Debian Codegraph @

rfc8827.html

raw
1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en" class="RFC">
3 <head>
4 <meta charset="utf-8">
5 <meta content="Common,Latin" name="scripts">
6 <meta content="initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport">
7 <title>RFC 8827: WebRTC Security Architecture</title>
8 <meta content="Eric Rescorla" name="author">
9 <meta content='
10
11 This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol
12 suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed
13 in browsers -- "real-time communication on the Web".
14
15 ' name="description">
16 <meta content="xml2rfc 3.5.0" name="generator">
17 <meta content="8827" name="rfc.number">
18 <!-- Generator version information:
19 xml2rfc 3.5.0
20 Python 3.6.10
21 appdirs 1.4.4
22 ConfigArgParse 1.2.3
23 google-i18n-address 2.3.5
24 html5lib 1.0.1
25 intervaltree 3.0.2
26 Jinja2 2.11.2
27 kitchen 1.2.6
28 lxml 4.4.2
29 pycairo 1.19.0
30 pycountry 19.8.18
31 pyflakes 2.1.1
32 PyYAML 5.3.1
33 requests 2.22.0
34 setuptools 40.6.2
35 six 1.14.0
36 WeasyPrint 51
37 -->
38 <link href="rfc8827.xml" rel="alternate" type="application/rfc+xml">
39 <link href="#copyright" rel="license">
40 <style type="text/css">/*
41
42 NOTE: Changes at the bottom of this file overrides some earlier settings.
43
44 Once the style has stabilized and has been adopted as an official RFC style,
45 this can be consolidated so that style settings occur only in one place, but
46 for now the contents of this file consists first of the initial CSS work as
47 provided to the RFC Formatter (xml2rfc) work, followed by itemized and
48 commented changes found necssary during the development of the v3
49 formatters.
50
51 */
52
53 /* fonts */
54 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Sans'); /* Sans-serif */
55 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Serif'); /* Serif (print) */
56 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto+Mono'); /* Monospace */
57
58 @viewport {
59 zoom: 1.0;
60 width: extend-to-zoom;
61 }
62 @-ms-viewport {
63 width: extend-to-zoom;
64 zoom: 1.0;
65 }
66 /* general and mobile first */
67 html {
68 }
69 body {
70 max-width: 90%;
71 margin: 1.5em auto;
72 color: #222;
73 background-color: #fff;
74 font-size: 14px;
75 font-family: 'Noto Sans', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
76 line-height: 1.6;
77 scroll-behavior: smooth;
78 }
79 .ears {
80 display: none;
81 }
82
83 /* headings */
84 #title, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
85 margin: 1em 0 0.5em;
86 font-weight: bold;
87 line-height: 1.3;
88 }
89 #title {
90 clear: both;
91 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
92 margin: 0 0 0.5em 0;
93 padding: 1em 0 0.5em;
94 }
95 .author {
96 padding-bottom: 4px;
97 }
98 h1 {
99 font-size: 26px;
100 margin: 1em 0;
101 }
102 h2 {
103 font-size: 22px;
104 margin-top: -20px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
105 padding-top: 33px;
106 }
107 h3 {
108 font-size: 18px;
109 margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
110 padding-top: 42px;
111 }
112 h4 {
113 font-size: 16px;
114 margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
115 padding-top: 42px;
116 }
117 h5, h6 {
118 font-size: 14px;
119 }
120 #n-copyright-notice {
121 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
122 padding-bottom: 1em;
123 margin-bottom: 1em;
124 }
125 /* general structure */
126 p {
127 padding: 0;
128 margin: 0 0 1em 0;
129 text-align: left;
130 }
131 div, span {
132 position: relative;
133 }
134 div {
135 margin: 0;
136 }
137 .alignRight.art-text {
138 background-color: #f9f9f9;
139 border: 1px solid #eee;
140 border-radius: 3px;
141 padding: 1em 1em 0;
142 margin-bottom: 1.5em;
143 }
144 .alignRight.art-text pre {
145 padding: 0;
146 }
147 .alignRight {
148 margin: 1em 0;
149 }
150 .alignRight > *:first-child {
151 border: none;
152 margin: 0;
153 float: right;
154 clear: both;
155 }
156 .alignRight > *:nth-child(2) {
157 clear: both;
158 display: block;
159 border: none;
160 }
161 svg {
162 display: block;
163 }
164 .alignCenter.art-text {
165 background-color: #f9f9f9;
166 border: 1px solid #eee;
167 border-radius: 3px;
168 padding: 1em 1em 0;
169 margin-bottom: 1.5em;
170 }
171 .alignCenter.art-text pre {
172 padding: 0;
173 }
174 .alignCenter {
175 margin: 1em 0;
176 }
177 .alignCenter > *:first-child {
178 border: none;
179 /* this isn't optimal, but it's an existence proof. PrinceXML doesn't
180 support flexbox yet.
181 */
182 display: table;
183 margin: 0 auto;
184 }
185
186 /* lists */
187 ol, ul {
188 padding: 0;
189 margin: 0 0 1em 2em;
190 }
191 ol ol, ul ul, ol ul, ul ol {
192 margin-left: 1em;
193 }
194 li {
195 margin: 0 0 0.25em 0;
196 }
197 .ulCompact li {
198 margin: 0;
199 }
200 ul.empty, .ulEmpty {
201 list-style-type: none;
202 }
203 ul.empty li, .ulEmpty li {
204 margin-top: 0.5em;
205 }
206 ul.compact, .ulCompact,
207 ol.compact, .olCompact {
208 line-height: 100%;
209 margin: 0 0 0 2em;
210 }
211
212 /* definition lists */
213 dl {
214 }
215 dl > dt {
216 float: left;
217 margin-right: 1em;
218 }
219 /*
220 dl.nohang > dt {
221 float: none;
222 }
223 */
224 dl > dd {
225 margin-bottom: .8em;
226 min-height: 1.3em;
227 }
228 dl.compact > dd, .dlCompact > dd {
229 margin-bottom: 0em;
230 }
231 dl > dd > dl {
232 margin-top: 0.5em;
233 margin-bottom: 0em;
234 }
235
236 /* links */
237 a {
238 text-decoration: none;
239 }
240 a[href] {
241 color: #22e; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
242 }
243 a[href]:hover {
244 background-color: #f2f2f2;
245 }
246 figcaption a[href],
247 a[href].selfRef {
248 color: #222;
249 }
250 /* XXX probably not this:
251 a.selfRef:hover {
252 background-color: transparent;
253 cursor: default;
254 } */
255
256 /* Figures */
257 tt, code, pre, code {
258 background-color: #f9f9f9;
259 font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace;
260 }
261 pre {
262 border: 1px solid #eee;
263 margin: 0;
264 padding: 1em;
265 }
266 img {
267 max-width: 100%;
268 }
269 figure {
270 margin: 0;
271 }
272 figure blockquote {
273 margin: 0.8em 0.4em 0.4em;
274 }
275 figcaption {
276 font-style: italic;
277 margin: 0 0 1em 0;
278 }
279 @media screen {
280 pre {
281 overflow-x: auto;
282 max-width: 100%;
283 max-width: calc(100% - 22px);
284 }
285 }
286
287 /* aside, blockquote */
288 aside, blockquote {
289 margin-left: 0;
290 padding: 1.2em 2em;
291 }
292 blockquote {
293 background-color: #f9f9f9;
294 color: #111; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
295 border: 1px solid #ddd;
296 border-radius: 3px;
297 margin: 1em 0;
298 }
299 cite {
300 display: block;
301 text-align: right;
302 font-style: italic;
303 }
304
305 /* tables */
306 table {
307 width: 100%;
308 margin: 0 0 1em;
309 border-collapse: collapse;
310 border: 1px solid #eee;
311 }
312 th, td {
313 text-align: left;
314 vertical-align: top;
315 padding: 0.5em 0.75em;
316 }
317 th {
318 text-align: left;
319 background-color: #e9e9e9;
320 }
321 tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
322 background-color: #f5f5f5;
323 }
324 table caption {
325 font-style: italic;
326 margin: 0;
327 padding: 0;
328 text-align: left;
329 }
330 table p {
331 /* XXX to avoid bottom margin on table row signifiers. If paragraphs should
332 be allowed within tables more generally, it would be far better to select on a class. */
333 margin: 0;
334 }
335
336 /* pilcrow */
337 a.pilcrow {
338 color: #666; /* Arlen: AHDJ 2019 */
339 text-decoration: none;
340 visibility: hidden;
341 user-select: none;
342 -ms-user-select: none;
343 -o-user-select:none;
344 -moz-user-select: none;
345 -khtml-user-select: none;
346 -webkit-user-select: none;
347 -webkit-touch-callout: none;
348 }
349 @media screen {
350 aside:hover > a.pilcrow,
351 p:hover > a.pilcrow,
352 blockquote:hover > a.pilcrow,
353 div:hover > a.pilcrow,
354 li:hover > a.pilcrow,
355 pre:hover > a.pilcrow {
356 visibility: visible;
357 }
358 a.pilcrow:hover {
359 background-color: transparent;
360 }
361 }
362
363 /* misc */
364 hr {
365 border: 0;
366 border-top: 1px solid #eee;
367 }
368 .bcp14 {
369 font-variant: small-caps;
370 }
371
372 .role {
373 font-variant: all-small-caps;
374 }
375
376 /* info block */
377 #identifiers {
378 margin: 0;
379 font-size: 0.9em;
380 }
381 #identifiers dt {
382 width: 3em;
383 clear: left;
384 }
385 #identifiers dd {
386 float: left;
387 margin-bottom: 0;
388 }
389 #identifiers .authors .author {
390 display: inline-block;
391 margin-right: 1.5em;
392 }
393 #identifiers .authors .org {
394 font-style: italic;
395 }
396
397 /* The prepared/rendered info at the very bottom of the page */
398 .docInfo {
399 color: #666; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
400 font-size: 0.9em;
401 font-style: italic;
402 margin-top: 2em;
403 }
404 .docInfo .prepared {
405 float: left;
406 }
407 .docInfo .prepared {
408 float: right;
409 }
410
411 /* table of contents */
412 #toc {
413 padding: 0.75em 0 2em 0;
414 margin-bottom: 1em;
415 }
416 nav.toc ul {
417 margin: 0 0.5em 0 0;
418 padding: 0;
419 list-style: none;
420 }
421 nav.toc li {
422 line-height: 1.3em;
423 margin: 0.75em 0;
424 padding-left: 1.2em;
425 text-indent: -1.2em;
426 }
427 /* references */
428 .references dt {
429 text-align: right;
430 font-weight: bold;
431 min-width: 7em;
432 }
433 .references dd {
434 margin-left: 8em;
435 overflow: auto;
436 }
437
438 .refInstance {
439 margin-bottom: 1.25em;
440 }
441
442 .references .ascii {
443 margin-bottom: 0.25em;
444 }
445
446 /* index */
447 .index ul {
448 margin: 0 0 0 1em;
449 padding: 0;
450 list-style: none;
451 }
452 .index ul ul {
453 margin: 0;
454 }
455 .index li {
456 margin: 0;
457 text-indent: -2em;
458 padding-left: 2em;
459 padding-bottom: 5px;
460 }
461 .indexIndex {
462 margin: 0.5em 0 1em;
463 }
464 .index a {
465 font-weight: 700;
466 }
467 /* make the index two-column on all but the smallest screens */
468 @media (min-width: 600px) {
469 .index ul {
470 -moz-column-count: 2;
471 -moz-column-gap: 20px;
472 }
473 .index ul ul {
474 -moz-column-count: 1;
475 -moz-column-gap: 0;
476 }
477 }
478
479 /* authors */
480 address.vcard {
481 font-style: normal;
482 margin: 1em 0;
483 }
484
485 address.vcard .nameRole {
486 font-weight: 700;
487 margin-left: 0;
488 }
489 address.vcard .label {
490 font-family: "Noto Sans",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
491 margin: 0.5em 0;
492 }
493 address.vcard .type {
494 display: none;
495 }
496 .alternative-contact {
497 margin: 1.5em 0 1em;
498 }
499 hr.addr {
500 border-top: 1px dashed;
501 margin: 0;
502 color: #ddd;
503 max-width: calc(100% - 16px);
504 }
505
506 /* temporary notes */
507 .rfcEditorRemove::before {
508 position: absolute;
509 top: 0.2em;
510 right: 0.2em;
511 padding: 0.2em;
512 content: "The RFC Editor will remove this note";
513 color: #9e2a00; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
514 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
515 }
516 .rfcEditorRemove {
517 position: relative;
518 padding-top: 1.8em;
519 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
520 border-radius: 3px;
521 }
522 .cref {
523 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
524 padding: 2px 4px;
525 }
526 .crefSource {
527 font-style: italic;
528 }
529 /* alternative layout for smaller screens */
530 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
531 body {
532 padding-top: 2em;
533 }
534 #title {
535 padding: 1em 0;
536 }
537 h1 {
538 font-size: 24px;
539 }
540 h2 {
541 font-size: 20px;
542 margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
543 padding-top: 38px;
544 }
545 #identifiers dd {
546 max-width: 60%;
547 }
548 #toc {
549 position: fixed;
550 z-index: 2;
551 top: 0;
552 right: 0;
553 padding: 0;
554 margin: 0;
555 background-color: inherit;
556 border-bottom: 1px solid #ccc;
557 }
558 #toc h2 {
559 margin: -1px 0 0 0;
560 padding: 4px 0 4px 6px;
561 padding-right: 1em;
562 min-width: 190px;
563 font-size: 1.1em;
564 text-align: right;
565 background-color: #444;
566 color: white;
567 cursor: pointer;
568 }
569 #toc h2::before { /* css hamburger */
570 float: right;
571 position: relative;
572 width: 1em;
573 height: 1px;
574 left: -164px;
575 margin: 6px 0 0 0;
576 background: white none repeat scroll 0 0;
577 box-shadow: 0 4px 0 0 white, 0 8px 0 0 white;
578 content: "";
579 }
580 #toc nav {
581 display: none;
582 padding: 0.5em 1em 1em;
583 overflow: auto;
584 height: calc(100vh - 48px);
585 border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
586 }
587 }
588
589 /* alternative layout for wide screens */
590 @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
591 body {
592 max-width: 724px;
593 margin: 42px auto;
594 padding-left: 1.5em;
595 padding-right: 29em;
596 }
597 #toc {
598 position: fixed;
599 top: 42px;
600 right: 42px;
601 width: 25%;
602 margin: 0;
603 padding: 0 1em;
604 z-index: 1;
605 }
606 #toc h2 {
607 border-top: none;
608 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
609 font-size: 1em;
610 font-weight: normal;
611 margin: 0;
612 padding: 0.25em 1em 1em 0;
613 }
614 #toc nav {
615 display: block;
616 height: calc(90vh - 84px);
617 bottom: 0;
618 padding: 0.5em 0 0;
619 overflow: auto;
620 }
621 img { /* future proofing */
622 max-width: 100%;
623 height: auto;
624 }
625 }
626
627 /* pagination */
628 @media print {
629 body {
630
631 width: 100%;
632 }
633 p {
634 orphans: 3;
635 widows: 3;
636 }
637 #n-copyright-notice {
638 border-bottom: none;
639 }
640 #toc, #n-introduction {
641 page-break-before: always;
642 }
643 #toc {
644 border-top: none;
645 padding-top: 0;
646 }
647 figure, pre {
648 page-break-inside: avoid;
649 }
650 figure {
651 overflow: scroll;
652 }
653 h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
654 page-break-after: avoid;
655 }
656 h2+*, h3+*, h4+*, h5+*, h6+* {
657 page-break-before: avoid;
658 }
659 pre {
660 white-space: pre-wrap;
661 word-wrap: break-word;
662 font-size: 10pt;
663 }
664 table {
665 border: 1px solid #ddd;
666 }
667 td {
668 border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
669 }
670 }
671
672 /* This is commented out here, as the string-set: doesn't
673 pass W3C validation currently */
674 /*
675 .ears thead .left {
676 string-set: ears-top-left content();
677 }
678
679 .ears thead .center {
680 string-set: ears-top-center content();
681 }
682
683 .ears thead .right {
684 string-set: ears-top-right content();
685 }
686
687 .ears tfoot .left {
688 string-set: ears-bottom-left content();
689 }
690
691 .ears tfoot .center {
692 string-set: ears-bottom-center content();
693 }
694
695 .ears tfoot .right {
696 string-set: ears-bottom-right content();
697 }
698 */
699
700 @page :first {
701 padding-top: 0;
702 @top-left {
703 content: normal;
704 border: none;
705 }
706 @top-center {
707 content: normal;
708 border: none;
709 }
710 @top-right {
711 content: normal;
712 border: none;
713 }
714 }
715
716 @page {
717 size: A4;
718 margin-bottom: 45mm;
719 padding-top: 20px;
720 /* The follwing is commented out here, but set appropriately by in code, as
721 the content depends on the document */
722 /*
723 @top-left {
724 content: 'Internet-Draft';
725 vertical-align: bottom;
726 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
727 }
728 @top-left {
729 content: string(ears-top-left);
730 vertical-align: bottom;
731 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
732 }
733 @top-center {
734 content: string(ears-top-center);
735 vertical-align: bottom;
736 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
737 }
738 @top-right {
739 content: string(ears-top-right);
740 vertical-align: bottom;
741 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
742 }
743 @bottom-left {
744 content: string(ears-bottom-left);
745 vertical-align: top;
746 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
747 }
748 @bottom-center {
749 content: string(ears-bottom-center);
750 vertical-align: top;
751 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
752 }
753 @bottom-right {
754 content: '[Page ' counter(page) ']';
755 vertical-align: top;
756 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
757 }
758 */
759
760 }
761
762 /* Changes introduced to fix issues found during implementation */
763 /* Make sure links are clickable even if overlapped by following H* */
764 a {
765 z-index: 2;
766 }
767 /* Separate body from document info even without intervening H1 */
768 section {
769 clear: both;
770 }
771
772
773 /* Top align author divs, to avoid names without organization dropping level with org names */
774 .author {
775 vertical-align: top;
776 }
777
778 /* Leave room in document info to show Internet-Draft on one line */
779 #identifiers dt {
780 width: 8em;
781 }
782
783 /* Don't waste quite as much whitespace between label and value in doc info */
784 #identifiers dd {
785 margin-left: 1em;
786 }
787
788 /* Give floating toc a background color (needed when it's a div inside section */
789 #toc {
790 background-color: white;
791 }
792
793 /* Make the collapsed ToC header render white on gray also when it's a link */
794 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
795 #toc h2 a,
796 #toc h2 a:link,
797 #toc h2 a:focus,
798 #toc h2 a:hover,
799 #toc a.toplink,
800 #toc a.toplink:hover {
801 color: white;
802 background-color: #444;
803 text-decoration: none;
804 }
805 }
806
807 /* Give the bottom of the ToC some whitespace */
808 @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
809 #toc {
810 padding: 0 0 1em 1em;
811 }
812 }
813
814 /* Style section numbers with more space between number and title */
815 .section-number {
816 padding-right: 0.5em;
817 }
818
819 /* prevent monospace from becoming overly large */
820 tt, code, pre, code {
821 font-size: 95%;
822 }
823
824 /* Fix the height/width aspect for ascii art*/
825 pre.sourcecode,
826 .art-text pre {
827 line-height: 1.12;
828 }
829
830
831 /* Add styling for a link in the ToC that points to the top of the document */
832 a.toplink {
833 float: right;
834 margin-right: 0.5em;
835 }
836
837 /* Fix the dl styling to match the RFC 7992 attributes */
838 dl > dt,
839 dl.dlParallel > dt {
840 float: left;
841 margin-right: 1em;
842 }
843 dl.dlNewline > dt {
844 float: none;
845 }
846
847 /* Provide styling for table cell text alignment */
848 table td.text-left,
849 table th.text-left {
850 text-align: left;
851 }
852 table td.text-center,
853 table th.text-center {
854 text-align: center;
855 }
856 table td.text-right,
857 table th.text-right {
858 text-align: right;
859 }
860
861 /* Make the alternative author contact informatio look less like just another
862 author, and group it closer with the primary author contact information */
863 .alternative-contact {
864 margin: 0.5em 0 0.25em 0;
865 }
866 address .non-ascii {
867 margin: 0 0 0 2em;
868 }
869
870 /* With it being possible to set tables with alignment
871 left, center, and right, { width: 100%; } does not make sense */
872 table {
873 width: auto;
874 }
875
876 /* Avoid reference text that sits in a block with very wide left margin,
877 because of a long floating dt label.*/
878 .references dd {
879 overflow: visible;
880 }
881
882 /* Control caption placement */
883 caption {
884 caption-side: bottom;
885 }
886
887 /* Limit the width of the author address vcard, so names in right-to-left
888 script don't end up on the other side of the page. */
889
890 address.vcard {
891 max-width: 30em;
892 margin-right: auto;
893 }
894
895 /* For address alignment dependent on LTR or RTL scripts */
896 address div.left {
897 text-align: left;
898 }
899 address div.right {
900 text-align: right;
901 }
902
903 /* Provide table alignment support. We can't use the alignX classes above
904 since they do unwanted things with caption and other styling. */
905 table.right {
906 margin-left: auto;
907 margin-right: 0;
908 }
909 table.center {
910 margin-left: auto;
911 margin-right: auto;
912 }
913 table.left {
914 margin-left: 0;
915 margin-right: auto;
916 }
917
918 /* Give the table caption label the same styling as the figcaption */
919 caption a[href] {
920 color: #222;
921 }
922
923 @media print {
924 .toplink {
925 display: none;
926 }
927
928 /* avoid overwriting the top border line with the ToC header */
929 #toc {
930 padding-top: 1px;
931 }
932
933 /* Avoid page breaks inside dl and author address entries */
934 .vcard {
935 page-break-inside: avoid;
936 }
937
938 }
939 /* Tweak the bcp14 keyword presentation */
940 .bcp14 {
941 font-variant: small-caps;
942 font-weight: bold;
943 font-size: 0.9em;
944 }
945 /* Tweak the invisible space above H* in order not to overlay links in text above */
946 h2 {
947 margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
948 padding-top: 31px;
949 }
950 h3 {
951 margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
952 padding-top: 24px;
953 }
954 h4 {
955 margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
956 padding-top: 24px;
957 }
958 /* Float artwork pilcrow to the right */
959 @media screen {
960 .artwork a.pilcrow {
961 display: block;
962 line-height: 0.7;
963 margin-top: 0.15em;
964 }
965 }
966 /* Make pilcrows on dd visible */
967 @media screen {
968 dd:hover > a.pilcrow {
969 visibility: visible;
970 }
971 }
972 /* Make the placement of figcaption match that of a table's caption
973 by removing the figure's added bottom margin */
974 .alignLeft.art-text,
975 .alignCenter.art-text,
976 .alignRight.art-text {
977 margin-bottom: 0;
978 }
979 .alignLeft,
980 .alignCenter,
981 .alignRight {
982 margin: 1em 0 0 0;
983 }
984 /* In print, the pilcrow won't show on hover, so prevent it from taking up space,
985 possibly even requiring a new line */
986 @media print {
987 a.pilcrow {
988 display: none;
989 }
990 }
991 /* Styling for the external metadata */
992 div#external-metadata {
993 background-color: #eee;
994 padding: 0.5em;
995 margin-bottom: 0.5em;
996 display: none;
997 }
998 div#internal-metadata {
999 padding: 0.5em; /* to match the external-metadata padding */
1000 }
1001 /* Styling for title RFC Number */
1002 h1#rfcnum {
1003 clear: both;
1004 margin: 0 0 -1em;
1005 padding: 1em 0 0 0;
1006 }
1007 /* Make .olPercent look the same as <ol><li> */
1008 dl.olPercent > dd {
1009 margin-bottom: 0.25em;
1010 min-height: initial;
1011 }
1012 /* Give aside some styling to set it apart */
1013 aside {
1014 border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
1015 margin: 1em 0 1em 2em;
1016 padding: 0.2em 2em;
1017 }
1018 aside > dl,
1019 aside > ol,
1020 aside > ul,
1021 aside > table,
1022 aside > p {
1023 margin-bottom: 0.5em;
1024 }
1025 /* Additional page break settings */
1026 @media print {
1027 figcaption, table caption {
1028 page-break-before: avoid;
1029 }
1030 }
1031 /* Font size adjustments for print */
1032 @media print {
1033 body { font-size: 10pt; line-height: normal; max-width: 96%; }
1034 h1 { font-size: 1.72em; padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2*1.2*1.2 */
1035 h2 { font-size: 1.44em; padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2*1.2 */
1036 h3 { font-size: 1.2em; padding-top: 1.5em; } /* 1*1.2 */
1037 h4 { font-size: 1em; padding-top: 1.5em; }
1038 h5, h6 { font-size: 1em; margin: initial; padding: 0.5em 0 0.3em; }
1039 }
1040 /* Sourcecode margin in print, when there's no pilcrow */
1041 @media print {
1042 .artwork,
1043 .sourcecode {
1044 margin-bottom: 1em;
1045 }
1046 }
1047 /* Avoid narrow tables forcing too narrow table captions, which may render badly */
1048 table {
1049 min-width: 20em;
1050 }
1051 /* ol type a */
1052 ol.type-a { list-style-type: lower-alpha; }
1053 ol.type-A { list-style-type: upper-alpha; }
1054 ol.type-i { list-style-type: lower-roman; }
1055 ol.type-I { list-style-type: lower-roman; }
1056 /* Apply the print table and row borders in general, on request from the RPC,
1057 and increase the contrast between border and odd row background sligthtly */
1058 table {
1059 border: 1px solid #ddd;
1060 }
1061 td {
1062 border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
1063 }
1064 tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
1065 background-color: #f8f8f8;
1066 }
1067 /* Use style rules to govern display of the TOC. */
1068 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
1069 #toc nav { display: none; }
1070 #toc.active nav { display: block; }
1071 }
1072 /* Add support for keepWithNext */
1073 .keepWithNext {
1074 break-after: avoid-page;
1075 break-after: avoid-page;
1076 }
1077 /* Add support for keepWithPrevious */
1078 .keepWithPrevious {
1079 break-before: avoid-page;
1080 }
1081 /* Change the approach to avoiding breaks inside artwork etc. */
1082 figure, pre, table, .artwork, .sourcecode {
1083 break-before: avoid-page;
1084 break-after: auto;
1085 }
1086 /* Avoid breaks between <dt> and <dd> */
1087 dl {
1088 break-before: auto;
1089 break-inside: auto;
1090 }
1091 dt {
1092 break-before: auto;
1093 break-after: avoid-page;
1094 }
1095 dd {
1096 break-before: avoid-page;
1097 break-after: auto;
1098 orphans: 3;
1099 widows: 3
1100 }
1101 span.break, dd.break {
1102 margin-bottom: 0;
1103 min-height: 0;
1104 break-before: auto;
1105 break-inside: auto;
1106 break-after: auto;
1107 }
1108 /* Undo break-before ToC */
1109 @media print {
1110 #toc {
1111 break-before: auto;
1112 }
1113 }
1114 /* Text in compact lists should not get extra bottim margin space,
1115 since that would makes the list not compact */
1116 ul.compact p, .ulCompact p,
1117 ol.compact p, .olCompact p {
1118 margin: 0;
1119 }
1120 /* But the list as a whole needs the extra space at the end */
1121 section ul.compact,
1122 section .ulCompact,
1123 section ol.compact,
1124 section .olCompact {
1125 margin-bottom: 1em; /* same as p not within ul.compact etc. */
1126 }
1127 /* The tt and code background above interferes with for instance table cell
1128 backgrounds. Changed to something a bit more selective. */
1129 tt, code {
1130 background-color: transparent;
1131 }
1132 p tt, p code, li tt, li code {
1133 background-color: #f8f8f8;
1134 }
1135 /* Tweak the pre margin -- 0px doesn't come out well */
1136 pre {
1137 margin-top: 0.5px;
1138 }
1139 /* Tweak the comact list text */
1140 ul.compact, .ulCompact,
1141 ol.compact, .olCompact,
1142 dl.compact, .dlCompact {
1143 line-height: normal;
1144 }
1145 /* Don't add top margin for nested lists */
1146 li > ul, li > ol, li > dl,
1147 dd > ul, dd > ol, dd > dl,
1148 dl > dd > dl {
1149 margin-top: initial;
1150 }
1151 /* Elements that should not be rendered on the same line as a <dt> */
1152 /* This should match the element list in writer.text.TextWriter.render_dl() */
1153 dd > div.artwork:first-child,
1154 dd > aside:first-child,
1155 dd > figure:first-child,
1156 dd > ol:first-child,
1157 dd > div:first-child > pre.sourcecode,
1158 dd > table:first-child,
1159 dd > ul:first-child {
1160 clear: left;
1161 }
1162 /* fix for weird browser behaviour when <dd/> is empty */
1163 dt+dd:empty::before{
1164 content: "\00a0";
1165 }
1166 </style>
1167 <link href="rfc-local.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
1168 <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc8827" rel="alternate">
1169 <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate">
1170 <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-rtcweb-security-arch-20" rel="prev">
1171 </head>
1172 <body>
1173 <script src="https://www.rfc-editor.org/js/metadata.min.js"></script>
1174 <table class="ears">
1175 <thead><tr>
1176 <td class="left">RFC 8827</td>
1177 <td class="center">WebRTC Sec. Arch.</td>
1178 <td class="right">January 2021</td>
1179 </tr></thead>
1180 <tfoot><tr>
1181 <td class="left">Rescorla</td>
1182 <td class="center">Standards Track</td>
1183 <td class="right">[Page]</td>
1184 </tr></tfoot>
1185 </table>
1186 <div id="external-metadata" class="document-information"></div>
1187 <div id="internal-metadata" class="document-information">
1188 <dl id="identifiers">
1189 <dt class="label-stream">Stream:</dt>
1190 <dd class="stream">Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)</dd>
1191 <dt class="label-rfc">RFC:</dt>
1192 <dd class="rfc"><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8827" class="eref">8827</a></dd>
1193 <dt class="label-category">Category:</dt>
1194 <dd class="category">Standards Track</dd>
1195 <dt class="label-published">Published:</dt>
1196 <dd class="published">
1197 <time datetime="2021-01" class="published">January 2021</time>
1198 </dd>
1199 <dt class="label-issn">ISSN:</dt>
1200 <dd class="issn">2070-1721</dd>
1201 <dt class="label-authors">Author:</dt>
1202 <dd class="authors">
1203 <div class="author">
1204 <div class="author-name">E. Rescorla</div>
1205 <div class="org">Mozilla</div>
1206 </div>
1207 </dd>
1208 </dl>
1209 </div>
1210 <h1 id="rfcnum">RFC 8827</h1>
1211 <h1 id="title">WebRTC Security Architecture</h1>
1212 <section id="section-abstract">
1213 <h2 id="abstract"><a href="#abstract" class="selfRef">Abstract</a></h2>
1214 <p id="section-abstract-1">
1215 This document defines the security architecture for WebRTC, a protocol
1216 suite intended for use with real-time applications that can be deployed
1217 in browsers -- "real-time communication on the Web".<a href="#section-abstract-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1218 </section>
1219 <div id="status-of-memo">
1220 <section id="section-boilerplate.1">
1221 <h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo">
1222 <a href="#name-status-of-this-memo" class="section-name selfRef">Status of This Memo</a>
1223 </h2>
1224 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-1">
1225 This is an Internet Standards Track document.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1226 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-2">
1227 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
1228 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
1229 received public review and has been approved for publication by
1230 the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further
1231 information on Internet Standards is available in Section 2 of
1232 RFC 7841.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1233 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-3">
1234 Information about the current status of this document, any
1235 errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
1236 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8827">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8827</a></span>.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1237 </section>
1238 </div>
1239 <div id="copyright">
1240 <section id="section-boilerplate.2">
1241 <h2 id="name-copyright-notice">
1242 <a href="#name-copyright-notice" class="section-name selfRef">Copyright Notice</a>
1243 </h2>
1244 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-1">
1245 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
1246 document authors. All rights reserved.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1247 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-2">
1248 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
1249 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
1250 (<span><a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a></span>) in effect on the date of
1251 publication of this document. Please review these documents
1252 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
1253 respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
1254 document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
1255 Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
1256 warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1257 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-3">
1258 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
1259 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
1260 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
1261 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
1262 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
1263 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s)
1264 controlling the copyright in such materials, this document may not
1265 be modified outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative
1266 works of it may not be created outside the IETF Standards Process,
1267 except to format it for publication as an RFC or to translate it
1268 into languages other than English.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1269 </section>
1270 </div>
1271 <div id="toc">
1272 <section id="section-toc.1">
1273 <a href="#" onclick="scroll(0,0)" class="toplink">▲</a><h2 id="name-table-of-contents">
1274 <a href="#name-table-of-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Table of Contents</a>
1275 </h2>
1276 <nav class="toc"><ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1277 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.1">
1278 <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1" class="xref">1</a>.  <a href="#name-introduction" class="xref">Introduction</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1279 </li>
1280 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.2">
1281 <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-2" class="xref">2</a>.  <a href="#name-terminology" class="xref">Terminology</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1282 </li>
1283 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3">
1284 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.1"><a href="#section-3" class="xref">3</a>.  <a href="#name-trust-model" class="xref">Trust Model</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1285 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1286 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1">
1287 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-3.1" class="xref">3.1</a>.  <a href="#name-authenticated-entities" class="xref">Authenticated Entities</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1288 </li>
1289 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2">
1290 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1"><a href="#section-3.2" class="xref">3.2</a>.  <a href="#name-unauthenticated-entities" class="xref">Unauthenticated Entities</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.3.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1291 </li>
1292 </ul>
1293 </li>
1294 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4">
1295 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><a href="#section-4" class="xref">4</a>.  <a href="#name-overview" class="xref">Overview</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1296 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1297 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1">
1298 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-4.1" class="xref">4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-initial-signaling" class="xref">Initial Signaling</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1299 </li>
1300 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2">
1301 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-4.2" class="xref">4.2</a>.  <a href="#name-media-consent-verification" class="xref">Media Consent Verification</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1302 </li>
1303 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3">
1304 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-4.3" class="xref">4.3</a>.  <a href="#name-dtls-handshake" class="xref">DTLS Handshake</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1305 </li>
1306 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4">
1307 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.4.1"><a href="#section-4.4" class="xref">4.4</a>.  <a href="#name-communications-and-consent-" class="xref">Communications and Consent Freshness</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.4.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1308 </li>
1309 </ul>
1310 </li>
1311 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5">
1312 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><a href="#section-5" class="xref">5</a>.  <a href="#name-sdp-identity-attribute" class="xref">SDP Identity Attribute</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1313 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1314 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
1315 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1" class="xref">5.1</a>.  <a href="#name-offer-answer-considerations" class="xref">Offer/Answer Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1316 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1317 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1">
1318 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1.1" class="xref">5.1.1</a>.  <a href="#name-generating-the-initial-sdp-" class="xref">Generating the Initial SDP Offer</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1319 </li>
1320 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2">
1321 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.1.2" class="xref">5.1.2</a>.  <a href="#name-generating-an-sdp-answer" class="xref">Generating an SDP Answer</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1322 </li>
1323 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3">
1324 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3.1"><a href="#section-5.1.3" class="xref">5.1.3</a>.  <a href="#name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-" class="xref">Processing an SDP Offer or Answer</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1325 </li>
1326 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4">
1327 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4.1"><a href="#section-5.1.4" class="xref">5.1.4</a>.  <a href="#name-modifying-the-session" class="xref">Modifying the Session</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1328 </li>
1329 </ul>
1330 </li>
1331 </ul>
1332 </li>
1333 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6">
1334 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><a href="#section-6" class="xref">6</a>.  <a href="#name-detailed-technical-descript" class="xref">Detailed Technical Description</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1335 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1336 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1">
1337 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><a href="#section-6.1" class="xref">6.1</a>.  <a href="#name-origin-and-web-security-iss" class="xref">Origin and Web Security Issues</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1338 </li>
1339 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2">
1340 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><a href="#section-6.2" class="xref">6.2</a>.  <a href="#name-device-permissions-model" class="xref">Device Permissions Model</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1341 </li>
1342 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3">
1343 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1"><a href="#section-6.3" class="xref">6.3</a>.  <a href="#name-communications-consent" class="xref">Communications Consent</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1344 </li>
1345 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4">
1346 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1"><a href="#section-6.4" class="xref">6.4</a>.  <a href="#name-ip-location-privacy" class="xref">IP Location Privacy</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1347 </li>
1348 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5">
1349 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1"><a href="#section-6.5" class="xref">6.5</a>.  <a href="#name-communications-security" class="xref">Communications Security</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.6.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1350 </li>
1351 </ul>
1352 </li>
1353 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7">
1354 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><a href="#section-7" class="xref">7</a>.  <a href="#name-web-based-peer-authenticati" class="xref">Web-Based Peer Authentication</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1355 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1356 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
1357 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.1" class="xref">7.1</a>.  <a href="#name-trust-relationships-idps-ap" class="xref">Trust Relationships: IdPs, APs, and RPs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1358 </li>
1359 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2">
1360 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.2" class="xref">7.2</a>.  <a href="#name-overview-of-operation" class="xref">Overview of Operation</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1361 </li>
1362 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3">
1363 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1"><a href="#section-7.3" class="xref">7.3</a>.  <a href="#name-items-for-standardization" class="xref">Items for Standardization</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1364 </li>
1365 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4">
1366 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.1"><a href="#section-7.4" class="xref">7.4</a>.  <a href="#name-binding-identity-assertions" class="xref">Binding Identity Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transactions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1367 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1368 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1">
1369 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.4.1" class="xref">7.4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-carrying-identity-assertion" class="xref">Carrying Identity Assertions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1370 </li>
1371 </ul>
1372 </li>
1373 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5">
1374 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.1"><a href="#section-7.5" class="xref">7.5</a>.  <a href="#name-determining-the-idp-uri" class="xref">Determining the IdP URI</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1375 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1376 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1">
1377 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.5.1" class="xref">7.5.1</a>.  <a href="#name-authenticating-party" class="xref">Authenticating Party</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1378 </li>
1379 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2">
1380 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.5.2" class="xref">7.5.2</a>.  <a href="#name-relying-party" class="xref">Relying Party</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.5.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1381 </li>
1382 </ul>
1383 </li>
1384 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.6">
1385 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.6.1"><a href="#section-7.6" class="xref">7.6</a>.  <a href="#name-requesting-assertions" class="xref">Requesting Assertions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1386 </li>
1387 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.7">
1388 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.7.1"><a href="#section-7.7" class="xref">7.7</a>.  <a href="#name-managing-user-login" class="xref">Managing User Login</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.7.2.7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1389 </li>
1390 </ul>
1391 </li>
1392 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8">
1393 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><a href="#section-8" class="xref">8</a>.  <a href="#name-verifying-assertions" class="xref">Verifying Assertions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1394 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1395 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1">
1396 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1"><a href="#section-8.1" class="xref">8.1</a>.  <a href="#name-identity-formats" class="xref">Identity Formats</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.8.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1397 </li>
1398 </ul>
1399 </li>
1400 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9">
1401 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><a href="#section-9" class="xref">9</a>.  <a href="#name-security-considerations" class="xref">Security Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1402 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1403 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1">
1404 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.1" class="xref">9.1</a>.  <a href="#name-communications-security-2" class="xref">Communications Security</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1405 </li>
1406 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2">
1407 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.2" class="xref">9.2</a>.  <a href="#name-privacy" class="xref">Privacy</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1408 </li>
1409 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3">
1410 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.1"><a href="#section-9.3" class="xref">9.3</a>.  <a href="#name-denial-of-service" class="xref">Denial of Service</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1411 </li>
1412 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4">
1413 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.1"><a href="#section-9.4" class="xref">9.4</a>.  <a href="#name-idp-authentication-mechanis" class="xref">IdP Authentication Mechanism</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1414 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1415 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1">
1416 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.4.1" class="xref">9.4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-peerconnection-origin-check" class="xref">PeerConnection Origin Check</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1417 </li>
1418 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2">
1419 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.4.2" class="xref">9.4.2</a>.  <a href="#name-idp-well-known-uri" class="xref">IdP Well-Known URI</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1420 </li>
1421 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3">
1422 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-9.4.3" class="xref">9.4.3</a>.  <a href="#name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id" class="xref">Privacy of IdP-Generated Identities and the Hosting Site</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1423 </li>
1424 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4">
1425 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.1"><a href="#section-9.4.4" class="xref">9.4.4</a>.  <a href="#name-security-of-third-party-idp" class="xref">Security of Third-Party IdPs</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1426 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1427 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1">
1428 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.4.4.1" class="xref">9.4.4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-confusable-characters" class="xref">Confusable Characters</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.4.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1429 </li>
1430 </ul>
1431 </li>
1432 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5">
1433 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.1"><a href="#section-9.4.5" class="xref">9.4.5</a>.  <a href="#name-web-security-feature-intera" class="xref">Web Security Feature Interactions</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1434 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1435 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1">
1436 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-9.4.5.1" class="xref">9.4.5.1</a>.  <a href="#name-popup-blocking" class="xref">Popup Blocking</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1437 </li>
1438 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2">
1439 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-9.4.5.2" class="xref">9.4.5.2</a>.  <a href="#name-third-party-cookies" class="xref">Third Party Cookies</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.9.2.4.2.5.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1440 </li>
1441 </ul>
1442 </li>
1443 </ul>
1444 </li>
1445 </ul>
1446 </li>
1447 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.10">
1448 <p id="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><a href="#section-10" class="xref">10</a>. <a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="xref">IANA Considerations</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.10.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1449 </li>
1450 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11">
1451 <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><a href="#section-11" class="xref">11</a>. <a href="#name-references" class="xref">References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1452 <ul class="compact toc ulEmpty">
1453 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1">
1454 <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.1.1"><a href="#section-11.1" class="xref">11.1</a>.  <a href="#name-normative-references" class="xref">Normative References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.2.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1455 </li>
1456 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2">
1457 <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.2.2.1"><a href="#section-11.2" class="xref">11.2</a>.  <a href="#name-informative-references" class="xref">Informative References</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.11.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1458 </li>
1459 </ul>
1460 </li>
1461 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12">
1462 <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><a href="#section-appendix.a" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-acknowledgements" class="xref">Acknowledgements</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.12.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1463 </li>
1464 <li class="compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.13">
1465 <p id="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><a href="#section-appendix.b" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-authors-address" class="xref">Author's Address</a><a href="#section-toc.1-1.13.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1466 </li>
1467 </ul>
1468 </nav>
1469 </section>
1470 </div>
1471 <div id="sec.introduction">
1472 <section id="section-1">
1473 <h2 id="name-introduction">
1474 <a href="#section-1" class="section-number selfRef">1. </a><a href="#name-introduction" class="section-name selfRef">Introduction</a>
1475 </h2>
1476 <p id="section-1-1">
1477 The Real-Time Communications on the Web (RTCWEB) Working Group
1478 standardized protocols for real-time communications between Web
1479 browsers, generally called "WebRTC" <span>[<a href="#RFC8825" class="xref">RFC8825</a>]</span>.
1480 The major use cases for WebRTC technology are real-time audio
1481 and/or video calls, Web conferencing, and direct data transfer. Unlike
1482 most conventional real-time systems (e.g., SIP-based <span>[<a href="#RFC3261" class="xref">RFC3261</a>]</span> soft phones), WebRTC communications are directly
1483 controlled by some Web server, via a JavaScript (JS) API as shown in
1484 <a href="#fig.simple" class="xref">Figure 1</a>.<a href="#section-1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1485 <span id="name-a-simple-webrtc-system"></span><div id="fig.simple">
1486 <figure id="figure-1">
1487 <div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-1-2.1">
1488 <pre>
1489 +----------------+
1490 | |
1491 | Web Server |
1492 | |
1493 +----------------+
1494 ^ ^
1495 / \
1496 HTTP / \ HTTP
1497 / \
1498 / \
1499 v v
1500 JS API JS API
1501 +-----------+ +-----------+
1502 | | Media | |
1503 | Browser |&lt;----------&gt;| Browser |
1504 | | | |
1505 +-----------+ +-----------+</pre>
1506 </div>
1507 <figcaption><a href="#figure-1" class="selfRef">Figure 1</a>:
1508 <a href="#name-a-simple-webrtc-system" class="selfRef">A Simple WebRTC System</a>
1509 </figcaption></figure>
1510 </div>
1511 <p id="section-1-3">
1512 A more complicated system might allow for inter-domain calling, as shown
1513 in <a href="#fig.multidomain" class="xref">Figure 2</a>. The protocol to be used between
1514 the domains is not standardized by WebRTC, but given the installed base
1515 and the form of the WebRTC API is likely to be something SDP-based like
1516 SIP or something like the Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP)
1517 <span>[<a href="#RFC6120" class="xref">RFC6120</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1518 <span id="name-a-multidomain-webrtc-system"></span><div id="fig.multidomain">
1519 <figure id="figure-2">
1520 <div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-1-4.1">
1521 <pre>
1522 +--------------+ +--------------+
1523 | | SIP, XMPP, ... | |
1524 | Web Server |&lt;--------------&gt;| Web Server |
1525 | | | |
1526 +--------------+ +--------------+
1527 ^ ^
1528 | |
1529 HTTP | | HTTP
1530 | |
1531 v v
1532 JS API JS API
1533 +-----------+ +-----------+
1534 | | Media | |
1535 | Browser |&lt;-------------------&gt;| Browser |
1536 | | | |
1537 +-----------+ +-----------+</pre>
1538 </div>
1539 <figcaption><a href="#figure-2" class="selfRef">Figure 2</a>:
1540 <a href="#name-a-multidomain-webrtc-system" class="selfRef">A Multidomain WebRTC System</a>
1541 </figcaption></figure>
1542 </div>
1543 <p id="section-1-5">
1544 This system presents a number of new security challenges, which are
1545 analyzed in <span>[<a href="#RFC8826" class="xref">RFC8826</a>]</span>. This document
1546 describes a security architecture for WebRTC which addresses the threats
1547 and requirements described in that document.<a href="#section-1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1548 </section>
1549 </div>
1550 <div id="sec-term">
1551 <section id="section-2">
1552 <h2 id="name-terminology">
1553 <a href="#section-2" class="section-number selfRef">2. </a><a href="#name-terminology" class="section-name selfRef">Terminology</a>
1554 </h2>
1555 <p id="section-2-1">The key words "<span class="bcp14">MUST</span>", "<span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>",
1556 "<span class="bcp14">REQUIRED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHALL</span>",
1557 "<span class="bcp14">SHALL NOT</span>", "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span>",
1558 "<span class="bcp14">SHOULD NOT</span>",
1559 "<span class="bcp14">RECOMMENDED</span>", "<span class="bcp14">NOT RECOMMENDED</span>",
1560 "<span class="bcp14">MAY</span>", and "<span class="bcp14">OPTIONAL</span>" in this document are
1561 to be interpreted as described in BCP 14 <span>[<a href="#RFC2119" class="xref">RFC2119</a>]</span>
1562 <span>[<a href="#RFC8174" class="xref">RFC8174</a>]</span> when, and only when, they appear in all capitals,
1563 as shown here.<a href="#section-2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1564 </section>
1565 </div>
1566 <div id="sec.proposal.trusthierarchy">
1567 <section id="section-3">
1568 <h2 id="name-trust-model">
1569 <a href="#section-3" class="section-number selfRef">3. </a><a href="#name-trust-model" class="section-name selfRef">Trust Model</a>
1570 </h2>
1571 <p id="section-3-1">
1572 The basic assumption of this architecture is that network resources
1573 exist in a hierarchy of trust, rooted in the browser, which serves as
1574 the user's Trusted Computing Base (TCB). Any security property which the
1575 user wishes to have enforced must be ultimately guaranteed by the
1576 browser (or transitively by some property the browser
1577 verifies). Conversely, if the browser is compromised, then no security
1578 guarantees are possible. Note that there are cases (e.g., Internet
1579 kiosks) where the user can't really trust the browser that much. In
1580 these cases, the level of security provided is limited by how much they
1581 trust the browser.<a href="#section-3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1582 <p id="section-3-2">
1583 Optimally, we would not rely on trust in any entities other than the
1584 browser. However, this is unfortunately not possible if we wish to have
1585 a functional system. Other network elements fall into two categories:
1586 those which can be authenticated by the browser and thus can be granted
1587 permissions to access sensitive resources, and those which cannot be
1588 authenticated and thus are untrusted.<a href="#section-3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1589 <div id="sec.proposal.authenticated">
1590 <section id="section-3.1">
1591 <h3 id="name-authenticated-entities">
1592 <a href="#section-3.1" class="section-number selfRef">3.1. </a><a href="#name-authenticated-entities" class="section-name selfRef">Authenticated Entities</a>
1593 </h3>
1594 <p id="section-3.1-1">
1595 There are two major classes of authenticated entities in the system:<a href="#section-3.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1596 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-3.1-2">
1597 <dt id="section-3.1-2.1">Calling services:</dt>
1598 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-2.2">Web sites whose origin we can verify (optimally
1599 via HTTPS, but in some cases because we are on a topologically
1600 restricted network, such as behind a firewall, and can infer
1601 authentication from firewall behavior).<a href="#section-3.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1602 </dd>
1603 <dd class="break"></dd>
1604 <dt id="section-3.1-2.3">Other users:</dt>
1605 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-3.1-2.4">WebRTC peers whose origin we can verify
1606 cryptographically (optimally via DTLS-SRTP).<a href="#section-3.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1607 </dd>
1608 <dd class="break"></dd>
1609 </dl>
1610 <p id="section-3.1-3">
1611 Note that merely being authenticated does not make these entities
1612 trusted. For instance, just because we can verify that
1613 &lt;https://www.example.org/&gt; is owned by Dr. Evil does not mean that we can
1614 trust Dr. Evil to access our camera and microphone. However, it gives
1615 the user an opportunity to determine whether they wish to trust
1616 Dr. Evil or not; after all, if they desire to contact Dr. Evil (perhaps
1617 to arrange for ransom payment), it's safe to temporarily give them
1618 access to the camera and microphone for the purpose of the call, but
1619 they don't want Dr. Evil to be able to access their camera and
1620 microphone other than during the call. The point here is that we must
1621 first identify other elements before we can determine whether and how
1622 much to trust them. Additionally, sometimes we need to identify the
1623 communicating peer before we know what policies to apply.<a href="#section-3.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1624 </section>
1625 </div>
1626 <div id="sec.proposal.unauthenticated">
1627 <section id="section-3.2">
1628 <h3 id="name-unauthenticated-entities">
1629 <a href="#section-3.2" class="section-number selfRef">3.2. </a><a href="#name-unauthenticated-entities" class="section-name selfRef">Unauthenticated Entities</a>
1630 </h3>
1631 <p id="section-3.2-1">
1632 Other than the above entities, we are not generally able to identify
1633 other network elements; thus, we cannot trust them. This does not mean
1634 that it is not possible to have any interaction with them, but it
1635 means that we must assume that they will behave maliciously and design
1636 a system which is secure even if they do so.<a href="#section-3.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1637 </section>
1638 </div>
1639 </section>
1640 </div>
1641 <div id="sec.proposal.overview">
1642 <section id="section-4">
1643 <h2 id="name-overview">
1644 <a href="#section-4" class="section-number selfRef">4. </a><a href="#name-overview" class="section-name selfRef">Overview</a>
1645 </h2>
1646 <p id="section-4-1">
1647 This section describes a typical WebRTC session and shows how the
1648 various security elements interact and what guarantees are provided to
1649 the user. The example in this section is a "best case" scenario in which
1650 we provide the maximal amount of user authentication and media privacy
1651 with the minimal level of trust in the calling service. Simpler versions
1652 with lower levels of security are also possible and are noted in the
1653 text where applicable. It's also important to recognize the tension
1654 between security (or performance) and privacy. The example shown here is
1655 aimed towards settings where we are more concerned about secure calling
1656 than about privacy, but as we shall see, there are settings where one
1657 might wish to make different tradeoffs -- this architecture is still
1658 compatible with those settings.<a href="#section-4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1659 <p id="section-4-2">
1660 For the purposes of this example, we assume the topology shown in the
1661 figures below. This topology is derived from the topology shown in <a href="#fig.simple" class="xref">Figure 1</a>, but separates Alice's and Bob's identities from the
1662 process of signaling. Specifically, Alice and Bob have relationships
1663 with some Identity Provider (IdP) that supports a protocol (such as
1664 OpenID Connect) that can be used to demonstrate their identity to
1665 other parties. For instance, Alice might have an account with a social
1666 network which she can then use to authenticate to other Web sites
1667 without explicitly having an account with those sites; this is a fairly
1668 conventional pattern on the Web. <a href="#sec.trust-relationships" class="xref">Section 7.1</a> provides an overview of IdPs
1669 and the relevant terminology. Alice and Bob might have
1670 relationships with different IdPs as well.
1671 Note: The IdP mechanism described here has not seen wide adoption.
1672 See <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> for more on the status of
1673 IdP-based authentication.<a href="#section-4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1674 <p id="section-4-3">
1675 This separation of identity provision and signaling isn't particularly
1676 important in "closed world" cases where Alice and Bob are users on the
1677 same social network and have identities based on that domain (<a href="#fig.proposal.idp" class="xref">Figure 3</a>). However, there are important settings where
1678 that is not the case, such as federation (calls from one domain to
1679 another; see <a href="#fig.proposal-federated.idp" class="xref">Figure 4</a>) and calling on
1680 untrusted sites, such as where two users who have a relationship via a
1681 given social network want to call each other on another, untrusted,
1682 site, such as a poker site.<a href="#section-4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1683 <p id="section-4-4">
1684 Note that the servers themselves are also authenticated by an external
1685 identity service, the SSL/TLS certificate infrastructure (not shown).
1686 As is conventional in the Web, all identities are ultimately rooted in
1687 that system. For instance, when an IdP makes an identity assertion, the
1688 Relying Party consuming that assertion is able to verify because it is
1689 able to connect to the IdP via HTTPS.<a href="#section-4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1690 <span id="name-a-call-with-idp-based-ident"></span><div id="fig.proposal.idp">
1691 <figure id="figure-3">
1692 <div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-4-5.1">
1693 <pre>
1694 +----------------+
1695 | |
1696 | Signaling |
1697 | Server |
1698 | |
1699 +----------------+
1700 ^ ^
1701 / \
1702 HTTPS / \ HTTPS
1703 / \
1704 / \
1705 v v
1706 JS API JS API
1707 +-----------+ +-----------+
1708 | | Media | |
1709 Alice | Browser |&lt;----------&gt;| Browser | Bob
1710 | | (DTLS+SRTP)| |
1711 +-----------+ +-----------+
1712 ^ ^--+ +--^ ^
1713 | | | |
1714 v | | v
1715 +-----------+ | | +-----------+
1716 | |&lt;--------+ | |
1717 | IdP1 | | | IdP2 |
1718 | | +-------&gt;| |
1719 +-----------+ +-----------+</pre>
1720 </div>
1721 <figcaption><a href="#figure-3" class="selfRef">Figure 3</a>:
1722 <a href="#name-a-call-with-idp-based-ident" class="selfRef">A Call with IdP-Based Identity</a>
1723 </figcaption></figure>
1724 </div>
1725 <p id="section-4-6">
1726 <a href="#fig.proposal-federated.idp" class="xref">Figure 4</a> shows essentially the same
1727 calling scenario but with a call between two separate domains (i.e., a
1728 federated case), as in <a href="#fig.multidomain" class="xref">Figure 2</a>. As mentioned
1729 above, the domains communicate by some unspecified protocol, and
1730 providing separate signaling and identity allows for calls to be
1731 authenticated regardless of the details of the inter-domain protocol.<a href="#section-4-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1732 <span id="name-a-federated-call-with-idp-b"></span><div id="fig.proposal-federated.idp">
1733 <figure id="figure-4">
1734 <div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-4-7.1">
1735 <pre>
1736 +----------------+ Unspecified +----------------+
1737 | | protocol | |
1738 | Signaling |&lt;-----------------&gt;| Signaling |
1739 | Server | (SIP, XMPP, ...) | Server |
1740 | | | |
1741 +----------------+ +----------------+
1742 ^ ^
1743 | |
1744 HTTPS | | HTTPS
1745 | |
1746 | |
1747 v v
1748 JS API JS API
1749 +-----------+ +-----------+
1750 | | Media | |
1751 Alice | Browser |&lt;---------------------------&gt;| Browser | Bob
1752 | | DTLS+SRTP | |
1753 +-----------+ +-----------+
1754 ^ ^--+ +--^ ^
1755 | | | |
1756 v | | v
1757 +-----------+ | | +-----------+
1758 | |&lt;-------------------------+ | |
1759 | IdP1 | | | IdP2 |
1760 | | +------------------------&gt;| |
1761 +-----------+ +-----------+</pre>
1762 </div>
1763 <figcaption><a href="#figure-4" class="selfRef">Figure 4</a>:
1764 <a href="#name-a-federated-call-with-idp-b" class="selfRef">A Federated Call with IdP-Based Identity</a>
1765 </figcaption></figure>
1766 </div>
1767 <section id="section-4.1">
1768 <h3 id="name-initial-signaling">
1769 <a href="#section-4.1" class="section-number selfRef">4.1. </a><a href="#name-initial-signaling" class="section-name selfRef">Initial Signaling</a>
1770 </h3>
1771 <p id="section-4.1-1">
1772 For simplicity, assume the topology in <a href="#fig.proposal.idp" class="xref">Figure 3</a>. Alice and Bob are both users of a common
1773 calling service; they both have approved the calling service to make
1774 calls (we defer the discussion of device access permissions until
1775 later). They are both connected to the calling service via HTTPS and
1776 so know the origin with some level of confidence. They also have
1777 accounts with some IdP. This sort of identity service
1778 is becoming increasingly common in the Web environment (with technologies
1779 such as Federated Google Login, Facebook Connect, OAuth,
1780 OpenID, WebFinger), and is often provided as a side effect service of
1781 a user's ordinary accounts with some service. In this example, we show
1782 Alice and Bob using a separate identity service, though the identity
1783 service may be the same entity as the calling service or there may be
1784 no identity service at all.<a href="#section-4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1785 <p id="section-4.1-2">
1786 Alice is logged onto the calling service and decides to call Bob. She
1787 can see from the calling service that he is online and the calling
1788 service presents a JS UI in the form of a button next to Bob's name
1789 which says "Call". Alice clicks the button, which initiates a JS
1790 callback that instantiates a PeerConnection object. This does not
1791 require a security check: JS from any origin is allowed to get this
1792 far.<a href="#section-4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1793 <p id="section-4.1-3">
1794 Once the PeerConnection is created, the calling service JS needs to
1795 set up some media. Because this is an audio/video call, it creates a
1796 MediaStream with two MediaStreamTracks, one connected to an audio
1797 input and one connected to a video input. At this point, the first
1798 security check is required: untrusted origins are not allowed to
1799 access the camera and microphone, so the browser prompts Alice for
1800 permission.<a href="#section-4.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1801 <p id="section-4.1-4">
1802 In the current W3C API, once some streams have been added, Alice's
1803 browser + JS generates a signaling message <span>[<a href="#RFC8829" class="xref">RFC8829</a>]</span> containing:<a href="#section-4.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1804 <ul class="normal">
1805 <li class="normal" id="section-4.1-5.1">
1806 Media channel information<a href="#section-4.1-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1807 </li>
1808 <li class="normal" id="section-4.1-5.2">
1809 Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE) <span>[<a href="#RFC8445" class="xref">RFC8445</a>]</span> candidates<a href="#section-4.1-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1810 </li>
1811 <li class="normal" id="section-4.1-5.3">
1812 A "fingerprint" attribute binding the communication to a key pair
1813 <span>[<a href="#RFC5763" class="xref">RFC5763</a>]</span>. Note that this key may simply be
1814 ephemerally generated for this call or specific to this domain,
1815 and Alice may have a large number of such keys.<a href="#section-4.1-5.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1816 </li>
1817 </ul>
1818 <p id="section-4.1-6">
1819 Prior to sending out the signaling message, the PeerConnection code
1820 contacts the identity service and obtains an assertion binding Alice's
1821 identity to her fingerprint. The exact details depend on the identity
1822 service (though as discussed in <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a>
1823 PeerConnection can be agnostic to them), but for now it's easiest to
1824 think of as an OAuth token. The assertion may bind other
1825 information to the identity besides the fingerprint, but at minimum it
1826 needs to bind the fingerprint.<a href="#section-4.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1827 <p id="section-4.1-7">
1828 This message is sent to the signaling server, e.g., by fetch()
1829 <span>[<a href="#fetch" class="xref">fetch</a>]</span> or by WebSockets
1830 <span>[<a href="#RFC6455" class="xref">RFC6455</a>]</span>, over TLS <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>.
1831 The signaling server processes the message from Alice's browser,
1832 determines that this is a call to Bob, and sends a signaling message to
1833 Bob's browser (again, the format is currently undefined). The JS on
1834 Bob's browser processes it, and alerts Bob to the incoming call and to
1835 Alice's identity. In this case, Alice has provided an identity
1836 assertion and so Bob's browser contacts Alice's IdP
1837 (again, this is done in a generic way so the browser has no specific
1838 knowledge of the IdP) to verify the assertion. It is also possible
1839 to have IdPs with which the browser has a specific trust relationship,
1840 as described in <a href="#sec.trust-relationships" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>.
1841 This allows the browser
1842 to display a trusted element in the browser chrome indicating that a
1843 call is coming in from Alice. If Alice is in Bob's address book, then
1844 this interface might also include her real name, a picture, etc. The
1845 calling site will also provide some user interface element (e.g., a
1846 button) to allow Bob to answer the call, though this is most likely
1847 not part of the trusted UI.<a href="#section-4.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1848 <p id="section-4.1-8">
1849 If Bob agrees, a PeerConnection is instantiated with the message from
1850 Alice's side. Then, a similar process occurs as on Alice's browser:
1851 Bob's browser prompts him for device permission, the media streams are
1852 created, and a return signaling message containing media information,
1853 ICE candidates, and a fingerprint is sent back to Alice via the
1854 signaling service. If Bob has a relationship with an IdP, the message
1855 will also come with an identity assertion.<a href="#section-4.1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1856 <p id="section-4.1-9">
1857 At this point, Alice and Bob each know that the other party wants to
1858 have a secure call with them. Based purely on the interface provided
1859 by the signaling server, they know that the signaling server claims
1860 that the call is from Alice to Bob. This level of security is provided
1861 merely by having the fingerprint in the message and having that
1862 message received securely from the signaling server. Because the far
1863 end sent an identity assertion along with their message, they know
1864 that this is verifiable from the IdP as well. Note that if the call is
1865 federated, as shown in <a href="#fig.proposal-federated.idp" class="xref">Figure 4</a>,
1866 then Alice is able to verify Bob's identity in a way that is not
1867 mediated by either her signaling server or Bob's. Rather, she verifies
1868 it directly with Bob's IdP.<a href="#section-4.1-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1869 <p id="section-4.1-10">
1870 Of course, the call works perfectly well if either Alice or Bob
1871 doesn't have a relationship with an IdP; they just get a lower level
1872 of assurance. I.e., they simply have whatever information their
1873 calling site claims about the caller/callee's identity. Moreover,
1874 Alice might wish to make an anonymous call through an anonymous
1875 calling site, in which case she would of course just not provide any
1876 identity assertion and the calling site would mask her identity from
1877 Bob.<a href="#section-4.1-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1878 </section>
1879 <section id="section-4.2">
1880 <h3 id="name-media-consent-verification">
1881 <a href="#section-4.2" class="section-number selfRef">4.2. </a><a href="#name-media-consent-verification" class="section-name selfRef">Media Consent Verification</a>
1882 </h3>
1883 <p id="section-4.2-1">
1884 As described in <span>[<a href="#RFC8826" class="xref">RFC8826</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8826#section-4.2" class="relref">Section 4.2</a></span>, media consent verification is provided via ICE.
1885 Thus, Alice and
1886 Bob perform ICE checks with each other. At the completion of these
1887 checks, they are ready to send non-ICE data.<a href="#section-4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1888 <p id="section-4.2-2">
1889 At this point, Alice knows that (a) Bob (assuming he is verified via
1890 his IdP) or someone else who the signaling service is claiming is Bob
1891 is willing to exchange traffic with her and (b) either Bob is at
1892 the IP address which she has verified via ICE or there is an attacker
1893 who is on-path to that IP address detouring the traffic. Note that it
1894 is not possible for an attacker who is on-path between Alice and Bob
1895 but not attached to the signaling service to spoof these checks
1896 because they do not have the ICE credentials. Bob has the same
1897 security guarantees with respect to Alice.<a href="#section-4.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1898 </section>
1899 <section id="section-4.3">
1900 <h3 id="name-dtls-handshake">
1901 <a href="#section-4.3" class="section-number selfRef">4.3. </a><a href="#name-dtls-handshake" class="section-name selfRef">DTLS Handshake</a>
1902 </h3>
1903 <p id="section-4.3-1">
1904 Once the requisite ICE checks have completed, Alice and Bob can set
1905 up a secure channel or channels. This is performed via DTLS <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span>
1906 and DTLS-SRTP <span>[<a href="#RFC5763" class="xref">RFC5763</a>]</span> keying for SRTP
1907 <span>[<a href="#RFC3711" class="xref">RFC3711</a>]</span> for the media channel and
1908 the Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) over DTLS
1909 <span>[<a href="#RFC8261" class="xref">RFC8261</a>]</span> for data
1910 channels. Specifically, Alice and Bob perform a DTLS handshake on
1911 every component which has been established by ICE. The total number of
1912 channels depends on the amount of muxing; in the most likely case, we
1913 are using both RTP/RTCP mux and muxing multiple media streams on the
1914 same channel, in which case there is only one DTLS handshake. Once the
1915 DTLS handshake has completed, the keys are exported <span>[<a href="#RFC5705" class="xref">RFC5705</a>]</span> and used to key SRTP for the media channels.<a href="#section-4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1916 <p id="section-4.3-2">
1917 At this point, Alice and Bob know that they share a set of secure data
1918 and/or media channels with keys which are not known to any third-party
1919 attacker. If Alice and Bob authenticated via their IdPs, then they
1920 also know that the signaling service is not mounting a
1921 man-in-the-middle attack on their traffic. Even if they do not use an
1922 IdP, as long as they have minimal trust in the signaling service not
1923 to perform a man-in-the-middle attack, they know that their
1924 communications are secure against the signaling service as well (i.e.,
1925 that the signaling service cannot mount a passive attack on the
1926 communications).<a href="#section-4.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1927 </section>
1928 <section id="section-4.4">
1929 <h3 id="name-communications-and-consent-">
1930 <a href="#section-4.4" class="section-number selfRef">4.4. </a><a href="#name-communications-and-consent-" class="section-name selfRef">Communications and Consent Freshness</a>
1931 </h3>
1932 <p id="section-4.4-1">
1933 From a security perspective, everything from here on in is a little
1934 anticlimactic: Alice and Bob exchange data protected by the keys
1935 negotiated by DTLS. Because of the security guarantees discussed in
1936 the previous sections, they know that the communications are encrypted
1937 and authenticated.<a href="#section-4.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1938 <p id="section-4.4-2">
1939 The one remaining security property we need to establish is "consent
1940 freshness", i.e., allowing Alice to verify that Bob is still prepared
1941 to receive her communications so that Alice does not continue to send
1942 large traffic volumes to entities which went abruptly offline. ICE
1943 specifies periodic Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) keepalives but only if media is not flowing.
1944 Because the consent issue is more difficult here, we require WebRTC
1945 implementations to periodically send keepalives using the
1946 consent freshness
1947 mechanism specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC7675" class="xref">RFC7675</a>]</span>.
1948 If a
1949 keepalive fails and no new ICE channels can be established, then the
1950 session is terminated.<a href="#section-4.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1951 </section>
1952 </section>
1953 </div>
1954 <div id="sec.sdp-id-attr">
1955 <section id="section-5">
1956 <h2 id="name-sdp-identity-attribute">
1957 <a href="#section-5" class="section-number selfRef">5. </a><a href="#name-sdp-identity-attribute" class="section-name selfRef">SDP Identity Attribute</a>
1958 </h2>
1959 <p id="section-5-1">
1960 The SDP "identity" attribute is a session-level attribute that
1961 is used by an endpoint to convey its identity assertion to its
1962 peer. The identity-assertion value is encoded as base64, as described
1963 in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4648#section-4" class="relref">Section 4</a> of [<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1964 <p id="section-5-2">
1965 The procedures in this section are based on the assumption
1966 that the identity assertion of an endpoint is bound to the
1967 fingerprints of the endpoint. This does not preclude the definition of
1968 alternative means of binding an assertion to the endpoint, but such
1969 means are outside the scope of this specification.<a href="#section-5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1970 <p id="section-5-3">
1971 The semantics of multiple "identity" attributes within an
1972 offer or answer are undefined. Implementations <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> only include a
1973 single "identity" attribute in an offer or answer, and Relying Parties
1974 <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> elect to ignore all but the first "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1975 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-5-4">
1976 <dt id="section-5-4.1">Name:</dt>
1977 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.2">identity<a href="#section-5-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1978 </dd>
1979 <dd class="break"></dd>
1980 <dt id="section-5-4.3">Value:</dt>
1981 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.4">identity-assertion<a href="#section-5-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1982 </dd>
1983 <dd class="break"></dd>
1984 <dt id="section-5-4.5">Usage Level:</dt>
1985 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.6">session<a href="#section-5-4.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1986 </dd>
1987 <dd class="break"></dd>
1988 <dt id="section-5-4.7">Charset Dependent:</dt>
1989 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.8">no<a href="#section-5-4.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1990 </dd>
1991 <dd class="break"></dd>
1992 <dt id="section-5-4.9">Default Value:</dt>
1993 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-5-4.10">N/A<a href="#section-5-4.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1994 </dd>
1995 <dd class="break"></dd>
1996 </dl>
1997 <p id="section-5-5">Syntax:<a href="#section-5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1998 <div id="section-5-6">
1999 <pre class="sourcecode lang-abnf">
2000 identity-assertion = identity-assertion-value
2001 *(SP identity-extension)
2002 identity-assertion-value = base64
2003 identity-extension = extension-name [ "=" extension-value ]
2004 extension-name = token
2005 extension-value = 1*(%x01-09 / %x0b-0c / %x0e-3a / %x3c-ff)
2006 ; byte-string from [RFC4566]
2007
2008 &lt;ALPHA and DIGIT as defined in [RFC4566]&gt;
2009 &lt;base64 as defined in [RFC4566]&gt;
2010 </pre><a href="#section-5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2011 </div>
2012 <p id="section-5-7">Example:<a href="#section-5-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2013 <div id="section-5-8">
2014 <pre class="sourcecode lang-sdp">
2015 a=identity:\
2016 eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\
2017 In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\
2018 IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\
2019 aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9</pre><a href="#section-5-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2020 </div>
2021 <aside id="section-5-9">
2022 <p id="section-5-9.1">Note that long lines in the example are folded to meet the column
2023 width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of
2024 a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored.<a href="#section-5-9.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2025 </aside>
2026 <p id="section-5-10">
2027 This specification does not define any extensions for the attribute.<a href="#section-5-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2028 <p id="section-5-11">
2029 The identity-assertion value is a JSON encoded string
2030 <span>[<a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">RFC8259</a>]</span>. The JSON object
2031 contains two keys: "assertion" and "idp". The "assertion" key value contains
2032 an opaque string that is consumed by the IdP. The "idp" key value contains a
2033 dictionary with one or two further values that identify the IdP. See
2034 <a href="#sec.request-assert" class="xref">Section 7.6</a> for more details.<a href="#section-5-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2035 <div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa">
2036 <section id="section-5.1">
2037 <h3 id="name-offer-answer-considerations">
2038 <a href="#section-5.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1. </a><a href="#name-offer-answer-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Offer/Answer Considerations</a>
2039 </h3>
2040 <p id="section-5.1-1">
2041 This section defines the SDP offer/answer <span>[<a href="#RFC3264" class="xref">RFC3264</a>]</span> considerations for the SDP
2042 "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2043 <p id="section-5.1-2">
2044 Within this section, 'initial offer' refers to the first offer in the
2045 SDP session that contains an SDP "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-5.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2046 <div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio">
2047 <section id="section-5.1.1">
2048 <h4 id="name-generating-the-initial-sdp-">
2049 <a href="#section-5.1.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.1. </a><a href="#name-generating-the-initial-sdp-" class="section-name selfRef">Generating the Initial SDP Offer</a>
2050 </h4>
2051 <p id="section-5.1.1-1">
2052 When an offerer sends an offer, in order to provide its
2053 identity assertion to the peer, it includes an "identity" attribute in
2054 the offer. In addition, the offerer includes one or more SDP
2055 "fingerprint" attributes. The "identity" attribute <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be bound to
2056 all the "fingerprint" attributes in the session
2057 description.<a href="#section-5.1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2058 </section>
2059 </div>
2060 <div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-ansa">
2061 <section id="section-5.1.2">
2062 <h4 id="name-generating-an-sdp-answer">
2063 <a href="#section-5.1.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.2. </a><a href="#name-generating-an-sdp-answer" class="section-name selfRef">Generating an SDP Answer</a>
2064 </h4>
2065 <p id="section-5.1.2-1">
2066 If the answerer elects to include an "identity" attribute, it follows
2067 the same steps as those in <a href="#sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-inio" class="xref">Section 5.1.1</a>.
2068 The answerer can choose to include or omit an "identity" attribute independently,
2069 regardless of whether the offerer did so.<a href="#section-5.1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2070 </section>
2071 </div>
2072 <div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-offa">
2073 <section id="section-5.1.3">
2074 <h4 id="name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-">
2075 <a href="#section-5.1.3" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.3. </a><a href="#name-processing-an-sdp-offer-or-" class="section-name selfRef">Processing an SDP Offer or Answer</a>
2076 </h4>
2077 <p id="section-5.1.3-1">
2078 When an endpoint receives an offer or answer that contains an "identity"
2079 attribute, the answerer can use the attribute information to
2080 contact the IdP and verify the identity of the peer. If the identity
2081 requires a third-party IdP as described in <a href="#sec.trust-relationships" class="xref">Section 7.1</a>,
2082 then that IdP will need to have been specifically configured.
2083 If the identity verification fails, the answerer <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard the
2084 offer or answer as malformed.<a href="#section-5.1.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2085 </section>
2086 </div>
2087 <div id="sec.sdp-id-attr-oa-modi">
2088 <section id="section-5.1.4">
2089 <h4 id="name-modifying-the-session">
2090 <a href="#section-5.1.4" class="section-number selfRef">5.1.4. </a><a href="#name-modifying-the-session" class="section-name selfRef">Modifying the Session</a>
2091 </h4>
2092 <p id="section-5.1.4-1">
2093 When modifying a session, if the set of fingerprints is
2094 unchanged, then the sender <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> send the same "identity" attribute. In
2095 this case, the established identity <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be applied to existing DTLS
2096 connections as well as new connections established using one of those
2097 fingerprints. Note that <span>[<a href="#RFC8829" class="xref">RFC8829</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8829#section-5.2.1" class="relref">Section 5.2.1</a></span> requires that each media section use the same set of fingerprints.
2098 If a new "identity" attribute is received, then the receiver <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2099 apply that identity to all existing connections.<a href="#section-5.1.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2100 <p id="section-5.1.4-2">
2101 If the set of fingerprints changes, then the sender <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2102 either send a new "identity" attribute or none at all.
2103 Because a change in fingerprints also causes a new DTLS
2104 connection to be established, the receiver <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> discard
2105 all previously established identities.<a href="#section-5.1.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2106 </section>
2107 </div>
2108 </section>
2109 </div>
2110 </section>
2111 </div>
2112 <div id="sec.proposal.detailed">
2113 <section id="section-6">
2114 <h2 id="name-detailed-technical-descript">
2115 <a href="#section-6" class="section-number selfRef">6. </a><a href="#name-detailed-technical-descript" class="section-name selfRef">Detailed Technical Description</a>
2116 </h2>
2117 <div id="sec.proposal.origin">
2118 <section id="section-6.1">
2119 <h3 id="name-origin-and-web-security-iss">
2120 <a href="#section-6.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1. </a><a href="#name-origin-and-web-security-iss" class="section-name selfRef">Origin and Web Security Issues</a>
2121 </h3>
2122 <p id="section-6.1-1">
2123 The basic unit of permissions for WebRTC is the origin <span>[<a href="#RFC6454" class="xref">RFC6454</a>]</span>. Because the security of the origin depends on
2124 being able to authenticate content from that origin, the origin can
2125 only be securely established if data is transferred over HTTPS <span>[<a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">RFC2818</a>]</span>. Thus, clients <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> treat HTTP and HTTPS origins as
2126 different permissions domains. Note: This follows directly from the
2127 origin security model and is stated here merely for clarity.<a href="#section-6.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2128 <p id="section-6.1-2">
2129 Many Web browsers currently forbid by default any active mixed content
2130 on HTTPS pages. That is, when JavaScript is loaded from an HTTP origin
2131 onto an HTTPS page, an error is displayed and the HTTP content is not
2132 executed unless the user overrides the error. Any browser which
2133 enforces such a policy will also not permit access to WebRTC
2134 functionality from mixed content pages (because they never display
2135 mixed content). Browsers which allow active mixed content <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2136 nevertheless disable WebRTC functionality in mixed content settings.<a href="#section-6.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2137 <p id="section-6.1-3">
2138 Note that it is possible for a page which was not mixed content to
2139 become mixed content during the duration of the call. The major risk
2140 here is that the newly arrived insecure JS might redirect media to a
2141 location controlled by the attacker. Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> either
2142 choose to terminate the call or display a warning at that point.<a href="#section-6.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2143 <p id="section-6.1-4">
2144 Also note that the security architecture depends on the keying material
2145 not being available to move between origins. However, it is assumed that
2146 the identity assertion can be passed to anyone that the page cares to.<a href="#section-6.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2147 </section>
2148 </div>
2149 <div id="sec.proposal.device.permissions">
2150 <section id="section-6.2">
2151 <h3 id="name-device-permissions-model">
2152 <a href="#section-6.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.2. </a><a href="#name-device-permissions-model" class="section-name selfRef">Device Permissions Model</a>
2153 </h3>
2154 <p id="section-6.2-1">
2155 Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> obtain explicit user consent prior to providing
2156 access to the camera and/or microphone. Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> at
2157 minimum support the following two permissions models for HTTPS
2158 origins.<a href="#section-6.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2159 <ul class="normal">
2160 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-2.1">
2161 Requests for one-time camera/microphone access.<a href="#section-6.2-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2162 </li>
2163 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-2.2">
2164 Requests for permanent access.<a href="#section-6.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2165 </li>
2166 </ul>
2167 <p id="section-6.2-3">
2168 Because HTTP origins cannot be securely established against network
2169 attackers, implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> refuse all permissions grants for
2170 HTTP origins.<a href="#section-6.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2171 <p id="section-6.2-4">
2172 In addition, they <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> support requests for access that promise that
2173 media from this grant will be sent to a single communicating peer
2174 (obviously there could be other requests for other peers), e.g.,
2175 "Call [email protected]". The semantics of this request are
2176 that the media stream from the camera and microphone will only be
2177 routed through a connection which has been cryptographically verified
2178 (through the IdP mechanism or an X.509 certificate in the DTLS-SRTP
2179 handshake) as being associated with the stated identity. Note that it
2180 is unlikely that browsers would have X.509 certificates, but servers
2181 might. Browsers servicing such requests <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> clearly indicate that
2182 identity to the user when asking for permission. The idea behind this
2183 type of permissions is that a user might have a fairly narrow list of
2184 peers they are willing to communicate with, e.g., "my mother" rather than
2185 "anyone on Facebook". Narrow permissions grants allow the browser to
2186 do that enforcement.<a href="#section-6.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2187 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.2-5">
2188 <dt id="section-6.2-5.1">API Requirement:</dt>
2189 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.2-5.2">
2190 The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism for the requesting JS to
2191 relinquish the ability to see or modify the media (e.g., via
2192 MediaStream.record()). Combined with secure authentication of the
2193 communicating peer, this allows a user to be sure that the calling
2194 site is not accessing or modifying their conversion.<a href="#section-6.2-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2195 </dd>
2196 <dd class="break"></dd>
2197 </dl>
2198 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.2-6">
2199 <dt id="section-6.2-6.1">UI Requirement:</dt>
2200 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.2-6.2">
2201 The UI <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> clearly indicate when the user's camera and microphone
2202 are in use. This indication <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be suppressible by the JS
2203 and <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> clearly indicate how to terminate device access, and
2204 provide a UI means to immediately stop camera/microphone input
2205 without the JS being able to prevent it.<a href="#section-6.2-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2206 </dd>
2207 <dd class="break"></dd>
2208 </dl>
2209 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.2-7">
2210 <dt id="section-6.2-7.1">UI Requirement:</dt>
2211 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.2-7.2">
2212 If the UI indication of camera/microphone use is displayed in the
2213 browser such that minimizing the browser window would hide the
2214 indication, or the JS creating an overlapping window would hide
2215 the indication, then the browser <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> stop camera and microphone
2216 input when the indication is hidden. (Note: This may not be
2217 necessary in systems that are non-windows-based but that have good
2218 notifications support, such as phones.)<a href="#section-6.2-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2219 </dd>
2220 <dd class="break"></dd>
2221 </dl>
2222 <ul class="normal">
2223 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-8.1">
2224 Browsers <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> permit permanent screen or application sharing
2225 permissions to be installed as a response to a JS request for
2226 permissions. Instead, they must require some other user action
2227 such as a permissions setting or an application install experience
2228 to grant permission to a site.<a href="#section-6.2-8.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2229 </li>
2230 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-8.2">
2231 Browsers <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a separate dialog request for
2232 screen/application sharing permissions even if the media request
2233 is made at the same time as the request for camera and microphone
2234 permissions.<a href="#section-6.2-8.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2235 </li>
2236 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-8.3">
2237 The browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> indicate any windows which are currently being
2238 shared in some unambiguous way. Windows which are not visible <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be shared even if the application is being shared. If the
2239 screen is being shared, then that <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be indicated.<a href="#section-6.2-8.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2240 </li>
2241 </ul>
2242 <p id="section-6.2-9">
2243 Browsers <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> permit the formation of data channels without any direct
2244 user approval. Because sites can always tunnel data through the
2245 server, further restrictions on the data channel do not provide any
2246 additional security. (See <a href="#sec.proposal.communications.consent" class="xref">Section 6.3</a> for a related issue.)<a href="#section-6.2-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2247 <p id="section-6.2-10">
2248 Implementations which support some form of direct user authentication
2249 <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> also provide a policy by which a user can authorize calls only
2250 to specific communicating peers. Specifically, the implementation
2251 <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> provide the following interfaces/controls:<a href="#section-6.2-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2252 <ul class="normal">
2253 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-11.1">
2254 Allow future calls to this verified user.<a href="#section-6.2-11.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2255 </li>
2256 <li class="normal" id="section-6.2-11.2">
2257 Allow future calls to any verified user who is in my system
2258 address book (this only works with address book integration, of
2259 course).<a href="#section-6.2-11.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2260 </li>
2261 </ul>
2262 <p id="section-6.2-12">
2263 Implementations <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> also provide a different user interface
2264 indication when calls are in progress to users whose identities are
2265 directly verifiable. <a href="#sec.proposal.comsec" class="xref">Section 6.5</a> provides
2266 more on this.<a href="#section-6.2-12" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2267 </section>
2268 </div>
2269 <div id="sec.proposal.communications.consent">
2270 <section id="section-6.3">
2271 <h3 id="name-communications-consent">
2272 <a href="#section-6.3" class="section-number selfRef">6.3. </a><a href="#name-communications-consent" class="section-name selfRef">Communications Consent</a>
2273 </h3>
2274 <p id="section-6.3-1">
2275 Browser client implementations of WebRTC <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> implement ICE. Server
2276 gateway implementations which operate only at public IP addresses <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2277 implement either full ICE or ICE-Lite <span>[<a href="#RFC8445" class="xref">RFC8445</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2278 <p id="section-6.3-2">
2279 Browser implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify reachability via ICE prior to
2280 sending any non-ICE packets to a given destination. Implementations
2281 <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> provide the ICE transaction ID to JavaScript during the
2282 lifetime of the transaction (i.e., during the period when the ICE
2283 stack would accept a new response for that transaction). The JS <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be permitted to control the local ufrag and password, though it of
2284 course knows it.<a href="#section-6.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2285 <p id="section-6.3-3">
2286 While continuing consent is required, the ICE <span>[<a href="#RFC8445" class="xref">RFC8445</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8445#section-11" class="relref">Section 11</a></span> keepalives use STUN Binding Indications, which are
2287 one-way and therefore not sufficient. The current WG consensus is to
2288 use ICE Binding Requests for continuing consent freshness. ICE already
2289 requires that implementations respond to such requests, so this
2290 approach is maximally compatible. A separate document will profile the
2291 ICE timers to be used; see <span>[<a href="#RFC7675" class="xref">RFC7675</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2292 </section>
2293 </div>
2294 <div id="sec.proposal.ip.location.privacy">
2295 <section id="section-6.4">
2296 <h3 id="name-ip-location-privacy">
2297 <a href="#section-6.4" class="section-number selfRef">6.4. </a><a href="#name-ip-location-privacy" class="section-name selfRef">IP Location Privacy</a>
2298 </h3>
2299 <p id="section-6.4-1">
2300 A side effect of the default ICE behavior is that the peer learns
2301 one's IP address, which leaks large amounts of location
2302 information. This has negative privacy consequences in some
2303 circumstances. The API requirements in this section are intended to
2304 mitigate this issue. Note that these requirements are not intended to
2305 protect the user's IP address from a malicious site. In general, the
2306 site will learn at least a user's server-reflexive address from any
2307 HTTP transaction. Rather, these requirements are intended to allow a
2308 site to cooperate with the user to hide the user's IP address from the
2309 other side of the call. Hiding the user's IP address from the server
2310 requires some sort of explicit privacy-preserving mechanism on the
2311 client (e.g., Tor Browser <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en">https://www.torproject.org/projects/torbrowser.html.en</a>&gt;</span>) and
2312 is out of scope for this specification.<a href="#section-6.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2313 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.4-2">
2314 <dt id="section-6.4-2.1">API Requirement:</dt>
2315 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.4-2.2">
2316 The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism to allow the JS to suppress ICE
2317 negotiation (though perhaps to allow candidate gathering) until
2318 the user has decided to answer the call. (Note: Determining when
2319 the call has been answered is a question for the JS.) This
2320 enables a user to prevent a peer from learning their IP address if
2321 they elect not to answer a call and also from learning whether the
2322 user is online.<a href="#section-6.4-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2323 </dd>
2324 <dd class="break"></dd>
2325 </dl>
2326 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.4-3">
2327 <dt id="section-6.4-3.1">API Requirement:</dt>
2328 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.4-3.2">
2329 The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism for the calling application JS to
2330 indicate that only TURN candidates are to be used. This prevents
2331 the peer from learning one's IP address at all. This mechanism
2332 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> also permit suppression of the related address field, since
2333 that leaks local addresses.<a href="#section-6.4-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2334 </dd>
2335 <dd class="break"></dd>
2336 </dl>
2337 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.4-4">
2338 <dt id="section-6.4-4.1">API Requirement:</dt>
2339 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.4-4.2">
2340 The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a mechanism for the calling application to
2341 reconfigure an existing call to add non-TURN candidates. Taken
2342 together, this and the previous requirement allow ICE negotiation
2343 to start immediately on incoming call notification, thus reducing
2344 post-dial delay, but also to avoid disclosing the user's IP
2345 address until they have decided to answer. They also allow users
2346 to completely hide their IP address for the duration of the
2347 call. Finally, they allow a mechanism for the user to optimize
2348 performance by reconfiguring to allow non-TURN candidates during
2349 an active call if the user decides they no longer need to hide
2350 their IP address.<a href="#section-6.4-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2351 </dd>
2352 <dd class="break"></dd>
2353 </dl>
2354 <p id="section-6.4-5">
2355 Note that some enterprises may operate proxies and/or NATs designed to
2356 hide internal IP addresses from the outside world. WebRTC provides no
2357 explicit mechanism to allow this function. Either such enterprises
2358 need to proxy the HTTP/HTTPS and modify the SDP and/or the JS, or
2359 there needs to be browser support to set the "TURN-only" policy
2360 regardless of the site's preferences.<a href="#section-6.4-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2361 <p id="section-6.4-6">
2362 Note: These requirements are intended to allow sites to conceal the
2363 user's IP address from the peer. For guidance on concealing the
2364 user's IP address from the calling site see <span>[<a href="#RFC8828" class="xref">RFC8828</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.4-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2365 </section>
2366 </div>
2367 <div id="sec.proposal.comsec">
2368 <section id="section-6.5">
2369 <h3 id="name-communications-security">
2370 <a href="#section-6.5" class="section-number selfRef">6.5. </a><a href="#name-communications-security" class="section-name selfRef">Communications Security</a>
2371 </h3>
2372 <p id="section-6.5-1">
2373 Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support SRTP <span>[<a href="#RFC3711" class="xref">RFC3711</a>]</span>.
2374 Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support DTLS <span>[<a href="#RFC6347" class="xref">RFC6347</a>]</span> and
2375 DTLS-SRTP <span>[<a href="#RFC5763" class="xref">RFC5763</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#RFC5764" class="xref">RFC5764</a>]</span> for SRTP
2376 keying. Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support SCTP over DTLS <span>[<a href="#RFC8261" class="xref">RFC8261</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2377 <p id="section-6.5-2">
2378 All media channels <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be secured via SRTP and the
2379 Secure Real-time Transport Control Protocol (SRTCP). Media traffic <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>
2380 be sent over plain (unencrypted) RTP or RTCP; that is, implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> negotiate cipher suites with NULL encryption modes. DTLS-SRTP
2381 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be offered for every media channel. WebRTC implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>
2382 offer SDP security descriptions <span>[<a href="#RFC4568" class="xref">RFC4568</a>]</span> or select it if offered.
2383 An SRTP Master Key Identifier (MKI) <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be used.<a href="#section-6.5-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2384 <p id="section-6.5-3">
2385 All data channels <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be secured via DTLS.<a href="#section-6.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2386 <p id="section-6.5-4">
2387 All implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> support DTLS 1.2 with the
2388 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 cipher suite and the
2389 <span><a href="#FIPS186" class="xref">P-256 curve</a> [<a href="#FIPS186" class="xref">FIPS186</a>]</span>.
2390 Earlier drafts of this specification required
2391 DTLS 1.0 with the cipher suite
2392 TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA, and at the time of this
2393 writing some implementations do not support DTLS 1.2;
2394 endpoints which support only DTLS 1.2 might encounter
2395 interoperability issues.
2396 The DTLS-SRTP protection profile
2397 SRTP_AES128_CM_HMAC_SHA1_80 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be supported for
2398 SRTP.
2399 Implementations
2400 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> favor cipher suites which support Forward Secrecy (FS)
2401 over non-FS cipher suites and <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> favor
2402 Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data (AEAD) over non-AEAD cipher suites.
2403 Note: the IETF is in the process of standardizing DTLS 1.3
2404 <span>[<a href="#I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13" class="xref">TLS-DTLS13</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.5-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2405 <p id="section-6.5-5">
2406 Implementations <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> implement DTLS renegotiation and <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject
2407 it with a "no_renegotiation" alert if offered.<a href="#section-6.5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2408 <p id="section-6.5-6">
2409 Endpoints <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> implement TLS False Start <span>[<a href="#RFC7918" class="xref">RFC7918</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2410 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.5-7">
2411 <dt id="section-6.5-7.1">API Requirement:</dt>
2412 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.2">
2413 The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> generate a new authentication key pair for every new
2414 call by default. This is intended to allow for unlinkability.<a href="#section-6.5-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2415 </dd>
2416 <dd class="break"></dd>
2417 <dt id="section-6.5-7.3">API Requirement:</dt>
2418 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.4">
2419 The API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a means to reuse a key pair for calls. This
2420 can be used to enable key continuity-based authentication, and
2421 could be used to amortize key generation costs.<a href="#section-6.5-7.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2422 </dd>
2423 <dd class="break"></dd>
2424 <dt id="section-6.5-7.5">API Requirement:</dt>
2425 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.6">
2426 Unless
2427 the user specifically configures an external key pair, different
2428 key pairs <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be used for each origin. (This avoids creating a
2429 super-cookie.)<a href="#section-6.5-7.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2430 </dd>
2431 <dd class="break"></dd>
2432 <dt id="section-6.5-7.7">API Requirement:</dt>
2433 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-7.8">
2434 When DTLS-SRTP is used, the API <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> permit the JS to obtain
2435 the negotiated keying material. This requirement preserves the
2436 end-to-end security of the media.<a href="#section-6.5-7.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2437 </dd>
2438 <dd class="break"></dd>
2439 </dl>
2440 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-6.5-8">
2441 <dt id="section-6.5-8.1">UI Requirements:</dt>
2442 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.2">
2443 A user-oriented client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide an "inspector" interface which
2444 allows the user to determine the "security characteristics" of the
2445 media.<a href="#section-6.5-8.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2446 </dd>
2447 <dd class="break"></dd>
2448 <dt id="section-6.5-8.3"></dt>
2449 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.4">
2450 The following properties <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> be displayed "up-front" in the
2451 browser chrome, i.e., without requiring the user to ask for them:<a href="#section-6.5-8.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2452 </dd>
2453 <dd class="break"></dd>
2454 <dt id="section-6.5-8.5"></dt>
2455 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.6">
2456 <ul class="normal">
2457 <li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.6.1.1">
2458 A client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a user interface through which a user
2459 may determine the "security characteristics" for
2460 currently displayed audio and video stream(s).<a href="#section-6.5-8.6.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2461 </li>
2462 <li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.6.1.2">
2463 A client <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> provide a user interface through which a user
2464 may determine the "security characteristics" for transmissions
2465 of their microphone audio and camera video.<a href="#section-6.5-8.6.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2466 </li>
2467 <li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.6.1.3">
2468 If the far endpoint was directly verified, either via a
2469 third-party verifiable X.509 certificate or via a Web IdP
2470 mechanism (see <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a>), the "security
2471 characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include the verified information. X.509
2472 identities and Web IdP identities have similar semantics and
2473 should be displayed in a similar way.<a href="#section-6.5-8.6.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2474 </li>
2475 </ul>
2476 </dd>
2477 <dd class="break"></dd>
2478 <dt id="section-6.5-8.7"></dt>
2479 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.8">
2480 The following properties are more likely to require some
2481 "drill-down" from the user:<a href="#section-6.5-8.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2482 </dd>
2483 <dd class="break"></dd>
2484 <dt id="section-6.5-8.9"></dt>
2485 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-6.5-8.10">
2486 <ul class="normal">
2487 <li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.10.1.1">
2488 The "security characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> indicate the cryptographic
2489 algorithms in use (for example, "AES-CBC").<a href="#section-6.5-8.10.1.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2490 </li>
2491 <li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.10.1.2">
2492 The "security characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> indicate whether FS is
2493 provided.<a href="#section-6.5-8.10.1.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2494 </li>
2495 <li class="normal" id="section-6.5-8.10.1.3">
2496 The "security characteristics" <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include some mechanism to
2497 allow an out-of-band verification of the peer, such as a
2498 certificate fingerprint or a Short Authentication String (SAS).
2499 These are compared by the peers to authenticate one another.<a href="#section-6.5-8.10.1.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2500 </li>
2501 </ul>
2502 </dd>
2503 <dd class="break"></dd>
2504 </dl>
2505 </section>
2506 </div>
2507 </section>
2508 </div>
2509 <div id="sec.generic.idp">
2510 <section id="section-7">
2511 <h2 id="name-web-based-peer-authenticati">
2512 <a href="#section-7" class="section-number selfRef">7. </a><a href="#name-web-based-peer-authenticati" class="section-name selfRef">Web-Based Peer Authentication</a>
2513 </h2>
2514 <p id="section-7-1">
2515 NOTE: The mechanism described in this section was designed relatively
2516 early in the RTCWEB process. In retrospect, the WG was too optimistic
2517 about the enthusiasm for this kind of mechanism. At the time of publication,
2518 it has not been widely adopted or implemented. It appears in this document
2519 as a description of the state of the art as of this writing.<a href="#section-7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2520 <p id="section-7-2">
2521 In a number of cases, it is desirable for the endpoint (i.e., the
2522 browser) to be able to directly identify the endpoint on the other
2523 side without trusting the signaling service to which they are
2524 connected. For instance, users may be making a call via a federated
2525 system where they wish to get direct authentication of the other
2526 side. Alternately, they may be making a call on a site which they
2527 minimally trust (such as a poker site) but to someone who has an
2528 identity on a site they do trust (such as a social network).<a href="#section-7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2529 <p id="section-7-3">
2530 Recently, a number of Web-based identity technologies (OAuth,
2531 Facebook Connect, etc.) have been developed. While the
2532 details vary, what these technologies share is that they have a
2533 Web-based (i.e., HTTP/HTTPS) IdP which attests to Alice's
2534 identity. For instance, if Alice has an account at example.org, Alice could
2535 use the example.org IdP to prove to others that Alice is
2536 [email protected]. The development of these technologies allows us to
2537 separate calling from identity provision: Alice could call you on a
2538 poker site but identify herself as [email protected].<a href="#section-7-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2539 <p id="section-7-4">
2540 Whatever the underlying technology, the general principle is that the
2541 party which is being authenticated is NOT the signaling site but
2542 rather the user (and their browser). Similarly, the Relying Party is
2543 the browser and not the signaling site. Thus, the browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
2544 generate the input to the IdP assertion process and
2545 display the results of the verification process to the user
2546 in a way which cannot be imitated by the calling site.<a href="#section-7-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2547 <p id="section-7-5">
2548 The mechanisms defined in this document do not require the browser to
2549 implement any particular identity protocol or to support any
2550 particular IdP. Instead, this document provides a generic interface
2551 which any IdP can implement. Thus, new IdPs and protocols can be
2552 introduced without change to either the browser or the calling
2553 service. This avoids the need to make a commitment to any particular
2554 identity protocol, although browsers may opt to directly implement
2555 some identity protocols in order to provide superior performance or UI
2556 properties.<a href="#section-7-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2557 <div id="sec.trust-relationships">
2558 <section id="section-7.1">
2559 <h3 id="name-trust-relationships-idps-ap">
2560 <a href="#section-7.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.1. </a><a href="#name-trust-relationships-idps-ap" class="section-name selfRef">Trust Relationships: IdPs, APs, and RPs</a>
2561 </h3>
2562 <p id="section-7.1-1">
2563 Any federated identity protocol has three major participants:<a href="#section-7.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2564 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.1-2">
2565 <dt id="section-7.1-2.1">Authenticating Party (AP):</dt>
2566 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-2.2">
2567 The entity which is trying to establish its identity.<a href="#section-7.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2568 </dd>
2569 <dd class="break"></dd>
2570 <dt id="section-7.1-2.3">Identity Provider (IdP):</dt>
2571 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-2.4">
2572 The entity which is vouching for the AP's identity.<a href="#section-7.1-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2573 </dd>
2574 <dd class="break"></dd>
2575 <dt id="section-7.1-2.5">Relying Party (RP):</dt>
2576 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-2.6">
2577 The entity which is trying to verify the AP's identity.<a href="#section-7.1-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2578 </dd>
2579 <dd class="break"></dd>
2580 </dl>
2581 <p id="section-7.1-3">
2582 The AP and the IdP have an account relationship of some kind: the AP
2583 registers with the IdP and is able to subsequently authenticate
2584 directly to the IdP (e.g., with a password). This means that the
2585 browser must somehow know which IdP(s) the user has an account
2586 relationship with. This can either be something that the user
2587 configures into the browser or that is configured at the calling
2588 site and then provided to the PeerConnection by the Web application
2589 at the calling site. The use case for having this information
2590 configured into the browser is that the user may "log into" the
2591 browser to bind it to some identity. This is becoming common in new
2592 browsers. However, it should also be possible for the IdP
2593 information to simply be provided by the calling application.<a href="#section-7.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2594 <p id="section-7.1-4">
2595 At a high level, there are two kinds of IdPs:<a href="#section-7.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2596 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.1-5">
2597 <dt id="section-7.1-5.1">Authoritative:</dt>
2598 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-5.2">
2599 IdPs which have verifiable control of some section of the
2600 identity space. For instance, in the realm of email, the
2601 operator of "example.com" has complete control of the namespace
2602 ending in "@example.com". Thus, "[email protected]" is whoever
2603 the operator says it is. Examples of systems with authoritative
2604 IdPs include DNSSEC, an identity system for SIP
2605 (see <span>[<a href="#RFC8224" class="xref">RFC8224</a>]</span>), and Facebook
2606 Connect (Facebook identities only make sense within the context
2607 of the Facebook system).<a href="#section-7.1-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2608 </dd>
2609 <dd class="break"></dd>
2610 <dt id="section-7.1-5.3">Third-Party:</dt>
2611 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.1-5.4">
2612 IdPs which don't have control of their section of the identity
2613 space but instead verify users' identities via some unspecified
2614 mechanism and then attest to it. Because the IdP doesn't
2615 actually control the namespace, RPs need to trust that the IdP
2616 is correctly verifying AP identities, and there can potentially
2617 be multiple IdPs attesting to the same section of the identity
2618 space. Probably the best-known example of a third-party IdP
2619 is SSL/TLS certificates, where there are a large number of
2620 certificate authorities (CAs) all of whom can attest to any domain name.<a href="#section-7.1-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2621 </dd>
2622 <dd class="break"></dd>
2623 </dl>
2624 <p id="section-7.1-6">
2625 If an AP is authenticating via an authoritative IdP, then the RP
2626 does not need to explicitly configure trust in the IdP at all. The
2627 identity mechanism can directly verify that the IdP indeed made the
2628 relevant identity assertion (a function provided by the mechanisms
2629 in this document), and any assertion it makes about an identity for
2630 which it is authoritative is directly verifiable. Note that this
2631 does not mean that the IdP might not lie, but that is a
2632 trustworthiness judgement that the user can make at the time they
2633 look at the identity.<a href="#section-7.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2634 <p id="section-7.1-7">
2635 By contrast, if an AP is authenticating via a third-party IdP, the
2636 RP needs to explicitly trust that IdP (hence the need for an
2637 explicit trust anchor list in PKI-based SSL/TLS clients). The list
2638 of trustable IdPs needs to be configured directly into the browser,
2639 either by the user or potentially by the browser manufacturer. This
2640 is a significant advantage of authoritative IdPs and implies that if
2641 third-party IdPs are to be supported, the potential number needs to
2642 be fairly small.<a href="#section-7.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2643 </section>
2644 </div>
2645 <div id="sec.overview">
2646 <section id="section-7.2">
2647 <h3 id="name-overview-of-operation">
2648 <a href="#section-7.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.2. </a><a href="#name-overview-of-operation" class="section-name selfRef">Overview of Operation</a>
2649 </h3>
2650 <p id="section-7.2-1">
2651 In order to provide security without trusting the calling site, the
2652 PeerConnection component of the browser must interact directly with
2653 the IdP. The details of the mechanism are described in the W3C API
2654 specification, but the general idea is that the PeerConnection
2655 component downloads JS from a specific location on the IdP dictated
2656 by the IdP domain name. That JS (the "IdP proxy") runs in an
2657 isolated security context within the browser, and the PeerConnection
2658 talks to it via a secure message passing channel.<a href="#section-7.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2659 <p id="section-7.2-2">
2660 Note that there are two logically separate functions here:<a href="#section-7.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2661 <ul class="normal">
2662 <li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.1">
2663 Identity assertion generation.<a href="#section-7.2-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2664 </li>
2665 <li class="normal" id="section-7.2-3.2">
2666 Identity assertion verification.<a href="#section-7.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2667 </li>
2668 </ul>
2669 <p id="section-7.2-4">
2670 The same IdP JS "endpoint" is used for both functions, but of course
2671 a given IdP might behave differently and load new JS to perform one
2672 function or the other.<a href="#section-7.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2673 <div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-7.2-5">
2674 <pre>
2675 +--------------------------------------+
2676 | Browser |
2677 | |
2678 | +----------------------------------+ |
2679 | | https://calling-site.example.com | |
2680 | | | |
2681 | | Calling JS Code | |
2682 | | ^ | |
2683 | +---------------|------------------+ |
2684 | | API Calls |
2685 | v |
2686 | PeerConnection |
2687 | ^ |
2688 | | API Calls |
2689 | +-----------|-------------+ | +---------------+
2690 | | v | | | |
2691 | | IdP Proxy |&lt;--------&gt;| Identity |
2692 | | | | | Provider |
2693 | | https://idp.example.org | | | |
2694 | +-------------------------+ | +---------------+
2695 | |
2696 +--------------------------------------+</pre><a href="#section-7.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2697 </div>
2698 <p id="section-7.2-6">
2699 When the PeerConnection object wants to interact with the IdP, the
2700 sequence of events is as follows:<a href="#section-7.2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2701 <ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-7.2-7">
2702 <li id="section-7.2-7.1">
2703 The browser (the PeerConnection component) instantiates an IdP
2704 proxy. This allows the IdP to load whatever JS is necessary into
2705 the proxy. The resulting code runs in the IdP's security
2706 context.<a href="#section-7.2-7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2707 </li>
2708 <li id="section-7.2-7.2">
2709 The IdP registers an object with the browser that conforms to
2710 the API defined in <span>[<a href="#webrtc-api" class="xref">webrtc-api</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.2-7.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2711 </li>
2712 <li id="section-7.2-7.3">
2713 The browser invokes methods on the object registered by the IdP
2714 proxy to create or verify identity assertions.<a href="#section-7.2-7.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2715 </li>
2716 </ol>
2717 <p id="section-7.2-8">
2718 This approach allows us to decouple the browser from any particular
2719 IdP; the browser need only know how to load the IdP's
2720 JavaScript -- the location of which is determined based on the IdP's
2721 identity -- and to call the generic API for requesting and verifying
2722 identity assertions. The IdP provides whatever logic is necessary to
2723 bridge the generic protocol to the IdP's specific
2724 requirements. Thus, a single browser can support any number of
2725 identity protocols, including being forward compatible with IdPs
2726 which did not exist at the time the browser was written.<a href="#section-7.2-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2727 </section>
2728 </div>
2729 <div id="sec.standardized">
2730 <section id="section-7.3">
2731 <h3 id="name-items-for-standardization">
2732 <a href="#section-7.3" class="section-number selfRef">7.3. </a><a href="#name-items-for-standardization" class="section-name selfRef">Items for Standardization</a>
2733 </h3>
2734 <p id="section-7.3-1">
2735 There are two parts to this work:<a href="#section-7.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2736 <ul class="normal">
2737 <li class="normal" id="section-7.3-2.1">
2738 The precise information from the signaling message that must be
2739 cryptographically bound to the user's identity and a mechanism
2740 for carrying assertions in JavaScript Session Establishment
2741 Protocol (JSEP) messages. This is specified in
2742 <a href="#sec.jsep-binding" class="xref">Section 7.4</a>.<a href="#section-7.3-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2743 </li>
2744 <li class="normal" id="section-7.3-2.2">
2745 The interface to the IdP, which is defined in the companion W3C
2746 WebRTC API specification <span>[<a href="#webrtc-api" class="xref">webrtc-api</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.3-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2747 </li>
2748 </ul>
2749 <p id="section-7.3-3">
2750 The WebRTC API specification also defines JavaScript interfaces that
2751 the calling application can use to specify which IdP to use. That
2752 API also provides access to the assertion-generation capability and
2753 the status of the validation process.<a href="#section-7.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2754 </section>
2755 </div>
2756 <div id="sec.jsep-binding">
2757 <section id="section-7.4">
2758 <h3 id="name-binding-identity-assertions">
2759 <a href="#section-7.4" class="section-number selfRef">7.4. </a><a href="#name-binding-identity-assertions" class="section-name selfRef">Binding Identity Assertions to JSEP Offer/Answer Transactions</a>
2760 </h3>
2761 <p id="section-7.4-1">
2762 An identity assertion binds the user's identity (as asserted by the
2763 IdP) to the SDP offer/answer exchange and specifically to the
2764 media. In order to achieve this, the PeerConnection must provide the
2765 DTLS-SRTP fingerprint to be bound to the identity. This is provided
2766 as a JavaScript object (also known as a dictionary or hash) with a
2767 single "fingerprint" key, as shown below:<a href="#section-7.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2768 <div id="section-7.4-2">
2769 <pre class="sourcecode lang-json">
2770 {
2771 "fingerprint":
2772 [
2773 { "algorithm": "sha-256",
2774 "digest": "4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:...:E5:7C:AB" },
2775 { "algorithm": "sha-1",
2776 "digest": "74:E9:76:C8:19:...:F4:45:6B" }
2777 ]
2778 }</pre><a href="#section-7.4-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2779 </div>
2780 <p id="section-7.4-3">
2781 The "fingerprint" value is an array of
2782 objects. Each object in the array contains "algorithm" and "digest" values, which correspond directly to
2783 the algorithm and digest values in the "fingerprint" attribute of the SDP <span>[<a href="#RFC8122" class="xref">RFC8122</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.4-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2784 <p id="section-7.4-4">
2785 This object is encoded in a <span><a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">JSON</a> [<a href="#RFC8259" class="xref">RFC8259</a>]</span>
2786 string for passing to the IdP. The identity assertion returned by
2787 the IdP, which is encoded in the "identity" attribute, is a JSON object that is
2788 encoded as described in <a href="#sec.carry-assertion" class="xref">Section 7.4.1</a>.<a href="#section-7.4-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2789 <p id="section-7.4-5">
2790 This structure does not need to be interpreted by the IdP or the
2791 IdP proxy. It is consumed solely by the RP's browser. The IdP
2792 merely treats it as an opaque value to be attested to. Thus, new
2793 parameters can be added to the assertion without modifying the
2794 IdP.<a href="#section-7.4-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2795 <div id="sec.carry-assertion">
2796 <section id="section-7.4.1">
2797 <h4 id="name-carrying-identity-assertion">
2798 <a href="#section-7.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.4.1. </a><a href="#name-carrying-identity-assertion" class="section-name selfRef">Carrying Identity Assertions</a>
2799 </h4>
2800 <p id="section-7.4.1-1">
2801 Once an IdP has generated an assertion (see <a href="#sec.request-assert" class="xref">Section 7.6</a>), it is attached to the SDP
2802 offer/answer message. This is done by adding a new "identity"
2803 attribute to the SDP. The sole contents of this value is the
2804 identity assertion. The identity assertion produced by the IdP is
2805 encoded into a UTF-8 JSON text, then <span><a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">base64-encoded</a> [<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span> to produce this string.
2806 For example:<a href="#section-7.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2807 <div id="section-7.4.1-2">
2808 <pre class="sourcecode lang-sdp">
2809 v=0
2810 o=- 1181923068 1181923196 IN IP4 ua1.example.com
2811 s=example1
2812 c=IN IP4 ua1.example.com
2813 a=fingerprint:sha-1 \
2814 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
2815 a=identity:\
2816 eyJpZHAiOnsiZG9tYWluIjoiZXhhbXBsZS5vcmciLCJwcm90b2NvbCI6ImJvZ3Vz\
2817 In0sImFzc2VydGlvbiI6IntcImlkZW50aXR5XCI6XCJib2JAZXhhbXBsZS5vcmdc\
2818 IixcImNvbnRlbnRzXCI6XCJhYmNkZWZnaGlqa2xtbm9wcXJzdHV2d3l6XCIsXCJz\
2819 aWduYXR1cmVcIjpcIjAxMDIwMzA0MDUwNlwifSJ9
2820 a=...
2821 t=0 0
2822 m=audio 6056 RTP/SAVP 0
2823 a=sendrecv
2824 ...</pre><a href="#section-7.4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2825 </div>
2826 <aside id="section-7.4.1-3">
2827 <p id="section-7.4.1-3.1">Note that long lines in the example are folded to meet the column
2828 width constraints of this document; the backslash ("\") at the end of
2829 a line, the carriage return that follows, and whitespace shall be ignored.<a href="#section-7.4.1-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2830 </aside>
2831 <p id="section-7.4.1-4">
2832 The "identity" attribute attests to all "fingerprint" attributes in the session
2833 description. It is therefore a session-level attribute.<a href="#section-7.4.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2834 <p id="section-7.4.1-5">
2835 Multiple "fingerprint" values can be
2836 used to offer alternative certificates for a peer. The "identity" attribute <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> include all
2837 "fingerprint" values that are included in "fingerprint" attributes of the session
2838 description.<a href="#section-7.4.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2839 <p id="section-7.4.1-6">
2840 The RP browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> verify that the in-use certificate for a DTLS
2841 connection is in the set of fingerprints returned from the IdP
2842 when verifying an assertion.<a href="#section-7.4.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2843 </section>
2844 </div>
2845 </section>
2846 </div>
2847 <div id="sec.idp-uri">
2848 <section id="section-7.5">
2849 <h3 id="name-determining-the-idp-uri">
2850 <a href="#section-7.5" class="section-number selfRef">7.5. </a><a href="#name-determining-the-idp-uri" class="section-name selfRef">Determining the IdP URI</a>
2851 </h3>
2852 <p id="section-7.5-1">
2853 In order to ensure that the IdP is under control of the domain
2854 owner rather than someone who merely has an account on the
2855 domain owner's server (e.g., in shared hosting scenarios), the
2856 IdP JavaScript is hosted at a deterministic location based on
2857 the IdP's domain name. Each IdP proxy instance is associated
2858 with two values:<a href="#section-7.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2859 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.5-2">
2860 <dt id="section-7.5-2.1">authority:</dt>
2861 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.5-2.2">
2862 The <span><a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">authority</a> [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span> at which the
2863 IdP's service is hosted.<a href="#section-7.5-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2864 </dd>
2865 <dd class="break"></dd>
2866 <dt id="section-7.5-2.3">protocol:</dt>
2867 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.5-2.4">
2868 The specific IdP protocol which the IdP is using. This is a
2869 completely opaque IdP-specific string, but allows an IdP to
2870 implement two protocols in parallel. This value may be the
2871 empty string. If no value for protocol is provided, a value
2872 of "default" is used.<a href="#section-7.5-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2873 </dd>
2874 <dd class="break"></dd>
2875 </dl>
2876 <p id="section-7.5-3">
2877 Each IdP <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> serve its initial entry page (i.e., the one loaded
2878 by the IdP proxy) from a <span><a href="#RFC8615" class="xref">well-known
2879 URI</a> [<a href="#RFC8615" class="xref">RFC8615</a>]</span>.
2880 The well-known URI for an IdP proxy is formed from
2881 the following URI components:<a href="#section-7.5-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2882 <ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-7.5-4">
2883 <li id="section-7.5-4.1">
2884 The scheme, "https:". An IdP <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be loaded using <span><a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">HTTPS</a> [<a href="#RFC2818" class="xref">RFC2818</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.5-4.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2885 </li>
2886 <li id="section-7.5-4.2">
2887 The <span><a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">authority</a> [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span>. As noted above,
2888 the authority <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> contain a non-default port number or
2889 userinfo sub-component. Both are removed when determining
2890 if an asserted identity matches the name of the IdP.<a href="#section-7.5-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2891 </li>
2892 <li id="section-7.5-4.3">
2893 The path, starting with "/.well-known/idp-proxy/" and
2894 appended with the IdP protocol. Note that the separator
2895 characters '/' (%2F) and '\' (%5C) <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be permitted in
2896 the protocol field, lest an attacker be able to direct
2897 requests outside of the controlled "/.well-known/" prefix.
2898 Query and fragment values <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> be used by including '?' or
2899 '#' characters.<a href="#section-7.5-4.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2900 </li>
2901 </ol>
2902 <p id="section-7.5-5">
2903 For example, for the IdP "identity.example.com" and the protocol
2904 "example", the URL would be:<a href="#section-7.5-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2905 <div class="artwork art-text alignLeft" id="section-7.5-6">
2906 <pre>https://identity.example.com/.well-known/idp-proxy/example</pre><a href="#section-7.5-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2907 </div>
2908 <p id="section-7.5-7">
2909 The IdP <span class="bcp14">MAY</span> redirect requests to this URL, but they <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> retain
2910 the "https:" scheme. This changes the effective origin of the
2911 IdP, but not the domain of the identities that the IdP is
2912 permitted to assert and validate. I.e., the IdP is still
2913 regarded as authoritative for the original domain.<a href="#section-7.5-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2914 <section id="section-7.5.1">
2915 <h4 id="name-authenticating-party">
2916 <a href="#section-7.5.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.5.1. </a><a href="#name-authenticating-party" class="section-name selfRef">Authenticating Party</a>
2917 </h4>
2918 <p id="section-7.5.1-1">
2919 How an AP determines the appropriate IdP domain is out of
2920 scope of this specification. In general, however, the AP has
2921 some actual account relationship with the IdP, as this
2922 identity is what the IdP is attesting to. Thus, the AP somehow
2923 supplies the IdP information to the browser. Some potential
2924 mechanisms include:<a href="#section-7.5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2925 <ul class="normal">
2926 <li class="normal" id="section-7.5.1-2.1">
2927 Provided by the user directly.<a href="#section-7.5.1-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2928 </li>
2929 <li class="normal" id="section-7.5.1-2.2">
2930 Selected from some set of IdPs known to the calling site
2931 (e.g., a button that shows "Authenticate via Facebook
2932 Connect").<a href="#section-7.5.1-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2933 </li>
2934 </ul>
2935 </section>
2936 <section id="section-7.5.2">
2937 <h4 id="name-relying-party">
2938 <a href="#section-7.5.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.5.2. </a><a href="#name-relying-party" class="section-name selfRef">Relying Party</a>
2939 </h4>
2940 <p id="section-7.5.2-1">
2941 Unlike the AP, the RP need not have any particular
2942 relationship with the IdP. Rather, it needs to be able to
2943 process whatever assertion is provided by the AP. As the
2944 assertion contains the IdP's identity in the "idp" field of the JSON-encoded object (see
2945 <a href="#sec.request-assert" class="xref">Section 7.6</a>), the URI can be
2946 constructed directly from the assertion, and thus the RP can
2947 directly verify the technical validity of the assertion with
2948 no user interaction. Authoritative assertions need only be
2949 verifiable. Third-party assertions also <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be verified
2950 against local policy, as described in <a href="#sec.id-format" class="xref">Section 8.1</a>.<a href="#section-7.5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2951 </section>
2952 </section>
2953 </div>
2954 <div id="sec.request-assert">
2955 <section id="section-7.6">
2956 <h3 id="name-requesting-assertions">
2957 <a href="#section-7.6" class="section-number selfRef">7.6. </a><a href="#name-requesting-assertions" class="section-name selfRef">Requesting Assertions</a>
2958 </h3>
2959 <p id="section-7.6-1">
2960 The input to the identity assertion generation process is the JSON-encoded object
2961 described in <a href="#sec.jsep-binding" class="xref">Section 7.4</a> that contains the
2962 set of certificate fingerprints the browser intends to use.
2963 This string is treated as opaque from the perspective of the
2964 IdP.<a href="#section-7.6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2965 <p id="section-7.6-2">
2966 The browser also identifies the origin that the PeerConnection
2967 is run in, which allows the IdP to make decisions based on who
2968 is requesting the assertion.<a href="#section-7.6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2969 <p id="section-7.6-3">
2970 An application can optionally provide a user identifier hint
2971 when specifying an IdP. This value is a hint that the IdP can
2972 use to select amongst multiple identities, or to avoid providing
2973 assertions for unwanted identities. The "username" is a string that has no meaning to
2974 any entity other than the IdP; it can contain any data the IdP
2975 needs in order to correctly generate an assertion.<a href="#section-7.6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2976 <p id="section-7.6-4">
2977 An identity assertion that is successfully provided by the IdP
2978 consists of the following information:<a href="#section-7.6-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2979 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-7.6-5">
2980 <dt id="section-7.6-5.1">idp:</dt>
2981 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.6-5.2">
2982 The domain name of an IdP and the protocol string. This <span class="bcp14">MAY</span>
2983 identify a different IdP or protocol from the one that
2984 generated the assertion.<a href="#section-7.6-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2985 </dd>
2986 <dd class="break"></dd>
2987 <dt id="section-7.6-5.3">assertion:</dt>
2988 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-7.6-5.4">
2989 An opaque value containing the assertion itself. This is
2990 only interpretable by the identified IdP or the IdP code
2991 running in the client.<a href="#section-7.6-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2992 </dd>
2993 <dd class="break"></dd>
2994 </dl>
2995 <p id="section-7.6-6">
2996 <a href="#fig.assert-ex" class="xref">Figure 5</a> shows an example assertion
2997 formatted as JSON. In this case, the message has presumably
2998 been digitally signed/MACed in some way that the IdP can later
2999 verify it, but this is an implementation detail and out of scope
3000 of this document.<a href="#section-7.6-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3001 <span id="name-example-assertion"></span><div id="fig.assert-ex">
3002 <figure id="figure-5">
3003 <div id="section-7.6-7.1">
3004 <pre class="sourcecode lang-json">
3005 {
3006 "idp":{
3007 "domain": "example.org",
3008 "protocol": "bogus"
3009 },
3010 "assertion": "{\"identity\":\"[email protected]\",
3011 \"contents\":\"abcdefghijklmnopqrstuvwyz\",
3012 \"signature\":\"010203040506\"}"
3013 }</pre>
3014 </div>
3015 <figcaption><a href="#figure-5" class="selfRef">Figure 5</a>:
3016 <a href="#name-example-assertion" class="selfRef">Example Assertion</a>
3017 </figcaption></figure>
3018 </div>
3019 <p id="section-7.6-8">
3020 For use in signaling, the assertion is serialized into JSON,
3021 <span><a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">base64-encoded</a> [<a href="#RFC4648" class="xref">RFC4648</a>]</span>, and used as the
3022 value of the "identity" attribute.
3023 IdPs <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> ensure that any assertions they
3024 generate cannot be interpreted in a different context. E.g.,
3025 they should use a distinct format or have separate cryptographic
3026 keys for assertion generation and other purposes.
3027 Line breaks are inserted solely for
3028 readability.<a href="#section-7.6-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3029 </section>
3030 </div>
3031 <div id="sec.user-login">
3032 <section id="section-7.7">
3033 <h3 id="name-managing-user-login">
3034 <a href="#section-7.7" class="section-number selfRef">7.7. </a><a href="#name-managing-user-login" class="section-name selfRef">Managing User Login</a>
3035 </h3>
3036 <p id="section-7.7-1">
3037 In order to generate an identity assertion, the IdP needs proof of
3038 the user's identity. It is common practice to authenticate users
3039 (using passwords or multi-factor authentication), then use <span><a href="#RFC6265" class="xref">cookies</a> [<a href="#RFC6265" class="xref">RFC6265</a>]</span> or <span><a href="#RFC7617" class="xref">HTTP
3040 authentication</a> [<a href="#RFC7617" class="xref">RFC7617</a>]</span> for subsequent exchanges.<a href="#section-7.7-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3041 <p id="section-7.7-2">
3042 The IdP proxy is able to access cookies, HTTP authentication data, or
3043 other persistent session data because it operates in the security
3044 context of the IdP origin. Therefore, if a user is logged in, the
3045 IdP could have all the information needed to generate an
3046 assertion.<a href="#section-7.7-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3047 <p id="section-7.7-3">
3048 An IdP proxy is unable to generate an assertion if the user is
3049 not logged in, or the IdP wants to interact with the user to
3050 acquire more information before generating the assertion. If
3051 the IdP wants to interact with the user before generating an
3052 assertion, the IdP proxy can fail to generate an assertion and
3053 instead indicate a URL where login should proceed.<a href="#section-7.7-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3054 <p id="section-7.7-4">
3055 The application can then load the provided URL to enable the
3056 user to enter credentials. The communication between the
3057 application and the IdP is described in <span>[<a href="#webrtc-api" class="xref">webrtc-api</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.7-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3058 </section>
3059 </div>
3060 </section>
3061 </div>
3062 <div id="sec.verify-assert">
3063 <section id="section-8">
3064 <h2 id="name-verifying-assertions">
3065 <a href="#section-8" class="section-number selfRef">8. </a><a href="#name-verifying-assertions" class="section-name selfRef">Verifying Assertions</a>
3066 </h2>
3067 <p id="section-8-1">
3068 The input to identity validation is the assertion string taken
3069 from a decoded "identity" attribute.<a href="#section-8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3070 <p id="section-8-2">
3071 The IdP proxy verifies the assertion. Depending on the identity
3072 protocol, the proxy might contact the IdP server or other
3073 servers. For instance, an OAuth-based protocol will likely
3074 require using the IdP as an oracle, whereas with a
3075 signature-based scheme it might be able to verify the assertion
3076 without contacting the IdP, provided that it has cached the
3077 relevant public key.<a href="#section-8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3078 <p id="section-8-3">
3079 Regardless of the mechanism, if verification succeeds, a
3080 successful response from the IdP proxy consists of the following
3081 information:<a href="#section-8-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3082 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-8-4">
3083 <dt id="section-8-4.1">identity:</dt>
3084 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8-4.2">
3085 The identity of the AP from the IdP's perspective. Details
3086 of this are provided in <a href="#sec.id-format" class="xref">Section 8.1</a>.<a href="#section-8-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3087 </dd>
3088 <dd class="break"></dd>
3089 <dt id="section-8-4.3">contents:</dt>
3090 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-8-4.4">
3091 The original unmodified string provided by the AP as input
3092 to the assertion generation process.<a href="#section-8-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3093 </dd>
3094 <dd class="break"></dd>
3095 </dl>
3096 <p id="section-8-5">
3097 <a href="#fig.verify-ex" class="xref">Figure 6</a> shows an example response,
3098 which is JSON-formatted.<a href="#section-8-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3099 <span id="name-example-verification-result"></span><div id="fig.verify-ex">
3100 <figure id="figure-6">
3101 <div id="section-8-6.1">
3102 <pre class="sourcecode lang-json">
3103 {
3104 "identity": "[email protected]",
3105 "contents": "{\"fingerprint\":[ ... ]}"
3106 }</pre>
3107 </div>
3108 <figcaption><a href="#figure-6" class="selfRef">Figure 6</a>:
3109 <a href="#name-example-verification-result" class="selfRef">Example Verification Result</a>
3110 </figcaption></figure>
3111 </div>
3112 <div id="sec.id-format">
3113 <section id="section-8.1">
3114 <h3 id="name-identity-formats">
3115 <a href="#section-8.1" class="section-number selfRef">8.1. </a><a href="#name-identity-formats" class="section-name selfRef">Identity Formats</a>
3116 </h3>
3117 <p id="section-8.1-1">
3118 The identity provided from the IdP to the RP browser <span class="bcp14">MUST</span>
3119 consist of a string representing the user's identity. This
3120 string is in the form "&lt;user&gt;@&lt;domain&gt;", where "user" consists of any character,
3121 and domain is an internationalized
3122 domain name <span>[<a href="#RFC5890" class="xref">RFC5890</a>]</span> encoded as a sequence of U-labels.<a href="#section-8.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3123 <p id="section-8.1-2">
3124 The PeerConnection API <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> check this string as follows:<a href="#section-8.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3125 <ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-8.1-3">
3126 <li id="section-8.1-3.1">
3127 If the "domain" portion of the string is equal to the domain
3128 name of the IdP proxy, then the assertion is valid, as the
3129 IdP is authoritative for this domain. Comparison of
3130 domain names is done using the label equivalence rule
3131 defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890#section-2.3.2.4" class="relref">Section 2.3.2.4</a> of [<a href="#RFC5890" class="xref">RFC5890</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8.1-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3132 </li>
3133 <li id="section-8.1-3.2">
3134 <p id="section-8.1-3.2.1">
3135 If the "domain" portion of the string is not equal to the
3136 domain name of the IdP proxy, then the PeerConnection
3137 object <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> reject the assertion unless both:<a href="#section-8.1-3.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3138 <ol start="1" type="1" class="normal type-1" id="section-8.1-3.2.2">
3139 <li id="section-8.1-3.2.2.1">
3140 the IdP domain is trusted as an acceptable third-party
3141 IdP; and<a href="#section-8.1-3.2.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3142 </li>
3143 <li id="section-8.1-3.2.2.2">
3144 local policy is configured to trust this IdP domain
3145 for the domain portion of the identity string.<a href="#section-8.1-3.2.2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3146 </li>
3147 </ol>
3148 </li>
3149 </ol>
3150 <p id="section-8.1-4">
3151 Any '@' or '%' characters in the "user" portion of the
3152 identity <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> be escaped according to the "percent-encoding"
3153 rules defined in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc3986#section-2.1" class="relref">Section 2.1</a> of [<a href="#RFC3986" class="xref">RFC3986</a>]</span>. Characters other than '@' and '%' <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span>
3154 be percent-encoded. For example, with a "user" of "user@133" and
3155 a "domain" of "identity.example.com", the resulting string will
3156 be encoded as "user%[email protected]".<a href="#section-8.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3157 <p id="section-8.1-5">
3158 Implementations are cautioned to take care when displaying
3159 user identities containing escaped '@' characters. If such
3160 characters are unescaped prior to display, implementations
3161 <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> distinguish between the domain of the IdP proxy and any
3162 domain that might be implied by the portion of the
3163 "&lt;user&gt;" portion that appears after the escaped "@"
3164 sign.<a href="#section-8.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3165 </section>
3166 </div>
3167 </section>
3168 </div>
3169 <div id="sec.sec-cons">
3170 <section id="section-9">
3171 <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
3172 <a href="#section-9" class="section-number selfRef">9. </a><a href="#name-security-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Security Considerations</a>
3173 </h2>
3174 <p id="section-9-1">
3175 Much of the security analysis of RTCWEB is contained in <span>[<a href="#RFC8826" class="xref">RFC8826</a>]</span> or in the discussion of the
3176 particular issues above. In order to avoid repetition, this section
3177 focuses on (a) residual threats that are not addressed by this
3178 document and (b) threats produced by failure/misbehavior of one of the
3179 components in the system.<a href="#section-9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3180 <section id="section-9.1">
3181 <h3 id="name-communications-security-2">
3182 <a href="#section-9.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.1. </a><a href="#name-communications-security-2" class="section-name selfRef">Communications Security</a>
3183 </h3>
3184 <p id="section-9.1-1">
3185 If HTTPS is not used to secure communications to the signaling
3186 server, and the identity mechanism used in
3187 <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> is not used,
3188 then any on-path attacker can replace the DTLS-SRTP fingerprints
3189 in the handshake and thus substitute its own identity for that
3190 of either endpoint.<a href="#section-9.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3191 <p id="section-9.1-2">
3192 Even if HTTPS is used, the signaling server can
3193 potentially mount a man-in-the-middle attack unless implementations
3194 have some mechanism for independently verifying keys. The UI
3195 requirements in <a href="#sec.proposal.comsec" class="xref">Section 6.5</a> are designed to
3196 provide such a mechanism for motivated/security conscious users, but
3197 are not suitable for general use. The identity service mechanisms
3198 in <a href="#sec.generic.idp" class="xref">Section 7</a> are more suitable for general
3199 use. Note, however, that a malicious signaling service can strip off
3200 any such identity assertions, though it cannot forge new ones. Note
3201 that all of the third-party security mechanisms available (whether
3202 X.509 certificates or a third-party IdP) rely on the security of the
3203 third party -- this is of course also true of the user's connection to the
3204 Web site itself. Users who wish to assure themselves of security
3205 against a malicious IdP can only do so by verifying
3206 peer credentials directly, e.g., by checking the peer's fingerprint
3207 against a value delivered out of band.<a href="#section-9.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3208 <p id="section-9.1-3">
3209 In order to protect against malicious content JavaScript, that
3210 JavaScript <span class="bcp14">MUST NOT</span> be allowed to have direct
3211 access to -- or perform
3212 computations with -- DTLS keys. For instance, if content JS were able
3213 to compute digital signatures, then it would be possible for content
3214 JS to get an identity assertion for a browser's generated key and
3215 then use that assertion plus a signature by the key to authenticate
3216 a call protected under an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman (DH) key controlled by the content
3217 JS, thus violating the security guarantees otherwise provided by the
3218 IdP mechanism. Note that it is not sufficient merely to deny the
3219 content JS direct access to the keys, as some have suggested doing
3220 with the WebCrypto API <span>[<a href="#webcrypto" class="xref">webcrypto</a>]</span>. The JS must
3221 also not be allowed to perform operations that would be valid for a
3222 DTLS endpoint. By far the safest approach is simply to deny the
3223 ability to perform any operations that depend on secret information
3224 associated with the key. Operations that depend on public
3225 information, such as exporting the public key, are of course safe.<a href="#section-9.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3226 </section>
3227 <section id="section-9.2">
3228 <h3 id="name-privacy">
3229 <a href="#section-9.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.2. </a><a href="#name-privacy" class="section-name selfRef">Privacy</a>
3230 </h3>
3231 <p id="section-9.2-1">
3232 The requirements in this document are intended to allow:<a href="#section-9.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3233 <ul class="normal">
3234 <li class="normal" id="section-9.2-2.1">
3235 Users to participate in calls without revealing their location.<a href="#section-9.2-2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3236 </li>
3237 <li class="normal" id="section-9.2-2.2">
3238 Potential callees to avoid revealing their location and even
3239 presence status prior to agreeing to answer a call.<a href="#section-9.2-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3240 </li>
3241 </ul>
3242 <p id="section-9.2-3">
3243 However, these privacy protections come at a performance cost in
3244 terms of using TURN relays and, in the latter case, delaying
3245 ICE. Sites <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> make users aware of these tradeoffs.<a href="#section-9.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3246 <p id="section-9.2-4">
3247 Note that the protections provided here assume a non-malicious
3248 calling service. As the calling service always knows the user's
3249 status and (absent the use of a technology like Tor) their IP
3250 address, they can violate the user's privacy at will. Users who wish
3251 privacy against the calling sites they are using must use separate
3252 privacy-enhancing technologies such as Tor. Combined WebRTC/Tor
3253 implementations <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> arrange to route the media as well as the
3254 signaling through Tor. Currently this will produce very suboptimal
3255 performance.<a href="#section-9.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3256 <p id="section-9.2-5">
3257 Additionally, any identifier which persists across multiple calls is
3258 potentially a problem for privacy, especially for anonymous calling
3259 services. Such services <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> instruct the browser to use separate
3260 DTLS keys for each call and also to use TURN throughout the
3261 call. Otherwise, the other side will learn linkable information that
3262 would allow them to correlate the browser across multiple calls.
3263 Additionally, browsers <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> implement the privacy-preserving CNAME
3264 generation mode of <span>[<a href="#RFC7022" class="xref">RFC7022</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-9.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3265 </section>
3266 <section id="section-9.3">
3267 <h3 id="name-denial-of-service">
3268 <a href="#section-9.3" class="section-number selfRef">9.3. </a><a href="#name-denial-of-service" class="section-name selfRef">Denial of Service</a>
3269 </h3>
3270 <p id="section-9.3-1">
3271 The consent mechanisms described in this document are intended to
3272 mitigate denial-of-service (DoS) attacks in which an attacker uses clients
3273 to send large amounts of traffic to a victim without the consent of
3274 the victim. While these mechanisms are sufficient to protect victims
3275 who have not implemented WebRTC at all, WebRTC implementations need
3276 to be more careful.<a href="#section-9.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3277 <p id="section-9.3-2">
3278 Consider the case of a call center which accepts calls via
3279 WebRTC. An attacker proxies the call center's front-end and arranges
3280 for multiple clients to initiate calls to the call center. Note that
3281 this requires user consent in many cases, but because the data
3282 channel does not need consent, they can use that directly. Since ICE
3283 will complete, browsers can then be induced to send large amounts of
3284 data to the victim call center if it supports the data channel at
3285 all. Preventing this attack requires that automated WebRTC
3286 implementations implement sensible flow control and have the ability
3287 to triage out (i.e., stop responding to ICE probes on) calls which
3288 are behaving badly, and especially to be prepared to remotely
3289 throttle the data channel in the absence of plausible audio and
3290 video (which the attacker cannot control).<a href="#section-9.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3291 <p id="section-9.3-3">
3292 Another related attack is for the signaling service to swap the ICE
3293 candidates for the audio and video streams, thus forcing a browser
3294 to send video to the sink that the other victim expects will contain
3295 audio (perhaps it is only expecting audio!), potentially causing
3296 overload. Muxing multiple media flows over a single transport makes
3297 it harder to individually suppress a single flow by denying ICE
3298 keepalives. Either media-level (RTCP) mechanisms must be used or the
3299 implementation must deny responses entirely, thus terminating the
3300 call.<a href="#section-9.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3301 <p id="section-9.3-4">
3302 Yet another attack, suggested by Magnus Westerlund, is for the
3303 attacker to cross-connect offers and answers as follows. It induces
3304 the victim to make a call and then uses its control of other users'
3305 browsers to get them to attempt a call to someone. It then
3306 translates their offers into apparent answers to the victim, which
3307 looks like large-scale parallel forking. The victim still responds
3308 to ICE responses, and now the browsers all try to send media to the
3309 victim. Implementations can defend themselves from this attack by
3310 only responding to ICE Binding Requests for a limited number of
3311 remote ufrags (this is the reason for the requirement that the JS
3312 not be able to control the ufrag and password).
3313 <span>[<a href="#RFC8834" class="xref">RFC8834</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8834#section-13" class="relref">Section 13</a></span> documents a number
3314 of potential RTCP-based DoS attacks and countermeasures.<a href="#section-9.3-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3315 <p id="section-9.3-5">
3316 Note that attacks based on confusing one end or the other about
3317 consent are possible even in the face of the third-party identity
3318 mechanism as long as major parts of the signaling messages are not
3319 signed. On the other hand, signing the entire message severely
3320 restricts the capabilities of the calling application, so there are
3321 difficult tradeoffs here.<a href="#section-9.3-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3322 </section>
3323 <section id="section-9.4">
3324 <h3 id="name-idp-authentication-mechanis">
3325 <a href="#section-9.4" class="section-number selfRef">9.4. </a><a href="#name-idp-authentication-mechanis" class="section-name selfRef">IdP Authentication Mechanism</a>
3326 </h3>
3327 <p id="section-9.4-1">
3328 This mechanism relies for its security on the IdP and on the
3329 PeerConnection correctly enforcing the security invariants described
3330 above. At a high level, the IdP is attesting that the user
3331 identified in the assertion wishes to be associated with the
3332 assertion. Thus, it must not be possible for arbitrary third parties
3333 to get assertions tied to a user or to produce assertions that RPs
3334 will accept.<a href="#section-9.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3335 <div id="sec.pc-origin">
3336 <section id="section-9.4.1">
3337 <h4 id="name-peerconnection-origin-check">
3338 <a href="#section-9.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.1. </a><a href="#name-peerconnection-origin-check" class="section-name selfRef">PeerConnection Origin Check</a>
3339 </h4>
3340 <p id="section-9.4.1-1">
3341 Fundamentally, the IdP proxy is just a piece of HTML and JS loaded
3342 by the browser, so nothing stops a Web attacker from creating
3343 their own IFRAME, loading the IdP proxy HTML/JS, and requesting a
3344 signature over their own keys rather than those generated in
3345 the browser. However, that proxy would be in the
3346 attacker's origin, not the IdP's origin. Only the
3347 browser itself can instantiate a context that (a) is in the IdP's origin and
3348 (b) exposes the correct API surface. Thus, the IdP proxy on
3349 the sender's side <span class="bcp14">MUST</span> ensure that it is running in the IdP's origin
3350 prior to issuing assertions.<a href="#section-9.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3351 <p id="section-9.4.1-2">
3352 Note that this check only asserts that the browser (or some other
3353 entity with access to the user's authentication data) attests to
3354 the request and hence to the fingerprint. It does not demonstrate
3355 that the browser has access to the associated private
3356 key, and therefore an attacker can attach their own identity
3357 to another party's keying material, thus making a call which
3358 comes from Alice appear to come from the attacker.
3359 See <span>[<a href="#RFC8844" class="xref">RFC8844</a>]</span> for defenses against this
3360 form of attack.<a href="#section-9.4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3361 </section>
3362 </div>
3363 <div id="sec.sec-idp-uri">
3364 <section id="section-9.4.2">
3365 <h4 id="name-idp-well-known-uri">
3366 <a href="#section-9.4.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.2. </a><a href="#name-idp-well-known-uri" class="section-name selfRef">IdP Well-Known URI</a>
3367 </h4>
3368 <p id="section-9.4.2-1">
3369 As described in <a href="#sec.idp-uri" class="xref">Section 7.5</a>, the IdP proxy HTML/JS
3370 landing page is located at a well-known URI based on the IdP's
3371 domain name. This requirement prevents an attacker who can write
3372 some resources at the IdP (e.g., on one's Facebook wall) from
3373 being able to impersonate the IdP.<a href="#section-9.4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3374 </section>
3375 </div>
3376 <section id="section-9.4.3">
3377 <h4 id="name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id">
3378 <a href="#section-9.4.3" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.3. </a><a href="#name-privacy-of-idp-generated-id" class="section-name selfRef">Privacy of IdP-Generated Identities and the Hosting Site</a>
3379 </h4>
3380 <p id="section-9.4.3-1">
3381 Depending on the structure of the IdP's assertions, the calling
3382 site may learn the user's identity from the perspective of the
3383 IdP. In many cases, this is not an issue because the user is
3384 authenticating to the site via the IdP in any case -- for instance,
3385 when the user has logged in with Facebook Connect and is then
3386 authenticating their call with a Facebook identity. However, in
3387 other cases, the user may not have already revealed their identity
3388 to the site. In general, IdPs <span class="bcp14">SHOULD</span> either verify that the user
3389 is willing to have their identity revealed to the site (e.g.,
3390 through the usual IdP permissions dialog) or arrange that the
3391 identity information is only available to known RPs (e.g., social
3392 graph adjacencies) but not to the calling site. The "domain" field
3393 of the assertion request can be used to check that the user has
3394 agreed to disclose their identity to the calling site; because it
3395 is supplied by the PeerConnection it can be trusted to be correct.<a href="#section-9.4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3396 </section>
3397 <div id="sec.sec-third-party">
3398 <section id="section-9.4.4">
3399 <h4 id="name-security-of-third-party-idp">
3400 <a href="#section-9.4.4" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.4. </a><a href="#name-security-of-third-party-idp" class="section-name selfRef">Security of Third-Party IdPs</a>
3401 </h4>
3402 <p id="section-9.4.4-1">
3403 As discussed above, each third-party IdP represents a new
3404 universal trust point and therefore the number of these IdPs needs
3405 to be quite limited. Most IdPs, even those which issue unqualified
3406 identities such as Facebook, can be recast as authoritative IdPs
3407 (e.g., [email protected]). However, in such cases, the user
3408 interface implications are not entirely desirable. One
3409 intermediate approach is to have special (potentially user
3410 configurable) UI for large authoritative IdPs, thus allowing the
3411 user to instantly grasp that the call is being authenticated by
3412 Facebook, Google, etc.<a href="#section-9.4.4-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3413 <section id="section-9.4.4.1">
3414 <h5 id="name-confusable-characters">
3415 <a href="#section-9.4.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.4.1. </a><a href="#name-confusable-characters" class="section-name selfRef">Confusable Characters</a>
3416 </h5>
3417 <p id="section-9.4.4.1-1">
3418 Because a broad range of characters are permitted in identity
3419 strings, it may be possible for attackers to craft identities
3420 which are confusable with other identities (see
3421 <span>[<a href="#RFC6943" class="xref">RFC6943</a>]</span> for more on this topic). This is
3422 a problem with any identifier space of this type
3423 (e.g., email addresses).
3424 Those minting identifiers should avoid mixed scripts and similar
3425 confusable characters. Those presenting these identifiers to a
3426 user should consider highlighting cases of mixed script usage
3427 (see <span>[<a href="#RFC5890" class="xref">RFC5890</a>], <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc5890#section-4.4" class="relref">Section 4.4</a></span>). Other best practices are still in development.<a href="#section-9.4.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3428 </section>
3429 </section>
3430 </div>
3431 <section id="section-9.4.5">
3432 <h4 id="name-web-security-feature-intera">
3433 <a href="#section-9.4.5" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.5. </a><a href="#name-web-security-feature-intera" class="section-name selfRef">Web Security Feature Interactions</a>
3434 </h4>
3435 <p id="section-9.4.5-1">
3436 A number of optional Web security features have the potential to
3437 cause issues for this mechanism, as discussed below.<a href="#section-9.4.5-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3438 <div id="sec.popup-blocking">
3439 <section id="section-9.4.5.1">
3440 <h5 id="name-popup-blocking">
3441 <a href="#section-9.4.5.1" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.5.1. </a><a href="#name-popup-blocking" class="section-name selfRef">Popup Blocking</a>
3442 </h5>
3443 <p id="section-9.4.5.1-1">
3444 When popup blocking is in use, the IdP proxy is unable to generate popup windows, dialogs, or
3445 any other form of user interactions. This prevents the IdP
3446 proxy from being used to circumvent user interaction. The
3447 "LOGINNEEDED" message allows the IdP proxy to inform the calling
3448 site of a need for user login, providing the information
3449 necessary to satisfy this requirement without resorting to
3450 direct user interaction from the IdP proxy itself.<a href="#section-9.4.5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3451 </section>
3452 </div>
3453 <div id="sec.3rd-party-cookies">
3454 <section id="section-9.4.5.2">
3455 <h5 id="name-third-party-cookies">
3456 <a href="#section-9.4.5.2" class="section-number selfRef">9.4.5.2. </a><a href="#name-third-party-cookies" class="section-name selfRef">Third Party Cookies</a>
3457 </h5>
3458 <p id="section-9.4.5.2-1">
3459 Some browsers allow users to block third party cookies (cookies
3460 associated with origins other than the top-level page) for
3461 privacy reasons. Any IdP which uses cookies to persist logins
3462 will be broken by third-party cookie blocking. One option is to
3463 accept this as a limitation; another is to have the
3464 PeerConnection object disable third-party cookie blocking for
3465 the IdP proxy.<a href="#section-9.4.5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3466 </section>
3467 </div>
3468 </section>
3469 </section>
3470 </section>
3471 </div>
3472 <div id="sec.iana-cons">
3473 <section id="section-10">
3474 <h2 id="name-iana-considerations">
3475 <a href="#section-10" class="section-number selfRef">10. </a><a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">IANA Considerations</a>
3476 </h2>
3477 <p id="section-10-1">
3478 This specification defines the "identity"
3479 SDP attribute per the procedures of <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc4566#section-8.2.4" class="relref">Section 8.2.4</a> of [<a href="#RFC4566" class="xref">RFC4566</a>]</span>. The required information for the registration is
3480 included here:<a href="#section-10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3481 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-10-2">
3482 <dt id="section-10-2.1">Contact Name:</dt>
3483 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.2">IESG ([email protected])<a href="#section-10-2.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3484 </dd>
3485 <dd class="break"></dd>
3486 <dt id="section-10-2.3">Attribute Name:</dt>
3487 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.4">identity<a href="#section-10-2.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3488 </dd>
3489 <dd class="break"></dd>
3490 <dt id="section-10-2.5">Long Form:</dt>
3491 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.6">identity<a href="#section-10-2.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3492 </dd>
3493 <dd class="break"></dd>
3494 <dt id="section-10-2.7">Type of Attribute:</dt>
3495 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.8">session<a href="#section-10-2.8" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3496 </dd>
3497 <dd class="break"></dd>
3498 <dt id="section-10-2.9">Charset Considerations:</dt>
3499 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.10">This attribute is not subject
3500 to the charset attribute.<a href="#section-10-2.10" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3501 </dd>
3502 <dd class="break"></dd>
3503 <dt id="section-10-2.11">Purpose:</dt>
3504 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.12">This attribute carries an identity assertion,
3505 binding an identity to the transport-level security session.<a href="#section-10-2.12" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3506 </dd>
3507 <dd class="break"></dd>
3508 <dt id="section-10-2.13">Appropriate Values:</dt>
3509 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.14">See <a href="#sec.sdp-id-attr" class="xref">Section 5</a> of RFC 8827.<a href="#section-10-2.14" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3510 </dd>
3511 <dd class="break"></dd>
3512 <dt id="section-10-2.15">Mux Category:</dt>
3513 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-2.16">NORMAL<a href="#section-10-2.16" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3514 </dd>
3515 <dd class="break"></dd>
3516 </dl>
3517 <p id="section-10-3">
3518 This section registers the "idp-proxy" well-known
3519 URI from <span>[<a href="#RFC8615" class="xref">RFC8615</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-10-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3520 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlParallel" id="section-10-4">
3521 <dt id="section-10-4.1">URI suffix:</dt>
3522 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-4.2">idp-proxy<a href="#section-10-4.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3523 </dd>
3524 <dd class="break"></dd>
3525 <dt id="section-10-4.3">Change controller:</dt>
3526 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-10-4.4">IETF<a href="#section-10-4.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
3527 </dd>
3528 <dd class="break"></dd>
3529 </dl>
3530 </section>
3531 </div>
3532 <section id="section-11">
3533 <h2 id="name-references">
3534 <a href="#section-11" class="section-number selfRef">11. </a><a href="#name-references" class="section-name selfRef">References</a>
3535 </h2>
3536 <section id="section-11.1">
3537 <h3 id="name-normative-references">
3538 <a href="#section-11.1" class="section-number selfRef">11.1. </a><a href="#name-normative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Normative References</a>
3539 </h3>
3540 <dl class="references">
3541 <dt id="FIPS186">[FIPS186]</dt>
3542 <dd>
3543 <span class="refAuthor">National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST)</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Digital Signature Standard (DSS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">NIST PUB 186-4</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4</span>, <time datetime="2013-07" class="refDate">July 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4">https://doi.org/10.6028/NIST.FIPS.186-4</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3544 <dd class="break"></dd>
3545 <dt id="RFC2119">[RFC2119]</dt>
3546 <dd>
3547 <span class="refAuthor">Bradner, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2119</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2119</span>, <time datetime="1997-03" class="refDate">March 1997</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3548 <dd class="break"></dd>
3549 <dt id="RFC2818">[RFC2818]</dt>
3550 <dd>
3551 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP Over TLS"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 2818</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC2818</span>, <time datetime="2000-05" class="refDate">May 2000</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3552 <dd class="break"></dd>
3553 <dt id="RFC3264">[RFC3264]</dt>
3554 <dd>
3555 <span class="refAuthor">Rosenberg, J.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and H. Schulzrinne</span>, <span class="refTitle">"An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3264</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3264</span>, <time datetime="2002-06" class="refDate">June 2002</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3556 <dd class="break"></dd>
3557 <dt id="RFC3711">[RFC3711]</dt>
3558 <dd>
3559 <span class="refAuthor">Baugher, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, McGrew, D.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Naslund, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Carrara, E.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and K. Norrman</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3711</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3711</span>, <time datetime="2004-03" class="refDate">March 2004</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3711</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3560 <dd class="break"></dd>
3561 <dt id="RFC3986">[RFC3986]</dt>
3562 <dd>
3563 <span class="refAuthor">Berners-Lee, T.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Fielding, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and L. Masinter</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 66</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3986</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3986</span>, <time datetime="2005-01" class="refDate">January 2005</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3564 <dd class="break"></dd>
3565 <dt id="RFC4566">[RFC4566]</dt>
3566 <dd>
3567 <span class="refAuthor">Handley, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jacobson, V.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and C. Perkins</span>, <span class="refTitle">"SDP: Session Description Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4566</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4566</span>, <time datetime="2006-07" class="refDate">July 2006</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3568 <dd class="break"></dd>
3569 <dt id="RFC4568">[RFC4568]</dt>
3570 <dd>
3571 <span class="refAuthor">Andreasen, F.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Baugher, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and D. Wing</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Session Description Protocol (SDP) Security Descriptions for Media Streams"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4568</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4568</span>, <time datetime="2006-07" class="refDate">July 2006</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4568</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3572 <dd class="break"></dd>
3573 <dt id="RFC4648">[RFC4648]</dt>
3574 <dd>
3575 <span class="refAuthor">Josefsson, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Base16, Base32, and Base64 Data Encodings"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4648</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4648</span>, <time datetime="2006-10" class="refDate">October 2006</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4648</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3576 <dd class="break"></dd>
3577 <dt id="RFC5763">[RFC5763]</dt>
3578 <dd>
3579 <span class="refAuthor">Fischl, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Tschofenig, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Framework for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5763</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5763</span>, <time datetime="2010-05" class="refDate">May 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5763</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3580 <dd class="break"></dd>
3581 <dt id="RFC5764">[RFC5764]</dt>
3582 <dd>
3583 <span class="refAuthor">McGrew, D.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Extension to Establish Keys for the Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5764</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5764</span>, <time datetime="2010-05" class="refDate">May 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5764</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3584 <dd class="break"></dd>
3585 <dt id="RFC5890">[RFC5890]</dt>
3586 <dd>
3587 <span class="refAuthor">Klensin, J.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5890</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5890</span>, <time datetime="2010-08" class="refDate">August 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3588 <dd class="break"></dd>
3589 <dt id="RFC6347">[RFC6347]</dt>
3590 <dd>
3591 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and N. Modadugu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security Version 1.2"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6347</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6347</span>, <time datetime="2012-01" class="refDate">January 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6347</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3592 <dd class="break"></dd>
3593 <dt id="RFC6454">[RFC6454]</dt>
3594 <dd>
3595 <span class="refAuthor">Barth, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Web Origin Concept"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6454</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6454</span>, <time datetime="2011-12" class="refDate">December 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6454</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3596 <dd class="break"></dd>
3597 <dt id="RFC7022">[RFC7022]</dt>
3598 <dd>
3599 <span class="refAuthor">Begen, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Perkins, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Wing, D.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Guidelines for Choosing RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Canonical Names (CNAMEs)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7022</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7022</span>, <time datetime="2013-09" class="refDate">September 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7022">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7022</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3600 <dd class="break"></dd>
3601 <dt id="RFC7675">[RFC7675]</dt>
3602 <dd>
3603 <span class="refAuthor">Perumal, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Wing, D.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Ravindranath, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Reddy, T.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and M. Thomson</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) Usage for Consent Freshness"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7675</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7675</span>, <time datetime="2015-10" class="refDate">October 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7675</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3604 <dd class="break"></dd>
3605 <dt id="RFC7918">[RFC7918]</dt>
3606 <dd>
3607 <span class="refAuthor">Langley, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Modadugu, N.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and B. Moeller</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Transport Layer Security (TLS) False Start"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7918</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7918</span>, <time datetime="2016-08" class="refDate">August 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7918">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7918</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3608 <dd class="break"></dd>
3609 <dt id="RFC8122">[RFC8122]</dt>
3610 <dd>
3611 <span class="refAuthor">Lennox, J.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and C. Holmberg</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8122</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8122</span>, <time datetime="2017-03" class="refDate">March 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3612 <dd class="break"></dd>
3613 <dt id="RFC8174">[RFC8174]</dt>
3614 <dd>
3615 <span class="refAuthor">Leiba, B.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 14</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8174</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8174</span>, <time datetime="2017-05" class="refDate">May 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3616 <dd class="break"></dd>
3617 <dt id="RFC8259">[RFC8259]</dt>
3618 <dd>
3619 <span class="refAuthor">Bray, T., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The JavaScript Object Notation (JSON) Data Interchange Format"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 90</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8259</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8259</span>, <time datetime="2017-12" class="refDate">December 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8259</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3620 <dd class="break"></dd>
3621 <dt id="RFC8261">[RFC8261]</dt>
3622 <dd>
3623 <span class="refAuthor">Tuexen, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Stewart, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jesup, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and S. Loreto</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Encapsulation of SCTP Packets"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8261</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8261</span>, <time datetime="2017-11" class="refDate">November 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8261</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3624 <dd class="break"></dd>
3625 <dt id="RFC8445">[RFC8445]</dt>
3626 <dd>
3627 <span class="refAuthor">Keranen, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Holmberg, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and J. Rosenberg</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8445</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8445</span>, <time datetime="2018-07" class="refDate">July 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8445">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8445</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3628 <dd class="break"></dd>
3629 <dt id="RFC8446">[RFC8446]</dt>
3630 <dd>
3631 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8446</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8446</span>, <time datetime="2018-08" class="refDate">August 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3632 <dd class="break"></dd>
3633 <dt id="RFC8615">[RFC8615]</dt>
3634 <dd>
3635 <span class="refAuthor">Nottingham, M.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Well-Known Uniform Resource Identifiers (URIs)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8615</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8615</span>, <time datetime="2019-05" class="refDate">May 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8615</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3636 <dd class="break"></dd>
3637 <dt id="RFC8825">[RFC8825]</dt>
3638 <dd>
3639 <span class="refAuthor">Alvestrand, H.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Overview: Real-Time Protocols for Browser-Based Applications"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8825</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8825</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8825">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8825</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3640 <dd class="break"></dd>
3641 <dt id="RFC8826">[RFC8826]</dt>
3642 <dd>
3643 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Security Considerations for WebRTC"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8826</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8826</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8826">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8826</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3644 <dd class="break"></dd>
3645 <dt id="RFC8829">[RFC8829]</dt>
3646 <dd>
3647 <span class="refAuthor">Uberti, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jennings, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Rescorla, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"JavaScript Session Establishment Protocol (JSEP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8829</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8829</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8829">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8829</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3648 <dd class="break"></dd>
3649 <dt id="RFC8834">[RFC8834]</dt>
3650 <dd>
3651 <span class="refAuthor">Perkins, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Westerlund, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and J. Ott</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Media Transport and Use of RTP in WebRTC"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8834</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8834</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8834">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8834</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3652 <dd class="break"></dd>
3653 <dt id="RFC8844">[RFC8844]</dt>
3654 <dd>
3655 <span class="refAuthor">Thomson, M.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and E. Rescorla</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Unknown Key-Share Attacks on Uses of TLS with the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8844</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8844</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8844">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8844</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3656 <dd class="break"></dd>
3657 <dt id="webcrypto">[webcrypto]</dt>
3658 <dd>
3659 <span class="refAuthor">Watson, M.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Web Cryptography API"</span>, <span class="refContent">W3C Recommendation</span>, <time datetime="2017-01-26" class="refDate">26 January 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/REC-WebCryptoAPI-20170126/">https://www.w3.org/TR/2017/REC-WebCryptoAPI-20170126/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3660 <dd class="break"></dd>
3661 <dt id="webrtc-api">[webrtc-api]</dt>
3662 <dd>
3663 <span class="refAuthor">Jennings, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Boström, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and J-I. Bruaroey</span>, <span class="refTitle">"WebRTC 1.0: Real-time Communication Between Browsers"</span>, <span class="refContent">W3C Proposed Recommendation</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/">https://www.w3.org/TR/webrtc/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3664 <dd class="break"></dd>
3665 </dl>
3666 </section>
3667 <section id="section-11.2">
3668 <h3 id="name-informative-references">
3669 <a href="#section-11.2" class="section-number selfRef">11.2. </a><a href="#name-informative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Informative References</a>
3670 </h3>
3671 <dl class="references">
3672 <dt id="fetch">[fetch]</dt>
3673 <dd>
3674 <span class="refAuthor">van Kesteren, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Fetch"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/">https://fetch.spec.whatwg.org/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3675 <dd class="break"></dd>
3676 <dt id="RFC3261">[RFC3261]</dt>
3677 <dd>
3678 <span class="refAuthor">Rosenberg, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Schulzrinne, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Camarillo, G.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Johnston, A.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Peterson, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Sparks, R.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Handley, M.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and E. Schooler</span>, <span class="refTitle">"SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3261</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3261</span>, <time datetime="2002-06" class="refDate">June 2002</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3679 <dd class="break"></dd>
3680 <dt id="RFC5705">[RFC5705]</dt>
3681 <dd>
3682 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Keying Material Exporters for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5705</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5705</span>, <time datetime="2010-03" class="refDate">March 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5705</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3683 <dd class="break"></dd>
3684 <dt id="RFC6120">[RFC6120]</dt>
3685 <dd>
3686 <span class="refAuthor">Saint-Andre, P.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Extensible Messaging and Presence Protocol (XMPP): Core"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6120</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6120</span>, <time datetime="2011-03" class="refDate">March 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6120</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3687 <dd class="break"></dd>
3688 <dt id="RFC6265">[RFC6265]</dt>
3689 <dd>
3690 <span class="refAuthor">Barth, A.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"HTTP State Management Mechanism"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6265</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6265</span>, <time datetime="2011-04" class="refDate">April 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6265</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3691 <dd class="break"></dd>
3692 <dt id="RFC6455">[RFC6455]</dt>
3693 <dd>
3694 <span class="refAuthor">Fette, I.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and A. Melnikov</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The WebSocket Protocol"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6455</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6455</span>, <time datetime="2011-12" class="refDate">December 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6455">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6455</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3695 <dd class="break"></dd>
3696 <dt id="RFC6943">[RFC6943]</dt>
3697 <dd>
3698 <span class="refAuthor">Thaler, D., Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Issues in Identifier Comparison for Security Purposes"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6943</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6943</span>, <time datetime="2013-05" class="refDate">May 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6943">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6943</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3699 <dd class="break"></dd>
3700 <dt id="RFC7617">[RFC7617]</dt>
3701 <dd>
3702 <span class="refAuthor">Reschke, J.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The 'Basic' HTTP Authentication Scheme"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7617</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7617</span>, <time datetime="2015-09" class="refDate">September 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7617</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3703 <dd class="break"></dd>
3704 <dt id="RFC8224">[RFC8224]</dt>
3705 <dd>
3706 <span class="refAuthor">Peterson, J.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Jennings, C.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Rescorla, E.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and C. Wendt</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8224</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8224</span>, <time datetime="2018-02" class="refDate">February 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8224</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3707 <dd class="break"></dd>
3708 <dt id="RFC8828">[RFC8828]</dt>
3709 <dd>
3710 <span class="refAuthor">Uberti, J.</span><span class="refAuthor"> and G. Shieh</span>, <span class="refTitle">"WebRTC IP Address Handling Requirements"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8828</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8828</span>, <time datetime="2021-01" class="refDate">January 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8828">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8828</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3711 <dd class="break"></dd>
3712 <dt id="I-D.ietf-tls-dtls13">[TLS-DTLS13]</dt>
3713 <dd>
3714 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span><span class="refAuthor">, Tschofenig, H.</span><span class="refAuthor">, and N. Modadugu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39</span>, <time datetime="2020-11-02" class="refDate">2 November 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39">https://tools.ietf.org/html/draft-ietf-tls-dtls13-39</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
3715 <dd class="break"></dd>
3716 </dl>
3717 </section>
3718 </section>
3719 <section id="section-appendix.a">
3720 <h2 id="name-acknowledgements">
3721 <a href="#name-acknowledgements" class="section-name selfRef">Acknowledgements</a>
3722 </h2>
3723 <p id="section-appendix.a-1">
3724 <span class="contact-name">Bernard Aboba</span>, <span class="contact-name">Harald Alvestrand</span>, <span class="contact-name">Richard Barnes</span>, <span class="contact-name">Dan Druta</span>, <span class="contact-name">Cullen Jennings</span>, <span class="contact-name">Hadriel Kaplan</span>, <span class="contact-name">Matthew Kaufman</span>, <span class="contact-name">Jim McEachern</span>,
3725 <span class="contact-name">Martin Thomson</span>, <span class="contact-name">Magnus Westerlund</span>. <span class="contact-name">Matthew Kaufman</span> provided the UI material in
3726 <a href="#sec.proposal.comsec" class="xref">Section 6.5</a>. <span class="contact-name">Christer Holmberg</span> provided
3727 the initial version of <a href="#sec.sdp-id-attr-oa" class="xref">Section 5.1</a>.<a href="#section-appendix.a-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
3728 </section>
3729 <div id="authors-addresses">
3730 <section id="section-appendix.b">
3731 <h2 id="name-authors-address">
3732 <a href="#name-authors-address" class="section-name selfRef">Author's Address</a>
3733 </h2>
3734 <address class="vcard">
3735 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Eric Rescorla</span></div>
3736 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="org">Mozilla</span></div>
3737 <div class="email">
3738 <span>Email:</span>
3739 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
3740 </div>
3741 </address>
3742 </section>
3743 </div>
3744 <script>const toc = document.getElementById("toc");
3745 toc.querySelector("h2").addEventListener("click", e => {
3746 toc.classList.toggle("active");
3747 });
3748 toc.querySelector("nav").addEventListener("click", e => {
3749 toc.classList.remove("active");
3750 });
3751 </script>
3752 </body>
3753 </html>