded by requirement 5 of <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>.
264
265 3. Large class number. The class number of the maximal order of the
266 quotient field of the endomorphism ring End(E) of E is larger
267 than 10^7. Generally, E cannot be "lifted" to a curve E' over an
268 algebraic number field L with End(E) = End(E') unless the degree
269 of L over the rationals is larger than the class number of
270 End(E). Although there are no efficient attacks exploiting a
271 small class number, recent work ([<a href="#ref-JMV" title="&quot;Ramanujan Graphs and the Random Reducibility of Discrete Log on Isogenous Elliptic Curves&quot;">JMV</a>] and [<a href="#ref-HR" title="&quot;Signature Calculus and the Discrete Logarithm Problem for Elliptic Curves (Preliminary Version)&quot;">HR</a>]) also may be seen
272 as argument for the class number condition.
273
274
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276 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
279
280
281 4. Prime group order. The group order #E(GF(p)) shall be a prime
282 number in order to counter small-subgroup attacks (see [<a href="#ref-HMV" title="&quot;Guide to Elliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">HMV</a>]).
283 Therefore, all groups proposed in this RFC have cofactor 1. Note
284 that curves with prime order have no point of order 2 and
285 therefore no point with y-coordinate 0.
286
287 5. Verifiably pseudo-random. The elliptic curve domain parameters
288 shall be generated in a pseudo-random manner using seeds that are
289 generated in a systematic and comprehensive way. The methods by
290 which the parameters have been obtained are explained in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix</a>
291 <a href="#appendix-A">A</a>.
292
293 6. Proof of security. For all curves, a proof should be given that
294 all security requirements are met. These proofs are provided in
295 [<a href="#ref-EBP" title="&quot;ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation&quot;">EBP</a>].
296
297 In [<a href="#ref-BG" title="&quot;The Static Diffie-Hellman Problem&quot;">BG</a>], attacks are described that apply to elliptic curve domain
298 parameters where q-1 has a factor u in the order of q^(1/3).
299 However, the circumstances under which these attacks are applicable
300 can be avoided in most applications. Therefore, no corresponding
301 security requirement is stated here. However, it is highly
302 recommended that developers verify the security of their
303 implementations against this kind of attack.
304
305 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Technical Requirements</span>
306
307 Commercial demands and experience with existing implementations lead
308 to the following technical requirements for the elliptic curve domain
309 parameters.
310
311 1. For each of the bit lengths 160, 192, 224, 256, 320, 384, and
312 512, one curve shall be proposed. This requirement follows from
313 the need for curves providing different levels of security that
314 are appropriate for the underlying symmetric algorithms. The
315 existing standards specify a 521-bit curve instead of a 512-bit
316 curve.
317
318 2. The prime number p shall be congruent 3 mod 4. This requirement
319 allows efficient point compression: one method for the
320 transmission of curve points P=(x,y) is to transmit only x and
321 the least significant bit LSB(y) of y. For p = 3 mod 4, we get
322 (y^2)^((p+1)/4) = y*y^((p-1)/2), which is either y or -y by
323 Fermat's Little Theorem; hence, y can be computed very
324 efficiently using the curve equation. This requirement is not
325 always met by the parameters defined in existing standards.
326
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332 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
335
336
337 3. The curves shall be GF(p)-isomorphic to a curve E': y^2 = x^3 +
338 A'*x + B' mod p with A' = -3 mod p. This property permits the
339 use of the arithmetical advantages of curves with A = -3, as
340 shown by Brier and Joyce [<a href="#ref-BJ" title="&quot;Fast Multiplication on Elliptic Curves through Isogenies&quot;">BJ</a>]. For p = 3 mod 4, approximately
341 half of the isomorphism classes of elliptic curves over GF(p)
342 contain a curve E' with A' = -3 mod p. Precisely, if a curve is
343 given by E: y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B mod p with -3 = A*u^4 being
344 solvable in GF(p) and u=Z is a solution to this equation, then
345 the requirement is fulfilled by means of the quadratic twist E':
346 y^2 = x^3 + Z^4*A*x + Z^6*B mod p, and the GF(p)-isomorphism is
347 given by F(x,y) := (x*Z^2, y*Z^3). Due to this isomorphism,
348 E(GF(p)) and E'(GF(p)) have the same number of points, share the
349 same algebraic structure, and hence offer the same level of
350 security. This constraint has also been used by [<a href="#ref-SEC2" title="&quot;Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters&quot;">SEC2</a>] and
351 [<a href="#ref-FIPS" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">FIPS</a>].
352
353 4. The prime p must not be of any special form; this requirement is
354 met by a verifiably pseudo-random generation of the parameters
355 (see requirement 5 in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>). Although parameters
356 specified by existing standards do not meet this requirement, the
357 need for such curves over (pseudo-)randomly chosen fields has
358 already been foreseen by the Standards for Efficient Cryptography
359 Group (SECG), see [<a href="#ref-SEC2" title="&quot;Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain Parameters&quot;">SEC2</a>].
360
361 5. #E(GF(p)) &lt; p. As a consequence of the Hasse-Weil Theorem, the
362 number of points #E(GF(p)) may be greater than the characteristic
363 p of the prime field GF(p). In some cases, even the bit-length
364 of #E(GF(p)) can exceed the bit-length of p. To avoid overruns
365 in implementations, we require that #E(GF(p)) &lt; p. In order to
366 thwart attacks on digital signature schemes, some authors propose
367 to use q &gt; p, but the attacks described, e.g., in [<a href="#ref-BRS" title="&quot;Key Substitution Attacks Revisited: Taking into Account Malicious Signers&quot;">BRS</a>], appear
368 infeasible in a well-designed Public Key Infrastructure (PKI).
369
370 6. B shall be a non-square mod p. Otherwise, the compressed
371 representations of the curve-points (0,0) and (0,X), with X being
372 the square root of B with a least significant bit of 0, would be
373 identical. As there are implementations of elliptic curves that
374 encode the point at infinity as (0,0), we try to avoid
375 ambiguities. Note that this condition is stable under quadratic
376 twists as described in condition 3 above. Condition 6 makes the
377 attack described in [<a href="#ref-G" title="&quot;A Refined Power-Analysis-Attack on Elliptic Curve Cryptosystems&quot;">G</a>] impossible. It can therefore also be
378 seen as a security requirement. This constraint has not been
379 specified by existing standards.
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388 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Domain Parameter Specification</span>
394
395 In this section, the elliptic curve domain parameters proposed are
396 specified in the following way.
397
398 For all curves, an ID is given by which it can be referenced.
399
400 p is the prime specifying the base field.
401
402 A and B are the coefficients of the equation y^2 = x^3 + A*x + B
403 mod p defining the elliptic curve.
404
405 G = (x,y) is the base point, i.e., a point in E of prime order,
406 with x and y being its x- and y-coordinates, respectively.
407
408 q is the prime order of the group generated by G.
409
410 h is the cofactor of G in E, i.e., #E(GF(p))/q.
411
412 For the twisted curve, we also give the coefficient Z that defines
413 the isomorphism F (see requirement 3 in <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>).
414
415 The methods for the generation of the parameters are given in
416 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Proofs for the fulfillment of the security requirements
417 specified in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a> are given in [<a href="#ref-EBP" title="&quot;ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation&quot;">EBP</a>].
418
419 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Domain Parameters for 160-Bit Curves</span>
420
421 Curve-ID: brainpoolP160r1
422
423 p = E95E4A5F737059DC60DFC7AD95B3D8139515620F
424
425 A = 340E7BE2A280EB74E2BE61BADA745D97E8F7C300
426
427 B = 1E589A8595423412134FAA2DBDEC95C8D8675E58
428
429 x = BED5AF16EA3F6A4F62938C4631EB5AF7BDBCDBC3
430
431 y = 1667CB477A1A8EC338F94741669C976316DA6321
432
433 q = E95E4A5F737059DC60DF5991D45029409E60FC09
434
435 h = 1
436
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
447
448
449 #Twisted curve
450
451 Curve-ID: brainpoolP160t1
452
453 Z = 24DBFF5DEC9B986BBFE5295A29BFBAE45E0F5D0B
454
455 A = E95E4A5F737059DC60DFC7AD95B3D8139515620C
456
457 B = 7A556B6DAE535B7B51ED2C4D7DAA7A0B5C55F380
458
459 x = B199B13B9B34EFC1397E64BAEB05ACC265FF2378
460
461 y = ADD6718B7C7C1961F0991B842443772152C9E0AD
462
463 q = E95E4A5F737059DC60DF5991D45029409E60FC09
464
465 h = 1
466
467 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Domain Parameters for 192-Bit Curves</span>
468
469 Curve-ID: brainpoolP192r1
470
471 p = C302F41D932A36CDA7A3463093D18DB78FCE476DE1A86297
472
473 A = 6A91174076B1E0E19C39C031FE8685C1CAE040E5C69A28EF
474
475 B = 469A28EF7C28CCA3DC721D044F4496BCCA7EF4146FBF25C9
476
477 x = C0A0647EAAB6A48753B033C56CB0F0900A2F5C4853375FD6
478
479 y = 14B690866ABD5BB88B5F4828C1490002E6773FA2FA299B8F
480
481 q = C302F41D932A36CDA7A3462F9E9E916B5BE8F1029AC4ACC1
482
483 h = 1
484
485 #Twisted curve
486
487 Curve-ID: brainpoolP192t1
488
489 Z = 1B6F5CC8DB4DC7AF19458A9CB80DC2295E5EB9C3732104CB
490
491 A = C302F41D932A36CDA7A3463093D18DB78FCE476DE1A86294
492
493 B = 13D56FFAEC78681E68F9DEB43B35BEC2FB68542E27897B79
494
495 x = 3AE9E58C82F63C30282E1FE7BBF43FA72C446AF6F4618129
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
503
504
505 y = 097E2C5667C2223A902AB5CA449D0084B7E5B3DE7CCC01C9
506
507 q = C302F41D932A36CDA7A3462F9E9E916B5BE8F1029AC4ACC1
508
509 h = 1
510
511 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Domain Parameters for 224-Bit Curves</span>
512
513 Curve-ID: brainpoolP224r1
514
515 p = D7C134AA264366862A18302575D1D787B09F075797DA89F57EC8C0FF
516
517 A = 68A5E62CA9CE6C1C299803A6C1530B514E182AD8B0042A59CAD29F43
518
519 B = 2580F63CCFE44138870713B1A92369E33E2135D266DBB372386C400B
520
521 x = 0D9029AD2C7E5CF4340823B2A87DC68C9E4CE3174C1E6EFDEE12C07D
522
523 y = 58AA56F772C0726F24C6B89E4ECDAC24354B9E99CAA3F6D3761402CD
524
525 q = D7C134AA264366862A18302575D0FB98D116BC4B6DDEBCA3A5A7939F
526
527 h = 1
528
529 #Twisted curve
530
531 Curve-ID: brainpoolP224t1
532
533 Z = 2DF271E14427A346910CF7A2E6CFA7B3F484E5C2CCE1C8B730E28B3F
534
535 A = D7C134AA264366862A18302575D1D787B09F075797DA89F57EC8C0FC
536
537 B = 4B337D934104CD7BEF271BF60CED1ED20DA14C08B3BB64F18A60888D
538
539 x = 6AB1E344CE25FF3896424E7FFE14762ECB49F8928AC0C76029B4D580
540
541 y = 0374E9F5143E568CD23F3F4D7C0D4B1E41C8CC0D1C6ABD5F1A46DB4C
542
543 q = D7C134AA264366862A18302575D0FB98D116BC4B6DDEBCA3A5A7939F
544
545 h = 1
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Domain Parameters for 256-Bit Curves</span>
562
563 Curve-ID: brainpoolP256r1
564
565 p =
566 A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5377
567
568 A =
569 7D5A0975FC2C3057EEF67530417AFFE7FB8055C126DC5C6CE94A4B44F330B5D9
570
571 B =
572 26DC5C6CE94A4B44F330B5D9BBD77CBF958416295CF7E1CE6BCCDC18FF8C07B6
573
574 x =
575 8BD2AEB9CB7E57CB2C4B482FFC81B7AFB9DE27E1E3BD23C23A4453BD9ACE3262
576
577 y =
578 547EF835C3DAC4FD97F8461A14611DC9C27745132DED8E545C1D54C72F046997
579
580 q =
581 A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7
582
583 h = 1
584
585 #Twisted curve
586
587 Curve-ID: brainpoolP256t1
588
589 Z =
590 3E2D4BD9597B58639AE7AA669CAB9837CF5CF20A2C852D10F655668DFC150EF0
591
592 A =
593 A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D726E3BF623D52620282013481D1F6E5374
594
595 B =
596 662C61C430D84EA4FE66A7733D0B76B7BF93EBC4AF2F49256AE58101FEE92B04
597
598 x =
599 A3E8EB3CC1CFE7B7732213B23A656149AFA142C47AAFBC2B79A191562E1305F4
600
601 y =
602 2D996C823439C56D7F7B22E14644417E69BCB6DE39D027001DABE8F35B25C9BE
603
604 q =
605 A9FB57DBA1EEA9BC3E660A909D838D718C397AA3B561A6F7901E0E82974856A7
606
607 h = 1
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Domain Parameters for 320-Bit Curves</span>
618
619 Curve-ID: brainpoolP320r1
620
621 p = D35E472036BC4FB7E13C785ED201E065F98FCFA6F6F40DEF4F92B9EC7893EC
622 28FCD412B1F1B32E27
623
624 A = 3EE30B568FBAB0F883CCEBD46D3F3BB8A2A73513F5EB79DA66190EB085FFA9
625 F492F375A97D860EB4
626
627 B = 520883949DFDBC42D3AD198640688A6FE13F41349554B49ACC31DCCD884539
628 816F5EB4AC8FB1F1A6
629
630 x = 43BD7E9AFB53D8B85289BCC48EE5BFE6F20137D10A087EB6E7871E2A10A599
631 C710AF8D0D39E20611
632
633 y = 14FDD05545EC1CC8AB4093247F77275E0743FFED117182EAA9C77877AAAC6A
634 C7D35245D1692E8EE1
635
636 q = D35E472036BC4FB7E13C785ED201E065F98FCFA5B68F12A32D482EC7EE8658
637 E98691555B44C59311
638
639 h = 1
640
641 #Twisted curve
642
643 Curve-ID: brainpoolP320t1
644
645 Z = 15F75CAF668077F7E85B42EB01F0A81FF56ECD6191D55CB82B7D861458A18F
646 EFC3E5AB7496F3C7B1
647
648 A = D35E472036BC4FB7E13C785ED201E065F98FCFA6F6F40DEF4F92B9EC7893EC
649 28FCD412B1F1B32E24
650
651 B = A7F561E038EB1ED560B3D147DB782013064C19F27ED27C6780AAF77FB8A547
652 CEB5B4FEF422340353
653
654 x = 925BE9FB01AFC6FB4D3E7D4990010F813408AB106C4F09CB7EE07868CC136F
655 FF3357F624A21BED52
656
657 y = 63BA3A7A27483EBF6671DBEF7ABB30EBEE084E58A0B077AD42A5A0989D1EE7
658 1B1B9BC0455FB0D2C3
659
660 q = D35E472036BC4FB7E13C785ED201E065F98FCFA5B68F12A32D482EC7EE8658
661 E98691555B44C59311
662
663 h = 1
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
671
672
673 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Domain Parameters for 384-Bit Curves</span>
674
675 Curve-ID: brainpoolP384r1
676
677 p = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B412B1DA197FB711
678 23ACD3A729901D1A71874700133107EC53
679
680 A = 7BC382C63D8C150C3C72080ACE05AFA0C2BEA28E4FB22787139165EFBA91F9
681 0F8AA5814A503AD4EB04A8C7DD22CE2826
682
683 B = 04A8C7DD22CE28268B39B55416F0447C2FB77DE107DCD2A62E880EA53EEB62
684 D57CB4390295DBC9943AB78696FA504C11
685
686 x = 1D1C64F068CF45FFA2A63A81B7C13F6B8847A3E77EF14FE3DB7FCAFE0CBD10
687 E8E826E03436D646AAEF87B2E247D4AF1E
688
689 y = 8ABE1D7520F9C2A45CB1EB8E95CFD55262B70B29FEEC5864E19C054FF99129
690 280E4646217791811142820341263C5315
691
692 q = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425
693 A7CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565
694
695 h = 1
696
697 #Twisted curve
698
699 Curve-ID: brainpoolP384t1
700
701 Z = 41DFE8DD399331F7166A66076734A89CD0D2BCDB7D068E44E1F378F41ECBAE
702 97D2D63DBC87BCCDDCCC5DA39E8589291C
703
704 A = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B412B1DA197FB711
705 23ACD3A729901D1A71874700133107EC50
706
707 B = 7F519EADA7BDA81BD826DBA647910F8C4B9346ED8CCDC64E4B1ABD11756DCE
708 1D2074AA263B88805CED70355A33B471EE
709
710 x = 18DE98B02DB9A306F2AFCD7235F72A819B80AB12EBD653172476FECD462AAB
711 FFC4FF191B946A5F54D8D0AA2F418808CC
712
713 y = 25AB056962D30651A114AFD2755AD336747F93475B7A1FCA3B88F2B6A208CC
714 FE469408584DC2B2912675BF5B9E582928
715
716 q = 8CB91E82A3386D280F5D6F7E50E641DF152F7109ED5456B31F166E6CAC0425
717 A7CF3AB6AF6B7FC3103B883202E9046565
718
719 h = 1
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Domain Parameters for 512-Bit Curves</span>
730
731 Curve-ID: brainpoolP512r1
732
733 p = AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308
734 717D4D9B009BC66842AECDA12AE6A380E62881FF2F2D82C68528AA6056583A48F3
735
736 A = 7830A3318B603B89E2327145AC234CC594CBDD8D3DF91610A83441CAEA9863
737 BC2DED5D5AA8253AA10A2EF1C98B9AC8B57F1117A72BF2C7B9E7C1AC4D77FC94CA
738
739 B = 3DF91610A83441CAEA9863BC2DED5D5AA8253AA10A2EF1C98B9AC8B57F1117
740 A72BF2C7B9E7C1AC4D77FC94CADC083E67984050B75EBAE5DD2809BD638016F723
741
742 x = 81AEE4BDD82ED9645A21322E9C4C6A9385ED9F70B5D916C1B43B62EEF4D009
743 8EFF3B1F78E2D0D48D50D1687B93B97D5F7C6D5047406A5E688B352209BCB9F822
744
745 y = 7DDE385D566332ECC0EABFA9CF7822FDF209F70024A57B1AA000C55B881F81
746 11B2DCDE494A5F485E5BCA4BD88A2763AED1CA2B2FA8F0540678CD1E0F3AD80892
747
748 q = AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308
749 70553E5C414CA92619418661197FAC10471DB1D381085DDADDB58796829CA90069
750
751 h = 1
752
753 #Twisted curve
754
755 Curve-ID: brainpoolP512t1
756
757 Z = 12EE58E6764838B69782136F0F2D3BA06E27695716054092E60A80BEDB212B
758 64E585D90BCE13761F85C3F1D2A64E3BE8FEA2220F01EBA5EEB0F35DBD29D922AB
759
760 A = AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308
761 717D4D9B009BC66842AECDA12AE6A380E62881FF2F2D82C68528AA6056583A48F0
762
763 B = 7CBBBCF9441CFAB76E1890E46884EAE321F70C0BCB4981527897504BEC3E36
764 A62BCDFA2304976540F6450085F2DAE145C22553B465763689180EA2571867423E
765
766 x = 640ECE5C12788717B9C1BA06CBC2A6FEBA85842458C56DDE9DB1758D39C031
767 3D82BA51735CDB3EA499AA77A7D6943A64F7A3F25FE26F06B51BAA2696FA9035DA
768
769 y = 5B534BD595F5AF0FA2C892376C84ACE1BB4E3019B71634C01131159CAE03CE
770 E9D9932184BEEF216BD71DF2DADF86A627306ECFF96DBB8BACE198B61E00F8B332
771
772 q = AADD9DB8DBE9C48B3FD4E6AE33C9FC07CB308DB3B3C9D20ED6639CCA703308
773 70553E5C414CA92619418661197FAC10471DB1D381085DDADDB58796829CA90069
774
775 h = 1
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
783
784
785 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Object Identifiers and ASN.1 Syntax</span>
786
787 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Object Identifiers</span>
788
789 The root of the tree for the object identifiers defined in this
790 specification is given by:
791
792 ecStdCurvesAndGeneration OBJECT IDENTIFIER::= {iso(1)
793 identified-organization(3) teletrust(36) algorithm(3) signature-
794 algorithm(3) ecSign(2) 8}
795
796 The object identifier ellipticCurve represents the tree for domain
797 parameter sets. It has the following value:
798
799 ellipticCurve OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ecStdCurvesAndGeneration 1}
800
801 The tree containing the object identifiers for each set of domain
802 parameters defined in this RFC is:
803
804 versionOne OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {ellipticCurve 1}
805
806 The following object identifiers represent the domain parameter sets
807 defined in this RFC:
808
809 brainpoolP160r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 1}
810
811 brainpoolP160t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 2}
812
813 brainpoolP192r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 3}
814
815 brainpoolP192t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 4}
816
817 brainpoolP224r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 5}
818
819 brainpoolP224t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 6}
820
821 brainpoolP256r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 7}
822
823 brainpoolP256t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 8}
824
825 brainpoolP320r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 9}
826
827 brainpoolP320t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 10}
828
829 brainpoolP384r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 11}
830
831 brainpoolP384t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 12}
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
839
840
841 brainpoolP512r1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 13}
842
843 brainpoolP512t1 OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= {versionOne 14}
844
845 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. ASN.1 Syntax for Usage with X.509 Certificates</span>
846
847 The domain parameters specified in this RFC SHALL be used with X.509
848 certificates in accordance with [<a href="./rfc5480" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information&quot;">RFC5480</a>]. In particular,
849
850 o the algorithm field of subjectPublicKeyInfo MUST be set to:
851
852 * id-ecPublicKey, if the algorithms that can be used with the
853 subject public key are not restricted, or
854
855 * id-ecDH to restrict the usage of the subject public key to
856 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) key agreement, or
857
858 * id-ecMQV to restrict the usage of the subject public key to
859 Elliptic Curve Menezes-Qu-Vanstone (ECMQV) key agreement, and
860
861 o the field algorithm.parameter of subjectPublicKeyInfo MUST be of
862 type:
863
864 * namedCurve to specify the domain parameters by one of the
865 Object Identifiers (OIDs) defined in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>, or
866
867 * specifiedCurve to specify the domain parameters explicitly as
868 defined in [<a href="./rfc5480" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information&quot;">RFC5480</a>], or
869
870 * implicitCurve, if the domain parameters are found in an
871 issuer's certificate.
872
873 If the domain parameters are explicitly specified using the type
874 specifiedCurve in the field algorithm.parameter of
875 subjectPublicKeyInfo, ANSI X9.62 [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5480" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information&quot;">RFC5480</a>] allow
876 indicating whether or not a curve and base point have been generated
877 verifiably in a pseudo-random way. Although the parameters specified
878 in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> have all been generated by the pseudo-random methods
879 described in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>, these algorithms deviate from those mandated
880 in ANSI X9.62, A.3.3.1. Consequently, applications following ANSI
881 X9.62 or [<a href="./rfc5480" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key Information&quot;">RFC5480</a>] will not be able to verify the pseudo-randomness
882 of the parameters. In order to avoid rejection of the parameters,
883 the ASN.1 encoding SHOULD NOT specify that the curve or base point
884 has been generated verifiably at random. In particular,
885 certification authorities (CAs) SHOULD set the contents of
886 specifiedCurve in the following way:
887
888 o version is set to ecpVer1(1).
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
895
896
897 o fieldId includes the fieldType prime-field and as parameter the
898 value p of the selected domain parameters as specified in <a href="#section-3">Section</a>
899 <a href="#section-3">3</a>.
900
901 o curve includes the values a and b of the selected domain
902 parameters as specified in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>, but seed is absent.
903
904 o base is the octet string representation of the base point G of the
905 selected domain parameters as specified in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>.
906
907 o order is set to q of the selected domain parameters as specified
908 in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>.
909
910 o cofactor is set to 1.
911
912 o hash is absent.
913
914 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
915
916 The level of security provided by symmetric ciphers and hash
917 functions used in conjunction with the elliptic curve domain
918 parameters specified in this RFC should roughly match or exceed the
919 level provided by the domain parameters. The following table
920 indicates the minimum key sizes for symmetric ciphers and hash
921 functions providing at least (roughly) comparable security.
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
951
952
953 +--------------------+--------------------+-------------------------+
954 | elliptic curve | minimum length of | hash functions |
955 | domain parameters | symmetric keys | |
956 +--------------------+--------------------+-------------------------+
957 | brainpoolP160r1 | 80 | SHA-1, SHA-224, |
958 | | | SHA-256, SHA-384, |
959 | | | SHA-512 |
960 | | | |
961 | brainpoolP192r1 | 96 | SHA-224, SHA-256, |
962 | | | SHA-384, SHA-512 |
963 | | | |
964 | brainpoolP224r1 | 112 | SHA-224, SHA-256, |
965 | | | SHA-384, SHA-512 |
966 | | | |
967 | brainpoolP256r1 | 128 | SHA-256, SHA-384, |
968 | | | SHA-512 |
969 | | | |
970 | brainpoolP320r1 | 160 | SHA-384, SHA-512 |
971 | | | |
972 | brainpoolP384r1 | 192 | SHA-384, SHA-512 |
973 | | | |
974 | brainpoolP512r1 | 256 | SHA-512 |
975 +--------------------+--------------------+-------------------------+
976
977 Table 1
978
979 Security properties of the elliptic curve domain parameters specified
980 in this RFC are discussed in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>. Further security
981 discussions specific to elliptic curve cryptography can be found in
982 [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>] and [<a href="#ref-SEC1" title="&quot;Elliptic Curve Cryptography&quot;">SEC1</a>].
983
984 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Intellectual Property Rights</span>
985
986 The authors have no knowledge about any intellectual property rights
987 that cover the usage of the domain parameters defined herein.
988 However, readers should be aware that implementations based on these
989 domain parameters may require use of inventions covered by patent
990 rights.
991
992 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
993
994 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
995
996 [<a id="ref-ANSI1">ANSI1</a>] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
997 Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The
998 Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)", ANSI
999 X9.62, 2005.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1007
1008
1009 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1010 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
1011
1012 [<a id="ref-RFC5480">RFC5480</a>] Turner, S., Brown, D., Yiu, K., Housley, R., and T. Polk,
1013 "Elliptic Curve Cryptography Subject Public Key
1014 Information", <a href="./rfc5480">RFC 5480</a>, March 2009.
1015
1016 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1017
1018 [<a id="ref-ANSI2">ANSI2</a>] American National Standards Institute, "Public Key
1019 Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: Key
1020 Agreement and Key Transport Using The Elliptic Curve
1021 Cryptography", ANSI X9.63, 2001.
1022
1023 [<a id="ref-BJ">BJ</a>] Brier, E. and M. Joyce, "Fast Multiplication on Elliptic
1024 Curves through Isogenies", Applied Algebra Algebraic
1025 Algorithms and Error-Correcting Codes, Lecture Notes in
1026 Computer Science 2643, Springer Verlag, 2003.
1027
1028 [<a id="ref-BG">BG</a>] Brown, J. and R. Gallant, "The Static Diffie-Hellman
1029 Problem", Centre for Applied Cryptographic Research,
1030 University of Waterloo, Technical Report CACR 2004-10,
1031 2005.
1032
1033 [<a id="ref-BRS">BRS</a>] Bohli, J., Roehrich, S., and R. Steinwandt, "Key
1034 Substitution Attacks Revisited: Taking into Account
1035 Malicious Signers", International Journal of Information
1036 Security Volume 5, Issue 1, January 2006.
1037
1038 [<a id="ref-BSS">BSS</a>] Blake, I., Seroussi, G., and N. Smart, "Elliptic Curves in
1039 Cryptography", Cambridge University Press, 1999.
1040
1041 [<a id="ref-EBP">EBP</a>] ECC Brainpool, "ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve
1042 Generation", October 2005, &lt;<a href="http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/download/Domain-parameters.pdf">http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/</a>
1043 <a href="http://www.ecc-brainpool.org/download/Domain-parameters.pdf">download/Domain-parameters.pdf</a>&gt;.
1044
1045 [<a id="ref-ETSI">ETSI</a>] European Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI),
1046 "Algorithms and Parameters for Secure Electronic
1047 Signatures, Part 1: Hash Functions and Asymmetric
1048 Algorithms", TS 102 176-1, July 2005.
1049
1050 [<a id="ref-FIPS">FIPS</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
1051 Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS PUB 186-2, December 1998.
1052
1053 [<a id="ref-G">G</a>] Goubin, L., "A Refined Power-Analysis-Attack on Elliptic
1054 Curve Cryptosystems", Proceedings of Public-Key-
1055 Cryptography - PKC 2003, Lecture Notes in Computer Science
1056 2567, Springer Verlag, 2003.
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1063
1064
1065 [<a id="ref-CFDA">CFDA</a>] Cohen, H., Frey, G., Doche, C., Avanzi, R., Lange, T.,
1066 Nguyen, K., and F. Vercauteren, "Handbook of Elliptic and
1067 Hyperelliptic Curve Cryptography", Chapman &amp; Hall CRC
1068 Press, 2006.
1069
1070 [<a id="ref-HMV">HMV</a>] Hankerson, D., Menezes, A., and S. Vanstone, "Guide to
1071 Elliptic Curve Cryptography", Springer Verlag, 2004.
1072
1073 [<a id="ref-HR">HR</a>] Huang, M. and W. Raskind, "Signature Calculus and the
1074 Discrete Logarithm Problem for Elliptic Curves
1075 (Preliminary Version)", Unpublished Preprint, 2006,
1076 &lt;<a href="http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~mdhuang/mypapers/062806dl3.pdf">http://www-rcf.usc.edu/~mdhuang/mypapers/062806dl3.pdf</a>&gt;.
1077
1078 [<a id="ref-ISO1">ISO1</a>] International Organization for Standardization,
1079 "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Digital
1080 Signatures with Appendix - Part 3: Discrete Logarithm
1081 Based Mechanisms", ISO/IEC 14888-3, 2006.
1082
1083 [<a id="ref-ISO2">ISO2</a>] International Organization for Standardization,
1084 "Information Technology - Security Techniques -
1085 Cryptographic Techniques Based on Elliptic Curves - Part
1086 2: Digital signatures", ISO/IEC 15946-2, 2002.
1087
1088 [<a id="ref-ISO3">ISO3</a>] International Organization for Standardization,
1089 "Information Technology - Security Techniques - Prime
1090 Number Generation", ISO/IEC 18032, 2005.
1091
1092 [<a id="ref-JMV">JMV</a>] Jao, D., Miller, SD., and R. Venkatesan, "Ramanujan Graphs
1093 and the Random Reducibility of Discrete Log on Isogenous
1094 Elliptic Curves", IACR Cryptology ePrint Archive 2004/312,
1095 2004.
1096
1097 [<a id="ref-RFC3279">RFC3279</a>] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
1098 Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key
1099 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
1100 (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a>, April 2002.
1101
1102 [<a id="ref-RFC4050">RFC4050</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Karlinger, G., Kobayashi, T., and Y.
1103 Wang, "Using the Elliptic Curve Signature Algorithm
1104 (ECDSA) for XML Digital Signatures", <a href="./rfc4050">RFC 4050</a>, April 2005.
1105
1106 [<a id="ref-RFC4492">RFC4492</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Bolyard, N., Gupta, V., Hawk, C., and B.
1107 Moeller, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) Cipher Suites
1108 for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc4492">RFC 4492</a>, May 2006.
1109
1110 [<a id="ref-RFC4754">RFC4754</a>] Fu, D. and J. Solinas, "IKE and IKEv2 Authentication Using
1111 the Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)",
1112 <a href="./rfc4754">RFC 4754</a>, January 2007.
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1119
1120
1121 [<a id="ref-RFC5753">RFC5753</a>] Turner, S. and D. Brown, "Use of Elliptic Curve
1122 Cryptography (ECC) Algorithms in Cryptographic Message
1123 Syntax (CMS)", <a href="./rfc5753">RFC 5753</a>, January 2010.
1124
1125 [<a id="ref-SA">SA</a>] Satoh, T. and K. Araki, "Fermat Quotients and the
1126 Polynomial Time Discrete Log Algorithm for Anomalous
1127 Elliptic Curves", Commentarii Mathematici Universitatis
1128 Sancti Pauli 47, 1998.
1129
1130 [<a id="ref-SEC1">SEC1</a>] Certicom Research, "Elliptic Curve Cryptography",
1131 Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 1, September
1132 2000.
1133
1134 [<a id="ref-SEC2">SEC2</a>] Certicom Research, "Recommended Elliptic Curve Domain
1135 Parameters", Standards for Efficient Cryptography (SEC) 2,
1136 September 2000.
1137
1138 [<a id="ref-Sem">Sem</a>] Semaev, I., "Evaluation of Discrete Logarithms on Some
1139 Elliptic Curves", Mathematics of Computation 67, 1998.
1140
1141 [<a id="ref-Sma">Sma</a>] Smart, N., "The Discrete Logarithm Problem on Elliptic
1142 Curves of Trace One", Journal of Cryptology 12, 1999.
1143
1144
1145
1146
1147
1148
1149
1150
1151
1152
1153
1154
1155
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1175
1176
1177 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Pseudo-Random Generation of Parameters</span>
1178
1179 In this appendix, the methods used for pseudo-random generation of
1180 the elliptic curve domain parameters are described. A comprehensive
1181 description is given in [<a href="#ref-EBP" title="&quot;ECC Brainpool Standard Curves and Curve Generation&quot;">EBP</a>].
1182
1183 Throughout this section the following conventions are used:
1184
1185 The conversion between integers x in the range 0 &lt;= x &lt;= 2^L - 1 and
1186 bit strings of length L is given by x &lt;--&gt; {x_1,...,x_L} and the
1187 binary expansion
1188 x = x_1 * 2^(L-1) + x_2 * 2^(L-2) + ... + x_(L-1)*2 + x_L, i.e., the
1189 first bit of the bit string corresponds to the most significant bit
1190 of the corresponding integer and the last bit to the least
1191 significant bit.
1192
1193 For a real number x, let floor(x) denote the highest integer less
1194 than or equal to x.
1195
1196 For updating the seed s of 160-bit length we use the following
1197 function update_seed(s):
1198
1199 1. Convert s to an integer z.
1200
1201 2. Convert (z+1) mod 2^160 to a bit string t and output t.
1202
1203 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Generation of Prime Numbers</span>
1204
1205 This section describes the systematic selection of the base fields
1206 GF(p) proposed in this specification. The prime generation method is
1207 similar to the method given in FIPS 186-2 [<a href="#ref-FIPS" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">FIPS</a>], Appendix 6.4, and
1208 ANSI X9.62 [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>], A.3.2. It is a modification of the method
1209 "incremental search" given in Section 8.2.2 of [<a href="#ref-ISO3" title="&quot;Information Technology - Security Techniques - Prime Number Generation&quot;">ISO3</a>].
1210
1211 For computing an integer x in the range 0 &lt;= x &lt;= 2^L - 1 from a seed
1212 s of 160-bit length, we use the following algorithm find_integer(s):
1213
1214 1. Set v = floor((L-1)/160) and w = L - 160*v.
1215
1216 2. Compute h = SHA-1(s).
1217
1218 3. Let h_0 be the bit string obtained by taking the w rightmost bits
1219 of h.
1220
1221 4. Convert s to an integer z.
1222
1223 5. For i from 1 to v do:
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1231
1232
1233 A. Set z_i = (z+i) mod 2^160.
1234
1235 B. Convert z_i to a bit string s_i.
1236
1237 C. Set h_i = SHA-1(s_i).
1238
1239 6. Let h be the string obtained by the concatenation of h_0,...,h_v
1240 from left to right.
1241
1242 7. Convert h to an integer x and output x.
1243
1244 The following procedure is used to generate an L bit prime p from a
1245 160-bit seed s.
1246
1247 1. Set c = find_integer(s).
1248
1249 2. Let p be the smallest prime p &gt;= c with p = 3 mod 4.
1250
1251 3. If 2^(L-1) &lt;= p &lt;= 2^L - 1 output p and stop.
1252
1253 4. Set s = update_seed(s) and go to Step 1.
1254
1255 For the generation of the primes p used as base fields GF(p) for the
1256 curves defined in this specification (and the corresponding twisted
1257 curves), the following values (in hexadecimal representation) have
1258 been used as initial seed s:
1259
1260 Seed_p_160 for brainpoolP160r1:
1261 3243F6A8885A308D313198A2E03707344A409382
1262
1263 Seed_p_192 for brainpoolP192r1:
1264 2299F31D0082EFA98EC4E6C89452821E638D0137
1265
1266 Seed_p_224 for brainpoolP224r1:
1267 7BE5466CF34E90C6CC0AC29B7C97C50DD3F84D5B
1268
1269 Seed_p_256 for brainpoolP256r1:
1270 5B54709179216D5D98979FB1BD1310BA698DFB5A
1271
1272 Seed_p_320 for brainpoolP320r1:
1273 C2FFD72DBD01ADFB7B8E1AFED6A267E96BA7C904
1274
1275 Seed_p_384 for brainpoolP384r1:
1276 5F12C7F9924A19947B3916CF70801F2E2858EFC1
1277
1278 Seed_p_512 for brainpoolP512r1:
1279 6636920D871574E69A458FEA3F4933D7E0D95748
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1287
1288
1289 These seeds have been obtained as the first 7 substrings of 160-bit
1290 length each of Q = Pi*2^1120, where Pi is the constant 3.14159...,
1291 also known as Ludolph's number, i.e.,
1292
1293 Q = Seed_p_160||Seed_p_192||...||Seed_p_512||Remainder,
1294 where || denotes concatenation.
1295
1296 Using these seeds and the above algorithm the following primes are
1297 obtained:
1298
1299 p_160 = 1332297598440044874827085558802491743757193798159
1300
1301 p_192 = 4781668983906166242955001894344923773259119655253013193367
1302
1303 p_224 = 2272162293245435278755253799591092807334073214594499230443
1304 5472941311
1305
1306 p_256 = 7688495639704534422080974662900164909303795020094305520373
1307 5601445031516197751
1308
1309 p_320 = 1763593322239166354161909842446019520889512772719515192772
1310 9604152886408688021498180955014999035278
1311
1312 p_384 = 2165927077011931617306923684233260497979611638701764860008
1313 1618503821089934025961822236561982844534088440708417973331
1314
1315 p_512 = 8948962207650232551656602815159153422162609644098354511344
1316 597187200057010413552439917934304191956942765446530386427345937963
1317 894309923928536070534607816947
1318
1319 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Generation of Pseudo-Random Curves</span>
1320
1321 The generation procedure is similar to the procedure given in FIPS
1322 PUB 186-2 [<a href="#ref-FIPS" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">FIPS</a>], Appendix 6.4, and ANSI X9.62 [<a href="#ref-ANSI1" title="&quot;Public Key Cryptography For The Financial Services Industry: The Elliptic Curve Digital Signature Algorithm (ECDSA)&quot;">ANSI1</a>], A.3.2.
1323
1324 For computing an integer x in the range 0 &lt;= x &lt;= 2^(L-1) - 1 from a
1325 seed s of 160-bit length, we use the algorithm find_integer_2(s),
1326 which slightly differs from the method used for the generation of the
1327 primes.
1328
1329 1. Set v = floor((L-1)/160) and w = L - 160*v - 1.
1330
1331 2. Compute h = SHA-1(s).
1332
1333 3. Let h_0 be the bit string obtained by taking the w rightmost bits
1334 of h.
1335
1336 4. Convert s to an integer z.
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1343
1344
1345 5. For i from 1 to v do:
1346
1347 A. Set z_i = (z+i) mod 2^160.
1348
1349 B. Convert z_i to a bit string s_i.
1350
1351 C. Set h_i = SHA-1(s_i).
1352
1353 6. Let h be the string obtained by the concatenation of h_0,...,h_v
1354 from left to right.
1355
1356 7. Convert h to an integer x and output x.
1357
1358 The following procedure is used to generate the parameters A and B of
1359 a suitable elliptic curve over GF(p) and a base point G from a prime
1360 p of bit length L and a 160-bit seed s.
1361
1362 1. Set h = find_integer_2(s).
1363
1364 2. Convert h to an integer A.
1365
1366 3. If -3 = A*Z^4 mod p is not solvable, then set s = update_seed(s)
1367 and go to Step 1.
1368
1369 4. Compute one solution Z of -3 = A*Z^4 mod p.
1370
1371 5. Set s = update_seed(s).
1372
1373 6. Set B = find_integer_2(s).
1374
1375 7. If B is a square mod p, then set s = update_seed(s) and go to
1376 Step 6.
1377
1378 8. If 4*A^3 + 27*B^2 = 0 mod p, then set s = update_seed(s) and go
1379 to Step 1.
1380
1381 9. Check that the elliptic curve E over GF(p) given by y^2 = x^3 +
1382 A*x + B fulfills all security and functional requirements given
1383 in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. If not, then set s = update_seed(s) and go to Step
1384 1.
1385
1386 10. Set s = update_seed(s).
1387
1388 11. Set k = find_integer_2(s).
1389
1390 12. Determine the points Q and -Q having the smallest x-coordinate in
1391 E(GF(p)). Randomly select one of them as point P.
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1399
1400
1401 13. Compute the base point G = k * P.
1402
1403 14. Output A, B, and G.
1404
1405 Note: Of course P could also be used as a base point. However, the
1406 small x-coordinate of P could possibly render the curve vulnerable to
1407 side-channel attacks.
1408
1409 For the generation of curve parameters A and B, and the base points G
1410 defined in this specification, the following values (in hexadecimal
1411 representation) have been used as initial seed s:
1412
1413 Seed_ab_160 for brainpoolP160r1:
1414 2B7E151628AED2A6ABF7158809CF4F3C762E7160
1415
1416 Seed_ab_192 for brainpoolP192r1:
1417 F38B4DA56A784D9045190CFEF324E7738926CFBE
1418
1419 Seed_ab_224 for brainpoolP224r1:
1420 5F4BF8D8D8C31D763DA06C80ABB1185EB4F7C7B5
1421
1422 Seed_ab_256 for brainpoolP256r1:
1423 757F5958490CFD47D7C19BB42158D9554F7B46BC
1424
1425 Seed_ab_320 for brainpoolP320r1:
1426 ED55C4D79FD5F24D6613C31C3839A2DDF8A9A276
1427
1428 Seed_ab_384 for brainpoolP384r1:
1429 BCFBFA1C877C56284DAB79CD4C2B3293D20E9E5E
1430
1431 Seed_ab_512 for brainpoolP384r1:
1432 AF02AC60ACC93ED874422A52ECB238FEEE5AB6AD
1433
1434 These seeds have been obtained as the first 7 substrings of 160-bit
1435 length each of R = floor(e*2^1120), where e denotes the constant
1436 2.71828..., also known as Euler's number, i.e.,
1437
1438 R = Seed_ab_160||Seed_ab_192||...||Seed_ab_512||Remainder,
1439 where || denotes concatenation.
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5639">RFC 5639</a> ECC Brainpool Standard Curves &amp; Curve Generation March 2010</span>
1455
1456
1457 Authors' Addresses
1458
1459 Manfred Lochter
1460 Bundesamt fuer Sicherheit in der Informationstechnik (BSI)
1461 Postfach 200363
1462 53133 Bonn
1463 Germany
1464
1465 Phone: +49 228 9582 5643
1466 EMail: [email protected]
1467
1468
1469 Johannes Merkle
1470 secunet Security Networks
1471 Mergenthaler Allee 77
1472 65760 Eschborn
1473 Germany
1474
1475 Phone: +49 201 5454 2021
1476 EMail: [email protected]
1477
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1508 Lochter &amp; Merkle Informational [Page 27]
1509 </pre>