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<!DOCTYPE html> |
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<html lang="en" class="RFC"> |
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<head> |
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<meta charset="utf-8"> |
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<meta content="Common,Latin" name="scripts"> |
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<meta content="initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport"> |
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<title>RFC 8827: WebRTC Security Architecture</title> |
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<meta content="Eric Rescorla" name="author"> |
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<meta content=' |
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|
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This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol |
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suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed |
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in browsers -- "real-time communication on the Web". |
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|
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' name="description"> |
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<meta content="xml2rfc 3.5.0" name="generator"> |
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<meta content="8827" name="rfc.number"> |
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<!-- Generator version information: |
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xml2rfc 3.5.0 |
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Python 3.6.10 |
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appdirs 1.4.4 |
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ConfigArgParse 1.2.3 |
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google-i18n-address 2.3.5 |
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html5lib 1.0.1 |
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intervaltree 3.0.2 |
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Jinja2 2.11.2 |
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kitchen 1.2.6 |
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lxml 4.4.2 |
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pycairo 1.19.0 |
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pycountry 19.8.18 |
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pyflakes 2.1.1 |
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PyYAML 5.3.1 |
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requests 2.22.0 |
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setuptools 40.6.2 |
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six 1.14.0 |
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WeasyPrint 51 |
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--> |
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<link href="rfc8827.xml" rel="alternate" type="application/rfc+xml"> |
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<link href="#copyright" rel="license"> |
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<style type="text/css">/* |
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|
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NOTE: Changes at the bottom of this file overrides some earlier settings. |
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|
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Once the style has stabilized and has been adopted as an official RFC style, |
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this can be consolidated so that style settings occur only in one place, but |
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for now the contents of this file consists first of the initial CSS work as |
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provided to the RFC Formatter (xml2rfc) work, followed by itemized and |
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commented changes found necssary during the development of the v3 |
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formatters. |
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|
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*/ |
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|
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/* fonts */ |
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@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Sans'); /* Sans-serif */ |
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@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Serif'); /* Serif (print) */ |
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@import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto+Mono'); /* Monospace */ |
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|
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@viewport { |
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zoom: 1.0; |
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width: extend-to-zoom; |
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} |
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@-ms-viewport { |
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width: extend-to-zoom; |
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zoom: 1.0; |
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} |
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/* general and mobile first */ |
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html { |
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} |
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body { |
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max-width: 90%; |
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margin: 1.5em auto; |
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color: #222; |
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background-color: #fff; |
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font-size: 14px; |
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font-family: 'Noto Sans', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif; |
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line-height: 1.6; |
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scroll-behavior: smooth; |
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} |
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.ears { |
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display: none; |
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} |
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|
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/* headings */ |
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#title, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 { |
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margin: 1em 0 0.5em; |
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font-weight: bold; |
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line-height: 1.3; |
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} |
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#title { |
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clear: both; |
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border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd; |
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margin: 0 0 0.5em 0; |
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padding: 1em 0 0.5em; |
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} |
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.author { |
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padding-bottom: 4px; |
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} |
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h1 { |
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font-size: 26px; |
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margin: 1em 0; |
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} |
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h2 { |
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font-size: 22px; |
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margin-top: -20px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
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padding-top: 33px; |
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} |
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h3 { |
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font-size: 18px; |
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margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
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padding-top: 42px; |
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} |
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h4 { |
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font-size: 16px; |
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margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
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padding-top: 42px; |
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} |
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h5, h6 { |
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font-size: 14px; |
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} |
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#n-copyright-notice { |
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border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd; |
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padding-bottom: 1em; |
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margin-bottom: 1em; |
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} |
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/* general structure */ |
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p { |
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padding: 0; |
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margin: 0 0 1em 0; |
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text-align: left; |
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} |
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div, span { |
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position: relative; |
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} |
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div { |
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margin: 0; |
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} |
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.alignRight.art-text { |
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background-color: #f9f9f9; |
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border: 1px solid #eee; |
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border-radius: 3px; |
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padding: 1em 1em 0; |
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margin-bottom: 1.5em; |
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} |
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.alignRight.art-text pre { |
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padding: 0; |
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} |
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.alignRight { |
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margin: 1em 0; |
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} |
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.alignRight > *:first-child { |
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border: none; |
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margin: 0; |
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float: right; |
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clear: both; |
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} |
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.alignRight > *:nth-child(2) { |
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clear: both; |
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display: block; |
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border: none; |
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} |
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svg { |
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display: block; |
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} |
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.alignCenter.art-text { |
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background-color: #f9f9f9; |
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border: 1px solid #eee; |
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border-radius: 3px; |
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padding: 1em 1em 0; |
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margin-bottom: 1.5em; |
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} |
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.alignCenter.art-text pre { |
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padding: 0; |
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} |
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.alignCenter { |
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margin: 1em 0; |
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} |
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.alignCenter > *:first-child { |
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border: none; |
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/* this isn't optimal, but it's an existence proof. PrinceXML doesn't |
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support flexbox yet. |
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*/ |
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display: table; |
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margin: 0 auto; |
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} |
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|
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/* lists */ |
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ol, ul { |
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padding: 0; |
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margin: 0 0 1em 2em; |
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} |
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ol ol, ul ul, ol ul, ul ol { |
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margin-left: 1em; |
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} |
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li { |
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margin: 0 0 0.25em 0; |
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} |
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.ulCompact li { |
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margin: 0; |
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} |
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ul.empty, .ulEmpty { |
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list-style-type: none; |
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} |
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ul.empty li, .ulEmpty li { |
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margin-top: 0.5em; |
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} |
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ul.compact, .ulCompact, |
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ol.compact, .olCompact { |
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line-height: 100%; |
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margin: 0 0 0 2em; |
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} |
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|
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/* definition lists */ |
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dl { |
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} |
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dl > dt { |
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float: left; |
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margin-right: 1em; |
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} |
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/* |
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dl.nohang > dt { |
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float: none; |
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} |
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*/ |
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dl > dd { |
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margin-bottom: .8em; |
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min-height: 1.3em; |
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} |
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dl.compact > dd, .dlCompact > dd { |
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margin-bottom: 0em; |
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} |
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dl > dd > dl { |
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margin-top: 0.5em; |
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margin-bottom: 0em; |
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} |
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|
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/* links */ |
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a { |
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text-decoration: none; |
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} |
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a[href] { |
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color: #22e; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
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} |
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a[href]:hover { |
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background-color: #f2f2f2; |
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} |
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figcaption a[href], |
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a[href].selfRef { |
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color: #222; |
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} |
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/* XXX probably not this: |
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a.selfRef:hover { |
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background-color: transparent; |
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cursor: default; |
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} */ |
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|
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/* Figures */ |
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tt, code, pre, code { |
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background-color: #f9f9f9; |
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font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace; |
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} |
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pre { |
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border: 1px solid #eee; |
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margin: 0; |
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padding: 1em; |
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} |
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img { |
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max-width: 100%; |
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} |
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figure { |
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margin: 0; |
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} |
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figure blockquote { |
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margin: 0.8em 0.4em 0.4em; |
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} |
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figcaption { |
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font-style: italic; |
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margin: 0 0 1em 0; |
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} |
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@media screen { |
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pre { |
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overflow-x: auto; |
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max-width: 100%; |
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max-width: calc(100% - 22px); |
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} |
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} |
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|
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/* aside, blockquote */ |
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aside, blockquote { |
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margin-left: 0; |
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padding: 1.2em 2em; |
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} |
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blockquote { |
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background-color: #f9f9f9; |
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color: #111; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
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border: 1px solid #ddd; |
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border-radius: 3px; |
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margin: 1em 0; |
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} |
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cite { |
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display: block; |
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text-align: right; |
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font-style: italic; |
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} |
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|
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/* tables */ |
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table { |
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width: 100%; |
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margin: 0 0 1em; |
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border-collapse: collapse; |
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border: 1px solid #eee; |
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} |
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th, td { |
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text-align: left; |
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vertical-align: top; |
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padding: 0.5em 0.75em; |
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} |
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th { |
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text-align: left; |
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background-color: #e9e9e9; |
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} |
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tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td { |
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background-color: #f5f5f5; |
| 323 |
} |
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table caption { |
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font-style: italic; |
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margin: 0; |
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padding: 0; |
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text-align: left; |
| 329 |
} |
| 330 |
table p { |
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/* XXX to avoid bottom margin on table row signifiers. If paragraphs should |
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be allowed within tables more generally, it would be far better to select on a class. */ |
| 333 |
margin: 0; |
| 334 |
} |
| 335 |
|
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/* pilcrow */ |
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a.pilcrow { |
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color: #666; /* Arlen: AHDJ 2019 */ |
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text-decoration: none; |
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visibility: hidden; |
| 341 |
user-select: none; |
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-ms-user-select: none; |
| 343 |
-o-user-select:none; |
| 344 |
-moz-user-select: none; |
| 345 |
-khtml-user-select: none; |
| 346 |
-webkit-user-select: none; |
| 347 |
-webkit-touch-callout: none; |
| 348 |
} |
| 349 |
@media screen { |
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aside:hover > a.pilcrow, |
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p:hover > a.pilcrow, |
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blockquote:hover > a.pilcrow, |
| 353 |
div:hover > a.pilcrow, |
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li:hover > a.pilcrow, |
| 355 |
pre:hover > a.pilcrow { |
| 356 |
visibility: visible; |
| 357 |
} |
| 358 |
a.pilcrow:hover { |
| 359 |
background-color: transparent; |
| 360 |
} |
| 361 |
} |
| 362 |
|
| 363 |
/* misc */ |
| 364 |
hr { |
| 365 |
border: 0; |
| 366 |
border-top: 1px solid #eee; |
| 367 |
} |
| 368 |
.bcp14 { |
| 369 |
font-variant: small-caps; |
| 370 |
} |
| 371 |
|
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.role { |
| 373 |
font-variant: all-small-caps; |
| 374 |
} |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
/* info block */ |
| 377 |
#identifiers { |
| 378 |
margin: 0; |
| 379 |
font-size: 0.9em; |
| 380 |
} |
| 381 |
#identifiers dt { |
| 382 |
width: 3em; |
| 383 |
clear: left; |
| 384 |
} |
| 385 |
#identifiers dd { |
| 386 |
float: left; |
| 387 |
margin-bottom: 0; |
| 388 |
} |
| 389 |
#identifiers .authors .author { |
| 390 |
display: inline-block; |
| 391 |
margin-right: 1.5em; |
| 392 |
} |
| 393 |
#identifiers .authors .org { |
| 394 |
font-style: italic; |
| 395 |
} |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
/* The prepared/rendered info at the very bottom of the page */ |
| 398 |
.docInfo { |
| 399 |
color: #666; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
| 400 |
font-size: 0.9em; |
| 401 |
font-style: italic; |
| 402 |
margin-top: 2em; |
| 403 |
} |
| 404 |
.docInfo .prepared { |
| 405 |
float: left; |
| 406 |
} |
| 407 |
.docInfo .prepared { |
| 408 |
float: right; |
| 409 |
} |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
/* table of contents */ |
| 412 |
#toc { |
| 413 |
padding: 0.75em 0 2em 0; |
| 414 |
margin-bottom: 1em; |
| 415 |
} |
| 416 |
nav.toc ul { |
| 417 |
margin: 0 0.5em 0 0; |
| 418 |
padding: 0; |
| 419 |
list-style: none; |
| 420 |
} |
| 421 |
nav.toc li { |
| 422 |
line-height: 1.3em; |
| 423 |
margin: 0.75em 0; |
| 424 |
padding-left: 1.2em; |
| 425 |
text-indent: -1.2em; |
| 426 |
} |
| 427 |
/* references */ |
| 428 |
.references dt { |
| 429 |
text-align: right; |
| 430 |
font-weight: bold; |
| 431 |
min-width: 7em; |
| 432 |
} |
| 433 |
.references dd { |
| 434 |
margin-left: 8em; |
| 435 |
overflow: auto; |
| 436 |
} |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
.refInstance { |
| 439 |
margin-bottom: 1.25em; |
| 440 |
} |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
.references .ascii { |
| 443 |
margin-bottom: 0.25em; |
| 444 |
} |
| 445 |
|
| 446 |
/* index */ |
| 447 |
.index ul { |
| 448 |
margin: 0 0 0 1em; |
| 449 |
padding: 0; |
| 450 |
list-style: none; |
| 451 |
} |
| 452 |
.index ul ul { |
| 453 |
margin: 0; |
| 454 |
} |
| 455 |
.index li { |
| 456 |
margin: 0; |
| 457 |
text-indent: -2em; |
| 458 |
padding-left: 2em; |
| 459 |
padding-bottom: 5px; |
| 460 |
} |
| 461 |
.indexIndex { |
| 462 |
margin: 0.5em 0 1em; |
| 463 |
} |
| 464 |
.index a { |
| 465 |
font-weight: 700; |
| 466 |
} |
| 467 |
/* make the index two-column on all but the smallest screens */ |
| 468 |
@media (min-width: 600px) { |
| 469 |
.index ul { |
| 470 |
-moz-column-count: 2; |
| 471 |
-moz-column-gap: 20px; |
| 472 |
} |
| 473 |
.index ul ul { |
| 474 |
-moz-column-count: 1; |
| 475 |
-moz-column-gap: 0; |
| 476 |
} |
| 477 |
} |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
/* authors */ |
| 480 |
address.vcard { |
| 481 |
font-style: normal; |
| 482 |
margin: 1em 0; |
| 483 |
} |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
address.vcard .nameRole { |
| 486 |
font-weight: 700; |
| 487 |
margin-left: 0; |
| 488 |
} |
| 489 |
address.vcard .label { |
| 490 |
font-family: "Noto Sans",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif; |
| 491 |
margin: 0.5em 0; |
| 492 |
} |
| 493 |
address.vcard .type { |
| 494 |
display: none; |
| 495 |
} |
| 496 |
.alternative-contact { |
| 497 |
margin: 1.5em 0 1em; |
| 498 |
} |
| 499 |
hr.addr { |
| 500 |
border-top: 1px dashed; |
| 501 |
margin: 0; |
| 502 |
color: #ddd; |
| 503 |
max-width: calc(100% - 16px); |
| 504 |
} |
| 505 |
|
| 506 |
/* temporary notes */ |
| 507 |
.rfcEditorRemove::before { |
| 508 |
position: absolute; |
| 509 |
top: 0.2em; |
| 510 |
right: 0.2em; |
| 511 |
padding: 0.2em; |
| 512 |
content: "The RFC Editor will remove this note"; |
| 513 |
color: #9e2a00; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
| 514 |
background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
| 515 |
} |
| 516 |
.rfcEditorRemove { |
| 517 |
position: relative; |
| 518 |
padding-top: 1.8em; |
| 519 |
background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
| 520 |
border-radius: 3px; |
| 521 |
} |
| 522 |
.cref { |
| 523 |
background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */ |
| 524 |
padding: 2px 4px; |
| 525 |
} |
| 526 |
.crefSource { |
| 527 |
font-style: italic; |
| 528 |
} |
| 529 |
/* alternative layout for smaller screens */ |
| 530 |
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) { |
| 531 |
body { |
| 532 |
padding-top: 2em; |
| 533 |
} |
| 534 |
#title { |
| 535 |
padding: 1em 0; |
| 536 |
} |
| 537 |
h1 { |
| 538 |
font-size: 24px; |
| 539 |
} |
| 540 |
h2 { |
| 541 |
font-size: 20px; |
| 542 |
margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
| 543 |
padding-top: 38px; |
| 544 |
} |
| 545 |
#identifiers dd { |
| 546 |
max-width: 60%; |
| 547 |
} |
| 548 |
#toc { |
| 549 |
position: fixed; |
| 550 |
z-index: 2; |
| 551 |
top: 0; |
| 552 |
right: 0; |
| 553 |
padding: 0; |
| 554 |
margin: 0; |
| 555 |
background-color: inherit; |
| 556 |
border-bottom: 1px solid #ccc; |
| 557 |
} |
| 558 |
#toc h2 { |
| 559 |
margin: -1px 0 0 0; |
| 560 |
padding: 4px 0 4px 6px; |
| 561 |
padding-right: 1em; |
| 562 |
min-width: 190px; |
| 563 |
font-size: 1.1em; |
| 564 |
text-align: right; |
| 565 |
background-color: #444; |
| 566 |
color: white; |
| 567 |
cursor: pointer; |
| 568 |
} |
| 569 |
#toc h2::before { /* css hamburger */ |
| 570 |
float: right; |
| 571 |
position: relative; |
| 572 |
width: 1em; |
| 573 |
height: 1px; |
| 574 |
left: -164px; |
| 575 |
margin: 6px 0 0 0; |
| 576 |
background: white none repeat scroll 0 0; |
| 577 |
box-shadow: 0 4px 0 0 white, 0 8px 0 0 white; |
| 578 |
content: ""; |
| 579 |
} |
| 580 |
#toc nav { |
| 581 |
display: none; |
| 582 |
padding: 0.5em 1em 1em; |
| 583 |
overflow: auto; |
| 584 |
height: calc(100vh - 48px); |
| 585 |
border-left: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 586 |
} |
| 587 |
} |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
/* alternative layout for wide screens */ |
| 590 |
@media screen and (min-width: 1024px) { |
| 591 |
body { |
| 592 |
max-width: 724px; |
| 593 |
margin: 42px auto; |
| 594 |
padding-left: 1.5em; |
| 595 |
padding-right: 29em; |
| 596 |
} |
| 597 |
#toc { |
| 598 |
position: fixed; |
| 599 |
top: 42px; |
| 600 |
right: 42px; |
| 601 |
width: 25%; |
| 602 |
margin: 0; |
| 603 |
padding: 0 1em; |
| 604 |
z-index: 1; |
| 605 |
} |
| 606 |
#toc h2 { |
| 607 |
border-top: none; |
| 608 |
border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 609 |
font-size: 1em; |
| 610 |
font-weight: normal; |
| 611 |
margin: 0; |
| 612 |
padding: 0.25em 1em 1em 0; |
| 613 |
} |
| 614 |
#toc nav { |
| 615 |
display: block; |
| 616 |
height: calc(90vh - 84px); |
| 617 |
bottom: 0; |
| 618 |
padding: 0.5em 0 0; |
| 619 |
overflow: auto; |
| 620 |
} |
| 621 |
img { /* future proofing */ |
| 622 |
max-width: 100%; |
| 623 |
height: auto; |
| 624 |
} |
| 625 |
} |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
/* pagination */ |
| 628 |
@media print { |
| 629 |
body { |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
width: 100%; |
| 632 |
} |
| 633 |
p { |
| 634 |
orphans: 3; |
| 635 |
widows: 3; |
| 636 |
} |
| 637 |
#n-copyright-notice { |
| 638 |
border-bottom: none; |
| 639 |
} |
| 640 |
#toc, #n-introduction { |
| 641 |
page-break-before: always; |
| 642 |
} |
| 643 |
#toc { |
| 644 |
border-top: none; |
| 645 |
padding-top: 0; |
| 646 |
} |
| 647 |
figure, pre { |
| 648 |
page-break-inside: avoid; |
| 649 |
} |
| 650 |
figure { |
| 651 |
overflow: scroll; |
| 652 |
} |
| 653 |
h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 { |
| 654 |
page-break-after: avoid; |
| 655 |
} |
| 656 |
h2+*, h3+*, h4+*, h5+*, h6+* { |
| 657 |
page-break-before: avoid; |
| 658 |
} |
| 659 |
pre { |
| 660 |
white-space: pre-wrap; |
| 661 |
word-wrap: break-word; |
| 662 |
font-size: 10pt; |
| 663 |
} |
| 664 |
table { |
| 665 |
border: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 666 |
} |
| 667 |
td { |
| 668 |
border-top: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 669 |
} |
| 670 |
} |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
/* This is commented out here, as the string-set: doesn't |
| 673 |
pass W3C validation currently */ |
| 674 |
/* |
| 675 |
.ears thead .left { |
| 676 |
string-set: ears-top-left content(); |
| 677 |
} |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
.ears thead .center { |
| 680 |
string-set: ears-top-center content(); |
| 681 |
} |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
.ears thead .right { |
| 684 |
string-set: ears-top-right content(); |
| 685 |
} |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
.ears tfoot .left { |
| 688 |
string-set: ears-bottom-left content(); |
| 689 |
} |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
.ears tfoot .center { |
| 692 |
string-set: ears-bottom-center content(); |
| 693 |
} |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
.ears tfoot .right { |
| 696 |
string-set: ears-bottom-right content(); |
| 697 |
} |
| 698 |
*/ |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
@page :first { |
| 701 |
padding-top: 0; |
| 702 |
@top-left { |
| 703 |
content: normal; |
| 704 |
border: none; |
| 705 |
} |
| 706 |
@top-center { |
| 707 |
content: normal; |
| 708 |
border: none; |
| 709 |
} |
| 710 |
@top-right { |
| 711 |
content: normal; |
| 712 |
border: none; |
| 713 |
} |
| 714 |
} |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
@page { |
| 717 |
size: A4; |
| 718 |
margin-bottom: 45mm; |
| 719 |
padding-top: 20px; |
| 720 |
/* The follwing is commented out here, but set appropriately by in code, as |
| 721 |
the content depends on the document */ |
| 722 |
/* |
| 723 |
@top-left { |
| 724 |
content: 'Internet-Draft'; |
| 725 |
vertical-align: bottom; |
| 726 |
border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 727 |
} |
| 728 |
@top-left { |
| 729 |
content: string(ears-top-left); |
| 730 |
vertical-align: bottom; |
| 731 |
border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 732 |
} |
| 733 |
@top-center { |
| 734 |
content: string(ears-top-center); |
| 735 |
vertical-align: bottom; |
| 736 |
border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 737 |
} |
| 738 |
@top-right { |
| 739 |
content: string(ears-top-right); |
| 740 |
vertical-align: bottom; |
| 741 |
border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 742 |
} |
| 743 |
@bottom-left { |
| 744 |
content: string(ears-bottom-left); |
| 745 |
vertical-align: top; |
| 746 |
border-top: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 747 |
} |
| 748 |
@bottom-center { |
| 749 |
content: string(ears-bottom-center); |
| 750 |
vertical-align: top; |
| 751 |
border-top: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 752 |
} |
| 753 |
@bottom-right { |
| 754 |
content: '[Page ' counter(page) ']'; |
| 755 |
vertical-align: top; |
| 756 |
border-top: solid 1px #ccc; |
| 757 |
} |
| 758 |
*/ |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
} |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
/* Changes introduced to fix issues found during implementation */ |
| 763 |
/* Make sure links are clickable even if overlapped by following H* */ |
| 764 |
a { |
| 765 |
z-index: 2; |
| 766 |
} |
| 767 |
/* Separate body from document info even without intervening H1 */ |
| 768 |
section { |
| 769 |
clear: both; |
| 770 |
} |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
/* Top align author divs, to avoid names without organization dropping level with org names */ |
| 774 |
.author { |
| 775 |
vertical-align: top; |
| 776 |
} |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
/* Leave room in document info to show Internet-Draft on one line */ |
| 779 |
#identifiers dt { |
| 780 |
width: 8em; |
| 781 |
} |
| 782 |
|
| 783 |
/* Don't waste quite as much whitespace between label and value in doc info */ |
| 784 |
#identifiers dd { |
| 785 |
margin-left: 1em; |
| 786 |
} |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
/* Give floating toc a background color (needed when it's a div inside section */ |
| 789 |
#toc { |
| 790 |
background-color: white; |
| 791 |
} |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
/* Make the collapsed ToC header render white on gray also when it's a link */ |
| 794 |
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) { |
| 795 |
#toc h2 a, |
| 796 |
#toc h2 a:link, |
| 797 |
#toc h2 a:focus, |
| 798 |
#toc h2 a:hover, |
| 799 |
#toc a.toplink, |
| 800 |
#toc a.toplink:hover { |
| 801 |
color: white; |
| 802 |
background-color: #444; |
| 803 |
text-decoration: none; |
| 804 |
} |
| 805 |
} |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
/* Give the bottom of the ToC some whitespace */ |
| 808 |
@media screen and (min-width: 1024px) { |
| 809 |
#toc { |
| 810 |
padding: 0 0 1em 1em; |
| 811 |
} |
| 812 |
} |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
/* Style section numbers with more space between number and title */ |
| 815 |
.section-number { |
| 816 |
padding-right: 0.5em; |
| 817 |
} |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
/* prevent monospace from becoming overly large */ |
| 820 |
tt, code, pre, code { |
| 821 |
font-size: 95%; |
| 822 |
} |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
/* Fix the height/width aspect for ascii art*/ |
| 825 |
pre.sourcecode, |
| 826 |
.art-text pre { |
| 827 |
line-height: 1.12; |
| 828 |
} |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
/* Add styling for a link in the ToC that points to the top of the document */ |
| 832 |
a.toplink { |
| 833 |
float: right; |
| 834 |
margin-right: 0.5em; |
| 835 |
} |
| 836 |
|
| 837 |
/* Fix the dl styling to match the RFC 7992 attributes */ |
| 838 |
dl > dt, |
| 839 |
dl.dlParallel > dt { |
| 840 |
float: left; |
| 841 |
margin-right: 1em; |
| 842 |
} |
| 843 |
dl.dlNewline > dt { |
| 844 |
float: none; |
| 845 |
} |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
/* Provide styling for table cell text alignment */ |
| 848 |
table td.text-left, |
| 849 |
table th.text-left { |
| 850 |
text-align: left; |
| 851 |
} |
| 852 |
table td.text-center, |
| 853 |
table th.text-center { |
| 854 |
text-align: center; |
| 855 |
} |
| 856 |
table td.text-right, |
| 857 |
table th.text-right { |
| 858 |
text-align: right; |
| 859 |
} |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
/* Make the alternative author contact informatio look less like just another |
| 862 |
author, and group it closer with the primary author contact information */ |
| 863 |
.alternative-contact { |
| 864 |
margin: 0.5em 0 0.25em 0; |
| 865 |
} |
| 866 |
address .non-ascii { |
| 867 |
margin: 0 0 0 2em; |
| 868 |
} |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
/* With it being possible to set tables with alignment |
| 871 |
left, center, and right, { width: 100%; } does not make sense */ |
| 872 |
table { |
| 873 |
width: auto; |
| 874 |
} |
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
/* Avoid reference text that sits in a block with very wide left margin, |
| 877 |
because of a long floating dt label.*/ |
| 878 |
.references dd { |
| 879 |
overflow: visible; |
| 880 |
} |
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
/* Control caption placement */ |
| 883 |
caption { |
| 884 |
caption-side: bottom; |
| 885 |
} |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
/* Limit the width of the author address vcard, so names in right-to-left |
| 888 |
script don't end up on the other side of the page. */ |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
address.vcard { |
| 891 |
max-width: 30em; |
| 892 |
margin-right: auto; |
| 893 |
} |
| 894 |
|
| 895 |
/* For address alignment dependent on LTR or RTL scripts */ |
| 896 |
address div.left { |
| 897 |
text-align: left; |
| 898 |
} |
| 899 |
address div.right { |
| 900 |
text-align: right; |
| 901 |
} |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
/* Provide table alignment support. We can't use the alignX classes above |
| 904 |
since they do unwanted things with caption and other styling. */ |
| 905 |
table.right { |
| 906 |
margin-left: auto; |
| 907 |
margin-right: 0; |
| 908 |
} |
| 909 |
table.center { |
| 910 |
margin-left: auto; |
| 911 |
margin-right: auto; |
| 912 |
} |
| 913 |
table.left { |
| 914 |
margin-left: 0; |
| 915 |
margin-right: auto; |
| 916 |
} |
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
/* Give the table caption label the same styling as the figcaption */ |
| 919 |
caption a[href] { |
| 920 |
color: #222; |
| 921 |
} |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
@media print { |
| 924 |
.toplink { |
| 925 |
display: none; |
| 926 |
} |
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
/* avoid overwriting the top border line with the ToC header */ |
| 929 |
#toc { |
| 930 |
padding-top: 1px; |
| 931 |
} |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
/* Avoid page breaks inside dl and author address entries */ |
| 934 |
.vcard { |
| 935 |
page-break-inside: avoid; |
| 936 |
} |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
} |
| 939 |
/* Tweak the bcp14 keyword presentation */ |
| 940 |
.bcp14 { |
| 941 |
font-variant: small-caps; |
| 942 |
font-weight: bold; |
| 943 |
font-size: 0.9em; |
| 944 |
} |
| 945 |
/* Tweak the invisible space above H* in order not to overlay links in text above */ |
| 946 |
h2 { |
| 947 |
margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
| 948 |
padding-top: 31px; |
| 949 |
} |
| 950 |
h3 { |
| 951 |
margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
| 952 |
padding-top: 24px; |
| 953 |
} |
| 954 |
h4 { |
| 955 |
margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */ |
| 956 |
padding-top: 24px; |
| 957 |
} |
| 958 |
/* Float artwork pilcrow to the right */ |
| 959 |
@media screen { |
| 960 |
.artwork a.pilcrow { |
| 961 |
display: block; |
| 962 |
line-height: 0.7; |
| 963 |
margin-top: 0.15em; |
| 964 |
} |
| 965 |
} |
| 966 |
/* Make pilcrows on dd visible */ |
| 967 |
@media screen { |
| 968 |
dd:hover > a.pilcrow { |
| 969 |
visibility: visible; |
| 970 |
} |
| 971 |
} |
| 972 |
/* Make the placement of figcaption match that of a table's caption |
| 973 |
by removing the figure's added bottom margin */ |
| 974 |
.alignLeft.art-text, |
| 975 |
.alignCenter.art-text, |
| 976 |
.alignRight.art-text { |
| 977 |
margin-bottom: 0; |
| 978 |
} |
| 979 |
.alignLeft, |
| 980 |
.alignCenter, |
| 981 |
.alignRight { |
| 982 |
margin: 1em 0 0 0; |
| 983 |
} |
| 984 |
/* In print, the pilcrow won't show on hover, so prevent it from taking up space, |
| 985 |
possibly even requiring a new line */ |
| 986 |
@media print { |
| 987 |
a.pilcrow { |
| 988 |
display: none; |
| 989 |
} |
| 990 |
} |
| 991 |
/* Styling for the external metadata */ |
| 992 |
div#external-metadata { |
| 993 |
background-color: #eee; |
| 994 |
padding: 0.5em; |
| 995 |
margin-bottom: 0.5em; |
| 996 |
display: none; |
| 997 |
} |
| 998 |
div#internal-metadata { |
| 999 |
padding: 0.5em; /* to match the external-metadata padding */ |
| 1000 |
} |
| 1001 |
/* Styling for title RFC Number */ |
| 1002 |
h1#rfcnum { |
| 1003 |
clear: both; |
| 1004 |
margin: 0 0 -1em; |
| 1005 |
padding: 1em 0 0 0; |
| 1006 |
} |
| 1007 |
/* Make .olPercent look the same as <ol><li> */ |
| 1008 |
dl.olPercent > dd { |
| 1009 |
margin-bottom: 0.25em; |
| 1010 |
min-height: initial; |
| 1011 |
} |
| 1012 |
/* Give aside some styling to set it apart */ |
| 1013 |
aside { |
| 1014 |
border-left: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 1015 |
margin: 1em 0 1em 2em; |
| 1016 |
padding: 0.2em 2em; |
| 1017 |
} |
| 1018 |
aside > dl, |
| 1019 |
aside > ol, |
| 1020 |
aside > ul, |
| 1021 |
aside > table, |
| 1022 |
aside > p { |
| 1023 |
margin-bottom: 0.5em; |
| 1024 |
} |
| 1025 |
/* Additional page break settings */ |
| 1026 |
@media print { |
| 1027 |
figcaption, table caption { |
| 1028 |
page-break-before: avoid; |
| 1029 |
} |
| 1030 |
} |
| 1031 |
/* Font size adjustments for print */ |
| 1032 |
@media print { |
| 1033 |
body { font-size: 10pt; line-height: normal; max-width: 96%; } |
| 1034 |
h1 { font-size: 1.72em; padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2*1.2*1.2 */ |
| 1035 |
h2 { font-size: 1.44em; padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2*1.2 */ |
| 1036 |
h3 { font-size: 1.2em; padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2 */ |
| 1037 |
h4 { font-size: 1em; padding-top: 1.5em; } |
| 1038 |
h5, h6 { font-size: 1em; margin: initial; padding: 0.5em 0 0.3em; } |
| 1039 |
} |
| 1040 |
/* Sourcecode margin in print, when there's no pilcrow */ |
| 1041 |
@media print { |
| 1042 |
.artwork, |
| 1043 |
.sourcecode { |
| 1044 |
margin-bottom: 1em; |
| 1045 |
} |
| 1046 |
} |
| 1047 |
/* Avoid narrow tables forcing too narrow table captions, which may render badly */ |
| 1048 |
table { |
| 1049 |
min-width: 20em; |
| 1050 |
} |
| 1051 |
/* ol type a */ |
| 1052 |
ol.type-a { list-style-type: lower-alpha; } |
| 1053 |
ol.type-A { list-style-type: upper-alpha; } |
| 1054 |
ol.type-i { list-style-type: lower-roman; } |
| 1055 |
ol.type-I { list-style-type: lower-roman; } |
| 1056 |
/* Apply the print table and row borders in general, on request from the RPC, |
| 1057 |
and increase the contrast between border and odd row background sligthtly */ |
| 1058 |
table { |
| 1059 |
border: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 1060 |
} |
| 1061 |
td { |
| 1062 |
border-top: 1px solid #ddd; |
| 1063 |
} |
| 1064 |
tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td { |
| 1065 |
background-color: #f8f8f8; |
| 1066 |
} |
| 1067 |
/* Use style rules to govern display of the TOC. */ |
| 1068 |
@media screen and (max-width: 1023px) { |
| 1069 |
#toc nav { display: none; } |
| 1070 |
#toc.active nav { display: block; } |
| 1071 |
} |
| 1072 |
/* Add support for keepWithNext */ |
| 1073 |
.keepWithNext { |
| 1074 |
break-after: avoid-page; |
| 1075 |
break-after: avoid-page; |
| 1076 |
} |
| 1077 |
/* Add support for keepWithPrevious */ |
| 1078 |
.keepWithPrevious { |
| 1079 |
break-before: avoid-page; |
| 1080 |
} |
| 1081 |
/* Change the approach to avoiding breaks inside artwork etc. */ |
| 1082 |
figure, pre, table, .artwork, .sourcecode { |
| 1083 |
break-before: avoid-page; |
| 1084 |
break-after: auto; |
| 1085 |
} |
| 1086 |
/* Avoid breaks between <dt> and <dd> */ |
| 1087 |
dl { |
| 1088 |
break-before: auto; |
| 1089 |
break-inside: auto; |
| 1090 |
} |
| 1091 |
dt { |
| 1092 |
break-before: auto; |
| 1093 |
break-after: avoid-page; |
| 1094 |
} |
| 1095 |
dd { |
| 1096 |
break-before: avoid-page; |
| 1097 |
break-after: auto; |
| 1098 |
orphans: 3; |
| 1099 |
widows: 3 |
| 1100 |
} |
| 1101 |
span.break, dd.break { |
| 1102 |
margin-bottom: 0; |
| 1103 |
min-height: 0; |
| 1104 |
break-before: auto; |
| 1105 |
break-inside: auto; |
| 1106 |
break-after: auto; |
| 1107 |
} |
| 1108 |
/* Undo break-before ToC */ |
| 1109 |
@media print { |
| 1110 |
#toc { |
| 1111 |
break-before: auto; |
| 1112 |
} |
| 1113 |
} |
| 1114 |
/* Text in compact lists should not get extra bottim margin space, |
| 1115 |
since that would makes the list not compact */ |
| 1116 |
ul.compact p, .ulCompact p, |
| 1117 |
ol.compact p, .olCompact p { |
| 1118 |
margin: 0; |
| 1119 |
} |
| 1120 |
/* But the list as a whole needs the extra space at the end */ |
| 1121 |
section ul.compact, |
| 1122 |
section .ulCompact, |
| 1123 |
section ol.compact, |
| 1124 |
section .olCompact { |
| 1125 |
margin-bottom: 1em; /* same as p not within ul.compact etc. */ |
| 1126 |
} |
| 1127 |
/* The tt and code background above interferes with for instance table cell |
| 1128 |
backgrounds. Changed to something a bit more selective. */ |
| 1129 |
tt, code { |
| 1130 |
background-color: transparent; |
| 1131 |
} |
| 1132 |
p tt, p code, li tt, li code { |
| 1133 |
background-color: #f8f8f8; |
| 1134 |
} |
| 1135 |
/* Tweak the pre margin -- 0px doesn't come out well */ |
| 1136 |
pre { |
| 1137 |
margin-top: 0.5px; |
| 1138 |
} |
| 1139 |
/* Tweak the comact list text */ |
| 1140 |
ul.compact, .ulCompact, |
| 1141 |
ol.compact, .olCompact, |
| 1142 |
dl.compact, .dlCompact { |
| 1143 |
line-height: normal; |
| 1144 |
} |
| 1145 |
/* Don't add top margin for nested lists */ |
| 1146 |
li > ul, li > ol, li > dl, |
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dd > ul, dd > ol, dd > dl, |
| 1148 |
dl > dd > dl { |
| 1149 |
margin-top: initial; |
| 1150 |
} |
| 1151 |
/* Elements that should not be rendered on the same line as a <dt> */ |
| 1152 |
/* This should match the element list in writer.text.TextWriter.render_dl() */ |
| 1153 |
dd > div.artwork:first-child, |
| 1154 |
dd > aside:first-child, |
| 1155 |
dd > figure:first-child, |
| 1156 |
dd > ol:first-child, |
| 1157 |
dd > div:first-child > pre.sourcecode, |
| 1158 |
dd > table:first-child, |
| 1159 |
dd > ul:first-child { |
| 1160 |
clear: left; |
| 1161 |
} |
| 1162 |
/* fix for weird browser behaviour when <dd/> is empty */ |
| 1163 |
dt+dd:empty::before{ |
| 1164 |
content: "\00a0"; |
| 1165 |
} |
| 1166 |
</style> |
| 1167 |
<link href="rfc-local.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css"> |
| 1168 |
<link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc8827" rel="alternate"> |
| 1169 |
<link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate"> |
| 1170 |
<link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-20" rel="prev"> |
| 1171 |
</head> |
| 1172 |
<body> |
| 1173 |
<script src="https://www.rfc-editor.org/js/metadata.min.js"></script> |
| 1174 |
<table class="ears"> |
| 1175 |
<thead><tr> |
| 1176 |
<td class="left">RFC 8827</td> |
| 1177 |
<td class="center">WebRTC Sec. Arch.</td> |
| 1178 |
<td class="right">January 2021</td> |
| 1179 |
</tr></thead> |
| 1180 |
<tfoot><tr> |
| 1181 |
<td class="left">Rescorla</td> |
| 1182 |
<td class="center">Standards Track</td> |
| 1183 |
<td class="right">[Page]</td> |
| 1184 |
</tr></tfoot> |
| 1185 |
</table> |
| 1186 |
<div id="external-metadata" class="document-information"></div> |
| 1187 |
<div id="internal-metadata" class="document-information"> |
| 1188 |
<dl id="identifiers"> |
| 1189 |
<dt class="label-stream">Stream:</dt> |
| 1190 |
<dd class="stream">Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)</dd> |
| 1191 |
<dt class="label-rfc">RFC:</dt> |
| 1192 |
<dd class="rfc"><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8827" class="eref">8827</a></dd> |
| 1193 |
<dt class="label-category">Category:</dt> |
| 1194 |
<dd class="category">Standards Track</dd> |
| 1195 |
<dt class="label-published">Published:</dt> |
| 1196 |
<dd class="published"> |
| 1197 |
<time datetime="2021-01" class="published">January 2021</time> |
| 1198 |
</dd> |
| 1199 |
<dt class="label-issn">ISSN:</dt> |
| 1200 |
<dd class="issn">2070-1721</dd> |
| 1201 |
<dt class="label-authors">Author:</dt> |
| 1202 |
<dd class="authors"> |
| 1203 |
<div class="author"> |
| 1204 |
<div class="author-name">E. Rescorla</div> |
| 1205 |
<div class="org">Mozilla</div> |
| 1206 |
</div> |
| 1207 |
</dd> |
| 1208 |
</dl> |
| 1209 |
</div> |
| 1210 |
<h1 id="rfcnum">RFC 8827</h1> |
| 1211 |
<h1 id="title">WebRTC Security Architecture</h1> |
| 1212 |
<section id="section-abstract"> |
| 1213 |
<h2 id="abstract"><a href="#abstract" class="selfRef">Abstract</a></h2> |
| 1214 |
<p id="section-abstract-1"> |
| 1215 |
This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol |
| 1216 |
suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed |
| 1217 |
in browsers -- "real-time communication on the Web".<a href="#section-abstract-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1218 |
</section> |
| 1219 |
<div id="status-of-memo"> |
| 1220 |
<section id="section-boilerplate.1"> |
| 1221 |
<h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo"> |
| 1222 |
<a href="#name-status-of-this-memo" class="section-name selfRef">Status of This Memo</a> |
| 1223 |
</h2> |
| 1224 |
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-1"> |
| 1225 |
This is an Internet Standards Track document.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1226 |
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-2"> |
| 1227 |
This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
| 1228 |
(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
| 1229 |
received public review and has been approved for publication by |
| 1230 |
the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further |
| 1231 |
information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of |
| 1232 |
RFC 7841.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1233 |
<p id="section-boilerplate.1-3"> |
| 1234 |
Information about the current status of this document, any |
| 1235 |
errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
| 1236 |
<span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8827">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8827</a></span>.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1237 |
</section> |
| 1238 |
</div> |
| 1239 |
<div id="copyright"> |
| 1240 |
<section id="section-boilerplate.2"> |
| 1241 |
<h2 id="name-copyright-notice"> |
| 1242 |
<a href="#name-copyright-notice" class="section-name selfRef">Copyright Notice</a> |
| 1243 |
</h2> |
| 1244 |
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-1"> |
| 1245 |
Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
| 1246 |
document authors. All rights reserved.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1247 |
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-2"> |
| 1248 |
This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal |
| 1249 |
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
| 1250 |
(<span><a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a></span>) in effect on the date of |
| 1251 |
publication of this document. Please review these documents |
| 1252 |
carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with |
| 1253 |
respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this |
| 1254 |
document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in |
| 1255 |
Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without |
| 1256 |
warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1257 |
<p id="section-boilerplate.2-3"> |
| 1258 |
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
| 1259 |
Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
| 1260 |
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
| 1261 |
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
| 1262 |
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
| 1263 |
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) |
| 1264 |
controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not |
| 1265 |
be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative |
| 1266 |
works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, |
| 1267 |
except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it |
| 1268 |
into languages other than English.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1269 |
</section> |
| 1270 |
</div> |
| 1271 |
<div id="toc"> |
| 1272 |
<section id="section-toc.1"> |
| 1273 |
<a href="#" onclick="scroll(0,0)" class="toplink">▲</a><h2 id="name-table-of-contents"> |
| 1274 |
<a href="#name-table-of-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Table of Contents</a> |
| 1275 |
</h2> |
| 1276 |
<nav class="toc"><ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1277 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1"> |
| 1278 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1" class="xref">1</a>. <a href="#name-introduction" class="xref">Introduction</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1279 |
</li> |
| 1280 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.2"> |
| 1281 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-2" class="xref">2</a>. <a href="#name-terminology" class="xref">Terminology</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1282 |
</li> |
| 1283 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3"> |
| 1284 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><a href="#section-3" class="xref">3</a>. <a href="#name-trust-model" class="xref">Trust Model</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1285 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1286 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1"> |
| 1287 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-3.1" class="xref">3.1</a>. <a href="#name-authenticated-entities" class="xref">Authenticated Entities</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1288 |
</li> |
| 1289 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2"> |
| 1290 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1"><a href="#section-3.2" class="xref">3.2</a>. <a href="#name-unauthenticated-entities" class="xref">Unauthenticated Entities</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1291 |
</li> |
| 1292 |
</ul> |
| 1293 |
</li> |
| 1294 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4"> |
| 1295 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><a href="#section-4" class="xref">4</a>. <a href="#name-overview" class="xref">Overview</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1296 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1297 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1"> |
| 1298 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-4.1" class="xref">4.1</a>. <a href="#name-initial-signaling" class="xref">Initial Signaling</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1299 |
</li> |
| 1300 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2"> |
| 1301 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-4.2" class="xref">4.2</a>. <a href="#name-media-consent-verification" class="xref">Media Consent Verification</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1302 |
</li> |
| 1303 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3"> |
| 1304 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-4.3" class="xref">4.3</a>. <a href="#name-dtls-handshake" class="xref">DTLS Handshake</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1305 |
</li> |
| 1306 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4"> |
| 1307 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4.1"><a href="#section-4.4" class="xref">4.4</a>. <a href="#name-communications-and-consent-" class="xref">Communications and Consent Freshness</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1308 |
</li> |
| 1309 |
</ul> |
| 1310 |
</li> |
| 1311 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5"> |
| 1312 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><a href="#section-5" class="xref">5</a>. <a href="#name-sdp-identity-attribute" class="xref">SDP Identity Attribute</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1313 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1314 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1"> |
| 1315 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1" class="xref">5.1</a>. <a href="#name-offer-answer-considerations" class="xref">Offer/Answer Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1316 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1317 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1"> |
| 1318 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1.1" class="xref">5.1.1</a>. <a href="#name-generating-the-initial-sdp-" class="xref">Generating the Initial SDP Offer</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1319 |
</li> |
| 1320 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2"> |
| 1321 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.1.2" class="xref">5.1.2</a>. <a href="#name-generating-an-sdp-answer" class="xref">Generating an SDP Answer</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1322 |
</li> |
| 1323 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3"> |
| 1324 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.1.3" class="xref">5.1.3</a>. <a href="#name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-" class="xref">Processing an SDP Offer or Answer</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1325 |
</li> |
| 1326 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4"> |
| 1327 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.1.4" class="xref">5.1.4</a>. <a href="#name-modifying-the-session" class="xref">Modifying the Session</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1328 |
</li> |
| 1329 |
</ul> |
| 1330 |
</li> |
| 1331 |
</ul> |
| 1332 |
</li> |
| 1333 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6"> |
| 1334 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><a href="#section-6" class="xref">6</a>. <a href="#name-detailed-technical-descript" class="xref">Detailed Technical Description</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1335 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1336 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1"> |
| 1337 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><a href="#section-6.1" class="xref">6.1</a>. <a href="#name-origin-and-web-security-iss" class="xref">Origin and Web Security Issues</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1338 |
</li> |
| 1339 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2"> |
| 1340 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><a href="#section-6.2" class="xref">6.2</a>. <a href="#name-device-permissions-model" class="xref">Device Permissions Model</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1341 |
</li> |
| 1342 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3"> |
| 1343 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1"><a href="#section-6.3" class="xref">6.3</a>. <a href="#name-communications-consent" class="xref">Communications Consent</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1344 |
</li> |
| 1345 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4"> |
| 1346 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1"><a href="#section-6.4" class="xref">6.4</a>. <a href="#name-ip-location-privacy" class="xref">IP Location Privacy</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1347 |
</li> |
| 1348 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5"> |
| 1349 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1"><a href="#section-6.5" class="xref">6.5</a>. <a href="#name-communications-security" class="xref">Communications Security</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1350 |
</li> |
| 1351 |
</ul> |
| 1352 |
</li> |
| 1353 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7"> |
| 1354 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><a href="#section-7" class="xref">7</a>. <a href="#name-web-based-peer-authenticati" class="xref">Web-Based Peer Authentication</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1355 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1356 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1"> |
| 1357 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.1" class="xref">7.1</a>. <a href="#name-trust-relationships-idps-ap" class="xref">Trust Relationships: IdPs, APs, and RPs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1358 |
</li> |
| 1359 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2"> |
| 1360 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.2" class="xref">7.2</a>. <a href="#name-overview-of-operation" class="xref">Overview of Operation</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1361 |
</li> |
| 1362 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3"> |
| 1363 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1"><a href="#section-7.3" class="xref">7.3</a>. <a href="#name-items-for-standardization" class="xref">Items for Standardization</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1364 |
</li> |
| 1365 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4"> |
| 1366 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.1"><a href="#section-7.4" class="xref">7.4</a>. <a href="#name-binding-identity-assertions" class="xref">Binding Identity Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transactions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1367 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1368 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1"> |
| 1369 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.4.1" class="xref">7.4.1</a>. <a href="#name-carrying-identity-assertion" class="xref">Carrying Identity Assertions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1370 |
</li> |
| 1371 |
</ul> |
| 1372 |
</li> |
| 1373 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5"> |
| 1374 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.1"><a href="#section-7.5" class="xref">7.5</a>. <a href="#name-determining-the-idp-uri" class="xref">Determining the IdP URI</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1375 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1376 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1"> |
| 1377 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.5.1" class="xref">7.5.1</a>. <a href="#name-authenticating-party" class="xref">Authenticating Party</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1378 |
</li> |
| 1379 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2"> |
| 1380 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.5.2" class="xref">7.5.2</a>. <a href="#name-relying-party" class="xref">Relying Party</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1381 |
</li> |
| 1382 |
</ul> |
| 1383 |
</li> |
| 1384 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.6"> |
| 1385 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.6.1"><a href="#section-7.6" class="xref">7.6</a>. <a href="#name-requesting-assertions" class="xref">Requesting Assertions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1386 |
</li> |
| 1387 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.7"> |
| 1388 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.7.1"><a href="#section-7.7" class="xref">7.7</a>. <a href="#name-managing-user-login" class="xref">Managing User Login</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1389 |
</li> |
| 1390 |
</ul> |
| 1391 |
</li> |
| 1392 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8"> |
| 1393 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><a href="#section-8" class="xref">8</a>. <a href="#name-verifying-assertions" class="xref">Verifying Assertions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1394 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1395 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1"> |
| 1396 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><a href="#section-8.1" class="xref">8.1</a>. <a href="#name-identity-formats" class="xref">Identity Formats</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1397 |
</li> |
| 1398 |
</ul> |
| 1399 |
</li> |
| 1400 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9"> |
| 1401 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><a href="#section-9" class="xref">9</a>. <a href="#name-security-considerations" class="xref">Security Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1402 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1403 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1"> |
| 1404 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.1" class="xref">9.1</a>. <a href="#name-communications-security-2" class="xref">Communications Security</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1405 |
</li> |
| 1406 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2"> |
| 1407 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.2" class="xref">9.2</a>. <a href="#name-privacy" class="xref">Privacy</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1408 |
</li> |
| 1409 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3"> |
| 1410 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.1"><a href="#section-9.3" class="xref">9.3</a>. <a href="#name-denial-of-service" class="xref">Denial of Service</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1411 |
</li> |
| 1412 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4"> |
| 1413 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.1"><a href="#section-9.4" class="xref">9.4</a>. <a href="#name-idp-authentication-mechanis" class="xref">IdP Authentication Mechanism</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1414 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1415 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1"> |
| 1416 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.4.1" class="xref">9.4.1</a>. <a href="#name-peerconnection-origin-check" class="xref">PeerConnection Origin Check</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1417 |
</li> |
| 1418 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2"> |
| 1419 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.4.2" class="xref">9.4.2</a>. <a href="#name-idp-well-known-uri" class="xref">IdP Well-Known URI</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1420 |
</li> |
| 1421 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3"> |
| 1422 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-9.4.3" class="xref">9.4.3</a>. <a href="#name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id" class="xref">Privacy of IdP-Generated Identities and the Hosting Site</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1423 |
</li> |
| 1424 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4"> |
| 1425 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.1"><a href="#section-9.4.4" class="xref">9.4.4</a>. <a href="#name-security-of-third-party-idp" class="xref">Security of Third-Party IdPs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1426 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1427 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1"> |
| 1428 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.4.4.1" class="xref">9.4.4.1</a>. <a href="#name-confusable-characters" class="xref">Confusable Characters</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1429 |
</li> |
| 1430 |
</ul> |
| 1431 |
</li> |
| 1432 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5"> |
| 1433 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.1"><a href="#section-9.4.5" class="xref">9.4.5</a>. <a href="#name-web-security-feature-intera" class="xref">Web Security Feature Interactions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1434 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1435 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1"> |
| 1436 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.4.5.1" class="xref">9.4.5.1</a>. <a href="#name-popup-blocking" class="xref">Popup Blocking</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1437 |
</li> |
| 1438 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2"> |
| 1439 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.4.5.2" class="xref">9.4.5.2</a>. <a href="#name-third-party-cookies" class="xref">Third Party Cookies</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1440 |
</li> |
| 1441 |
</ul> |
| 1442 |
</li> |
| 1443 |
</ul> |
| 1444 |
</li> |
| 1445 |
</ul> |
| 1446 |
</li> |
| 1447 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.10"> |
| 1448 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><a href="#section-10" class="xref">10</a>. <a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="xref">IANA Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.10.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1449 |
</li> |
| 1450 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11"> |
| 1451 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><a href="#section-11" class="xref">11</a>. <a href="#name-references" class="xref">References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1452 |
<ul class="compact toc ulEmpty"> |
| 1453 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1"> |
| 1454 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1.1"><a href="#section-11.1" class="xref">11.1</a>. <a href="#name-normative-references" class="xref">Normative References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1455 |
</li> |
| 1456 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2"> |
| 1457 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2.1"><a href="#section-11.2" class="xref">11.2</a>. <a href="#name-informative-references" class="xref">Informative References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1458 |
</li> |
| 1459 |
</ul> |
| 1460 |
</li> |
| 1461 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12"> |
| 1462 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><a href="#section-appendix.a" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-acknowledgements" class="xref">Acknowledgements</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.12.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1463 |
</li> |
| 1464 |
<li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.13"> |
| 1465 |
<p id="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><a href="#section-appendix.b" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-authors-address" class="xref">Author's Address</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.13.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1466 |
</li> |
| 1467 |
</ul> |
| 1468 |
</nav> |
| 1469 |
</section> |
| 1470 |
</div> |
| 1471 |
<div id="sec.introduction"> |
| 1472 |
<section id="section-1"> |
| 1473 |
<h2 id="name-introduction"> |
| 1474 |
<a href="#section-1" class="section-number selfRef">1. </a><a href="#name-introduction" class="section-name selfRef">Introduction</a> |
| 1475 |
</h2> |
| 1476 |
<p id="section-1-1"> |
| 1477 |
The Real-Time Communications on the Web (RTCWEB) Working Group |
| 1478 |
standardized protocols for real-time communications between Web |
| 1479 |
browsers, generally called "WebRTC" <span>[<a href="#RFC8825" class="xref">RFC8825</a>]</span>. |
| 1480 |
The major use cases for WebRTC technology are real-time audio |
| 1481 |
and/or video calls, Web conferencing, and direct data transfer. Unlike |
| 1482 |
most conventional real-time systems (e.g., SIP-based <span>[<a href="#RFC3261" class="xref">RFC3261</a>]</span> soft phones), WebRTC communications are directly |
| 1483 |
controlled by some Web server, via a JavaScript (JS) API as shown in |
| 1484 |
<a href="#fig.simple" class="xref">Figure 1</a>.<a href="#section-1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1485 |
<span id="name-a-simple-webrtc-system"></span><div id="fig.simple"> |
| 1486 |
<figure id="figure-1"> |
| 1487 |
<div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-1-2.1"> |
| 1488 |
<pre> |
| 1489 |
+----------------+ |
| 1490 |
| | |
| 1491 |
| Web Server | |
| 1492 |
| | |
| 1493 |
+----------------+ |
| 1494 |
^ ^ |
| 1495 |
/ \ |
| 1496 |
HTTP / \ HTTP |
| 1497 |
/ \ |
| 1498 |
/ \ |
| 1499 |
v v |
| 1500 |
JS API JS API |
| 1501 |
+-----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1502 |
| | Media | | |
| 1503 |
| Browser |<---------->| Browser | |
| 1504 |
| | | | |
| 1505 |
+-----------+ +-----------+</pre> |
| 1506 |
</div> |
| 1507 |
<figcaption><a href="#figure-1" class="selfRef">Figure 1</a>: |
| 1508 |
<a href="#name-a-simple-webrtc-system" class="selfRef">A Simple WebRTC System</a> |
| 1509 |
</figcaption></figure> |
| 1510 |
</div> |
| 1511 |
<p id="section-1-3"> |
| 1512 |
A more complicated system might allow for inter-domain calling, as shown |
| 1513 |
in <a href="#fig.multidomain" class="xref">Figure 2</a>. The protocol to be used between |
| 1514 |
the domains is not standardized by WebRTC, but given the installed base |
| 1515 |
and the form of the WebRTC API is likely to be something SDP-based like |
| 1516 |
SIP or something like the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP) |
| 1517 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC6120" class="xref">RFC6120</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1518 |
<span id="name-a-multidomain-webrtc-system"></span><div id="fig.multidomain"> |
| 1519 |
<figure id="figure-2"> |
| 1520 |
<div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-1-4.1"> |
| 1521 |
<pre> |
| 1522 |
+--------------+ +--------------+ |
| 1523 |
| | SIP, XMPP, ... | | |
| 1524 |
| Web Server |<-------------->| Web Server | |
| 1525 |
| | | | |
| 1526 |
+--------------+ +--------------+ |
| 1527 |
^ ^ |
| 1528 |
| | |
| 1529 |
HTTP | | HTTP |
| 1530 |
| | |
| 1531 |
v v |
| 1532 |
JS API JS API |
| 1533 |
+-----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1534 |
| | Media | | |
| 1535 |
| Browser |<------------------->| Browser | |
| 1536 |
| | | | |
| 1537 |
+-----------+ +-----------+</pre> |
| 1538 |
</div> |
| 1539 |
<figcaption><a href="#figure-2" class="selfRef">Figure 2</a>: |
| 1540 |
<a href="#name-a-multidomain-webrtc-system" class="selfRef">A Multidomain WebRTC System</a> |
| 1541 |
</figcaption></figure> |
| 1542 |
</div> |
| 1543 |
<p id="section-1-5"> |
| 1544 |
This system presents a number of new security challenges, which are |
| 1545 |
analyzed in <span>[<a href="#RFC8826" class="xref">RFC8826</a>]</span>. This document |
| 1546 |
describes a security architecture for WebRTC which addresses the threats |
| 1547 |
and requirements described in that document.<a href="#section-1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1548 |
</section> |
| 1549 |
</div> |
| 1550 |
<div id="sec-term"> |
| 1551 |
<section id="section-2"> |
| 1552 |
<h2 id="name-terminology"> |
| 1553 |
<a href="#section-2" class="section-number selfRef">2. </a><a href="#name-terminology" class="section-name selfRef">Terminology</a> |
| 1554 |
</h2> |
| 1555 |
<p id="section-2-1">The key words "<span class="bcp14">MUST</span>", "<span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>", |
| 1556 |
"<span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHALL</span>", |
| 1557 |
"<span class="bcp14">SHALL NOT</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span>", |
| 1558 |
"<span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span>", |
| 1559 |
"<span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">NOT RECOMMENDED</span>", |
| 1560 |
"<span class="bcp14">MAY</span>", and "<span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>" in this document are |
| 1561 |
to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <span>[<a href="#RFC2119" class="xref">RFC2119</a>]</span> |
| 1562 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC8174" class="xref">RFC8174</a>]</span> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals, |
| 1563 |
as shown here.<a href="#section-2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1564 |
</section> |
| 1565 |
</div> |
| 1566 |
<div id="sec.proposal.trusthierarchy"> |
| 1567 |
<section id="section-3"> |
| 1568 |
<h2 id="name-trust-model"> |
| 1569 |
<a href="#section-3" class="section-number selfRef">3. </a><a href="#name-trust-model" class="section-name selfRef">Trust Model</a> |
| 1570 |
</h2> |
| 1571 |
<p id="section-3-1"> |
| 1572 |
The basic assumption of this architecture is that network resources |
| 1573 |
exist in a hierarchy of trust, rooted in the browser, which serves as |
| 1574 |
the user's Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Any security property which the |
| 1575 |
user wishes to have enforced must be ultimately guaranteed by the |
| 1576 |
browser (or transitively by some property the browser |
| 1577 |
verifies). Conversely, if the browser is compromised, then no security |
| 1578 |
guarantees are possible. Note that there are cases (e.g., Internet |
| 1579 |
kiosks) where the user can't really trust the browser that much. In |
| 1580 |
these cases, the level of security provided is limited by how much they |
| 1581 |
trust the browser.<a href="#section-3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1582 |
<p id="section-3-2"> |
| 1583 |
Optimally, we would not rely on trust in any entities other than the |
| 1584 |
browser. However, this is unfortunately not possible if we wish to have |
| 1585 |
a functional system. Other network elements fall into two categories: |
| 1586 |
those which can be authenticated by the browser and thus can be granted |
| 1587 |
permissions to access sensitive resources, and those which cannot be |
| 1588 |
authenticated and thus are untrusted.<a href="#section-3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1589 |
<div id="sec.proposal.authenticated"> |
| 1590 |
<section id="section-3.1"> |
| 1591 |
<h3 id="name-authenticated-entities"> |
| 1592 |
<a href="#section-3.1" class="section-number selfRef">3.1. </a><a href="#name-authenticated-entities" class="section-name selfRef">Authenticated Entities</a> |
| 1593 |
</h3> |
| 1594 |
<p id="section-3.1-1"> |
| 1595 |
There are two major classes of authenticated entities in the system:<a href="#section-3.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1596 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-3.1-2"> |
| 1597 |
<dt id="section-3.1-2.1">Calling services:</dt> |
| 1598 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-2.2">Web sites whose origin we can verify (optimally |
| 1599 |
via HTTPS, but in some cases because we are on a topologically |
| 1600 |
restricted network, such as behind a firewall, and can infer |
| 1601 |
authentication from firewall behavior).<a href="#section-3.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1602 |
</dd> |
| 1603 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1604 |
<dt id="section-3.1-2.3">Other users:</dt> |
| 1605 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-2.4">WebRTC peers whose origin we can verify |
| 1606 |
cryptographically (optimally via DTLS-SRTP).<a href="#section-3.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1607 |
</dd> |
| 1608 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1609 |
</dl> |
| 1610 |
<p id="section-3.1-3"> |
| 1611 |
Note that merely being authenticated does not make these entities |
| 1612 |
trusted. For instance, just because we can verify that |
| 1613 |
<https://www.example.org/> is owned by Dr. Evil does not mean that we can |
| 1614 |
trust Dr. Evil to access our camera and microphone. However, it gives |
| 1615 |
the user an opportunity to determine whether they wish to trust |
| 1616 |
Dr. Evil or not; after all, if they desire to contact Dr. Evil (perhaps |
| 1617 |
to arrange for ransom payment), it's safe to temporarily give them |
| 1618 |
access to the camera and microphone for the purpose of the call, but |
| 1619 |
they don't want Dr. Evil to be able to access their camera and |
| 1620 |
microphone other than during the call. The point here is that we must |
| 1621 |
first identify other elements before we can determine whether and how |
| 1622 |
much to trust them. Additionally, sometimes we need to identify the |
| 1623 |
communicating peer before we know what policies to apply.<a href="#section-3.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1624 |
</section> |
| 1625 |
</div> |
| 1626 |
<div id="sec.proposal.unauthenticated"> |
| 1627 |
<section id="section-3.2"> |
| 1628 |
<h3 id="name-unauthenticated-entities"> |
| 1629 |
<a href="#section-3.2" class="section-number selfRef">3.2. </a><a href="#name-unauthenticated-entities" class="section-name selfRef">Unauthenticated Entities</a> |
| 1630 |
</h3> |
| 1631 |
<p id="section-3.2-1"> |
| 1632 |
Other than the above entities, we are not generally able to identify |
| 1633 |
other network elements; thus, we cannot trust them. This does not mean |
| 1634 |
that it is not possible to have any interaction with them, but it |
| 1635 |
means that we must assume that they will behave maliciously and design |
| 1636 |
a system which is secure even if they do so.<a href="#section-3.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1637 |
</section> |
| 1638 |
</div> |
| 1639 |
</section> |
| 1640 |
</div> |
| 1641 |
<div id="sec.proposal.overview"> |
| 1642 |
<section id="section-4"> |
| 1643 |
<h2 id="name-overview"> |
| 1644 |
<a href="#section-4" class="section-number selfRef">4. </a><a href="#name-overview" class="section-name selfRef">Overview</a> |
| 1645 |
</h2> |
| 1646 |
<p id="section-4-1"> |
| 1647 |
This section describes a typical WebRTC session and shows how the |
| 1648 |
various security elements interact and what guarantees are provided to |
| 1649 |
the user. The example in this section is a "best case" scenario in which |
| 1650 |
we provide the maximal amount of user authentication and media privacy |
| 1651 |
with the minimal level of trust in the calling service. Simpler versions |
| 1652 |
with lower levels of security are also possible and are noted in the |
| 1653 |
text where applicable. It's also important to recognize the tension |
| 1654 |
between security (or performance) and privacy. The example shown here is |
| 1655 |
aimed towards settings where we are more concerned about secure calling |
| 1656 |
than about privacy, but as we shall see, there are settings where one |
| 1657 |
might wish to make different tradeoffs -- this architecture is still |
| 1658 |
compatible with those settings.<a href="#section-4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1659 |
<p id="section-4-2"> |
| 1660 |
For the purposes of this example, we assume the topology shown in the |
| 1661 |
figures below. This topology is derived from the topology shown in <a href="#fig.simple" class="xref">Figure 1</a>, but separates Alice's and Bob's identities from the |
| 1662 |
process of signaling. Specifically, Alice and Bob have relationships |
| 1663 |
with some Identity Provider (IdP) that supports a protocol (such as |
| 1664 |
OpenID Connect) that can be used to demonstrate their identity to |
| 1665 |
other parties. For instance, Alice might have an account with a social |
| 1666 |
network which she can then use to authenticate to other Web sites |
| 1667 |
without explicitly having an account with those sites; this is a fairly |
| 1668 |
conventional pattern on the Web. <a href="#sec.trust-relationships" class="xref">Section 7.1</a> provides an overview of IdPs |
| 1669 |
and the relevant terminology. Alice and Bob might have |
| 1670 |
relationships with different IdPs as well. |
| 1671 |
Note: The IdP mechanism described here has not seen wide adoption. |
| 1672 |
See <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> for more on the status of |
| 1673 |
IdP-based authentication.<a href="#section-4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1674 |
<p id="section-4-3"> |
| 1675 |
This separation of identity provision and signaling isn't particularly |
| 1676 |
important in "closed world" cases where Alice and Bob are users on the |
| 1677 |
same social network and have identities based on that domain (<a href="#fig.proposal.idp" class="xref">Figure 3</a>). However, there are important settings where |
| 1678 |
that is not the case, such as federation (calls from one domain to |
| 1679 |
another; see <a href="#fig.proposal-federated.idp" class="xref">Figure 4</a>) and calling on |
| 1680 |
untrusted sites, such as where two users who have a relationship via a |
| 1681 |
given social network want to call each other on another, untrusted, |
| 1682 |
site, such as a poker site.<a href="#section-4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1683 |
<p id="section-4-4"> |
| 1684 |
Note that the servers themselves are also authenticated by an external |
| 1685 |
identity service, the SSL/TLS certificate infrastructure (not shown). |
| 1686 |
As is conventional in the Web, all identities are ultimately rooted in |
| 1687 |
that system. For instance, when an IdP makes an identity assertion, the |
| 1688 |
Relying Party consuming that assertion is able to verify because it is |
| 1689 |
able to connect to the IdP via HTTPS.<a href="#section-4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1690 |
<span id="name-a-call-with-idp-based-ident"></span><div id="fig.proposal.idp"> |
| 1691 |
<figure id="figure-3"> |
| 1692 |
<div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-4-5.1"> |
| 1693 |
<pre> |
| 1694 |
+----------------+ |
| 1695 |
| | |
| 1696 |
| Signaling | |
| 1697 |
| Server | |
| 1698 |
| | |
| 1699 |
+----------------+ |
| 1700 |
^ ^ |
| 1701 |
/ \ |
| 1702 |
HTTPS / \ HTTPS |
| 1703 |
/ \ |
| 1704 |
/ \ |
| 1705 |
v v |
| 1706 |
JS API JS API |
| 1707 |
+-----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1708 |
| | Media | | |
| 1709 |
Alice | Browser |<---------->| Browser | Bob |
| 1710 |
| | (DTLS+SRTP)| | |
| 1711 |
+-----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1712 |
^ ^--+ +--^ ^ |
| 1713 |
| | | | |
| 1714 |
v | | v |
| 1715 |
+-----------+ | | +-----------+ |
| 1716 |
| |<--------+ | | |
| 1717 |
| IdP1 | | | IdP2 | |
| 1718 |
| | +------->| | |
| 1719 |
+-----------+ +-----------+</pre> |
| 1720 |
</div> |
| 1721 |
<figcaption><a href="#figure-3" class="selfRef">Figure 3</a>: |
| 1722 |
<a href="#name-a-call-with-idp-based-ident" class="selfRef">A Call with IdP-Based Identity</a> |
| 1723 |
</figcaption></figure> |
| 1724 |
</div> |
| 1725 |
<p id="section-4-6"> |
| 1726 |
<a href="#fig.proposal-federated.idp" class="xref">Figure 4</a> shows essentially the same |
| 1727 |
calling scenario but with a call between two separate domains (i.e., a |
| 1728 |
federated case), as in <a href="#fig.multidomain" class="xref">Figure 2</a>. As mentioned |
| 1729 |
above, the domains communicate by some unspecified protocol, and |
| 1730 |
providing separate signaling and identity allows for calls to be |
| 1731 |
authenticated regardless of the details of the inter-domain protocol.<a href="#section-4-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1732 |
<span id="name-a-federated-call-with-idp-b"></span><div id="fig.proposal-federated.idp"> |
| 1733 |
<figure id="figure-4"> |
| 1734 |
<div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-4-7.1"> |
| 1735 |
<pre> |
| 1736 |
+----------------+ Unspecified +----------------+ |
| 1737 |
| | protocol | | |
| 1738 |
| Signaling |<----------------->| Signaling | |
| 1739 |
| Server | (SIP, XMPP, ...) | Server | |
| 1740 |
| | | | |
| 1741 |
+----------------+ +----------------+ |
| 1742 |
^ ^ |
| 1743 |
| | |
| 1744 |
HTTPS | | HTTPS |
| 1745 |
| | |
| 1746 |
| | |
| 1747 |
v v |
| 1748 |
JS API JS API |
| 1749 |
+-----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1750 |
| | Media | | |
| 1751 |
Alice | Browser |<--------------------------->| Browser | Bob |
| 1752 |
| | DTLS+SRTP | | |
| 1753 |
+-----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1754 |
^ ^--+ +--^ ^ |
| 1755 |
| | | | |
| 1756 |
v | | v |
| 1757 |
+-----------+ | | +-----------+ |
| 1758 |
| |<-------------------------+ | | |
| 1759 |
| IdP1 | | | IdP2 | |
| 1760 |
| | +------------------------>| | |
| 1761 |
+-----------+ +-----------+</pre> |
| 1762 |
</div> |
| 1763 |
<figcaption><a href="#figure-4" class="selfRef">Figure 4</a>: |
| 1764 |
<a href="#name-a-federated-call-with-idp-b" class="selfRef">A Federated Call with IdP-Based Identity</a> |
| 1765 |
</figcaption></figure> |
| 1766 |
</div> |
| 1767 |
<section id="section-4.1"> |
| 1768 |
<h3 id="name-initial-signaling"> |
| 1769 |
<a href="#section-4.1" class="section-number selfRef">4.1. </a><a href="#name-initial-signaling" class="section-name selfRef">Initial Signaling</a> |
| 1770 |
</h3> |
| 1771 |
<p id="section-4.1-1"> |
| 1772 |
For simplicity, assume the topology in <a href="#fig.proposal.idp" class="xref">Figure 3</a>. Alice and Bob are both users of a common |
| 1773 |
calling service; they both have approved the calling service to make |
| 1774 |
calls (we defer the discussion of device access permissions until |
| 1775 |
later). They are both connected to the calling service via HTTPS and |
| 1776 |
so know the origin with some level of confidence. They also have |
| 1777 |
accounts with some IdP. This sort of identity service |
| 1778 |
is becoming increasingly common in the Web environment (with technologies |
| 1779 |
such as Federated Google Login, Facebook Connect, OAuth, |
| 1780 |
OpenID, WebFinger), and is often provided as a side effect service of |
| 1781 |
a user's ordinary accounts with some service. In this example, we show |
| 1782 |
Alice and Bob using a separate identity service, though the identity |
| 1783 |
service may be the same entity as the calling service or there may be |
| 1784 |
no identity service at all.<a href="#section-4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1785 |
<p id="section-4.1-2"> |
| 1786 |
Alice is logged onto the calling service and decides to call Bob. She |
| 1787 |
can see from the calling service that he is online and the calling |
| 1788 |
service presents a JS UI in the form of a button next to Bob's name |
| 1789 |
which says "Call". Alice clicks the button, which initiates a JS |
| 1790 |
callback that instantiates a PeerConnection object. This does not |
| 1791 |
require a security check: JS from any origin is allowed to get this |
| 1792 |
far.<a href="#section-4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1793 |
<p id="section-4.1-3"> |
| 1794 |
Once the PeerConnection is created, the calling service JS needs to |
| 1795 |
set up some media. Because this is an audio/video call, it creates a |
| 1796 |
MediaStream with two MediaStreamTracks, one connected to an audio |
| 1797 |
input and one connected to a video input. At this point, the first |
| 1798 |
security check is required: untrusted origins are not allowed to |
| 1799 |
access the camera and microphone, so the browser prompts Alice for |
| 1800 |
permission.<a href="#section-4.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1801 |
<p id="section-4.1-4"> |
| 1802 |
In the current W3C API, once some streams have been added, Alice's |
| 1803 |
browser + JS generates a signaling message <span>[<a href="#RFC8829" class="xref">RFC8829</a>]</span> containing:<a href="#section-4.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1804 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 1805 |
<li class="normal" id="section-4.1-5.1"> |
| 1806 |
Media channel information<a href="#section-4.1-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1807 |
</li> |
| 1808 |
<li class="normal" id="section-4.1-5.2"> |
| 1809 |
Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) <span>[<a href="#RFC8445" class="xref">RFC8445</a>]</span> candidates<a href="#section-4.1-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1810 |
</li> |
| 1811 |
<li class="normal" id="section-4.1-5.3"> |
| 1812 |
A "fingerprint" attribute binding the communication to a key pair |
| 1813 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC5763" class="xref">RFC5763</a>]</span>. Note that this key may simply be |
| 1814 |
ephemerally generated for this call or specific to this domain, |
| 1815 |
and Alice may have a large number of such keys.<a href="#section-4.1-5.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1816 |
</li> |
| 1817 |
</ul> |
| 1818 |
<p id="section-4.1-6"> |
| 1819 |
Prior to sending out the signaling message, the PeerConnection code |
| 1820 |
contacts the identity service and obtains an assertion binding Alice's |
| 1821 |
identity to her fingerprint. The exact details depend on the identity |
| 1822 |
service (though as discussed in <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> |
| 1823 |
PeerConnection can be agnostic to them), but for now it's easiest to |
| 1824 |
think of as an OAuth token. The assertion may bind other |
| 1825 |
information to the identity besides the fingerprint, but at minimum it |
| 1826 |
needs to bind the fingerprint.<a href="#section-4.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1827 |
<p id="section-4.1-7"> |
| 1828 |
This message is sent to the signaling server, e.g., by fetch() |
| 1829 |
<span>[<a href="#fetch" class="xref">fetch</a>]</span> or by WebSockets |
| 1830 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC6455" class="xref">RFC6455</a>]</span>, over TLS <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>. |
| 1831 |
The signaling server processes the message from Alice's browser, |
| 1832 |
determines that this is a call to Bob, and sends a signaling message to |
| 1833 |
Bob's browser (again, the format is currently undefined). The JS on |
| 1834 |
Bob's browser processes it, and alerts Bob to the incoming call and to |
| 1835 |
Alice's identity. In this case, Alice has provided an identity |
| 1836 |
assertion and so Bob's browser contacts Alice's IdP |
| 1837 |
(again, this is done in a generic way so the browser has no specific |
| 1838 |
knowledge of the IdP) to verify the assertion. It is also possible |
| 1839 |
to have IdPs with which the browser has a specific trust relationship, |
| 1840 |
as described in <a href="#sec.trust-relationships" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>. |
| 1841 |
This allows the browser |
| 1842 |
to display a trusted element in the browser chrome indicating that a |
| 1843 |
call is coming in from Alice. If Alice is in Bob's address book, then |
| 1844 |
this interface might also include her real name, a picture, etc. The |
| 1845 |
calling site will also provide some user interface element (e.g., a |
| 1846 |
button) to allow Bob to answer the call, though this is most likely |
| 1847 |
not part of the trusted UI.<a href="#section-4.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1848 |
<p id="section-4.1-8"> |
| 1849 |
If Bob agrees, a PeerConnection is instantiated with the message from |
| 1850 |
Alice's side. Then, a similar process occurs as on Alice's browser: |
| 1851 |
Bob's browser prompts him for device permission, the media streams are |
| 1852 |
created, and a return signaling message containing media information, |
| 1853 |
ICE candidates, and a fingerprint is sent back to Alice via the |
| 1854 |
signaling service. If Bob has a relationship with an IdP, the message |
| 1855 |
will also come with an identity assertion.<a href="#section-4.1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1856 |
<p id="section-4.1-9"> |
| 1857 |
At this point, Alice and Bob each know that the other party wants to |
| 1858 |
have a secure call with them. Based purely on the interface provided |
| 1859 |
by the signaling server, they know that the signaling server claims |
| 1860 |
that the call is from Alice to Bob. This level of security is provided |
| 1861 |
merely by having the fingerprint in the message and having that |
| 1862 |
message received securely from the signaling server. Because the far |
| 1863 |
end sent an identity assertion along with their message, they know |
| 1864 |
that this is verifiable from the IdP as well. Note that if the call is |
| 1865 |
federated, as shown in <a href="#fig.proposal-federated.idp" class="xref">Figure 4</a>, |
| 1866 |
then Alice is able to verify Bob's identity in a way that is not |
| 1867 |
mediated by either her signaling server or Bob's. Rather, she verifies |
| 1868 |
it directly with Bob's IdP.<a href="#section-4.1-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1869 |
<p id="section-4.1-10"> |
| 1870 |
Of course, the call works perfectly well if either Alice or Bob |
| 1871 |
doesn't have a relationship with an IdP; they just get a lower level |
| 1872 |
of assurance. I.e., they simply have whatever information their |
| 1873 |
calling site claims about the caller/callee's identity. Moreover, |
| 1874 |
Alice might wish to make an anonymous call through an anonymous |
| 1875 |
calling site, in which case she would of course just not provide any |
| 1876 |
identity assertion and the calling site would mask her identity from |
| 1877 |
Bob.<a href="#section-4.1-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1878 |
</section> |
| 1879 |
<section id="section-4.2"> |
| 1880 |
<h3 id="name-media-consent-verification"> |
| 1881 |
<a href="#section-4.2" class="section-number selfRef">4.2. </a><a href="#name-media-consent-verification" class="section-name selfRef">Media Consent Verification</a> |
| 1882 |
</h3> |
| 1883 |
<p id="section-4.2-1"> |
| 1884 |
As described in <span>[<a href="#RFC8826" class="xref">RFC8826</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8826#section-4.2" class="relref">Section 4.2</a></span>, media consent verification is provided via ICE. |
| 1885 |
Thus, Alice and |
| 1886 |
Bob perform ICE checks with each other. At the completion of these |
| 1887 |
checks, they are ready to send non-ICE data.<a href="#section-4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1888 |
<p id="section-4.2-2"> |
| 1889 |
At this point, Alice knows that (a) Bob (assuming he is verified via |
| 1890 |
his IdP) or someone else who the signaling service is claiming is Bob |
| 1891 |
is willing to exchange traffic with her and (b) either Bob is at |
| 1892 |
the IP address which she has verified via ICE or there is an attacker |
| 1893 |
who is on-path to that IP address detouring the traffic. Note that it |
| 1894 |
is not possible for an attacker who is on-path between Alice and Bob |
| 1895 |
but not attached to the signaling service to spoof these checks |
| 1896 |
because they do not have the ICE credentials. Bob has the same |
| 1897 |
security guarantees with respect to Alice.<a href="#section-4.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1898 |
</section> |
| 1899 |
<section id="section-4.3"> |
| 1900 |
<h3 id="name-dtls-handshake"> |
| 1901 |
<a href="#section-4.3" class="section-number selfRef">4.3. </a><a href="#name-dtls-handshake" class="section-name selfRef">DTLS Handshake</a> |
| 1902 |
</h3> |
| 1903 |
<p id="section-4.3-1"> |
| 1904 |
Once the requisite ICE checks have completed, Alice and Bob can set |
| 1905 |
up a secure channel or channels. This is performed via DTLS <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span> |
| 1906 |
and DTLS-SRTP <span>[<a href="#RFC5763" class="xref">RFC5763</a>]</span> keying for SRTP |
| 1907 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC3711" class="xref">RFC3711</a>]</span> for the media channel and |
| 1908 |
the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) over DTLS |
| 1909 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC8261" class="xref">RFC8261</a>]</span> for data |
| 1910 |
channels. Specifically, Alice and Bob perform a DTLS handshake on |
| 1911 |
every component which has been established by ICE. The total number of |
| 1912 |
channels depends on the amount of muxing; in the most likely case, we |
| 1913 |
are using both RTP/RTCP mux and muxing multiple media streams on the |
| 1914 |
same channel, in which case there is only one DTLS handshake. Once the |
| 1915 |
DTLS handshake has completed, the keys are exported <span>[<a href="#RFC5705" class="xref">RFC5705</a>]</span> and used to key SRTP for the media channels.<a href="#section-4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1916 |
<p id="section-4.3-2"> |
| 1917 |
At this point, Alice and Bob know that they share a set of secure data |
| 1918 |
and/or media channels with keys which are not known to any third-party |
| 1919 |
attacker. If Alice and Bob authenticated via their IdPs, then they |
| 1920 |
also know that the signaling service is not mounting a |
| 1921 |
man-in-the-middle attack on their traffic. Even if they do not use an |
| 1922 |
IdP, as long as they have minimal trust in the signaling service not |
| 1923 |
to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they know that their |
| 1924 |
communications are secure against the signaling service as well (i.e., |
| 1925 |
that the signaling service cannot mount a passive attack on the |
| 1926 |
communications).<a href="#section-4.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1927 |
</section> |
| 1928 |
<section id="section-4.4"> |
| 1929 |
<h3 id="name-communications-and-consent-"> |
| 1930 |
<a href="#section-4.4" class="section-number selfRef">4.4. </a><a href="#name-communications-and-consent-" class="section-name selfRef">Communications and Consent Freshness</a> |
| 1931 |
</h3> |
| 1932 |
<p id="section-4.4-1"> |
| 1933 |
From a security perspective, everything from here on in is a little |
| 1934 |
anticlimactic: Alice and Bob exchange data protected by the keys |
| 1935 |
negotiated by DTLS. Because of the security guarantees discussed in |
| 1936 |
the previous sections, they know that the communications are encrypted |
| 1937 |
and authenticated.<a href="#section-4.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1938 |
<p id="section-4.4-2"> |
| 1939 |
The one remaining security property we need to establish is "consent |
| 1940 |
freshness", i.e., allowing Alice to verify that Bob is still prepared |
| 1941 |
to receive her communications so that Alice does not continue to send |
| 1942 |
large traffic volumes to entities which went abruptly offline. ICE |
| 1943 |
specifies periodic Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) keepalives but only if media is not flowing. |
| 1944 |
Because the consent issue is more difficult here, we require WebRTC |
| 1945 |
implementations to periodically send keepalives using the |
| 1946 |
consent freshness |
| 1947 |
mechanism specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC7675" class="xref">RFC7675</a>]</span>. |
| 1948 |
If a |
| 1949 |
keepalive fails and no new ICE channels can be established, then the |
| 1950 |
session is terminated.<a href="#section-4.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1951 |
</section> |
| 1952 |
</section> |
| 1953 |
</div> |
| 1954 |
<div id="sec.sdp-id-attr"> |
| 1955 |
<section id="section-5"> |
| 1956 |
<h2 id="name-sdp-identity-attribute"> |
| 1957 |
<a href="#section-5" class="section-number selfRef">5. </a><a href="#name-sdp-identity-attribute" class="section-name selfRef">SDP Identity Attribute</a> |
| 1958 |
</h2> |
| 1959 |
<p id="section-5-1"> |
| 1960 |
The SDP "identity" attribute is a session-level attribute that |
| 1961 |
is used by an endpoint to convey its identity assertion to its |
| 1962 |
peer. The identity-assertion value is encoded as base64, as described |
| 1963 |
in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648#section-4" class="relref">Section 4</a> of [<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1964 |
<p id="section-5-2"> |
| 1965 |
The procedures in this section are based on the assumption |
| 1966 |
that the identity assertion of an endpoint is bound to the |
| 1967 |
fingerprints of the endpoint. This does not preclude the definition of |
| 1968 |
alternative means of binding an assertion to the endpoint, but such |
| 1969 |
means are outside the scope of this specification.<a href="#section-5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1970 |
<p id="section-5-3"> |
| 1971 |
The semantics of multiple "identity" attributes within an |
| 1972 |
offer or answer are undefined. Implementations <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> only include a |
| 1973 |
single "identity" attribute in an offer or answer, and Relying Parties |
| 1974 |
<span class="bcp14">MAY</span> elect to ignore all but the first "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1975 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-5-4"> |
| 1976 |
<dt id="section-5-4.1">Name:</dt> |
| 1977 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.2">identity<a href="#section-5-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1978 |
</dd> |
| 1979 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1980 |
<dt id="section-5-4.3">Value:</dt> |
| 1981 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.4">identity-assertion<a href="#section-5-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1982 |
</dd> |
| 1983 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1984 |
<dt id="section-5-4.5">Usage Level:</dt> |
| 1985 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.6">session<a href="#section-5-4.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1986 |
</dd> |
| 1987 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1988 |
<dt id="section-5-4.7">Charset Dependent:</dt> |
| 1989 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.8">no<a href="#section-5-4.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1990 |
</dd> |
| 1991 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1992 |
<dt id="section-5-4.9">Default Value:</dt> |
| 1993 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.10">N/A<a href="#section-5-4.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 1994 |
</dd> |
| 1995 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 1996 |
</dl> |
| 1997 |
<p id="section-5-5">Syntax:<a href="#section-5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 1998 |
<div id="section-5-6"> |
| 1999 |
<pre class="sourcecode lang-abnf"> |
| 2000 |
identity-assertion = identity-assertion-value |
| 2001 |
*(SP identity-extension) |
| 2002 |
identity-assertion-value = base64 |
| 2003 |
identity-extension = extension-name [ "=" extension-value ] |
| 2004 |
extension-name = token |
| 2005 |
extension-value = 1*(%x01-09 / %x0b-0c / %x0e-3a / %x3c-ff) |
| 2006 |
; byte-string from [RFC4566] |
| 2007 |
|
| 2008 |
<ALPHA and DIGIT as defined in [RFC4566]> |
| 2009 |
<base64 as defined in [RFC4566]> |
| 2010 |
</pre><a href="#section-5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2011 |
</div> |
| 2012 |
<p id="section-5-7">Example:<a href="#section-5-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2013 |
<div id="section-5-8"> |
| 2014 |
<pre class="sourcecode lang-sdp"> |
| 2015 |
a=identity:\ |
| 2016 |
eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\ |
| 2017 |
In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\ |
| 2018 |
IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\ |
| 2019 |
aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9</pre><a href="#section-5-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2020 |
</div> |
| 2021 |
<aside id="section-5-9"> |
| 2022 |
<p id="section-5-9.1">Note that long lines in the example are folded to meet the column |
| 2023 |
width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of |
| 2024 |
a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored.<a href="#section-5-9.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2025 |
</aside> |
| 2026 |
<p id="section-5-10"> |
| 2027 |
This specification does not define any extensions for the attribute.<a href="#section-5-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2028 |
<p id="section-5-11"> |
| 2029 |
The identity-assertion value is a JSON encoded string |
| 2030 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">RFC8259</a>]</span>. The JSON object |
| 2031 |
contains two keys: "assertion" and "idp". The "assertion" key value contains |
| 2032 |
an opaque string that is consumed by the IdP. The "idp" key value contains a |
| 2033 |
dictionary with one or two further values that identify the IdP. See |
| 2034 |
<a href="#sec.request-assert" class="xref">Section 7.6</a> for more details.<a href="#section-5-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2035 |
<div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa"> |
| 2036 |
<section id="section-5.1"> |
| 2037 |
<h3 id="name-offer-answer-considerations"> |
| 2038 |
<a href="#section-5.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1. </a><a href="#name-offer-answer-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Offer/Answer Considerations</a> |
| 2039 |
</h3> |
| 2040 |
<p id="section-5.1-1"> |
| 2041 |
This section defines the SDP offer/answer <span>[<a href="#RFC3264" class="xref">RFC3264</a>]</span> considerations for the SDP |
| 2042 |
"identity" attribute.<a href="#section-5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2043 |
<p id="section-5.1-2"> |
| 2044 |
Within this section, 'initial offer' refers to the first offer in the |
| 2045 |
SDP session that contains an SDP "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-5.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2046 |
<div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio"> |
| 2047 |
<section id="section-5.1.1"> |
| 2048 |
<h4 id="name-generating-the-initial-sdp-"> |
| 2049 |
<a href="#section-5.1.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.1. </a><a href="#name-generating-the-initial-sdp-" class="section-name selfRef">Generating the Initial SDP Offer</a> |
| 2050 |
</h4> |
| 2051 |
<p id="section-5.1.1-1"> |
| 2052 |
When an offerer sends an offer, in order to provide its |
| 2053 |
identity assertion to the peer, it includes an "identity" attribute in |
| 2054 |
the offer. In addition, the offerer includes one or more SDP |
| 2055 |
"fingerprint" attributes. The "identity" attribute <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be bound to |
| 2056 |
all the "fingerprint" attributes in the session |
| 2057 |
description.<a href="#section-5.1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2058 |
</section> |
| 2059 |
</div> |
| 2060 |
<div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-ansa"> |
| 2061 |
<section id="section-5.1.2"> |
| 2062 |
<h4 id="name-generating-an-sdp-answer"> |
| 2063 |
<a href="#section-5.1.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.2. </a><a href="#name-generating-an-sdp-answer" class="section-name selfRef">Generating an SDP Answer</a> |
| 2064 |
</h4> |
| 2065 |
<p id="section-5.1.2-1"> |
| 2066 |
If the answerer elects to include an "identity" attribute, it follows |
| 2067 |
the same steps as those in <a href="#sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio" class="xref">Section 5.1.1</a>. |
| 2068 |
The answerer can choose to include or omit an "identity" attribute independently, |
| 2069 |
regardless of whether the offerer did so.<a href="#section-5.1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2070 |
</section> |
| 2071 |
</div> |
| 2072 |
<div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-offa"> |
| 2073 |
<section id="section-5.1.3"> |
| 2074 |
<h4 id="name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-"> |
| 2075 |
<a href="#section-5.1.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.3. </a><a href="#name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-" class="section-name selfRef">Processing an SDP Offer or Answer</a> |
| 2076 |
</h4> |
| 2077 |
<p id="section-5.1.3-1"> |
| 2078 |
When an endpoint receives an offer or answer that contains an "identity" |
| 2079 |
attribute, the answerer can use the attribute information to |
| 2080 |
contact the IdP and verify the identity of the peer. If the identity |
| 2081 |
requires a third-party IdP as described in <a href="#sec.trust-relationships" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>, |
| 2082 |
then that IdP will need to have been specifically configured. |
| 2083 |
If the identity verification fails, the answerer <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the |
| 2084 |
offer or answer as malformed.<a href="#section-5.1.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2085 |
</section> |
| 2086 |
</div> |
| 2087 |
<div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-modi"> |
| 2088 |
<section id="section-5.1.4"> |
| 2089 |
<h4 id="name-modifying-the-session"> |
| 2090 |
<a href="#section-5.1.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.4. </a><a href="#name-modifying-the-session" class="section-name selfRef">Modifying the Session</a> |
| 2091 |
</h4> |
| 2092 |
<p id="section-5.1.4-1"> |
| 2093 |
When modifying a session, if the set of fingerprints is |
| 2094 |
unchanged, then the sender <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> send the same "identity" attribute. In |
| 2095 |
this case, the established identity <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be applied to existing DTLS |
| 2096 |
connections as well as new connections established using one of those |
| 2097 |
fingerprints. Note that <span>[<a href="#RFC8829" class="xref">RFC8829</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8829#section-5.2.1" class="relref">Section 5.2.1</a></span> requires that each media section use the same set of fingerprints. |
| 2098 |
If a new "identity" attribute is received, then the receiver <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> |
| 2099 |
apply that identity to all existing connections.<a href="#section-5.1.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2100 |
<p id="section-5.1.4-2"> |
| 2101 |
If the set of fingerprints changes, then the sender <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> |
| 2102 |
either send a new "identity" attribute or none at all. |
| 2103 |
Because a change in fingerprints also causes a new DTLS |
| 2104 |
connection to be established, the receiver <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard |
| 2105 |
all previously established identities.<a href="#section-5.1.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2106 |
</section> |
| 2107 |
</div> |
| 2108 |
</section> |
| 2109 |
</div> |
| 2110 |
</section> |
| 2111 |
</div> |
| 2112 |
<div id="sec.proposal.detailed"> |
| 2113 |
<section id="section-6"> |
| 2114 |
<h2 id="name-detailed-technical-descript"> |
| 2115 |
<a href="#section-6" class="section-number selfRef">6. </a><a href="#name-detailed-technical-descript" class="section-name selfRef">Detailed Technical Description</a> |
| 2116 |
</h2> |
| 2117 |
<div id="sec.proposal.origin"> |
| 2118 |
<section id="section-6.1"> |
| 2119 |
<h3 id="name-origin-and-web-security-iss"> |
| 2120 |
<a href="#section-6.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1. </a><a href="#name-origin-and-web-security-iss" class="section-name selfRef">Origin and Web Security Issues</a> |
| 2121 |
</h3> |
| 2122 |
<p id="section-6.1-1"> |
| 2123 |
The basic unit of permissions for WebRTC is the origin <span>[<a href="#RFC6454" class="xref">RFC6454</a>]</span>. Because the security of the origin depends on |
| 2124 |
being able to authenticate content from that origin, the origin can |
| 2125 |
only be securely established if data is transferred over HTTPS <span>[<a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">RFC2818</a>]</span>. Thus, clients <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> treat HTTP and HTTPS origins as |
| 2126 |
different permissions domains. Note: This follows directly from the |
| 2127 |
origin security model and is stated here merely for clarity.<a href="#section-6.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2128 |
<p id="section-6.1-2"> |
| 2129 |
Many Web browsers currently forbid by default any active mixed content |
| 2130 |
on HTTPS pages. That is, when JavaScript is loaded from an HTTP origin |
| 2131 |
onto an HTTPS page, an error is displayed and the HTTP content is not |
| 2132 |
executed unless the user overrides the error. Any browser which |
| 2133 |
enforces such a policy will also not permit access to WebRTC |
| 2134 |
functionality from mixed content pages (because they never display |
| 2135 |
mixed content). Browsers which allow active mixed content <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> |
| 2136 |
nevertheless disable WebRTC functionality in mixed content settings.<a href="#section-6.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2137 |
<p id="section-6.1-3"> |
| 2138 |
Note that it is possible for a page which was not mixed content to |
| 2139 |
become mixed content during the duration of the call. The major risk |
| 2140 |
here is that the newly arrived insecure JS might redirect media to a |
| 2141 |
location controlled by the attacker. Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> either |
| 2142 |
choose to terminate the call or display a warning at that point.<a href="#section-6.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2143 |
<p id="section-6.1-4"> |
| 2144 |
Also note that the security architecture depends on the keying material |
| 2145 |
not being available to move between origins. However, it is assumed that |
| 2146 |
the identity assertion can be passed to anyone that the page cares to.<a href="#section-6.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2147 |
</section> |
| 2148 |
</div> |
| 2149 |
<div id="sec.proposal.device.permissions"> |
| 2150 |
<section id="section-6.2"> |
| 2151 |
<h3 id="name-device-permissions-model"> |
| 2152 |
<a href="#section-6.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.2. </a><a href="#name-device-permissions-model" class="section-name selfRef">Device Permissions Model</a> |
| 2153 |
</h3> |
| 2154 |
<p id="section-6.2-1"> |
| 2155 |
Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> obtain explicit user consent prior to providing |
| 2156 |
access to the camera and/or microphone. Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> at |
| 2157 |
minimum support the following two permissions models for HTTPS |
| 2158 |
origins.<a href="#section-6.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2159 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2160 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-2.1"> |
| 2161 |
Requests for one-time camera/microphone access.<a href="#section-6.2-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2162 |
</li> |
| 2163 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-2.2"> |
| 2164 |
Requests for permanent access.<a href="#section-6.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2165 |
</li> |
| 2166 |
</ul> |
| 2167 |
<p id="section-6.2-3"> |
| 2168 |
Because HTTP origins cannot be securely established against network |
| 2169 |
attackers, implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> refuse all permissions grants for |
| 2170 |
HTTP origins.<a href="#section-6.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2171 |
<p id="section-6.2-4"> |
| 2172 |
In addition, they <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> support requests for access that promise that |
| 2173 |
media from this grant will be sent to a single communicating peer |
| 2174 |
(obviously there could be other requests for other peers), e.g., |
| 2175 |
"Call [email protected]". The semantics of this request are |
| 2176 |
that the media stream from the camera and microphone will only be |
| 2177 |
routed through a connection which has been cryptographically verified |
| 2178 |
(through the IdP mechanism or an X.509 certificate in the DTLS-SRTP |
| 2179 |
handshake) as being associated with the stated identity. Note that it |
| 2180 |
is unlikely that browsers would have X.509 certificates, but servers |
| 2181 |
might. Browsers servicing such requests <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> clearly indicate that |
| 2182 |
identity to the user when asking for permission. The idea behind this |
| 2183 |
type of permissions is that a user might have a fairly narrow list of |
| 2184 |
peers they are willing to communicate with, e.g., "my mother" rather than |
| 2185 |
"anyone on Facebook". Narrow permissions grants allow the browser to |
| 2186 |
do that enforcement.<a href="#section-6.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2187 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.2-5"> |
| 2188 |
<dt id="section-6.2-5.1">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2189 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.2-5.2"> |
| 2190 |
The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism for the requesting JS to |
| 2191 |
relinquish the ability to see or modify the media (e.g., via |
| 2192 |
MediaStream.record()). Combined with secure authentication of the |
| 2193 |
communicating peer, this allows a user to be sure that the calling |
| 2194 |
site is not accessing or modifying their conversion.<a href="#section-6.2-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2195 |
</dd> |
| 2196 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2197 |
</dl> |
| 2198 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.2-6"> |
| 2199 |
<dt id="section-6.2-6.1">UI Requirement:</dt> |
| 2200 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.2-6.2"> |
| 2201 |
The UI <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> clearly indicate when the user's camera and microphone |
| 2202 |
are in use. This indication <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be suppressible by the JS |
| 2203 |
and <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> clearly indicate how to terminate device access, and |
| 2204 |
provide a UI means to immediately stop camera/microphone input |
| 2205 |
without the JS being able to prevent it.<a href="#section-6.2-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2206 |
</dd> |
| 2207 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2208 |
</dl> |
| 2209 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.2-7"> |
| 2210 |
<dt id="section-6.2-7.1">UI Requirement:</dt> |
| 2211 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.2-7.2"> |
| 2212 |
If the UI indication of camera/microphone use is displayed in the |
| 2213 |
browser such that minimizing the browser window would hide the |
| 2214 |
indication, or the JS creating an overlapping window would hide |
| 2215 |
the indication, then the browser <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> stop camera and microphone |
| 2216 |
input when the indication is hidden. (Note: This may not be |
| 2217 |
necessary in systems that are non-windows-based but that have good |
| 2218 |
notifications support, such as phones.)<a href="#section-6.2-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2219 |
</dd> |
| 2220 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2221 |
</dl> |
| 2222 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2223 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-8.1"> |
| 2224 |
Browsers <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> permit permanent screen or application sharing |
| 2225 |
permissions to be installed as a response to a JS request for |
| 2226 |
permissions. Instead, they must require some other user action |
| 2227 |
such as a permissions setting or an application install experience |
| 2228 |
to grant permission to a site.<a href="#section-6.2-8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2229 |
</li> |
| 2230 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-8.2"> |
| 2231 |
Browsers <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a separate dialog request for |
| 2232 |
screen/application sharing permissions even if the media request |
| 2233 |
is made at the same time as the request for camera and microphone |
| 2234 |
permissions.<a href="#section-6.2-8.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2235 |
</li> |
| 2236 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-8.3"> |
| 2237 |
The browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> indicate any windows which are currently being |
| 2238 |
shared in some unambiguous way. Windows which are not visible <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be shared even if the application is being shared. If the |
| 2239 |
screen is being shared, then that <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be indicated.<a href="#section-6.2-8.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2240 |
</li> |
| 2241 |
</ul> |
| 2242 |
<p id="section-6.2-9"> |
| 2243 |
Browsers <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> permit the formation of data channels without any direct |
| 2244 |
user approval. Because sites can always tunnel data through the |
| 2245 |
server, further restrictions on the data channel do not provide any |
| 2246 |
additional security. (See <a href="#sec.proposal.communications.consent" class="xref">Section 6.3</a> for a related issue.)<a href="#section-6.2-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2247 |
<p id="section-6.2-10"> |
| 2248 |
Implementations which support some form of direct user authentication |
| 2249 |
<span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> also provide a policy by which a user can authorize calls only |
| 2250 |
to specific communicating peers. Specifically, the implementation |
| 2251 |
<span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> provide the following interfaces/controls:<a href="#section-6.2-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2252 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2253 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-11.1"> |
| 2254 |
Allow future calls to this verified user.<a href="#section-6.2-11.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2255 |
</li> |
| 2256 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.2-11.2"> |
| 2257 |
Allow future calls to any verified user who is in my system |
| 2258 |
address book (this only works with address book integration, of |
| 2259 |
course).<a href="#section-6.2-11.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2260 |
</li> |
| 2261 |
</ul> |
| 2262 |
<p id="section-6.2-12"> |
| 2263 |
Implementations <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> also provide a different user interface |
| 2264 |
indication when calls are in progress to users whose identities are |
| 2265 |
directly verifiable. <a href="#sec.proposal.comsec" class="xref">Section 6.5</a> provides |
| 2266 |
more on this.<a href="#section-6.2-12" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2267 |
</section> |
| 2268 |
</div> |
| 2269 |
<div id="sec.proposal.communications.consent"> |
| 2270 |
<section id="section-6.3"> |
| 2271 |
<h3 id="name-communications-consent"> |
| 2272 |
<a href="#section-6.3" class="section-number selfRef">6.3. </a><a href="#name-communications-consent" class="section-name selfRef">Communications Consent</a> |
| 2273 |
</h3> |
| 2274 |
<p id="section-6.3-1"> |
| 2275 |
Browser client implementations of WebRTC <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> implement ICE. Server |
| 2276 |
gateway implementations which operate only at public IP addresses <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> |
| 2277 |
implement either full ICE or ICE-Lite <span>[<a href="#RFC8445" class="xref">RFC8445</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2278 |
<p id="section-6.3-2"> |
| 2279 |
Browser implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify reachability via ICE prior to |
| 2280 |
sending any non-ICE packets to a given destination. Implementations |
| 2281 |
<span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> provide the ICE transaction ID to JavaScript during the |
| 2282 |
lifetime of the transaction (i.e., during the period when the ICE |
| 2283 |
stack would accept a new response for that transaction). The JS <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be permitted to control the local ufrag and password, though it of |
| 2284 |
course knows it.<a href="#section-6.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2285 |
<p id="section-6.3-3"> |
| 2286 |
While continuing consent is required, the ICE <span>[<a href="#RFC8445" class="xref">RFC8445</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8445#section-11" class="relref">Section 11</a></span> keepalives use STUN Binding Indications, which are |
| 2287 |
one-way and therefore not sufficient. The current WG consensus is to |
| 2288 |
use ICE Binding Requests for continuing consent freshness. ICE already |
| 2289 |
requires that implementations respond to such requests, so this |
| 2290 |
approach is maximally compatible. A separate document will profile the |
| 2291 |
ICE timers to be used; see <span>[<a href="#RFC7675" class="xref">RFC7675</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2292 |
</section> |
| 2293 |
</div> |
| 2294 |
<div id="sec.proposal.ip.location.privacy"> |
| 2295 |
<section id="section-6.4"> |
| 2296 |
<h3 id="name-ip-location-privacy"> |
| 2297 |
<a href="#section-6.4" class="section-number selfRef">6.4. </a><a href="#name-ip-location-privacy" class="section-name selfRef">IP Location Privacy</a> |
| 2298 |
</h3> |
| 2299 |
<p id="section-6.4-1"> |
| 2300 |
A side effect of the default ICE behavior is that the peer learns |
| 2301 |
one's IP address, which leaks large amounts of location |
| 2302 |
information. This has negative privacy consequences in some |
| 2303 |
circumstances. The API requirements in this section are intended to |
| 2304 |
mitigate this issue. Note that these requirements are not intended to |
| 2305 |
protect the user's IP address from a malicious site. In general, the |
| 2306 |
site will learn at least a user's server-reflexive address from any |
| 2307 |
HTTP transaction. Rather, these requirements are intended to allow a |
| 2308 |
site to cooperate with the user to hide the user's IP address from the |
| 2309 |
other side of the call. Hiding the user's IP address from the server |
| 2310 |
requires some sort of explicit privacy-preserving mechanism on the |
| 2311 |
client (e.g., Tor Browser <span><<a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en</a>></span>) and |
| 2312 |
is out of scope for this specification.<a href="#section-6.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2313 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.4-2"> |
| 2314 |
<dt id="section-6.4-2.1">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2315 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.4-2.2"> |
| 2316 |
The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism to allow the JS to suppress ICE |
| 2317 |
negotiation (though perhaps to allow candidate gathering) until |
| 2318 |
the user has decided to answer the call. (Note: Determining when |
| 2319 |
the call has been answered is a question for the JS.) This |
| 2320 |
enables a user to prevent a peer from learning their IP address if |
| 2321 |
they elect not to answer a call and also from learning whether the |
| 2322 |
user is online.<a href="#section-6.4-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2323 |
</dd> |
| 2324 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2325 |
</dl> |
| 2326 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.4-3"> |
| 2327 |
<dt id="section-6.4-3.1">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2328 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.4-3.2"> |
| 2329 |
The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism for the calling application JS to |
| 2330 |
indicate that only TURN candidates are to be used. This prevents |
| 2331 |
the peer from learning one's IP address at all. This mechanism |
| 2332 |
<span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also permit suppression of the related address field, since |
| 2333 |
that leaks local addresses.<a href="#section-6.4-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2334 |
</dd> |
| 2335 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2336 |
</dl> |
| 2337 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.4-4"> |
| 2338 |
<dt id="section-6.4-4.1">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2339 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.4-4.2"> |
| 2340 |
The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism for the calling application to |
| 2341 |
reconfigure an existing call to add non-TURN candidates. Taken |
| 2342 |
together, this and the previous requirement allow ICE negotiation |
| 2343 |
to start immediately on incoming call notification, thus reducing |
| 2344 |
post-dial delay, but also to avoid disclosing the user's IP |
| 2345 |
address until they have decided to answer. They also allow users |
| 2346 |
to completely hide their IP address for the duration of the |
| 2347 |
call. Finally, they allow a mechanism for the user to optimize |
| 2348 |
performance by reconfiguring to allow non-TURN candidates during |
| 2349 |
an active call if the user decides they no longer need to hide |
| 2350 |
their IP address.<a href="#section-6.4-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2351 |
</dd> |
| 2352 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2353 |
</dl> |
| 2354 |
<p id="section-6.4-5"> |
| 2355 |
Note that some enterprises may operate proxies and/or NATs designed to |
| 2356 |
hide internal IP addresses from the outside world. WebRTC provides no |
| 2357 |
explicit mechanism to allow this function. Either such enterprises |
| 2358 |
need to proxy the HTTP/HTTPS and modify the SDP and/or the JS, or |
| 2359 |
there needs to be browser support to set the "TURN-only" policy |
| 2360 |
regardless of the site's preferences.<a href="#section-6.4-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2361 |
<p id="section-6.4-6"> |
| 2362 |
Note: These requirements are intended to allow sites to conceal the |
| 2363 |
user's IP address from the peer. For guidance on concealing the |
| 2364 |
user's IP address from the calling site see <span>[<a href="#RFC8828" class="xref">RFC8828</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.4-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2365 |
</section> |
| 2366 |
</div> |
| 2367 |
<div id="sec.proposal.comsec"> |
| 2368 |
<section id="section-6.5"> |
| 2369 |
<h3 id="name-communications-security"> |
| 2370 |
<a href="#section-6.5" class="section-number selfRef">6.5. </a><a href="#name-communications-security" class="section-name selfRef">Communications Security</a> |
| 2371 |
</h3> |
| 2372 |
<p id="section-6.5-1"> |
| 2373 |
Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support SRTP <span>[<a href="#RFC3711" class="xref">RFC3711</a>]</span>. |
| 2374 |
Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support DTLS <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span> and |
| 2375 |
DTLS-SRTP <span>[<a href="#RFC5763" class="xref">RFC5763</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC5764" class="xref">RFC5764</a>]</span> for SRTP |
| 2376 |
keying. Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support SCTP over DTLS <span>[<a href="#RFC8261" class="xref">RFC8261</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2377 |
<p id="section-6.5-2"> |
| 2378 |
All media channels <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be secured via SRTP and the |
| 2379 |
Secure Real-time Transport Control Protocol (SRTCP). Media traffic <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> |
| 2380 |
be sent over plain (unencrypted) RTP or RTCP; that is, implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> negotiate cipher suites with NULL encryption modes. DTLS-SRTP |
| 2381 |
<span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be offered for every media channel. WebRTC implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> |
| 2382 |
offer SDP security descriptions <span>[<a href="#RFC4568" class="xref">RFC4568</a>]</span> or select it if offered. |
| 2383 |
An SRTP Master Key Identifier (MKI) <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be used.<a href="#section-6.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2384 |
<p id="section-6.5-3"> |
| 2385 |
All data channels <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be secured via DTLS.<a href="#section-6.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2386 |
<p id="section-6.5-4"> |
| 2387 |
All implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support DTLS 1.2 with the |
| 2388 |
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and the |
| 2389 |
<span><a href="#FIPS186" class="xref">P-256 curve</a> [<a href="#FIPS186" class="xref">FIPS186</a>]</span>. |
| 2390 |
Earlier drafts of this specification required |
| 2391 |
DTLS 1.0 with the cipher suite |
| 2392 |
TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and at the time of this |
| 2393 |
writing some implementations do not support DTLS 1.2; |
| 2394 |
endpoints which support only DTLS 1.2 might encounter |
| 2395 |
interoperability issues. |
| 2396 |
The DTLS-SRTP protection profile |
| 2397 |
SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be supported for |
| 2398 |
SRTP. |
| 2399 |
Implementations |
| 2400 |
<span class="bcp14">MUST</span> favor cipher suites which support Forward Secrecy (FS) |
| 2401 |
over non-FS cipher suites and <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> favor |
| 2402 |
Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) over non-AEAD cipher suites. |
| 2403 |
Note: the IETF is in the process of standardizing DTLS 1.3 |
| 2404 |
<span>[<a href="#I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" class="xref">TLS-DTLS13</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2405 |
<p id="section-6.5-5"> |
| 2406 |
Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> implement DTLS renegotiation and <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject |
| 2407 |
it with a "no_renegotiation" alert if offered.<a href="#section-6.5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2408 |
<p id="section-6.5-6"> |
| 2409 |
Endpoints <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> implement TLS False Start <span>[<a href="#RFC7918" class="xref">RFC7918</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2410 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.5-7"> |
| 2411 |
<dt id="section-6.5-7.1">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2412 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.2"> |
| 2413 |
The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> generate a new authentication key pair for every new |
| 2414 |
call by default. This is intended to allow for unlinkability.<a href="#section-6.5-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2415 |
</dd> |
| 2416 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2417 |
<dt id="section-6.5-7.3">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2418 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.4"> |
| 2419 |
The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a means to reuse a key pair for calls. This |
| 2420 |
can be used to enable key continuity-based authentication, and |
| 2421 |
could be used to amortize key generation costs.<a href="#section-6.5-7.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2422 |
</dd> |
| 2423 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2424 |
<dt id="section-6.5-7.5">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2425 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.6"> |
| 2426 |
Unless |
| 2427 |
the user specifically configures an external key pair, different |
| 2428 |
key pairs <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be used for each origin. (This avoids creating a |
| 2429 |
super-cookie.)<a href="#section-6.5-7.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2430 |
</dd> |
| 2431 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2432 |
<dt id="section-6.5-7.7">API Requirement:</dt> |
| 2433 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.8"> |
| 2434 |
When DTLS-SRTP is used, the API <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> permit the JS to obtain |
| 2435 |
the negotiated keying material. This requirement preserves the |
| 2436 |
end-to-end security of the media.<a href="#section-6.5-7.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2437 |
</dd> |
| 2438 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2439 |
</dl> |
| 2440 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.5-8"> |
| 2441 |
<dt id="section-6.5-8.1">UI Requirements:</dt> |
| 2442 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.2"> |
| 2443 |
A user-oriented client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide an "inspector" interface which |
| 2444 |
allows the user to determine the "security characteristics" of the |
| 2445 |
media.<a href="#section-6.5-8.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2446 |
</dd> |
| 2447 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2448 |
<dt id="section-6.5-8.3"></dt> |
| 2449 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.4"> |
| 2450 |
The following properties <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be displayed "up-front" in the |
| 2451 |
browser chrome, i.e., without requiring the user to ask for them:<a href="#section-6.5-8.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2452 |
</dd> |
| 2453 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2454 |
<dt id="section-6.5-8.5"></dt> |
| 2455 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.6"> |
| 2456 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2457 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.6.1.1"> |
| 2458 |
A client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a user interface through which a user |
| 2459 |
may determine the "security characteristics" for |
| 2460 |
currently displayed audio and video stream(s).<a href="#section-6.5-8.6.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2461 |
</li> |
| 2462 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.6.1.2"> |
| 2463 |
A client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a user interface through which a user |
| 2464 |
may determine the "security characteristics" for transmissions |
| 2465 |
of their microphone audio and camera video.<a href="#section-6.5-8.6.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2466 |
</li> |
| 2467 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.6.1.3"> |
| 2468 |
If the far endpoint was directly verified, either via a |
| 2469 |
third-party verifiable X.509 certificate or via a Web IdP |
| 2470 |
mechanism (see <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a>), the "security |
| 2471 |
characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include the verified information. X.509 |
| 2472 |
identities and Web IdP identities have similar semantics and |
| 2473 |
should be displayed in a similar way.<a href="#section-6.5-8.6.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2474 |
</li> |
| 2475 |
</ul> |
| 2476 |
</dd> |
| 2477 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2478 |
<dt id="section-6.5-8.7"></dt> |
| 2479 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.8"> |
| 2480 |
The following properties are more likely to require some |
| 2481 |
"drill-down" from the user:<a href="#section-6.5-8.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2482 |
</dd> |
| 2483 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2484 |
<dt id="section-6.5-8.9"></dt> |
| 2485 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.10"> |
| 2486 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2487 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.10.1.1"> |
| 2488 |
The "security characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> indicate the cryptographic |
| 2489 |
algorithms in use (for example, "AES-CBC").<a href="#section-6.5-8.10.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2490 |
</li> |
| 2491 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.10.1.2"> |
| 2492 |
The "security characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> indicate whether FS is |
| 2493 |
provided.<a href="#section-6.5-8.10.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2494 |
</li> |
| 2495 |
<li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.10.1.3"> |
| 2496 |
The "security characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include some mechanism to |
| 2497 |
allow an out-of-band verification of the peer, such as a |
| 2498 |
certificate fingerprint or a Short Authentication String (SAS). |
| 2499 |
These are compared by the peers to authenticate one another.<a href="#section-6.5-8.10.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2500 |
</li> |
| 2501 |
</ul> |
| 2502 |
</dd> |
| 2503 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2504 |
</dl> |
| 2505 |
</section> |
| 2506 |
</div> |
| 2507 |
</section> |
| 2508 |
</div> |
| 2509 |
<div id="sec.generic.idp"> |
| 2510 |
<section id="section-7"> |
| 2511 |
<h2 id="name-web-based-peer-authenticati"> |
| 2512 |
<a href="#section-7" class="section-number selfRef">7. </a><a href="#name-web-based-peer-authenticati" class="section-name selfRef">Web-Based Peer Authentication</a> |
| 2513 |
</h2> |
| 2514 |
<p id="section-7-1"> |
| 2515 |
NOTE: The mechanism described in this section was designed relatively |
| 2516 |
early in the RTCWEB process. In retrospect, the WG was too optimistic |
| 2517 |
about the enthusiasm for this kind of mechanism. At the time of publication, |
| 2518 |
it has not been widely adopted or implemented. It appears in this document |
| 2519 |
as a description of the state of the art as of this writing.<a href="#section-7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2520 |
<p id="section-7-2"> |
| 2521 |
In a number of cases, it is desirable for the endpoint (i.e., the |
| 2522 |
browser) to be able to directly identify the endpoint on the other |
| 2523 |
side without trusting the signaling service to which they are |
| 2524 |
connected. For instance, users may be making a call via a federated |
| 2525 |
system where they wish to get direct authentication of the other |
| 2526 |
side. Alternately, they may be making a call on a site which they |
| 2527 |
minimally trust (such as a poker site) but to someone who has an |
| 2528 |
identity on a site they do trust (such as a social network).<a href="#section-7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2529 |
<p id="section-7-3"> |
| 2530 |
Recently, a number of Web-based identity technologies (OAuth, |
| 2531 |
Facebook Connect, etc.) have been developed. While the |
| 2532 |
details vary, what these technologies share is that they have a |
| 2533 |
Web-based (i.e., HTTP/HTTPS) IdP which attests to Alice's |
| 2534 |
identity. For instance, if Alice has an account at example.org, Alice could |
| 2535 |
use the example.org IdP to prove to others that Alice is |
| 2536 |
[email protected]. The development of these technologies allows us to |
| 2537 |
separate calling from identity provision: Alice could call you on a |
| 2538 |
poker site but identify herself as [email protected].<a href="#section-7-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2539 |
<p id="section-7-4"> |
| 2540 |
Whatever the underlying technology, the general principle is that the |
| 2541 |
party which is being authenticated is NOT the signaling site but |
| 2542 |
rather the user (and their browser). Similarly, the Relying Party is |
| 2543 |
the browser and not the signaling site. Thus, the browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> |
| 2544 |
generate the input to the IdP assertion process and |
| 2545 |
display the results of the verification process to the user |
| 2546 |
in a way which cannot be imitated by the calling site.<a href="#section-7-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2547 |
<p id="section-7-5"> |
| 2548 |
The mechanisms defined in this document do not require the browser to |
| 2549 |
implement any particular identity protocol or to support any |
| 2550 |
particular IdP. Instead, this document provides a generic interface |
| 2551 |
which any IdP can implement. Thus, new IdPs and protocols can be |
| 2552 |
introduced without change to either the browser or the calling |
| 2553 |
service. This avoids the need to make a commitment to any particular |
| 2554 |
identity protocol, although browsers may opt to directly implement |
| 2555 |
some identity protocols in order to provide superior performance or UI |
| 2556 |
properties.<a href="#section-7-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2557 |
<div id="sec.trust-relationships"> |
| 2558 |
<section id="section-7.1"> |
| 2559 |
<h3 id="name-trust-relationships-idps-ap"> |
| 2560 |
<a href="#section-7.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.1. </a><a href="#name-trust-relationships-idps-ap" class="section-name selfRef">Trust Relationships: IdPs, APs, and RPs</a> |
| 2561 |
</h3> |
| 2562 |
<p id="section-7.1-1"> |
| 2563 |
Any federated identity protocol has three major participants:<a href="#section-7.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2564 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.1-2"> |
| 2565 |
<dt id="section-7.1-2.1">Authenticating Party (AP):</dt> |
| 2566 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-2.2"> |
| 2567 |
The entity which is trying to establish its identity.<a href="#section-7.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2568 |
</dd> |
| 2569 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2570 |
<dt id="section-7.1-2.3">Identity Provider (IdP):</dt> |
| 2571 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-2.4"> |
| 2572 |
The entity which is vouching for the AP's identity.<a href="#section-7.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2573 |
</dd> |
| 2574 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2575 |
<dt id="section-7.1-2.5">Relying Party (RP):</dt> |
| 2576 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-2.6"> |
| 2577 |
The entity which is trying to verify the AP's identity.<a href="#section-7.1-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2578 |
</dd> |
| 2579 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2580 |
</dl> |
| 2581 |
<p id="section-7.1-3"> |
| 2582 |
The AP and the IdP have an account relationship of some kind: the AP |
| 2583 |
registers with the IdP and is able to subsequently authenticate |
| 2584 |
directly to the IdP (e.g., with a password). This means that the |
| 2585 |
browser must somehow know which IdP(s) the user has an account |
| 2586 |
relationship with. This can either be something that the user |
| 2587 |
configures into the browser or that is configured at the calling |
| 2588 |
site and then provided to the PeerConnection by the Web application |
| 2589 |
at the calling site. The use case for having this information |
| 2590 |
configured into the browser is that the user may "log into" the |
| 2591 |
browser to bind it to some identity. This is becoming common in new |
| 2592 |
browsers. However, it should also be possible for the IdP |
| 2593 |
information to simply be provided by the calling application.<a href="#section-7.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2594 |
<p id="section-7.1-4"> |
| 2595 |
At a high level, there are two kinds of IdPs:<a href="#section-7.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2596 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.1-5"> |
| 2597 |
<dt id="section-7.1-5.1">Authoritative:</dt> |
| 2598 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-5.2"> |
| 2599 |
IdPs which have verifiable control of some section of the |
| 2600 |
identity space. For instance, in the realm of email, the |
| 2601 |
operator of "example.com" has complete control of the namespace |
| 2602 |
ending in "@example.com". Thus, "[email protected]" is whoever |
| 2603 |
the operator says it is. Examples of systems with authoritative |
| 2604 |
IdPs include DNSSEC, an identity system for SIP |
| 2605 |
(see <span>[<a href="#RFC8224" class="xref">RFC8224</a>]</span>), and Facebook |
| 2606 |
Connect (Facebook identities only make sense within the context |
| 2607 |
of the Facebook system).<a href="#section-7.1-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2608 |
</dd> |
| 2609 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2610 |
<dt id="section-7.1-5.3">Third-Party:</dt> |
| 2611 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-5.4"> |
| 2612 |
IdPs which don't have control of their section of the identity |
| 2613 |
space but instead verify users' identities via some unspecified |
| 2614 |
mechanism and then attest to it. Because the IdP doesn't |
| 2615 |
actually control the namespace, RPs need to trust that the IdP |
| 2616 |
is correctly verifying AP identities, and there can potentially |
| 2617 |
be multiple IdPs attesting to the same section of the identity |
| 2618 |
space. Probably the best-known example of a third-party IdP |
| 2619 |
is SSL/TLS certificates, where there are a large number of |
| 2620 |
certificate authorities (CAs) all of whom can attest to any domain name.<a href="#section-7.1-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2621 |
</dd> |
| 2622 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2623 |
</dl> |
| 2624 |
<p id="section-7.1-6"> |
| 2625 |
If an AP is authenticating via an authoritative IdP, then the RP |
| 2626 |
does not need to explicitly configure trust in the IdP at all. The |
| 2627 |
identity mechanism can directly verify that the IdP indeed made the |
| 2628 |
relevant identity assertion (a function provided by the mechanisms |
| 2629 |
in this document), and any assertion it makes about an identity for |
| 2630 |
which it is authoritative is directly verifiable. Note that this |
| 2631 |
does not mean that the IdP might not lie, but that is a |
| 2632 |
trustworthiness judgement that the user can make at the time they |
| 2633 |
look at the identity.<a href="#section-7.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2634 |
<p id="section-7.1-7"> |
| 2635 |
By contrast, if an AP is authenticating via a third-party IdP, the |
| 2636 |
RP needs to explicitly trust that IdP (hence the need for an |
| 2637 |
explicit trust anchor list in PKI-based SSL/TLS clients). The list |
| 2638 |
of trustable IdPs needs to be configured directly into the browser, |
| 2639 |
either by the user or potentially by the browser manufacturer. This |
| 2640 |
is a significant advantage of authoritative IdPs and implies that if |
| 2641 |
third-party IdPs are to be supported, the potential number needs to |
| 2642 |
be fairly small.<a href="#section-7.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2643 |
</section> |
| 2644 |
</div> |
| 2645 |
<div id="sec.overview"> |
| 2646 |
<section id="section-7.2"> |
| 2647 |
<h3 id="name-overview-of-operation"> |
| 2648 |
<a href="#section-7.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.2. </a><a href="#name-overview-of-operation" class="section-name selfRef">Overview of Operation</a> |
| 2649 |
</h3> |
| 2650 |
<p id="section-7.2-1"> |
| 2651 |
In order to provide security without trusting the calling site, the |
| 2652 |
PeerConnection component of the browser must interact directly with |
| 2653 |
the IdP. The details of the mechanism are described in the W3C API |
| 2654 |
specification, but the general idea is that the PeerConnection |
| 2655 |
component downloads JS from a specific location on the IdP dictated |
| 2656 |
by the IdP domain name. That JS (the "IdP proxy") runs in an |
| 2657 |
isolated security context within the browser, and the PeerConnection |
| 2658 |
talks to it via a secure message passing channel.<a href="#section-7.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2659 |
<p id="section-7.2-2"> |
| 2660 |
Note that there are two logically separate functions here:<a href="#section-7.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2661 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2662 |
<li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.1"> |
| 2663 |
Identity assertion generation.<a href="#section-7.2-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2664 |
</li> |
| 2665 |
<li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.2"> |
| 2666 |
Identity assertion verification.<a href="#section-7.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2667 |
</li> |
| 2668 |
</ul> |
| 2669 |
<p id="section-7.2-4"> |
| 2670 |
The same IdP JS "endpoint" is used for both functions, but of course |
| 2671 |
a given IdP might behave differently and load new JS to perform one |
| 2672 |
function or the other.<a href="#section-7.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2673 |
<div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-7.2-5"> |
| 2674 |
<pre> |
| 2675 |
+--------------------------------------+ |
| 2676 |
| Browser | |
| 2677 |
| | |
| 2678 |
| +----------------------------------+ | |
| 2679 |
| | https://calling-site.example.com | | |
| 2680 |
| | | | |
| 2681 |
| | Calling JS Code | | |
| 2682 |
| | ^ | | |
| 2683 |
| +---------------|------------------+ | |
| 2684 |
| | API Calls | |
| 2685 |
| v | |
| 2686 |
| PeerConnection | |
| 2687 |
| ^ | |
| 2688 |
| | API Calls | |
| 2689 |
| +-----------|-------------+ | +---------------+ |
| 2690 |
| | v | | | | |
| 2691 |
| | IdP Proxy |<-------->| Identity | |
| 2692 |
| | | | | Provider | |
| 2693 |
| | https://idp.example.org | | | | |
| 2694 |
| +-------------------------+ | +---------------+ |
| 2695 |
| | |
| 2696 |
+--------------------------------------+</pre><a href="#section-7.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2697 |
</div> |
| 2698 |
<p id="section-7.2-6"> |
| 2699 |
When the PeerConnection object wants to interact with the IdP, the |
| 2700 |
sequence of events is as follows:<a href="#section-7.2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2701 |
<ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-7.2-7"> |
| 2702 |
<li id="section-7.2-7.1"> |
| 2703 |
The browser (the PeerConnection component) instantiates an IdP |
| 2704 |
proxy. This allows the IdP to load whatever JS is necessary into |
| 2705 |
the proxy. The resulting code runs in the IdP's security |
| 2706 |
context.<a href="#section-7.2-7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2707 |
</li> |
| 2708 |
<li id="section-7.2-7.2"> |
| 2709 |
The IdP registers an object with the browser that conforms to |
| 2710 |
the API defined in <span>[<a href="#webrtc-api" class="xref">webrtc-api</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.2-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2711 |
</li> |
| 2712 |
<li id="section-7.2-7.3"> |
| 2713 |
The browser invokes methods on the object registered by the IdP |
| 2714 |
proxy to create or verify identity assertions.<a href="#section-7.2-7.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2715 |
</li> |
| 2716 |
</ol> |
| 2717 |
<p id="section-7.2-8"> |
| 2718 |
This approach allows us to decouple the browser from any particular |
| 2719 |
IdP; the browser need only know how to load the IdP's |
| 2720 |
JavaScript -- the location of which is determined based on the IdP's |
| 2721 |
identity -- and to call the generic API for requesting and verifying |
| 2722 |
identity assertions. The IdP provides whatever logic is necessary to |
| 2723 |
bridge the generic protocol to the IdP's specific |
| 2724 |
requirements. Thus, a single browser can support any number of |
| 2725 |
identity protocols, including being forward compatible with IdPs |
| 2726 |
which did not exist at the time the browser was written.<a href="#section-7.2-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2727 |
</section> |
| 2728 |
</div> |
| 2729 |
<div id="sec.standardized"> |
| 2730 |
<section id="section-7.3"> |
| 2731 |
<h3 id="name-items-for-standardization"> |
| 2732 |
<a href="#section-7.3" class="section-number selfRef">7.3. </a><a href="#name-items-for-standardization" class="section-name selfRef">Items for Standardization</a> |
| 2733 |
</h3> |
| 2734 |
<p id="section-7.3-1"> |
| 2735 |
There are two parts to this work:<a href="#section-7.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2736 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2737 |
<li class="normal" id="section-7.3-2.1"> |
| 2738 |
The precise information from the signaling message that must be |
| 2739 |
cryptographically bound to the user's identity and a mechanism |
| 2740 |
for carrying assertions in JavaScript Session Establishment |
| 2741 |
Protocol (JSEP) messages. This is specified in |
| 2742 |
<a href="#sec.jsep-binding" class="xref">Section 7.4</a>.<a href="#section-7.3-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2743 |
</li> |
| 2744 |
<li class="normal" id="section-7.3-2.2"> |
| 2745 |
The interface to the IdP, which is defined in the companion W3C |
| 2746 |
WebRTC API specification <span>[<a href="#webrtc-api" class="xref">webrtc-api</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.3-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2747 |
</li> |
| 2748 |
</ul> |
| 2749 |
<p id="section-7.3-3"> |
| 2750 |
The WebRTC API specification also defines JavaScript interfaces that |
| 2751 |
the calling application can use to specify which IdP to use. That |
| 2752 |
API also provides access to the assertion-generation capability and |
| 2753 |
the status of the validation process.<a href="#section-7.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2754 |
</section> |
| 2755 |
</div> |
| 2756 |
<div id="sec.jsep-binding"> |
| 2757 |
<section id="section-7.4"> |
| 2758 |
<h3 id="name-binding-identity-assertions"> |
| 2759 |
<a href="#section-7.4" class="section-number selfRef">7.4. </a><a href="#name-binding-identity-assertions" class="section-name selfRef">Binding Identity Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transactions</a> |
| 2760 |
</h3> |
| 2761 |
<p id="section-7.4-1"> |
| 2762 |
An identity assertion binds the user's identity (as asserted by the |
| 2763 |
IdP) to the SDP offer/answer exchange and specifically to the |
| 2764 |
media. In order to achieve this, the PeerConnection must provide the |
| 2765 |
DTLS-SRTP fingerprint to be bound to the identity. This is provided |
| 2766 |
as a JavaScript object (also known as a dictionary or hash) with a |
| 2767 |
single "fingerprint" key, as shown below:<a href="#section-7.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2768 |
<div id="section-7.4-2"> |
| 2769 |
<pre class="sourcecode lang-json"> |
| 2770 |
{ |
| 2771 |
"fingerprint": |
| 2772 |
[ |
| 2773 |
{ "algorithm": "sha-256", |
| 2774 |
"digest": "4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:...:E5:7C:AB" }, |
| 2775 |
{ "algorithm": "sha-1", |
| 2776 |
"digest": "74:E9:76:C8:19:...:F4:45:6B" } |
| 2777 |
] |
| 2778 |
}</pre><a href="#section-7.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2779 |
</div> |
| 2780 |
<p id="section-7.4-3"> |
| 2781 |
The "fingerprint" value is an array of |
| 2782 |
objects. Each object in the array contains "algorithm" and "digest" values, which correspond directly to |
| 2783 |
the algorithm and digest values in the "fingerprint" attribute of the SDP <span>[<a href="#RFC8122" class="xref">RFC8122</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2784 |
<p id="section-7.4-4"> |
| 2785 |
This object is encoded in a <span><a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">JSON</a> [<a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">RFC8259</a>]</span> |
| 2786 |
string for passing to the IdP. The identity assertion returned by |
| 2787 |
the IdP, which is encoded in the "identity" attribute, is a JSON object that is |
| 2788 |
encoded as described in <a href="#sec.carry-assertion" class="xref">Section 7.4.1</a>.<a href="#section-7.4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2789 |
<p id="section-7.4-5"> |
| 2790 |
This structure does not need to be interpreted by the IdP or the |
| 2791 |
IdP proxy. It is consumed solely by the RP's browser. The IdP |
| 2792 |
merely treats it as an opaque value to be attested to. Thus, new |
| 2793 |
parameters can be added to the assertion without modifying the |
| 2794 |
IdP.<a href="#section-7.4-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2795 |
<div id="sec.carry-assertion"> |
| 2796 |
<section id="section-7.4.1"> |
| 2797 |
<h4 id="name-carrying-identity-assertion"> |
| 2798 |
<a href="#section-7.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.4.1. </a><a href="#name-carrying-identity-assertion" class="section-name selfRef">Carrying Identity Assertions</a> |
| 2799 |
</h4> |
| 2800 |
<p id="section-7.4.1-1"> |
| 2801 |
Once an IdP has generated an assertion (see <a href="#sec.request-assert" class="xref">Section 7.6</a>), it is attached to the SDP |
| 2802 |
offer/answer message. This is done by adding a new "identity" |
| 2803 |
attribute to the SDP. The sole contents of this value is the |
| 2804 |
identity assertion. The identity assertion produced by the IdP is |
| 2805 |
encoded into a UTF-8 JSON text, then <span><a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">base64-encoded</a> [<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span> to produce this string. |
| 2806 |
For example:<a href="#section-7.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2807 |
<div id="section-7.4.1-2"> |
| 2808 |
<pre class="sourcecode lang-sdp"> |
| 2809 |
v=0 |
| 2810 |
o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4 ua1.example.com |
| 2811 |
s=example1 |
| 2812 |
c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com |
| 2813 |
a=fingerprint:sha-1 \ |
| 2814 |
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB |
| 2815 |
a=identity:\ |
| 2816 |
eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\ |
| 2817 |
In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\ |
| 2818 |
IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\ |
| 2819 |
aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9 |
| 2820 |
a=... |
| 2821 |
t=0 0 |
| 2822 |
m=audio 6056 RTP/SAVP 0 |
| 2823 |
a=sendrecv |
| 2824 |
...</pre><a href="#section-7.4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2825 |
</div> |
| 2826 |
<aside id="section-7.4.1-3"> |
| 2827 |
<p id="section-7.4.1-3.1">Note that long lines in the example are folded to meet the column |
| 2828 |
width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of |
| 2829 |
a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored.<a href="#section-7.4.1-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2830 |
</aside> |
| 2831 |
<p id="section-7.4.1-4"> |
| 2832 |
The "identity" attribute attests to all "fingerprint" attributes in the session |
| 2833 |
description. It is therefore a session-level attribute.<a href="#section-7.4.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2834 |
<p id="section-7.4.1-5"> |
| 2835 |
Multiple "fingerprint" values can be |
| 2836 |
used to offer alternative certificates for a peer. The "identity" attribute <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include all |
| 2837 |
"fingerprint" values that are included in "fingerprint" attributes of the session |
| 2838 |
description.<a href="#section-7.4.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2839 |
<p id="section-7.4.1-6"> |
| 2840 |
The RP browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify that the in-use certificate for a DTLS |
| 2841 |
connection is in the set of fingerprints returned from the IdP |
| 2842 |
when verifying an assertion.<a href="#section-7.4.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2843 |
</section> |
| 2844 |
</div> |
| 2845 |
</section> |
| 2846 |
</div> |
| 2847 |
<div id="sec.idp-uri"> |
| 2848 |
<section id="section-7.5"> |
| 2849 |
<h3 id="name-determining-the-idp-uri"> |
| 2850 |
<a href="#section-7.5" class="section-number selfRef">7.5. </a><a href="#name-determining-the-idp-uri" class="section-name selfRef">Determining the IdP URI</a> |
| 2851 |
</h3> |
| 2852 |
<p id="section-7.5-1"> |
| 2853 |
In order to ensure that the IdP is under control of the domain |
| 2854 |
owner rather than someone who merely has an account on the |
| 2855 |
domain owner's server (e.g., in shared hosting scenarios), the |
| 2856 |
IdP JavaScript is hosted at a deterministic location based on |
| 2857 |
the IdP's domain name. Each IdP proxy instance is associated |
| 2858 |
with two values:<a href="#section-7.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2859 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.5-2"> |
| 2860 |
<dt id="section-7.5-2.1">authority:</dt> |
| 2861 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.5-2.2"> |
| 2862 |
The <span><a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">authority</a> [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span> at which the |
| 2863 |
IdP's service is hosted.<a href="#section-7.5-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2864 |
</dd> |
| 2865 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2866 |
<dt id="section-7.5-2.3">protocol:</dt> |
| 2867 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.5-2.4"> |
| 2868 |
The specific IdP protocol which the IdP is using. This is a |
| 2869 |
completely opaque IdP-specific string, but allows an IdP to |
| 2870 |
implement two protocols in parallel. This value may be the |
| 2871 |
empty string. If no value for protocol is provided, a value |
| 2872 |
of "default" is used.<a href="#section-7.5-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2873 |
</dd> |
| 2874 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2875 |
</dl> |
| 2876 |
<p id="section-7.5-3"> |
| 2877 |
Each IdP <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> serve its initial entry page (i.e., the one loaded |
| 2878 |
by the IdP proxy) from a <span><a href="#RFC8615" class="xref">well-known |
| 2879 |
URI</a> [<a href="#RFC8615" class="xref">RFC8615</a>]</span>. |
| 2880 |
The well-known URI for an IdP proxy is formed from |
| 2881 |
the following URI components:<a href="#section-7.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2882 |
<ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-7.5-4"> |
| 2883 |
<li id="section-7.5-4.1"> |
| 2884 |
The scheme, "https:". An IdP <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be loaded using <span><a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">HTTPS</a> [<a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">RFC2818</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.5-4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2885 |
</li> |
| 2886 |
<li id="section-7.5-4.2"> |
| 2887 |
The <span><a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">authority</a> [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span>. As noted above, |
| 2888 |
the authority <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> contain a non-default port number or |
| 2889 |
userinfo sub-component. Both are removed when determining |
| 2890 |
if an asserted identity matches the name of the IdP.<a href="#section-7.5-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2891 |
</li> |
| 2892 |
<li id="section-7.5-4.3"> |
| 2893 |
The path, starting with "/.well-known/idp-proxy/" and |
| 2894 |
appended with the IdP protocol. Note that the separator |
| 2895 |
characters '/' (%2F) and '\' (%5C) <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be permitted in |
| 2896 |
the protocol field, lest an attacker be able to direct |
| 2897 |
requests outside of the controlled "/.well-known/" prefix. |
| 2898 |
Query and fragment values <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be used by including '?' or |
| 2899 |
'#' characters.<a href="#section-7.5-4.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2900 |
</li> |
| 2901 |
</ol> |
| 2902 |
<p id="section-7.5-5"> |
| 2903 |
For example, for the IdP "identity.example.com" and the protocol |
| 2904 |
"example", the URL would be:<a href="#section-7.5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2905 |
<div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-7.5-6"> |
| 2906 |
<pre>https://identity.example.com/.well-known/idp-proxy/example</pre><a href="#section-7.5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2907 |
</div> |
| 2908 |
<p id="section-7.5-7"> |
| 2909 |
The IdP <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> redirect requests to this URL, but they <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> retain |
| 2910 |
the "https:" scheme. This changes the effective origin of the |
| 2911 |
IdP, but not the domain of the identities that the IdP is |
| 2912 |
permitted to assert and validate. I.e., the IdP is still |
| 2913 |
regarded as authoritative for the original domain.<a href="#section-7.5-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2914 |
<section id="section-7.5.1"> |
| 2915 |
<h4 id="name-authenticating-party"> |
| 2916 |
<a href="#section-7.5.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.5.1. </a><a href="#name-authenticating-party" class="section-name selfRef">Authenticating Party</a> |
| 2917 |
</h4> |
| 2918 |
<p id="section-7.5.1-1"> |
| 2919 |
How an AP determines the appropriate IdP domain is out of |
| 2920 |
scope of this specification. In general, however, the AP has |
| 2921 |
some actual account relationship with the IdP, as this |
| 2922 |
identity is what the IdP is attesting to. Thus, the AP somehow |
| 2923 |
supplies the IdP information to the browser. Some potential |
| 2924 |
mechanisms include:<a href="#section-7.5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2925 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 2926 |
<li class="normal" id="section-7.5.1-2.1"> |
| 2927 |
Provided by the user directly.<a href="#section-7.5.1-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2928 |
</li> |
| 2929 |
<li class="normal" id="section-7.5.1-2.2"> |
| 2930 |
Selected from some set of IdPs known to the calling site |
| 2931 |
(e.g., a button that shows "Authenticate via Facebook |
| 2932 |
Connect").<a href="#section-7.5.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2933 |
</li> |
| 2934 |
</ul> |
| 2935 |
</section> |
| 2936 |
<section id="section-7.5.2"> |
| 2937 |
<h4 id="name-relying-party"> |
| 2938 |
<a href="#section-7.5.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.5.2. </a><a href="#name-relying-party" class="section-name selfRef">Relying Party</a> |
| 2939 |
</h4> |
| 2940 |
<p id="section-7.5.2-1"> |
| 2941 |
Unlike the AP, the RP need not have any particular |
| 2942 |
relationship with the IdP. Rather, it needs to be able to |
| 2943 |
process whatever assertion is provided by the AP. As the |
| 2944 |
assertion contains the IdP's identity in the "idp" field of the JSON-encoded object (see |
| 2945 |
<a href="#sec.request-assert" class="xref">Section 7.6</a>), the URI can be |
| 2946 |
constructed directly from the assertion, and thus the RP can |
| 2947 |
directly verify the technical validity of the assertion with |
| 2948 |
no user interaction. Authoritative assertions need only be |
| 2949 |
verifiable. Third-party assertions also <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be verified |
| 2950 |
against local policy, as described in <a href="#sec.id-format" class="xref">Section 8.1</a>.<a href="#section-7.5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2951 |
</section> |
| 2952 |
</section> |
| 2953 |
</div> |
| 2954 |
<div id="sec.request-assert"> |
| 2955 |
<section id="section-7.6"> |
| 2956 |
<h3 id="name-requesting-assertions"> |
| 2957 |
<a href="#section-7.6" class="section-number selfRef">7.6. </a><a href="#name-requesting-assertions" class="section-name selfRef">Requesting Assertions</a> |
| 2958 |
</h3> |
| 2959 |
<p id="section-7.6-1"> |
| 2960 |
The input to the identity assertion generation process is the JSON-encoded object |
| 2961 |
described in <a href="#sec.jsep-binding" class="xref">Section 7.4</a> that contains the |
| 2962 |
set of certificate fingerprints the browser intends to use. |
| 2963 |
This string is treated as opaque from the perspective of the |
| 2964 |
IdP.<a href="#section-7.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2965 |
<p id="section-7.6-2"> |
| 2966 |
The browser also identifies the origin that the PeerConnection |
| 2967 |
is run in, which allows the IdP to make decisions based on who |
| 2968 |
is requesting the assertion.<a href="#section-7.6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2969 |
<p id="section-7.6-3"> |
| 2970 |
An application can optionally provide a user identifier hint |
| 2971 |
when specifying an IdP. This value is a hint that the IdP can |
| 2972 |
use to select amongst multiple identities, or to avoid providing |
| 2973 |
assertions for unwanted identities. The "username" is a string that has no meaning to |
| 2974 |
any entity other than the IdP; it can contain any data the IdP |
| 2975 |
needs in order to correctly generate an assertion.<a href="#section-7.6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2976 |
<p id="section-7.6-4"> |
| 2977 |
An identity assertion that is successfully provided by the IdP |
| 2978 |
consists of the following information:<a href="#section-7.6-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 2979 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.6-5"> |
| 2980 |
<dt id="section-7.6-5.1">idp:</dt> |
| 2981 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.6-5.2"> |
| 2982 |
The domain name of an IdP and the protocol string. This <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> |
| 2983 |
identify a different IdP or protocol from the one that |
| 2984 |
generated the assertion.<a href="#section-7.6-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2985 |
</dd> |
| 2986 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2987 |
<dt id="section-7.6-5.3">assertion:</dt> |
| 2988 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.6-5.4"> |
| 2989 |
An opaque value containing the assertion itself. This is |
| 2990 |
only interpretable by the identified IdP or the IdP code |
| 2991 |
running in the client.<a href="#section-7.6-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 2992 |
</dd> |
| 2993 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 2994 |
</dl> |
| 2995 |
<p id="section-7.6-6"> |
| 2996 |
<a href="#fig.assert-ex" class="xref">Figure 5</a> shows an example assertion |
| 2997 |
formatted as JSON. In this case, the message has presumably |
| 2998 |
been digitally signed/MACed in some way that the IdP can later |
| 2999 |
verify it, but this is an implementation detail and out of scope |
| 3000 |
of this document.<a href="#section-7.6-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3001 |
<span id="name-example-assertion"></span><div id="fig.assert-ex"> |
| 3002 |
<figure id="figure-5"> |
| 3003 |
<div id="section-7.6-7.1"> |
| 3004 |
<pre class="sourcecode lang-json"> |
| 3005 |
{ |
| 3006 |
"idp":{ |
| 3007 |
"domain": "example.org", |
| 3008 |
"protocol": "bogus" |
| 3009 |
}, |
| 3010 |
"assertion": "{\"identity\":\"[email protected]\", |
| 3011 |
\"contents\":\"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwyz\", |
| 3012 |
\"signature\":\"010203040506\"}" |
| 3013 |
}</pre> |
| 3014 |
</div> |
| 3015 |
<figcaption><a href="#figure-5" class="selfRef">Figure 5</a>: |
| 3016 |
<a href="#name-example-assertion" class="selfRef">Example Assertion</a> |
| 3017 |
</figcaption></figure> |
| 3018 |
</div> |
| 3019 |
<p id="section-7.6-8"> |
| 3020 |
For use in signaling, the assertion is serialized into JSON, |
| 3021 |
<span><a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">base64-encoded</a> [<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>, and used as the |
| 3022 |
value of the "identity" attribute. |
| 3023 |
IdPs <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> ensure that any assertions they |
| 3024 |
generate cannot be interpreted in a different context. E.g., |
| 3025 |
they should use a distinct format or have separate cryptographic |
| 3026 |
keys for assertion generation and other purposes. |
| 3027 |
Line breaks are inserted solely for |
| 3028 |
readability.<a href="#section-7.6-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3029 |
</section> |
| 3030 |
</div> |
| 3031 |
<div id="sec.user-login"> |
| 3032 |
<section id="section-7.7"> |
| 3033 |
<h3 id="name-managing-user-login"> |
| 3034 |
<a href="#section-7.7" class="section-number selfRef">7.7. </a><a href="#name-managing-user-login" class="section-name selfRef">Managing User Login</a> |
| 3035 |
</h3> |
| 3036 |
<p id="section-7.7-1"> |
| 3037 |
In order to generate an identity assertion, the IdP needs proof of |
| 3038 |
the user's identity. It is common practice to authenticate users |
| 3039 |
(using passwords or multi-factor authentication), then use <span><a href="#RFC6265" class="xref">cookies</a> [<a href="#RFC6265" class="xref">RFC6265</a>]</span> or <span><a href="#RFC7617" class="xref">HTTP |
| 3040 |
authentication</a> [<a href="#RFC7617" class="xref">RFC7617</a>]</span> for subsequent exchanges.<a href="#section-7.7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3041 |
<p id="section-7.7-2"> |
| 3042 |
The IdP proxy is able to access cookies, HTTP authentication data, or |
| 3043 |
other persistent session data because it operates in the security |
| 3044 |
context of the IdP origin. Therefore, if a user is logged in, the |
| 3045 |
IdP could have all the information needed to generate an |
| 3046 |
assertion.<a href="#section-7.7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3047 |
<p id="section-7.7-3"> |
| 3048 |
An IdP proxy is unable to generate an assertion if the user is |
| 3049 |
not logged in, or the IdP wants to interact with the user to |
| 3050 |
acquire more information before generating the assertion. If |
| 3051 |
the IdP wants to interact with the user before generating an |
| 3052 |
assertion, the IdP proxy can fail to generate an assertion and |
| 3053 |
instead indicate a URL where login should proceed.<a href="#section-7.7-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3054 |
<p id="section-7.7-4"> |
| 3055 |
The application can then load the provided URL to enable the |
| 3056 |
user to enter credentials. The communication between the |
| 3057 |
application and the IdP is described in <span>[<a href="#webrtc-api" class="xref">webrtc-api</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.7-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3058 |
</section> |
| 3059 |
</div> |
| 3060 |
</section> |
| 3061 |
</div> |
| 3062 |
<div id="sec.verify-assert"> |
| 3063 |
<section id="section-8"> |
| 3064 |
<h2 id="name-verifying-assertions"> |
| 3065 |
<a href="#section-8" class="section-number selfRef">8. </a><a href="#name-verifying-assertions" class="section-name selfRef">Verifying Assertions</a> |
| 3066 |
</h2> |
| 3067 |
<p id="section-8-1"> |
| 3068 |
The input to identity validation is the assertion string taken |
| 3069 |
from a decoded "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3070 |
<p id="section-8-2"> |
| 3071 |
The IdP proxy verifies the assertion. Depending on the identity |
| 3072 |
protocol, the proxy might contact the IdP server or other |
| 3073 |
servers. For instance, an OAuth-based protocol will likely |
| 3074 |
require using the IdP as an oracle, whereas with a |
| 3075 |
signature-based scheme it might be able to verify the assertion |
| 3076 |
without contacting the IdP, provided that it has cached the |
| 3077 |
relevant public key.<a href="#section-8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3078 |
<p id="section-8-3"> |
| 3079 |
Regardless of the mechanism, if verification succeeds, a |
| 3080 |
successful response from the IdP proxy consists of the following |
| 3081 |
information:<a href="#section-8-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3082 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8-4"> |
| 3083 |
<dt id="section-8-4.1">identity:</dt> |
| 3084 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8-4.2"> |
| 3085 |
The identity of the AP from the IdP's perspective. Details |
| 3086 |
of this are provided in <a href="#sec.id-format" class="xref">Section 8.1</a>.<a href="#section-8-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3087 |
</dd> |
| 3088 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3089 |
<dt id="section-8-4.3">contents:</dt> |
| 3090 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8-4.4"> |
| 3091 |
The original unmodified string provided by the AP as input |
| 3092 |
to the assertion generation process.<a href="#section-8-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3093 |
</dd> |
| 3094 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3095 |
</dl> |
| 3096 |
<p id="section-8-5"> |
| 3097 |
<a href="#fig.verify-ex" class="xref">Figure 6</a> shows an example response, |
| 3098 |
which is JSON-formatted.<a href="#section-8-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3099 |
<span id="name-example-verification-result"></span><div id="fig.verify-ex"> |
| 3100 |
<figure id="figure-6"> |
| 3101 |
<div id="section-8-6.1"> |
| 3102 |
<pre class="sourcecode lang-json"> |
| 3103 |
{ |
| 3104 |
"identity": "[email protected]", |
| 3105 |
"contents": "{\"fingerprint\":[ ... ]}" |
| 3106 |
}</pre> |
| 3107 |
</div> |
| 3108 |
<figcaption><a href="#figure-6" class="selfRef">Figure 6</a>: |
| 3109 |
<a href="#name-example-verification-result" class="selfRef">Example Verification Result</a> |
| 3110 |
</figcaption></figure> |
| 3111 |
</div> |
| 3112 |
<div id="sec.id-format"> |
| 3113 |
<section id="section-8.1"> |
| 3114 |
<h3 id="name-identity-formats"> |
| 3115 |
<a href="#section-8.1" class="section-number selfRef">8.1. </a><a href="#name-identity-formats" class="section-name selfRef">Identity Formats</a> |
| 3116 |
</h3> |
| 3117 |
<p id="section-8.1-1"> |
| 3118 |
The identity provided from the IdP to the RP browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> |
| 3119 |
consist of a string representing the user's identity. This |
| 3120 |
string is in the form "<user>@<domain>", where "user" consists of any character, |
| 3121 |
and domain is an internationalized |
| 3122 |
domain name <span>[<a href="#RFC5890" class="xref">RFC5890</a>]</span> encoded as a sequence of U-labels.<a href="#section-8.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3123 |
<p id="section-8.1-2"> |
| 3124 |
The PeerConnection API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> check this string as follows:<a href="#section-8.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3125 |
<ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-8.1-3"> |
| 3126 |
<li id="section-8.1-3.1"> |
| 3127 |
If the "domain" portion of the string is equal to the domain |
| 3128 |
name of the IdP proxy, then the assertion is valid, as the |
| 3129 |
IdP is authoritative for this domain. Comparison of |
| 3130 |
domain names is done using the label equivalence rule |
| 3131 |
defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890#section-2.3.2.4" class="relref">Section 2.3.2.4</a> of [<a href="#RFC5890" class="xref">RFC5890</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.1-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3132 |
</li> |
| 3133 |
<li id="section-8.1-3.2"> |
| 3134 |
<p id="section-8.1-3.2.1"> |
| 3135 |
If the "domain" portion of the string is not equal to the |
| 3136 |
domain name of the IdP proxy, then the PeerConnection |
| 3137 |
object <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject the assertion unless both:<a href="#section-8.1-3.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3138 |
<ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-8.1-3.2.2"> |
| 3139 |
<li id="section-8.1-3.2.2.1"> |
| 3140 |
the IdP domain is trusted as an acceptable third-party |
| 3141 |
IdP; and<a href="#section-8.1-3.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3142 |
</li> |
| 3143 |
<li id="section-8.1-3.2.2.2"> |
| 3144 |
local policy is configured to trust this IdP domain |
| 3145 |
for the domain portion of the identity string.<a href="#section-8.1-3.2.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3146 |
</li> |
| 3147 |
</ol> |
| 3148 |
</li> |
| 3149 |
</ol> |
| 3150 |
<p id="section-8.1-4"> |
| 3151 |
Any '@' or '%' characters in the "user" portion of the |
| 3152 |
identity <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be escaped according to the "percent-encoding" |
| 3153 |
rules defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-2.1" class="relref">Section 2.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span>. Characters other than '@' and '%' <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> |
| 3154 |
be percent-encoded. For example, with a "user" of "user@133" and |
| 3155 |
a "domain" of "identity.example.com", the resulting string will |
| 3156 |
be encoded as "user%[email protected]".<a href="#section-8.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3157 |
<p id="section-8.1-5"> |
| 3158 |
Implementations are cautioned to take care when displaying |
| 3159 |
user identities containing escaped '@' characters. If such |
| 3160 |
characters are unescaped prior to display, implementations |
| 3161 |
<span class="bcp14">MUST</span> distinguish between the domain of the IdP proxy and any |
| 3162 |
domain that might be implied by the portion of the |
| 3163 |
"<user>" portion that appears after the escaped "@" |
| 3164 |
sign.<a href="#section-8.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3165 |
</section> |
| 3166 |
</div> |
| 3167 |
</section> |
| 3168 |
</div> |
| 3169 |
<div id="sec.sec-cons"> |
| 3170 |
<section id="section-9"> |
| 3171 |
<h2 id="name-security-considerations"> |
| 3172 |
<a href="#section-9" class="section-number selfRef">9. </a><a href="#name-security-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Security Considerations</a> |
| 3173 |
</h2> |
| 3174 |
<p id="section-9-1"> |
| 3175 |
Much of the security analysis of RTCWEB is contained in <span>[<a href="#RFC8826" class="xref">RFC8826</a>]</span> or in the discussion of the |
| 3176 |
particular issues above. In order to avoid repetition, this section |
| 3177 |
focuses on (a) residual threats that are not addressed by this |
| 3178 |
document and (b) threats produced by failure/misbehavior of one of the |
| 3179 |
components in the system.<a href="#section-9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3180 |
<section id="section-9.1"> |
| 3181 |
<h3 id="name-communications-security-2"> |
| 3182 |
<a href="#section-9.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.1. </a><a href="#name-communications-security-2" class="section-name selfRef">Communications Security</a> |
| 3183 |
</h3> |
| 3184 |
<p id="section-9.1-1"> |
| 3185 |
If HTTPS is not used to secure communications to the signaling |
| 3186 |
server, and the identity mechanism used in |
| 3187 |
<a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> is not used, |
| 3188 |
then any on-path attacker can replace the DTLS-SRTP fingerprints |
| 3189 |
in the handshake and thus substitute its own identity for that |
| 3190 |
of either endpoint.<a href="#section-9.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3191 |
<p id="section-9.1-2"> |
| 3192 |
Even if HTTPS is used, the signaling server can |
| 3193 |
potentially mount a man-in-the-middle attack unless implementations |
| 3194 |
have some mechanism for independently verifying keys. The UI |
| 3195 |
requirements in <a href="#sec.proposal.comsec" class="xref">Section 6.5</a> are designed to |
| 3196 |
provide such a mechanism for motivated/security conscious users, but |
| 3197 |
are not suitable for general use. The identity service mechanisms |
| 3198 |
in <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> are more suitable for general |
| 3199 |
use. Note, however, that a malicious signaling service can strip off |
| 3200 |
any such identity assertions, though it cannot forge new ones. Note |
| 3201 |
that all of the third-party security mechanisms available (whether |
| 3202 |
X.509 certificates or a third-party IdP) rely on the security of the |
| 3203 |
third party -- this is of course also true of the user's connection to the |
| 3204 |
Web site itself. Users who wish to assure themselves of security |
| 3205 |
against a malicious IdP can only do so by verifying |
| 3206 |
peer credentials directly, e.g., by checking the peer's fingerprint |
| 3207 |
against a value delivered out of band.<a href="#section-9.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3208 |
<p id="section-9.1-3"> |
| 3209 |
In order to protect against malicious content JavaScript, that |
| 3210 |
JavaScript <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be allowed to have direct |
| 3211 |
access to -- or perform |
| 3212 |
computations with -- DTLS keys. For instance, if content JS were able |
| 3213 |
to compute digital signatures, then it would be possible for content |
| 3214 |
JS to get an identity assertion for a browser's generated key and |
| 3215 |
then use that assertion plus a signature by the key to authenticate |
| 3216 |
a call protected under an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) key controlled by the content |
| 3217 |
JS, thus violating the security guarantees otherwise provided by the |
| 3218 |
IdP mechanism. Note that it is not sufficient merely to deny the |
| 3219 |
content JS direct access to the keys, as some have suggested doing |
| 3220 |
with the WebCrypto API <span>[<a href="#webcrypto" class="xref">webcrypto</a>]</span>. The JS must |
| 3221 |
also not be allowed to perform operations that would be valid for a |
| 3222 |
DTLS endpoint. By far the safest approach is simply to deny the |
| 3223 |
ability to perform any operations that depend on secret information |
| 3224 |
associated with the key. Operations that depend on public |
| 3225 |
information, such as exporting the public key, are of course safe.<a href="#section-9.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3226 |
</section> |
| 3227 |
<section id="section-9.2"> |
| 3228 |
<h3 id="name-privacy"> |
| 3229 |
<a href="#section-9.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.2. </a><a href="#name-privacy" class="section-name selfRef">Privacy</a> |
| 3230 |
</h3> |
| 3231 |
<p id="section-9.2-1"> |
| 3232 |
The requirements in this document are intended to allow:<a href="#section-9.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3233 |
<ul class="normal"> |
| 3234 |
<li class="normal" id="section-9.2-2.1"> |
| 3235 |
Users to participate in calls without revealing their location.<a href="#section-9.2-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3236 |
</li> |
| 3237 |
<li class="normal" id="section-9.2-2.2"> |
| 3238 |
Potential callees to avoid revealing their location and even |
| 3239 |
presence status prior to agreeing to answer a call.<a href="#section-9.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3240 |
</li> |
| 3241 |
</ul> |
| 3242 |
<p id="section-9.2-3"> |
| 3243 |
However, these privacy protections come at a performance cost in |
| 3244 |
terms of using TURN relays and, in the latter case, delaying |
| 3245 |
ICE. Sites <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> make users aware of these tradeoffs.<a href="#section-9.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3246 |
<p id="section-9.2-4"> |
| 3247 |
Note that the protections provided here assume a non-malicious |
| 3248 |
calling service. As the calling service always knows the user's |
| 3249 |
status and (absent the use of a technology like Tor) their IP |
| 3250 |
address, they can violate the user's privacy at will. Users who wish |
| 3251 |
privacy against the calling sites they are using must use separate |
| 3252 |
privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor. Combined WebRTC/Tor |
| 3253 |
implementations <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> arrange to route the media as well as the |
| 3254 |
signaling through Tor. Currently this will produce very suboptimal |
| 3255 |
performance.<a href="#section-9.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3256 |
<p id="section-9.2-5"> |
| 3257 |
Additionally, any identifier which persists across multiple calls is |
| 3258 |
potentially a problem for privacy, especially for anonymous calling |
| 3259 |
services. Such services <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> instruct the browser to use separate |
| 3260 |
DTLS keys for each call and also to use TURN throughout the |
| 3261 |
call. Otherwise, the other side will learn linkable information that |
| 3262 |
would allow them to correlate the browser across multiple calls. |
| 3263 |
Additionally, browsers <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> implement the privacy-preserving CNAME |
| 3264 |
generation mode of <span>[<a href="#RFC7022" class="xref">RFC7022</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-9.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3265 |
</section> |
| 3266 |
<section id="section-9.3"> |
| 3267 |
<h3 id="name-denial-of-service"> |
| 3268 |
<a href="#section-9.3" class="section-number selfRef">9.3. </a><a href="#name-denial-of-service" class="section-name selfRef">Denial of Service</a> |
| 3269 |
</h3> |
| 3270 |
<p id="section-9.3-1"> |
| 3271 |
The consent mechanisms described in this document are intended to |
| 3272 |
mitigate denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which an attacker uses clients |
| 3273 |
to send large amounts of traffic to a victim without the consent of |
| 3274 |
the victim. While these mechanisms are sufficient to protect victims |
| 3275 |
who have not implemented WebRTC at all, WebRTC implementations need |
| 3276 |
to be more careful.<a href="#section-9.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3277 |
<p id="section-9.3-2"> |
| 3278 |
Consider the case of a call center which accepts calls via |
| 3279 |
WebRTC. An attacker proxies the call center's front-end and arranges |
| 3280 |
for multiple clients to initiate calls to the call center. Note that |
| 3281 |
this requires user consent in many cases, but because the data |
| 3282 |
channel does not need consent, they can use that directly. Since ICE |
| 3283 |
will complete, browsers can then be induced to send large amounts of |
| 3284 |
data to the victim call center if it supports the data channel at |
| 3285 |
all. Preventing this attack requires that automated WebRTC |
| 3286 |
implementations implement sensible flow control and have the ability |
| 3287 |
to triage out (i.e., stop responding to ICE probes on) calls which |
| 3288 |
are behaving badly, and especially to be prepared to remotely |
| 3289 |
throttle the data channel in the absence of plausible audio and |
| 3290 |
video (which the attacker cannot control).<a href="#section-9.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3291 |
<p id="section-9.3-3"> |
| 3292 |
Another related attack is for the signaling service to swap the ICE |
| 3293 |
candidates for the audio and video streams, thus forcing a browser |
| 3294 |
to send video to the sink that the other victim expects will contain |
| 3295 |
audio (perhaps it is only expecting audio!), potentially causing |
| 3296 |
overload. Muxing multiple media flows over a single transport makes |
| 3297 |
it harder to individually suppress a single flow by denying ICE |
| 3298 |
keepalives. Either media-level (RTCP) mechanisms must be used or the |
| 3299 |
implementation must deny responses entirely, thus terminating the |
| 3300 |
call.<a href="#section-9.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3301 |
<p id="section-9.3-4"> |
| 3302 |
Yet another attack, suggested by Magnus Westerlund, is for the |
| 3303 |
attacker to cross-connect offers and answers as follows. It induces |
| 3304 |
the victim to make a call and then uses its control of other users' |
| 3305 |
browsers to get them to attempt a call to someone. It then |
| 3306 |
translates their offers into apparent answers to the victim, which |
| 3307 |
looks like large-scale parallel forking. The victim still responds |
| 3308 |
to ICE responses, and now the browsers all try to send media to the |
| 3309 |
victim. Implementations can defend themselves from this attack by |
| 3310 |
only responding to ICE Binding Requests for a limited number of |
| 3311 |
remote ufrags (this is the reason for the requirement that the JS |
| 3312 |
not be able to control the ufrag and password). |
| 3313 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC8834" class="xref">RFC8834</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8834#section-13" class="relref">Section 13</a></span> documents a number |
| 3314 |
of potential RTCP-based DoS attacks and countermeasures.<a href="#section-9.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3315 |
<p id="section-9.3-5"> |
| 3316 |
Note that attacks based on confusing one end or the other about |
| 3317 |
consent are possible even in the face of the third-party identity |
| 3318 |
mechanism as long as major parts of the signaling messages are not |
| 3319 |
signed. On the other hand, signing the entire message severely |
| 3320 |
restricts the capabilities of the calling application, so there are |
| 3321 |
difficult tradeoffs here.<a href="#section-9.3-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3322 |
</section> |
| 3323 |
<section id="section-9.4"> |
| 3324 |
<h3 id="name-idp-authentication-mechanis"> |
| 3325 |
<a href="#section-9.4" class="section-number selfRef">9.4. </a><a href="#name-idp-authentication-mechanis" class="section-name selfRef">IdP Authentication Mechanism</a> |
| 3326 |
</h3> |
| 3327 |
<p id="section-9.4-1"> |
| 3328 |
This mechanism relies for its security on the IdP and on the |
| 3329 |
PeerConnection correctly enforcing the security invariants described |
| 3330 |
above. At a high level, the IdP is attesting that the user |
| 3331 |
identified in the assertion wishes to be associated with the |
| 3332 |
assertion. Thus, it must not be possible for arbitrary third parties |
| 3333 |
to get assertions tied to a user or to produce assertions that RPs |
| 3334 |
will accept.<a href="#section-9.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3335 |
<div id="sec.pc-origin"> |
| 3336 |
<section id="section-9.4.1"> |
| 3337 |
<h4 id="name-peerconnection-origin-check"> |
| 3338 |
<a href="#section-9.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.1. </a><a href="#name-peerconnection-origin-check" class="section-name selfRef">PeerConnection Origin Check</a> |
| 3339 |
</h4> |
| 3340 |
<p id="section-9.4.1-1"> |
| 3341 |
Fundamentally, the IdP proxy is just a piece of HTML and JS loaded |
| 3342 |
by the browser, so nothing stops a Web attacker from creating |
| 3343 |
their own IFRAME, loading the IdP proxy HTML/JS, and requesting a |
| 3344 |
signature over their own keys rather than those generated in |
| 3345 |
the browser. However, that proxy would be in the |
| 3346 |
attacker's origin, not the IdP's origin. Only the |
| 3347 |
browser itself can instantiate a context that (a) is in the IdP's origin and |
| 3348 |
(b) exposes the correct API surface. Thus, the IdP proxy on |
| 3349 |
the sender's side <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> ensure that it is running in the IdP's origin |
| 3350 |
prior to issuing assertions.<a href="#section-9.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3351 |
<p id="section-9.4.1-2"> |
| 3352 |
Note that this check only asserts that the browser (or some other |
| 3353 |
entity with access to the user's authentication data) attests to |
| 3354 |
the request and hence to the fingerprint. It does not demonstrate |
| 3355 |
that the browser has access to the associated private |
| 3356 |
key, and therefore an attacker can attach their own identity |
| 3357 |
to another party's keying material, thus making a call which |
| 3358 |
comes from Alice appear to come from the attacker. |
| 3359 |
See <span>[<a href="#RFC8844" class="xref">RFC8844</a>]</span> for defenses against this |
| 3360 |
form of attack.<a href="#section-9.4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3361 |
</section> |
| 3362 |
</div> |
| 3363 |
<div id="sec.sec-idp-uri"> |
| 3364 |
<section id="section-9.4.2"> |
| 3365 |
<h4 id="name-idp-well-known-uri"> |
| 3366 |
<a href="#section-9.4.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.2. </a><a href="#name-idp-well-known-uri" class="section-name selfRef">IdP Well-Known URI</a> |
| 3367 |
</h4> |
| 3368 |
<p id="section-9.4.2-1"> |
| 3369 |
As described in <a href="#sec.idp-uri" class="xref">Section 7.5</a>, the IdP proxy HTML/JS |
| 3370 |
landing page is located at a well-known URI based on the IdP's |
| 3371 |
domain name. This requirement prevents an attacker who can write |
| 3372 |
some resources at the IdP (e.g., on one's Facebook wall) from |
| 3373 |
being able to impersonate the IdP.<a href="#section-9.4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3374 |
</section> |
| 3375 |
</div> |
| 3376 |
<section id="section-9.4.3"> |
| 3377 |
<h4 id="name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id"> |
| 3378 |
<a href="#section-9.4.3" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.3. </a><a href="#name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id" class="section-name selfRef">Privacy of IdP-Generated Identities and the Hosting Site</a> |
| 3379 |
</h4> |
| 3380 |
<p id="section-9.4.3-1"> |
| 3381 |
Depending on the structure of the IdP's assertions, the calling |
| 3382 |
site may learn the user's identity from the perspective of the |
| 3383 |
IdP. In many cases, this is not an issue because the user is |
| 3384 |
authenticating to the site via the IdP in any case -- for instance, |
| 3385 |
when the user has logged in with Facebook Connect and is then |
| 3386 |
authenticating their call with a Facebook identity. However, in |
| 3387 |
other cases, the user may not have already revealed their identity |
| 3388 |
to the site. In general, IdPs <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> either verify that the user |
| 3389 |
is willing to have their identity revealed to the site (e.g., |
| 3390 |
through the usual IdP permissions dialog) or arrange that the |
| 3391 |
identity information is only available to known RPs (e.g., social |
| 3392 |
graph adjacencies) but not to the calling site. The "domain" field |
| 3393 |
of the assertion request can be used to check that the user has |
| 3394 |
agreed to disclose their identity to the calling site; because it |
| 3395 |
is supplied by the PeerConnection it can be trusted to be correct.<a href="#section-9.4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3396 |
</section> |
| 3397 |
<div id="sec.sec-third-party"> |
| 3398 |
<section id="section-9.4.4"> |
| 3399 |
<h4 id="name-security-of-third-party-idp"> |
| 3400 |
<a href="#section-9.4.4" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.4. </a><a href="#name-security-of-third-party-idp" class="section-name selfRef">Security of Third-Party IdPs</a> |
| 3401 |
</h4> |
| 3402 |
<p id="section-9.4.4-1"> |
| 3403 |
As discussed above, each third-party IdP represents a new |
| 3404 |
universal trust point and therefore the number of these IdPs needs |
| 3405 |
to be quite limited. Most IdPs, even those which issue unqualified |
| 3406 |
identities such as Facebook, can be recast as authoritative IdPs |
| 3407 |
(e.g., [email protected]). However, in such cases, the user |
| 3408 |
interface implications are not entirely desirable. One |
| 3409 |
intermediate approach is to have special (potentially user |
| 3410 |
configurable) UI for large authoritative IdPs, thus allowing the |
| 3411 |
user to instantly grasp that the call is being authenticated by |
| 3412 |
Facebook, Google, etc.<a href="#section-9.4.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3413 |
<section id="section-9.4.4.1"> |
| 3414 |
<h5 id="name-confusable-characters"> |
| 3415 |
<a href="#section-9.4.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.4.1. </a><a href="#name-confusable-characters" class="section-name selfRef">Confusable Characters</a> |
| 3416 |
</h5> |
| 3417 |
<p id="section-9.4.4.1-1"> |
| 3418 |
Because a broad range of characters are permitted in identity |
| 3419 |
strings, it may be possible for attackers to craft identities |
| 3420 |
which are confusable with other identities (see |
| 3421 |
<span>[<a href="#RFC6943" class="xref">RFC6943</a>]</span> for more on this topic). This is |
| 3422 |
a problem with any identifier space of this type |
| 3423 |
(e.g., email addresses). |
| 3424 |
Those minting identifiers should avoid mixed scripts and similar |
| 3425 |
confusable characters. Those presenting these identifiers to a |
| 3426 |
user should consider highlighting cases of mixed script usage |
| 3427 |
(see <span>[<a href="#RFC5890" class="xref">RFC5890</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890#section-4.4" class="relref">Section 4.4</a></span>). Other best practices are still in development.<a href="#section-9.4.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3428 |
</section> |
| 3429 |
</section> |
| 3430 |
</div> |
| 3431 |
<section id="section-9.4.5"> |
| 3432 |
<h4 id="name-web-security-feature-intera"> |
| 3433 |
<a href="#section-9.4.5" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.5. </a><a href="#name-web-security-feature-intera" class="section-name selfRef">Web Security Feature Interactions</a> |
| 3434 |
</h4> |
| 3435 |
<p id="section-9.4.5-1"> |
| 3436 |
A number of optional Web security features have the potential to |
| 3437 |
cause issues for this mechanism, as discussed below.<a href="#section-9.4.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3438 |
<div id="sec.popup-blocking"> |
| 3439 |
<section id="section-9.4.5.1"> |
| 3440 |
<h5 id="name-popup-blocking"> |
| 3441 |
<a href="#section-9.4.5.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.5.1. </a><a href="#name-popup-blocking" class="section-name selfRef">Popup Blocking</a> |
| 3442 |
</h5> |
| 3443 |
<p id="section-9.4.5.1-1"> |
| 3444 |
When popup blocking is in use, the IdP proxy is unable to generate popup windows, dialogs, or |
| 3445 |
any other form of user interactions. This prevents the IdP |
| 3446 |
proxy from being used to circumvent user interaction. The |
| 3447 |
"LOGINNEEDED" message allows the IdP proxy to inform the calling |
| 3448 |
site of a need for user login, providing the information |
| 3449 |
necessary to satisfy this requirement without resorting to |
| 3450 |
direct user interaction from the IdP proxy itself.<a href="#section-9.4.5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3451 |
</section> |
| 3452 |
</div> |
| 3453 |
<div id="sec.3rd-party-cookies"> |
| 3454 |
<section id="section-9.4.5.2"> |
| 3455 |
<h5 id="name-third-party-cookies"> |
| 3456 |
<a href="#section-9.4.5.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.5.2. </a><a href="#name-third-party-cookies" class="section-name selfRef">Third Party Cookies</a> |
| 3457 |
</h5> |
| 3458 |
<p id="section-9.4.5.2-1"> |
| 3459 |
Some browsers allow users to block third party cookies (cookies |
| 3460 |
associated with origins other than the top-level page) for |
| 3461 |
privacy reasons. Any IdP which uses cookies to persist logins |
| 3462 |
will be broken by third-party cookie blocking. One option is to |
| 3463 |
accept this as a limitation; another is to have the |
| 3464 |
PeerConnection object disable third-party cookie blocking for |
| 3465 |
the IdP proxy.<a href="#section-9.4.5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3466 |
</section> |
| 3467 |
</div> |
| 3468 |
</section> |
| 3469 |
</section> |
| 3470 |
</section> |
| 3471 |
</div> |
| 3472 |
<div id="sec.iana-cons"> |
| 3473 |
<section id="section-10"> |
| 3474 |
<h2 id="name-iana-considerations"> |
| 3475 |
<a href="#section-10" class="section-number selfRef">10. </a><a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">IANA Considerations</a> |
| 3476 |
</h2> |
| 3477 |
<p id="section-10-1"> |
| 3478 |
This specification defines the "identity" |
| 3479 |
SDP attribute per the procedures of <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4566#section-8.2.4" class="relref">Section 8.2.4</a> of [<a href="#RFC4566" class="xref">RFC4566</a>]</span>. The required information for the registration is |
| 3480 |
included here:<a href="#section-10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3481 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-10-2"> |
| 3482 |
<dt id="section-10-2.1">Contact Name:</dt> |
| 3483 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.2">IESG ([email protected])<a href="#section-10-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3484 |
</dd> |
| 3485 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3486 |
<dt id="section-10-2.3">Attribute Name:</dt> |
| 3487 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.4">identity<a href="#section-10-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3488 |
</dd> |
| 3489 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3490 |
<dt id="section-10-2.5">Long Form:</dt> |
| 3491 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.6">identity<a href="#section-10-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3492 |
</dd> |
| 3493 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3494 |
<dt id="section-10-2.7">Type of Attribute:</dt> |
| 3495 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.8">session<a href="#section-10-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3496 |
</dd> |
| 3497 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3498 |
<dt id="section-10-2.9">Charset Considerations:</dt> |
| 3499 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.10">This attribute is not subject |
| 3500 |
to the charset attribute.<a href="#section-10-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3501 |
</dd> |
| 3502 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3503 |
<dt id="section-10-2.11">Purpose:</dt> |
| 3504 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.12">This attribute carries an identity assertion, |
| 3505 |
binding an identity to the transport-level security session.<a href="#section-10-2.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3506 |
</dd> |
| 3507 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3508 |
<dt id="section-10-2.13">Appropriate Values:</dt> |
| 3509 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.14">See <a href="#sec.sdp-id-attr" class="xref">Section 5</a> of RFC 8827.<a href="#section-10-2.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3510 |
</dd> |
| 3511 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3512 |
<dt id="section-10-2.15">Mux Category:</dt> |
| 3513 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.16">NORMAL<a href="#section-10-2.16" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3514 |
</dd> |
| 3515 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3516 |
</dl> |
| 3517 |
<p id="section-10-3"> |
| 3518 |
This section registers the "idp-proxy" well-known |
| 3519 |
URI from <span>[<a href="#RFC8615" class="xref">RFC8615</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-10-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3520 |
<span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-10-4"> |
| 3521 |
<dt id="section-10-4.1">URI suffix:</dt> |
| 3522 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-4.2">idp-proxy<a href="#section-10-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3523 |
</dd> |
| 3524 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3525 |
<dt id="section-10-4.3">Change controller:</dt> |
| 3526 |
<dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-4.4">IETF<a href="#section-10-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a> |
| 3527 |
</dd> |
| 3528 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3529 |
</dl> |
| 3530 |
</section> |
| 3531 |
</div> |
| 3532 |
<section id="section-11"> |
| 3533 |
<h2 id="name-references"> |
| 3534 |
<a href="#section-11" class="section-number selfRef">11. </a><a href="#name-references" class="section-name selfRef">References</a> |
| 3535 |
</h2> |
| 3536 |
<section id="section-11.1"> |
| 3537 |
<h3 id="name-normative-references"> |
| 3538 |
<a href="#section-11.1" class="section-number selfRef">11.1. </a><a href="#name-normative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Normative References</a> |
| 3539 |
</h3> |
| 3540 |
<dl class="references"> |
| 3541 |
<dt id="FIPS186">[FIPS186]</dt> |
| 3542 |
<dd> |
| 3543 |
<span class="refAuthor">National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">NIST PUB 186-4</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4</span>, <time datetime="2013-07" class="refDate">July 2013</time>, <span><<a href="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4">https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3544 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3545 |
<dt id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</dt> |
| 3546 |
<dd> |
| 3547 |
<span class="refAuthor">Bradner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2119</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2119</span>, <time datetime="1997-03" class="refDate">March 1997</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3548 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3549 |
<dt id="RFC2818">[RFC2818]</dt> |
| 3550 |
<dd> |
| 3551 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP Over TLS"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2818</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2818</span>, <time datetime="2000-05" class="refDate">May 2000</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3552 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3553 |
<dt id="RFC3264">[RFC3264]</dt> |
| 3554 |
<dd> |
| 3555 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rosenberg, J.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and H. Schulzrinne</span>, <span class="refTitle">"An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3264</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3264</span>, <time datetime="2002-06" class="refDate">June 2002</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3556 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3557 |
<dt id="RFC3711">[RFC3711]</dt> |
| 3558 |
<dd> |
| 3559 |
<span class="refAuthor">Baugher, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, McGrew, D.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Naslund, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Carrara, E.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and K. Norrman</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3711</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3711</span>, <time datetime="2004-03" class="refDate">March 2004</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3560 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3561 |
<dt id="RFC3986">[RFC3986]</dt> |
| 3562 |
<dd> |
| 3563 |
<span class="refAuthor">Berners-Lee, T.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Fielding, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and L. Masinter</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 66</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3986</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3986</span>, <time datetime="2005-01" class="refDate">January 2005</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3564 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3565 |
<dt id="RFC4566">[RFC4566]</dt> |
| 3566 |
<dd> |
| 3567 |
<span class="refAuthor">Handley, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jacobson, V.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and C. Perkins</span>, <span class="refTitle">"SDP: Session Description Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4566</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4566</span>, <time datetime="2006-07" class="refDate">July 2006</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3568 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3569 |
<dt id="RFC4568">[RFC4568]</dt> |
| 3570 |
<dd> |
| 3571 |
<span class="refAuthor">Andreasen, F.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Baugher, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and D. Wing</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4568</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4568</span>, <time datetime="2006-07" class="refDate">July 2006</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3572 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3573 |
<dt id="RFC4648">[RFC4648]</dt> |
| 3574 |
<dd> |
| 3575 |
<span class="refAuthor">Josefsson, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4648</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4648</span>, <time datetime="2006-10" class="refDate">October 2006</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3576 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3577 |
<dt id="RFC5763">[RFC5763]</dt> |
| 3578 |
<dd> |
| 3579 |
<span class="refAuthor">Fischl, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Tschofenig, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Framework for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5763</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5763</span>, <time datetime="2010-05" class="refDate">May 2010</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3580 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3581 |
<dt id="RFC5764">[RFC5764]</dt> |
| 3582 |
<dd> |
| 3583 |
<span class="refAuthor">McGrew, D.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5764</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5764</span>, <time datetime="2010-05" class="refDate">May 2010</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3584 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3585 |
<dt id="RFC5890">[RFC5890]</dt> |
| 3586 |
<dd> |
| 3587 |
<span class="refAuthor">Klensin, J.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5890</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5890</span>, <time datetime="2010-08" class="refDate">August 2010</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3588 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3589 |
<dt id="RFC6347">[RFC6347]</dt> |
| 3590 |
<dd> |
| 3591 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and N. Modadugu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6347</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6347</span>, <time datetime="2012-01" class="refDate">January 2012</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3592 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3593 |
<dt id="RFC6454">[RFC6454]</dt> |
| 3594 |
<dd> |
| 3595 |
<span class="refAuthor">Barth, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Web Origin Concept"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6454</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6454</span>, <time datetime="2011-12" class="refDate">December 2011</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3596 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3597 |
<dt id="RFC7022">[RFC7022]</dt> |
| 3598 |
<dd> |
| 3599 |
<span class="refAuthor">Begen, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Perkins, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Wing, D.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Guidelines for Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical Names (CNAMEs)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7022</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7022</span>, <time datetime="2013-09" class="refDate">September 2013</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7022">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7022</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3600 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3601 |
<dt id="RFC7675">[RFC7675]</dt> |
| 3602 |
<dd> |
| 3603 |
<span class="refAuthor">Perumal, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Wing, D.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Ravindranath, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Reddy, T.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and M. Thomson</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage for Consent Freshness"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7675</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7675</span>, <time datetime="2015-10" class="refDate">October 2015</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3604 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3605 |
<dt id="RFC7918">[RFC7918]</dt> |
| 3606 |
<dd> |
| 3607 |
<span class="refAuthor">Langley, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Modadugu, N.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and B. Moeller</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7918</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7918</span>, <time datetime="2016-08" class="refDate">August 2016</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7918">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7918</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3608 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3609 |
<dt id="RFC8122">[RFC8122]</dt> |
| 3610 |
<dd> |
| 3611 |
<span class="refAuthor">Lennox, J.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and C. Holmberg</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8122</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8122</span>, <time datetime="2017-03" class="refDate">March 2017</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3612 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3613 |
<dt id="RFC8174">[RFC8174]</dt> |
| 3614 |
<dd> |
| 3615 |
<span class="refAuthor">Leiba, B.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8174</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8174</span>, <time datetime="2017-05" class="refDate">May 2017</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3616 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3617 |
<dt id="RFC8259">[RFC8259]</dt> |
| 3618 |
<dd> |
| 3619 |
<span class="refAuthor">Bray, T., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 90</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8259</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8259</span>, <time datetime="2017-12" class="refDate">December 2017</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3620 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3621 |
<dt id="RFC8261">[RFC8261]</dt> |
| 3622 |
<dd> |
| 3623 |
<span class="refAuthor">Tuexen, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Stewart, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jesup, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and S. Loreto</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Encapsulation of SCTP Packets"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8261</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8261</span>, <time datetime="2017-11" class="refDate">November 2017</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3624 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3625 |
<dt id="RFC8445">[RFC8445]</dt> |
| 3626 |
<dd> |
| 3627 |
<span class="refAuthor">Keranen, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Holmberg, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and J. Rosenberg</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8445</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8445</span>, <time datetime="2018-07" class="refDate">July 2018</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8445">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8445</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3628 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3629 |
<dt id="RFC8446">[RFC8446]</dt> |
| 3630 |
<dd> |
| 3631 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8446</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8446</span>, <time datetime="2018-08" class="refDate">August 2018</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3632 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3633 |
<dt id="RFC8615">[RFC8615]</dt> |
| 3634 |
<dd> |
| 3635 |
<span class="refAuthor">Nottingham, M.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8615</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8615</span>, <time datetime="2019-05" class="refDate">May 2019</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3636 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3637 |
<dt id="RFC8825">[RFC8825]</dt> |
| 3638 |
<dd> |
| 3639 |
<span class="refAuthor">Alvestrand, H.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Overview: Real-Time Protocols for Browser-Based Applications"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8825</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8825</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8825">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8825</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3640 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3641 |
<dt id="RFC8826">[RFC8826]</dt> |
| 3642 |
<dd> |
| 3643 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Security Considerations for WebRTC"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8826</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8826</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8826">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8826</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3644 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3645 |
<dt id="RFC8829">[RFC8829]</dt> |
| 3646 |
<dd> |
| 3647 |
<span class="refAuthor">Uberti, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jennings, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Rescorla, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JavaScript Session Establishment Protocol (JSEP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8829</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8829</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8829">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8829</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3648 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3649 |
<dt id="RFC8834">[RFC8834]</dt> |
| 3650 |
<dd> |
| 3651 |
<span class="refAuthor">Perkins, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Westerlund, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and J. Ott</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Media Transport and Use of RTP in WebRTC"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8834</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8834</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8834">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8834</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3652 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3653 |
<dt id="RFC8844">[RFC8844]</dt> |
| 3654 |
<dd> |
| 3655 |
<span class="refAuthor">Thomson, M.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Unknown Key-Share Attacks on Uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8844</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8844</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8844">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8844</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3656 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3657 |
<dt id="webcrypto">[webcrypto]</dt> |
| 3658 |
<dd> |
| 3659 |
<span class="refAuthor">Watson, M.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Web Cryptography API"</span>, <span class="refContent">W3C Recommendation</span>, <time datetime="2017-01-26" class="refDate">26 January 2017</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/REC-WebCryptoAPI-20170126/">https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/REC-WebCryptoAPI-20170126/</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3660 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3661 |
<dt id="webrtc-api">[webrtc-api]</dt> |
| 3662 |
<dd> |
| 3663 |
<span class="refAuthor">Jennings, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Boström, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and J-I. Bruaroey</span>, <span class="refTitle">"WebRTC 1.0: Real-time Communication Between Browsers"</span>, <span class="refContent">W3C Proposed Recommendation</span>, <span><<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/">https://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3664 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3665 |
</dl> |
| 3666 |
</section> |
| 3667 |
<section id="section-11.2"> |
| 3668 |
<h3 id="name-informative-references"> |
| 3669 |
<a href="#section-11.2" class="section-number selfRef">11.2. </a><a href="#name-informative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Informative References</a> |
| 3670 |
</h3> |
| 3671 |
<dl class="references"> |
| 3672 |
<dt id="fetch">[fetch]</dt> |
| 3673 |
<dd> |
| 3674 |
<span class="refAuthor">van Kesteren, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Fetch"</span>, <span><<a href="https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/">https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3675 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3676 |
<dt id="RFC3261">[RFC3261]</dt> |
| 3677 |
<dd> |
| 3678 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rosenberg, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Schulzrinne, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Camarillo, G.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Johnston, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Peterson, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Sparks, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Handley, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Schooler</span>, <span class="refTitle">"SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3261</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3261</span>, <time datetime="2002-06" class="refDate">June 2002</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3679 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3680 |
<dt id="RFC5705">[RFC5705]</dt> |
| 3681 |
<dd> |
| 3682 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5705</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5705</span>, <time datetime="2010-03" class="refDate">March 2010</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3683 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3684 |
<dt id="RFC6120">[RFC6120]</dt> |
| 3685 |
<dd> |
| 3686 |
<span class="refAuthor">Saint-Andre, P.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6120</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6120</span>, <time datetime="2011-03" class="refDate">March 2011</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3687 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3688 |
<dt id="RFC6265">[RFC6265]</dt> |
| 3689 |
<dd> |
| 3690 |
<span class="refAuthor">Barth, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP State Management Mechanism"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6265</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6265</span>, <time datetime="2011-04" class="refDate">April 2011</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3691 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3692 |
<dt id="RFC6455">[RFC6455]</dt> |
| 3693 |
<dd> |
| 3694 |
<span class="refAuthor">Fette, I.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and A. Melnikov</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The WebSocket Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6455</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6455</span>, <time datetime="2011-12" class="refDate">December 2011</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6455">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6455</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3695 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3696 |
<dt id="RFC6943">[RFC6943]</dt> |
| 3697 |
<dd> |
| 3698 |
<span class="refAuthor">Thaler, D., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security Purposes"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6943</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6943</span>, <time datetime="2013-05" class="refDate">May 2013</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6943">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6943</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3699 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3700 |
<dt id="RFC7617">[RFC7617]</dt> |
| 3701 |
<dd> |
| 3702 |
<span class="refAuthor">Reschke, J.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7617</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7617</span>, <time datetime="2015-09" class="refDate">September 2015</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3703 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3704 |
<dt id="RFC8224">[RFC8224]</dt> |
| 3705 |
<dd> |
| 3706 |
<span class="refAuthor">Peterson, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jennings, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Rescorla, E.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and C. Wendt</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8224</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8224</span>, <time datetime="2018-02" class="refDate">February 2018</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3707 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3708 |
<dt id="RFC8828">[RFC8828]</dt> |
| 3709 |
<dd> |
| 3710 |
<span class="refAuthor">Uberti, J.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and G. Shieh</span>, <span class="refTitle">"WebRTC IP Address Handling Requirements"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8828</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8828</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span><<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8828">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8828</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3711 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3712 |
<dt id="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13">[TLS-DTLS13]</dt> |
| 3713 |
<dd> |
| 3714 |
<span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Tschofenig, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and N. Modadugu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39</span>, <time datetime="2020-11-02" class="refDate">2 November 2020</time>, <span><<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39</a>></span>. </dd> |
| 3715 |
<dd class="break"></dd> |
| 3716 |
</dl> |
| 3717 |
</section> |
| 3718 |
</section> |
| 3719 |
<section id="section-appendix.a"> |
| 3720 |
<h2 id="name-acknowledgements"> |
| 3721 |
<a href="#name-acknowledgements" class="section-name selfRef">Acknowledgements</a> |
| 3722 |
</h2> |
| 3723 |
<p id="section-appendix.a-1"> |
| 3724 |
<span class="contact-name">Bernard Aboba</span>, <span class="contact-name">Harald Alvestrand</span>, <span class="contact-name">Richard Barnes</span>, <span class="contact-name">Dan Druta</span>, <span class="contact-name">Cullen Jennings</span>, <span class="contact-name">Hadriel Kaplan</span>, <span class="contact-name">Matthew Kaufman</span>, <span class="contact-name">Jim McEachern</span>, |
| 3725 |
<span class="contact-name">Martin Thomson</span>, <span class="contact-name">Magnus Westerlund</span>. <span class="contact-name">Matthew Kaufman</span> provided the UI material in |
| 3726 |
<a href="#sec.proposal.comsec" class="xref">Section 6.5</a>. <span class="contact-name">Christer Holmberg</span> provided |
| 3727 |
the initial version of <a href="#sec.sdp-id-attr-oa" class="xref">Section 5.1</a>.<a href="#section-appendix.a-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p> |
| 3728 |
</section> |
| 3729 |
<div id="authors-addresses"> |
| 3730 |
<section id="section-appendix.b"> |
| 3731 |
<h2 id="name-authors-address"> |
| 3732 |
<a href="#name-authors-address" class="section-name selfRef">Author's Address</a> |
| 3733 |
</h2> |
| 3734 |
<address class="vcard"> |
| 3735 |
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Eric Rescorla</span></div> |
| 3736 |
<div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Mozilla</span></div> |
| 3737 |
<div class="email"> |
| 3738 |
<span>Email:</span> |
| 3739 |
<a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a> |
| 3740 |
</div> |
| 3741 |
</address> |
| 3742 |
</section> |
| 3743 |
</div> |
| 3744 |
<script>const toc = document.getElementById("toc"); |
| 3745 |
toc.querySelector("h2").addEventListener("click", e => { |
| 3746 |
toc.classList.toggle("active"); |
| 3747 |
}); |
| 3748 |
toc.querySelector("nav").addEventListener("click", e => { |
| 3749 |
toc.classList.remove("active"); |
| 3750 |
}); |
| 3751 |
</script> |
| 3752 |
</body> |
| 3753 |
</html> |