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<pre>Network Working Group A. Gwinn |
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Request for Comments: 2179 Networld+Interop NOC Team |
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Category: Informational July 1997 |
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|
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<span class="h1">Network Security For Trade Shows</span> |
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Status of this Memo |
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo |
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does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of |
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this memo is unlimited. |
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Abstract |
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This document is designed to assist vendors and other participants in |
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trade shows, such as Networld+Interop, in designing effective |
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protection against network and system attacks by unauthorized |
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individuals. Generally, it has been observed that many system |
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administrators and trade show coordinators tend to overlook the |
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importance of system security at trade shows. In fact, systems at |
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trade shows are at least as prone to attack as office-based |
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platforms. Trade show systems should be treated as seriously as an |
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office computer. A breach of security of a trade show system can |
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render -- and has rendered -- an exhibitor's demonstrations |
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inoperable -- sometimes for the entire event! |
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This document is not intended to replace the multitudes of |
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comprehensive books on the subject of Internet security. Rather, its |
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purpose is to provide a checklist-style collection of frequently |
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overlooked, simple ways to minimize the chance of a costly attack. |
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We encourage exhibitors to pay special attention to this document and |
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share it with all associated representatives. |
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Physical Security |
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Before addressing technical security issues, one of the most |
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frequently underrated and overlooked security breaches is the simple |
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low-tech attack. The common victim is the one who leaves a console |
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logged in, perhaps as root, and leaves the system. Other times, an |
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anonymous "helpful soul" might ask for a password in order to assist |
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the user in "identifying a problem." This type of method allows an |
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intruder, especially one logged in as "root", access to system files. |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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Tips: |
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* Educate sales and support staff regarding system logins, especially |
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"root" or other privileged accounts. |
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* Identify individuals who are not using exhibit systems for their |
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intended purpose, especially non-booth personnel. |
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* Request identification from anyone wishing to access systems |
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for maintenance purposes unless their identities are known. |
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System Security |
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This section discusses technical security procedures for workstations |
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on the vendor network. Although specifics tend to be for Unix |
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systems, general procedures apply to all platforms. |
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Password Security |
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Lack of passwords or easy to guess passwords are a relatively low- |
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tech door into systems, but are responsible for a significant number |
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of breakins. Good passwords are a cornerstone of system security. |
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By default, PC operating systems like Windows 95 and MacOS do not |
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provide adequate password security. The Windows login password |
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provides no security (hitting the "ESC" key allows the user to bypass |
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password entry). Password security for these machines is possible, |
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but is beyond the scope of this document. |
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Tips: |
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* Check /etc/passwd on Unix systems and the user administration |
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application on other systems for lack of passwords. Some vendors |
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ship systems with null passwords, in some cases even for |
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privileged accounts. |
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* Change passwords, especially system and root passwords. |
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* Mix case, numbers and punctuation, especially on privileged |
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accounts. |
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* Change system passwords on a regular basis. |
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* Do not use passwords relating to the event, the company, or |
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products being displayed. Systems personnel at Networld+Interop, |
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when asked to assist booth personnel, often guess even root |
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passwords! |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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Extra Privileged Accounts |
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Some system vendors have been known to ship systems with multiple |
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privileged accounts (for example, Unix systems with accounts that |
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have root privileges [UID=0]). Some vendors may include a separate |
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system administration account that places a user in a specific |
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administrative program. Each additional privileged account presents |
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yet another opportunity for abuse. |
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Generally, if a Unix system does not need additional root accounts, |
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these can be disabled by placing "*" in the password field of |
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/etc/passwd, or by using the administrative tool when a system |
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employees enhanced security. Verify all systems for extra privileged |
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accounts and either disable them or change their password as |
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appropriate. |
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Make certain that privileged accounts are inaccessible from anywhere |
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other than the system console. Frequently systems rely on files such |
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as /etc/securettys for a list of "secure" terminals. As a general |
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rule, unless a terminal is in this file, a root login is not |
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possible. Specific use of this feature should be covered in the |
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system's documentation files. |
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Tips: |
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* Check /etc/passwd on Unix systems and the user administration |
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application on other systems for additional privileged accounts. |
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* Disable remote login for privileged accounts. |
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* Disable any unnecessary privileged accounts. |
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* Limit logins from root accounts to "secure" terminals or the |
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system console. |
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Use of Authentication Tokens |
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Authentication tokens such as SecureID, Cryptocard, DES Gold and |
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others, provide a method of producing "one-time" passwords. The |
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principle advantage in a trade-show environment is to render |
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worthless, packets captured by sniffers on the network. It should be |
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treated as fact, that there are many packet sniffers and other |
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administration tools constantly (legitimately) watching the network- |
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-especially at a large network-oriented trade show. Typed passwords, |
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by default, are sent clear text across the network, allowing others |
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to view them. Authentication tokens provide a password that is only |
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valid for that one instance, and are useless after that. A logical |
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extension of the use of authentication tokens would be to use them |
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for "trips home" (from the show network to a home site) to minimize |
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the chance of off-site security problems. |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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An alternative to these tokens is the secure shell ("ssh") protocol |
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which provides an encrypted connection between clients and servers. |
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This connection can carry both login traffic and arbitrary port-to- |
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port communication, and is a powerful tool for securing an in-booth |
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network and communications to and from remote systems. |
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Tips: |
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* Contact vendors of authentication tokens/cards for further |
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information as to how to integrate into specific environments, or |
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on to specific platforms. |
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* The public-domain utility "cryptosu" (csu), when used with a |
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Cryptocard, provides a replacement for Unix's "su" command, |
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employing a challenge/response style of authentication for root |
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access. |
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* Explore the use of ssh clients and servers. |
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Anonymous FTP |
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Anonymous FTP accounts can easily turn into a security hole. Disable |
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this service if not specifically needed. In the event that anonymous |
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FTP is to be used, the following tips may help secure it. |
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* When a user logs in as "anonymous", they should be locked into a |
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specific directory tree. Be sure that FTPd properly chroots to the |
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appropriate directory. A "cd /" should put an anonymous user at the |
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top of the "public" tree, and not the system's root directory. |
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* Some systems may allow symbolic links (or "shortcuts") to take a |
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user outside the allowed tree. Verify all links inside the |
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anonymous FTP hierarchy. |
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* Make sure that ftp's root directory is "owned" by someone other |
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than the 'ftp' account. Typically, it should be owned by "root". |
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* Do not use a world-writable incoming directory unless absolutely |
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necessary. Many sites use these as a way for users to transfer |
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files into the site. This can, and frequently does, turn into an |
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archive for stolen software (referred to by the pirate community as |
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"warez"). |
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* Removing read permissions from the directory permissions (chmod 733 |
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on Unix systems) prohibits an anonymous user from being able to |
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list the contents of a directory. Files can be deposited as usual, |
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but not retrieved unless the user knows the exact name of the file. |
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Network File Sharing |
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Writable file shares without some form of security are invitations to |
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destruction of information and demonstrations. Whether using NFS on |
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Unix systems, or PC sharing facilities like CIFS, AppleShare, or |
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NetWare, close attention should be paid to security of the files |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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exported. Keep in mind that one's competition frequently shares the |
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same network at a trade show! Security for both read and write |
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access should be employed and each access point examined. |
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Exporting a writable NFS filesystem to the world grants anyone the |
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ability to read and write any file in the exported mount point. If |
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this is done, for example, with a system directory such as "/" or |
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"/etc", it is a simple matter to edit password files to create one- |
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self access to a system. Therefore, /etc/exports should be closely |
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examined to be certain that nothing of a sensitive nature is exported |
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to anyone but another trusted host. Anything exported to the general |
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public should be exported "read-only", and verified for the |
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information that is available via the file shares. |
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Tips: |
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* Do not provide file sharing space unless needed. |
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* Verify where exported information will be "visible". |
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* Do not maintain any writable shares unless absolutely necessary! |
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Trusted Hosts |
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Trusted host entries are a method for allowing other hosts |
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"equivalent" security access to another host computer. Some vendors |
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ship systems with open trusted host files. Make certain that this |
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issue is addressed. |
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Tips: |
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* On Unix systems, check for a '+' entry (all systems trusted) in |
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/etc/hosts.equiv and all ".rhosts" files (there may be multiple |
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.rhosts files) and remove it. |
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* Check for an "xhost +" entry in the "...X11/xdm/Xsession" file. |
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Most often, an "xhost" entry will appear with a pathname such as |
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"/usr/local/lib/xhost +". Remove this. |
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SetUID and SetGID binaries (Unix systems) |
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On Unix systems, the "suid" bit on a system executable program allows |
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the program to execute as the owner. A program that is setUID to |
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"root" will allow the program to execute with root privileges. There |
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are multiple legitimate reasons for a program to have root |
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privileges, and many do. However, it may be unusual to have suid |
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programs in individual user directories or other non-system places. A |
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scan of the filesystems can turn up any program with its suid or sgid |
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bit set. Before disabling any programs, check the legitimacy of the |
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files. |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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Tips: |
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* "find / -user root -perm -4000 -print" will find any occurrence of |
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a setuid file anywhere in the system, including those on NFS |
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mounted partitions. |
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* "find / -group kmem -perm -2000 -print" will do the same for kmem |
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group permissions. |
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System Directory Ownership and Write Permissions |
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Check ownership of all system directories and permissions needed to |
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write or modify files. There is no simple way to do this on PC |
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operating systems like Windows NT without simply checking all files |
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and directories or using a version of "ls" that will list ACLs. |
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On Unix systems, a directory with permissions such as "drwxrwxrwx" |
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(such as /tmp) is world-writable and anyone can create or modify |
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files in such area. Pay special attention to "/" and "/etc". These |
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should be owned by some system account-not by an individual user. |
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When in doubt, contact the vendor of the system software for |
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confirmation of the appropriate directory or file permissions. |
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Network Services |
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Any servers not needed should be disabled. The notorious "R services" |
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(rexec, rsh, and rlogin) are particularly prone to security problems |
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and should be disabled unless specifically needed. Pay particular |
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attention to trusted hosts files, and be aware of the risk of IP |
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spoofing attacks from machines "pretending" to be trusted hosts. |
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Tips: |
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* On Unix systems, comment out "R services" (rexec, rsh, rlogin) in |
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/etc/inetd.conf. |
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* Check for other unknown or unneeded services. |
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Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP) |
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TFTP can be an easy way for an intruder to access system files. It is |
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good general practice to disable TFTP. If TFTP is needed, verify |
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that only files targeted for export are accessible. A simple way to |
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check security is to attempt to tftp files such as /etc/passwd or |
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/etc/motd to check accessiblity of system files. |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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TCP Connection Monitoring |
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Public domain software (TCP Wrappers or "tcpd" for Unix systems) |
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allow restriction and monitoring of TCP connections on a host by host |
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basis. Systems can be configured to notify an administrator and |
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syslog when any unauthorized party attempts to access the host. This |
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software is available from: |
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* <a href="ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/">ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/</a> |
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BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Daemon) |
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Earlier versions of BIND have been prone to various attacks. If a |
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host is going to be acting as DNS, use the latest version of BIND. |
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It is available at: |
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* <a href="ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind">ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind</a> |
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Sendmail and Mailer Security |
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A great number of previous versions of Sendmail have known security |
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holes. Check installed sendmail for the most recent version. |
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Alternatively, consult the operating system vendor to get the most |
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recent release for the platform. |
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Web Server Scripting Security |
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All Web server scripts and binaries should be checked (especially the |
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"...httpd/cgi-bin" directory) for those that allow shell commands to |
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be executed. Many attacks in recent months have focused on the use of |
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utilities such as "phf" for accessing /etc/passwd on a target system. |
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Remove any script that is not needed in the course of operation of a |
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web server. |
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Other Suggestions |
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* Check with the vendor of the operating system for known security |
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issues. Make certain that all systems have the latest version of |
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software--especially security patches to fix specific problems. |
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* Examine log files on the host frequently. On Unix systems, the |
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"last" command will furnish information on recent logins and where |
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they came from. The "syslogs" or "Event Viewer" will contain more |
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specific information on system events. |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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* Web server logfiles (...httpd/log/access_log and |
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...httpd/log/error_log) will contain information on who has been |
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accessing a WWW server, what has been accessed, and what has |
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failed. |
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* Good backups are the best defense against system damage. Perform |
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backups before placing a system on the trade show network then |
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continue backups throughout the show and again following the event. |
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A final backup set is useful to examine for possible attempts at |
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(or successful) penetrations of system security. |
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General Network Security |
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As would be expected at network trade shows (large or otherwise), |
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there are many entities running packet sniffers. Most are exhibitors |
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who have a legitimate need to run them during the course of product |
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demonstrations. However, be aware that there are many "listening |
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ears" on network segments--any of whom can "hear" or "see" |
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information as it crosses the net. Particularly prone to |
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eavesdropping are telnet sessions. A good rule of thumb is to assume |
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that "when you type your password, the only one that doesn't see it |
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is you!" |
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It is a good practice to not log in (or "su") to an account with |
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privileges across the network if at all possible. As mentioned |
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previously, authentication tokens and ssh are a simple way to add |
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security to system account access. |
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Packet Filtering |
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Many routers support basic packet filtering. If a router can be |
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deployed between the local network and the show's network, general |
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basic packet filtering should be employed. Below is a good "general" |
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packet filter approach. The approach itself is ordered into |
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categories: |
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* General global denials/acceptance. |
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* Specific global service denials. |
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* Specific service acceptance. |
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* Final denial of all other TCP/UDP services. |
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Based on the theory of denying everything that you don't know is |
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acceptable traffic, a good approach to a filter ruleset, in order of |
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execution priority, might be: |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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General Global Denials/Acceptance |
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1 Filter spoofed source addresses by interface. Match source |
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addresses to routing information available for the interface. |
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Discard packets with source addresses arriving on one interface |
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(from the "outside" for example) claiming a source address on |
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another interface (the "inside"). |
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2 Filter all source routed packets unless source routing is |
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specifically needed. |
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3 Allow outbound connections from "inside" hosts. |
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4 Allow established TCP connections (protocol field contains 6 and |
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the TCP flags field either contains ACK or does NOT contain SYN |
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bit). Only filter requests for 'new' connections. |
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5 Filter 'new' connections with source port of 25. Prevents people |
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from pretending to be a remote mail server. |
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6 Filter loopback address (source address 127.0.0.1). Prevents |
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packets from a misconfigured DNS resolver. |
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Specific Global Service Denials |
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1 Specifically block all "R-command" ports |
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(destination ports 512-515). |
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2 Block telnet (destination port 23) from any host not requiring |
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telnet access from the outside. (If you use ssh, you can |
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block it from all hosts!) |
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3 Add specific filters to deny other specific protocols to the |
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network, as needed. |
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Specific Host/Service Acceptance |
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1 Add specific access to specific "public" hosts' services |
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(unsecure FTP or WWW servers). |
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2 Allow SMTP (source and destination port 25) for electronic mail |
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to the mail server(s). |
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3 Allow inbound FTP connections (source port 20) to the FTP server(s). |
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4 Allow DNS (source and destination port 53, UDP & TCP) to name servers. |
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If zone transfers are not needed, block the TCP ports. |
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5 Allow RIP packets in (source and destination port 520, UDP), if |
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appropriate. |
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6 Add specific filters to allow other desired specific protocols |
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or to open certain ports to specific machines. |
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Final Service Denial |
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1 Deny all other UDP and TCP services not allowed by the previous |
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filters. |
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<span class="grey">Gwinn Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2179">RFC 2179</a> Network Security For Trade Shows July 1997</span> |
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|
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Author's Address |
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|
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R. Allen Gwinn, Jr. |
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Associate Director, Computing |
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Business Information Center |
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Southern Methodist University |
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Dallas, TX 75275 |
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|
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Phone: 214/768-3186 |
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EMail: [email protected] or [email protected] |
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Contributing Writer |
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Stephen S. Hultquist |
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President |
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Worldwide Solutions, Inc. |
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4450 Arapahoe Ave., Suite 100 |
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Boulder, CO 80303 |
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Phone: +1.303.581.0800 |
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EMail: [email protected] |
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Gwinn Informational [Page 10] |
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</pre> |