Debian Codegraph @

rfc4213.html

raw
1 <pre>Network Working Group E. Nordmark
2 Request for Comments: 4213 Sun Microsystems, Inc.
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc2893">2893</a> R. Gilligan
4 Category: Standards Track Intransa, Inc.
5 October 2005
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers</span>
9
10 Status of This Memo
11
12 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
13 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
14 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
15 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
16 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
17
18 Copyright Notice
19
20 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
21
22 Abstract
23
24 This document specifies IPv4 compatibility mechanisms that can be
25 implemented by IPv6 hosts and routers. Two mechanisms are specified,
26 dual stack and configured tunneling. Dual stack implies providing
27 complete implementations of both versions of the Internet Protocol
28 (IPv4 and IPv6), and configured tunneling provides a means to carry
29 IPv6 packets over unmodified IPv4 routing infrastructures.
30
31 This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a>.
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Terminology ................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
61 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Dual IP Layer Operation .........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
62 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Address Configuration ......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
63 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. DNS ........................................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
64 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms .................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
65 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Encapsulation ..............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
66 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation ...............................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
67 <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Static Tunnel MTU ...................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
68 <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Dynamic Tunnel MTU ..................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
69 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Hop Limit .................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
70 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Handling ICMPv4 Errors ....................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
71 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. IPv4 Header Construction ..................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
72 <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Decapsulation .............................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
73 <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Link-Local Addresses ......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
74 <a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels ...........................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
75 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing ......................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
76 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
77 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
78 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
79 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
80 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
81 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a> ..........................................<a href="#page-23">23</a>
82
83 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
84
85 The key to a successful IPv6 transition is compatibility with the
86 large installed base of IPv4 hosts and routers. Maintaining
87 compatibility with IPv4 while deploying IPv6 will streamline the task
88 of transitioning the Internet to IPv6. This specification defines
89 two mechanisms that IPv6 hosts and routers may implement in order to
90 be compatible with IPv4 hosts and routers.
91
92 The mechanisms in this document are designed to be employed by IPv6
93 hosts and routers that need to interoperate with IPv4 hosts and
94 utilize IPv4 routing infrastructures. We expect that most nodes in
95 the Internet will need such compatibility for a long time to come,
96 and perhaps even indefinitely.
97
98 The mechanisms specified here are:
99
100 - Dual IP layer (also known as dual stack): A technique for
101 providing complete support for both Internet protocols -- IPv4 and
102 IPv6 -- in hosts and routers.
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
111
112
113 - Configured tunneling of IPv6 over IPv4: A technique for
114 establishing point-to-point tunnels by encapsulating IPv6 packets
115 within IPv4 headers to carry them over IPv4 routing
116 infrastructures.
117
118 The mechanisms defined here are intended to be the core of a
119 "transition toolbox" -- a growing collection of techniques that
120 implementations and users may employ to ease the transition. The
121 tools may be used as needed. Implementations and sites decide which
122 techniques are appropriate to their specific needs.
123
124 This document defines the basic set of transition mechanisms, but
125 these are not the only tools available. Additional transition and
126 compatibility mechanisms are specified in other documents.
127
128 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Terminology</span>
129
130 The following terms are used in this document:
131
132 Types of Nodes
133
134 IPv4-only node:
135
136 A host or router that implements only IPv4. An IPv4-only node
137 does not understand IPv6. The installed base of IPv4 hosts and
138 routers existing before the transition begins are IPv4-only
139 nodes.
140
141 IPv6/IPv4 node:
142
143 A host or router that implements both IPv4 and IPv6.
144
145 IPv6-only node:
146
147 A host or router that implements IPv6 and does not implement
148 IPv4. The operation of IPv6-only nodes is not addressed in
149 this memo.
150
151 IPv6 node:
152
153 Any host or router that implements IPv6. IPv6/IPv4 and IPv6-
154 only nodes are both IPv6 nodes.
155
156 IPv4 node:
157
158 Any host or router that implements IPv4. IPv6/IPv4 and IPv4-
159 only nodes are both IPv4 nodes.
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
167
168
169 Techniques Used in the Transition
170
171 IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling:
172
173 The technique of encapsulating IPv6 packets within IPv4 so that
174 they can be carried across IPv4 routing infrastructures.
175
176 Configured tunneling:
177
178 IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling where the IPv4 tunnel endpoint
179 address(es) are determined by configuration information on
180 tunnel endpoints. All tunnels are assumed to be bidirectional.
181 The tunnel provides a (virtual) point-to-point link to the IPv6
182 layer, using the configured IPv4 addresses as the lower-layer
183 endpoint addresses.
184
185 Other transition mechanisms, including other tunneling mechanisms,
186 are outside the scope of this document.
187
188 The key words MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
189 SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
190 document, are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
191
192 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Dual IP Layer Operation</span>
193
194 The most straightforward way for IPv6 nodes to remain compatible with
195 IPv4-only nodes is by providing a complete IPv4 implementation. IPv6
196 nodes that provide complete IPv4 and IPv6 implementations are called
197 "IPv6/IPv4 nodes". IPv6/IPv4 nodes have the ability to send and
198 receive both IPv4 and IPv6 packets. They can directly interoperate
199 with IPv4 nodes using IPv4 packets, and also directly interoperate
200 with IPv6 nodes using IPv6 packets.
201
202 Even though a node may be equipped to support both protocols, one or
203 the other stack may be disabled for operational reasons. Here we use
204 a rather loose notion of "stack". A stack being enabled has IP
205 addresses assigned, but whether or not any particular application is
206 available on the stacks is explicitly not defined. Thus, IPv6/IPv4
207 nodes may be operated in one of three modes:
208
209 - With their IPv4 stack enabled and their IPv6 stack disabled.
210
211 - With their IPv6 stack enabled and their IPv4 stack disabled.
212
213 - With both stacks enabled.
214
215 IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv6 stack disabled will operate like
216 IPv4-only nodes. Similarly, IPv6/IPv4 nodes with their IPv4 stacks
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
223
224
225 disabled will operate like IPv6-only nodes. IPv6/IPv4 nodes MAY
226 provide a configuration switch to disable either their IPv4 or IPv6
227 stack.
228
229 The configured tunneling technique, which is described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>,
230 may or may not be used in addition to the dual IP layer operation.
231
232 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Address Configuration</span>
233
234 Because the nodes support both protocols, IPv6/IPv4 nodes may be
235 configured with both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses. IPv6/IPv4 nodes use
236 IPv4 mechanisms (e.g., DHCP) to acquire their IPv4 addresses, and
237 IPv6 protocol mechanisms (e.g., stateless address autoconfiguration
238 [<a href="./rfc2462" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC2462</a>] and/or DHCPv6) to acquire their IPv6 addresses.
239
240 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. DNS</span>
241
242 The Domain Naming System (DNS) is used in both IPv4 and IPv6 to map
243 between hostnames and IP addresses. A new resource record type named
244 "AAAA" has been defined for IPv6 addresses [<a href="./rfc3596" title="&quot;DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6&quot;">RFC3596</a>]. Since
245 IPv6/IPv4 nodes must be able to interoperate directly with both IPv4
246 and IPv6 nodes, they must provide resolver libraries capable of
247 dealing with IPv4 "A" records as well as IPv6 "AAAA" records. Note
248 that the lookup of A versus AAAA records is independent of whether
249 the DNS packets are carried in IPv4 or IPv6 packets and that there is
250 no assumption that the DNS servers know the IPv4/IPv6 capabilities of
251 the requesting node.
252
253 The issues and operational guidelines for using IPv6 with DNS are
254 described at more length in other documents, e.g., [<a href="#ref-DNSOPV6" title="&quot;Operational Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS&quot;">DNSOPV6</a>].
255
256 DNS resolver libraries on IPv6/IPv4 nodes MUST be capable of handling
257 both AAAA and A records. However, when a query locates an AAAA
258 record holding an IPv6 address, and an A record holding an IPv4
259 address, the resolver library MAY order the results returned to the
260 application in order to influence the version of IP packets used to
261 communicate with that specific node -- IPv6 first, or IPv4 first.
262
263 The applications SHOULD be able to specify whether they want IPv4,
264 IPv6, or both records [<a href="./rfc3493" title="&quot;Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6&quot;">RFC3493</a>]. That defines which address families
265 the resolver looks up. If there is not an application choice, or if
266 the application has requested both, the resolver library MUST NOT
267 filter out any records.
268
269 Since most applications try the addresses in the order they are
270 returned by the resolver, this can affect the IP version "preference"
271 of applications.
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
279
280
281 The actual ordering mechanisms are out of scope of this memo.
282 Address selection is described at more length in [<a href="./rfc3484" title="&quot;Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">RFC3484</a>].
283
284 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Configured Tunneling Mechanisms</span>
285
286 In most deployment scenarios, the IPv6 routing infrastructure will be
287 built up over time. While the IPv6 infrastructure is being deployed,
288 the existing IPv4 routing infrastructure can remain functional and
289 can be used to carry IPv6 traffic. Tunneling provides a way to
290 utilize an existing IPv4 routing infrastructure to carry IPv6
291 traffic.
292
293 IPv6/IPv4 hosts and routers can tunnel IPv6 datagrams over regions of
294 IPv4 routing topology by encapsulating them within IPv4 packets.
295 Tunneling can be used in a variety of ways:
296
297 - Router-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 routers interconnected by an IPv4
298 infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In
299 this case, the tunnel spans one segment of the end-to-end path
300 that the IPv6 packet takes.
301
302 - Host-to-Router. IPv6/IPv4 hosts can tunnel IPv6 packets to an
303 intermediary IPv6/IPv4 router that is reachable via an IPv4
304 infrastructure. This type of tunnel spans the first segment of
305 the packet's end-to-end path.
306
307 - Host-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 hosts that are interconnected by an IPv4
308 infrastructure can tunnel IPv6 packets between themselves. In
309 this case, the tunnel spans the entire end-to-end path that the
310 packet takes.
311
312 - Router-to-Host. IPv6/IPv4 routers can tunnel IPv6 packets to
313 their final destination IPv6/IPv4 host. This tunnel spans only
314 the last segment of the end-to-end path.
315
316 Configured tunneling can be used in all of the above cases, but it is
317 most likely to be used router-to-router due to the need to explicitly
318 configure the tunneling endpoints.
319
320 The underlying mechanisms for tunneling are:
321
322 - The entry node of the tunnel (the encapsulator) creates an
323 encapsulating IPv4 header and transmits the encapsulated packet.
324
325 - The exit node of the tunnel (the decapsulator) receives the
326 encapsulated packet, reassembles the packet if needed, removes the
327 IPv4 header, and processes the received IPv6 packet.
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
335
336
337 - The encapsulator may need to maintain soft-state information for
338 each tunnel recording such parameters as the MTU of the tunnel in
339 order to process IPv6 packets forwarded into the tunnel.
340
341 In configured tunneling, the tunnel endpoint addresses are determined
342 in the encapsulator from configuration information stored for each
343 tunnel. When an IPv6 packet is transmitted over a tunnel, the
344 destination and source addresses for the encapsulating IPv4 header
345 are set as described in <a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>.
346
347 The determination of which packets to tunnel is usually made by
348 routing information on the encapsulator. This is usually done via a
349 routing table, which directs packets based on their destination
350 address using the prefix mask and match technique.
351
352 The decapsulator matches the received protocol-41 packets to the
353 tunnels it has configured, and allows only the packets in which IPv4
354 source addresses match the tunnels configured on the decapsulator.
355 Therefore, the operator must ensure that the tunnel's IPv4 address
356 configuration is the same both at the encapsulator and the
357 decapsulator.
358
359 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Encapsulation</span>
360
361 The encapsulation of an IPv6 datagram in IPv4 is shown below:
362
363 +-------------+
364 | IPv4 |
365 | Header |
366 +-------------+ +-------------+
367 | IPv6 | | IPv6 |
368 | Header | | Header |
369 +-------------+ +-------------+
370 | Transport | | Transport |
371 | Layer | ===&gt; | Layer |
372 | Header | | Header |
373 +-------------+ +-------------+
374 | | | |
375 ~ Data ~ ~ Data ~
376 | | | |
377 +-------------+ +-------------+
378
379 Encapsulating IPv6 in IPv4
380
381
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
391
392
393 In addition to adding an IPv4 header, the encapsulator also has to
394 handle some more complex issues:
395
396 - Determine when to fragment and when to report an ICMPv6 "packet
397 too big" error back to the source.
398
399 - How to reflect ICMPv4 errors from routers along the tunnel path
400 back to the source as ICMPv6 errors.
401
402 Those issues are discussed in the following sections.
403
404 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Tunnel MTU and Fragmentation</span>
405
406 Naively, the encapsulator could view encapsulation as IPv6 using IPv4
407 as a link layer with a very large MTU (65535-20 bytes at most; 20
408 bytes "extra" are needed for the encapsulating IPv4 header). The
409 encapsulator would only need to report ICMPv6 "packet too big" errors
410 back to the source for packets that exceed this MTU. However, such a
411 scheme would be inefficient or non-interoperable for three reasons
412 and therefore MUST NOT be used:
413
414 1) It would result in more fragmentation than needed. IPv4 layer
415 fragmentation should be avoided due to the performance problems
416 caused by the loss unit being smaller than the retransmission unit
417 [<a href="#ref-KM97" title="&quot;Fragmentation Considered Harmful&quot;">KM97</a>].
418
419 2) Any IPv4 fragmentation occurring inside the tunnel, i.e., between
420 the encapsulator and the decapsulator, would have to be
421 reassembled at the tunnel endpoint. For tunnels that terminate at
422 a router, this would require additional memory and other resources
423 to reassemble the IPv4 fragments into a complete IPv6 packet
424 before that packet could be forwarded.
425
426 3) The encapsulator has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is
427 able to defragment such IPv4 packets (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> for
428 details), and has no way of knowing that the decapsulator is able
429 to handle such a large IPv6 Maximum Receive Unit (MRU).
430
431 Hence, the encapsulator MUST NOT treat the tunnel as an interface
432 with an MTU of 64 kilobytes, but instead either use the fixed static
433 MTU or OPTIONAL dynamic MTU determination based on the IPv4 path MTU
434 to the tunnel endpoint.
435
436 If both the mechanisms are implemented, the decision of which to use
437 SHOULD be configurable on a per-tunnel endpoint basis.
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Static Tunnel MTU</span>
450
451 A node using static tunnel MTU treats the tunnel interface as having
452 a fixed-interface MTU. By default, the MTU MUST be between 1280 and
453 1480 bytes (inclusive), but it SHOULD be 1280 bytes. If the default
454 is not 1280 bytes, the implementation MUST have a configuration knob
455 that can be used to change the MTU value.
456
457 A node must be able to accept a fragmented IPv6 packet that, after
458 reassembly, is as large as 1500 octets [<a href="./rfc2460" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">RFC2460</a>]. This memo also
459 includes requirements (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>) for the amount of IPv4
460 reassembly and IPv6 MRU that MUST be supported by all the
461 decapsulators. These ensure correct interoperability with any fixed
462 MTUs between 1280 and 1480 bytes.
463
464 A larger fixed MTU than supported by these requirements must not be
465 configured unless it has been administratively ensured that the
466 decapsulator can reassemble or receive packets of that size.
467
468 The selection of a good tunnel MTU depends on many factors, at least:
469
470 - Whether the IPv4 protocol-41 packets will be transported over
471 media that may have a lower path MTU (e.g., IPv4 Virtual Private
472 Networks); then picking too high a value might lead to IPv4
473 fragmentation.
474
475 - Whether the tunnel is used to transport IPv6 tunneled packets
476 (e.g., a mobile node with an IPv6-in-IPv4 configured tunnel, and
477 an IPv6-in-IPv6 tunnel interface); then picking too low a value
478 might lead to IPv6 fragmentation.
479
480 If layered encapsulation is believed to be present, it may be prudent
481 to consider supporting dynamic MTU determination instead as it is
482 able to minimize fragmentation and optimize packet sizes.
483
484 When using the static tunnel MTU, the Don't Fragment bit MUST NOT be
485 set in the encapsulating IPv4 header. As a result, the encapsulator
486 should not receive any ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages as a result
487 of the packets it has encapsulated.
488
489 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Dynamic Tunnel MTU</span>
490
491 The dynamic MTU determination is OPTIONAL. However, if it is
492 implemented, it SHOULD have the behavior described in this document.
493
494 The fragmentation inside the tunnel can be reduced to a minimum by
495 having the encapsulator track the IPv4 path MTU across the tunnel,
496 using the IPv4 Path MTU Discovery Protocol [<a href="./rfc1191" title="&quot;Path MTU discovery&quot;">RFC1191</a>] and recording
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
503
504
505 the resulting path MTU. The IPv6 layer in the encapsulator can then
506 view a tunnel as a link layer with an MTU equal to the IPv4 path MTU,
507 minus the size of the encapsulating IPv4 header.
508
509 Note that this does not eliminate IPv4 fragmentation in the case when
510 the IPv4 path MTU would result in an IPv6 MTU less than 1280 bytes.
511 (Any link layer used by IPv6 has to have an MTU of at least 1280
512 bytes [<a href="./rfc2460" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">RFC2460</a>].) In this case, the IPv6 layer has to "see" a link
513 layer with an MTU of 1280 bytes and the encapsulator has to use IPv4
514 fragmentation in order to forward the 1280 byte IPv6 packets.
515
516 The encapsulator SHOULD employ the following algorithm to determine
517 when to forward an IPv6 packet that is larger than the tunnel's path
518 MTU using IPv4 fragmentation, and when to return an ICMPv6 "packet
519 too big" message per [<a href="./rfc1981" title="&quot;Path MTU Discovery for IP version 6&quot;">RFC1981</a>]:
520
521 if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than 1280
522 if packet is larger than 1280 bytes
523 Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with MTU = 1280.
524 Drop packet.
525 else
526 Encapsulate but do not set the Don't Fragment
527 flag in the IPv4 header. The resulting IPv4
528 packet might be fragmented by the IPv4 layer
529 on the encapsulator or by some router along
530 the IPv4 path.
531 endif
532 else
533 if packet is larger than (IPv4 path MTU - 20)
534 Send ICMPv6 "packet too big" with
535 MTU = (IPv4 path MTU - 20).
536 Drop packet.
537 else
538 Encapsulate and set the Don't Fragment flag
539 in the IPv4 header.
540 endif
541 endif
542
543 Encapsulators that have a large number of tunnels may choose between
544 dynamic versus static tunnel MTUs on a per-tunnel endpoint basis. In
545 cases where the number of tunnels that any one node is using is
546 large, it is helpful to observe that this state information can be
547 cached and discarded when not in use.
548
549 Note that using dynamic tunnel MTU is subject to IPv4 path MTU
550 blackholes should the ICMPv4 "packet too big" messages be dropped by
551 firewalls or not generated by the routers [RFC1435, <a href="./rfc2923">RFC2923</a>].
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Hop Limit</span>
562
563 IPv6-over-IPv4 tunnels are modeled as "single-hop" from the IPv6
564 perspective. The tunnel is opaque to users of the network, and it is
565 not detectable by network diagnostic tools such as traceroute.
566
567 The single-hop model is implemented by having the encapsulators and
568 decapsulators process the IPv6 hop limit field as they would if they
569 were forwarding a packet on to any other datalink. That is, they
570 decrement the hop limit by 1 when forwarding an IPv6 packet. (The
571 originating node and final destination do not decrement the hop
572 limit.)
573
574 The TTL of the encapsulating IPv4 header is selected in an
575 implementation-dependent manner. The current suggested value is
576 published in the "Assigned Numbers" RFC [<a href="./rfc3232" title="&quot;Assigned Numbers: RFC 1700 is Replaced by an On-line Database&quot;">RFC3232</a>][ASSIGNED].
577 Implementations MAY provide a mechanism to allow the administrator to
578 configure the IPv4 TTL as the IP Tunnel MIB [<a href="./rfc4087" title="&quot;IP Tunnel MIB&quot;">RFC4087</a>].
579
580 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Handling ICMPv4 Errors</span>
581
582 In response to encapsulated packets it has sent into the tunnel, the
583 encapsulator might receive ICMPv4 error messages from IPv4 routers
584 inside the tunnel. These packets are addressed to the encapsulator
585 because it is the IPv4 source of the encapsulated packet.
586
587 ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic MTU
588 determination, even though the functions could be used with static
589 MTU tunnels as well.
590
591 The ICMPv4 "packet too big" error messages are handled according to
592 IPv4 Path MTU Discovery [<a href="./rfc1191" title="&quot;Path MTU discovery&quot;">RFC1191</a>] and the resulting path MTU is
593 recorded in the IPv4 layer. The recorded path MTU is used by IPv6 to
594 determine if an ICMPv6 "packet too big" error has to be generated as
595 described in <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section 3.2.2</a>.
596
597 The handling of other types of ICMPv4 error messages depends on how
598 much information is available from the encapsulated packet that
599 caused the error.
600
601 Many older IPv4 routers return only 8 bytes of data beyond the IPv4
602 header of the packet in error, which is not enough to include the
603 address fields of the IPv6 header. More modern IPv4 routers are
604 likely to return enough data beyond the IPv4 header to include the
605 entire IPv6 header and possibly even the data beyond that. See
606 [<a href="./rfc1812" title="&quot;Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers&quot;">RFC1812</a>].
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
615
616
617 If sufficient data bytes from the offending packet are available, the
618 encapsulator MAY extract the encapsulated IPv6 packet and use it to
619 generate an ICMPv6 message directed back to the originating IPv6
620 node, as shown below:
621
622 +--------------+
623 | IPv4 Header |
624 | dst = encaps |
625 | node |
626 +--------------+
627 | ICMPv4 |
628 | Header |
629 - - +--------------+
630 | IPv4 Header |
631 | src = encaps |
632 IPv4 | node |
633 +--------------+ - -
634 Packet | IPv6 |
635 | Header | Original IPv6
636 in +--------------+ Packet -
637 | Transport | Can be used to
638 Error | Header | generate an
639 +--------------+ ICMPv6
640 | | error message
641 ~ Data ~ back to the source.
642 | |
643 - - +--------------+ - -
644
645 ICMPv4 Error Message Returned to Encapsulating Node
646
647 When receiving ICMPv4 errors as above and the errors are not "packet
648 too big", it would be useful to log the error as an error related to
649 the tunnel. Also, if sufficient headers are available, then the
650 originating node MAY send an ICMPv6 error of type "unreachable" with
651 code "address unreachable" to the IPv6 source. (The "address
652 unreachable" code is appropriate since, from the perspective of IPv6,
653 the tunnel is a link and that code is used for link-specific errors
654 [<a href="./rfc2463" title="&quot;Internet Control Message Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">RFC2463</a>]).
655
656 Note that when the IPv4 path MTU is exceeded, and sufficient bytes of
657 payload associated with the ICMPv4 errors are not available, or
658 ICMPv4 errors do not cause the generation of ICMPv6 errors in case
659 there is enough payload, there will be at least two packet drops
660 instead of at least one (the case of a single layer of MTU
661 discovery). Consider a case where an IPv6 host is connected to an
662 IPv4/IPv6 router, which is connected to a network where an ICMPv4
663 error about too big packet size is generated. First, the router
664 needs to learn the tunnel (IPv4) MTU that causes at least one packet
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
671
672
673 loss, and then the host needs to learn the (IPv6) MTU from the router
674 that causes at least one packet loss. Still, in all cases there can
675 be more than one packet loss if there are multiple large packets in
676 flight at the same time.
677
678 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. IPv4 Header Construction</span>
679
680 When encapsulating an IPv6 packet in an IPv4 datagram, the IPv4
681 header fields are set as follows:
682
683 Version:
684
685 4
686
687 IP Header Length in 32-bit words:
688
689 5 (There are no IPv4 options in the encapsulating header.)
690
691 Type of Service:
692
693 0 unless otherwise specified. (See [<a href="./rfc2983" title="&quot;Differentiated Services and Tunnels&quot;">RFC2983</a>] and <a href="./rfc3168#section-9.1">[RFC3168]
694 Section&nbsp;9.1</a> for issues relating to the Type-of-Service byte and
695 tunneling.)
696
697 Total Length:
698
699 Payload length from IPv6 header plus length of IPv6 and IPv4
700 headers (i.e., IPv6 payload length plus a constant 60 bytes).
701
702 Identification:
703
704 Generated uniquely as for any IPv4 packet transmitted by the
705 system.
706
707 Flags:
708
709 Set the Don't Fragment (DF) flag as specified in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>.
710 Set the More Fragments (MF) bit as necessary if fragmenting.
711
712 Fragment Offset:
713
714 Set as necessary if fragmenting.
715
716 Time to Live:
717
718 Set in an implementation-specific manner, as described in
719 <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>.
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
727
728
729 Protocol:
730
731 41 (Assigned payload type number for IPv6).
732
733 Header Checksum:
734
735 Calculate the checksum of the IPv4 header [<a href="./rfc791" title="&quot;Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC791</a>].
736
737 Source Address:
738
739 An IPv4 address of the encapsulator: either configured by the
740 administrator or an address of the outgoing interface.
741
742 Destination Address:
743
744 IPv4 address of the tunnel endpoint.
745
746 When encapsulating the packets, the node must ensure that it will use
747 the correct source address so that the packets are acceptable to the
748 decapsulator as described in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>. Configuring the source
749 address is appropriate particularly in cases in which automatic
750 selection of source address may produce different results in a
751 certain period of time. This is often the case with multiple
752 addresses, and multiple interfaces, or when routes may change
753 frequently. Therefore, it SHOULD be possible to administratively
754 specify the source address of a tunnel.
755
756 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Decapsulation</span>
757
758 When an IPv6/IPv4 host or a router receives an IPv4 datagram that is
759 addressed to one of its own IPv4 addresses or a joined multicast
760 group address, and the value of the protocol field is 41, the packet
761 is potentially a tunnel packet and needs to be verified to belong to
762 one of the configured tunnel interfaces (by checking
763 source/destination addresses), reassembled (if fragmented at the IPv4
764 level), and have the IPv4 header removed and the resulting IPv6
765 datagram be submitted to the IPv6 layer code on the node.
766
767 The decapsulator MUST verify that the tunnel source address is
768 correct before further processing packets, to mitigate the problems
769 with address spoofing (see <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). This check also applies to
770 packets that are delivered to transport protocols on the
771 decapsulator. This is done by verifying that the source address is
772 the IPv4 address of the encapsulator, as configured on the
773 decapsulator. Packets for which the IPv4 source address does not
774 match MUST be discarded and an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated;
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
783
784
785 however, if the implementation normally sends an ICMP message when
786 receiving an unknown protocol packet, such an error message MAY be
787 sent (e.g., ICMPv4 Protocol 41 Unreachable).
788
789 A side effect of this address verification is that the node will
790 silently discard packets with a wrong source address and packets that
791 were received by the node but not directly addressed to it (e.g.,
792 broadcast addresses).
793
794 Independent of any other forms of IPv4 ingress filtering the
795 administrator of the node may have configured, the implementation MAY
796 perform ingress filtering, i.e., check that the packet is arriving
797 from the interface in the direction of the route toward the tunnel
798 end-point, similar to a Strict Reverse Path Forwarding (RPF) check
799 [<a href="./rfc3704" title="&quot;Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks&quot;">RFC3704</a>]. As this may cause problems on tunnels that are routed
800 through multiple links, it is RECOMMENDED that this check, if done,
801 is disabled by default. The packets caught by this check SHOULD be
802 discarded; an ICMP message SHOULD NOT be generated by default.
803
804 The decapsulator MUST be capable of having, on the tunnel interfaces,
805 an IPv6 MRU of at least the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest
806 (IPv6) interface MTU on the decapsulator.
807
808 The decapsulator MUST be capable of reassembling an IPv4 packet that
809 is (after the reassembly) the maximum of 1500 bytes and the largest
810 (IPv4) interface MTU on the decapsulator. The 1500-byte number is a
811 result of encapsulators that use the static MTU scheme in <a href="#section-3.2.1">Section</a>
812 <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>, while encapsulators that use the dynamic scheme in <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section</a>
813 <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> can cause up to the largest interface MTU on the decapsulator
814 to be received. (Note that it is strictly the interface MTU on the
815 last IPv4 router *before* the decapsulator that matters, but for most
816 links the MTU is the same between all neighbors.)
817
818 This reassembly limit allows dynamic tunnel MTU determination by the
819 encapsulator to take advantage of larger IPv4 path MTUs. An
820 implementation MAY have a configuration knob that can be used to set
821 a larger value of the tunnel reassembly buffers than the above
822 number, but it MUST NOT be set below the above number.
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
839
840
841 The decapsulation is shown below:
842
843 +-------------+
844 | IPv4 |
845 | Header |
846 +-------------+ +-------------+
847 | IPv6 | | IPv6 |
848 | Header | | Header |
849 +-------------+ +-------------+
850 | Transport | | Transport |
851 | Layer | ===&gt; | Layer |
852 | Header | | Header |
853 +-------------+ +-------------+
854 | | | |
855 ~ Data ~ ~ Data ~
856 | | | |
857 +-------------+ +-------------+
858
859 Decapsulating IPv6 from IPv4
860
861 The decapsulator performs IPv4 reassembly before decapsulating the
862 IPv6 packet.
863
864 When decapsulating the packet, the IPv6 header is not modified.
865 (However, see [<a href="./rfc2983" title="&quot;Differentiated Services and Tunnels&quot;">RFC2983</a>] and <a href="./rfc3168#section-9.1">[RFC3168] section&nbsp;9.1</a> for issues relating
866 to the Type of Service byte and tunneling.) If the packet is
867 subsequently forwarded, its hop limit is decremented by one.
868
869 The encapsulating IPv4 header is discarded, and the resulting packet
870 is checked for validity when submitted to the IPv6 layer. When
871 reconstructing the IPv6 packet, the length MUST be determined from
872 the IPv6 payload length since the IPv4 packet might be padded (thus
873 have a length that is larger than the IPv6 packet plus the IPv4
874 header being removed).
875
876 After the decapsulation, the node MUST silently discard a packet with
877 an invalid IPv6 source address. The list of invalid source addresses
878 SHOULD include at least:
879
880 - all multicast addresses (FF00::/8)
881
882 - the loopback address (::1)
883
884 - all the IPv4-compatible IPv6 addresses [<a href="./rfc3513" title="&quot;Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture&quot;">RFC3513</a>] (::/96),
885 excluding the unspecified address for Duplicate Address Detection
886 (::/128)
887
888 - all the IPv4-mapped IPv6 addresses (::ffff:0:0/96)
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
895
896
897 In addition, the node should be configured to perform ingress
898 filtering [<a href="./rfc2827" title="&quot;Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing&quot;">RFC2827</a>][RFC3704] on the IPv6 source address, similar to
899 on any of its interfaces, e.g.:
900
901 1) if the tunnel is toward the Internet, the node should be
902 configured to check that the site's IPv6 prefixes are not used as
903 the source addresses, or
904
905 2) if the tunnel is toward an edge network, the node should be
906 configured to check that the source address belongs to that edge
907 network.
908
909 The prefix lists in the former typically need to be manually
910 configured; the latter could be verified automatically, e.g., by
911 using a strict unicast RPF check, as long as an interface can be
912 designated to be toward an edge.
913
914 It is RECOMMENDED that the implementations provide a single knob to
915 make it easier to for the administrators to enable strict ingress
916 filtering toward edge networks.
917
918 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Link-Local Addresses</span>
919
920 The configured tunnels are IPv6 interfaces (over the IPv4 "link
921 layer") and thus MUST have link-local addresses. The link-local
922 addresses are used by, e.g., routing protocols operating over the
923 tunnels.
924
925 The interface identifier [<a href="./rfc3513" title="&quot;Internet Protocol Version 6 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture&quot;">RFC3513</a>] for such an interface may be based
926 on the 32-bit IPv4 address of an underlying interface, or formed
927 using some other means, as long as it is unique from the other tunnel
928 endpoint with a reasonably high probability.
929
930 Note that it may be desirable to form the link-local address in a
931 fashion that minimizes the probability and the effect of having to
932 renumber the link-local address in the event of a topology or
933 hardware change.
934
935 If an IPv4 address is used for forming the IPv6 link-local address,
936 the interface identifier is the IPv4 address, prepended by zeros.
937 Note that the "Universal/Local" bit is zero, indicating that the
938 interface identifier is not globally unique. The link-local address
939 is formed by appending the interface identifier to the prefix
940 FE80::/64.
941
942 When the host has more than one IPv4 address in use on the physical
943 interface concerned, a choice of one of these IPv4 addresses is made
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
951
952
953 by the administrator or the implementation when forming the link-
954 local address.
955
956 +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+
957 | FE 80 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
958 +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+
959 | 00 00 00 00 | IPv4 Address |
960 +-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+-------+------+------+
961
962 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Neighbor Discovery over Tunnels</span>
963
964 Configured tunnel implementations MUST at least accept and respond to
965 the probe packets used by Neighbor Unreachability Detection (NUD)
966 [<a href="./rfc2461" title="&quot;Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">RFC2461</a>]. The implementations SHOULD also send NUD probe packets to
967 detect when the configured tunnel fails at which point the
968 implementation can use an alternate path to reach the destination.
969 Note that Neighbor Discovery allows that the sending of NUD probes be
970 omitted for router-to-router links if the routing protocol tracks
971 bidirectional reachability.
972
973 For the purposes of Neighbor Discovery, the configured tunnels
974 specified in this document are assumed to NOT have a link-layer
975 address, even though the link-layer (IPv4) does have an address.
976 This means that:
977
978 - the sender of Neighbor Discovery packets SHOULD NOT include Source
979 Link Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options on
980 the tunnel link.
981
982 - the receiver MUST, while otherwise processing the Neighbor
983 Discovery packet, silently ignore the content of any Source Link
984 Layer Address options or Target Link Layer Address options
985 received on the tunnel link.
986
987 Not using link-layer address options is consistent with how Neighbor
988 Discovery is used on other point-to-point links.
989
990 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Threat Related to Source Address Spoofing</span>
991
992 The specification above contains rules that apply tunnel source
993 address verification in particular and ingress filtering
994 [<a href="./rfc2827" title="&quot;Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing&quot;">RFC2827</a>][RFC3704] in general to packets before they are
995 decapsulated. When IP-in-IP tunneling (independent of IP versions)
996 is used, it is important that this not be used to bypass any ingress
997 filtering in use for non-tunneled packets. Thus, the rules in this
998 document are derived based on should ingress filtering be used for
999 IPv4 and IPv6, the use of tunneling should not provide an easy way to
1000 circumvent the filtering.
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1007
1008
1009 In this case, without specific ingress filtering checks in the
1010 decapsulator, it would be possible for an attacker to inject a packet
1011 with:
1012
1013 - Outer IPv4 source: real IPv4 address of attacker
1014
1015 - Outer IPv4 destination: IPv4 address of decapsulator
1016
1017 - Inner IPv6 source: Alice, which is either the decapsulator or a
1018 node close to it
1019
1020 - Inner IPv6 destination: Bob
1021
1022 Even if all IPv4 routers between the attacker and the decapsulator
1023 implement IPv4 ingress filtering, and all IPv6 routers between the
1024 decapsulator and Bob implement IPv6 ingress filtering, the above
1025 spoofed packets will not be filtered out. As a result, Bob will
1026 receive a packet that looks like it was sent from Alice even though
1027 the sender was some unrelated node.
1028
1029 The solution to this is to have the decapsulator accept only
1030 encapsulated packets from the explicitly configured source address
1031 (i.e., the other end of the tunnel) as specified in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>.
1032 While this does not provide complete protection in the case ingress
1033 filtering has not been deployed, it does provide a significant
1034 increase in security. The issue and the remainder threats are
1035 discussed at more length in Security Considerations.
1036
1037 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
1038
1039 Generic security considerations of using IPv6 are discussed in a
1040 separate document [<a href="#ref-V6SEC" title="&quot;IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security Considerations&quot;">V6SEC</a>].
1041
1042 An implementation of tunneling needs to be aware that although a
1043 tunnel is a link (as defined in [<a href="./rfc2460" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">RFC2460</a>]), the threat model for a
1044 tunnel might be rather different than for other links, since the
1045 tunnel potentially includes all of the Internet.
1046
1047 Several mechanisms (e.g., Neighbor Discovery) depend on Hop Count
1048 being 255 and/or the addresses being link local for ensuring that a
1049 packet originated on-link, in a semi-trusted environment. Tunnels
1050 are more vulnerable to a breach of this assumption than physical
1051 links, as an attacker anywhere in the Internet can send an IPv6-in-
1052 IPv4 packet to the tunnel decapsulator, causing injection of an
1053 encapsulted IPv6 packet to the configured tunnel interface unless the
1054 decapsulation checks are able to discard packets injected in such a
1055 manner.
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1063
1064
1065 Therefore, this memo specifies that the decapsulators make these
1066 steps (as described in <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a>) to mitigate this threat:
1067
1068 - IPv4 source address of the packet MUST be the same as configured
1069 for the tunnel end-point;
1070
1071 - Independent of any IPv4 ingress filtering the administrator may
1072 have configured, the implementation MAY perform IPv4 ingress
1073 filtering to check that the IPv4 packets are received from an
1074 expected interface (but as this may cause some problems, it may be
1075 disabled by default);
1076
1077 - IPv6 packets with several, obviously invalid IPv6 source addresses
1078 received from the tunnel MUST be discarded (see <a href="#section-3.6">Section 3.6</a> for
1079 details); and
1080
1081 - IPv6 ingress filtering should be performed (typically requiring
1082 configuration from the operator), to check that the tunneled IPv6
1083 packets are received from an expected interface.
1084
1085 Especially the first verification is vital: to avoid this check, the
1086 attacker must be able to know the source of the tunnel (ranging from
1087 difficult to predictable) and be able to spoof it (easier).
1088
1089 If the remainder threats of tunnel source verification are considered
1090 to be significant, a tunneling scheme with authentication should be
1091 used instead, e.g., IPsec [<a href="./rfc2401" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC2401</a>] (preferable) or Generic Routing
1092 Encapsulation with a pre-configured secret key [<a href="./rfc2890" title="&quot;Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE&quot;">RFC2890</a>]. As the
1093 configured tunnels are set up more or less manually, setting up the
1094 keying material is probably not a problem. However, setting up
1095 secure IPsec IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnels is described in another document
1096 [<a href="#ref-V64IPSEC" title="&quot;Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-over- IPv4 Tunnels&quot;">V64IPSEC</a>].
1097
1098 If the tunneling is done inside an administrative domain, proper
1099 ingress filtering at the edge of the domain can also eliminate the
1100 threat from outside of the domain. Therefore, shorter tunnels are
1101 preferable to longer ones, possibly spanning the whole Internet.
1102
1103 In addition, an implementation MUST treat interfaces to different
1104 links as separate, e.g., to ensure that Neighbor Discovery packets
1105 arriving on one link do not affect other links. This is especially
1106 important for tunnel links.
1107
1108 When dropping packets due to failing to match the allowed IPv4 source
1109 addresses for a tunnel the node should not "acknowledge" the
1110 existence of a tunnel, otherwise this could be used to probe the
1111 acceptable tunnel endpoint addresses. For that reason, the
1112 specification says that such packets MUST be discarded, and an ICMP
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1119
1120
1121 error message SHOULD NOT be generated, unless the implementation
1122 normally sends ICMP destination unreachable messages for unknown
1123 protocols; in such a case, the same code MAY be sent. As should be
1124 obvious, not returning the same ICMP code if an error is returned for
1125 other protocols may hint that the IPv6 stack (or the protocol 41
1126 tunneling processing) has been enabled -- the behaviour should be
1127 consistent on how the implementation otherwise behaves to be
1128 transparent to probing.
1129
1130 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
1131
1132 We would like to thank the members of the IPv6 working group, the
1133 Next Generation Transition (ngtrans) working group, and the v6ops
1134 working group for their many contributions and extensive review of
1135 this document. Special thanks are due to (in alphabetical order) Jim
1136 Bound, Ross Callon, Tim Chown, Alex Conta, Bob Hinden, Bill Manning,
1137 John Moy, Mohan Parthasarathy, Chirayu Patel, Pekka Savola, and Fred
1138 Templin for many helpful suggestions. Pekka Savola helped in editing
1139 the final revisions of the specification.
1140
1141 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
1142
1143 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
1144
1145 [<a id="ref-RFC791">RFC791</a>] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>, September
1146 1981.
1147
1148 [<a id="ref-RFC1191">RFC1191</a>] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>,
1149 November 1990.
1150
1151 [<a id="ref-RFC1981">RFC1981</a>] McCann, J., Deering, S., and J. Mogul, "Path MTU Discovery
1152 for IP version 6", <a href="./rfc1981">RFC 1981</a>, August 1996.
1153
1154 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1155 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
1156
1157 [<a id="ref-RFC2460">RFC2460</a>] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6
1158 (IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>, December 1998.
1159
1160 [<a id="ref-RFC2463">RFC2463</a>] Conta, A. and S. Deering, "Internet Control Message
1161 Protocol (ICMPv6) for the Internet Protocol Version 6
1162 (IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc2463">RFC 2463</a>, December 1998.
1163
1164 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1165
1166 [<a id="ref-ASSIGNED">ASSIGNED</a>] IANA, "Assigned numbers online database",
1167 <a href="http://www.iana.org/numbers.html">http://www.iana.org/numbers.html</a>
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1175
1176
1177 [<a id="ref-DNSOPV6">DNSOPV6</a>] Durand, A., Ihren, J., and Savola P., "Operational
1178 Considerations and Issues with IPv6 DNS", Work in
1179 Progress, October 2004.
1180
1181 [<a id="ref-KM97">KM97</a>] Kent, C., and J. Mogul, "Fragmentation Considered
1182 Harmful". In Proc. SIGCOMM '87 Workshop on Frontiers in
1183 Computer Communications Technology. August 1987.
1184
1185 [<a id="ref-V6SEC">V6SEC</a>] Savola, P., "IPv6 Transition/Co-existence Security
1186 Considerations", Work in Progress, October 2004.
1187
1188 [<a id="ref-V64IPSEC">V64IPSEC</a>] Graveman, R., et al., "Using IPsec to Secure IPv6-over-
1189 IPv4 Tunnels", Work in Progress, December 2004.
1190
1191 [<a id="ref-RFC1435">RFC1435</a>] Knowles, S., "IESG Advice from Experience with Path MTU
1192 Discovery", <a href="./rfc1435">RFC 1435</a>, March 1993.
1193
1194 [<a id="ref-RFC1812">RFC1812</a>] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", <a href="./rfc1812">RFC</a>
1195 <a href="./rfc1812">1812</a>, June 1995.
1196
1197 [<a id="ref-RFC2401">RFC2401</a>] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
1198 Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998.
1199
1200 [<a id="ref-RFC2461">RFC2461</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor
1201 Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc2461">RFC 2461</a>, December
1202 1998.
1203
1204 [<a id="ref-RFC2462">RFC2462</a>] Thomson, S. and T. Narten, "IPv6 Stateless Address
1205 Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc2462">RFC 2462</a>, December 1998.
1206
1207 [<a id="ref-RFC2827">RFC2827</a>] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
1208 Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source
1209 Address Spoofing", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp38">BCP 38</a>, <a href="./rfc2827">RFC 2827</a>, May 2000.
1210
1211 [<a id="ref-RFC2890">RFC2890</a>] Dommety, G., "Key and Sequence Number Extensions to GRE",
1212 <a href="./rfc2890">RFC 2890</a>, September 2000.
1213
1214 [<a id="ref-RFC2923">RFC2923</a>] Lahey, K., "TCP Problems with Path MTU Discovery", <a href="./rfc2923">RFC</a>
1215 <a href="./rfc2923">2923</a>, September 2000.
1216
1217 [<a id="ref-RFC2983">RFC2983</a>] Black, D., "Differentiated Services and Tunnels", <a href="./rfc2983">RFC</a>
1218 <a href="./rfc2983">2983</a>, October 2000.
1219
1220 [<a id="ref-RFC3056">RFC3056</a>] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains
1221 via IPv4 Clouds", <a href="./rfc3056">RFC 3056</a>, February 2001.
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1231
1232
1233 [<a id="ref-RFC3168">RFC3168</a>] Ramakrishnan, K., Floyd, S., and D. Black, "The Addition
1234 of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP", <a href="./rfc3168">RFC</a>
1235 <a href="./rfc3168">3168</a>, September 2001.
1236
1237 [<a id="ref-RFC3232">RFC3232</a>] Reynolds, J., "Assigned Numbers: <a href="./rfc1700">RFC 1700</a> is Replaced by
1238 an On-line Database", <a href="./rfc3232">RFC 3232</a>, January 2002.
1239
1240 [<a id="ref-RFC3484">RFC3484</a>] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet
1241 Protocol version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc3484">RFC 3484</a>, February 2003.
1242
1243 [<a id="ref-RFC3493">RFC3493</a>] Gilligan, R., Thomson, S., Bound, J., McCann, J., and W.
1244 Stevens, "Basic Socket Interface Extensions for IPv6", <a href="./rfc3493">RFC</a>
1245 <a href="./rfc3493">3493</a>, February 2003.
1246
1247 [<a id="ref-RFC3513">RFC3513</a>] Hinden, R. and S. Deering, "Internet Protocol Version 6
1248 (IPv6) Addressing Architecture", <a href="./rfc3513">RFC 3513</a>, April 2003.
1249
1250 [<a id="ref-RFC3596">RFC3596</a>] Thomson, S., Huitema, C., Ksinant, V., and M. Souissi,
1251 "DNS Extensions to Support IP Version 6", <a href="./rfc3596">RFC 3596</a>,
1252 October 2003.
1253
1254 [<a id="ref-RFC3704">RFC3704</a>] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
1255 Networks", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp84">BCP 84</a>, <a href="./rfc3704">RFC 3704</a>, March 2004.
1256
1257 [<a id="ref-RFC4087">RFC4087</a>] Thaler, D., "IP Tunnel MIB", <a href="./rfc4087">RFC 4087</a>, June 2005.
1258
1259 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a></span>
1260
1261 The motivation for the bulk of these changes are to simplify the
1262 document to only contain the mechanisms of wide-spread use.
1263
1264 <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a> contains a mechanism called automatic tunneling. But a much
1265 more general mechanism is specified in <a href="./rfc3056">RFC 3056</a> [<a href="./rfc3056" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">RFC3056</a>] which gives
1266 each node with a (global) IPv4 address a /48 IPv6 prefix i.e., enough
1267 for a whole site.
1268
1269 The following changes have been performed since <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a>:
1270
1271 - Removed references to A6 and retained AAAA.
1272
1273 - Removed automatic tunneling and use of IPv4-compatible addresses.
1274
1275 - Removed default Configured Tunnel using IPv4 "Anycast Address"
1276
1277 - Removed Source Address Selection section since this is now covered
1278 by another document ([<a href="./rfc3484" title="&quot;Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">RFC3484</a>]).
1279
1280 - Removed brief mention of 6over4.
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1287
1288
1289 - Split into normative and non-normative references and other
1290 reference cleanup.
1291
1292 - Dropped "or equal" in if (IPv4 path MTU - 20) is less than or
1293 equal to 1280.
1294
1295 - Dropped this: However, IPv6 may be used in some environments where
1296 interoperability with IPv4 is not required. IPv6 nodes that are
1297 designed to be used in such environments need not use or even
1298 implement these mechanisms.
1299
1300 - Described Static MTU and Dynamic MTU cases separately; clarified
1301 that the dynamic path MTU mechanism is OPTIONAL but if it is
1302 implemented it should follow the rules in <a href="#section-3.2.2">section 3.2.2</a>.
1303
1304 - Specified Static MTU to default to a MTU of 1280 to 1480 bytes,
1305 and that this may be configurable. Discussed the issues with
1306 using Static MTU at more length.
1307
1308 - Specified minimal rules for IPv4 reassembly and IPv6 MRU to
1309 enhance interoperability and to minimize blacholes.
1310
1311 - Restated the "currently underway" language about Type-of-Service,
1312 and loosely point at [<a href="./rfc2983" title="&quot;Differentiated Services and Tunnels&quot;">RFC2983</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3168" title="&quot;The Addition of Explicit Congestion Notification (ECN) to IP&quot;">RFC3168</a>].
1313
1314 - Fixed reference to Assigned Numbers to be to online version (with
1315 proper pointer to "Assigned Numbers is obsolete" RFC).
1316
1317 - Clarified text about ingress filtering e.g., that it applies to
1318 packet delivered to transport protocols on the decapsulator as
1319 well as packets being forwarded by the decapsulator, and how the
1320 decapsulator's checks help when IPv4 and IPv6 ingress filtering is
1321 in place.
1322
1323 - Removed unidirectional tunneling; assume all tunnels are
1324 bidirectional, between endpoint addresses (not nodes).
1325
1326 - Removed the guidelines for advertising addresses in DNS as
1327 slightly out of scope, referring to another document for the
1328 details.
1329
1330 - Removed the SHOULD requirement that the link-local addresses
1331 should be formed based on IPv4 addresses.
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1343
1344
1345 - Added a SHOULD for implementing a knob to be able to set the
1346 source address of the tunnel, and add discussion why this is
1347 useful.
1348
1349 - Added stronger wording for source address checks: both IPv4 and
1350 IPv6 source addresses MUST be checked, and RPF-like ingress
1351 filtering is optional.
1352
1353 - Rewrote security considerations to be more precise about the
1354 threats of tunneling.
1355
1356 - Added a note about considering using TTL=255 when encapsulating.
1357
1358 - Added more discussion in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a> why using an "infinite" IPv6
1359 MTU leads to likely interoperability problems.
1360
1361 - Added an explicit requirement that if both MTU determination
1362 methods are used, choosing one should be possible on a per-tunnel
1363 basis.
1364
1365 - Clarified that ICMPv4 error handling is only applicable to dynamic
1366 MTU determination.
1367
1368 - Removed/clarified DNS record filtering; an API is a SHOULD and if
1369 it does not exist, MUST NOT filter anything. Decree ordering out
1370 of scope, but refer to <a href="./rfc3484">RFC3484</a>.
1371
1372 - Add a note that the destination IPv4 address could also be a
1373 multicast address.
1374
1375 - Make it RECOMMENDED to provide a toggle to perform strict ingress
1376 filtering on an interface.
1377
1378 - Generalize the text on the data in ICMPv4 messages.
1379
1380 - Made a lot of miscellaneous editorial cleanups.
1381
1382
1383
1384
1385
1386
1387
1388
1389
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1399
1400
1401 Authors' Addresses
1402
1403 Erik Nordmark
1404 Sun Microsystems
1405 17 Network Circle
1406 Menlo Park, CA 94025
1407 USA
1408
1409 Phone: +1 650 786 2921
1410 EMail: [email protected]
1411
1412
1413 Robert E. Gilligan
1414 Intransa, Inc.
1415 2870 Zanker Rd., Suite 100
1416 San Jose, CA 95134 USA
1417
1418 Phone : +1 408 678 8600
1419 Fax : +1 408 678 8800
1420 EMail: [email protected]
1421
1422
1423
1424
1425
1426
1427
1428
1429
1430
1431
1432
1433
1434
1435
1436
1437
1438
1439
1440
1441
1442
1443
1444
1445
1446
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4213">RFC 4213</a> Basic IPv6 Transition Mechanisms October 2005</span>
1455
1456
1457 Full Copyright Statement
1458
1459 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
1460
1461 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
1462 contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
1463 retain all their rights.
1464
1465 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
1466 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
1467 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
1468 ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
1469 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
1470 INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
1471 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
1472
1473 Intellectual Property
1474
1475 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
1476 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
1477 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
1478 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
1479 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
1480 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
1481 on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
1482 found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>.
1483
1484 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
1485 assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
1486 attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
1487 such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
1488 specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
1489 <a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>.
1490
1491 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
1492 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
1493 rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
1494 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
1495 [email protected].
1496
1497 Acknowledgement
1498
1499 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
1500 Internet Society.
1501
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 Nordmark &amp; Gilligan Standards Track [Page 27]
1509 </pre>