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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) A. Ramaiah
2 Request for Comments: 5961 Cisco
3 Category: Standards Track R. Stewart
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei
5 M. Dalal
6 Cisco
7 August 2010
8
9
10 <span class="h1">Improving TCP's Robustness to Blind In-Window Attacks</span>
11
12 Abstract
13
14 TCP has historically been considered to be protected against spoofed
15 off-path packet injection attacks by relying on the fact that it is
16 difficult to guess the 4-tuple (the source and destination IP
17 addresses and the source and destination ports) in combination with
18 the 32-bit sequence number(s). A combination of increasing window
19 sizes and applications using longer-term connections (e.g., H-323 or
20 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>]) have left modern TCP
21 implementations more vulnerable to these types of spoofed packet
22 injection attacks.
23
24 Many of these long-term TCP applications tend to have predictable IP
25 addresses and ports that makes it far easier for the 4-tuple (4-tuple
26 is the same as the socket pair mentioned in <a href="./rfc793">RFC 793</a>) to be guessed.
27 Having guessed the 4-tuple correctly, an attacker can inject a TCP
28 segment with the RST bit set, the SYN bit set or data into a TCP
29 connection by systematically guessing the sequence number of the
30 spoofed segment to be in the current receive window. This can cause
31 the connection to abort or cause data corruption. This document
32 specifies small modifications to the way TCP handles inbound segments
33 that can reduce the chances of a successful attack.
34
35 Status of This Memo
36
37 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
38
39 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
40 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
41 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
42 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
43 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
44
45 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
46 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
47 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5961</a>.
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Applicability Statement ....................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
76 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Basic Attack Methodology ...................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Attack probabilities .......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology .....................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
79 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Blind Reset Attack Using the RST Bit ............................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Description of the Attack ..................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Mitigation .................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
82 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Blind Reset Attack Using the SYN Bit ............................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
83 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Description of the Attack ..................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
84 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Mitigation .................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
85 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Blind Data Injection Attack ....................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
86 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Description of the Attack .................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
87 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Mitigation ................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
88 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Suggested Mitigation Strengths .................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
89 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. ACK Throttling .................................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
90 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Backward Compatibility and Other Considerations ................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
91 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Middlebox Considerations .......................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
92 <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Middlebox That Resend RSTs ................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
93 <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Middleboxes That Advance Sequence Numbers .................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
94 <a href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Middleboxes That Drop the Challenge ACK ...................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
95 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. Security Considerations .......................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
96 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Contributors ..................................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
97 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. Acknowledgments ...............................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
98 <a href="#section-13">13</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
99 <a href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
100 <a href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 TCP [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] is widely deployed and the most common reliable end-to-
116 end transport protocol used for data communication in today's
117 Internet. Yet, when it was standardized over 20 years ago, the
118 Internet was a different place, lacking many of the threats that are
119 now common. The off-path TCP spoofing attacks, which are seen in the
120 Internet today, fall into this category.
121
122 In a TCP spoofing attack, an off-path attacker crafts TCP packets by
123 forging the IP source and destination addresses as well as the source
124 and destination ports (referred to as a 4-tuple value in this
125 document). The targeted TCP endpoint will then associate such a
126 packet with an existing TCP connection. It needs to be noted that,
127 guessing this 4-tuple value is not always easy for an attacker. But
128 there are some applications (e.g., BGP [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>]) that have a
129 tendency to use the same set(s) of ports on either endpoint, making
130 the odds of correctly guessing the 4-tuple value much easier. When
131 an attacker is successful in guessing the 4-tuple value, one of three
132 types of injection attacks may be waged against a long-lived
133 connection.
134 RST - Where an attacker injects a RST segment hoping to cause the
135 connection to be torn down. "RST segment" here refers to a TCP
136 segment with the RST bit set.
137 SYN - Where an attacker injects a SYN hoping to cause the receiver
138 to believe the peer has restarted and therefore tear down the
139 connection state. "SYN segment" here refers to a TCP segment with
140 SYN bit set.
141 DATA - Where an attacker tries to inject a DATA segment to corrupt
142 the contents of the transmission. "DATA segment" here refers to
143 any TCP segment containing data.
144
145 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Applicability Statement</span>
146
147 This document talks about some known in-window attacks and suitable
148 defenses against these. The mitigations suggested in this document
149 SHOULD be implemented in devices that regularly need to maintain TCP
150 connections of the kind most vulnerable to the attacks described in
151 this document. Examples of such TCP connections are the ones that
152 tend to be long-lived and where the connection endpoints can be
153 determined, in cases where no auxiliary anti-spoofing protection
154 mechanisms like TCP MD5 [<a href="./rfc2385" title="&quot;Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option&quot;">RFC2385</a>] can be deployed. These mitigations
155 MAY be implemented in other cases.
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Basic Attack Methodology</span>
170
171 Focusing upon the RST attack, we examine this attack in more detail
172 to get an overview as to how it works and how this document addresses
173 the issue. For this attack, the goal is for the attacker to cause
174 one of the two endpoints of the connection to incorrectly tear down
175 the connection state, effectively aborting the connection. One of
176 the important things to note is that for the attack to succeed the
177 RST needs to be in the valid receive window. It also needs to be
178 emphasized that the receive window is independent of the current
179 congestion window of the TCP connection. The attacker would try to
180 forge many RST segments to try to cover the space of possible windows
181 by putting out a packet in each potential window. To do this, the
182 attacker needs to have or guess several pieces of information namely:
183
184 1) The 4-tuple value containing the IP address and TCP port number of
185 both ends of the connection. For one side (usually the server),
186 guessing the port number is a trivial exercise. The client side
187 may or may not be easy for an attacker to guess depending on a
188 number of factors, most notably the operating system and
189 application involved.
190
191 2) A sequence number that will be used in the RST. This sequence
192 number will be a starting point for a series of guesses to attempt
193 to present a RST segment to a connection endpoint that would be
194 acceptable to it. Any random value may be used to guess the
195 starting sequence number.
196
197 3) The window size that the two endpoints are using. This value does
198 NOT have to be the exact window size since a smaller value used in
199 lieu of the correct one will just cause the attacker to generate
200 more segments before succeeding in his mischief. Most modern
201 operating systems have a default window size that usually is
202 applied to most connections. Some applications however may change
203 the window size to better suit the needs of the application. So
204 often times the attacker, with a fair degree of certainty (knowing
205 the application that is under attack), can come up with a very
206 close approximation as to the actual window size in use on the
207 connection.
208
209 After assembling the above set of information, the attacker begins
210 sending spoofed TCP segments with the RST bit set and a guessed TCP
211 sequence number. Each time a new RST segment is sent, the sequence
212 number guess is incremented by the window size. The feasibility of
213 this methodology (without mitigations) was first shown in [<a href="#ref-SITW" title="&quot;Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks&quot;">SITW</a>].
214 This is because [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] specifies that any RST within the current
215 window is acceptable. Also, [<a href="./rfc4953" title="&quot;Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks&quot;">RFC4953</a>] talks about the probability of
216 a successful attack with varying window sizes and bandwidth.
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
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224
225 A slight enhancement to TCP's segment processing rules can be made,
226 which makes such an attack much more difficult to accomplish. If the
227 receiver examines the incoming RST segment and validates that the
228 sequence number exactly matches the sequence number that is next
229 expected, then such an attack becomes much more difficult than
230 outlined in [<a href="#ref-SITW" title="&quot;Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks&quot;">SITW</a>] (i.e., the attacker would have to generate 1/2 the
231 entire sequence space, on average). This document will discuss the
232 exact details of what needs to be changed within TCP's segment
233 processing rules to mitigate all three types of attacks (RST, SYN,
234 and DATA).
235
236 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Attack probabilities</span>
237
238 Every application has control of a number of factors that drastically
239 affect the probability of a successful spoofing attack. These
240 factors include such things as:
241
242 Window Size - Normally settable by the application but often times
243 defaulting to 32,768 or 65,535 depending upon the operating system
244 (see Figure 6 of [<a href="#ref-Medina05" title="&quot;Measuring the Evolution of Transport Protocols in the Internet&quot;">Medina05</a>]).
245
246 Server Port number - This value is normally a fixed value so that a
247 client will know where to connect to the peer. Thus, this value
248 normally provides no additional protection.
249
250 Client Port number - This value may be a random ephemeral value, if
251 so, this makes a spoofing attack more difficult. There are some
252 clients, however, that for whatever reason either pick a fixed
253 client port or have a very guessable one (due to the range of
254 ephemeral ports available with their operating system or other
255 application considerations) for such applications a spoofing
256 attack becomes less difficult.
257
258 For the purposes of the rest of this discussion we will assume that
259 the attacker knows the 4-tuple values. This assumption will help us
260 focus on the effects of the window size versus the number of TCP
261 packets an attacker must generate. This assumption will rarely be
262 true in the real Internet since at least the client port number will
263 provide us with some amount of randomness (depending on the operating
264 system).
265
266 To successfully inject a spoofed packet (RST, SYN, or DATA), in the
267 past, the entire sequence space (i.e., 2^32) was often considered
268 available to make such an attack unlikely. [<a href="#ref-SITW" title="&quot;Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks&quot;">SITW</a>] demonstrated that
269 this assumption was incorrect and that instead of (1/2 * 2^32)
270 packets (assuming a random distribution), (1/2 * (2^32/window))
271
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
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280
281 packets are required. In other words, the mean number of tries
282 needed to inject a RST segment is (2^31/window) rather than the 2^31
283 assumed before.
284
285 Substituting numbers into this formula, we see that for a window size
286 of 32,768, an average of 65,536 packets would need to be transmitted
287 in order to "spoof" a TCP segment that would be acceptable to a TCP
288 receiver. A window size of 65,535 reduces this even further to
289 32,768 packets. At today's access bandwidths, an attack of that size
290 is feasible.
291
292 With rises in bandwidth to both the home and office, it can only be
293 expected that the values for default window sizes will continue to
294 rise in order to better take advantage of the newly available
295 bandwidth. It also needs to be noted that this attack can be
296 performed in a distributed fashion in order potentially gain access
297 to more bandwidth.
298
299 As we can see from the above discussion this weakness lowers the bar
300 quite considerably for likely attacks. But there is one additional
301 dependency that is the duration of the TCP connection. A TCP
302 connection that lasts only a few brief packets, as often is the case
303 for web traffic, would not be subject to such an attack since the
304 connection may not be established long enough for an attacker to
305 generate enough traffic. However, there is a set of applications,
306 such as BGP [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>], that is judged to be potentially most affected
307 by this vulnerability. BGP relies on a persistent TCP session
308 between BGP peers. Resetting the connection can result in term-
309 medium unavailability due to the need to rebuild routing tables and
310 route flapping; see [<a href="#ref-NISCC" title="&quot;NISCC Vulnerability Advisory 236929 - Vulnerability Issues in TCP&quot;">NISCC</a>] for further details.
311
312 For applications that can use the TCP MD5 option [<a href="./rfc2385" title="&quot;Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option&quot;">RFC2385</a>], such as
313 BGP, that option makes the attacks described in this specification
314 effectively impossible. However, some applications or
315 implementations may find that option expensive to implement.
316
317 There are alternative protections against the threats that this
318 document addresses. For further details regarding the attacks and
319 the existing techniques, please refer to [<a href="./rfc4953" title="&quot;Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks&quot;">RFC4953</a>]. It also needs to
320 be emphasized that, as suggested in [<a href="#ref-TSVWG-PORT" title="&quot;Transport Protocol Port Randomization Recommendations&quot;">TSVWG-PORT</a>] and [<a href="./rfc1948" title="&quot;Defending Against Sequence Number Attacks&quot;">RFC1948</a>], port
321 randomization and initial sequence number (ISN) randomization would
322 help improve the robustness of the TCP connection against off-path
323 attacks.
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
335
336
337 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology</span>
338
339 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
340 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
341 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>]. TCP
342 terminology should be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>].
343
344 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Blind Reset Attack Using the RST Bit</span>
345
346 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Description of the Attack</span>
347
348 As described in the introduction, it is possible for an attacker to
349 generate a RST segment that would be acceptable to a TCP receiver by
350 guessing in-window sequence numbers. In particular [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>], page
351 37, states the following:
352
353 In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are
354 validated by checking their SEQ-fields [sequence numbers]. A
355 reset is valid if its sequence number is in the window. In the
356 SYN-SENT state (a RST received in response to an initial SYN), the
357 RST is acceptable if the ACK field acknowledges the SYN.
358
359 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Mitigation</span>
360
361 [<a id="ref-RFC0793">RFC0793</a>] currently requires handling of a segment with the RST bit
362 when in a synchronized state to be processed as follows:
363
364 1) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number is outside the
365 current receive window (SEG.SEQ &lt;= RCV.NXT || SEG.SEQ &gt; RCV.NXT+
366 RCV.WND), silently drop the segment.
367
368 2) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number is acceptable, i.e.,
369 (RCV.NXT &lt;= SEG.SEQ &lt; RCV.NXT+RCV.WND), then reset the connection.
370
371 Instead, implementations SHOULD implement the following steps in
372 place of those specified in [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] (as listed above).
373
374 1) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number is outside the
375 current receive window, silently drop the segment.
376
377 2) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number exactly matches the
378 next expected sequence number (RCV.NXT), then TCP MUST reset the
379 connection.
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
391
392
393 3) If the RST bit is set and the sequence number does not exactly
394 match the next expected sequence value, yet is within the current
395 receive window (RCV.NXT &lt; SEG.SEQ &lt; RCV.NXT+RCV.WND), TCP MUST
396 send an acknowledgment (challenge ACK):
397
398 &lt;SEQ=SND.NXT&gt;&lt;ACK=RCV.NXT&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;
399
400 After sending the challenge ACK, TCP MUST drop the unacceptable
401 segment and stop processing the incoming packet further. Further
402 segments destined to this connection will be processed as normal.
403
404 The modified RST segment processing would thus become:
405
406 In all states except SYN-SENT, all reset (RST) segments are validated
407 by checking their SEQ-fields [sequence numbers]. A reset is valid if
408 its sequence number exactly matches the next expected sequence
409 number. If the RST arrives and its sequence number field does NOT
410 match the next expected sequence number but is within the window,
411 then the receiver should generate an ACK. In all other cases, where
412 the SEQ-field does not match and is outside the window, the receiver
413 MUST silently discard the segment.
414
415 In the SYN-SENT state (a RST received in response to an initial SYN),
416 the RST is acceptable if the ACK field acknowledges the SYN. In all
417 other cases the receiver MUST silently discard the segment.
418
419 With the above slight change to the TCP state machine, it becomes
420 much harder for an attacker to generate an acceptable reset segment.
421
422 In cases where the remote peer did generate a RST, but it fails to
423 meet the above criteria (the RST sequence number was within the
424 window but NOT the exact expected sequence number), when the
425 challenge ACK is sent back, it will no longer have the transmission
426 control block (TCB) related to this connection and hence as per
427 [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>], the remote peer will send a second RST back. The sequence
428 number of the second RST is derived from the acknowledgment number of
429 the incoming ACK. This second RST, if it reaches the sender, will
430 cause the connection to be aborted since the sequence number would
431 now be an exact match.
432
433 A valid RST received out of order would still generate a challenge
434 ACK in response. If this RST happens to be a genuine one, the other
435 end would send an RST with an exact sequence number match that would
436 cause the connection to be dropped.
437
438 Note that the above mitigation may cause a non-amplification ACK
439 exchange. This concern is discussed in <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>.
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Blind Reset Attack Using the SYN Bit</span>
450
451 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Description of the Attack</span>
452
453 The analysis of the reset attack using the RST bit highlights another
454 possible avenue for a blind attacker using a similar set of sequence
455 number guessing. Instead of using the RST bit, an attacker can use
456 the SYN bit with the exact same semantics to tear down a connection.
457
458 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Mitigation</span>
459
460 [<a id="ref-RFC0793">RFC0793</a>] currently requires handling of a segment with the SYN bit
461 set in the synchronized state to be as follows:
462
463 1) If the SYN bit is set and the sequence number is outside the
464 expected window, send an ACK back to the sender.
465
466 2) If the SYN bit is set and the sequence number is acceptable, i.e.,
467 (RCV.NXT &lt;= SEG.SEQ &lt; RCV.NXT+RCV.WND), then send a RST segment to
468 the sender.
469
470 Instead, the handling of the SYN in the synchronized state SHOULD be
471 performed as follows:
472
473 1) If the SYN bit is set, irrespective of the sequence number, TCP
474 MUST send an ACK (also referred to as challenge ACK) to the remote
475 peer:
476
477 &lt;SEQ=SND.NXT&gt;&lt;ACK=RCV.NXT&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;
478
479 After sending the acknowledgment, TCP MUST drop the unacceptable
480 segment and stop processing further.
481
482 By sending an ACK, the remote peer is challenged to confirm the loss
483 of the previous connection and the request to start a new connection.
484 A legitimate peer, after restart, would not have a TCB in the
485 synchronized state. Thus, when the ACK arrives, the peer should send
486 a RST segment back with the sequence number derived from the ACK
487 field that caused the RST.
488
489 This RST will confirm that the remote peer has indeed closed the
490 previous connection. Upon receipt of a valid RST, the local TCP
491 endpoint MUST terminate its connection. The local TCP endpoint
492 should then rely on SYN retransmission from the remote end to
493 re-establish the connection.
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
503
504
505 A spoofed SYN, on the other hand, will then have generated an
506 additional ACK that the peer will discard as a duplicate ACK and will
507 not affect the established connection.
508
509 Note that this mitigation does leave one corner case un-handled,
510 which will prevent the reset of a connection when it should be reset
511 (i.e., it is a non-spoofed SYN wherein a peer really did restart).
512 This problem occurs when the restarting host chooses the exact same
513 IP address and port number that it was using prior to its restart.
514 By chance, the restarted host must also choose an initial sequence
515 number of exactly (RCV.NXT - 1) of the remote peer that is still in
516 the established state. Such a case would cause the receiver to
517 generate a "challenge" ACK as described above. But since the ACK
518 would be within the outgoing connections window, the inbound ACK
519 would be acceptable, and the sender of the SYN will do nothing with
520 the response ACK. This sequence will continue as the SYN sender
521 continually times out and retransmits the SYN until such time as the
522 connection attempt fails.
523
524 This corner case is a result of the [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] specification and is
525 not introduced by these new requirements.
526
527 Note that the above mitigation may cause a non-amplification ACK
528 exchange. This concern is discussed in <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>.
529
530 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Blind Data Injection Attack</span>
531
532 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Description of the Attack</span>
533
534 A third type of attack is also highlighted by both the RST and SYN
535 attacks. It is also possible to inject data into a TCP connection by
536 simply guessing a sequence number within the current receive window
537 of the victim. The ACK value of any data segment is considered valid
538 as long as it does not acknowledge data ahead of the next segment to
539 send. In other words, an ACK value is acceptable if it is
540 ((SND.UNA-(2^31-1)) &lt;= SEG.ACK &lt;= SND.NXT). The (2^31 - 1) in the
541 above inequality takes into account the fact that comparisons on TCP
542 sequence and acknowledgment numbers is done using the modulo 32-bit
543 arithmetic to accommodate the number wraparound. This means that an
544 attacker has to guess two ACK values with every guessed sequence
545 number so that the chances of successfully injecting data into a
546 connection are 1 in ( 1/2 (2^32 / RCV.WND) * 2). Thus, the mean
547 number of tries needed to inject data successfully is
548 1/2 (2*2^32/RWND) = 2^32/RCV.WND.
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
559
560
561 When an attacker successfully injects data into a connection, the
562 data will sit in the receiver's re-assembly queue until the peer
563 sends enough data to bridge the gap between the RCV.NXT value and the
564 injected data. At that point, one of two things will occur:
565
566 1) A packet war will ensue with the receiver indicating that it has
567 received data up until RCV.NXT (which includes the attacker's
568 data) and the sender sending an ACK with an acknowledgment number
569 less than RCV.NXT.
570
571 2) The sender will send enough data to the peer that will move
572 RCV.NXT even further along past the injected data.
573
574 Depending upon the TCP implementation in question and the TCP traffic
575 characteristics at that time, data corruption may result. In case
576 (a), the connection will eventually be reset by one of the sides
577 unless the sender produces more data that will transform the ACK war
578 into case (b). The reset will usually occur via User Time Out (UTO)
579 (see <a href="./rfc1122#section-4.2.3.5">section&nbsp;4.2.3.5 of [RFC1122]</a>).
580
581 Note that the protections illustrated in this section neither cause
582 an ACK war nor prevent one from occurring if data is actually
583 injected into a connection. The ACK war is a product of the attack
584 itself and cannot be prevented (other than by preventing the data
585 from being injected).
586
587 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Mitigation</span>
588
589 All TCP stacks MAY implement the following mitigation. TCP stacks
590 that implement this mitigation MUST add an additional input check to
591 any incoming segment. The ACK value is considered acceptable only if
592 it is in the range of ((SND.UNA - MAX.SND.WND) &lt;= SEG.ACK &lt;=
593 SND.NXT). All incoming segments whose ACK value doesn't satisfy the
594 above condition MUST be discarded and an ACK sent back. It needs to
595 be noted that <a href="./rfc793">RFC 793</a> on page 72 (fifth check) says: "If the ACK is a
596 duplicate (SEG.ACK &lt; SND.UNA), it can be ignored. If the ACK
597 acknowledges something not yet sent (SEG.ACK &gt; SND.NXT) then send an
598 ACK, drop the segment, and return". The "ignored" above implies that
599 the processing of the incoming data segment continues, which means
600 the ACK value is treated as acceptable. This mitigation makes the
601 ACK check more stringent since any ACK &lt; SND.UNA wouldn't be
602 accepted, instead only ACKs that are in the range ((SND.UNA -
603 MAX.SND.WND) &lt;= SEG.ACK &lt;= SND.NXT) get through.
604
605 A new state variable MAX.SND.WND is defined as the largest window
606 that the local sender has ever received from its peer. This window
607 may be scaled to a value larger than 65,535 bytes ([<a href="./rfc1323" title="&quot;TCP Extensions for High Performance&quot;">RFC1323</a>]). This
608 small check will reduce the vulnerability to an attacker guessing a
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
615
616
617 valid sequence number, since, not only one must guess the in-window
618 sequence number, but also guess a proper ACK value within a scoped
619 range. This mitigation reduces, but does not eliminate, the ability
620 to generate false segments. It does however reduce the probability
621 that invalid data will be injected.
622
623 Implementations can also chose to hard code the MAX.SND.WND value to
624 the maximum permissible window size, i.e., 65535 in the absence of
625 window scaling. In the presence of the window scaling option, the
626 value becomes (MAX.SND.WND &lt;&lt; Snd.Wind.Scale).
627
628 This mitigation also helps in improving robustness on accepting
629 spoofed FIN segments (FIN attacks). Among other things, this
630 mitigation requires that the attacker also needs to get the
631 acknowledgment number to fall in the range mentioned above in order
632 to successfully spoof a FIN segment leading to the closure of the
633 connection. Thus, this mitigation greatly improves the robustness to
634 spoofed FIN segments.
635
636 Note that the above mitigation may cause a non-amplification ACK
637 exchange. This concern is discussed in <a href="#section-10">Section 10</a>.
638
639 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Suggested Mitigation Strengths</span>
640
641 As described in the above sections, recommendation levels for RST,
642 SYN, and DATA are tagged as SHOULD, SHOULD, and MAY, respectively.
643 The reason that DATA mitigation is tagged as MAY, even though it
644 increased the TCP robustness in general is because, the DATA
645 injection is perceived to be more difficult (twice as unlikely) when
646 compared to RST and SYN counterparts. However, it needs to be noted
647 that all the suggested mitigations improve TCP's robustness in
648 general and hence the choice of implementing some or all mitigations
649 recommended in the document is purely left to the implementer.
650
651 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. ACK Throttling</span>
652
653 In order to alleviate multiple RSTs/SYNs from triggering multiple
654 challenge ACKs, an ACK throttling mechanism is suggested as follows:
655
656 1) The system administrator can configure the number of challenge
657 ACKs that can be sent out in a given interval. For example, in
658 any 5 second window, no more than 10 challenge ACKs should be
659 sent.
660
661 2) The values for both the time and number of ACKs SHOULD be tunable
662 by the system administrator to accommodate different perceived
663 levels of threat and/or system resources.
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
671
672
673 It should be noted that these numbers are empirical in nature and
674 have been obtained from the RST throttling mechanisms existing in
675 some implementations. Also, note that no timer is needed to
676 implement the above mechanism, instead a timestamp and a counter can
677 be used.
678
679 An implementation SHOULD include an ACK throttling mechanism to be
680 conservative. While we have not encountered a case where the lack of
681 ACK throttling can be exploited, as a fail-safe mechanism we
682 recommend its use. An implementation may take an excessive number of
683 invocations of the throttling mechanism as an indication that network
684 conditions are unusual or hostile.
685
686 An administrator who is more concerned about protecting his bandwidth
687 and CPU utilization may set smaller ACK throttling values whereas an
688 administrator who is more interested in faster cleanup of stale
689 connections (i.e., concerned about excess TCP state) may decide to
690 set a higher value thus allowing more RST's to be processed in any
691 given time period.
692
693 The time limit SHOULD be tunable to help timeout brute force attacks
694 faster than a potential legitimate flood of RSTs.
695
696 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Backward Compatibility and Other Considerations</span>
697
698 All of the new required mitigation techniques in this document are
699 totally compatible with existing ([<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>]) compliant TCP
700 implementations as this document introduces no new assumptions or
701 conditions.
702
703 There is a corner scenario in the above mitigations that will require
704 more than one round-trip time to successfully abort the connection as
705 per the figure below. This scenario is similar to the one in which
706 the original RST was lost in the network.
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
727
728
729 TCP A TCP B
730 1.a. ESTAB &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=300&gt;&lt;ACK=101&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;&lt;DATA&gt; &lt;-- ESTAB
731 b. (delayed) ... &lt;SEQ=400&gt;&lt;ACK=101&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;&lt;DATA&gt; &lt;-- ESTAB
732 c. (in flight) ... &lt;SEQ=500&gt;&lt;ACK=101&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- CLOSED
733 2. ESTAB --&gt; &lt;SEQ=101&gt;&lt;ACK=400&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt; --&gt; CLOSED
734 (ACK for 1.a)
735 ... &lt;SEQ=400&gt;&lt;ACK=0&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- CLOSED
736 3. CHALLENGE --&gt; &lt;SEQ=101&gt;&lt;ACK=400&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt; --&gt; CLOSED
737 (for 1.c)
738 ... &lt;SEQ=400&gt;&lt;ACK=0&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- RESPONSE
739 4.a. ESTAB &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=400&gt;&lt;ACK=101&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;&lt;DATA&gt; 1.b reaches A
740 b. ESTAB --&gt; &lt;SEQ=101&gt;&lt;ACK=500&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt;
741 c. (in flight) ... &lt;SEQ=500&gt;&lt;ACK=0&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- CLOSED
742 5. RESPONSE arrives at A, but dropped since its outside of window.
743 6. ESTAB &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=500&gt;&lt;ACK=0&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; 4.c reaches A
744 7. CLOSED CLOSED
745
746 For the mitigation to be maximally effective against the
747 vulnerabilities discussed in this document, both ends of the TCP
748 connection need to have the fix. Although, having the mitigations at
749 one end might prevent that end from being exposed to the attack, the
750 connection is still vulnerable at the other end.
751
752 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Middlebox Considerations</span>
753
754 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Middlebox That Resend RSTs</span>
755
756 Consider a middlebox M-B tracking connections between two TCP end
757 hosts E-A and E-C. If E-C sends a RST with a sequence number that is
758 within the window but not an exact match to reset the connection and
759 M-B does not have the fix recommended in this document, it may clear
760 the connection and forward the RST to E-A saving an incorrect
761 sequence number. If E-A does not have the fix, the connection would
762 get cleared as required. However, if E-A does have the required fix,
763 it will send a challenge ACK to E-C. M-B, being a middlebox, may
764 intercept this ACK and resend the RST on behalf of E-C with the old
765 sequence number. This RST will, again, not be acceptable and may
766 trigger a challenge ACK.
767
768 The above situation may result in a RST/ACK war. However, we believe
769 that if such a case exists in the Internet, the middlebox is
770 generating packets a conformant TCP endpoint would not generate.
771 [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] dictates that the sequence number of a RST has to be
772 derived from the acknowledgment number of the incoming ACK segment.
773 It is outside the scope of this document to suggest mitigations to
774 the ill-behaved middleboxes.
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
783
784
785 Consider a similar scenario where the RST from M-B to E-A gets lost,
786 E-A will continue to hold the connection and E-A might send an ACK an
787 arbitrary time later after the connection state was destroyed at M-B.
788 For this case, M-B will have to cache the RST for an arbitrary amount
789 of time until it is confirmed that the connection has been cleared at
790 E-A.
791
792 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Middleboxes That Advance Sequence Numbers</span>
793
794 Some middleboxes may compute RST sequence numbers at the higher end
795 of the acceptable window. The scenario is the same as the earlier
796 case, but in this case instead of sending the cached RST, the
797 middlebox (M-B) sends a RST that computes its sequence number as the
798 sum of the acknowledgment field in the ACK and the window advertised
799 by the ACK that was sent by E-A to challenge the RST as depicted
800 below. The difference in the sequence numbers between step 1 and 2
801 below is due to data lost in the network.
802
803 TCP A Middlebox
804
805 1. ESTABLISHED &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=500&gt;&lt;ACK=100&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- CLOSED
806
807 2. ESTABLISHED --&gt; &lt;SEQ=100&gt;&lt;ACK=300&gt;&lt;WND=500&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt; --&gt; CLOSED
808
809 3. ESTABLISHED &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=800&gt;&lt;ACK=100&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- CLOSED
810
811 4. ESTABLISHED --&gt; &lt;SEQ=100&gt;&lt;ACK=300&gt;&lt;WND=500&gt;&lt;CTL=ACK&gt; --&gt; CLOSED
812
813 5. ESTABLISHED &lt;-- &lt;SEQ=800&gt;&lt;ACK=100&gt;&lt;CTL=RST&gt; &lt;-- CLOSED
814
815 Although the authors are not aware of an implementation that does the
816 above, it could be mitigated by implementing the ACK throttling
817 mechanism described earlier.
818
819 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.3" href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Middleboxes That Drop the Challenge ACK</span>
820
821 It also needs to be noted that, some middleboxes (Firewalls/NATs)
822 that don't have the fix recommended in the document, may drop the
823 challenge ACK. This can happen because, the original RST segment
824 that was in window had already cleared the flow state pertaining to
825 the TCP connection in the middlebox. In such cases, the end hosts
826 that have implemented the RST mitigation described in this document,
827 will have the TCP connection left open. This is a corner case and
828 can go away if the middlebox is conformant with the changes proposed
829 in this document.
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Security Considerations</span>
842
843 These changes to the TCP state machine do NOT protect an
844 implementation from on-path attacks. It also needs to be emphasized
845 that while mitigations within this document make it harder for off-
846 path attackers to inject segments, it does NOT make it impossible.
847 The only way to fully protect a TCP connection from both on- and off-
848 path attacks is by using either IPsec Authentication Header (AH)
849 [<a href="./rfc4302" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">RFC4302</a>] or IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4303</a>].
850
851 Implementers also should be aware that the attacks detailed in this
852 specification are not the only attacks available to an off-path
853 attacker and that the counter measures described herein are not a
854 comprehensive defense against such attacks.
855
856 In particular, administrators should be aware that forged ICMP
857 messages provide off-path attackers the opportunity to disrupt
858 connections or degrade service. Such attacks may be subject to even
859 less scrutiny than the TCP attacks addressed here, especially in
860 stacks not tuned for hostile environments. It is important to note
861 that some ICMP messages, validated or not, are key to the proper
862 function of TCP. Those ICMP messages used to properly set the path
863 maximum transmission unit are the most obvious example. There are a
864 variety of ways to choose which, if any, ICMP messages to trust in
865 the presence of off-path attackers and choosing between them depends
866 on the assumptions and guarantees developers and administrators can
867 make about their network. This specification does not attempt to do
868 more than note this and related issues. Unless implementers address
869 spoofed ICMP messages [<a href="./rfc5927" title="&quot;ICMP Attacks against TCP&quot;">RFC5927</a>], the mitigations specified in this
870 document may not provide the desired protection level.
871
872 In any case, this RFC details only part of a complete strategy to
873 prevent off-path attackers from disrupting services that use TCP.
874 Administrators and implementers should consider the other attack
875 vectors and determine appropriate mitigations in securing their
876 systems.
877
878 Another notable consideration is that a reflector attack is possible
879 with the required RST/SYN mitigation techniques. In this attack, an
880 off-path attacker can cause a victim to send an ACK segment for each
881 spoofed RST/SYN segment that lies within the current receive window
882 of the victim. It should be noted, however, that this does not cause
883 any amplification since the attacker must generate a segment for each
884 one that the victim will generate.
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
895
896
897 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Contributors</span>
898
899 Mitesh Dalal and Amol Khare of Cisco Systems came up with the
900 solution for the RST/SYN attacks. Anantha Ramaiah and Randall
901 Stewart of Cisco Systems discovered the data injection vulnerability
902 and together with Patrick Mahan and Peter Lei of Cisco Systems found
903 solutions for the same. Paul Goyette, Mark Baushke, Frank
904 Kastenholz, Art Stine, and David Wang of Juniper Networks provided
905 the insight that apart from RSTs, SYNs could also result in
906 formidable attacks. Shrirang Bage of Cisco Systems, Qing Li and
907 Preety Puri of Wind River Systems, and Xiaodan Tang of QNX Software
908 along with the folks above helped in ratifying and testing the
909 interoperability of the suggested solutions.
910
911 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
912
913 Special thanks to Mark Allman, Ted Faber, Steve Bellovin, Vern
914 Paxson, Allison Mankin, Sharad Ahlawat, Damir Rajnovic, John Wong,
915 Joe Touch, Alfred Hoenes, Andre Oppermann, Fernando Gont, Sandra
916 Murphy, Brian Carpenter, Cullen Jennings, and other members of the
917 tcpm WG for suggestions and comments. ACK throttling was introduced
918 to this document by combining the suggestions from the tcpm working
919 group.
920
921 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. References</span>
922
923 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.1" href="#section-13.1">13.1</a>. Normative References</span>
924
925 [<a id="ref-RFC0793">RFC0793</a>] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
926 <a href="./rfc793">RFC 793</a>, September 1981.
927
928 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
929 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
930
931 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-13.2" href="#section-13.2">13.2</a>. Informative References</span>
932
933 [<a id="ref-Medina05">Medina05</a>] Medina, A., Allman, M., and S. Floyd, "Measuring the
934 Evolution of Transport Protocols in the Internet", ACM
935 Computer Communication Review, 35(2), April 2005,
936 &lt;<a href="http://www.icir.org/mallman/papers/tcp-evo-ccr05.ps">http://www.icir.org/mallman/papers/tcp-evo-ccr05.ps</a>&gt;.
937
938 [<a id="ref-NISCC">NISCC</a>] NISCC, "NISCC Vulnerability Advisory 236929 -
939 Vulnerability Issues in TCP".
940
941 [<a id="ref-RFC1122">RFC1122</a>] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
942 Communication Layers", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1122">RFC 1122</a>, October 1989.
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
951
952
953 [<a id="ref-RFC1323">RFC1323</a>] Jacobson, V., Braden, B., and D. Borman, "TCP
954 Extensions for High Performance", <a href="./rfc1323">RFC 1323</a>, May 1992.
955
956 [<a id="ref-RFC1948">RFC1948</a>] Bellovin, S., "Defending Against Sequence Number
957 Attacks", <a href="./rfc1948">RFC 1948</a>, May 1996.
958
959 [<a id="ref-RFC2385">RFC2385</a>] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP
960 MD5 Signature Option", <a href="./rfc2385">RFC 2385</a>, August 1998.
961
962 [<a id="ref-RFC4271">RFC4271</a>] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
963 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", <a href="./rfc4271">RFC 4271</a>, January 2006.
964
965 [<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>,
966 December 2005.
967
968 [<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
969 <a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005.
970
971 [<a id="ref-RFC4953">RFC4953</a>] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
972 <a href="./rfc4953">RFC 4953</a>, July 2007.
973
974 [<a id="ref-RFC5927">RFC5927</a>] Gont, F., "ICMP Attacks against TCP", <a href="./rfc5927">RFC 5927</a>,
975 July 2010.
976
977 [<a id="ref-SITW">SITW</a>] Watson, P., "Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset
978 attacks", Presentation at 2004 CanSecWest,
979 &lt;<a href="http://cansecwest.com/csw04archive.html">http://cansecwest.com/csw04archive.html</a>&gt;.
980
981 [<a id="ref-TSVWG-PORT">TSVWG-PORT</a>] Larsen, M. and F. Gont, "Transport Protocol Port
982 Randomization Recommendations", Work in Progress,
983 August 2010.
984
985
986
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1004 <span class="grey">Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5961">RFC 5961</a> TCP Security August 2010</span>
1007
1008
1009 Authors' Addresses
1010
1011 Anantha Ramaiah
1012 Cisco Systems
1013 170 Tasman Drive
1014 San Jose, CA 95134
1015 USA
1016
1017 Phone: +1 (408) 525-6486
1018 EMail: [email protected]
1019
1020
1021 Randall R. Stewart
1022 Huawei
1023 148 Crystal Cove Ct
1024 Chapin, SC 29036
1025 USA
1026
1027 Phone: +1 (803) 345-0369
1028 EMail: [email protected]
1029
1030
1031 Mitesh Dalal
1032 Cisco Systems
1033 170 Tasman Drive
1034 San Jose, CA 95134
1035 USA
1036
1037 Phone: +1 (408) 853-5257
1038 EMail: [email protected]
1039
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1060 Ramaiah, et al. Standards Track [Page 19]
1061 </pre>