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1 <pre>Network Working Group A. Gwinn
2 Request for Comments: 2179 Networld+Interop NOC Team
3 Category: Informational July 1997
4
5
6 <span class="h1">Network Security For Trade Shows</span>
7
8 Status of this Memo
9
10 This memo provides information for the Internet community. This memo
11 does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of
12 this memo is unlimited.
13
14 Abstract
15
16 This document is designed to assist vendors and other participants in
17 trade shows, such as Networld+Interop, in designing effective
18 protection against network and system attacks by unauthorized
19 individuals. Generally, it has been observed that many system
20 administrators and trade show coordinators tend to overlook the
21 importance of system security at trade shows. In fact, systems at
22 trade shows are at least as prone to attack as office-based
23 platforms. Trade show systems should be treated as seriously as an
24 office computer. A breach of security of a trade show system can
25 render -- and has rendered -- an exhibitor's demonstrations
26 inoperable -- sometimes for the entire event!
27
28 This document is not intended to replace the multitudes of
29 comprehensive books on the subject of Internet security. Rather, its
30 purpose is to provide a checklist-style collection of frequently
31 overlooked, simple ways to minimize the chance of a costly attack.
32 We encourage exhibitors to pay special attention to this document and
33 share it with all associated representatives.
34
35 Physical Security
36
37 Before addressing technical security issues, one of the most
38 frequently underrated and overlooked security breaches is the simple
39 low-tech attack. The common victim is the one who leaves a console
40 logged in, perhaps as root, and leaves the system. Other times, an
41 anonymous "helpful soul" might ask for a password in order to assist
42 the user in "identifying a problem." This type of method allows an
43 intruder, especially one logged in as "root", access to system files.
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56
57 Tips:
58
59 * Educate sales and support staff regarding system logins, especially
60 "root" or other privileged accounts.
61 * Identify individuals who are not using exhibit systems for their
62 intended purpose, especially non-booth personnel.
63 * Request identification from anyone wishing to access systems
64 for maintenance purposes unless their identities are known.
65
66 System Security
67
68 This section discusses technical security procedures for workstations
69 on the vendor network. Although specifics tend to be for Unix
70 systems, general procedures apply to all platforms.
71
72 Password Security
73
74 Lack of passwords or easy to guess passwords are a relatively low-
75 tech door into systems, but are responsible for a significant number
76 of breakins. Good passwords are a cornerstone of system security.
77
78 By default, PC operating systems like Windows 95 and MacOS do not
79 provide adequate password security. The Windows login password
80 provides no security (hitting the "ESC" key allows the user to bypass
81 password entry). Password security for these machines is possible,
82 but is beyond the scope of this document.
83
84 Tips:
85
86 * Check /etc/passwd on Unix systems and the user administration
87 application on other systems for lack of passwords. Some vendors
88 ship systems with null passwords, in some cases even for
89 privileged accounts.
90 * Change passwords, especially system and root passwords.
91 * Mix case, numbers and punctuation, especially on privileged
92 accounts.
93 * Change system passwords on a regular basis.
94 * Do not use passwords relating to the event, the company, or
95 products being displayed. Systems personnel at Networld+Interop,
96 when asked to assist booth personnel, often guess even root
97 passwords!
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112
113 Extra Privileged Accounts
114
115 Some system vendors have been known to ship systems with multiple
116 privileged accounts (for example, Unix systems with accounts that
117 have root privileges [UID=0]). Some vendors may include a separate
118 system administration account that places a user in a specific
119 administrative program. Each additional privileged account presents
120 yet another opportunity for abuse.
121
122 Generally, if a Unix system does not need additional root accounts,
123 these can be disabled by placing "*" in the password field of
124 /etc/passwd, or by using the administrative tool when a system
125 employees enhanced security. Verify all systems for extra privileged
126 accounts and either disable them or change their password as
127 appropriate.
128
129 Make certain that privileged accounts are inaccessible from anywhere
130 other than the system console. Frequently systems rely on files such
131 as /etc/securettys for a list of "secure" terminals. As a general
132 rule, unless a terminal is in this file, a root login is not
133 possible. Specific use of this feature should be covered in the
134 system's documentation files.
135
136 Tips:
137
138 * Check /etc/passwd on Unix systems and the user administration
139 application on other systems for additional privileged accounts.
140 * Disable remote login for privileged accounts.
141 * Disable any unnecessary privileged accounts.
142 * Limit logins from root accounts to "secure" terminals or the
143 system console.
144
145 Use of Authentication Tokens
146
147 Authentication tokens such as SecureID, Cryptocard, DES Gold and
148 others, provide a method of producing "one-time" passwords. The
149 principle advantage in a trade-show environment is to render
150 worthless, packets captured by sniffers on the network. It should be
151 treated as fact, that there are many packet sniffers and other
152 administration tools constantly (legitimately) watching the network-
153 -especially at a large network-oriented trade show. Typed passwords,
154 by default, are sent clear text across the network, allowing others
155 to view them. Authentication tokens provide a password that is only
156 valid for that one instance, and are useless after that. A logical
157 extension of the use of authentication tokens would be to use them
158 for "trips home" (from the show network to a home site) to minimize
159 the chance of off-site security problems.
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168
169 An alternative to these tokens is the secure shell ("ssh") protocol
170 which provides an encrypted connection between clients and servers.
171 This connection can carry both login traffic and arbitrary port-to-
172 port communication, and is a powerful tool for securing an in-booth
173 network and communications to and from remote systems.
174
175 Tips:
176
177 * Contact vendors of authentication tokens/cards for further
178 information as to how to integrate into specific environments, or
179 on to specific platforms.
180 * The public-domain utility "cryptosu" (csu), when used with a
181 Cryptocard, provides a replacement for Unix's "su" command,
182 employing a challenge/response style of authentication for root
183 access.
184 * Explore the use of ssh clients and servers.
185
186 Anonymous FTP
187
188 Anonymous FTP accounts can easily turn into a security hole. Disable
189 this service if not specifically needed. In the event that anonymous
190 FTP is to be used, the following tips may help secure it.
191
192 * When a user logs in as "anonymous", they should be locked into a
193 specific directory tree. Be sure that FTPd properly chroots to the
194 appropriate directory. A "cd /" should put an anonymous user at the
195 top of the "public" tree, and not the system's root directory.
196 * Some systems may allow symbolic links (or "shortcuts") to take a
197 user outside the allowed tree. Verify all links inside the
198 anonymous FTP hierarchy.
199 * Make sure that ftp's root directory is "owned" by someone other
200 than the 'ftp' account. Typically, it should be owned by "root".
201 * Do not use a world-writable incoming directory unless absolutely
202 necessary. Many sites use these as a way for users to transfer
203 files into the site. This can, and frequently does, turn into an
204 archive for stolen software (referred to by the pirate community as
205 "warez").
206 * Removing read permissions from the directory permissions (chmod 733
207 on Unix systems) prohibits an anonymous user from being able to
208 list the contents of a directory. Files can be deposited as usual,
209 but not retrieved unless the user knows the exact name of the file.
210
211 Network File Sharing
212
213 Writable file shares without some form of security are invitations to
214 destruction of information and demonstrations. Whether using NFS on
215 Unix systems, or PC sharing facilities like CIFS, AppleShare, or
216 NetWare, close attention should be paid to security of the files
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224
225 exported. Keep in mind that one's competition frequently shares the
226 same network at a trade show! Security for both read and write
227 access should be employed and each access point examined.
228
229 Exporting a writable NFS filesystem to the world grants anyone the
230 ability to read and write any file in the exported mount point. If
231 this is done, for example, with a system directory such as "/" or
232 "/etc", it is a simple matter to edit password files to create one-
233 self access to a system. Therefore, /etc/exports should be closely
234 examined to be certain that nothing of a sensitive nature is exported
235 to anyone but another trusted host. Anything exported to the general
236 public should be exported "read-only", and verified for the
237 information that is available via the file shares.
238
239 Tips:
240
241 * Do not provide file sharing space unless needed.
242 * Verify where exported information will be "visible".
243 * Do not maintain any writable shares unless absolutely necessary!
244
245 Trusted Hosts
246
247 Trusted host entries are a method for allowing other hosts
248 "equivalent" security access to another host computer. Some vendors
249 ship systems with open trusted host files. Make certain that this
250 issue is addressed.
251
252 Tips:
253
254 * On Unix systems, check for a '+' entry (all systems trusted) in
255 /etc/hosts.equiv and all ".rhosts" files (there may be multiple
256 .rhosts files) and remove it.
257 * Check for an "xhost +" entry in the "...X11/xdm/Xsession" file.
258 Most often, an "xhost" entry will appear with a pathname such as
259 "/usr/local/lib/xhost +". Remove this.
260
261 SetUID and SetGID binaries (Unix systems)
262
263 On Unix systems, the "suid" bit on a system executable program allows
264 the program to execute as the owner. A program that is setUID to
265 "root" will allow the program to execute with root privileges. There
266 are multiple legitimate reasons for a program to have root
267 privileges, and many do. However, it may be unusual to have suid
268 programs in individual user directories or other non-system places. A
269 scan of the filesystems can turn up any program with its suid or sgid
270 bit set. Before disabling any programs, check the legitimacy of the
271 files.
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281 Tips:
282
283 * "find / -user root -perm -4000 -print" will find any occurrence of
284 a setuid file anywhere in the system, including those on NFS
285 mounted partitions.
286 * "find / -group kmem -perm -2000 -print" will do the same for kmem
287 group permissions.
288
289 System Directory Ownership and Write Permissions
290
291 Check ownership of all system directories and permissions needed to
292 write or modify files. There is no simple way to do this on PC
293 operating systems like Windows NT without simply checking all files
294 and directories or using a version of "ls" that will list ACLs.
295
296 On Unix systems, a directory with permissions such as "drwxrwxrwx"
297 (such as /tmp) is world-writable and anyone can create or modify
298 files in such area. Pay special attention to "/" and "/etc". These
299 should be owned by some system account-not by an individual user.
300 When in doubt, contact the vendor of the system software for
301 confirmation of the appropriate directory or file permissions.
302
303 Network Services
304
305 Any servers not needed should be disabled. The notorious "R services"
306 (rexec, rsh, and rlogin) are particularly prone to security problems
307 and should be disabled unless specifically needed. Pay particular
308 attention to trusted hosts files, and be aware of the risk of IP
309 spoofing attacks from machines "pretending" to be trusted hosts.
310
311 Tips:
312
313 * On Unix systems, comment out "R services" (rexec, rsh, rlogin) in
314 /etc/inetd.conf.
315 * Check for other unknown or unneeded services.
316
317 Trivial File Transfer Protocol (TFTP)
318
319 TFTP can be an easy way for an intruder to access system files. It is
320 good general practice to disable TFTP. If TFTP is needed, verify
321 that only files targeted for export are accessible. A simple way to
322 check security is to attempt to tftp files such as /etc/passwd or
323 /etc/motd to check accessiblity of system files.
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336
337 TCP Connection Monitoring
338
339 Public domain software (TCP Wrappers or "tcpd" for Unix systems)
340 allow restriction and monitoring of TCP connections on a host by host
341 basis. Systems can be configured to notify an administrator and
342 syslog when any unauthorized party attempts to access the host. This
343 software is available from:
344
345 * <a href="ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/">ftp://info.cert.org/pub/tools/tcp_wrappers/</a>
346
347 BIND (Berkeley Internet Name Daemon)
348
349 Earlier versions of BIND have been prone to various attacks. If a
350 host is going to be acting as DNS, use the latest version of BIND.
351 It is available at:
352
353 * <a href="ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind">ftp://ftp.isc.org/isc/bind</a>
354
355 Sendmail and Mailer Security
356
357 A great number of previous versions of Sendmail have known security
358 holes. Check installed sendmail for the most recent version.
359 Alternatively, consult the operating system vendor to get the most
360 recent release for the platform.
361
362 Web Server Scripting Security
363
364 All Web server scripts and binaries should be checked (especially the
365 "...httpd/cgi-bin" directory) for those that allow shell commands to
366 be executed. Many attacks in recent months have focused on the use of
367 utilities such as "phf" for accessing /etc/passwd on a target system.
368 Remove any script that is not needed in the course of operation of a
369 web server.
370
371 Other Suggestions
372
373 * Check with the vendor of the operating system for known security
374 issues. Make certain that all systems have the latest version of
375 software--especially security patches to fix specific problems.
376
377 * Examine log files on the host frequently. On Unix systems, the
378 "last" command will furnish information on recent logins and where
379 they came from. The "syslogs" or "Event Viewer" will contain more
380 specific information on system events.
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392
393 * Web server logfiles (...httpd/log/access_log and
394 ...httpd/log/error_log) will contain information on who has been
395 accessing a WWW server, what has been accessed, and what has
396 failed.
397
398 * Good backups are the best defense against system damage. Perform
399 backups before placing a system on the trade show network then
400 continue backups throughout the show and again following the event.
401 A final backup set is useful to examine for possible attempts at
402 (or successful) penetrations of system security.
403
404 General Network Security
405
406 As would be expected at network trade shows (large or otherwise),
407 there are many entities running packet sniffers. Most are exhibitors
408 who have a legitimate need to run them during the course of product
409 demonstrations. However, be aware that there are many "listening
410 ears" on network segments--any of whom can "hear" or "see"
411 information as it crosses the net. Particularly prone to
412 eavesdropping are telnet sessions. A good rule of thumb is to assume
413 that "when you type your password, the only one that doesn't see it
414 is you!"
415
416 It is a good practice to not log in (or "su") to an account with
417 privileges across the network if at all possible. As mentioned
418 previously, authentication tokens and ssh are a simple way to add
419 security to system account access.
420
421 Packet Filtering
422
423 Many routers support basic packet filtering. If a router can be
424 deployed between the local network and the show's network, general
425 basic packet filtering should be employed. Below is a good "general"
426 packet filter approach. The approach itself is ordered into
427 categories:
428
429 * General global denials/acceptance.
430 * Specific global service denials.
431 * Specific service acceptance.
432 * Final denial of all other TCP/UDP services.
433
434 Based on the theory of denying everything that you don't know is
435 acceptable traffic, a good approach to a filter ruleset, in order of
436 execution priority, might be:
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448
449 General Global Denials/Acceptance
450
451 1 Filter spoofed source addresses by interface. Match source
452 addresses to routing information available for the interface.
453 Discard packets with source addresses arriving on one interface
454 (from the "outside" for example) claiming a source address on
455 another interface (the "inside").
456 2 Filter all source routed packets unless source routing is
457 specifically needed.
458 3 Allow outbound connections from "inside" hosts.
459 4 Allow established TCP connections (protocol field contains 6 and
460 the TCP flags field either contains ACK or does NOT contain SYN
461 bit). Only filter requests for 'new' connections.
462 5 Filter 'new' connections with source port of 25. Prevents people
463 from pretending to be a remote mail server.
464 6 Filter loopback address (source address 127.0.0.1). Prevents
465 packets from a misconfigured DNS resolver.
466
467 Specific Global Service Denials
468
469 1 Specifically block all "R-command" ports
470 (destination ports 512-515).
471 2 Block telnet (destination port 23) from any host not requiring
472 telnet access from the outside. (If you use ssh, you can
473 block it from all hosts!)
474 3 Add specific filters to deny other specific protocols to the
475 network, as needed.
476
477 Specific Host/Service Acceptance
478
479 1 Add specific access to specific "public" hosts' services
480 (unsecure FTP or WWW servers).
481 2 Allow SMTP (source and destination port 25) for electronic mail
482 to the mail server(s).
483 3 Allow inbound FTP connections (source port 20) to the FTP server(s).
484 4 Allow DNS (source and destination port 53, UDP &amp; TCP) to name servers.
485 If zone transfers are not needed, block the TCP ports.
486 5 Allow RIP packets in (source and destination port 520, UDP), if
487 appropriate.
488 6 Add specific filters to allow other desired specific protocols
489 or to open certain ports to specific machines.
490
491 Final Service Denial
492
493 1 Deny all other UDP and TCP services not allowed by the previous
494 filters.
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504
505 Author's Address
506
507 R. Allen Gwinn, Jr.
508 Associate Director, Computing
509 Business Information Center
510 Southern Methodist University
511 Dallas, TX 75275
512
513 Phone: 214/768-3186
514 EMail: [email protected] or [email protected]
515
516
517 Contributing Writer
518
519 Stephen S. Hultquist
520 President
521 Worldwide Solutions, Inc.
522 4450 Arapahoe Ave., Suite 100
523 Boulder, CO 80303
524
525 Phone: +1.303.581.0800
526 EMail: [email protected]
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