Debian Codegraph @

rfc5998.html

raw
1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Eronen
2 Request for Comments: 5998 Independent
3 Updates: <a href="./rfc5996">5996</a> H. Tschofenig
4 Category: Standards Track Nokia Siemens Networks
5 ISSN: 2070-1721 Y. Sheffer
6 Independent
7 September 2010
8
9
10 <span class="h1">An Extension for EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2</span>
11
12 Abstract
13
14 IKEv2 specifies that Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)
15 authentication must be used together with responder authentication
16 based on public key signatures. This is necessary with old EAP
17 methods that provide only unilateral authentication using, e.g., one-
18 time passwords or token cards.
19
20 This document specifies how EAP methods that provide mutual
21 authentication and key agreement can be used to provide extensible
22 responder authentication for IKEv2 based on methods other than public
23 key signatures.
24
25 Status of This Memo
26
27 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
28
29 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
30 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
31 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
32 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
33 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
34
35 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
36 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
37 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5998">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5998</a>.
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
73 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
74 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
75 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
76 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
77 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
78 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
79 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
80 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
81 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
82 than English.
83
84 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
85
86 The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [<a href="./rfc3748" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">RFC3748</a>],
87 is an authentication framework that supports multiple authentication
88 mechanisms. Today, EAP has been implemented at end hosts and routers
89 that connect via switched circuits or dial-up lines using PPP
90 [<a href="./rfc1661" title="&quot;The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)&quot;">RFC1661</a>], IEEE 802 wired switches [<a href="#ref-IEEE8021X" title="&quot;Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Control&quot;">IEEE8021X</a>], and IEEE 802.11
91 wireless access points [<a href="#ref-IEEE80211i" title="&quot;IEEE Standard for Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements&quot;">IEEE80211i</a>].
92
93 One of the advantages of the EAP architecture is its flexibility.
94 EAP is used to select a specific authentication mechanism, typically
95 after the authenticator requests more information in order to
96 determine the specific authentication method to be used. Rather than
97 requiring the authenticator (e.g., wireless LAN access point) to be
98 updated to support each new authentication method, EAP permits the
99 use of a backend authentication server that may implement some or all
100 authentication methods.
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
111
112
113 IKEv2 ([<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5996" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC5996</a>]) is a component of IPsec used for
114 performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining
115 Security Associations (SAs) for IPsec ESP and Authentication Header
116 (AH). In addition to supporting authentication using public key
117 signatures and shared secrets, IKEv2 also supports EAP
118 authentication.
119
120 IKEv2 provides EAP authentication since it was recognized that public
121 key signatures and shared secrets are not flexible enough to meet the
122 requirements of many deployment scenarios. By using EAP, IKEv2 can
123 leverage existing authentication infrastructure and credential
124 databases, since EAP allows users to choose a method suitable for
125 existing credentials, and also makes separation of the IKEv2
126 responder (VPN gateway) from the EAP authentication endpoint (backend
127 Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server) easier.
128
129 Some older EAP methods are designed for unilateral authentication
130 only (that is, EAP peer to EAP server). These methods are used in
131 conjunction with IKEv2 public-key-based authentication of the
132 responder to the initiator. It is expected that this approach is
133 especially useful for "road warrior" VPN gateways that use, for
134 instance, one-time passwords or token cards to authenticate the
135 clients.
136
137 However, most newer EAP methods, such as those typically used with
138 IEEE 802.11i wireless LANs, provide mutual authentication and key
139 agreement. Currently, IKEv2 specifies that these EAP methods must
140 also be used together with responder authentication based on public
141 key signatures.
142
143 In order for the public key signature authentication of the gateway
144 to be effective, a deployment of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is
145 required, which has to include management of trust anchors on all
146 supplicants. In many environments, this is not realistic, and the
147 security of the gateway public key is the same as the security of a
148 self-signed certificate. Mutually authenticating EAP methods alone
149 can provide a sufficient level of security in many circumstances, and
150 in fact, in some deployments, IEEE 802.11i uses EAP without any PKI
151 for authenticating the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) access
152 points.
153
154 This document specifies how EAP methods that offer mutual
155 authentication and key agreement can be used to provide responder
156 authentication in IKEv2 completely based on EAP.
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Terminology</span>
170
171 All notation in this protocol extension is taken from [<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>].
172
173 Numbered messages refer to the IKEv2 message sequence when using EAP.
174
175 Thus:
176
177 o Message 1 is the request message of IKE_SA_INIT.
178
179 o Message 2 is the response message of IKE_SA_INIT.
180
181 o Message 3 is the first request of IKE_AUTH.
182
183 o Message 4 is the first response of IKE_AUTH.
184
185 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
186 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
187 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
188
189 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Scenarios</span>
190
191 In this section, we describe two scenarios for extensible
192 authentication within IKEv2. These scenarios are intended to be
193 illustrative examples rather than specifying how things should be
194 done.
195
196 Figure 1 shows a configuration where the EAP and the IKEv2 endpoints
197 are co-located. Authenticating the IKEv2 responder using both EAP
198 and public key signatures is redundant. Offering EAP-based
199 authentication has the advantage that multiple different
200 authentication and key exchange protocols are available with EAP with
201 different security properties (such as strong password-based
202 protocols, protocols offering user identity confidentiality, and many
203 more).
204
205 +------+-----+ +------------+
206 O | IKEv2 | | IKEv2 |
207 /|\ | Initiator |&lt;---////////////////////---&gt;| Responder |
208 / \ +------------+ IKEv2 +------------+
209 User | EAP Peer | Exchange | EAP Server |
210 +------------+ +------------+
211
212 Figure 1: EAP and IKEv2 Endpoints Are Co-Located
213
214 Figure 2 shows a typical corporate network access scenario. The
215 initiator (client) interacts with the responder (VPN gateway) in the
216 corporate network. The EAP exchange within IKE runs between the
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
223
224
225 client and the home AAA server. As a result of a successful EAP
226 authentication protocol run, session keys are established and sent
227 from the AAA server to the VPN gateway, and then used to authenticate
228 the IKEv2 SA with AUTH payloads.
229
230 The protocol used between the VPN gateway and AAA server could be,
231 for instance, Diameter [<a href="./rfc4072" title="&quot;Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application&quot;">RFC4072</a>] or RADIUS [<a href="./rfc3579" title="&quot;RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">RFC3579</a>]. See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>
232 for related security considerations.
233
234 +-------------------------------+
235 | Corporate network |
236 | |
237 +-----------+ +--------+ |
238 | IKEv2 | AAA | Home | |
239 IKEv2 +////-----&gt;+ Responder +&lt;----------&gt;+ AAA | |
240 Exchange / | (VPN GW) | (RADIUS/ | Server | |
241 / +-----------+ Diameter) +--------+ |
242 / | carrying EAP |
243 | | |
244 | +-------------------------------+
245 v
246 +------+-----+
247 o | IKEv2 |
248 /|\ | Initiator |
249 / \ | VPN client |
250 User +------------+
251
252 Figure 2: Corporate Network Access
253
254 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Solution</span>
255
256 IKEv2 specifies that when the EAP method establishes a shared secret
257 key, that key is used by both the initiator and responder to generate
258 an AUTH payload (thus authenticating the IKEv2 SA set up by messages
259 1 and 2).
260
261 When used together with public key responder authentication, the
262 responder is, in effect, authenticated using two different methods:
263 the public key signature AUTH payload in message 4, and the EAP-based
264 AUTH payload later.
265
266 If the initiator does not wish to use public-key-based responder
267 authentication, it includes an EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION notification
268 payload (16417) in message 3. The Protocol ID and Security Parameter
269 Index (SPI) size fields are set to zero, and there is no additional
270 data associated with this notification.
271
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
279
280
281 If the responder supports this notification and chooses to use it, it
282 omits the public-key-based AUTH payload and CERT payloads from
283 message 4.
284
285 If the responder does not support the EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION
286 notification or does not wish to use it, it ignores the notification
287 payload, and includes the AUTH payload in message 4. In this case,
288 the initiator MUST verify that payload and any associated
289 certificates, as per [<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>].
290
291 When receiving message 4, the initiator MUST verify that the proposed
292 EAP method is allowed by this specification, and MUST abort the
293 protocol immediately otherwise.
294
295 Both the initiator and responder MUST verify that the EAP method
296 actually used provided mutual authentication and established a shared
297 secret key. The AUTH payloads sent after EAP Success MUST use the
298 EAP-generated key, and MUST NOT use SK_pi or SK_pr (see <a href="./rfc5996#section-2.15">Section&nbsp;2.15
299 of [RFC5996]</a>).
300
301
302
303
304
305
306
307
308
309
310
311
312
313
314
315
316
317
318
319
320
321
322
323
324
325
326
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
335
336
337 An IKEv2 message exchange with this modification is shown below:
338
339 Initiator Responder
340 ----------- -----------
341 HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni,
342 [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
343 N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)] --&gt;
344
345 &lt;-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ],
346 [N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP),
347 N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)]
348
349 HDR, SK { IDi, [IDr], SAi2, TSi, TSr,
350 N(EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION),
351 [CP(CFG_REQUEST)] } --&gt;
352
353 &lt;-- HDR, SK { IDr, EAP(Request) }
354
355 HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
356
357 &lt;-- HDR, SK { EAP(Request) }
358
359 HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --&gt;
360
361 &lt;-- HDR, SK { EAP(Success) }
362
363 HDR, SK { AUTH } --&gt;
364
365 &lt;-- HDR, SK { AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr,
366 [CP(CFG_REPLY] }
367
368 Note: all notation in the above protocol sequence and elsewhere in
369 this specification is as defined in [<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>], and see in particular
370 Sec. 1.2 of [<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>] for payload types.
371
372 The NAT detection and Configuration payloads are shown for
373 informative purposes only; they do not change how EAP authentication
374 works.
375
376 An IKE SA that was set up with this extension can be resumed using
377 the mechanism described in [<a href="./rfc5723" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption&quot;">RFC5723</a>]. However, session resumption
378 does not change the authentication method. Therefore, during the
379 IKE_AUTH exchange of the resumed session, this extension MUST NOT be
380 sent by the initiator.
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Safe EAP Methods</span>
394
395 EAP methods to be used with this extension MUST have the following
396 properties:
397
398 1. The method provides mutual authentication of the peers.
399
400 2. The method is key-generating.
401
402 3. The method is resistant to dictionary attacks.
403
404 The authors believe that the following EAP methods are secure when
405 used with the current extension. The list is not inclusive, and
406 there are likely other safe methods that have not been listed here.
407
408 +-------------------------------+-------------------+---------------+
409 | Method Name | Allows Channel | Reference |
410 | | Binding? | |
411 +-------------------------------+-------------------+---------------+
412 | EAP-SIM | No | [<a href="./rfc4186" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM)&quot;">RFC4186</a>] |
413 | EAP-AKA | Yes | [<a href="./rfc4187" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)&quot;">RFC4187</a>] |
414 | EAP-AKA' | Yes | [<a href="./rfc5448" title="&quot;Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP- AKA')&quot;">RFC5448</a>] |
415 | EAP-GPSK | Yes | [<a href="./rfc5433" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method&quot;">RFC5433</a>] |
416 | EAP-pwd | No | [<a href="./rfc5931" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only A Password&quot;">RFC5931</a>] |
417 | EAP-EKE | Yes | [<a href="#ref-EMU-EAP-EKE" title="&quot;An EAP Authentication Method Based on the EKE Protocol&quot;">EMU-EAP-EKE</a>] |
418 | EAP-PAX | Yes | [<a href="./rfc4746" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange&quot;">RFC4746</a>] |
419 | EAP-SAKE | No | [<a href="./rfc4763" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Shared-secret Authentication and Key Establishment (EAP-SAKE)&quot;">RFC4763</a>] |
420 | EAP-SRP | No | [<a href="#ref-EAP-SRP" title="&quot;EAP SRP- SHA1 Authentication Protocol&quot;">EAP-SRP</a>] |
421 | EAP-POTP (mutual | Yes | [<a href="./rfc4793" title="&quot;The EAP Protected One-Time Password Protocol (EAP-POTP)&quot;">RFC4793</a>] |
422 | authentication variant) | | |
423 | EAP-TLS | No | [<a href="./rfc5216" title="&quot;The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol&quot;">RFC5216</a>] |
424 | EAP-FAST | No | [<a href="./rfc4851" title="&quot;The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)&quot;">RFC4851</a>] |
425 | EAP-TTLS | No | [<a href="./rfc5281" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP- TTLSv0)&quot;">RFC5281</a>] |
426 +-------------------------------+-------------------+---------------+
427
428 The "Allows channel binding?" column denotes protocols where
429 protected identity information may be sent between the EAP endpoints.
430 This third, optional property of the method provides protection
431 against certain types of attacks (see <a href="#section-6.2">Section 6.2</a> for an
432 explanation), and therefore in some scenarios, methods that allow for
433 channel binding are to be preferred. It is noted that at the time of
434 writing, even when such capabilities are provided, they are not fully
435 specified in an interoperable manner. In particular, no RFC
436 specifies what identities should be sent under the protection of the
437 channel binding mechanism, or what policy is to be used to correlate
438 identities at the different layers.
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
450
451 This document defines a new IKEv2 Notification Payload type,
452 EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION, described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. This payload has
453 been assigned the type number 16417 from the "Status Types" range.
454
455 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span>
456
457 Security considerations applicable to all EAP methods are discussed
458 in [<a href="./rfc3748" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">RFC3748</a>]. The EAP Key Management Framework [<a href="./rfc5247" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework&quot;">RFC5247</a>] deals with
459 issues that arise when EAP is used as a part of a larger system.
460
461 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Authentication of IKEv2 SA</span>
462
463 It is important to note that the IKEv2 SA is not authenticated by
464 just running an EAP conversation: the crucial step is the AUTH
465 payload based on the EAP-generated key. Thus, EAP methods that do
466 not provide mutual authentication or establish a shared secret key
467 MUST NOT be used with the modifications presented in this document.
468
469 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Authentication with Separated IKEv2 Responder / EAP Server</span>
470
471 As described in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, the EAP conversation can terminate either
472 at the IKEv2 responder or at a backend AAA server.
473
474 If the EAP method is terminated at the IKEv2 responder, then no key
475 transport via the AAA infrastructure is required. Pre-shared secret
476 and public-key-based authentication offered by IKEv2 is then replaced
477 by a wider range of authentication and key exchange methods.
478
479 However, typically EAP will be used with a backend AAA server. See
480 [<a href="./rfc5247" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework&quot;">RFC5247</a>] for a more complete discussion of the related security
481 issues; here we provide only a short summary.
482
483 When a backend server is used, there are actually two authentication
484 exchanges: the EAP method between the client and the AAA server, and
485 another authentication between the AAA server and IKEv2 gateway. The
486 AAA server authenticates the client using the selected EAP method,
487 and they establish a session key. The AAA server then sends this key
488 to the IKEv2 gateway over a connection authenticated using, e.g.,
489 IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS).
490
491 Some EAP methods do not have any concept of pass-through
492 authenticator (e.g., Network Access Server (NAS) or IKEv2 gateway)
493 identity, and these two authentications remain quite independent of
494 each other. That is, after the client has verified the AUTH payload
495 sent by the IKEv2 gateway, it knows that it is talking to SOME
496 gateway trusted by the home AAA server, but not which one. The
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
503
504
505 situation is somewhat similar if a single cryptographic hardware
506 accelerator, containing a single private key, would be shared between
507 multiple IKEv2 gateways (perhaps in some kind of cluster
508 configuration). In particular, if one of the gateways is
509 compromised, it can impersonate any of the other gateways towards the
510 user (until the compromise is discovered and access rights revoked).
511
512 In some environments it is not desirable to trust the IKEv2 gateways
513 this much (also known as the "Lying NAS Problem"). EAP methods that
514 provide what is called "connection binding" or "channel binding"
515 transport some identity or identities of the gateway (or WLAN access
516 point / NAS) inside the EAP method. Then the AAA server can check
517 that it is indeed sending the key to the gateway expected by the
518 client. A potential solution is described in [<a href="#ref-EAP-SERVICE" title="&quot;Authenticated Service Information for the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">EAP-SERVICE</a>], see also
519 [<a href="#ref-EMU-AAAPAY" title="&quot;EAP Method Support for Transporting AAA Payloads&quot;">EMU-AAAPAY</a>].
520
521 In some deployment configurations, AAA proxies may be present between
522 the IKEv2 gateway and the backend AAA server. These AAA proxies MUST
523 be trusted for secure operation, and therefore SHOULD be avoided when
524 possible; see <a href="./rfc4072#section-2.3.4">Section&nbsp;2.3.4 of [RFC4072]</a> and <a href="./rfc3579#section-4.3.7">Section&nbsp;4.3.7 of
525 [RFC3579]</a> for more discussion.
526
527 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Protection of EAP Payloads</span>
528
529 Although the EAP payloads are encrypted and integrity protected with
530 SK_e/SK_a, this does not provide any protection against active
531 attackers. Until the AUTH payload has been received and verified, a
532 man-in-the-middle can change the KEi/KEr payloads and eavesdrop or
533 modify the EAP payloads.
534
535 In IEEE 802.11i wireless LANs, the EAP payloads are neither encrypted
536 nor integrity protected (by the link layer), so EAP methods are
537 typically designed to take that into account.
538
539 In particular, EAP methods that are vulnerable to dictionary attacks
540 when used in WLANs are still vulnerable (to active attackers) when
541 run inside IKEv2.
542
543 The rules in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> are designed to avoid this potential
544 vulnerability.
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Identities and Authenticated Identities</span>
562
563 When using this protocol, each of the peers sends two identity
564 values:
565
566 1. An identity contained in the IKE ID payload.
567
568 2. An identity transferred within the specific EAP method's
569 messages.
570
571 (IKEv2 omits the EAP Identity request/response pair, see <a href="./rfc5996#section-3.16">Section&nbsp;3.16
572 of [RFC5996]</a>.) The first identity value can be used by the recipient
573 to route AAA messages and/or to select authentication and EAP types.
574 But it is only the second identity that is directly authenticated by
575 the EAP method. The reader is referred to <a href="./rfc5996#section-2.16">Section&nbsp;2.16 of [RFC5996]</a>
576 regarding the need to base IPsec policy decisions on the
577 authenticated identity. In the context of the extension described
578 here, this guidance on IPsec policy applies both to the
579 authentication of the client by the gateway and vice versa.
580
581 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. User Identity Confidentiality</span>
582
583 IKEv2 provides confidentiality for the initiator identity against
584 passive eavesdroppers, but not against active attackers. The
585 initiator announces its identity first (in message 3), before the
586 responder has been authenticated. The usage of EAP in IKEv2 does not
587 change this situation, since the ID payload in message 3 is used
588 instead of the EAP Identity Request/Response exchange. This is
589 somewhat unfortunate since when EAP is used with public key
590 authentication of the responder, it would be possible to provide
591 active user identity confidentiality for the initiator.
592
593 IKEv2 protects the responder's identity even against active attacks.
594 This property cannot be provided when using EAP. If public key
595 responder authentication is used in addition to EAP, the responder
596 reveals its identity before authenticating the initiator. If only
597 EAP is used (as proposed in this document), the situation depends on
598 the EAP method used (in some EAP methods, the server reveals its
599 identity first).
600
601 Hence, if active user identity confidentiality for the responder is
602 required then EAP methods that offer this functionality have to be
603 used (see <a href="./rfc3748#section-7.3">[RFC3748], Section&nbsp;7.3</a>).
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
618
619 This document borrows some text from [<a href="./rfc3748" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)&quot;">RFC3748</a>], [<a href="./rfc4306" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol&quot;">RFC4306</a>], and
620 [<a href="./rfc4072" title="&quot;Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application&quot;">RFC4072</a>]. We would also like to thank Hugo Krawczyk for interesting
621 discussions about this topic, Dan Harkins, and David Harrington for
622 their comments.
623
624 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span>
625
626 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span>
627
628 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
629 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
630
631 [<a id="ref-RFC3748">RFC3748</a>] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and
632 H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol
633 (EAP)", <a href="./rfc3748">RFC 3748</a>, June 2004.
634
635 [<a id="ref-RFC4306">RFC4306</a>] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol",
636 <a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005.
637
638 [<a id="ref-RFC5723">RFC5723</a>] Sheffer, Y. and H. Tschofenig, "Internet Key Exchange
639 Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption",
640 <a href="./rfc5723">RFC 5723</a>, January 2010.
641
642 [<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
643 "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)",
644 <a href="./rfc5996">RFC 5996</a>, September 2010.
645
646 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span>
647
648 [<a id="ref-EAP-SERVICE">EAP-SERVICE</a>] Arkko, J. and P. Eronen, "Authenticated Service
649 Information for the Extensible Authentication Protocol
650 (EAP)", Work in Progress, October 2005.
651
652 [<a id="ref-EAP-SRP">EAP-SRP</a>] Carlson, J., Aboba, B., and H. Haverinen, "EAP SRP-
653 SHA1 Authentication Protocol", Work in Progress,
654 July 2001.
655
656 [<a id="ref-EMU-AAAPAY">EMU-AAAPAY</a>] Clancy, C., Lior, A., Zorn, G., and K. Hoeper, "EAP
657 Method Support for Transporting AAA Payloads", Work
658 in Progress, May 2010.
659
660 [<a id="ref-EMU-EAP-EKE">EMU-EAP-EKE</a>] Sheffer, Y., Zorn, G., Tschofenig, H., and S. Fluhrer,
661 "An EAP Authentication Method Based on the EKE
662 Protocol", Work in Progress, August 2010.
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
671
672
673 [<a id="ref-IEEE80211i">IEEE80211i</a>] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
674 "IEEE Standard for Information technology -
675 Telecommunications and information exchange between
676 systems - Local and metropolitan area networks -
677 Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium
678 Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY)
679 specifications: Amendment 6: Medium Access Control
680 (MAC) Security Enhancements", IEEE Standard 802.11i-
681 2004, July 2004.
682
683 [<a id="ref-IEEE8021X">IEEE8021X</a>] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers,
684 "Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based
685 Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2001,
686 2001.
687
688 [<a id="ref-RFC1661">RFC1661</a>] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)",
689 STD 51, <a href="./rfc1661">RFC 1661</a>, July 1994.
690
691 [<a id="ref-RFC3579">RFC3579</a>] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote
692 Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For
693 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", <a href="./rfc3579">RFC 3579</a>,
694 September 2003.
695
696 [<a id="ref-RFC4072">RFC4072</a>] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter
697 Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application",
698 <a href="./rfc4072">RFC 4072</a>, August 2005.
699
700 [<a id="ref-RFC4186">RFC4186</a>] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible
701 Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for
702 Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity
703 Modules (EAP-SIM)", <a href="./rfc4186">RFC 4186</a>, January 2006.
704
705 [<a id="ref-RFC4187">RFC4187</a>] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication
706 Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and
707 Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)", <a href="./rfc4187">RFC 4187</a>, January 2006.
708
709 [<a id="ref-RFC4746">RFC4746</a>] Clancy, T. and W. Arbaugh, "Extensible Authentication
710 Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange",
711 <a href="./rfc4746">RFC 4746</a>, November 2006.
712
713 [<a id="ref-RFC4763">RFC4763</a>] Vanderveen, M. and H. Soliman, "Extensible
714 Authentication Protocol Method for Shared-secret
715 Authentication and Key Establishment (EAP-SAKE)",
716 <a href="./rfc4763">RFC 4763</a>, November 2006.
717
718 [<a id="ref-RFC4793">RFC4793</a>] Nystroem, M., "The EAP Protected One-Time Password
719 Protocol (EAP-POTP)", <a href="./rfc4793">RFC 4793</a>, February 2007.
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
727
728
729 [<a id="ref-RFC4851">RFC4851</a>] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou,
730 "The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling
731 Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)",
732 <a href="./rfc4851">RFC 4851</a>, May 2007.
733
734 [<a id="ref-RFC5216">RFC5216</a>] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS
735 Authentication Protocol", <a href="./rfc5216">RFC 5216</a>, March 2008.
736
737 [<a id="ref-RFC5247">RFC5247</a>] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
738 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management
739 Framework", <a href="./rfc5247">RFC 5247</a>, August 2008.
740
741 [<a id="ref-RFC5281">RFC5281</a>] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible
742 Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer
743 Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP-
744 TTLSv0)", <a href="./rfc5281">RFC 5281</a>, August 2008.
745
746 [<a id="ref-RFC5433">RFC5433</a>] Clancy, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Extensible
747 Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key
748 (EAP-GPSK) Method", <a href="./rfc5433">RFC 5433</a>, February 2009.
749
750 [<a id="ref-RFC5448">RFC5448</a>] Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., and P. Eronen, "Improved
751 Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd
752 Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-
753 AKA')", <a href="./rfc5448">RFC 5448</a>, May 2009.
754
755 [<a id="ref-RFC5931">RFC5931</a>] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication
756 Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only A Password",
757 <a href="./rfc5931">RFC 5931</a>, August 2010.
758
759
760
761
762
763
764
765
766
767
768
769
770
771
772
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
783
784
785 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Alternative Approaches</span>
786
787 In this section, we list alternatives that have been considered
788 during the work on this document. We concluded that the solution
789 presented in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> seems to fit better into IKEv2.
790
791 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Ignore AUTH Payload at the Initiator</span>
792
793 With this approach, the initiator simply ignores the AUTH payload in
794 message 4 (but obviously must check the second AUTH payload later!).
795 The main advantage of this approach is that no protocol modifications
796 are required and no signature verification is required. A
797 significant disadvantage is that the EAP method to be used cannot be
798 selected to take this behavior into account.
799
800 The initiator could signal to the responder (using a notification
801 payload) that it did not verify the first AUTH payload.
802
803 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Unauthenticated Public Keys in AUTH Payload (Message 4)</span>
804
805 Another solution approach suggests the use of unauthenticated public
806 keys in the public key signature AUTH payload (for message 4).
807
808 That is, the initiator verifies the signature in the AUTH payload,
809 but does not verify that the public key indeed belongs to the
810 intended party (using certificates) -- since it doesn't have a PKI
811 that would allow this. This could be used with X.509 certificates
812 (the initiator ignores all other fields of the certificate except the
813 public key), or "Raw RSA Key" CERT payloads.
814
815 This approach has the advantage that initiators that wish to perform
816 certificate-based responder authentication (in addition to EAP) may
817 do so, without requiring the responder to handle these cases
818 separately. A disadvantage here, again, is that the EAP method
819 selection cannot take into account the incomplete validation of the
820 responder's certificate.
821
822 If using RSA, the overhead of signature verification is quite small,
823 compared to the g^xy calculation required by the Diffie-Hellman
824 exchange.
825
826 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Using EAP Derived Session Keys for IKEv2</span>
827
828 It has been proposed that when using an EAP method that provides
829 mutual authentication and key agreement, the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman
830 exchange could also be omitted. This would mean that the session
831 keys for IPsec SAs established later would rely only on EAP-provided
832 keys.
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span>
839
840
841 It seems the only benefit of this approach is saving some computation
842 time (g^xy calculation). This approach requires designing a
843 completely new protocol (which would not resemble IKEv2 anymore); we
844 do not believe that it should be considered. Nevertheless, we
845 include it for completeness.
846
847 Authors' Addresses
848
849 Pasi Eronen
850 Independent
851
852 EMail: [email protected]
853
854
855 Hannes Tschofenig
856 Nokia Siemens Networks
857 Linnoitustie 6
858 Espoo 02600
859 Finland
860
861 Phone: +358 (50) 4871445
862 EMail: [email protected]
863 URI: <a href="http://www.tschofenig.priv.at">http://www.tschofenig.priv.at</a>
864
865
866 Yaron Sheffer
867 Independent
868
869 EMail: [email protected]
870
871
872
873
874
875
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
893 </pre>