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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) V. Manral |
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Request for Comments: 6039 IP Infusion |
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Category: Informational M. Bhatia |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Alcatel-Lucent |
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J. Jaeggli |
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Nokia Inc. |
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R. White |
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Cisco Systems |
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October 2010 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods</span> |
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<span class="h1">for Routing Protocols</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic |
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mechanisms to ensure that data received from a neighboring router has |
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not been modified in transit and actually originated from an |
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authorized neighboring router. |
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|
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The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this |
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document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to |
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the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet. |
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|
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This document outlines some of the limitations of the current |
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mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic |
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algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these |
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limitations. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents |
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
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|
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Problem Statement ...............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Pre-Image vs. Collision Attacks ............................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Concerns about MD5 and the SHA-1 Algorithm .................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPFv2) .....................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv2 ..............................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv2 ...............................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3) .....................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv3 ..............................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv3 ...............................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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4. Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing |
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Protocol (IS-IS) ................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Management Issues with IS-IS ...............................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Technical Issues with IS-IS ...............................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4) ................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Management Issues with BGP-4 ..............................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Technical Issues with BGP-4 ...............................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP) .........................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Technical Issues with RIP .................................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) .......................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Technical Issues with BFD .................................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. Contributor's Address .........................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Problem Statement</span> |
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Protocols, such as OSPF version 2 [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>], version 3 [<a href="./rfc5340" title=""OSPF for IPv6"">RFC5340</a>], |
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IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title=""Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments"">RFC1195</a>], BGP-4 [<a href="./rfc4271" title=""A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)"">RFC4271</a>], and BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"">RFC5880</a>], employ various |
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mechanisms to create a cryptographic digest of each transmitted |
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protocol packet. Traditionally, these digests are the results of a |
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one-way hash algorithm, such as Message Digest 5 (MD5) [<a href="./rfc1321" title=""The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"">RFC1321</a>], |
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across the contents of the packet being transmitted. A secret key is |
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used as the hash base (or seed). The digest is then recomputed by |
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the receiving router, using the same key as the original router used |
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to create the hash, then compared with the transmitted digest to |
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verify: |
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o That the router originating this packet is authorized via the |
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shared key mechanism to peer with the local router and exchange |
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routing data. The implicit trust of the routing protocol exchange |
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protected by a shared secret is intended to protect against the |
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injection of falsely generated routing data into the routing |
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system by unauthorized systems. |
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|
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o That the data has not been altered in transit between the two |
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neighboring routers. |
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|
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Digest verification schemes are not intended to protect the |
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confidentiality of information being exchanged between routers. The |
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information (entries in the routing table) is potentially available |
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through other mechanisms. Moreover, access to the physical media |
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between two routers exchanging routing data will confer the ability |
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to capture or otherwise discover the contents of the routing tables |
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in those routers. |
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|
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Authentication mechanisms defined today have notable limitations: |
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|
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o Manual configuration of shared secret keys, especially in large |
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networks and between networks, poses a major management problem. |
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In many cases, it is challenging to replace keys without |
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significant coordination or disruption. |
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|
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o In some cases, when manual keys are configured, some forms of |
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replay protection are no longer possible, allowing the routing |
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protocol to be attacked through the replay of captured routing |
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messages. |
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This document outlines some of the problems with manual keying of |
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these cryptographic algorithms. |
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<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Pre-Image vs. Collision Attacks</span> |
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A pre-image attack (an attempt to find new data with the same hash |
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value) would enable someone to find an input message that causes a |
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hash function to produce a particular output. In contrast, a |
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collision attack finds two messages with the same hash, but the |
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attacker can't pick what the message will be. Feasible collision |
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attacks against MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD have been documented |
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in [<a href="#ref-Crypto2004" title=""Collisions for hash functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD"">Crypto2004</a>]. |
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The ability to produce a collision does not currently introduce any |
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obvious or known attacks on routing protocols. Pre-image attacks |
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have the potential to cause problems in the future; however, due to |
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the message length, there are serious limitations to the feasibility |
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of mounting such an attack. |
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|
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Protocols themselves have some built-in protection against collision |
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attacks. This is because a lot of values for fields in a protocol |
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packet are invalid or will produce an unusable packet. For example, |
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in OSPF the Link State Advertisement (LSA) type can be from 1 to 11. |
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Any other value in the field will result in the packet being |
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discarded. |
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Assume two packets M and M' are generated and have the same hash. |
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The above condition will further reduce the ability to produce a |
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message that is also a correct message from the protocol perspective, |
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as a lot of potential values are themselves not valid. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Concerns about MD5 and the SHA-1 Algorithm</span> |
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There are published concerns about the overall strength of the MD5 |
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algorithm ([<a href="#ref-Dobb96a" title=""Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress"">Dobb96a</a>], [<a href="#ref-Dobb96b" title=""The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack"">Dobb96b</a>], [<a href="#ref-Wang04" title=""Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD"">Wang04</a>]). While those published |
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concerns apply to the use of MD5 in other modes (e.g., use of MD5 |
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X.509v3/PKIX digital certificates), they are not an attack upon Keyed |
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MD5 and Hash-based Message Authentication Code MD5 (HMAC-MD5), which |
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is what the current routing protocols have specified. There are also |
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published concerns about the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) algorithm |
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([<a href="#ref-Wang05" title=""Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1"">Wang05</a>], [<a href="#ref-Philip01" title=""On Corrective Patterns for the SHA-2 Family"">Philip01</a>], [<a href="#ref-Prav01" title=""Collision Attacks on MD5 and SHA-1: Is this the 'Sword of Domocles' for Electronic Commerce?"">Prav01</a>], [<a href="#ref-Prav02" title=""Some thoughts on Collision Attacks in the Hash Functions Md5, SHA-0 and SHA-1"">Prav02</a>], [<a href="#ref-Arjen05" title=""Further progress in Hashing cryptanalysis"">Arjen05</a>]) and also |
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concerns about the MD5 and SHA algorithms in the HMAC [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>] mode |
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([<a href="#ref-RR07" title=""On Authentication with HMAC and Non-random Properties"">RR07</a>], [<a href="#ref-RR08" title=""New Results on NMAC/HMAC when Instantiated with Popular Hash Functions"">RR08</a>]). The National Institute of Standards and Technology |
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(NIST) will be supporting HMAC-SHA-1 even after 2010 [<a href="#ref-NISTHmacSHA" title=""NIST's Policy on Hash Functions"">NISTHmacSHA</a>], |
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whereas it will drop support for SHA-1 in digital signatures. NIST |
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also recommends application and protocol designers move to the SHA-2 |
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family of hash functions (i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and |
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SHA-512) for all new applications and protocols. |
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<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
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However, as explained above, such attacks are currently not |
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applicable to the routing protocols. Separately, some organizations |
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(e.g., the US government) prefer NIST algorithms, such as the SHA |
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family, over other algorithms (like MD5) for local policy reasons. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPFv2)</span> |
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OSPF [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>] describes the use of an MD5 digest with OSPF packets. |
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MD5 keys are manually configured. The OSPF packet header includes an |
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authentication type field as well as 64 bits of data for use by the |
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appropriate authentication scheme. OSPF also provides for a non- |
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decreasing sequence number to be included in each OSPF protocol |
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packet to protect against replay attacks. |
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"OSPF with Digital Signatures" [<a href="./rfc2154" title=""OSPF with Digital Signatures"">RFC2154</a>] is an Experimental RFC that |
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describes extensions to OSPF to digitally sign its Link State |
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Advertisements (LSAs). It is believed that if stronger |
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authentication and security is required, then OSPF (and the other |
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routing protocols) must migrate to using full digital signatures. |
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Doing this would enable precise authentication of the OSPF router |
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originating each OSPF link-state advertisement, and thereby provide |
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much stronger integrity protection for the OSPF routing domain. |
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However, since there have been no deployments, there is precious |
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little operational experience with this specification, and hence it |
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is not covered in this document. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv2</span> |
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According to the OSPF specification [<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>], digests are applied to |
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packets transmitted between adjacent neighbors, rather than being |
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applied to the routing information originated by a router (digests |
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are not applied at the LSA level, but rather at the packet level). |
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[<a href="./rfc2328" title=""OSPF Version 2"">RFC2328</a>] states that any set of OSPF routers adjacent across a |
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single link may use a different key to build MD5 digests than the key |
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used to build MD5 digests on any other link. Thus, MD5 keys may be |
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configured, and changed, on a per-link basis in an OSPF network. |
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OSPF does not specify a mechanism to negotiate keys, nor does it |
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specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be used. |
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With the proliferation of the number of hash algorithms, as well as |
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the need to continuously upgrade the algorithms, manually configuring |
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the information becomes very tedious. It should also be noted that |
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rekeying OSPF requires coordination among the adjacent routers. |
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<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv2</span> |
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While OSPF provides relatively strong protection through the |
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inclusion of MD5 digests, with additional data and sequence numbers |
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in transmitted packets, there are still attacks against OSPF: |
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o The sequence number is initialized to zero when forming an |
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adjacency with a newly discovered neighbor. When an adjacency is |
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brought down, the sequence number is also set to zero. If the |
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cryptographically protected packets of a router that is brought |
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down (for administrative or other reasons) are replayed by a |
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malicious router, traffic could be forced through the malicious |
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router. A malicious router might then induce routing loops, or |
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intercept or blackhole the traffic. |
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o OSPF allows multiple packets with the same sequence number. This |
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means that it's possible to replay the same packet many times |
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before the next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker may resend |
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the same packet repeatedly until the next Hello packet is |
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transmitted and received. The Hello interval, which is unknown, |
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determines the attack window. |
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o OSPF does not require the use of any particular hash algorithm; |
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however, only the use of MD5 digests for authentication and replay |
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protection is specified in <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>. Most OSPF implementations |
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only support MD5 in addition to Null and Simple Password |
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authentication. |
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Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the |
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MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="./rfc4270" title=""Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"">RFC4270</a>] |
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summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the |
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use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to |
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the use of MD5 in routing protocols, it is prudent to have other |
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options available. For this reason, the general use of these |
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algorithms should be discouraged, and [<a href="./rfc5709" title=""OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5709</a>] adds support for |
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using SHA-1 and SHA-2 with the HMAC construct for OSPF. |
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o OSPF on a broadcast network shares the same key between all |
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neighbors on that broadcast network. Some OSPF packets are sent |
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to a multicast address. |
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Spoofing by any malicious neighbor possessing credentials or |
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replayable packets is therefore very easy. Possession of the key |
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itself is used as an identity validation, and no other identity |
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check is used. A malicious neighbor could send a packet, forging |
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the identity of the sender as being from another neighbor. There |
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would be no way in which the victim could distinguish the identity |
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of the packet sender. |
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<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
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o In some OSPF implementations, neighbors on broadcast, non- |
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broadcast multi-access (NBMA), and point-to-multipoint networks |
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are identified by the IP address in the IP header. The IP header |
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is not covered by the MAC in the cryptographic authentication |
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scheme as described in <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>, and an attack can be made to |
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exploit this omission. |
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Assume the following scenario. |
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R1 sends an authenticated HELLO to R2. This HELLO is captured and |
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replayed back to R1. The source IP in the IP header of the |
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replayed packet is changed to that of R2. |
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R1, not finding itself in the HELLO, would deduce that the |
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connection is not bidirectional and would bring down the |
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adjacency. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3)</span> |
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OSPFv3 [<a href="./rfc5340" title=""OSPF for IPv6"">RFC5340</a>] relies on the IP Authentication Header (AH) |
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[<a href="./rfc4302" title=""IP Authentication Header"">RFC4302</a>] and the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>] |
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to cryptographically sign routing information passed between routers. |
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When using ESP, the null encryption algorithm [<a href="./rfc2410" title=""The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec"">RFC2410</a>] is used, so |
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the data carried in the OSPFv3 packets is signed, but not encrypted. |
| 362 |
This provides data origin authentication for adjacent routers, and |
| 363 |
data integrity (which gives the assurance that the data transmitted |
| 364 |
by a router has not changed in transit). However, it does not |
| 365 |
provide confidentiality of the information transmitted; this is |
| 366 |
acceptable because the privacy of the information being carried in |
| 367 |
the routing protocols need not be kept secret. |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
"Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3" [<a href="./rfc4552" title=""Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3"">RFC4552</a>] mandates the |
| 370 |
use of ESP with null encryption for authentication and also does |
| 371 |
encourage the use of confidentiality to protect the privacy of the |
| 372 |
routing information transmitted, using ESP encryption. However, it |
| 373 |
only specifies the use of manual keying of routing information as |
| 374 |
discussed in the following section. |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv3</span> |
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
The OSPFv3 security document ("Authentication/Confidentiality for |
| 379 |
OSPFv3" [<a href="./rfc4552" title=""Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3"">RFC4552</a>]) discusses, at length, the reasoning behind using |
| 380 |
manually configured keys, rather than some automated key management |
| 381 |
protocol such as IKEv2 [<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>]. The primary problem is the lack of |
| 382 |
a suitable key management mechanism, as OSPF adjacencies are formed |
| 383 |
on a one-to-many basis and most key management mechanisms are |
| 384 |
designed for a one-to-one communication model. This forces the |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
system administrator to use manually configured security associations |
| 394 |
(SAs) and cryptographic keys to provide the authentication and, if |
| 395 |
desired, confidentiality services. |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
Regarding replay protection, [<a href="./rfc4552" title=""Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3"">RFC4552</a>] states that: |
| 398 |
|
| 399 |
Since it is not possible using the current standards to provide |
| 400 |
complete replay protection while using manual keying, the proposed |
| 401 |
solution will not provide protection against replay attacks. |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
In the OSPFv3 case, the primary administrative issue with manually |
| 404 |
configured SAs and keys is the management issue -- maintaining shared |
| 405 |
sets of keys on all routers within a network. As with OSPFv2, |
| 406 |
rekeying is an infrequent event requiring coordination. [<a href="./rfc4552" title=""Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3"">RFC4552</a>] |
| 407 |
does not require that all OSPFv3 routers have the same key configured |
| 408 |
for every neighbor, so each set of neighbors connected to a given |
| 409 |
link could have a different key configured. While this makes it |
| 410 |
easier to change the keys (by forcing the system administrator to |
| 411 |
only change the keys on the routers on a single link), the process of |
| 412 |
manual configuration for all the routers in a network to change the |
| 413 |
keys used for OSPFv3 digests and confidentiality on a periodic basis |
| 414 |
can be difficult. |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv3</span> |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
The primary technical concern with the current specifications for |
| 419 |
OSPFv3 is that when manual SA and key management is used as specified |
| 420 |
in "Sequence Number Generation", <a href="./rfc4302#section-3.3.2">Section 3.3.2 of [RFC4302]</a>: "The |
| 421 |
sender assumes anti-replay is enabled as a default, unless otherwise |
| 422 |
notified by the receiver (see <a href="#section-3.4.3">Section 3.4.3</a>) or if the SA was |
| 423 |
configured using manual key management". Replaying OSPFv3 packets |
| 424 |
can induce several failures in a network, including: |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
o Replaying Hello packets with an empty neighbor list can cause all |
| 427 |
the neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset, |
| 428 |
disrupting network communications. |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
o Replaying Hello packets from early in the designated router |
| 431 |
election process on broadcast links can cause all the neighbor |
| 432 |
adjacencies with the sending router to be reset, disrupting |
| 433 |
network communications. |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
o Replaying database description (DB-Description) packets can cause |
| 436 |
all FULL neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset, |
| 437 |
disrupting network communications. |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
o Replaying link state request (LS-Request) packets can cause all |
| 450 |
FULL neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset, |
| 451 |
disrupting network communications. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
o Capturing a full adjacency process (from two-way all the way to |
| 454 |
FULL state), and then replaying this process when the router is no |
| 455 |
longer attached can cause a false adjacency to be formed, allowing |
| 456 |
an attacker to attract traffic. |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
o OSPFv3 on a broadcast network shares the same key between all |
| 459 |
neighbors on that network. Some OSPF packets are sent to a |
| 460 |
multicast address. |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
Spoofing by a malicious neighbor is very easy. Possession of the |
| 463 |
key itself is used as an identity check. There is no other |
| 464 |
identity check used. A neighbor could send a packet specifying |
| 465 |
the packet came from some other neighbor and there would be no way |
| 466 |
in which the attacked router could figure out the identity of the |
| 467 |
packet sender. |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing Protocol (IS-IS)</span> |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
Integrated IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title=""Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments"">RFC1195</a>] uses HMAC-MD5 authentication with manual |
| 472 |
keying, as described in [<a href="./rfc5304" title=""IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5304</a>], and has recently been extended to |
| 473 |
provide support for using the HMAC construct along with the SHA |
| 474 |
family of cryptographic hash functions [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>]. There is no |
| 475 |
provision within IS-IS to encrypt the body of a routing protocol |
| 476 |
message. |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Management Issues with IS-IS</span> |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] states that each Link State Protocol Data Unit (LSP) |
| 481 |
generated by an intermediate system is signed with the HMAC-MD5 |
| 482 |
algorithm using a key manually defined by the network administrator. |
| 483 |
Since authentication is performed on the LSPs transmitted by an |
| 484 |
intermediate system, rather than on the packets transmitted to a |
| 485 |
specific neighbor, it is implied that all the intermediate systems |
| 486 |
within a single flooding domain must be configured with the same key |
| 487 |
in order for authentication to work correctly. |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
The initial configuration of manual keys for authentication within an |
| 490 |
IS-IS network is simplified by a state where LSPs containing |
| 491 |
HMAC-MD5/HMAC-SHA authentication TLVs are accepted by intermediate |
| 492 |
systems without the keys, but the digest is not validated. Once keys |
| 493 |
are configured on all routers, changing those keys becomes much more |
| 494 |
difficult. |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title=""Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments"">RFC1195</a>] does not specify a mechanism to negotiate keys, nor |
| 506 |
does it specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be |
| 507 |
used. |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
With the proliferation of available hash algorithms, as well as the |
| 510 |
need to upgrade the algorithms, manual configuration requires |
| 511 |
coordination among intermediate systems, which can become tedious. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Technical Issues with IS-IS</span> |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] states: "This mechanism does not prevent replay attacks; |
| 516 |
however, in most cases, such attacks would trigger existing |
| 517 |
mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol that would effectively reject old |
| 518 |
information". |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
The few cases where existing mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol would |
| 521 |
not effectively reject old information are: |
| 522 |
- the Hello packets or the IS-IS Hellos (IIHs) that are used to |
| 523 |
discover neighbors, and |
| 524 |
- the Sequence Number Packets (SNPs). |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
As described in IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title=""Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments"">RFC1195</a>], a list of known neighbors is |
| 527 |
included in each Hello transmitted by an intermediate system to |
| 528 |
ensure two-way communications with any specific neighbor before |
| 529 |
exchanging link state databases. |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
IS-IS does not provide a sequence number. IS-IS packets are |
| 532 |
vulnerable to replay attacks; any packet can be replayed at any point |
| 533 |
of time. So long as the keys used are the same, protocol elements |
| 534 |
that would not be rejected will affect existing sessions. |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
A Hello packet containing a digest within a TLV and an empty neighbor |
| 537 |
list could be replayed, resulting in all adjacencies with the |
| 538 |
original transmitting intermediate system to be restarted. |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
A replay of an old Complete Sequence Number Packet (CSNP) could cause |
| 541 |
LSPs to be flooded, resulting in an LSP storm. |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
IS-IS specifies the use of the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 to protect |
| 544 |
IS-IS packets. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
IS-IS does not have a notion of Key ID. During key rollover, each |
| 547 |
message received has to be checked for integrity against all keys |
| 548 |
that are valid. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack may be induced by |
| 549 |
sending IS-IS packets with random hashes. This will cause the IS-IS |
| 550 |
packet to be checked for authentication with all possible keys, |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
increasing the amount of processing required. This issue, however, |
| 562 |
has been fixed in the recent [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>], which introduces the concept |
| 563 |
of Key IDs in IS-IS. |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the MD5 |
| 566 |
and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="./rfc4270" title=""Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"">RFC4270</a>] summarizes |
| 567 |
the discoveries. There have been attacks against the use of MD5 as a |
| 568 |
hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to the use of |
| 569 |
HMAC-MD5 in IS-IS, it is prudent to have other options available. |
| 570 |
For this reason, the general use of these algorithms should be |
| 571 |
discouraged, and [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>] adds support for using HMAC-SHA with |
| 572 |
IS-IS. |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
IS-IS on a broadcast network shares the same key between all |
| 575 |
neighbors on that network. |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
This makes spoofing by a malicious neighbor easy since IS-IS packets |
| 578 |
are sent to a link-layer multicast address. Possession of the key |
| 579 |
itself is used as an authorization check. A neighbor could send a |
| 580 |
packet spoofing the identity of a neighbor, and there would be no way |
| 581 |
in which the attacked router could discern the identity of the |
| 582 |
malicious packet sender. |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
The Remaining Lifetime field in the LSP is not covered by the |
| 585 |
authentication. An IS-IS router can receive its own self-generated |
| 586 |
LSP segment with zero lifetime remaining. In that case, if it has a |
| 587 |
copy with non-zero lifetime, it purges that LSP, i.e., it increments |
| 588 |
the current sequence number and floods all the segments again. This |
| 589 |
is much worse in IS-IS than in OSPF because there is only one LSP |
| 590 |
other than the pseudonode LSPs for the LANs on which the IS-IS router |
| 591 |
is the Designated Intermediate System (DIS). |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
In this way, an attacker can force the router to flood all segments |
| 594 |
-- potentially a large number if the number of routes is large. It |
| 595 |
also causes the sequence number of all the LSPs to increase fast. If |
| 596 |
the sequence number increases to the maximum (0xFFFFFFFF), the IS-IS |
| 597 |
process must shut down for around 20 minutes (the product of MaxAge + |
| 598 |
ZeroAgeLifetime) to allow the old LSPs to age out of all the router |
| 599 |
databases. |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)</span> |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
BGP-4 [<a href="./rfc4271" title=""A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)"">RFC4271</a>] uses TCP [<a href="./rfc0793" title=""Transmission Control Protocol"">RFC0793</a>] for transporting routing |
| 604 |
information between BGP speakers that have formed an adjacency. |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2385">RFC2385</a>] describes the use of the TCP MD5 digest option for |
| 607 |
providing packet origin authentication and data integrity protection |
| 608 |
of BGP packets. [<a href="./rfc3562" title=""Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5 Signature Option"">RFC3562</a>] provides suggestions for choosing the key |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
length of the ad hoc Keyed MD5 mechanism specified in [<a href="./rfc2385" title=""Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option"">RFC2385</a>]. |
| 618 |
There is no provision for confidentiality for any of these BGP |
| 619 |
messages. |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
TCP MD5 [<a href="./rfc2385" title=""Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option"">RFC2385</a>] has recently been obsoleted by a new TCP |
| 622 |
Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [<a href="./rfc5925" title=""The TCP Authentication Option"">RFC5925</a>]. [<a href="./rfc5925" title=""The TCP Authentication Option"">RFC5925</a>] specifies the |
| 623 |
use of stronger Message Authentication Codes (MACs), protects against |
| 624 |
replays even for long-lived TCP connections, and provides more |
| 625 |
details than TCP-MD5 on the association of security with TCP |
| 626 |
connections. It allows rekeying during a TCP connection, assuming |
| 627 |
that an out-of-band protocol or manual mechanism provides the new |
| 628 |
keys. Note that TCP MD5 does not preclude rekeying during a |
| 629 |
connection, but does not require its support either. Further, TCP-AO |
| 630 |
supports key changes with zero segment loss, whereas key changes in |
| 631 |
TCP MD5 can lose segments in transit during the changeover or require |
| 632 |
trying multiple keys on each received segment during key use overlap |
| 633 |
because TCP MD5 lacks an explicit Key ID. Although TCP recovers lost |
| 634 |
segments through retransmission, loss can have a substantial impact |
| 635 |
on performance. |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
However, this document covers only TCP MD5, as all current |
| 638 |
deployments are still using BGP with TCP MD5 and have not upgraded to |
| 639 |
[<a href="./rfc5925" title=""The TCP Authentication Option"">RFC5925</a>]. There isn't enough operational experience present to |
| 640 |
evaluate the technical and management issues with this proposal yet. |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
Compared to previously described IGP protocols, BGP has additional |
| 643 |
exposure due to the nature of the environment where it is typically |
| 644 |
used -- namely, between autonomous networks (under different |
| 645 |
administrative control). While routers running interior gateway |
| 646 |
protocols may all be configured with the same administrative |
| 647 |
authority, two BGP peers may be in different administrative domains, |
| 648 |
having different policies for key strength, rollover frequency, etc. |
| 649 |
An autonomous system must often support a large number of keys at |
| 650 |
different BGP boundaries, as each connecting AS represents a |
| 651 |
different administrative entity. In practice, once set, shared |
| 652 |
secrets between BGP peers are rarely, if ever, changed. |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Management Issues with BGP-4</span> |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
Each pair of BGP speakers forming a peering may have a different MD5 |
| 657 |
shared key that facilitates the independent configuration and |
| 658 |
changing of keys across a large-scale network. Manual configuration |
| 659 |
and maintenance of cryptographic keys across all BGP sessions is a |
| 660 |
challenge in any large-scale environment. |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
Most BGP implementations will accept BGP packets with a bad digest up |
| 663 |
to the hold interval negotiated between BGP peers at peering startup, |
| 664 |
in order to allow for MD5 keys to be changed with minimal impact on |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
operation of the network. This technique does, however, allow some |
| 674 |
short period of time during which an attacker may inject BGP packets |
| 675 |
with false MD5 digests into the network and can expect those packets |
| 676 |
to be accepted, even though the MD5 digests are not valid. |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Technical Issues with BGP-4</span> |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
BGP relies on TCP [<a href="./rfc0793" title=""Transmission Control Protocol"">RFC0793</a>] for transporting data between BGP |
| 681 |
speakers. BGP can rely on TCP's protection against data corruption |
| 682 |
and replay to preclude replay attacks against BGP sessions. A great |
| 683 |
deal of research has gone into the feasibility of an attacker |
| 684 |
overcoming these protections, including [<a href="#ref-TcpWindow" title=""Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks"">TcpWindow</a>] and [<a href="#ref-Conv01" title=""BGP Vulnerability Testing: Separating Fact from FUD v1.00"">Conv01</a>]. |
| 685 |
Most router and operating system (OS) vendors have modified their TCP |
| 686 |
implementations to resolve the security vulnerabilities described in |
| 687 |
these references, where possible. |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
As mentioned earlier, MD5 is vulnerable to collision attacks and can |
| 690 |
be attacked through several means, such as those explored in |
| 691 |
[<a href="#ref-Wang04" title=""Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD"">Wang04</a>]. |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
Though it can be argued that the collision attacks do not have a |
| 694 |
practical application in this scenario, the use of MD5 should be |
| 695 |
discouraged. |
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
Routers performing cryptographic processing of packets in software |
| 698 |
may be exposed to additional opportunities for DoS attacks. An |
| 699 |
attacker may be able to transmit enough spoofed traffic with false |
| 700 |
digests that the router's processor and memory resources are |
| 701 |
consumed, causing the router to be unable to perform normal |
| 702 |
processing. This exposure is particularly problematic between |
| 703 |
routers not under unified administrative control. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP)</span> |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
The initial version of RIP was specified in STD 34 [<a href="./rfc1058" title=""Routing Information Protocol"">RFC1058</a>]. This |
| 708 |
version did not provide for any authentication or authorization of |
| 709 |
routing data, and thus was vulnerable to any of a number of attacks |
| 710 |
against routing protocols. This limitation was one reason why this |
| 711 |
protocol was moved to Historic status [<a href="./rfc1923" title=""RIPv1 Applicability Statement for Historic Status"">RFC1923</a>]. |
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
RIPv2, originally specified in [<a href="./rfc1388" title=""RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional Information"">RFC1388</a>], then [<a href="./rfc1723" title=""RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional Information"">RFC1723</a>], was |
| 714 |
finalized in STD 56 [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>]. This version of the protocol provides |
| 715 |
for authenticating packets with a digest. The details thereof have |
| 716 |
initially been provided in "RIP-2 MD5 Authentication" [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>]; |
| 717 |
"RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>] obsoletes [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>] |
| 718 |
and adds details of how the SHA family of hash algorithms can be used |
| 719 |
to protect RIPv2. [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>] only specified the use of Keyed MD5. |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Technical Issues with RIP</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
o The sequence number used by a router is initialized to zero at |
| 732 |
startup, and is also set to zero whenever the neighbor is brought |
| 733 |
down. If the cryptographically protected packets of a router that |
| 734 |
is brought down (for administrative or other reasons) are stored |
| 735 |
by a malicious router, the new router could replay the packets |
| 736 |
from the previous session, thus forcing traffic through the |
| 737 |
malicious router. Dropping of such packets by the router could |
| 738 |
result in blackholes. Also, forwarding wrong packets could result |
| 739 |
in routing loops. |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
o RIPv2 allows multiple packets with the same sequence number. This |
| 742 |
could mean the same packet may be replayed many times before the |
| 743 |
next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker may resend the same |
| 744 |
packet repeatedly until the next Hello packet is transmitted and |
| 745 |
received, which means the Hello interval therefore determines the |
| 746 |
attack window. |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
o RIPv2 [<a href="./rfc2453" title=""RIP Version 2"">RFC2453</a>] did not specify the use of any particular hash |
| 749 |
algorithm. <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a> introduced HMAC-SHA1 as mandatory to |
| 750 |
implement, along with Keyed MD5 as specified in [<a href="./rfc2082" title=""RIP-2 MD5 Authentication"">RFC2082</a>]. |
| 751 |
Support for Keyed MD5 was mandated to ensure compatability with |
| 752 |
legacy implementations. |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
o "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>] does not cover the |
| 755 |
UDP and the IP headers. It is therefore possible for an attacker |
| 756 |
to modify some fields in the above headers without routers |
| 757 |
becoming aware of it. |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
There is limited exposure to modification of the UDP header, as |
| 760 |
the RIP protocol uses only it to compute the length of the RIP |
| 761 |
packet. Changes introduced in the UDP header would cause RIP |
| 762 |
authentication to fail the RIP authentication, thereby limiting |
| 763 |
exposure. |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
RIP uses the source IP address from the IP header to determine |
| 766 |
which RIP neighbor it has learnt the RIP Update from. Changing |
| 767 |
the source IP address can be used by an attacker to disrupt the |
| 768 |
RIP routing sessions between two routers R1 and R2, as shown in |
| 769 |
the following examples. |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
Scenario 1: |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
R1 sends an authenticated RIP message to R2 with a cryptographic |
| 774 |
sequence number X. |
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
The attacker then needs a packet with a higher sequence number |
| 786 |
originated by R2 either, from this session or from some earlier |
| 787 |
session. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
The attacker can then replay this packet to R2 by changing the |
| 790 |
source IP to that of R1. |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
R2 would then no longer accept any more RIP Updates from R1, as |
| 793 |
those would have a lower cryptographic sequence number. After 180 |
| 794 |
seconds (or less), R2 would consider R1 timed out and bring down |
| 795 |
the RIP session. |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
Scenario 2: |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
R1 announces a route with cost C1 to R2. This packet can be |
| 800 |
captured by an attacker. Later, if this cost changes and R1 |
| 801 |
announces this with a different cost C2, the attacker can replay |
| 802 |
the captured packet, modifying the source IP to a new arbitrary IP |
| 803 |
address, thereby masquerading as a different router. |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
R2 will accept this route and the router as a new gateway, and R2 |
| 806 |
would then use the non-existent router as a next hop for that |
| 807 |
network. This would only be effective if the cost C1 is less than |
| 808 |
C2. |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)</span> |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
BFD is specified in [<a href="./rfc5880" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"">RFC5880</a>]. Extensions to BFD for multihop |
| 813 |
[<a href="./rfc5883" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths"">RFC5883</a>] and single hop [<a href="./rfc5881" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)"">RFC5881</a>] are defined for IPv4 and IPv6. It |
| 814 |
is designed to detect failure with the forwarding plane next hop. |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
The BFD base specification specifies an optional authentication |
| 817 |
mechanism that can be used by the receiver of a packet to be able to |
| 818 |
authenticate the source of the packet. It relies on the facts that |
| 819 |
the keys are shared between the peers and no mechanism is defined for |
| 820 |
the actual key generation. |
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Technical Issues with BFD</span> |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
o The level of security provided is based on the Authentication Type |
| 825 |
used. However, the authentication algorithms defined are MD5 or |
| 826 |
SHA-1 based. As mentioned earlier, MD5 and SHA-1 are both known |
| 827 |
to be vulnerable to collision attacks. |
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
o The BFD specification mentions mechanisms to allow for the change |
| 830 |
of authentication state based on the state of a received packet. |
| 831 |
This can cause a denial-of-service attack where a malicious |
| 832 |
authenticated packet (stored from a past session) can be relayed |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
over a session that does not use authentication. This causes one |
| 842 |
end to assume that authentication is enabled at the other end, and |
| 843 |
hence the BFD adjacency is dropped. This would be a harder attack |
| 844 |
to put forth when meticulously keyed authentication is in use. |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
o BFD works on microsecond timers. When malicious packets are sent |
| 847 |
at short intervals, with the authentication bit set, it can cause |
| 848 |
a DoS attack. |
| 849 |
|
| 850 |
o BFD allows a mode called the echo mode. Echo packets are not |
| 851 |
defined in the BFD specification, though they can keep the BFD |
| 852 |
session up. There are no guidelines on the properties of the echo |
| 853 |
packets beyond the choice of the source and destination addresses. |
| 854 |
While the BFD specification recommends applying security |
| 855 |
mechanisms to prevent spoofing of these packets, there are no |
| 856 |
guidelines on what type of mechanisms are appropriate. |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
Any security issues in the echo mode will directly affect the BFD |
| 859 |
protocol and session states, and hence the network stability. The |
| 860 |
potential effects and remedies as understood today are somewhat |
| 861 |
limited, however. For instance, any replay attacks would be |
| 862 |
indistinguishable from normal forwarding of the tested router. An |
| 863 |
attack would still cause a faulty link to be believed to be up, |
| 864 |
but there is little that can be done about it. However, if the |
| 865 |
echo packets are guessable, it may be possible to spoof from an |
| 866 |
external source and cause BFD to believe that a one-way link is |
| 867 |
really bidirectional. As a result, it is important that the echo |
| 868 |
packets contain random material that is also checked upon |
| 869 |
reception. |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
o BFD packets can be sent at millisecond intervals (the protocol |
| 872 |
uses timers at microsecond intervals). When using authentication, |
| 873 |
this can cause frequent sequence number wrap-around as a 32-bit |
| 874 |
sequence number is used, thus considerably reducing the security |
| 875 |
of the authentication algorithms. |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
o Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the |
| 878 |
MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="./rfc4270" title=""Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols"">RFC4270</a>] |
| 879 |
summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the |
| 880 |
use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to |
| 881 |
the use of HMAC-MD5 and keyed SHA-1 in BFD, it is prudent to have |
| 882 |
other options available. Such attacks do not mean that BFD using |
| 883 |
SHA-1 for authentication is at risk. However, it does mean that |
| 884 |
SHA-1 should be replaced as soon as possible and should not be |
| 885 |
used for new applications. |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
It should be noted that if SHA-1 is used in the Hashed Message |
| 898 |
Authentication Code (HMAC) [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>] construction, then collision |
| 899 |
attacks currently known against SHA-1 do not apply. The new |
| 900 |
attacks on SHA-1 have no impact on the security of HMAC-SHA-1. |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
There are already proposals [<a href="#ref-GenBFDAuth" title=""BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">GenBFDAuth</a>] that add support for HMAC |
| 903 |
with the SHA-1 and SHA-2 family of hash functions for BFD. |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
This document outlines security issues arising from the current |
| 908 |
methodology for manual keying of various routing protocols. No |
| 909 |
specific changes to routing protocols are proposed in this document; |
| 910 |
likewise, no new security requirements result. |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
We would like to acknowledge Sam Hartman, Ran Atkinson, Stephen Kent |
| 915 |
and Brian Weis for their initial comments on this document. Thanks |
| 916 |
to Merike Kaeo and Alfred Hoenes for reviewing many sections of the |
| 917 |
document and providing lot of useful comments. |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. References</span> |
| 920 |
|
| 921 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
[<a id="ref-RFC0793">RFC0793</a>] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7, |
| 924 |
<a href="./rfc793">RFC 793</a>, September 1981. |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1195">RFC1195</a>] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP |
| 927 |
and dual environments", <a href="./rfc1195">RFC 1195</a>, December 1990. |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2328">RFC2328</a>] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>, April |
| 930 |
1998. |
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2385">RFC2385</a>] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the |
| 933 |
TCP MD5 Signature Option", <a href="./rfc2385">RFC 2385</a>, August 1998. |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2453">RFC2453</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, <a href="./rfc2453">RFC 2453</a>, |
| 936 |
November 1998. |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4271">RFC4271</a>] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A |
| 939 |
Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", <a href="./rfc4271">RFC 4271</a>, January |
| 940 |
2006. |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>, |
| 943 |
December 2005. Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", |
| 954 |
<a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005. |
| 955 |
|
| 956 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4552">RFC4552</a>] Gupta, M. and N. Melam, |
| 957 |
"Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3", <a href="./rfc4552">RFC</a> |
| 958 |
<a href="./rfc4552">4552</a>, June 2006. |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4822">RFC4822</a>] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic |
| 961 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a>, February 2007. |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5340">RFC5340</a>] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem, |
| 964 |
"OSPF for IPv6", <a href="./rfc5340">RFC 5340</a>, July 2008. |
| 965 |
|
| 966 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] Li, T. and R. Atkinson, "IS-IS Cryptographic |
| 967 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5304">RFC 5304</a>, October 2008. |
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5310">RFC5310</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, |
| 970 |
R., and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic |
| 971 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5310">RFC 5310</a>, February 2009. |
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.2" href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
[<a id="ref-Arjen05">Arjen05</a>] Arjen K. Lenstra, "Further progress in Hashing |
| 976 |
cryptanalysis", Lucent Bell Laboratories, February |
| 977 |
26, 2005. |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
[<a id="ref-Conv01">Conv01</a>] Convery, et al., "BGP Vulnerability Testing: |
| 980 |
Separating Fact from FUD v1.00", NANOG 28, pp. 1-61, |
| 981 |
June 2003. |
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
[<a id="ref-Crypto2004">Crypto2004</a>] Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, and Hongbo |
| 984 |
Yu, "Collisions for hash functions MD4, MD5, |
| 985 |
HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD", Crypto 2004 Rump Session. |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
[<a id="ref-Dobb96a">Dobb96a</a>] Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress", |
| 988 |
Technical Report, 2 May 1996. (Presented at the Rump |
| 989 |
Session of EuroCrypt 1996.) |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
[<a id="ref-Dobb96b">Dobb96b</a>] Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent |
| 992 |
Attack", CryptoBytes, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1996. |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
[<a id="ref-GenBFDAuth">GenBFDAuth</a>] Bhatia, M. and V. Manral, "BFD Generic Cryptographic |
| 995 |
Authentication", Work in Progress, June 2010. |
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
[<a id="ref-NISTHmacSHA">NISTHmacSHA</a>] "NIST's Policy on Hash Functions", 2006, |
| 998 |
<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html">http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html</a>. |
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
[<a id="ref-Philip01">Philip01</a>] Philip Hawkes, Michael Paddon, and Gregory G. Rose, |
| 1010 |
"On Corrective Patterns for the SHA-2 Family", IACR |
| 1011 |
ePrint Archive, 2004, |
| 1012 |
<a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207</a>. |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
[<a id="ref-Prav01">Prav01</a>] Praveen Gauravaram, et al., "Collision Attacks on MD5 |
| 1015 |
and SHA-1: Is this the 'Sword of Domocles' for |
| 1016 |
Electronic Commerce?", Information Security Institue |
| 1017 |
(ISI), Queensland University of Technology (QUT), |
| 1018 |
Australia. |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
[<a id="ref-Prav02">Prav02</a>] Praveen Gauravaram, et al., "Some thoughts on |
| 1021 |
Collision Attacks in the Hash Functions Md5, SHA-0 |
| 1022 |
and SHA-1", Information Security Institue (ISI), |
| 1023 |
Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Australia. |
| 1024 |
|
| 1025 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1058">RFC1058</a>] Hedrick, C., "Routing Information Protocol", <a href="./rfc1058">RFC</a> |
| 1026 |
<a href="./rfc1058">1058</a>, June 1988. |
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1321">RFC1321</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC</a> |
| 1029 |
<a href="./rfc1321">1321</a>, April 1992. |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1388">RFC1388</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional |
| 1032 |
Information", <a href="./rfc1388">RFC 1388</a>, January 1993. |
| 1033 |
|
| 1034 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1723">RFC1723</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional |
| 1035 |
Information", <a href="./rfc1723">RFC 1723</a>, November 1994. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1923">RFC1923</a>] Halpern, J. and S. Bradner, "RIPv1 Applicability |
| 1038 |
Statement for Historic Status", <a href="./rfc1923">RFC 1923</a>, March 1996. |
| 1039 |
|
| 1040 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2082">RFC2082</a>] Baker, F. and R. Atkinson, "RIP-2 MD5 |
| 1041 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a>, January 1997. |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2104">RFC2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: |
| 1044 |
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, |
| 1045 |
February 1997. |
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2154">RFC2154</a>] Murphy, S., Badger, M., and B. Wellington, "OSPF with |
| 1048 |
Digital Signatures", <a href="./rfc2154">RFC 2154</a>, June 1997. |
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2410">RFC2410</a>] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm |
| 1051 |
and Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc2410">RFC 2410</a>, November 1998. |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3562">RFC3562</a>] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP |
| 1054 |
MD5 Signature Option", <a href="./rfc3562">RFC 3562</a>, July 2003. |
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4270">RFC4270</a>] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on |
| 1066 |
Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols", <a href="./rfc4270">RFC</a> |
| 1067 |
<a href="./rfc4270">4270</a>, November 2005. |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4306">RFC4306</a>] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) |
| 1070 |
Protocol", <a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005. |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5709">RFC5709</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, |
| 1073 |
M., Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA |
| 1074 |
Cryptographic Authentication", <a href="./rfc5709">RFC 5709</a>, October |
| 1075 |
2009. |
| 1076 |
|
| 1077 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5880">RFC5880</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding |
| 1078 |
Detection (BFD)", <a href="./rfc5880">RFC 5880</a>, June 2010. |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5881">RFC5881</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding |
| 1081 |
Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", <a href="./rfc5881">RFC</a> |
| 1082 |
<a href="./rfc5881">5881</a>, June 2010. |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5883">RFC5883</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding |
| 1085 |
Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths", <a href="./rfc5883">RFC 5883</a>, June |
| 1086 |
2010. |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5925">RFC5925</a>] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP |
| 1089 |
Authentication Option", <a href="./rfc5925">RFC 5925</a>, June 2010. |
| 1090 |
|
| 1091 |
[<a id="ref-RR07">RR07</a>] Rechberger, C. and V. Rijmen, "On Authentication with |
| 1092 |
HMAC and Non-random Properties", Financial |
| 1093 |
Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in |
| 1094 |
Computer Science, Volume 4886/2008, Springer-Verlag, |
| 1095 |
Berlin, December 2007. |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
[<a id="ref-RR08">RR08</a>] Rechberger, C. and V. Rijmen, "New Results on |
| 1098 |
NMAC/HMAC when Instantiated with Popular Hash |
| 1099 |
Functions", Journal of Universal Computer Science, |
| 1100 |
Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 347-376, 1 February 2008. |
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
[<a id="ref-TcpWindow">TcpWindow</a>] Watson, P., "Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset |
| 1103 |
attacks", Presentation at 2004 CanSecWest, |
| 1104 |
<a href="http://cansecwest.com/csw04archive.html">http://cansecwest.com/csw04archive.html</a>. |
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
[<a id="ref-Wang04">Wang04</a>] Wang, X., et al., "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, |
| 1107 |
MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD", August 2004, IACR ePrint |
| 1108 |
Archive, <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199</a>. |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
[<a id="ref-Wang05">Wang05</a>] Wang, X., et al., "Finding Collisions in the Full |
| 1122 |
SHA-1", Proceedings of Crypto 2005, Lecture Notes in |
| 1123 |
Computer Science, Volume 3621, pp. 17-36, Springer- |
| 1124 |
Verlag, Berlin, August 31, 2005. |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Contributor's Address</span> |
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
Sue Hares |
| 1129 |
NextHop |
| 1130 |
USA |
| 1131 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1134 |
|
| 1135 |
Vishwas Manral |
| 1136 |
IP Infusion, Inc. |
| 1137 |
1188 E. Arques Ave. |
| 1138 |
Sunnyvale, CA 94085 |
| 1139 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
Manav Bhatia |
| 1142 |
Alcatel-Lucent |
| 1143 |
Bangalore |
| 1144 |
India |
| 1145 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 |
Joel P. Jaeggli |
| 1148 |
Nokia Inc. |
| 1149 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
Russ White |
| 1152 |
Cisco Systems |
| 1153 |
RTP North Carolina |
| 1154 |
USA |
| 1155 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
|
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
|
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
Manral, et al. Informational [Page 21] |
| 1173 |
</pre> |