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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) P. Eronen |
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Request for Comments: 5998 Independent |
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Updates: <a href="./rfc5996">5996</a> H. Tschofenig |
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Category: Standards Track Nokia Siemens Networks |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Y. Sheffer |
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Independent |
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September 2010 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">An Extension for EAP-Only Authentication in IKEv2</span> |
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Abstract |
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IKEv2 specifies that Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) |
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authentication must be used together with responder authentication |
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based on public key signatures. This is necessary with old EAP |
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methods that provide only unilateral authentication using, e.g., one- |
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time passwords or token cards. |
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|
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This document specifies how EAP methods that provide mutual |
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authentication and key agreement can be used to provide extensible |
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responder authentication for IKEv2 based on methods other than public |
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key signatures. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5998">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5998</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
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Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
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10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
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material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
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modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
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Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling |
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the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified |
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outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may |
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not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format |
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it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other |
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than English. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP), defined in [<a href="./rfc3748" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)"">RFC3748</a>], |
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is an authentication framework that supports multiple authentication |
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mechanisms. Today, EAP has been implemented at end hosts and routers |
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that connect via switched circuits or dial-up lines using PPP |
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[<a href="./rfc1661" title=""The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)"">RFC1661</a>], IEEE 802 wired switches [<a href="#ref-IEEE8021X" title=""Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based Network Access Control"">IEEE8021X</a>], and IEEE 802.11 |
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wireless access points [<a href="#ref-IEEE80211i" title=""IEEE Standard for Information technology - Telecommunications and information exchange between systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) specifications: Amendment 6: Medium Access Control (MAC) Security Enhancements"">IEEE80211i</a>]. |
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One of the advantages of the EAP architecture is its flexibility. |
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EAP is used to select a specific authentication mechanism, typically |
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after the authenticator requests more information in order to |
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determine the specific authentication method to be used. Rather than |
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requiring the authenticator (e.g., wireless LAN access point) to be |
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updated to support each new authentication method, EAP permits the |
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use of a backend authentication server that may implement some or all |
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authentication methods. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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IKEv2 ([<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5996" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC5996</a>]) is a component of IPsec used for |
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performing mutual authentication and establishing and maintaining |
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Security Associations (SAs) for IPsec ESP and Authentication Header |
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(AH). In addition to supporting authentication using public key |
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signatures and shared secrets, IKEv2 also supports EAP |
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authentication. |
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IKEv2 provides EAP authentication since it was recognized that public |
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key signatures and shared secrets are not flexible enough to meet the |
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requirements of many deployment scenarios. By using EAP, IKEv2 can |
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leverage existing authentication infrastructure and credential |
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databases, since EAP allows users to choose a method suitable for |
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existing credentials, and also makes separation of the IKEv2 |
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responder (VPN gateway) from the EAP authentication endpoint (backend |
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Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) server) easier. |
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Some older EAP methods are designed for unilateral authentication |
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only (that is, EAP peer to EAP server). These methods are used in |
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conjunction with IKEv2 public-key-based authentication of the |
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responder to the initiator. It is expected that this approach is |
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especially useful for "road warrior" VPN gateways that use, for |
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instance, one-time passwords or token cards to authenticate the |
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clients. |
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However, most newer EAP methods, such as those typically used with |
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IEEE 802.11i wireless LANs, provide mutual authentication and key |
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agreement. Currently, IKEv2 specifies that these EAP methods must |
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also be used together with responder authentication based on public |
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key signatures. |
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In order for the public key signature authentication of the gateway |
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to be effective, a deployment of Public Key Infrastructure (PKI) is |
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required, which has to include management of trust anchors on all |
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supplicants. In many environments, this is not realistic, and the |
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security of the gateway public key is the same as the security of a |
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self-signed certificate. Mutually authenticating EAP methods alone |
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can provide a sufficient level of security in many circumstances, and |
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in fact, in some deployments, IEEE 802.11i uses EAP without any PKI |
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for authenticating the Wireless Local Area Network (WLAN) access |
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points. |
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This document specifies how EAP methods that offer mutual |
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authentication and key agreement can be used to provide responder |
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authentication in IKEv2 completely based on EAP. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Terminology</span> |
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All notation in this protocol extension is taken from [<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>]. |
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Numbered messages refer to the IKEv2 message sequence when using EAP. |
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Thus: |
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o Message 1 is the request message of IKE_SA_INIT. |
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o Message 2 is the response message of IKE_SA_INIT. |
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o Message 3 is the first request of IKE_AUTH. |
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o Message 4 is the first response of IKE_AUTH. |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Scenarios</span> |
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In this section, we describe two scenarios for extensible |
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authentication within IKEv2. These scenarios are intended to be |
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illustrative examples rather than specifying how things should be |
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done. |
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Figure 1 shows a configuration where the EAP and the IKEv2 endpoints |
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are co-located. Authenticating the IKEv2 responder using both EAP |
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and public key signatures is redundant. Offering EAP-based |
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authentication has the advantage that multiple different |
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authentication and key exchange protocols are available with EAP with |
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different security properties (such as strong password-based |
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protocols, protocols offering user identity confidentiality, and many |
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more). |
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+------+-----+ +------------+ |
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O | IKEv2 | | IKEv2 | |
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/|\ | Initiator |<---////////////////////--->| Responder | |
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/ \ +------------+ IKEv2 +------------+ |
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User | EAP Peer | Exchange | EAP Server | |
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+------------+ +------------+ |
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Figure 1: EAP and IKEv2 Endpoints Are Co-Located |
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Figure 2 shows a typical corporate network access scenario. The |
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initiator (client) interacts with the responder (VPN gateway) in the |
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corporate network. The EAP exchange within IKE runs between the |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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client and the home AAA server. As a result of a successful EAP |
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authentication protocol run, session keys are established and sent |
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from the AAA server to the VPN gateway, and then used to authenticate |
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the IKEv2 SA with AUTH payloads. |
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The protocol used between the VPN gateway and AAA server could be, |
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for instance, Diameter [<a href="./rfc4072" title=""Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application"">RFC4072</a>] or RADIUS [<a href="./rfc3579" title=""RADIUS (Remote Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)"">RFC3579</a>]. See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> |
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for related security considerations. |
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+-------------------------------+ |
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| Corporate network | |
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| | |
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+-----------+ +--------+ | |
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| IKEv2 | AAA | Home | | |
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IKEv2 +////----->+ Responder +<---------->+ AAA | | |
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Exchange / | (VPN GW) | (RADIUS/ | Server | | |
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/ +-----------+ Diameter) +--------+ | |
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/ | carrying EAP | |
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| | | |
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| +-------------------------------+ |
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v |
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+------+-----+ |
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o | IKEv2 | |
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/|\ | Initiator | |
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/ \ | VPN client | |
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User +------------+ |
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Figure 2: Corporate Network Access |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Solution</span> |
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IKEv2 specifies that when the EAP method establishes a shared secret |
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key, that key is used by both the initiator and responder to generate |
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an AUTH payload (thus authenticating the IKEv2 SA set up by messages |
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1 and 2). |
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When used together with public key responder authentication, the |
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responder is, in effect, authenticated using two different methods: |
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the public key signature AUTH payload in message 4, and the EAP-based |
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AUTH payload later. |
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If the initiator does not wish to use public-key-based responder |
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authentication, it includes an EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION notification |
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payload (16417) in message 3. The Protocol ID and Security Parameter |
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Index (SPI) size fields are set to zero, and there is no additional |
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data associated with this notification. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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If the responder supports this notification and chooses to use it, it |
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omits the public-key-based AUTH payload and CERT payloads from |
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message 4. |
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If the responder does not support the EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION |
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notification or does not wish to use it, it ignores the notification |
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payload, and includes the AUTH payload in message 4. In this case, |
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the initiator MUST verify that payload and any associated |
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certificates, as per [<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>]. |
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When receiving message 4, the initiator MUST verify that the proposed |
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EAP method is allowed by this specification, and MUST abort the |
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protocol immediately otherwise. |
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Both the initiator and responder MUST verify that the EAP method |
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actually used provided mutual authentication and established a shared |
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secret key. The AUTH payloads sent after EAP Success MUST use the |
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EAP-generated key, and MUST NOT use SK_pi or SK_pr (see <a href="./rfc5996#section-2.15">Section 2.15 |
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of [RFC5996]</a>). |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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An IKEv2 message exchange with this modification is shown below: |
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Initiator Responder |
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----------- ----------- |
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HDR, SAi1, KEi, Ni, |
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[N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), |
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N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)] --> |
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<-- HDR, SAr1, KEr, Nr, [CERTREQ], |
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[N(NAT_DETECTION_SOURCE_IP), |
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N(NAT_DETECTION_DESTINATION_IP)] |
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HDR, SK { IDi, [IDr], SAi2, TSi, TSr, |
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N(EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION), |
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[CP(CFG_REQUEST)] } --> |
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<-- HDR, SK { IDr, EAP(Request) } |
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HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --> |
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<-- HDR, SK { EAP(Request) } |
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HDR, SK { EAP(Response) } --> |
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<-- HDR, SK { EAP(Success) } |
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HDR, SK { AUTH } --> |
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<-- HDR, SK { AUTH, SAr2, TSi, TSr, |
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[CP(CFG_REPLY] } |
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Note: all notation in the above protocol sequence and elsewhere in |
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this specification is as defined in [<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>], and see in particular |
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Sec. 1.2 of [<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>] for payload types. |
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The NAT detection and Configuration payloads are shown for |
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informative purposes only; they do not change how EAP authentication |
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works. |
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An IKE SA that was set up with this extension can be resumed using |
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the mechanism described in [<a href="./rfc5723" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption"">RFC5723</a>]. However, session resumption |
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does not change the authentication method. Therefore, during the |
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IKE_AUTH exchange of the resumed session, this extension MUST NOT be |
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sent by the initiator. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Safe EAP Methods</span> |
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EAP methods to be used with this extension MUST have the following |
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properties: |
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1. The method provides mutual authentication of the peers. |
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2. The method is key-generating. |
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3. The method is resistant to dictionary attacks. |
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The authors believe that the following EAP methods are secure when |
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used with the current extension. The list is not inclusive, and |
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there are likely other safe methods that have not been listed here. |
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|
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+-------------------------------+-------------------+---------------+ |
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| Method Name | Allows Channel | Reference | |
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| | Binding? | | |
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+-------------------------------+-------------------+---------------+ |
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| EAP-SIM | No | [<a href="./rfc4186" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity Modules (EAP-SIM)"">RFC4186</a>] | |
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| EAP-AKA | Yes | [<a href="./rfc4187" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)"">RFC4187</a>] | |
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| EAP-AKA' | Yes | [<a href="./rfc5448" title=""Improved Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP- AKA')"">RFC5448</a>] | |
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| EAP-GPSK | Yes | [<a href="./rfc5433" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key (EAP-GPSK) Method"">RFC5433</a>] | |
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| EAP-pwd | No | [<a href="./rfc5931" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only A Password"">RFC5931</a>] | |
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| EAP-EKE | Yes | [<a href="#ref-EMU-EAP-EKE" title=""An EAP Authentication Method Based on the EKE Protocol"">EMU-EAP-EKE</a>] | |
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| EAP-PAX | Yes | [<a href="./rfc4746" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange"">RFC4746</a>] | |
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| EAP-SAKE | No | [<a href="./rfc4763" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for Shared-secret Authentication and Key Establishment (EAP-SAKE)"">RFC4763</a>] | |
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| EAP-SRP | No | [<a href="#ref-EAP-SRP" title=""EAP SRP- SHA1 Authentication Protocol"">EAP-SRP</a>] | |
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| EAP-POTP (mutual | Yes | [<a href="./rfc4793" title=""The EAP Protected One-Time Password Protocol (EAP-POTP)"">RFC4793</a>] | |
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| authentication variant) | | | |
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| EAP-TLS | No | [<a href="./rfc5216" title=""The EAP-TLS Authentication Protocol"">RFC5216</a>] | |
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| EAP-FAST | No | [<a href="./rfc4851" title=""The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)"">RFC4851</a>] | |
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| EAP-TTLS | No | [<a href="./rfc5281" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP- TTLSv0)"">RFC5281</a>] | |
| 426 |
+-------------------------------+-------------------+---------------+ |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
The "Allows channel binding?" column denotes protocols where |
| 429 |
protected identity information may be sent between the EAP endpoints. |
| 430 |
This third, optional property of the method provides protection |
| 431 |
against certain types of attacks (see <a href="#section-6.2">Section 6.2</a> for an |
| 432 |
explanation), and therefore in some scenarios, methods that allow for |
| 433 |
channel binding are to be preferred. It is noted that at the time of |
| 434 |
writing, even when such capabilities are provided, they are not fully |
| 435 |
specified in an interoperable manner. In particular, no RFC |
| 436 |
specifies what identities should be sent under the protection of the |
| 437 |
channel binding mechanism, or what policy is to be used to correlate |
| 438 |
identities at the different layers. |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
This document defines a new IKEv2 Notification Payload type, |
| 452 |
EAP_ONLY_AUTHENTICATION, described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. This payload has |
| 453 |
been assigned the type number 16417 from the "Status Types" range. |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
Security considerations applicable to all EAP methods are discussed |
| 458 |
in [<a href="./rfc3748" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)"">RFC3748</a>]. The EAP Key Management Framework [<a href="./rfc5247" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework"">RFC5247</a>] deals with |
| 459 |
issues that arise when EAP is used as a part of a larger system. |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Authentication of IKEv2 SA</span> |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
It is important to note that the IKEv2 SA is not authenticated by |
| 464 |
just running an EAP conversation: the crucial step is the AUTH |
| 465 |
payload based on the EAP-generated key. Thus, EAP methods that do |
| 466 |
not provide mutual authentication or establish a shared secret key |
| 467 |
MUST NOT be used with the modifications presented in this document. |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Authentication with Separated IKEv2 Responder / EAP Server</span> |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
As described in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, the EAP conversation can terminate either |
| 472 |
at the IKEv2 responder or at a backend AAA server. |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
If the EAP method is terminated at the IKEv2 responder, then no key |
| 475 |
transport via the AAA infrastructure is required. Pre-shared secret |
| 476 |
and public-key-based authentication offered by IKEv2 is then replaced |
| 477 |
by a wider range of authentication and key exchange methods. |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
However, typically EAP will be used with a backend AAA server. See |
| 480 |
[<a href="./rfc5247" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework"">RFC5247</a>] for a more complete discussion of the related security |
| 481 |
issues; here we provide only a short summary. |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
When a backend server is used, there are actually two authentication |
| 484 |
exchanges: the EAP method between the client and the AAA server, and |
| 485 |
another authentication between the AAA server and IKEv2 gateway. The |
| 486 |
AAA server authenticates the client using the selected EAP method, |
| 487 |
and they establish a session key. The AAA server then sends this key |
| 488 |
to the IKEv2 gateway over a connection authenticated using, e.g., |
| 489 |
IPsec or Transport Layer Security (TLS). |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
Some EAP methods do not have any concept of pass-through |
| 492 |
authenticator (e.g., Network Access Server (NAS) or IKEv2 gateway) |
| 493 |
identity, and these two authentications remain quite independent of |
| 494 |
each other. That is, after the client has verified the AUTH payload |
| 495 |
sent by the IKEv2 gateway, it knows that it is talking to SOME |
| 496 |
gateway trusted by the home AAA server, but not which one. The |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
situation is somewhat similar if a single cryptographic hardware |
| 506 |
accelerator, containing a single private key, would be shared between |
| 507 |
multiple IKEv2 gateways (perhaps in some kind of cluster |
| 508 |
configuration). In particular, if one of the gateways is |
| 509 |
compromised, it can impersonate any of the other gateways towards the |
| 510 |
user (until the compromise is discovered and access rights revoked). |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
In some environments it is not desirable to trust the IKEv2 gateways |
| 513 |
this much (also known as the "Lying NAS Problem"). EAP methods that |
| 514 |
provide what is called "connection binding" or "channel binding" |
| 515 |
transport some identity or identities of the gateway (or WLAN access |
| 516 |
point / NAS) inside the EAP method. Then the AAA server can check |
| 517 |
that it is indeed sending the key to the gateway expected by the |
| 518 |
client. A potential solution is described in [<a href="#ref-EAP-SERVICE" title=""Authenticated Service Information for the Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)"">EAP-SERVICE</a>], see also |
| 519 |
[<a href="#ref-EMU-AAAPAY" title=""EAP Method Support for Transporting AAA Payloads"">EMU-AAAPAY</a>]. |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
In some deployment configurations, AAA proxies may be present between |
| 522 |
the IKEv2 gateway and the backend AAA server. These AAA proxies MUST |
| 523 |
be trusted for secure operation, and therefore SHOULD be avoided when |
| 524 |
possible; see <a href="./rfc4072#section-2.3.4">Section 2.3.4 of [RFC4072]</a> and <a href="./rfc3579#section-4.3.7">Section 4.3.7 of |
| 525 |
[RFC3579]</a> for more discussion. |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Protection of EAP Payloads</span> |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
Although the EAP payloads are encrypted and integrity protected with |
| 530 |
SK_e/SK_a, this does not provide any protection against active |
| 531 |
attackers. Until the AUTH payload has been received and verified, a |
| 532 |
man-in-the-middle can change the KEi/KEr payloads and eavesdrop or |
| 533 |
modify the EAP payloads. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
In IEEE 802.11i wireless LANs, the EAP payloads are neither encrypted |
| 536 |
nor integrity protected (by the link layer), so EAP methods are |
| 537 |
typically designed to take that into account. |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
In particular, EAP methods that are vulnerable to dictionary attacks |
| 540 |
when used in WLANs are still vulnerable (to active attackers) when |
| 541 |
run inside IKEv2. |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
The rules in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> are designed to avoid this potential |
| 544 |
vulnerability. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Identities and Authenticated Identities</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
When using this protocol, each of the peers sends two identity |
| 564 |
values: |
| 565 |
|
| 566 |
1. An identity contained in the IKE ID payload. |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
2. An identity transferred within the specific EAP method's |
| 569 |
messages. |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
(IKEv2 omits the EAP Identity request/response pair, see <a href="./rfc5996#section-3.16">Section 3.16 |
| 572 |
of [RFC5996]</a>.) The first identity value can be used by the recipient |
| 573 |
to route AAA messages and/or to select authentication and EAP types. |
| 574 |
But it is only the second identity that is directly authenticated by |
| 575 |
the EAP method. The reader is referred to <a href="./rfc5996#section-2.16">Section 2.16 of [RFC5996]</a> |
| 576 |
regarding the need to base IPsec policy decisions on the |
| 577 |
authenticated identity. In the context of the extension described |
| 578 |
here, this guidance on IPsec policy applies both to the |
| 579 |
authentication of the client by the gateway and vice versa. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. User Identity Confidentiality</span> |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
IKEv2 provides confidentiality for the initiator identity against |
| 584 |
passive eavesdroppers, but not against active attackers. The |
| 585 |
initiator announces its identity first (in message 3), before the |
| 586 |
responder has been authenticated. The usage of EAP in IKEv2 does not |
| 587 |
change this situation, since the ID payload in message 3 is used |
| 588 |
instead of the EAP Identity Request/Response exchange. This is |
| 589 |
somewhat unfortunate since when EAP is used with public key |
| 590 |
authentication of the responder, it would be possible to provide |
| 591 |
active user identity confidentiality for the initiator. |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
IKEv2 protects the responder's identity even against active attacks. |
| 594 |
This property cannot be provided when using EAP. If public key |
| 595 |
responder authentication is used in addition to EAP, the responder |
| 596 |
reveals its identity before authenticating the initiator. If only |
| 597 |
EAP is used (as proposed in this document), the situation depends on |
| 598 |
the EAP method used (in some EAP methods, the server reveals its |
| 599 |
identity first). |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
Hence, if active user identity confidentiality for the responder is |
| 602 |
required then EAP methods that offer this functionality have to be |
| 603 |
used (see <a href="./rfc3748#section-7.3">[RFC3748], Section 7.3</a>). |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
This document borrows some text from [<a href="./rfc3748" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)"">RFC3748</a>], [<a href="./rfc4306" title=""Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol"">RFC4306</a>], and |
| 620 |
[<a href="./rfc4072" title=""Diameter Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application"">RFC4072</a>]. We would also like to thank Hugo Krawczyk for interesting |
| 621 |
discussions about this topic, Dan Harkins, and David Harrington for |
| 622 |
their comments. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span> |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 629 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3748">RFC3748</a>] Aboba, B., Blunk, L., Vollbrecht, J., Carlson, J., and |
| 632 |
H. Levkowetz, "Extensible Authentication Protocol |
| 633 |
(EAP)", <a href="./rfc3748">RFC 3748</a>, June 2004. |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4306">RFC4306</a>] Kaufman, C., "Internet Key Exchange (IKEv2) Protocol", |
| 636 |
<a href="./rfc4306">RFC 4306</a>, December 2005. |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5723">RFC5723</a>] Sheffer, Y. and H. Tschofenig, "Internet Key Exchange |
| 639 |
Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2) Session Resumption", |
| 640 |
<a href="./rfc5723">RFC 5723</a>, January 2010. |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, |
| 643 |
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", |
| 644 |
<a href="./rfc5996">RFC 5996</a>, September 2010. |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
[<a id="ref-EAP-SERVICE">EAP-SERVICE</a>] Arkko, J. and P. Eronen, "Authenticated Service |
| 649 |
Information for the Extensible Authentication Protocol |
| 650 |
(EAP)", Work in Progress, October 2005. |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
[<a id="ref-EAP-SRP">EAP-SRP</a>] Carlson, J., Aboba, B., and H. Haverinen, "EAP SRP- |
| 653 |
SHA1 Authentication Protocol", Work in Progress, |
| 654 |
July 2001. |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
[<a id="ref-EMU-AAAPAY">EMU-AAAPAY</a>] Clancy, C., Lior, A., Zorn, G., and K. Hoeper, "EAP |
| 657 |
Method Support for Transporting AAA Payloads", Work |
| 658 |
in Progress, May 2010. |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
[<a id="ref-EMU-EAP-EKE">EMU-EAP-EKE</a>] Sheffer, Y., Zorn, G., Tschofenig, H., and S. Fluhrer, |
| 661 |
"An EAP Authentication Method Based on the EKE |
| 662 |
Protocol", Work in Progress, August 2010. |
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
[<a id="ref-IEEE80211i">IEEE80211i</a>] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, |
| 674 |
"IEEE Standard for Information technology - |
| 675 |
Telecommunications and information exchange between |
| 676 |
systems - Local and metropolitan area networks - |
| 677 |
Specific requirements - Part 11: Wireless Medium |
| 678 |
Access Control (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) |
| 679 |
specifications: Amendment 6: Medium Access Control |
| 680 |
(MAC) Security Enhancements", IEEE Standard 802.11i- |
| 681 |
2004, July 2004. |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
[<a id="ref-IEEE8021X">IEEE8021X</a>] Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, |
| 684 |
"Local and Metropolitan Area Networks: Port-Based |
| 685 |
Network Access Control", IEEE Standard 802.1X-2001, |
| 686 |
2001. |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1661">RFC1661</a>] Simpson, W., "The Point-to-Point Protocol (PPP)", |
| 689 |
STD 51, <a href="./rfc1661">RFC 1661</a>, July 1994. |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3579">RFC3579</a>] Aboba, B. and P. Calhoun, "RADIUS (Remote |
| 692 |
Authentication Dial In User Service) Support For |
| 693 |
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP)", <a href="./rfc3579">RFC 3579</a>, |
| 694 |
September 2003. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4072">RFC4072</a>] Eronen, P., Hiller, T., and G. Zorn, "Diameter |
| 697 |
Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Application", |
| 698 |
<a href="./rfc4072">RFC 4072</a>, August 2005. |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4186">RFC4186</a>] Haverinen, H. and J. Salowey, "Extensible |
| 701 |
Authentication Protocol Method for Global System for |
| 702 |
Mobile Communications (GSM) Subscriber Identity |
| 703 |
Modules (EAP-SIM)", <a href="./rfc4186">RFC 4186</a>, January 2006. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4187">RFC4187</a>] Arkko, J. and H. Haverinen, "Extensible Authentication |
| 706 |
Protocol Method for 3rd Generation Authentication and |
| 707 |
Key Agreement (EAP-AKA)", <a href="./rfc4187">RFC 4187</a>, January 2006. |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4746">RFC4746</a>] Clancy, T. and W. Arbaugh, "Extensible Authentication |
| 710 |
Protocol (EAP) Password Authenticated Exchange", |
| 711 |
<a href="./rfc4746">RFC 4746</a>, November 2006. |
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4763">RFC4763</a>] Vanderveen, M. and H. Soliman, "Extensible |
| 714 |
Authentication Protocol Method for Shared-secret |
| 715 |
Authentication and Key Establishment (EAP-SAKE)", |
| 716 |
<a href="./rfc4763">RFC 4763</a>, November 2006. |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4793">RFC4793</a>] Nystroem, M., "The EAP Protected One-Time Password |
| 719 |
Protocol (EAP-POTP)", <a href="./rfc4793">RFC 4793</a>, February 2007. |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4851">RFC4851</a>] Cam-Winget, N., McGrew, D., Salowey, J., and H. Zhou, |
| 730 |
"The Flexible Authentication via Secure Tunneling |
| 731 |
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method (EAP-FAST)", |
| 732 |
<a href="./rfc4851">RFC 4851</a>, May 2007. |
| 733 |
|
| 734 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5216">RFC5216</a>] Simon, D., Aboba, B., and R. Hurst, "The EAP-TLS |
| 735 |
Authentication Protocol", <a href="./rfc5216">RFC 5216</a>, March 2008. |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5247">RFC5247</a>] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible |
| 738 |
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management |
| 739 |
Framework", <a href="./rfc5247">RFC 5247</a>, August 2008. |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5281">RFC5281</a>] Funk, P. and S. Blake-Wilson, "Extensible |
| 742 |
Authentication Protocol Tunneled Transport Layer |
| 743 |
Security Authenticated Protocol Version 0 (EAP- |
| 744 |
TTLSv0)", <a href="./rfc5281">RFC 5281</a>, August 2008. |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5433">RFC5433</a>] Clancy, T. and H. Tschofenig, "Extensible |
| 747 |
Authentication Protocol - Generalized Pre-Shared Key |
| 748 |
(EAP-GPSK) Method", <a href="./rfc5433">RFC 5433</a>, February 2009. |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5448">RFC5448</a>] Arkko, J., Lehtovirta, V., and P. Eronen, "Improved |
| 751 |
Extensible Authentication Protocol Method for 3rd |
| 752 |
Generation Authentication and Key Agreement (EAP- |
| 753 |
AKA')", <a href="./rfc5448">RFC 5448</a>, May 2009. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5931">RFC5931</a>] Harkins, D. and G. Zorn, "Extensible Authentication |
| 756 |
Protocol (EAP) Authentication Using Only A Password", |
| 757 |
<a href="./rfc5931">RFC 5931</a>, August 2010. |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Alternative Approaches</span> |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
In this section, we list alternatives that have been considered |
| 788 |
during the work on this document. We concluded that the solution |
| 789 |
presented in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> seems to fit better into IKEv2. |
| 790 |
|
| 791 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Ignore AUTH Payload at the Initiator</span> |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
With this approach, the initiator simply ignores the AUTH payload in |
| 794 |
message 4 (but obviously must check the second AUTH payload later!). |
| 795 |
The main advantage of this approach is that no protocol modifications |
| 796 |
are required and no signature verification is required. A |
| 797 |
significant disadvantage is that the EAP method to be used cannot be |
| 798 |
selected to take this behavior into account. |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
The initiator could signal to the responder (using a notification |
| 801 |
payload) that it did not verify the first AUTH payload. |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Unauthenticated Public Keys in AUTH Payload (Message 4)</span> |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
Another solution approach suggests the use of unauthenticated public |
| 806 |
keys in the public key signature AUTH payload (for message 4). |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
That is, the initiator verifies the signature in the AUTH payload, |
| 809 |
but does not verify that the public key indeed belongs to the |
| 810 |
intended party (using certificates) -- since it doesn't have a PKI |
| 811 |
that would allow this. This could be used with X.509 certificates |
| 812 |
(the initiator ignores all other fields of the certificate except the |
| 813 |
public key), or "Raw RSA Key" CERT payloads. |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
This approach has the advantage that initiators that wish to perform |
| 816 |
certificate-based responder authentication (in addition to EAP) may |
| 817 |
do so, without requiring the responder to handle these cases |
| 818 |
separately. A disadvantage here, again, is that the EAP method |
| 819 |
selection cannot take into account the incomplete validation of the |
| 820 |
responder's certificate. |
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
If using RSA, the overhead of signature verification is quite small, |
| 823 |
compared to the g^xy calculation required by the Diffie-Hellman |
| 824 |
exchange. |
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Using EAP Derived Session Keys for IKEv2</span> |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
It has been proposed that when using an EAP method that provides |
| 829 |
mutual authentication and key agreement, the IKEv2 Diffie-Hellman |
| 830 |
exchange could also be omitted. This would mean that the session |
| 831 |
keys for IPsec SAs established later would rely only on EAP-provided |
| 832 |
keys. |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5998">RFC 5998</a> Extension for EAP in IKEv2 September 2010</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
It seems the only benefit of this approach is saving some computation |
| 842 |
time (g^xy calculation). This approach requires designing a |
| 843 |
completely new protocol (which would not resemble IKEv2 anymore); we |
| 844 |
do not believe that it should be considered. Nevertheless, we |
| 845 |
include it for completeness. |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
Pasi Eronen |
| 850 |
Independent |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 853 |
|
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
Hannes Tschofenig |
| 856 |
Nokia Siemens Networks |
| 857 |
Linnoitustie 6 |
| 858 |
Espoo 02600 |
| 859 |
Finland |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
Phone: +358 (50) 4871445 |
| 862 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 863 |
URI: <a href="http://www.tschofenig.priv.at">http://www.tschofenig.priv.at</a> |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
|
| 866 |
Yaron Sheffer |
| 867 |
Independent |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
|
| 873 |
|
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
Eronen, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] |
| 893 |
</pre> |