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<pre>Network Working Group E. Nordmark |
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Request for Comments: 4213 Sun Microsystems, Inc. |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc2893">2893</a> R. Gilligan |
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Category: Standards Track Intransa, Inc. |
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October 2005 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers</span> |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). |
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Abstract |
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This document specifies IPv4 compatibility mechanisms that can be |
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implemented by IPv6 hosts and routers. Two mechanisms are specified, |
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dual stack and configured tunneling. Dual stack implies providing |
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complete implementations of both versions of the Internet Protocol |
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(IPv4 and IPv6), and configured tunneling provides a means to carry |
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IPv6 packets over unmodified IPv4 routing infrastructures. |
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This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Terminology ................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Dual IP Layer Operation .........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Address Configuration ......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. DNS ........................................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms .................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Encapsulation ..............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation ...............................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Static Tunnel MTU ...................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Dynamic Tunnel MTU ..................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Hop Limit .................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Handling ICMPv4 Errors ....................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. IPv4 Header Construction ..................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Decapsulation .............................................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Link-Local Addresses ......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels ...........................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing ......................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a> ..........................................<a href="#page-23">23</a> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The key to a successful IPv6 transition is compatibility with the |
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large installed base of IPv4 hosts and routers. Maintaining |
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compatibility with IPv4 while deploying IPv6 will streamline the task |
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of transitioning the Internet to IPv6. This specification defines |
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two mechanisms that IPv6 hosts and routers may implement in order to |
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be compatible with IPv4 hosts and routers. |
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The mechanisms in this document are designed to be employed by IPv6 |
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hosts and routers that need to interoperate with IPv4 hosts and |
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utilize IPv4 routing infrastructures. We expect that most nodes in |
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the Internet will need such compatibility for a long time to come, |
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and perhaps even indefinitely. |
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The mechanisms specified here are: |
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- Dual IP layer (also known as dual stack): A technique for |
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providing complete support for both Internet protocols -- IPv4 and |
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IPv6 -- in hosts and routers. |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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- Configured tunneling of IPv6 over IPv4: A technique for |
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establishing point-to-point tunnels by encapsulating IPv6 packets |
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within IPv4 headers to carry them over IPv4 routing |
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infrastructures. |
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The mechanisms defined here are intended to be the core of a |
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"transition toolbox" -- a growing collection of techniques that |
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implementations and users may employ to ease the transition. The |
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tools may be used as needed. Implementations and sites decide which |
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techniques are appropriate to their specific needs. |
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This document defines the basic set of transition mechanisms, but |
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these are not the only tools available. Additional transition and |
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compatibility mechanisms are specified in other documents. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Terminology</span> |
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The following terms are used in this document: |
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Types of Nodes |
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IPv4-only node: |
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A host or router that implements only IPv4. An IPv4-only node |
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does not understand IPv6. The installed base of IPv4 hosts and |
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routers existing before the transition begins are IPv4-only |
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nodes. |
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IPv6/IPv4 node: |
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A host or router that implements both IPv4 and IPv6. |
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IPv6-only node: |
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A host or router that implements IPv6 and does not implement |
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IPv4. The operation of IPv6-only nodes is not addressed in |
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this memo. |
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IPv6 node: |
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Any host or router that implements IPv6. IPv6/IPv4 and IPv6- |
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only nodes are both IPv6 nodes. |
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IPv4 node: |
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Any host or router that implements IPv4. IPv6/IPv4 and IPv4- |
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only nodes are both IPv4 nodes. |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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Techniques Used in the Transition |
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IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling: |
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The technique of encapsulating IPv6 packets within IPv4 so that |
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they can be carried across IPv4 routing infrastructures. |
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Configured tunneling: |
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IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling where the IPv4 tunnel endpoint |
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address(es) are determined by configuration information on |
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tunnel endpoints. All tunnels are assumed to be bidirectional. |
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The tunnel provides a (virtual) point-to-point link to the IPv6 |
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layer, using the configured IPv4 addresses as the lower-layer |
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endpoint addresses. |
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Other transition mechanisms, including other tunneling mechanisms, |
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are outside the scope of this document. |
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The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, |
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SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this |
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document, are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Dual IP Layer Operation</span> |
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The most straightforward way for IPv6 nodes to remain compatible with |
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IPv4-only nodes is by providing a complete IPv4 implementation. IPv6 |
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nodes that provide complete IPv4 and IPv6 implementations are called |
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"IPv6/IPv4 nodes". IPv6/IPv4 nodes have the ability to send and |
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receive both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. They can directly interoperate |
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with IPv4 nodes using IPv4 packets, and also directly interoperate |
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with IPv6 nodes using IPv6 packets. |
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Even though a node may be equipped to support both protocols, one or |
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the other stack may be disabled for operational reasons. Here we use |
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a rather loose notion of "stack". A stack being enabled has IP |
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addresses assigned, but whether or not any particular application is |
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available on the stacks is explicitly not defined. Thus, IPv6/IPv4 |
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nodes may be operated in one of three modes: |
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- With their IPv4 stack enabled and their IPv6 stack disabled. |
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- With their IPv6 stack enabled and their IPv4 stack disabled. |
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- With both stacks enabled. |
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IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv6 stack disabled will operate like |
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IPv4-only nodes. Similarly, IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv4 stacks |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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disabled will operate like IPv6-only nodes. IPv6/IPv4 nodes MAY |
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provide a configuration switch to disable either their IPv4 or IPv6 |
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stack. |
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The configured tunneling technique, which is described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>, |
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may or may not be used in addition to the dual IP layer operation. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Address Configuration</span> |
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Because the nodes support both protocols, IPv6/IPv4 nodes may be |
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configured with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. IPv6/IPv4 nodes use |
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IPv4 mechanisms (e.g., DHCP) to acquire their IPv4 addresses, and |
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IPv6 protocol mechanisms (e.g., stateless address autoconfiguration |
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[<a href="./rfc2462" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC2462</a>] and/or DHCPv6) to acquire their IPv6 addresses. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. DNS</span> |
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The Domain Naming System (DNS) is used in both IPv4 and IPv6 to map |
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between hostnames and IP addresses. A new resource record type named |
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"AAAA" has been defined for IPv6 addresses [<a href="./rfc3596" title=""DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6"">RFC3596</a>]. Since |
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IPv6/IPv4 nodes must be able to interoperate directly with both IPv4 |
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and IPv6 nodes, they must provide resolver libraries capable of |
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dealing with IPv4 "A" records as well as IPv6 "AAAA" records. Note |
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that the lookup of A versus AAAA records is independent of whether |
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the DNS packets are carried in IPv4 or IPv6 packets and that there is |
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no assumption that the DNS servers know the IPv4/IPv6 capabilities of |
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the requesting node. |
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The issues and operational guidelines for using IPv6 with DNS are |
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described at more length in other documents, e.g., [<a href="#ref-DNSOPV6" title=""Operational Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS"">DNSOPV6</a>]. |
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DNS resolver libraries on IPv6/IPv4 nodes MUST be capable of handling |
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both AAAA and A records. However, when a query locates an AAAA |
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record holding an IPv6 address, and an A record holding an IPv4 |
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address, the resolver library MAY order the results returned to the |
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application in order to influence the version of IP packets used to |
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communicate with that specific node -- IPv6 first, or IPv4 first. |
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The applications SHOULD be able to specify whether they want IPv4, |
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IPv6, or both records [<a href="./rfc3493" title=""Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6"">RFC3493</a>]. That defines which address families |
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the resolver looks up. If there is not an application choice, or if |
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the application has requested both, the resolver library MUST NOT |
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filter out any records. |
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Since most applications try the addresses in the order they are |
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returned by the resolver, this can affect the IP version "preference" |
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of applications. |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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The actual ordering mechanisms are out of scope of this memo. |
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Address selection is described at more length in [<a href="./rfc3484" title=""Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)"">RFC3484</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms</span> |
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In most deployment scenarios, the IPv6 routing infrastructure will be |
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built up over time. While the IPv6 infrastructure is being deployed, |
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the existing IPv4 routing infrastructure can remain functional and |
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can be used to carry IPv6 traffic. Tunneling provides a way to |
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utilize an existing IPv4 routing infrastructure to carry IPv6 |
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traffic. |
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IPv6/IPv4 hosts and routers can tunnel IPv6 datagrams over regions of |
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IPv4 routing topology by encapsulating them within IPv4 packets. |
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Tunneling can be used in a variety of ways: |
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- Router-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 routers interconnected by an IPv4 |
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infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In |
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this case, the tunnel spans one segment of the end-to-end path |
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that the IPv6 packet takes. |
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- Host-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 hosts can tunnel IPv6 packets to an |
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intermediary IPv6/IPv4 router that is reachable via an IPv4 |
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infrastructure. This type of tunnel spans the first segment of |
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the packet's end-to-end path. |
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- Host-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 hosts that are interconnected by an IPv4 |
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infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In |
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this case, the tunnel spans the entire end-to-end path that the |
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packet takes. |
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- Router-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 routers can tunnel IPv6 packets to |
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their final destination IPv6/IPv4 host. This tunnel spans only |
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the last segment of the end-to-end path. |
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Configured tunneling can be used in all of the above cases, but it is |
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most likely to be used router-to-router due to the need to explicitly |
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configure the tunneling endpoints. |
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The underlying mechanisms for tunneling are: |
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- The entry node of the tunnel (the encapsulator) creates an |
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encapsulating IPv4 header and transmits the encapsulated packet. |
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- The exit node of the tunnel (the decapsulator) receives the |
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encapsulated packet, reassembles the packet if needed, removes the |
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IPv4 header, and processes the received IPv6 packet. |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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- The encapsulator may need to maintain soft-state information for |
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each tunnel recording such parameters as the MTU of the tunnel in |
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order to process IPv6 packets forwarded into the tunnel. |
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In configured tunneling, the tunnel endpoint addresses are determined |
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in the encapsulator from configuration information stored for each |
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tunnel. When an IPv6 packet is transmitted over a tunnel, the |
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destination and source addresses for the encapsulating IPv4 header |
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are set as described in <a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>. |
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The determination of which packets to tunnel is usually made by |
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routing information on the encapsulator. This is usually done via a |
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routing table, which directs packets based on their destination |
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address using the prefix mask and match technique. |
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The decapsulator matches the received protocol-41 packets to the |
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tunnels it has configured, and allows only the packets in which IPv4 |
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source addresses match the tunnels configured on the decapsulator. |
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Therefore, the operator must ensure that the tunnel's IPv4 address |
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configuration is the same both at the encapsulator and the |
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decapsulator. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Encapsulation</span> |
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The encapsulation of an IPv6 datagram in IPv4 is shown below: |
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+-------------+ |
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| IPv4 | |
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| Header | |
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+-------------+ +-------------+ |
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| IPv6 | | IPv6 | |
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| Header | | Header | |
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+-------------+ +-------------+ |
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| Transport | | Transport | |
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| Layer | ===> | Layer | |
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| Header | | Header | |
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+-------------+ +-------------+ |
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| | | | |
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~ Data ~ ~ Data ~ |
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| | | | |
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+-------------+ +-------------+ |
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Encapsulating IPv6 in IPv4 |
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<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
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In addition to adding an IPv4 header, the encapsulator also has to |
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handle some more complex issues: |
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- Determine when to fragment and when to report an ICMPv6 "packet |
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too big" error back to the source. |
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- How to reflect ICMPv4 errors from routers along the tunnel path |
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back to the source as ICMPv6 errors. |
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Those issues are discussed in the following sections. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation</span> |
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Naively, the encapsulator could view encapsulation as IPv6 using IPv4 |
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as a link layer with a very large MTU (65535-20 bytes at most; 20 |
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bytes "extra" are needed for the encapsulating IPv4 header). The |
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encapsulator would only need to report ICMPv6 "packet too big" errors |
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back to the source for packets that exceed this MTU. However, such a |
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scheme would be inefficient or non-interoperable for three reasons |
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and therefore MUST NOT be used: |
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|
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1) It would result in more fragmentation than needed. IPv4 layer |
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fragmentation should be avoided due to the performance problems |
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caused by the loss unit being smaller than the retransmission unit |
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[<a href="#ref-KM97" title=""Fragmentation Considered Harmful"">KM97</a>]. |
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2) Any IPv4 fragmentation occurring inside the tunnel, i.e., between |
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the encapsulator and the decapsulator, would have to be |
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reassembled at the tunnel endpoint. For tunnels that terminate at |
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a router, this would require additional memory and other resources |
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to reassemble the IPv4 fragments into a complete IPv6 packet |
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before that packet could be forwarded. |
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3) The encapsulator has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is |
| 427 |
able to defragment such IPv4 packets (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> for |
| 428 |
details), and has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is able |
| 429 |
to handle such a large IPv6 Maximum Receive Unit (MRU). |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
Hence, the encapsulator MUST NOT treat the tunnel as an interface |
| 432 |
with an MTU of 64 kilobytes, but instead either use the fixed static |
| 433 |
MTU or OPTIONAL dynamic MTU determination based on the IPv4 path MTU |
| 434 |
to the tunnel endpoint. |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
If both the mechanisms are implemented, the decision of which to use |
| 437 |
SHOULD be configurable on a per-tunnel endpoint basis. |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Static Tunnel MTU</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
A node using static tunnel MTU treats the tunnel interface as having |
| 452 |
a fixed-interface MTU. By default, the MTU MUST be between 1280 and |
| 453 |
1480 bytes (inclusive), but it SHOULD be 1280 bytes. If the default |
| 454 |
is not 1280 bytes, the implementation MUST have a configuration knob |
| 455 |
that can be used to change the MTU value. |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
A node must be able to accept a fragmented IPv6 packet that, after |
| 458 |
reassembly, is as large as 1500 octets [<a href="./rfc2460" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">RFC2460</a>]. This memo also |
| 459 |
includes requirements (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>) for the amount of IPv4 |
| 460 |
reassembly and IPv6 MRU that MUST be supported by all the |
| 461 |
decapsulators. These ensure correct interoperability with any fixed |
| 462 |
MTUs between 1280 and 1480 bytes. |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
A larger fixed MTU than supported by these requirements must not be |
| 465 |
configured unless it has been administratively ensured that the |
| 466 |
decapsulator can reassemble or receive packets of that size. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
The selection of a good tunnel MTU depends on many factors, at least: |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
- Whether the IPv4 protocol-41 packets will be transported over |
| 471 |
media that may have a lower path MTU (e.g., IPv4 Virtual Private |
| 472 |
Networks); then picking too high a value might lead to IPv4 |
| 473 |
fragmentation. |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
- Whether the tunnel is used to transport IPv6 tunneled packets |
| 476 |
(e.g., a mobile node with an IPv6-in-IPv4 configured tunnel, and |
| 477 |
an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel interface); then picking too low a value |
| 478 |
might lead to IPv6 fragmentation. |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
If layered encapsulation is believed to be present, it may be prudent |
| 481 |
to consider supporting dynamic MTU determination instead as it is |
| 482 |
able to minimize fragmentation and optimize packet sizes. |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
When using the static tunnel MTU, the Don't Fragment bit MUST NOT be |
| 485 |
set in the encapsulating IPv4 header. As a result, the encapsulator |
| 486 |
should not receive any ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages as a result |
| 487 |
of the packets it has encapsulated. |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Dynamic Tunnel MTU</span> |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
The dynamic MTU determination is OPTIONAL. However, if it is |
| 492 |
implemented, it SHOULD have the behavior described in this document. |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
The fragmentation inside the tunnel can be reduced to a minimum by |
| 495 |
having the encapsulator track the IPv4 path MTU across the tunnel, |
| 496 |
using the IPv4 Path MTU Discovery Protocol [<a href="./rfc1191" title=""Path MTU discovery"">RFC1191</a>] and recording |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
the resulting path MTU. The IPv6 layer in the encapsulator can then |
| 506 |
view a tunnel as a link layer with an MTU equal to the IPv4 path MTU, |
| 507 |
minus the size of the encapsulating IPv4 header. |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
Note that this does not eliminate IPv4 fragmentation in the case when |
| 510 |
the IPv4 path MTU would result in an IPv6 MTU less than 1280 bytes. |
| 511 |
(Any link layer used by IPv6 has to have an MTU of at least 1280 |
| 512 |
bytes [<a href="./rfc2460" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">RFC2460</a>].) In this case, the IPv6 layer has to "see" a link |
| 513 |
layer with an MTU of 1280 bytes and the encapsulator has to use IPv4 |
| 514 |
fragmentation in order to forward the 1280 byte IPv6 packets. |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
The encapsulator SHOULD employ the following algorithm to determine |
| 517 |
when to forward an IPv6 packet that is larger than the tunnel's path |
| 518 |
MTU using IPv4 fragmentation, and when to return an ICMPv6 "packet |
| 519 |
too big" message per [<a href="./rfc1981" title=""Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6"">RFC1981</a>]: |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280 |
| 522 |
if packet is larger than 1280 bytes |
| 523 |
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU = 1280. |
| 524 |
Drop packet. |
| 525 |
else |
| 526 |
Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment |
| 527 |
flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4 |
| 528 |
packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer |
| 529 |
on the encapsulator or by some router along |
| 530 |
the IPv4 path. |
| 531 |
endif |
| 532 |
else |
| 533 |
if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20) |
| 534 |
Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with |
| 535 |
MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20). |
| 536 |
Drop packet. |
| 537 |
else |
| 538 |
Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag |
| 539 |
in the IPv4 header. |
| 540 |
endif |
| 541 |
endif |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
Encapsulators that have a large number of tunnels may choose between |
| 544 |
dynamic versus static tunnel MTUs on a per-tunnel endpoint basis. In |
| 545 |
cases where the number of tunnels that any one node is using is |
| 546 |
large, it is helpful to observe that this state information can be |
| 547 |
cached and discarded when not in use. |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
Note that using dynamic tunnel MTU is subject to IPv4 path MTU |
| 550 |
blackholes should the ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages be dropped by |
| 551 |
firewalls or not generated by the routers [RFC1435, <a href="./rfc2923">RFC2923</a>]. |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Hop Limit</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
IPv6-over-IPv4 tunnels are modeled as "single-hop" from the IPv6 |
| 564 |
perspective. The tunnel is opaque to users of the network, and it is |
| 565 |
not detectable by network diagnostic tools such as traceroute. |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
The single-hop model is implemented by having the encapsulators and |
| 568 |
decapsulators process the IPv6 hop limit field as they would if they |
| 569 |
were forwarding a packet on to any other datalink. That is, they |
| 570 |
decrement the hop limit by 1 when forwarding an IPv6 packet. (The |
| 571 |
originating node and final destination do not decrement the hop |
| 572 |
limit.) |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
The TTL of the encapsulating IPv4 header is selected in an |
| 575 |
implementation-dependent manner. The current suggested value is |
| 576 |
published in the "Assigned Numbers" RFC [<a href="./rfc3232" title=""Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by an On-line Database"">RFC3232</a>][ASSIGNED]. |
| 577 |
Implementations MAY provide a mechanism to allow the administrator to |
| 578 |
configure the IPv4 TTL as the IP Tunnel MIB [<a href="./rfc4087" title=""IP Tunnel MIB"">RFC4087</a>]. |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Handling ICMPv4 Errors</span> |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
In response to encapsulated packets it has sent into the tunnel, the |
| 583 |
encapsulator might receive ICMPv4 error messages from IPv4 routers |
| 584 |
inside the tunnel. These packets are addressed to the encapsulator |
| 585 |
because it is the IPv4 source of the encapsulated packet. |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic MTU |
| 588 |
determination, even though the functions could be used with static |
| 589 |
MTU tunnels as well. |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
The ICMPv4 "packet too big" error messages are handled according to |
| 592 |
IPv4 Path MTU Discovery [<a href="./rfc1191" title=""Path MTU discovery"">RFC1191</a>] and the resulting path MTU is |
| 593 |
recorded in the IPv4 layer. The recorded path MTU is used by IPv6 to |
| 594 |
determine if an ICMPv6 "packet too big" error has to be generated as |
| 595 |
described in <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section 3.2.2</a>. |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
The handling of other types of ICMPv4 error messages depends on how |
| 598 |
much information is available from the encapsulated packet that |
| 599 |
caused the error. |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
Many older IPv4 routers return only 8 bytes of data beyond the IPv4 |
| 602 |
header of the packet in error, which is not enough to include the |
| 603 |
address fields of the IPv6 header. More modern IPv4 routers are |
| 604 |
likely to return enough data beyond the IPv4 header to include the |
| 605 |
entire IPv6 header and possibly even the data beyond that. See |
| 606 |
[<a href="./rfc1812" title=""Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers"">RFC1812</a>]. |
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
If sufficient data bytes from the offending packet are available, the |
| 618 |
encapsulator MAY extract the encapsulated IPv6 packet and use it to |
| 619 |
generate an ICMPv6 message directed back to the originating IPv6 |
| 620 |
node, as shown below: |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
+--------------+ |
| 623 |
| IPv4 Header | |
| 624 |
| dst = encaps | |
| 625 |
| node | |
| 626 |
+--------------+ |
| 627 |
| ICMPv4 | |
| 628 |
| Header | |
| 629 |
- - +--------------+ |
| 630 |
| IPv4 Header | |
| 631 |
| src = encaps | |
| 632 |
IPv4 | node | |
| 633 |
+--------------+ - - |
| 634 |
Packet | IPv6 | |
| 635 |
| Header | Original IPv6 |
| 636 |
in +--------------+ Packet - |
| 637 |
| Transport | Can be used to |
| 638 |
Error | Header | generate an |
| 639 |
+--------------+ ICMPv6 |
| 640 |
| | error message |
| 641 |
~ Data ~ back to the source. |
| 642 |
| | |
| 643 |
- - +--------------+ - - |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
ICMPv4 Error Message Returned to Encapsulating Node |
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
When receiving ICMPv4 errors as above and the errors are not "packet |
| 648 |
too big", it would be useful to log the error as an error related to |
| 649 |
the tunnel. Also, if sufficient headers are available, then the |
| 650 |
originating node MAY send an ICMPv6 error of type "unreachable" with |
| 651 |
code "address unreachable" to the IPv6 source. (The "address |
| 652 |
unreachable" code is appropriate since, from the perspective of IPv6, |
| 653 |
the tunnel is a link and that code is used for link-specific errors |
| 654 |
[<a href="./rfc2463" title=""Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">RFC2463</a>]). |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
Note that when the IPv4 path MTU is exceeded, and sufficient bytes of |
| 657 |
payload associated with the ICMPv4 errors are not available, or |
| 658 |
ICMPv4 errors do not cause the generation of ICMPv6 errors in case |
| 659 |
there is enough payload, there will be at least two packet drops |
| 660 |
instead of at least one (the case of a single layer of MTU |
| 661 |
discovery). Consider a case where an IPv6 host is connected to an |
| 662 |
IPv4/IPv6 router, which is connected to a network where an ICMPv4 |
| 663 |
error about too big packet size is generated. First, the router |
| 664 |
needs to learn the tunnel (IPv4) MTU that causes at least one packet |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
loss, and then the host needs to learn the (IPv6) MTU from the router |
| 674 |
that causes at least one packet loss. Still, in all cases there can |
| 675 |
be more than one packet loss if there are multiple large packets in |
| 676 |
flight at the same time. |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. IPv4 Header Construction</span> |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
When encapsulating an IPv6 packet in an IPv4 datagram, the IPv4 |
| 681 |
header fields are set as follows: |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
Version: |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
4 |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
IP Header Length in 32-bit words: |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
5 (There are no IPv4 options in the encapsulating header.) |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
Type of Service: |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
0 unless otherwise specified. (See [<a href="./rfc2983" title=""Differentiated Services and Tunnels"">RFC2983</a>] and <a href="./rfc3168#section-9.1">[RFC3168] |
| 694 |
Section 9.1</a> for issues relating to the Type-of-Service byte and |
| 695 |
tunneling.) |
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
Total Length: |
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
Payload length from IPv6 header plus length of IPv6 and IPv4 |
| 700 |
headers (i.e., IPv6 payload length plus a constant 60 bytes). |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
Identification: |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
Generated uniquely as for any IPv4 packet transmitted by the |
| 705 |
system. |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
Flags: |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
Set the Don't Fragment (DF) flag as specified in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>. |
| 710 |
Set the More Fragments (MF) bit as necessary if fragmenting. |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
Fragment Offset: |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
Set as necessary if fragmenting. |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
Time to Live: |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
Set in an implementation-specific manner, as described in |
| 719 |
<a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>. |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
Protocol: |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
41 (Assigned payload type number for IPv6). |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
Header Checksum: |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
Calculate the checksum of the IPv4 header [<a href="./rfc791" title=""Internet Protocol"">RFC791</a>]. |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
Source Address: |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
An IPv4 address of the encapsulator: either configured by the |
| 740 |
administrator or an address of the outgoing interface. |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
Destination Address: |
| 743 |
|
| 744 |
IPv4 address of the tunnel endpoint. |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
When encapsulating the packets, the node must ensure that it will use |
| 747 |
the correct source address so that the packets are acceptable to the |
| 748 |
decapsulator as described in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>. Configuring the source |
| 749 |
address is appropriate particularly in cases in which automatic |
| 750 |
selection of source address may produce different results in a |
| 751 |
certain period of time. This is often the case with multiple |
| 752 |
addresses, and multiple interfaces, or when routes may change |
| 753 |
frequently. Therefore, it SHOULD be possible to administratively |
| 754 |
specify the source address of a tunnel. |
| 755 |
|
| 756 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Decapsulation</span> |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
When an IPv6/IPv4 host or a router receives an IPv4 datagram that is |
| 759 |
addressed to one of its own IPv4 addresses or a joined multicast |
| 760 |
group address, and the value of the protocol field is 41, the packet |
| 761 |
is potentially a tunnel packet and needs to be verified to belong to |
| 762 |
one of the configured tunnel interfaces (by checking |
| 763 |
source/destination addresses), reassembled (if fragmented at the IPv4 |
| 764 |
level), and have the IPv4 header removed and the resulting IPv6 |
| 765 |
datagram be submitted to the IPv6 layer code on the node. |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
The decapsulator MUST verify that the tunnel source address is |
| 768 |
correct before further processing packets, to mitigate the problems |
| 769 |
with address spoofing (see <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). This check also applies to |
| 770 |
packets that are delivered to transport protocols on the |
| 771 |
decapsulator. This is done by verifying that the source address is |
| 772 |
the IPv4 address of the encapsulator, as configured on the |
| 773 |
decapsulator. Packets for which the IPv4 source address does not |
| 774 |
match MUST be discarded and an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated; |
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
however, if the implementation normally sends an ICMP message when |
| 786 |
receiving an unknown protocol packet, such an error message MAY be |
| 787 |
sent (e.g., ICMPv4 Protocol 41 Unreachable). |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
A side effect of this address verification is that the node will |
| 790 |
silently discard packets with a wrong source address and packets that |
| 791 |
were received by the node but not directly addressed to it (e.g., |
| 792 |
broadcast addresses). |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
Independent of any other forms of IPv4 ingress filtering the |
| 795 |
administrator of the node may have configured, the implementation MAY |
| 796 |
perform ingress filtering, i.e., check that the packet is arriving |
| 797 |
from the interface in the direction of the route toward the tunnel |
| 798 |
end-point, similar to a Strict Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check |
| 799 |
[<a href="./rfc3704" title=""Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks"">RFC3704</a>]. As this may cause problems on tunnels that are routed |
| 800 |
through multiple links, it is RECOMMENDED that this check, if done, |
| 801 |
is disabled by default. The packets caught by this check SHOULD be |
| 802 |
discarded; an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated by default. |
| 803 |
|
| 804 |
The decapsulator MUST be capable of having, on the tunnel interfaces, |
| 805 |
an IPv6 MRU of at least the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest |
| 806 |
(IPv6) interface MTU on the decapsulator. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
The decapsulator MUST be capable of reassembling an IPv4 packet that |
| 809 |
is (after the reassembly) the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest |
| 810 |
(IPv4) interface MTU on the decapsulator. The 1500-byte number is a |
| 811 |
result of encapsulators that use the static MTU scheme in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section</a> |
| 812 |
<a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>, while encapsulators that use the dynamic scheme in <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section</a> |
| 813 |
<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> can cause up to the largest interface MTU on the decapsulator |
| 814 |
to be received. (Note that it is strictly the interface MTU on the |
| 815 |
last IPv4 router *before* the decapsulator that matters, but for most |
| 816 |
links the MTU is the same between all neighbors.) |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
This reassembly limit allows dynamic tunnel MTU determination by the |
| 819 |
encapsulator to take advantage of larger IPv4 path MTUs. An |
| 820 |
implementation MAY have a configuration knob that can be used to set |
| 821 |
a larger value of the tunnel reassembly buffers than the above |
| 822 |
number, but it MUST NOT be set below the above number. |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
The decapsulation is shown below: |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
+-------------+ |
| 844 |
| IPv4 | |
| 845 |
| Header | |
| 846 |
+-------------+ +-------------+ |
| 847 |
| IPv6 | | IPv6 | |
| 848 |
| Header | | Header | |
| 849 |
+-------------+ +-------------+ |
| 850 |
| Transport | | Transport | |
| 851 |
| Layer | ===> | Layer | |
| 852 |
| Header | | Header | |
| 853 |
+-------------+ +-------------+ |
| 854 |
| | | | |
| 855 |
~ Data ~ ~ Data ~ |
| 856 |
| | | | |
| 857 |
+-------------+ +-------------+ |
| 858 |
|
| 859 |
Decapsulating IPv6 from IPv4 |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
The decapsulator performs IPv4 reassembly before decapsulating the |
| 862 |
IPv6 packet. |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
When decapsulating the packet, the IPv6 header is not modified. |
| 865 |
(However, see [<a href="./rfc2983" title=""Differentiated Services and Tunnels"">RFC2983</a>] and <a href="./rfc3168#section-9.1">[RFC3168] section 9.1</a> for issues relating |
| 866 |
to the Type of Service byte and tunneling.) If the packet is |
| 867 |
subsequently forwarded, its hop limit is decremented by one. |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
The encapsulating IPv4 header is discarded, and the resulting packet |
| 870 |
is checked for validity when submitted to the IPv6 layer. When |
| 871 |
reconstructing the IPv6 packet, the length MUST be determined from |
| 872 |
the IPv6 payload length since the IPv4 packet might be padded (thus |
| 873 |
have a length that is larger than the IPv6 packet plus the IPv4 |
| 874 |
header being removed). |
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
After the decapsulation, the node MUST silently discard a packet with |
| 877 |
an invalid IPv6 source address. The list of invalid source addresses |
| 878 |
SHOULD include at least: |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
- all multicast addresses (FF00::/8) |
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
- the loopback address (::1) |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
- all the IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses [<a href="./rfc3513" title=""Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture"">RFC3513</a>] (::/96), |
| 885 |
excluding the unspecified address for Duplicate Address Detection |
| 886 |
(::/128) |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
- all the IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96) |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
In addition, the node should be configured to perform ingress |
| 898 |
filtering [<a href="./rfc2827" title=""Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing"">RFC2827</a>][RFC3704] on the IPv6 source address, similar to |
| 899 |
on any of its interfaces, e.g.: |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
1) if the tunnel is toward the Internet, the node should be |
| 902 |
configured to check that the site's IPv6 prefixes are not used as |
| 903 |
the source addresses, or |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
2) if the tunnel is toward an edge network, the node should be |
| 906 |
configured to check that the source address belongs to that edge |
| 907 |
network. |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
The prefix lists in the former typically need to be manually |
| 910 |
configured; the latter could be verified automatically, e.g., by |
| 911 |
using a strict unicast RPF check, as long as an interface can be |
| 912 |
designated to be toward an edge. |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
It is RECOMMENDED that the implementations provide a single knob to |
| 915 |
make it easier to for the administrators to enable strict ingress |
| 916 |
filtering toward edge networks. |
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Link-Local Addresses</span> |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
The configured tunnels are IPv6 interfaces (over the IPv4 "link |
| 921 |
layer") and thus MUST have link-local addresses. The link-local |
| 922 |
addresses are used by, e.g., routing protocols operating over the |
| 923 |
tunnels. |
| 924 |
|
| 925 |
The interface identifier [<a href="./rfc3513" title=""Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture"">RFC3513</a>] for such an interface may be based |
| 926 |
on the 32-bit IPv4 address of an underlying interface, or formed |
| 927 |
using some other means, as long as it is unique from the other tunnel |
| 928 |
endpoint with a reasonably high probability. |
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
Note that it may be desirable to form the link-local address in a |
| 931 |
fashion that minimizes the probability and the effect of having to |
| 932 |
renumber the link-local address in the event of a topology or |
| 933 |
hardware change. |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
If an IPv4 address is used for forming the IPv6 link-local address, |
| 936 |
the interface identifier is the IPv4 address, prepended by zeros. |
| 937 |
Note that the "Universal/Local" bit is zero, indicating that the |
| 938 |
interface identifier is not globally unique. The link-local address |
| 939 |
is formed by appending the interface identifier to the prefix |
| 940 |
FE80::/64. |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
When the host has more than one IPv4 address in use on the physical |
| 943 |
interface concerned, a choice of one of these IPv4 addresses is made |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
by the administrator or the implementation when forming the link- |
| 954 |
local address. |
| 955 |
|
| 956 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+ |
| 957 |
| FE 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 | |
| 958 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+ |
| 959 |
| 00 00 00 00 | IPv4 Address | |
| 960 |
+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+ |
| 961 |
|
| 962 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels</span> |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
Configured tunnel implementations MUST at least accept and respond to |
| 965 |
the probe packets used by Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD) |
| 966 |
[<a href="./rfc2461" title=""Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)"">RFC2461</a>]. The implementations SHOULD also send NUD probe packets to |
| 967 |
detect when the configured tunnel fails at which point the |
| 968 |
implementation can use an alternate path to reach the destination. |
| 969 |
Note that Neighbor Discovery allows that the sending of NUD probes be |
| 970 |
omitted for router-to-router links if the routing protocol tracks |
| 971 |
bidirectional reachability. |
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
For the purposes of Neighbor Discovery, the configured tunnels |
| 974 |
specified in this document are assumed to NOT have a link-layer |
| 975 |
address, even though the link-layer (IPv4) does have an address. |
| 976 |
This means that: |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
- the sender of Neighbor Discovery packets SHOULD NOT include Source |
| 979 |
Link Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options on |
| 980 |
the tunnel link. |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
- the receiver MUST, while otherwise processing the Neighbor |
| 983 |
Discovery packet, silently ignore the content of any Source Link |
| 984 |
Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options |
| 985 |
received on the tunnel link. |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
Not using link-layer address options is consistent with how Neighbor |
| 988 |
Discovery is used on other point-to-point links. |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing</span> |
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
The specification above contains rules that apply tunnel source |
| 993 |
address verification in particular and ingress filtering |
| 994 |
[<a href="./rfc2827" title=""Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing"">RFC2827</a>][RFC3704] in general to packets before they are |
| 995 |
decapsulated. When IP-in-IP tunneling (independent of IP versions) |
| 996 |
is used, it is important that this not be used to bypass any ingress |
| 997 |
filtering in use for non-tunneled packets. Thus, the rules in this |
| 998 |
document are derived based on should ingress filtering be used for |
| 999 |
IPv4 and IPv6, the use of tunneling should not provide an easy way to |
| 1000 |
circumvent the filtering. |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
In this case, without specific ingress filtering checks in the |
| 1010 |
decapsulator, it would be possible for an attacker to inject a packet |
| 1011 |
with: |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
- Outer IPv4 source: real IPv4 address of attacker |
| 1014 |
|
| 1015 |
- Outer IPv4 destination: IPv4 address of decapsulator |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
- Inner IPv6 source: Alice, which is either the decapsulator or a |
| 1018 |
node close to it |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
- Inner IPv6 destination: Bob |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
Even if all IPv4 routers between the attacker and the decapsulator |
| 1023 |
implement IPv4 ingress filtering, and all IPv6 routers between the |
| 1024 |
decapsulator and Bob implement IPv6 ingress filtering, the above |
| 1025 |
spoofed packets will not be filtered out. As a result, Bob will |
| 1026 |
receive a packet that looks like it was sent from Alice even though |
| 1027 |
the sender was some unrelated node. |
| 1028 |
|
| 1029 |
The solution to this is to have the decapsulator accept only |
| 1030 |
encapsulated packets from the explicitly configured source address |
| 1031 |
(i.e., the other end of the tunnel) as specified in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>. |
| 1032 |
While this does not provide complete protection in the case ingress |
| 1033 |
filtering has not been deployed, it does provide a significant |
| 1034 |
increase in security. The issue and the remainder threats are |
| 1035 |
discussed at more length in Security Considerations. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 1038 |
|
| 1039 |
Generic security considerations of using IPv6 are discussed in a |
| 1040 |
separate document [<a href="#ref-V6SEC" title=""IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security Considerations"">V6SEC</a>]. |
| 1041 |
|
| 1042 |
An implementation of tunneling needs to be aware that although a |
| 1043 |
tunnel is a link (as defined in [<a href="./rfc2460" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">RFC2460</a>]), the threat model for a |
| 1044 |
tunnel might be rather different than for other links, since the |
| 1045 |
tunnel potentially includes all of the Internet. |
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
Several mechanisms (e.g., Neighbor Discovery) depend on Hop Count |
| 1048 |
being 255 and/or the addresses being link local for ensuring that a |
| 1049 |
packet originated on-link, in a semi-trusted environment. Tunnels |
| 1050 |
are more vulnerable to a breach of this assumption than physical |
| 1051 |
links, as an attacker anywhere in the Internet can send an IPv6-in- |
| 1052 |
IPv4 packet to the tunnel decapsulator, causing injection of an |
| 1053 |
encapsulted IPv6 packet to the configured tunnel interface unless the |
| 1054 |
decapsulation checks are able to discard packets injected in such a |
| 1055 |
manner. |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
Therefore, this memo specifies that the decapsulators make these |
| 1066 |
steps (as described in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>) to mitigate this threat: |
| 1067 |
|
| 1068 |
- IPv4 source address of the packet MUST be the same as configured |
| 1069 |
for the tunnel end-point; |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
- Independent of any IPv4 ingress filtering the administrator may |
| 1072 |
have configured, the implementation MAY perform IPv4 ingress |
| 1073 |
filtering to check that the IPv4 packets are received from an |
| 1074 |
expected interface (but as this may cause some problems, it may be |
| 1075 |
disabled by default); |
| 1076 |
|
| 1077 |
- IPv6 packets with several, obviously invalid IPv6 source addresses |
| 1078 |
received from the tunnel MUST be discarded (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> for |
| 1079 |
details); and |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
- IPv6 ingress filtering should be performed (typically requiring |
| 1082 |
configuration from the operator), to check that the tunneled IPv6 |
| 1083 |
packets are received from an expected interface. |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
Especially the first verification is vital: to avoid this check, the |
| 1086 |
attacker must be able to know the source of the tunnel (ranging from |
| 1087 |
difficult to predictable) and be able to spoof it (easier). |
| 1088 |
|
| 1089 |
If the remainder threats of tunnel source verification are considered |
| 1090 |
to be significant, a tunneling scheme with authentication should be |
| 1091 |
used instead, e.g., IPsec [<a href="./rfc2401" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">RFC2401</a>] (preferable) or Generic Routing |
| 1092 |
Encapsulation with a pre-configured secret key [<a href="./rfc2890" title=""Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE"">RFC2890</a>]. As the |
| 1093 |
configured tunnels are set up more or less manually, setting up the |
| 1094 |
keying material is probably not a problem. However, setting up |
| 1095 |
secure IPsec IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels is described in another document |
| 1096 |
[<a href="#ref-V64IPSEC" title=""Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-over- IPv4 Tunnels"">V64IPSEC</a>]. |
| 1097 |
|
| 1098 |
If the tunneling is done inside an administrative domain, proper |
| 1099 |
ingress filtering at the edge of the domain can also eliminate the |
| 1100 |
threat from outside of the domain. Therefore, shorter tunnels are |
| 1101 |
preferable to longer ones, possibly spanning the whole Internet. |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
In addition, an implementation MUST treat interfaces to different |
| 1104 |
links as separate, e.g., to ensure that Neighbor Discovery packets |
| 1105 |
arriving on one link do not affect other links. This is especially |
| 1106 |
important for tunnel links. |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
When dropping packets due to failing to match the allowed IPv4 source |
| 1109 |
addresses for a tunnel the node should not "acknowledge" the |
| 1110 |
existence of a tunnel, otherwise this could be used to probe the |
| 1111 |
acceptable tunnel endpoint addresses. For that reason, the |
| 1112 |
specification says that such packets MUST be discarded, and an ICMP |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
error message SHOULD NOT be generated, unless the implementation |
| 1122 |
normally sends ICMP destination unreachable messages for unknown |
| 1123 |
protocols; in such a case, the same code MAY be sent. As should be |
| 1124 |
obvious, not returning the same ICMP code if an error is returned for |
| 1125 |
other protocols may hint that the IPv6 stack (or the protocol 41 |
| 1126 |
tunneling processing) has been enabled -- the behaviour should be |
| 1127 |
consistent on how the implementation otherwise behaves to be |
| 1128 |
transparent to probing. |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
We would like to thank the members of the IPv6 working group, the |
| 1133 |
Next Generation Transition (ngtrans) working group, and the v6ops |
| 1134 |
working group for their many contributions and extensive review of |
| 1135 |
this document. Special thanks are due to (in alphabetical order) Jim |
| 1136 |
Bound, Ross Callon, Tim Chown, Alex Conta, Bob Hinden, Bill Manning, |
| 1137 |
John Moy, Mohan Parthasarathy, Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Fred |
| 1138 |
Templin for many helpful suggestions. Pekka Savola helped in editing |
| 1139 |
the final revisions of the specification. |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span> |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 1144 |
|
| 1145 |
[<a id="ref-RFC791">RFC791</a>] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>, September |
| 1146 |
1981. |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1191">RFC1191</a>] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>, |
| 1149 |
November 1990. |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1981">RFC1981</a>] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery |
| 1152 |
for IP version 6", <a href="./rfc1981">RFC 1981</a>, August 1996. |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1155 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2460">RFC2460</a>] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 |
| 1158 |
(IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>, December 1998. |
| 1159 |
|
| 1160 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2463">RFC2463</a>] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message |
| 1161 |
Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 |
| 1162 |
(IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc2463">RFC 2463</a>, December 1998. |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
[<a id="ref-ASSIGNED">ASSIGNED</a>] IANA, "Assigned numbers online database", |
| 1167 |
<a href="http://www.iana.org/numbers.html">http://www.iana.org/numbers.html</a> |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
[<a id="ref-DNSOPV6">DNSOPV6</a>] Durand, A., Ihren, J., and Savola P., "Operational |
| 1178 |
Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS", Work in |
| 1179 |
Progress, October 2004. |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
[<a id="ref-KM97">KM97</a>] Kent, C., and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered |
| 1182 |
Harmful". In Proc. SIGCOMM '87 Workshop on Frontiers in |
| 1183 |
Computer Communications Technology. August 1987. |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
[<a id="ref-V6SEC">V6SEC</a>] Savola, P., "IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security |
| 1186 |
Considerations", Work in Progress, October 2004. |
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
[<a id="ref-V64IPSEC">V64IPSEC</a>] Graveman, R., et al., "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-over- |
| 1189 |
IPv4 Tunnels", Work in Progress, December 2004. |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1435">RFC1435</a>] Knowles, S., "IESG Advice from Experience with Path MTU |
| 1192 |
Discovery", <a href="./rfc1435">RFC 1435</a>, March 1993. |
| 1193 |
|
| 1194 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1812">RFC1812</a>] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", <a href="./rfc1812">RFC</a> |
| 1195 |
<a href="./rfc1812">1812</a>, June 1995. |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2401">RFC2401</a>] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the |
| 1198 |
Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998. |
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2461">RFC2461</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor |
| 1201 |
Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc2461">RFC 2461</a>, December |
| 1202 |
1998. |
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2462">RFC2462</a>] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address |
| 1205 |
Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc2462">RFC 2462</a>, December 1998. |
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2827">RFC2827</a>] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: |
| 1208 |
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source |
| 1209 |
Address Spoofing", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp38">BCP 38</a>, <a href="./rfc2827">RFC 2827</a>, May 2000. |
| 1210 |
|
| 1211 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2890">RFC2890</a>] Dommety, G., "Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE", |
| 1212 |
<a href="./rfc2890">RFC 2890</a>, September 2000. |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2923">RFC2923</a>] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery", <a href="./rfc2923">RFC</a> |
| 1215 |
<a href="./rfc2923">2923</a>, September 2000. |
| 1216 |
|
| 1217 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2983">RFC2983</a>] Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels", <a href="./rfc2983">RFC</a> |
| 1218 |
<a href="./rfc2983">2983</a>, October 2000. |
| 1219 |
|
| 1220 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3056">RFC3056</a>] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains |
| 1221 |
via IPv4 Clouds", <a href="./rfc3056">RFC 3056</a>, February 2001. |
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3168">RFC3168</a>] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition |
| 1234 |
of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", <a href="./rfc3168">RFC</a> |
| 1235 |
<a href="./rfc3168">3168</a>, September 2001. |
| 1236 |
|
| 1237 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3232">RFC3232</a>] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: <a href="./rfc1700">RFC 1700</a> is Replaced by |
| 1238 |
an On-line Database", <a href="./rfc3232">RFC 3232</a>, January 2002. |
| 1239 |
|
| 1240 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3484">RFC3484</a>] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet |
| 1241 |
Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc3484">RFC 3484</a>, February 2003. |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3493">RFC3493</a>] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W. |
| 1244 |
Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", <a href="./rfc3493">RFC</a> |
| 1245 |
<a href="./rfc3493">3493</a>, February 2003. |
| 1246 |
|
| 1247 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3513">RFC3513</a>] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6 |
| 1248 |
(IPv6) Addressing Architecture", <a href="./rfc3513">RFC 3513</a>, April 2003. |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3596">RFC3596</a>] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi, |
| 1251 |
"DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", <a href="./rfc3596">RFC 3596</a>, |
| 1252 |
October 2003. |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3704">RFC3704</a>] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed |
| 1255 |
Networks", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp84">BCP 84</a>, <a href="./rfc3704">RFC 3704</a>, March 2004. |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4087">RFC4087</a>] Thaler, D., "IP Tunnel MIB", <a href="./rfc4087">RFC 4087</a>, June 2005. |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a></span> |
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
The motivation for the bulk of these changes are to simplify the |
| 1262 |
document to only contain the mechanisms of wide-spread use. |
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
<a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a> contains a mechanism called automatic tunneling. But a much |
| 1265 |
more general mechanism is specified in <a href="./rfc3056">RFC 3056</a> [<a href="./rfc3056" title=""Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds"">RFC3056</a>] which gives |
| 1266 |
each node with a (global) IPv4 address a /48 IPv6 prefix i.e., enough |
| 1267 |
for a whole site. |
| 1268 |
|
| 1269 |
The following changes have been performed since <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a>: |
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
- Removed references to A6 and retained AAAA. |
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 |
- Removed automatic tunneling and use of IPv4-compatible addresses. |
| 1274 |
|
| 1275 |
- Removed default Configured Tunnel using IPv4 "Anycast Address" |
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 |
- Removed Source Address Selection section since this is now covered |
| 1278 |
by another document ([<a href="./rfc3484" title=""Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)"">RFC3484</a>]). |
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
- Removed brief mention of 6over4. |
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
- Split into normative and non-normative references and other |
| 1290 |
reference cleanup. |
| 1291 |
|
| 1292 |
- Dropped "or equal" in if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than or |
| 1293 |
equal to 1280. |
| 1294 |
|
| 1295 |
- Dropped this: However, IPv6 may be used in some environments where |
| 1296 |
interoperability with IPv4 is not required. IPv6 nodes that are |
| 1297 |
designed to be used in such environments need not use or even |
| 1298 |
implement these mechanisms. |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
- Described Static MTU and Dynamic MTU cases separately; clarified |
| 1301 |
that the dynamic path MTU mechanism is OPTIONAL but if it is |
| 1302 |
implemented it should follow the rules in <a href="#section-3.2.2">section 3.2.2</a>. |
| 1303 |
|
| 1304 |
- Specified Static MTU to default to a MTU of 1280 to 1480 bytes, |
| 1305 |
and that this may be configurable. Discussed the issues with |
| 1306 |
using Static MTU at more length. |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
- Specified minimal rules for IPv4 reassembly and IPv6 MRU to |
| 1309 |
enhance interoperability and to minimize blacholes. |
| 1310 |
|
| 1311 |
- Restated the "currently underway" language about Type-of-Service, |
| 1312 |
and loosely point at [<a href="./rfc2983" title=""Differentiated Services and Tunnels"">RFC2983</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3168" title=""The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP"">RFC3168</a>]. |
| 1313 |
|
| 1314 |
- Fixed reference to Assigned Numbers to be to online version (with |
| 1315 |
proper pointer to "Assigned Numbers is obsolete" RFC). |
| 1316 |
|
| 1317 |
- Clarified text about ingress filtering e.g., that it applies to |
| 1318 |
packet delivered to transport protocols on the decapsulator as |
| 1319 |
well as packets being forwarded by the decapsulator, and how the |
| 1320 |
decapsulator's checks help when IPv4 and IPv6 ingress filtering is |
| 1321 |
in place. |
| 1322 |
|
| 1323 |
- Removed unidirectional tunneling; assume all tunnels are |
| 1324 |
bidirectional, between endpoint addresses (not nodes). |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
- Removed the guidelines for advertising addresses in DNS as |
| 1327 |
slightly out of scope, referring to another document for the |
| 1328 |
details. |
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
- Removed the SHOULD requirement that the link-local addresses |
| 1331 |
should be formed based on IPv4 addresses. |
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
- Added a SHOULD for implementing a knob to be able to set the |
| 1346 |
source address of the tunnel, and add discussion why this is |
| 1347 |
useful. |
| 1348 |
|
| 1349 |
- Added stronger wording for source address checks: both IPv4 and |
| 1350 |
IPv6 source addresses MUST be checked, and RPF-like ingress |
| 1351 |
filtering is optional. |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
- Rewrote security considerations to be more precise about the |
| 1354 |
threats of tunneling. |
| 1355 |
|
| 1356 |
- Added a note about considering using TTL=255 when encapsulating. |
| 1357 |
|
| 1358 |
- Added more discussion in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a> why using an "infinite" IPv6 |
| 1359 |
MTU leads to likely interoperability problems. |
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 |
- Added an explicit requirement that if both MTU determination |
| 1362 |
methods are used, choosing one should be possible on a per-tunnel |
| 1363 |
basis. |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
- Clarified that ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic |
| 1366 |
MTU determination. |
| 1367 |
|
| 1368 |
- Removed/clarified DNS record filtering; an API is a SHOULD and if |
| 1369 |
it does not exist, MUST NOT filter anything. Decree ordering out |
| 1370 |
of scope, but refer to <a href="./rfc3484">RFC3484</a>. |
| 1371 |
|
| 1372 |
- Add a note that the destination IPv4 address could also be a |
| 1373 |
multicast address. |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
- Make it RECOMMENDED to provide a toggle to perform strict ingress |
| 1376 |
filtering on an interface. |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
- Generalize the text on the data in ICMPv4 messages. |
| 1379 |
|
| 1380 |
- Made a lot of miscellaneous editorial cleanups. |
| 1381 |
|
| 1382 |
|
| 1383 |
|
| 1384 |
|
| 1385 |
|
| 1386 |
|
| 1387 |
|
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 |
|
| 1391 |
|
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1402 |
|
| 1403 |
Erik Nordmark |
| 1404 |
Sun Microsystems |
| 1405 |
17 Network Circle |
| 1406 |
Menlo Park, CA 94025 |
| 1407 |
USA |
| 1408 |
|
| 1409 |
Phone: +1 650 786 2921 |
| 1410 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1411 |
|
| 1412 |
|
| 1413 |
Robert E. Gilligan |
| 1414 |
Intransa, Inc. |
| 1415 |
2870 Zanker Rd., Suite 100 |
| 1416 |
San Jose, CA 95134 USA |
| 1417 |
|
| 1418 |
Phone : +1 408 678 8600 |
| 1419 |
Fax : +1 408 678 8800 |
| 1420 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1421 |
|
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
|
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
|
| 1427 |
|
| 1428 |
|
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
|
| 1431 |
|
| 1432 |
|
| 1433 |
|
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 |
|
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
|
| 1438 |
|
| 1439 |
|
| 1440 |
|
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
|
| 1443 |
|
| 1444 |
|
| 1445 |
|
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 1458 |
|
| 1459 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). |
| 1460 |
|
| 1461 |
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions |
| 1462 |
contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors |
| 1463 |
retain all their rights. |
| 1464 |
|
| 1465 |
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an |
| 1466 |
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS |
| 1467 |
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET |
| 1468 |
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, |
| 1469 |
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE |
| 1470 |
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED |
| 1471 |
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 1472 |
|
| 1473 |
Intellectual Property |
| 1474 |
|
| 1475 |
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any |
| 1476 |
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to |
| 1477 |
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in |
| 1478 |
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights |
| 1479 |
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has |
| 1480 |
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information |
| 1481 |
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be |
| 1482 |
found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>. |
| 1483 |
|
| 1484 |
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any |
| 1485 |
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an |
| 1486 |
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of |
| 1487 |
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this |
| 1488 |
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at |
| 1489 |
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>. |
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any |
| 1492 |
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary |
| 1493 |
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement |
| 1494 |
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- |
| 1495 |
[email protected]. |
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 |
Acknowledgement |
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the |
| 1500 |
Internet Society. |
| 1501 |
|
| 1502 |
|
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
Nordmark & Gilligan Standards Track [Page 27] |
| 1509 |
</pre> |