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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) V. Manral
2 Request for Comments: 6039 IP Infusion
3 Category: Informational M. Bhatia
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Alcatel-Lucent
5 J. Jaeggli
6 Nokia Inc.
7 R. White
8 Cisco Systems
9 October 2010
10
11
12 <span class="h1">Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods</span>
13 <span class="h1">for Routing Protocols</span>
14
15 Abstract
16
17 Routing protocols have been extended over time to use cryptographic
18 mechanisms to ensure that data received from a neighboring router has
19 not been modified in transit and actually originated from an
20 authorized neighboring router.
21
22 The cryptographic mechanisms defined to date and described in this
23 document rely on a digest produced with a hash algorithm applied to
24 the payload encapsulated in the routing protocol packet.
25
26 This document outlines some of the limitations of the current
27 mechanism, problems with manual keying of these cryptographic
28 algorithms, and possible vectors for the exploitation of these
29 limitations.
30
31 Status of This Memo
32
33 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
34 published for informational purposes.
35
36 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
37 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
38 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
39 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
40 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
41 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
42
43 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
44 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
45 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039</a>.
46
47
48
49
50
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52 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Problem Statement ...............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Pre-Image vs. Collision Attacks ............................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
76 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Concerns about MD5 and the SHA-1 Algorithm .................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPFv2) .....................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv2 ..............................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
79 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv2 ...............................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
80 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3) .....................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv3 ..............................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
82 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv3 ...............................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
83 4. Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing
84 Protocol (IS-IS) ................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
85 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Management Issues with IS-IS ...............................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
86 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Technical Issues with IS-IS ...............................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
87 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4) ................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
88 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Management Issues with BGP-4 ..............................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
89 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Technical Issues with BGP-4 ...............................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
90 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP) .........................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
91 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Technical Issues with RIP .................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
92 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) .......................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
93 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Technical Issues with BFD .................................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
94 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
95 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
96 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
97 <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
98 <a href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
99 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Contributor's Address .........................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
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110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Problem Statement</span>
114
115 Protocols, such as OSPF version 2 [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>], version 3 [<a href="./rfc5340" title="&quot;OSPF for IPv6&quot;">RFC5340</a>],
116 IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>], BGP-4 [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>], and BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)&quot;">RFC5880</a>], employ various
117 mechanisms to create a cryptographic digest of each transmitted
118 protocol packet. Traditionally, these digests are the results of a
119 one-way hash algorithm, such as Message Digest 5 (MD5) [<a href="./rfc1321" title="&quot;The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm&quot;">RFC1321</a>],
120 across the contents of the packet being transmitted. A secret key is
121 used as the hash base (or seed). The digest is then recomputed by
122 the receiving router, using the same key as the original router used
123 to create the hash, then compared with the transmitted digest to
124 verify:
125
126 o That the router originating this packet is authorized via the
127 shared key mechanism to peer with the local router and exchange
128 routing data. The implicit trust of the routing protocol exchange
129 protected by a shared secret is intended to protect against the
130 injection of falsely generated routing data into the routing
131 system by unauthorized systems.
132
133 o That the data has not been altered in transit between the two
134 neighboring routers.
135
136 Digest verification schemes are not intended to protect the
137 confidentiality of information being exchanged between routers. The
138 information (entries in the routing table) is potentially available
139 through other mechanisms. Moreover, access to the physical media
140 between two routers exchanging routing data will confer the ability
141 to capture or otherwise discover the contents of the routing tables
142 in those routers.
143
144 Authentication mechanisms defined today have notable limitations:
145
146 o Manual configuration of shared secret keys, especially in large
147 networks and between networks, poses a major management problem.
148 In many cases, it is challenging to replace keys without
149 significant coordination or disruption.
150
151 o In some cases, when manual keys are configured, some forms of
152 replay protection are no longer possible, allowing the routing
153 protocol to be attacked through the replay of captured routing
154 messages.
155
156 This document outlines some of the problems with manual keying of
157 these cryptographic algorithms.
158
159
160
161
162
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166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
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168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Pre-Image vs. Collision Attacks</span>
170
171 A pre-image attack (an attempt to find new data with the same hash
172 value) would enable someone to find an input message that causes a
173 hash function to produce a particular output. In contrast, a
174 collision attack finds two messages with the same hash, but the
175 attacker can't pick what the message will be. Feasible collision
176 attacks against MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD have been documented
177 in [<a href="#ref-Crypto2004" title="&quot;Collisions for hash functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD&quot;">Crypto2004</a>].
178
179 The ability to produce a collision does not currently introduce any
180 obvious or known attacks on routing protocols. Pre-image attacks
181 have the potential to cause problems in the future; however, due to
182 the message length, there are serious limitations to the feasibility
183 of mounting such an attack.
184
185 Protocols themselves have some built-in protection against collision
186 attacks. This is because a lot of values for fields in a protocol
187 packet are invalid or will produce an unusable packet. For example,
188 in OSPF the Link State Advertisement (LSA) type can be from 1 to 11.
189 Any other value in the field will result in the packet being
190 discarded.
191
192 Assume two packets M and M' are generated and have the same hash.
193 The above condition will further reduce the ability to produce a
194 message that is also a correct message from the protocol perspective,
195 as a lot of potential values are themselves not valid.
196
197 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Concerns about MD5 and the SHA-1 Algorithm</span>
198
199 There are published concerns about the overall strength of the MD5
200 algorithm ([<a href="#ref-Dobb96a" title="&quot;Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress&quot;">Dobb96a</a>], [<a href="#ref-Dobb96b" title="&quot;The Status of MD5 After a Recent Attack&quot;">Dobb96b</a>], [<a href="#ref-Wang04" title="&quot;Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD&quot;">Wang04</a>]). While those published
201 concerns apply to the use of MD5 in other modes (e.g., use of MD5
202 X.509v3/PKIX digital certificates), they are not an attack upon Keyed
203 MD5 and Hash-based Message Authentication Code MD5 (HMAC-MD5), which
204 is what the current routing protocols have specified. There are also
205 published concerns about the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) algorithm
206 ([<a href="#ref-Wang05" title="&quot;Finding Collisions in the Full SHA-1&quot;">Wang05</a>], [<a href="#ref-Philip01" title="&quot;On Corrective Patterns for the SHA-2 Family&quot;">Philip01</a>], [<a href="#ref-Prav01" title="&quot;Collision Attacks on MD5 and SHA-1: Is this the 'Sword of Domocles' for Electronic Commerce?&quot;">Prav01</a>], [<a href="#ref-Prav02" title="&quot;Some thoughts on Collision Attacks in the Hash Functions Md5, SHA-0 and SHA-1&quot;">Prav02</a>], [<a href="#ref-Arjen05" title="&quot;Further progress in Hashing cryptanalysis&quot;">Arjen05</a>]) and also
207 concerns about the MD5 and SHA algorithms in the HMAC [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC2104</a>] mode
208 ([<a href="#ref-RR07" title="&quot;On Authentication with HMAC and Non-random Properties&quot;">RR07</a>], [<a href="#ref-RR08" title="&quot;New Results on NMAC/HMAC when Instantiated with Popular Hash Functions&quot;">RR08</a>]). The National Institute of Standards and Technology
209 (NIST) will be supporting HMAC-SHA-1 even after 2010 [<a href="#ref-NISTHmacSHA" title="&quot;NIST's Policy on Hash Functions&quot;">NISTHmacSHA</a>],
210 whereas it will drop support for SHA-1 in digital signatures. NIST
211 also recommends application and protocol designers move to the SHA-2
212 family of hash functions (i.e., SHA-224, SHA-256, SHA-384 and
213 SHA-512) for all new applications and protocols.
214
215
216
217
218
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224
225 However, as explained above, such attacks are currently not
226 applicable to the routing protocols. Separately, some organizations
227 (e.g., the US government) prefer NIST algorithms, such as the SHA
228 family, over other algorithms (like MD5) for local policy reasons.
229
230 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 2 (OSPFv2)</span>
231
232 OSPF [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>] describes the use of an MD5 digest with OSPF packets.
233 MD5 keys are manually configured. The OSPF packet header includes an
234 authentication type field as well as 64 bits of data for use by the
235 appropriate authentication scheme. OSPF also provides for a non-
236 decreasing sequence number to be included in each OSPF protocol
237 packet to protect against replay attacks.
238
239 "OSPF with Digital Signatures" [<a href="./rfc2154" title="&quot;OSPF with Digital Signatures&quot;">RFC2154</a>] is an Experimental RFC that
240 describes extensions to OSPF to digitally sign its Link State
241 Advertisements (LSAs). It is believed that if stronger
242 authentication and security is required, then OSPF (and the other
243 routing protocols) must migrate to using full digital signatures.
244 Doing this would enable precise authentication of the OSPF router
245 originating each OSPF link-state advertisement, and thereby provide
246 much stronger integrity protection for the OSPF routing domain.
247 However, since there have been no deployments, there is precious
248 little operational experience with this specification, and hence it
249 is not covered in this document.
250
251 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv2</span>
252
253 According to the OSPF specification [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>], digests are applied to
254 packets transmitted between adjacent neighbors, rather than being
255 applied to the routing information originated by a router (digests
256 are not applied at the LSA level, but rather at the packet level).
257 [<a href="./rfc2328" title="&quot;OSPF Version 2&quot;">RFC2328</a>] states that any set of OSPF routers adjacent across a
258 single link may use a different key to build MD5 digests than the key
259 used to build MD5 digests on any other link. Thus, MD5 keys may be
260 configured, and changed, on a per-link basis in an OSPF network.
261
262 OSPF does not specify a mechanism to negotiate keys, nor does it
263 specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be used.
264
265 With the proliferation of the number of hash algorithms, as well as
266 the need to continuously upgrade the algorithms, manually configuring
267 the information becomes very tedious. It should also be noted that
268 rekeying OSPF requires coordination among the adjacent routers.
269
270
271
272
273
274
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280
281 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv2</span>
282
283 While OSPF provides relatively strong protection through the
284 inclusion of MD5 digests, with additional data and sequence numbers
285 in transmitted packets, there are still attacks against OSPF:
286
287 o The sequence number is initialized to zero when forming an
288 adjacency with a newly discovered neighbor. When an adjacency is
289 brought down, the sequence number is also set to zero. If the
290 cryptographically protected packets of a router that is brought
291 down (for administrative or other reasons) are replayed by a
292 malicious router, traffic could be forced through the malicious
293 router. A malicious router might then induce routing loops, or
294 intercept or blackhole the traffic.
295
296 o OSPF allows multiple packets with the same sequence number. This
297 means that it's possible to replay the same packet many times
298 before the next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker may resend
299 the same packet repeatedly until the next Hello packet is
300 transmitted and received. The Hello interval, which is unknown,
301 determines the attack window.
302
303 o OSPF does not require the use of any particular hash algorithm;
304 however, only the use of MD5 digests for authentication and replay
305 protection is specified in <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>. Most OSPF implementations
306 only support MD5 in addition to Null and Simple Password
307 authentication.
308
309 Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the
310 MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="./rfc4270" title="&quot;Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols&quot;">RFC4270</a>]
311 summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the
312 use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to
313 the use of MD5 in routing protocols, it is prudent to have other
314 options available. For this reason, the general use of these
315 algorithms should be discouraged, and [<a href="./rfc5709" title="&quot;OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5709</a>] adds support for
316 using SHA-1 and SHA-2 with the HMAC construct for OSPF.
317
318 o OSPF on a broadcast network shares the same key between all
319 neighbors on that broadcast network. Some OSPF packets are sent
320 to a multicast address.
321
322 Spoofing by any malicious neighbor possessing credentials or
323 replayable packets is therefore very easy. Possession of the key
324 itself is used as an identity validation, and no other identity
325 check is used. A malicious neighbor could send a packet, forging
326 the identity of the sender as being from another neighbor. There
327 would be no way in which the victim could distinguish the identity
328 of the packet sender.
329
330
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336
337 o In some OSPF implementations, neighbors on broadcast, non-
338 broadcast multi-access (NBMA), and point-to-multipoint networks
339 are identified by the IP address in the IP header. The IP header
340 is not covered by the MAC in the cryptographic authentication
341 scheme as described in <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>, and an attack can be made to
342 exploit this omission.
343
344 Assume the following scenario.
345
346 R1 sends an authenticated HELLO to R2. This HELLO is captured and
347 replayed back to R1. The source IP in the IP header of the
348 replayed packet is changed to that of R2.
349
350 R1, not finding itself in the HELLO, would deduce that the
351 connection is not bidirectional and would bring down the
352 adjacency.
353
354 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Open Shortest Path First Version 3 (OSPFv3)</span>
355
356 OSPFv3 [<a href="./rfc5340" title="&quot;OSPF for IPv6&quot;">RFC5340</a>] relies on the IP Authentication Header (AH)
357 [<a href="./rfc4302" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">RFC4302</a>] and the IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4303</a>]
358 to cryptographically sign routing information passed between routers.
359
360 When using ESP, the null encryption algorithm [<a href="./rfc2410" title="&quot;The NULL Encryption Algorithm and Its Use With IPsec&quot;">RFC2410</a>] is used, so
361 the data carried in the OSPFv3 packets is signed, but not encrypted.
362 This provides data origin authentication for adjacent routers, and
363 data integrity (which gives the assurance that the data transmitted
364 by a router has not changed in transit). However, it does not
365 provide confidentiality of the information transmitted; this is
366 acceptable because the privacy of the information being carried in
367 the routing protocols need not be kept secret.
368
369 "Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3" [<a href="./rfc4552" title="&quot;Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3&quot;">RFC4552</a>] mandates the
370 use of ESP with null encryption for authentication and also does
371 encourage the use of confidentiality to protect the privacy of the
372 routing information transmitted, using ESP encryption. However, it
373 only specifies the use of manual keying of routing information as
374 discussed in the following section.
375
376 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Management Issues with OSPFv3</span>
377
378 The OSPFv3 security document ("Authentication/Confidentiality for
379 OSPFv3" [<a href="./rfc4552" title="&quot;Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3&quot;">RFC4552</a>]) discusses, at length, the reasoning behind using
380 manually configured keys, rather than some automated key management
381 protocol such as IKEv2 [<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>]. The primary problem is the lack of
382 a suitable key management mechanism, as OSPF adjacencies are formed
383 on a one-to-many basis and most key management mechanisms are
384 designed for a one-to-one communication model. This forces the
385
386
387
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392
393 system administrator to use manually configured security associations
394 (SAs) and cryptographic keys to provide the authentication and, if
395 desired, confidentiality services.
396
397 Regarding replay protection, [<a href="./rfc4552" title="&quot;Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3&quot;">RFC4552</a>] states that:
398
399 Since it is not possible using the current standards to provide
400 complete replay protection while using manual keying, the proposed
401 solution will not provide protection against replay attacks.
402
403 In the OSPFv3 case, the primary administrative issue with manually
404 configured SAs and keys is the management issue -- maintaining shared
405 sets of keys on all routers within a network. As with OSPFv2,
406 rekeying is an infrequent event requiring coordination. [<a href="./rfc4552" title="&quot;Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3&quot;">RFC4552</a>]
407 does not require that all OSPFv3 routers have the same key configured
408 for every neighbor, so each set of neighbors connected to a given
409 link could have a different key configured. While this makes it
410 easier to change the keys (by forcing the system administrator to
411 only change the keys on the routers on a single link), the process of
412 manual configuration for all the routers in a network to change the
413 keys used for OSPFv3 digests and confidentiality on a periodic basis
414 can be difficult.
415
416 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Technical Issues with OSPFv3</span>
417
418 The primary technical concern with the current specifications for
419 OSPFv3 is that when manual SA and key management is used as specified
420 in "Sequence Number Generation", <a href="./rfc4302#section-3.3.2">Section&nbsp;3.3.2 of [RFC4302]</a>: "The
421 sender assumes anti-replay is enabled as a default, unless otherwise
422 notified by the receiver (see <a href="#section-3.4.3">Section 3.4.3</a>) or if the SA was
423 configured using manual key management". Replaying OSPFv3 packets
424 can induce several failures in a network, including:
425
426 o Replaying Hello packets with an empty neighbor list can cause all
427 the neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset,
428 disrupting network communications.
429
430 o Replaying Hello packets from early in the designated router
431 election process on broadcast links can cause all the neighbor
432 adjacencies with the sending router to be reset, disrupting
433 network communications.
434
435 o Replaying database description (DB-Description) packets can cause
436 all FULL neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset,
437 disrupting network communications.
438
439
440
441
442
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446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
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448
449 o Replaying link state request (LS-Request) packets can cause all
450 FULL neighbor adjacencies with the sending router to be reset,
451 disrupting network communications.
452
453 o Capturing a full adjacency process (from two-way all the way to
454 FULL state), and then replaying this process when the router is no
455 longer attached can cause a false adjacency to be formed, allowing
456 an attacker to attract traffic.
457
458 o OSPFv3 on a broadcast network shares the same key between all
459 neighbors on that network. Some OSPF packets are sent to a
460 multicast address.
461
462 Spoofing by a malicious neighbor is very easy. Possession of the
463 key itself is used as an identity check. There is no other
464 identity check used. A neighbor could send a packet specifying
465 the packet came from some other neighbor and there would be no way
466 in which the attacked router could figure out the identity of the
467 packet sender.
468
469 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Intermediate System to Intermediate System Routing Protocol (IS-IS)</span>
470
471 Integrated IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>] uses HMAC-MD5 authentication with manual
472 keying, as described in [<a href="./rfc5304" title="&quot;IS-IS Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5304</a>], and has recently been extended to
473 provide support for using the HMAC construct along with the SHA
474 family of cryptographic hash functions [<a href="./rfc5310" title="&quot;IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5310</a>]. There is no
475 provision within IS-IS to encrypt the body of a routing protocol
476 message.
477
478 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Management Issues with IS-IS</span>
479
480 [<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] states that each Link State Protocol Data Unit (LSP)
481 generated by an intermediate system is signed with the HMAC-MD5
482 algorithm using a key manually defined by the network administrator.
483 Since authentication is performed on the LSPs transmitted by an
484 intermediate system, rather than on the packets transmitted to a
485 specific neighbor, it is implied that all the intermediate systems
486 within a single flooding domain must be configured with the same key
487 in order for authentication to work correctly.
488
489 The initial configuration of manual keys for authentication within an
490 IS-IS network is simplified by a state where LSPs containing
491 HMAC-MD5/HMAC-SHA authentication TLVs are accepted by intermediate
492 systems without the keys, but the digest is not validated. Once keys
493 are configured on all routers, changing those keys becomes much more
494 difficult.
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
503
504
505 IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>] does not specify a mechanism to negotiate keys, nor
506 does it specify any mechanism to negotiate the hash algorithms to be
507 used.
508
509 With the proliferation of available hash algorithms, as well as the
510 need to upgrade the algorithms, manual configuration requires
511 coordination among intermediate systems, which can become tedious.
512
513 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Technical Issues with IS-IS</span>
514
515 [<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] states: "This mechanism does not prevent replay attacks;
516 however, in most cases, such attacks would trigger existing
517 mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol that would effectively reject old
518 information".
519
520 The few cases where existing mechanisms in the IS-IS protocol would
521 not effectively reject old information are:
522 - the Hello packets or the IS-IS Hellos (IIHs) that are used to
523 discover neighbors, and
524 - the Sequence Number Packets (SNPs).
525
526 As described in IS-IS [<a href="./rfc1195" title="&quot;Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP and dual environments&quot;">RFC1195</a>], a list of known neighbors is
527 included in each Hello transmitted by an intermediate system to
528 ensure two-way communications with any specific neighbor before
529 exchanging link state databases.
530
531 IS-IS does not provide a sequence number. IS-IS packets are
532 vulnerable to replay attacks; any packet can be replayed at any point
533 of time. So long as the keys used are the same, protocol elements
534 that would not be rejected will affect existing sessions.
535
536 A Hello packet containing a digest within a TLV and an empty neighbor
537 list could be replayed, resulting in all adjacencies with the
538 original transmitting intermediate system to be restarted.
539
540 A replay of an old Complete Sequence Number Packet (CSNP) could cause
541 LSPs to be flooded, resulting in an LSP storm.
542
543 IS-IS specifies the use of the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA-1 to protect
544 IS-IS packets.
545
546 IS-IS does not have a notion of Key ID. During key rollover, each
547 message received has to be checked for integrity against all keys
548 that are valid. A denial-of-service (DoS) attack may be induced by
549 sending IS-IS packets with random hashes. This will cause the IS-IS
550 packet to be checked for authentication with all possible keys,
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
559
560
561 increasing the amount of processing required. This issue, however,
562 has been fixed in the recent [<a href="./rfc5310" title="&quot;IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5310</a>], which introduces the concept
563 of Key IDs in IS-IS.
564
565 Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the MD5
566 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="./rfc4270" title="&quot;Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols&quot;">RFC4270</a>] summarizes
567 the discoveries. There have been attacks against the use of MD5 as a
568 hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to the use of
569 HMAC-MD5 in IS-IS, it is prudent to have other options available.
570 For this reason, the general use of these algorithms should be
571 discouraged, and [<a href="./rfc5310" title="&quot;IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5310</a>] adds support for using HMAC-SHA with
572 IS-IS.
573
574 IS-IS on a broadcast network shares the same key between all
575 neighbors on that network.
576
577 This makes spoofing by a malicious neighbor easy since IS-IS packets
578 are sent to a link-layer multicast address. Possession of the key
579 itself is used as an authorization check. A neighbor could send a
580 packet spoofing the identity of a neighbor, and there would be no way
581 in which the attacked router could discern the identity of the
582 malicious packet sender.
583
584 The Remaining Lifetime field in the LSP is not covered by the
585 authentication. An IS-IS router can receive its own self-generated
586 LSP segment with zero lifetime remaining. In that case, if it has a
587 copy with non-zero lifetime, it purges that LSP, i.e., it increments
588 the current sequence number and floods all the segments again. This
589 is much worse in IS-IS than in OSPF because there is only one LSP
590 other than the pseudonode LSPs for the LANs on which the IS-IS router
591 is the Designated Intermediate System (DIS).
592
593 In this way, an attacker can force the router to flood all segments
594 -- potentially a large number if the number of routes is large. It
595 also causes the sequence number of all the LSPs to increase fast. If
596 the sequence number increases to the maximum (0xFFFFFFFF), the IS-IS
597 process must shut down for around 20 minutes (the product of MaxAge +
598 ZeroAgeLifetime) to allow the old LSPs to age out of all the router
599 databases.
600
601 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Border Gateway Protocol (BGP-4)</span>
602
603 BGP-4 [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>] uses TCP [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] for transporting routing
604 information between BGP speakers that have formed an adjacency.
605
606 [<a id="ref-RFC2385">RFC2385</a>] describes the use of the TCP MD5 digest option for
607 providing packet origin authentication and data integrity protection
608 of BGP packets. [<a href="./rfc3562" title="&quot;Key Management Considerations for the TCP MD5 Signature Option&quot;">RFC3562</a>] provides suggestions for choosing the key
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
615
616
617 length of the ad hoc Keyed MD5 mechanism specified in [<a href="./rfc2385" title="&quot;Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option&quot;">RFC2385</a>].
618 There is no provision for confidentiality for any of these BGP
619 messages.
620
621 TCP MD5 [<a href="./rfc2385" title="&quot;Protection of BGP Sessions via the TCP MD5 Signature Option&quot;">RFC2385</a>] has recently been obsoleted by a new TCP
622 Authentication Option (TCP-AO) [<a href="./rfc5925" title="&quot;The TCP Authentication Option&quot;">RFC5925</a>]. [<a href="./rfc5925" title="&quot;The TCP Authentication Option&quot;">RFC5925</a>] specifies the
623 use of stronger Message Authentication Codes (MACs), protects against
624 replays even for long-lived TCP connections, and provides more
625 details than TCP-MD5 on the association of security with TCP
626 connections. It allows rekeying during a TCP connection, assuming
627 that an out-of-band protocol or manual mechanism provides the new
628 keys. Note that TCP MD5 does not preclude rekeying during a
629 connection, but does not require its support either. Further, TCP-AO
630 supports key changes with zero segment loss, whereas key changes in
631 TCP MD5 can lose segments in transit during the changeover or require
632 trying multiple keys on each received segment during key use overlap
633 because TCP MD5 lacks an explicit Key ID. Although TCP recovers lost
634 segments through retransmission, loss can have a substantial impact
635 on performance.
636
637 However, this document covers only TCP MD5, as all current
638 deployments are still using BGP with TCP MD5 and have not upgraded to
639 [<a href="./rfc5925" title="&quot;The TCP Authentication Option&quot;">RFC5925</a>]. There isn't enough operational experience present to
640 evaluate the technical and management issues with this proposal yet.
641
642 Compared to previously described IGP protocols, BGP has additional
643 exposure due to the nature of the environment where it is typically
644 used -- namely, between autonomous networks (under different
645 administrative control). While routers running interior gateway
646 protocols may all be configured with the same administrative
647 authority, two BGP peers may be in different administrative domains,
648 having different policies for key strength, rollover frequency, etc.
649 An autonomous system must often support a large number of keys at
650 different BGP boundaries, as each connecting AS represents a
651 different administrative entity. In practice, once set, shared
652 secrets between BGP peers are rarely, if ever, changed.
653
654 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Management Issues with BGP-4</span>
655
656 Each pair of BGP speakers forming a peering may have a different MD5
657 shared key that facilitates the independent configuration and
658 changing of keys across a large-scale network. Manual configuration
659 and maintenance of cryptographic keys across all BGP sessions is a
660 challenge in any large-scale environment.
661
662 Most BGP implementations will accept BGP packets with a bad digest up
663 to the hold interval negotiated between BGP peers at peering startup,
664 in order to allow for MD5 keys to be changed with minimal impact on
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
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670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
671
672
673 operation of the network. This technique does, however, allow some
674 short period of time during which an attacker may inject BGP packets
675 with false MD5 digests into the network and can expect those packets
676 to be accepted, even though the MD5 digests are not valid.
677
678 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Technical Issues with BGP-4</span>
679
680 BGP relies on TCP [<a href="./rfc0793" title="&quot;Transmission Control Protocol&quot;">RFC0793</a>] for transporting data between BGP
681 speakers. BGP can rely on TCP's protection against data corruption
682 and replay to preclude replay attacks against BGP sessions. A great
683 deal of research has gone into the feasibility of an attacker
684 overcoming these protections, including [<a href="#ref-TcpWindow" title="&quot;Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset attacks&quot;">TcpWindow</a>] and [<a href="#ref-Conv01" title="&quot;BGP Vulnerability Testing: Separating Fact from FUD v1.00&quot;">Conv01</a>].
685 Most router and operating system (OS) vendors have modified their TCP
686 implementations to resolve the security vulnerabilities described in
687 these references, where possible.
688
689 As mentioned earlier, MD5 is vulnerable to collision attacks and can
690 be attacked through several means, such as those explored in
691 [<a href="#ref-Wang04" title="&quot;Collisions for Hash Functions MD4, MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD&quot;">Wang04</a>].
692
693 Though it can be argued that the collision attacks do not have a
694 practical application in this scenario, the use of MD5 should be
695 discouraged.
696
697 Routers performing cryptographic processing of packets in software
698 may be exposed to additional opportunities for DoS attacks. An
699 attacker may be able to transmit enough spoofed traffic with false
700 digests that the router's processor and memory resources are
701 consumed, causing the router to be unable to perform normal
702 processing. This exposure is particularly problematic between
703 routers not under unified administrative control.
704
705 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. The Routing Information Protocol (RIP)</span>
706
707 The initial version of RIP was specified in STD 34 [<a href="./rfc1058" title="&quot;Routing Information Protocol&quot;">RFC1058</a>]. This
708 version did not provide for any authentication or authorization of
709 routing data, and thus was vulnerable to any of a number of attacks
710 against routing protocols. This limitation was one reason why this
711 protocol was moved to Historic status [<a href="./rfc1923" title="&quot;RIPv1 Applicability Statement for Historic Status&quot;">RFC1923</a>].
712
713 RIPv2, originally specified in [<a href="./rfc1388" title="&quot;RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional Information&quot;">RFC1388</a>], then [<a href="./rfc1723" title="&quot;RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional Information&quot;">RFC1723</a>], was
714 finalized in STD 56 [<a href="./rfc2453" title="&quot;RIP Version 2&quot;">RFC2453</a>]. This version of the protocol provides
715 for authenticating packets with a digest. The details thereof have
716 initially been provided in "RIP-2 MD5 Authentication" [<a href="./rfc2082" title="&quot;RIP-2 MD5 Authentication&quot;">RFC2082</a>];
717 "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc4822" title="&quot;RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC4822</a>] obsoletes [<a href="./rfc2082" title="&quot;RIP-2 MD5 Authentication&quot;">RFC2082</a>]
718 and adds details of how the SHA family of hash algorithms can be used
719 to protect RIPv2. [<a href="./rfc2082" title="&quot;RIP-2 MD5 Authentication&quot;">RFC2082</a>] only specified the use of Keyed MD5.
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Technical Issues with RIP</span>
730
731 o The sequence number used by a router is initialized to zero at
732 startup, and is also set to zero whenever the neighbor is brought
733 down. If the cryptographically protected packets of a router that
734 is brought down (for administrative or other reasons) are stored
735 by a malicious router, the new router could replay the packets
736 from the previous session, thus forcing traffic through the
737 malicious router. Dropping of such packets by the router could
738 result in blackholes. Also, forwarding wrong packets could result
739 in routing loops.
740
741 o RIPv2 allows multiple packets with the same sequence number. This
742 could mean the same packet may be replayed many times before the
743 next legitimate packet is sent. An attacker may resend the same
744 packet repeatedly until the next Hello packet is transmitted and
745 received, which means the Hello interval therefore determines the
746 attack window.
747
748 o RIPv2 [<a href="./rfc2453" title="&quot;RIP Version 2&quot;">RFC2453</a>] did not specify the use of any particular hash
749 algorithm. <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a> introduced HMAC-SHA1 as mandatory to
750 implement, along with Keyed MD5 as specified in [<a href="./rfc2082" title="&quot;RIP-2 MD5 Authentication&quot;">RFC2082</a>].
751 Support for Keyed MD5 was mandated to ensure compatability with
752 legacy implementations.
753
754 o "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc4822" title="&quot;RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC4822</a>] does not cover the
755 UDP and the IP headers. It is therefore possible for an attacker
756 to modify some fields in the above headers without routers
757 becoming aware of it.
758
759 There is limited exposure to modification of the UDP header, as
760 the RIP protocol uses only it to compute the length of the RIP
761 packet. Changes introduced in the UDP header would cause RIP
762 authentication to fail the RIP authentication, thereby limiting
763 exposure.
764
765 RIP uses the source IP address from the IP header to determine
766 which RIP neighbor it has learnt the RIP Update from. Changing
767 the source IP address can be used by an attacker to disrupt the
768 RIP routing sessions between two routers R1 and R2, as shown in
769 the following examples.
770
771 Scenario 1:
772
773 R1 sends an authenticated RIP message to R2 with a cryptographic
774 sequence number X.
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
783
784
785 The attacker then needs a packet with a higher sequence number
786 originated by R2 either, from this session or from some earlier
787 session.
788
789 The attacker can then replay this packet to R2 by changing the
790 source IP to that of R1.
791
792 R2 would then no longer accept any more RIP Updates from R1, as
793 those would have a lower cryptographic sequence number. After 180
794 seconds (or less), R2 would consider R1 timed out and bring down
795 the RIP session.
796
797 Scenario 2:
798
799 R1 announces a route with cost C1 to R2. This packet can be
800 captured by an attacker. Later, if this cost changes and R1
801 announces this with a different cost C2, the attacker can replay
802 the captured packet, modifying the source IP to a new arbitrary IP
803 address, thereby masquerading as a different router.
804
805 R2 will accept this route and the router as a new gateway, and R2
806 would then use the non-existent router as a next hop for that
807 network. This would only be effective if the cost C1 is less than
808 C2.
809
810 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)</span>
811
812 BFD is specified in [<a href="./rfc5880" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)&quot;">RFC5880</a>]. Extensions to BFD for multihop
813 [<a href="./rfc5883" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths&quot;">RFC5883</a>] and single hop [<a href="./rfc5881" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)&quot;">RFC5881</a>] are defined for IPv4 and IPv6. It
814 is designed to detect failure with the forwarding plane next hop.
815
816 The BFD base specification specifies an optional authentication
817 mechanism that can be used by the receiver of a packet to be able to
818 authenticate the source of the packet. It relies on the facts that
819 the keys are shared between the peers and no mechanism is defined for
820 the actual key generation.
821
822 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Technical Issues with BFD</span>
823
824 o The level of security provided is based on the Authentication Type
825 used. However, the authentication algorithms defined are MD5 or
826 SHA-1 based. As mentioned earlier, MD5 and SHA-1 are both known
827 to be vulnerable to collision attacks.
828
829 o The BFD specification mentions mechanisms to allow for the change
830 of authentication state based on the state of a received packet.
831 This can cause a denial-of-service attack where a malicious
832 authenticated packet (stored from a past session) can be relayed
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
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838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
839
840
841 over a session that does not use authentication. This causes one
842 end to assume that authentication is enabled at the other end, and
843 hence the BFD adjacency is dropped. This would be a harder attack
844 to put forth when meticulously keyed authentication is in use.
845
846 o BFD works on microsecond timers. When malicious packets are sent
847 at short intervals, with the authentication bit set, it can cause
848 a DoS attack.
849
850 o BFD allows a mode called the echo mode. Echo packets are not
851 defined in the BFD specification, though they can keep the BFD
852 session up. There are no guidelines on the properties of the echo
853 packets beyond the choice of the source and destination addresses.
854 While the BFD specification recommends applying security
855 mechanisms to prevent spoofing of these packets, there are no
856 guidelines on what type of mechanisms are appropriate.
857
858 Any security issues in the echo mode will directly affect the BFD
859 protocol and session states, and hence the network stability. The
860 potential effects and remedies as understood today are somewhat
861 limited, however. For instance, any replay attacks would be
862 indistinguishable from normal forwarding of the tested router. An
863 attack would still cause a faulty link to be believed to be up,
864 but there is little that can be done about it. However, if the
865 echo packets are guessable, it may be possible to spoof from an
866 external source and cause BFD to believe that a one-way link is
867 really bidirectional. As a result, it is important that the echo
868 packets contain random material that is also checked upon
869 reception.
870
871 o BFD packets can be sent at millisecond intervals (the protocol
872 uses timers at microsecond intervals). When using authentication,
873 this can cause frequent sequence number wrap-around as a 32-bit
874 sequence number is used, thus considerably reducing the security
875 of the authentication algorithms.
876
877 o Recently, limitations in collision-resistance properties of the
878 MD5 and SHA-1 hash functions have been discovered; [<a href="./rfc4270" title="&quot;Attacks on Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols&quot;">RFC4270</a>]
879 summarizes the discoveries. There have been attacks against the
880 use of MD5 as a hash; while these attacks do not directly apply to
881 the use of HMAC-MD5 and keyed SHA-1 in BFD, it is prudent to have
882 other options available. Such attacks do not mean that BFD using
883 SHA-1 for authentication is at risk. However, it does mean that
884 SHA-1 should be replaced as soon as possible and should not be
885 used for new applications.
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
895
896
897 It should be noted that if SHA-1 is used in the Hashed Message
898 Authentication Code (HMAC) [<a href="./rfc2104" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">RFC2104</a>] construction, then collision
899 attacks currently known against SHA-1 do not apply. The new
900 attacks on SHA-1 have no impact on the security of HMAC-SHA-1.
901
902 There are already proposals [<a href="#ref-GenBFDAuth" title="&quot;BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">GenBFDAuth</a>] that add support for HMAC
903 with the SHA-1 and SHA-2 family of hash functions for BFD.
904
905 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span>
906
907 This document outlines security issues arising from the current
908 methodology for manual keying of various routing protocols. No
909 specific changes to routing protocols are proposed in this document;
910 likewise, no new security requirements result.
911
912 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
913
914 We would like to acknowledge Sam Hartman, Ran Atkinson, Stephen Kent
915 and Brian Weis for their initial comments on this document. Thanks
916 to Merike Kaeo and Alfred Hoenes for reviewing many sections of the
917 document and providing lot of useful comments.
918
919 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. References</span>
920
921 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References</span>
922
923 [<a id="ref-RFC0793">RFC0793</a>] Postel, J., "Transmission Control Protocol", STD 7,
924 <a href="./rfc793">RFC 793</a>, September 1981.
925
926 [<a id="ref-RFC1195">RFC1195</a>] Callon, R., "Use of OSI IS-IS for routing in TCP/IP
927 and dual environments", <a href="./rfc1195">RFC 1195</a>, December 1990.
928
929 [<a id="ref-RFC2328">RFC2328</a>] Moy, J., "OSPF Version 2", STD 54, <a href="./rfc2328">RFC 2328</a>, April
930 1998.
931
932 [<a id="ref-RFC2385">RFC2385</a>] Heffernan, A., "Protection of BGP Sessions via the
933 TCP MD5 Signature Option", <a href="./rfc2385">RFC 2385</a>, August 1998.
934
935 [<a id="ref-RFC2453">RFC2453</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2", STD 56, <a href="./rfc2453">RFC 2453</a>,
936 November 1998.
937
938 [<a id="ref-RFC4271">RFC4271</a>] Rekhter, Y., Ed., Li, T., Ed., and S. Hares, Ed., "A
939 Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", <a href="./rfc4271">RFC 4271</a>, January
940 2006.
941
942 [<a id="ref-RFC4302">RFC4302</a>] Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc4302">RFC 4302</a>,
943 December 2005. Kent, S., "IP Authentication Header",
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
951
952
953 [<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)",
954 <a href="./rfc4303">RFC 4303</a>, December 2005.
955
956 [<a id="ref-RFC4552">RFC4552</a>] Gupta, M. and N. Melam,
957 "Authentication/Confidentiality for OSPFv3", <a href="./rfc4552">RFC</a>
958 <a href="./rfc4552">4552</a>, June 2006.
959
960 [<a id="ref-RFC4822">RFC4822</a>] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
961 Authentication", <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a>, February 2007.
962
963 [<a id="ref-RFC5340">RFC5340</a>] Coltun, R., Ferguson, D., Moy, J., and A. Lindem,
964 "OSPF for IPv6", <a href="./rfc5340">RFC 5340</a>, July 2008.
965
966 [<a id="ref-RFC5304">RFC5304</a>] Li, T. and R. Atkinson, "IS-IS Cryptographic
967 Authentication", <a href="./rfc5304">RFC 5304</a>, October 2008.
968
969 [<a id="ref-RFC5310">RFC5310</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White,
970 R., and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
971 Authentication", <a href="./rfc5310">RFC 5310</a>, February 2009.
972
973 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.2" href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References</span>
974
975 [<a id="ref-Arjen05">Arjen05</a>] Arjen K. Lenstra, "Further progress in Hashing
976 cryptanalysis", Lucent Bell Laboratories, February
977 26, 2005.
978
979 [<a id="ref-Conv01">Conv01</a>] Convery, et al., "BGP Vulnerability Testing:
980 Separating Fact from FUD v1.00", NANOG 28, pp. 1-61,
981 June 2003.
982
983 [<a id="ref-Crypto2004">Crypto2004</a>] Xiaoyun Wang, Xuejia Lai, Dengguo Feng, and Hongbo
984 Yu, "Collisions for hash functions MD4, MD5,
985 HAVAL-128, and RIPEMD", Crypto 2004 Rump Session.
986
987 [<a id="ref-Dobb96a">Dobb96a</a>] Dobbertin, H., "Cryptanalysis of MD5 Compress",
988 Technical Report, 2 May 1996. (Presented at the Rump
989 Session of EuroCrypt 1996.)
990
991 [<a id="ref-Dobb96b">Dobb96b</a>] Dobbertin, H., "The Status of MD5 After a Recent
992 Attack", CryptoBytes, Vol. 2, No. 2, Summer 1996.
993
994 [<a id="ref-GenBFDAuth">GenBFDAuth</a>] Bhatia, M. and V. Manral, "BFD Generic Cryptographic
995 Authentication", Work in Progress, June 2010.
996
997 [<a id="ref-NISTHmacSHA">NISTHmacSHA</a>] "NIST's Policy on Hash Functions", 2006,
998 <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html">http://csrc.nist.gov/groups/ST/hash/policy.html</a>.
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
1007
1008
1009 [<a id="ref-Philip01">Philip01</a>] Philip Hawkes, Michael Paddon, and Gregory G. Rose,
1010 "On Corrective Patterns for the SHA-2 Family", IACR
1011 ePrint Archive, 2004,
1012 <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/207</a>.
1013
1014 [<a id="ref-Prav01">Prav01</a>] Praveen Gauravaram, et al., "Collision Attacks on MD5
1015 and SHA-1: Is this the 'Sword of Domocles' for
1016 Electronic Commerce?", Information Security Institue
1017 (ISI), Queensland University of Technology (QUT),
1018 Australia.
1019
1020 [<a id="ref-Prav02">Prav02</a>] Praveen Gauravaram, et al., "Some thoughts on
1021 Collision Attacks in the Hash Functions Md5, SHA-0
1022 and SHA-1", Information Security Institue (ISI),
1023 Queensland University of Technology (QUT), Australia.
1024
1025 [<a id="ref-RFC1058">RFC1058</a>] Hedrick, C., "Routing Information Protocol", <a href="./rfc1058">RFC</a>
1026 <a href="./rfc1058">1058</a>, June 1988.
1027
1028 [<a id="ref-RFC1321">RFC1321</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC</a>
1029 <a href="./rfc1321">1321</a>, April 1992.
1030
1031 [<a id="ref-RFC1388">RFC1388</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 Carrying Additional
1032 Information", <a href="./rfc1388">RFC 1388</a>, January 1993.
1033
1034 [<a id="ref-RFC1723">RFC1723</a>] Malkin, G., "RIP Version 2 - Carrying Additional
1035 Information", <a href="./rfc1723">RFC 1723</a>, November 1994.
1036
1037 [<a id="ref-RFC1923">RFC1923</a>] Halpern, J. and S. Bradner, "RIPv1 Applicability
1038 Statement for Historic Status", <a href="./rfc1923">RFC 1923</a>, March 1996.
1039
1040 [<a id="ref-RFC2082">RFC2082</a>] Baker, F. and R. Atkinson, "RIP-2 MD5
1041 Authentication", <a href="./rfc2082">RFC 2082</a>, January 1997.
1042
1043 [<a id="ref-RFC2104">RFC2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
1044 Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>,
1045 February 1997.
1046
1047 [<a id="ref-RFC2154">RFC2154</a>] Murphy, S., Badger, M., and B. Wellington, "OSPF with
1048 Digital Signatures", <a href="./rfc2154">RFC 2154</a>, June 1997.
1049
1050 [<a id="ref-RFC2410">RFC2410</a>] Glenn, R. and S. Kent, "The NULL Encryption Algorithm
1051 and Its Use With IPsec", <a href="./rfc2410">RFC 2410</a>, November 1998.
1052
1053 [<a id="ref-RFC3562">RFC3562</a>] Leech, M., "Key Management Considerations for the TCP
1054 MD5 Signature Option", <a href="./rfc3562">RFC 3562</a>, July 2003.
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
1063
1064
1065 [<a id="ref-RFC4270">RFC4270</a>] Hoffman, P. and B. Schneier, "Attacks on
1066 Cryptographic Hashes in Internet Protocols", <a href="./rfc4270">RFC</a>
1067 <a href="./rfc4270">4270</a>, November 2005.
1068
1069 [<a id="ref-RFC4306">RFC4306</a>] Kaufman, C., Ed., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2)
1070 Protocol", <a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005.
1071
1072 [<a id="ref-RFC5709">RFC5709</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes,
1073 M., Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA
1074 Cryptographic Authentication", <a href="./rfc5709">RFC 5709</a>, October
1075 2009.
1076
1077 [<a id="ref-RFC5880">RFC5880</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding
1078 Detection (BFD)", <a href="./rfc5880">RFC 5880</a>, June 2010.
1079
1080 [<a id="ref-RFC5881">RFC5881</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding
1081 Detection (BFD) for IPv4 and IPv6 (Single Hop)", <a href="./rfc5881">RFC</a>
1082 <a href="./rfc5881">5881</a>, June 2010.
1083
1084 [<a id="ref-RFC5883">RFC5883</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding
1085 Detection (BFD) for Multihop Paths", <a href="./rfc5883">RFC 5883</a>, June
1086 2010.
1087
1088 [<a id="ref-RFC5925">RFC5925</a>] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
1089 Authentication Option", <a href="./rfc5925">RFC 5925</a>, June 2010.
1090
1091 [<a id="ref-RR07">RR07</a>] Rechberger, C. and V. Rijmen, "On Authentication with
1092 HMAC and Non-random Properties", Financial
1093 Cryptography and Data Security, Lecture Notes in
1094 Computer Science, Volume 4886/2008, Springer-Verlag,
1095 Berlin, December 2007.
1096
1097 [<a id="ref-RR08">RR08</a>] Rechberger, C. and V. Rijmen, "New Results on
1098 NMAC/HMAC when Instantiated with Popular Hash
1099 Functions", Journal of Universal Computer Science,
1100 Volume 14, Number 3, pp. 347-376, 1 February 2008.
1101
1102 [<a id="ref-TcpWindow">TcpWindow</a>] Watson, P., "Slipping in the Window: TCP Reset
1103 attacks", Presentation at 2004 CanSecWest,
1104 <a href="http://cansecwest.com/csw04archive.html">http://cansecwest.com/csw04archive.html</a>.
1105
1106 [<a id="ref-Wang04">Wang04</a>] Wang, X., et al., "Collisions for Hash Functions MD4,
1107 MD5, HAVAL-128 and RIPEMD", August 2004, IACR ePrint
1108 Archive, <a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199">http://eprint.iacr.org/2004/199</a>.
1109
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Manral, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a> Routing Protocol Protection Issues October 2010</span>
1119
1120
1121 [<a id="ref-Wang05">Wang05</a>] Wang, X., et al., "Finding Collisions in the Full
1122 SHA-1", Proceedings of Crypto 2005, Lecture Notes in
1123 Computer Science, Volume 3621, pp. 17-36, Springer-
1124 Verlag, Berlin, August 31, 2005.
1125
1126 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Contributor's Address</span>
1127
1128 Sue Hares
1129 NextHop
1130 USA
1131 EMail: [email protected]
1132
1133 Authors' Addresses
1134
1135 Vishwas Manral
1136 IP Infusion, Inc.
1137 1188 E. Arques Ave.
1138 Sunnyvale, CA 94085
1139 EMail: [email protected]
1140
1141 Manav Bhatia
1142 Alcatel-Lucent
1143 Bangalore
1144 India
1145 EMail: [email protected]
1146
1147 Joel P. Jaeggli
1148 Nokia Inc.
1149 EMail: [email protected]
1150
1151 Russ White
1152 Cisco Systems
1153 RTP North Carolina
1154 USA
1155 EMail: [email protected]
1156
1157
1158
1159
1160
1161
1162
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 Manral, et al. Informational [Page 21]
1173 </pre>