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1 <pre>Network Working Group C. Madson
2 Request for Comments: 2403 Cisco Systems Inc.
3 Category: Standards Track R. Glenn
4 NIST
5 November 1998
6
7
8 <span class="h1">The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH</span>
9
10 Status of this Memo
11
12 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
13 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
14 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
15 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
16 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
17
18 Copyright Notice
19
20 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
21
22 Abstract
23
24 This memo describes the use of the HMAC algorithm [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>] in
25 conjunction with the MD5 algorithm [<a href="./rfc1321" title="&quot;MD5 Digest Algorithm&quot;">RFC-1321</a>] as an authentication
26 mechanism within the revised IPSEC Encapsulating Security Payload
27 [<a href="#ref-ESP" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload&quot;">ESP</a>] and the revised IPSEC Authentication Header [<a href="#ref-AH" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">AH</a>]. HMAC with MD5
28 provides data origin authentication and integrity protection.
29
30 Further information on the other components necessary for ESP and AH
31 implementations is provided by [<a href="#ref-Thayer97a" title="&quot;IP Security Document Roadmap&quot;">Thayer97a</a>].
32
33 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
34
35 This memo specifies the use of MD5 [<a href="./rfc1321" title="&quot;MD5 Digest Algorithm&quot;">RFC-1321</a>] combined with HMAC
36 [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>] as a keyed authentication mechanism within the context of
37 the Encapsulating Security Payload and the Authentication Header.
38 The goal of HMAC-MD5-96 is to ensure that the packet is authentic and
39 cannot be modified in transit.
40
41 HMAC is a secret key authentication algorithm. Data integrity and
42 data origin authentication as provided by HMAC are dependent upon the
43 scope of the distribution of the secret key. If only the source and
44 destination know the HMAC key, this provides both data origin
45 authentication and data integrity for packets sent between the two
46 parties; if the HMAC is correct, this proves that it must have been
47 added by the source.
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a> The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH November 1998</span>
55
56
57 In this memo, HMAC-MD5-96 is used within the context of ESP and AH.
58 For further information on how the various pieces of ESP - including
59 the confidentiality mechanism -- fit together to provide security
60 services, refer to [<a href="#ref-ESP" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload&quot;">ESP</a>] and [<a href="#ref-Thayer97a" title="&quot;IP Security Document Roadmap&quot;">Thayer97a</a>]. For further information on
61 AH, refer to [<a href="#ref-AH" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">AH</a>] and [<a href="#ref-Thayer97a" title="&quot;IP Security Document Roadmap&quot;">Thayer97a</a>].
62
63 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
64 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
65 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC-2119</a>].
66
67 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Algorithm and Mode</span>
68
69 [<a id="ref-RFC-1321">RFC-1321</a>] describes the underlying MD5 algorithm, while [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>]
70 describes the HMAC algorithm. The HMAC algorithm provides a framework
71 for inserting various hashing algorithms such as MD5.
72
73 HMAC-MD5-96 operates on 64-byte blocks of data. Padding requirements
74 are specified in [<a href="./rfc1321" title="&quot;MD5 Digest Algorithm&quot;">RFC-1321</a>] and are part of the MD5 algorithm. If
75 MD5 is built according to [<a href="./rfc1321" title="&quot;MD5 Digest Algorithm&quot;">RFC-1321</a>], there is no need to add any
76 additional padding as far as HMAC-MD5-96 is concerned. With regard
77 to "implicit packet padding" as defined in [<a href="#ref-AH" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">AH</a>], no implicit packet
78 padding is required.
79
80 HMAC-MD5-96 produces a 128-bit authenticator value. This 128-bit
81 value can be truncated as described in <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>. For use with either
82 ESP or AH, a truncated value using the first 96 bits MUST be
83 supported. Upon sending, the truncated value is stored within the
84 authenticator field. Upon receipt, the entire 128-bit value is
85 computed and the first 96 bits are compared to the value stored in
86 the authenticator field. No other authenticator value lengths are
87 supported by HMAC-MD5-96.
88
89 The length of 96 bits was selected because it is the default
90 authenticator length as specified in [<a href="#ref-AH" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">AH</a>] and meets the security
91 requirements described in [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>].
92
93 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Performance</span>
94
95 [<a id="ref-Bellare96a">Bellare96a</a>] states that "(HMAC) performance is essentially that of
96 the underlying hash function". [<a href="./rfc1810" title="&quot;Report on MD5 Performance&quot;">RFC-1810</a>] provides some performance
97 analysis and recommendations of the use of MD5 with Internet
98 protocols. As of this writing no performance analysis has been done
99 of HMAC or HMAC combined with MD5.
100
101 [<a id="ref-RFC-2104">RFC-2104</a>] outlines an implementation modification which can improve
102 per-packet performance without affecting interoperability.
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a> The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH November 1998</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Keying Material</span>
114
115 HMAC-MD5-96 is a secret key algorithm. While no fixed key length is
116 specified in [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>], for use with either ESP or AH a fixed key
117 length of 128-bits MUST be supported. Key lengths other than 128-
118 bits MUST NOT be supported (i.e. only 128-bit keys are to be used by
119 HMAC-MD5-96). A key length of 128-bits was chosen based on the
120 recommendations in [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>] (i.e. key lengths less than the
121 authenticator length decrease security strength and keys longer than
122 the authenticator length do not significantly increase security
123 strength).
124
125 [<a id="ref-RFC-2104">RFC-2104</a>] discusses requirements for key material, which includes a
126 discussion on requirements for strong randomness. A strong pseudo-
127 random function MUST be used to generate the required 128-bit key.
128
129 At the time of this writing there are no specified weak keys for use
130 with HMAC. This does not mean to imply that weak keys do not exist.
131 If, at some point, a set of weak keys for HMAC are identified, the
132 use of these weak keys must be rejected followed by a request for
133 replacement keys or a newly negotiated Security Association.
134
135 [<a id="ref-ARCH">ARCH</a>] describes the general mechanism for obtaining keying material
136 when multiple keys are required for a single SA (e.g. when an ESP SA
137 requires a key for confidentiality and a key for authentication).
138
139 In order to provide data origin authentication, the key distribution
140 mechanism must ensure that unique keys are allocated and that they
141 are distributed only to the parties participating in the
142 communication.
143
144 [<a id="ref-RFC-2104">RFC-2104</a>] makes the following recommendation with regard to
145 rekeying. Current attacks do not indicate a specific recommended
146 frequency for key changes as these attacks are practically
147 infeasible. However, periodic key refreshment is a fundamental
148 security practice that helps against potential weaknesses of the
149 function and keys, reduces the information avaliable to a
150 cryptanalyst, and limits the damage of an exposed key.
151
152 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Interaction with the ESP Cipher Mechanism</span>
153
154 As of this writing, there are no known issues which preclude the use
155 of the HMAC-MD5-96 algorithm with any specific cipher algorithm.
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164 <span class="grey">Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a> The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH November 1998</span>
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168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
170
171 The security provided by HMAC-MD5-96 is based upon the strength of
172 HMAC, and to a lesser degree, the strength of MD5. [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>] claims
173 that HMAC does not depend upon the property of strong collision
174 resistance, which is important to consider when evaluating the use of
175 MD5, an algorithm which has, under recent scrutiny, been shown to be
176 much less collision-resistant than was first thought. At the time of
177 this writing there are no practical cryptographic attacks against
178 HMAC-MD5-96.
179
180 [<a id="ref-RFC-2104">RFC-2104</a>] states that for "minimally reasonable hash functions" the
181 "birthday attack", the strongest attack know against HMAC, is
182 impractical. For a 64-byte block hash such as HMAC-MD5-96, an attack
183 involving the successful processing of 2**64 blocks would be
184 infeasible unless it were discovered that the underlying hash had
185 collisions after processing 2**30 blocks. A hash with such weak
186 collision-resistance characteristics would generally be considered to
187 be unusable.
188
189 It is also important to consider that while MD5 was never developed
190 to be used as a keyed hash algorithm, HMAC had that criteria from the
191 onset. While the use of MD5 in the context of data security is
192 undergoing reevaluation, the combined HMAC with MD5 algorithm has
193 held up to cryptographic scrutiny.
194
195 [<a id="ref-RFC-2104">RFC-2104</a>] also discusses the potential additional security which is
196 provided by the truncation of the resulting hash. Specifications
197 which include HMAC are strongly encouraged to perform this hash
198 truncation.
199
200 As [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>] provides a framework for incorporating various hash
201 algorithms with HMAC, it is possible to replace MD5 with other
202 algorithms such as SHA-1. [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC-2104</a>] contains a detailed discussion
203 on the strengths and weaknesses of HMAC algorithms.
204
205 As is true with any cryptographic algorithm, part of its strength
206 lies in the correctness of the algorithm implementation, the security
207 of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the strength
208 of the associated secret key, and upon the correctness of the
209 implementation in all of the participating systems. [<a href="./rfc2202" title="&quot;Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1&quot;">RFC-2202</a>]
210 contains test vectors and example code to assist in verifying the
211 correctness of HMAC-MD5-96 code.
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220 <span class="grey">Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a> The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH November 1998</span>
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224
225 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
226
227 This document is derived in part from previous works by Jim Hughes,
228 those people that worked with Jim on the combined DES/CBC+HMAC-MD5
229 ESP transforms, the ANX bakeoff participants, and the members of the
230 IPsec working group.
231
232 We would also like to thank Hugo Krawczyk for his comments and
233 recommendations regarding some of the cryptographic specific text in
234 this document.
235
236 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
237
238 [<a id="ref-RFC-1321">RFC-1321</a>] Rivest, R., "MD5 Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, April
239 1992.
240
241 [<a id="ref-RFC-2104">RFC-2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
242 Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>,
243 February 1997.
244
245 [<a id="ref-RFC-1810">RFC-1810</a>] Touch, J., "Report on MD5 Performance", <a href="./rfc1810">RFC 1810</a>, June
246 1995.
247
248 [<a id="ref-Bellare96a">Bellare96a</a>] Bellare, M., Canetti, R., and H. Krawczyk, "Keying Hash
249 Functions for Message Authentication", Advances in
250 Cryptography, Crypto96 Proceeding, June 1996.
251
252 [<a id="ref-ARCH">ARCH</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for
253 the Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998.
254
255 [<a id="ref-ESP">ESP</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
256 Payload", <a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a>, November 1998.
257
258 [<a id="ref-AH">AH</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header",
259 <a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a>, November 1998.
260
261 [<a id="ref-Thayer97a">Thayer97a</a>] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., and R. Glenn, "IP Security
262 Document Roadmap", <a href="./rfc2411">RFC 2411</a>, November 1998.
263
264 [<a id="ref-RFC-2202">RFC-2202</a>] Cheng, P., and R. Glenn, "Test Cases for HMAC-MD5 and
265 HMAC-SHA-1", <a href="./rfc2202">RFC 2202</a>, March 1997.
266
267 [<a id="ref-RFC-2119">RFC-2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
268 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
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276 <span class="grey">Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a> The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH November 1998</span>
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280
281 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Editors' Address</span>
282
283 Cheryl Madson
284 Cisco Systems, Inc.
285
286 EMail: [email protected]
287
288
289 Rob Glenn
290 NIST
291
292 EMail: &lt;[email protected]&gt;
293
294 The IPsec working group can be contacted through the chairs:
295
296 Robert Moskowitz
297 ICSA
298
299 EMail: [email protected]
300
301
302 Ted T'so
303 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
304
305 EMail: [email protected]
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332 <span class="grey">Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a> The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH November 1998</span>
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336
337 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Full Copyright Statement</span>
338
339 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
340
341 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
342 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
343 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
344 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
345 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
346 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
347 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
348 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
349 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
350 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
351 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
352 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
353 English.
354
355 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
356 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
357
358 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
359 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
360 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
361 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
362 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
363 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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388 Madson &amp; Glenn Standards Track [Page 7]
389 </pre>