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<pre>Network Working Group S. Kent |
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Request for Comments: 2401 BBN Corp |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc1825">1825</a> R. Atkinson |
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Category: Standards Track @Home Network |
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November 1998 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol</span> |
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|
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction........................................................<a href="#page-1-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Summary of Contents of Document..................................<a href="#page-1-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a> Audience.........................................................<a href="#page-1-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a> Related Documents................................................<a href="#page-1-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Design Objectives...................................................<a href="#page-1-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description................<a href="#page-1-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Caveats and Assumptions..........................................<a href="#page-1-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. System Overview.....................................................<a href="#page-1-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> What IPsec Does..................................................<a href="#page-1-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> How IPsec Works..................................................<a href="#page-1-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Where IPsec May Be Implemented...................................<a href="#page-1-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Associations...............................................<a href="#page-1-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Definition and Scope.............................................<a href="#page-1-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Security Association Functionality..............................<a href="#page-1-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Combining Security Associations.................................<a href="#page-1-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a> Security Association Databases..................................<a href="#page-1-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a> The Security Policy Database (SPD).........................<a href="#page-1-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a> Selectors..................................................<a href="#page-1-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a> Security Association Database (SAD)........................<a href="#page-1-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a> Basic Combinations of Security Associations.....................<a href="#page-1-24">24</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a> SA and Key Management...........................................<a href="#page-1-26">26</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a> Manual Techniques..........................................<a href="#page-1-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a> Automated SA and Key Management............................<a href="#page-1-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a> Locating a Security Gateway................................<a href="#page-1-28">28</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.7">4.7</a> Security Associations and Multicast.............................<a href="#page-1-29">29</a> |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IP Traffic Processing..............................................<a href="#page-1-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> Outbound IP Traffic Processing..................................<a href="#page-1-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle.....................<a href="#page-1-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a> Header Construction for Tunnel Mode........................<a href="#page-1-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1.2.1">5.1.2.1</a> IPv4 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode...........<a href="#page-1-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1.2.2">5.1.2.2</a> IPv6 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode...........<a href="#page-1-32">32</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> Processing Inbound IP Traffic...................................<a href="#page-1-33">33</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle.....................<a href="#page-1-33">33</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a> Handling of AH and ESP tunnels.............................<a href="#page-1-34">34</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. ICMP Processing (relevant to IPsec)................................<a href="#page-1-35">35</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> PMTU/DF Processing..............................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1.1">6.1.1</a> DF Bit.....................................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1.2">6.1.2</a> Path MTU Discovery (PMTU)..................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1.2.1">6.1.2.1</a> Propagation of PMTU...................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1.2.2">6.1.2.2</a> Calculation of PMTU...................................<a href="#page-1-37">37</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1.2.3">6.1.2.3</a> Granularity of PMTU Processing........................<a href="#page-1-37">37</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1.2.4">6.1.2.4</a> PMTU Aging............................................<a href="#page-1-38">38</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Auditing...........................................................<a href="#page-1-39">39</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Use in Systems Supporting Information Flow Security................<a href="#page-1-39">39</a> |
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8.1 Relationship Between Security Associations and Data Sensitivity.40 |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a> Sensitivity Consistency Checking................................<a href="#page-1-40">40</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.3">8.3</a> Additional MLS Attributes for Security Association Databases....<a href="#page-1-41">41</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.4">8.4</a> Additional Inbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking..........<a href="#page-1-41">41</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.5">8.5</a> Additional Outbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking.........<a href="#page-1-41">41</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.6">8.6</a> Additional MLS Processing for Security Gateways.................<a href="#page-1-42">42</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Performance Issues.................................................<a href="#page-1-42">42</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. Conformance Requirements..........................................<a href="#page-1-43">43</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. Security Considerations...........................................<a href="#page-1-43">43</a> |
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<a href="#section-12">12</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1825">RFC 1825</a>.........................................<a href="#page-1-43">43</a> |
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Acknowledgements......................................................<a href="#page-1-44">44</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> -- Glossary................................................<a href="#page-1-45">45</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> -- Analysis/Discussion of PMTU/DF/Fragmentation Issues.....<a href="#page-1-48">48</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.1">B.1</a> DF bit..........................................................<a href="#page-1-48">48</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.2">B.2</a> Fragmentation...................................................<a href="#page-1-48">48</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3">B.3</a> Path MTU Discovery..............................................<a href="#page-1-52">52</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3.1">B.3.1</a> Identifying the Originating Host(s)........................<a href="#page-1-53">53</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3.2">B.3.2</a> Calculation of PMTU........................................<a href="#page-1-55">55</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3.3">B.3.3</a> Granularity of Maintaining PMTU Data.......................<a href="#page-1-56">56</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3.4">B.3.4</a> Per Socket Maintenance of PMTU Data........................<a href="#page-1-57">57</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3.5">B.3.5</a> Delivery of PMTU Data to the Transport Layer...............<a href="#page-1-57">57</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B.3.6">B.3.6</a> Aging of PMTU Data.........................................<a href="#page-1-57">57</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a> -- Sequence Space Window Code Example......................<a href="#page-1-58">58</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-D">Appendix D</a> -- Categorization of ICMP messages.........................<a href="#page-1-60">60</a> |
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References............................................................<a href="#page-1-63">63</a> |
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Disclaimer............................................................<a href="#page-1-64">64</a> |
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Author Information....................................................<a href="#page-1-65">65</a> |
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Full Copyright Statement..............................................<a href="#page-1-66">66</a> |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Summary of Contents of Document</span> |
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|
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This memo specifies the base architecture for IPsec compliant |
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systems. The goal of the architecture is to provide various security |
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services for traffic at the IP layer, in both the IPv4 and IPv6 |
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environments. This document describes the goals of such systems, |
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their components and how they fit together with each other and into |
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the IP environment. It also describes the security services offered |
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by the IPsec protocols, and how these services can be employed in the |
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IP environment. This document does not address all aspects of IPsec |
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architecture. Subsequent documents will address additional |
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architectural details of a more advanced nature, e.g., use of IPsec |
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in NAT environments and more complete support for IP multicast. The |
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following fundamental components of the IPsec security architecture |
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are discussed in terms of their underlying, required functionality. |
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Additional RFCs (see <a href="#section-1.3">Section 1.3</a> for pointers to other documents) |
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define the protocols in (a), (c), and (d). |
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|
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a. Security Protocols -- Authentication Header (AH) and |
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Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) |
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b. Security Associations -- what they are and how they work, |
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how they are managed, associated processing |
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c. Key Management -- manual and automatic (The Internet Key |
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Exchange (IKE)) |
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d. Algorithms for authentication and encryption |
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|
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This document is not an overall Security Architecture for the |
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Internet; it addresses security only at the IP layer, provided |
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through the use of a combination of cryptographic and protocol |
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security mechanisms. |
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|
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The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, |
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SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this |
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document, are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-Bra97" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Level"">Bra97</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a> Audience</span> |
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|
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The target audience for this document includes implementers of this |
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IP security technology and others interested in gaining a general |
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background understanding of this system. In particular, prospective |
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users of this technology (end users or system administrators) are |
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part of the target audience. A glossary is provided as an appendix |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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to help fill in gaps in background/vocabulary. This document assumes |
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that the reader is familiar with the Internet Protocol, related |
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networking technology, and general security terms and concepts. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a> Related Documents</span> |
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|
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As mentioned above, other documents provide detailed definitions of |
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some of the components of IPsec and of their inter-relationship. |
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They include RFCs on the following topics: |
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|
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a. "IP Security Document Roadmap" [<a href="#ref-TDG97" title=""IP Security Document Roadmap"">TDG97</a>] -- a document |
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providing guidelines for specifications describing encryption |
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and authentication algorithms used in this system. |
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b. security protocols -- RFCs describing the Authentication |
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Header (AH) [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title=""IP Authentication Header"">KA98a</a>] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) |
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[<a href="#ref-KA98b" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">KA98b</a>] protocols. |
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c. algorithms for authentication and encryption -- a separate |
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RFC for each algorithm. |
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d. automatic key management -- RFCs on "The Internet Key |
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Exchange (IKE)" [<a href="#ref-HC98" title=""The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">HC98</a>], "Internet Security Association and |
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Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)" [<a href="#ref-MSST97" title=""Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)"">MSST97</a>],"The OAKLEY Key |
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Determination Protocol" [<a href="#ref-Orm97" title=""The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol"">Orm97</a>], and "The Internet IP |
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Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" [<a href="#ref-Pip98" title=""The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP"">Pip98</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Design Objectives</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description</span> |
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|
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IPsec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality, |
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cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set of |
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security services offered includes access control, connectionless |
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integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays (a |
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form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption), |
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and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These services are |
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provided at the IP layer, offering protection for IP and/or upper |
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layer protocols. |
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|
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These objectives are met through the use of two traffic security |
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protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating |
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Security Payload (ESP), and through the use of cryptographic key |
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management procedures and protocols. The set of IPsec protocols |
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employed in any context, and the ways in which they are employed, |
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will be determined by the security and system requirements of users, |
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applications, and/or sites/organizations. |
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When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, they |
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ought not to adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internet |
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components that do not employ these security mechanisms for |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
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protection of their traffic. These mechanisms also are designed to |
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be algorithm-independent. This modularity permits selection of |
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different sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the |
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implementation. For example, different user communities may select |
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different sets of algorithms (creating cliques) if required. |
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A standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitate |
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interoperability in the global Internet. The use of these |
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algorithms, in conjunction with IPsec traffic protection and key |
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management protocols, is intended to permit system and application |
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developers to deploy high quality, Internet layer, cryptographic |
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security technology. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Caveats and Assumptions</span> |
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|
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The suite of IPsec protocols and associated default algorithms are |
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designed to provide high quality security for Internet traffic. |
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However, the security offered by use of these protocols ultimately |
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depends on the quality of the their implementation, which is outside |
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the scope of this set of standards. Moreover, the security of a |
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computer system or network is a function of many factors, including |
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personnel, physical, procedural, compromising emanations, and |
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computer security practices. Thus IPsec is only one part of an |
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overall system security architecture. |
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Finally, the security afforded by the use of IPsec is critically |
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dependent on many aspects of the operating environment in which the |
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IPsec implementation executes. For example, defects in OS security, |
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poor quality of random number sources, sloppy system management |
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protocols and practices, etc. can all degrade the security provided |
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by IPsec. As above, none of these environmental attributes are |
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within the scope of this or other IPsec standards. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. System Overview</span> |
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|
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This section provides a high level description of how IPsec works, |
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the components of the system, and how they fit together to provide |
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the security services noted above. The goal of this description is |
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to enable the reader to "picture" the overall process/system, see how |
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it fits into the IP environment, and to provide context for later |
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sections of this document, which describe each of the components in |
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more detail. |
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|
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An IPsec implementation operates in a host or a security gateway |
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environment, affording protection to IP traffic. The protection |
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offered is based on requirements defined by a Security Policy |
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Database (SPD) established and maintained by a user or system |
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administrator, or by an application operating within constraints |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
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|
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established by either of the above. In general, packets are selected |
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for one of three processing modes based on IP and transport layer |
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header information (Selectors, <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>) matched against entries |
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in the database (SPD). Each packet is either afforded IPsec security |
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services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec, based on the |
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applicable database policies identified by the Selectors. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> What IPsec Does</span> |
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|
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IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system |
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to select required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to |
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use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keys |
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required to provide the requested services. IPsec can be used to |
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protect one or more "paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pair |
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of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. (The |
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term "security gateway" is used throughout the IPsec documents to |
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refer to an intermediate system that implements IPsec protocols. For |
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example, a router or a firewall implementing IPsec is a security |
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gateway.) |
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|
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The set of security services that IPsec can provide includes access |
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control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, |
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rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity), |
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confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow |
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confidentiality. Because these services are provided at the IP |
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layer, they can be used by any higher layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, |
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ICMP, BGP, etc. |
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|
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The IPsec DOI also supports negotiation of IP compression [<a href="#ref-SMPT98" title=""IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)"">SMPT98</a>], |
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motivated in part by the observation that when encryption is employed |
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within IPsec, it prevents effective compression by lower protocol |
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layers. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> How IPsec Works</span> |
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|
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IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security -- |
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Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP). |
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Both protocols are described in more detail in their respective RFCs |
| 319 |
[<a href="#ref-KA98a" title=""IP Authentication Header"">KA98a</a>, <a href="#ref-KA98b" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">KA98b</a>]. |
| 320 |
|
| 321 |
o The IP Authentication Header (AH) [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title=""IP Authentication Header"">KA98a</a>] provides |
| 322 |
connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and an |
| 323 |
optional anti-replay service. |
| 324 |
o The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol [<a href="#ref-KA98b" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">KA98b</a>] may |
| 325 |
provide confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow |
| 326 |
confidentiality. It also may provide connectionless |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
integrity, data origin authentication, and an anti-replay |
| 338 |
service. (One or the other set of these security services |
| 339 |
must be applied whenever ESP is invoked.) |
| 340 |
o Both AH and ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the |
| 341 |
distribution of cryptographic keys and the management of |
| 342 |
traffic flows relative to these security protocols. |
| 343 |
|
| 344 |
These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with each |
| 345 |
other to provide a desired set of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. |
| 346 |
Each protocol supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnel |
| 347 |
mode. In transport mode the protocols provide protection primarily |
| 348 |
for upper layer protocols; in tunnel mode, the protocols are applied |
| 349 |
to tunneled IP packets. The differences between the two modes are |
| 350 |
discussed in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. |
| 351 |
|
| 352 |
IPsec allows the user (or system administrator) to control the |
| 353 |
granularity at which a security service is offered. For example, one |
| 354 |
can create a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between |
| 355 |
two security gateways or a separate encrypted tunnel can be created |
| 356 |
for each TCP connection between each pair of hosts communicating |
| 357 |
across these gateways. IPsec management must incorporate facilities |
| 358 |
for specifying: |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
o which security services to use and in what combinations |
| 361 |
o the granularity at which a given security protection should be |
| 362 |
applied |
| 363 |
o the algorithms used to effect cryptographic-based security |
| 364 |
|
| 365 |
Because these security services use shared secret values |
| 366 |
(cryptographic keys), IPsec relies on a separate set of mechanisms |
| 367 |
for putting these keys in place. (The keys are used for |
| 368 |
authentication/integrity and encryption services.) This document |
| 369 |
requires support for both manual and automatic distribution of keys. |
| 370 |
It specifies a specific public-key based approach (IKE -- [MSST97, |
| 371 |
Orm97, HC98]) for automatic key management, but other automated key |
| 372 |
distribution techniques MAY be used. For example, KDC-based systems |
| 373 |
such as Kerberos and other public-key systems such as SKIP could be |
| 374 |
employed. |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Where IPsec May Be Implemented</span> |
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
There are several ways in which IPsec may be implemented in a host or |
| 379 |
in conjunction with a router or firewall (to create a security |
| 380 |
gateway). Several common examples are provided below: |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation. This |
| 383 |
requires access to the IP source code and is applicable to |
| 384 |
both hosts and security gateways. |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
b. "Bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) implementations, where IPsec is |
| 394 |
implemented "underneath" an existing implementation of an IP |
| 395 |
protocol stack, between the native IP and the local network |
| 396 |
drivers. Source code access for the IP stack is not required |
| 397 |
in this context, making this implementation approach |
| 398 |
appropriate for use with legacy systems. This approach, when |
| 399 |
it is adopted, is usually employed in hosts. |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
c. The use of an outboard crypto processor is a common design |
| 402 |
feature of network security systems used by the military, and |
| 403 |
of some commercial systems as well. It is sometimes referred |
| 404 |
to as a "Bump-in-the-wire" (BITW) implementation. Such |
| 405 |
implementations may be designed to serve either a host or a |
| 406 |
gateway (or both). Usually the BITW device is IP |
| 407 |
addressable. When supporting a single host, it may be quite |
| 408 |
analogous to a BITS implementation, but in supporting a |
| 409 |
router or firewall, it must operate like a security gateway. |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Associations</span> |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
This section defines Security Association management requirements for |
| 414 |
all IPv6 implementations and for those IPv4 implementations that |
| 415 |
implement AH, ESP, or both. The concept of a "Security Association" |
| 416 |
(SA) is fundamental to IPsec. Both AH and ESP make use of SAs and a |
| 417 |
major function of IKE is the establishment and maintenance of |
| 418 |
Security Associations. All implementations of AH or ESP MUST support |
| 419 |
the concept of a Security Association as described below. The |
| 420 |
remainder of this section describes various aspects of Security |
| 421 |
Association management, defining required characteristics for SA |
| 422 |
policy management, traffic processing, and SA management techniques. |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Definition and Scope</span> |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
A Security Association (SA) is a simplex "connection" that affords |
| 427 |
security services to the traffic carried by it. Security services |
| 428 |
are afforded to an SA by the use of AH, or ESP, but not both. If |
| 429 |
both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, then two |
| 430 |
(or more) SAs are created to afford protection to the traffic stream. |
| 431 |
To secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or |
| 432 |
between two security gateways, two Security Associations (one in each |
| 433 |
direction) are required. |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting |
| 436 |
of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a |
| 437 |
security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In principle, the |
| 438 |
Destination Address may be a unicast address, an IP broadcast |
| 439 |
address, or a multicast group address. However, IPsec SA management |
| 440 |
mechanisms currently are defined only for unicast SAs. Hence, in the |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
discussions that follow, SAs will be described in the context of |
| 450 |
point-to-point communication, even though the concept is applicable |
| 451 |
in the point-to-multipoint case as well. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
As noted above, two types of SAs are defined: transport mode and |
| 454 |
tunnel mode. A transport mode SA is a security association between |
| 455 |
two hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol header |
| 456 |
appears immediately after the IP header and any options, and before |
| 457 |
any higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security |
| 458 |
protocol header appears after the base IP header and extensions, but |
| 459 |
may appear before or after destination options, and before higher |
| 460 |
layer protocols. In the case of ESP, a transport mode SA provides |
| 461 |
security services only for these higher layer protocols, not for the |
| 462 |
IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP header. In the |
| 463 |
case of AH, the protection is also extended to selected portions of |
| 464 |
the IP header, selected portions of extension headers, and selected |
| 465 |
options (contained in the IPv4 header, IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension |
| 466 |
header, or IPv6 Destination extension headers). For more details on |
| 467 |
the coverage afforded by AH, see the AH specification [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title=""IP Authentication Header"">KA98a</a>]. |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
A tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an IP tunnel. |
| 470 |
Whenever either end of a security association is a security gateway, |
| 471 |
the SA MUST be tunnel mode. Thus an SA between two security gateways |
| 472 |
is always a tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between a host and a security |
| 473 |
gateway. Note that for the case where traffic is destined for a |
| 474 |
security gateway, e.g., SNMP commands, the security gateway is acting |
| 475 |
as a host and transport mode is allowed. But in that case, the |
| 476 |
security gateway is not acting as a gateway, i.e., not transiting |
| 477 |
traffic. Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel mode SA between |
| 478 |
themselves. The requirement for any (transit traffic) SA involving a |
| 479 |
security gateway to be a tunnel SA arises due to the need to avoid |
| 480 |
potential problems with regard to fragmentation and reassembly of |
| 481 |
IPsec packets, and in circumstances where multiple paths (e.g., via |
| 482 |
different security gateways) exist to the same destination behind the |
| 483 |
security gateways. |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
For a tunnel mode SA, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies |
| 486 |
the IPsec processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that |
| 487 |
specifies the (apparently) ultimate destination for the packet. The |
| 488 |
security protocol header appears after the outer IP header, and |
| 489 |
before the inner IP header. If AH is employed in tunnel mode, |
| 490 |
portions of the outer IP header are afforded protection (as above), |
| 491 |
as well as all of the tunneled IP packet (i.e., all of the inner IP |
| 492 |
header is protected, as well as higher layer protocols). If ESP is |
| 493 |
employed, the protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not |
| 494 |
to the outer header. |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
In summary, |
| 506 |
a) A host MUST support both transport and tunnel mode. |
| 507 |
b) A security gateway is required to support only tunnel |
| 508 |
mode. If it supports transport mode, that should be used |
| 509 |
only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g., |
| 510 |
for network management. |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Security Association Functionality</span> |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
The set of security services offered by an SA depends on the security |
| 515 |
protocol selected, the SA mode, the endpoints of the SA, and on the |
| 516 |
election of optional services within the protocol. For example, AH |
| 517 |
provides data origin authentication and connectionless integrity for |
| 518 |
IP datagrams (hereafter referred to as just "authentication"). The |
| 519 |
"precision" of the authentication service is a function of the |
| 520 |
granularity of the security association with which AH is employed, as |
| 521 |
discussed in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>, "Selectors". |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
AH also offers an anti-replay (partial sequence integrity) service at |
| 524 |
the discretion of the receiver, to help counter denial of service |
| 525 |
attacks. AH is an appropriate protocol to employ when |
| 526 |
confidentiality is not required (or is not permitted, e.g , due to |
| 527 |
government restrictions on use of encryption). AH also provides |
| 528 |
authentication for selected portions of the IP header, which may be |
| 529 |
necessary in some contexts. For example, if the integrity of an IPv4 |
| 530 |
option or IPv6 extension header must be protected en route between |
| 531 |
sender and receiver, AH can provide this service (except for the |
| 532 |
non-predictable but mutable parts of the IP header.) |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
ESP optionally provides confidentiality for traffic. (The strength |
| 535 |
of the confidentiality service depends in part, on the encryption |
| 536 |
algorithm employed.) ESP also may optionally provide authentication |
| 537 |
(as defined above). If authentication is negotiated for an ESP SA, |
| 538 |
the receiver also may elect to enforce an anti-replay service with |
| 539 |
the same features as the AH anti-replay service. The scope of the |
| 540 |
authentication offered by ESP is narrower than for AH, i.e., the IP |
| 541 |
header(s) "outside" the ESP header is(are) not protected. If only |
| 542 |
the upper layer protocols need to be authenticated, then ESP |
| 543 |
authentication is an appropriate choice and is more space efficient |
| 544 |
than use of AH encapsulating ESP. Note that although both |
| 545 |
confidentiality and authentication are optional, they cannot both be |
| 546 |
omitted. At least one of them MUST be selected. |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
If confidentiality service is selected, then an ESP (tunnel mode) SA |
| 549 |
between two security gateways can offer partial traffic flow |
| 550 |
confidentiality. The use of tunnel mode allows the inner IP headers |
| 551 |
to be encrypted, concealing the identities of the (ultimate) traffic |
| 552 |
source and destination. Moreover, ESP payload padding also can be |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
invoked to hide the size of the packets, further concealing the |
| 562 |
external characteristics of the traffic. Similar traffic flow |
| 563 |
confidentiality services may be offered when a mobile user is |
| 564 |
assigned a dynamic IP address in a dialup context, and establishes a |
| 565 |
(tunnel mode) ESP SA to a corporate firewall (acting as a security |
| 566 |
gateway). Note that fine granularity SAs generally are more |
| 567 |
vulnerable to traffic analysis than coarse granularity ones which are |
| 568 |
carrying traffic from many subscribers. |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Combining Security Associations</span> |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
The IP datagrams transmitted over an individual SA are afforded |
| 573 |
protection by exactly one security protocol, either AH or ESP, but |
| 574 |
not both. Sometimes a security policy may call for a combination of |
| 575 |
services for a particular traffic flow that is not achievable with a |
| 576 |
single SA. In such instances it will be necessary to employ multiple |
| 577 |
SAs to implement the required security policy. The term "security |
| 578 |
association bundle" or "SA bundle" is applied to a sequence of SAs |
| 579 |
through which traffic must be processed to satisfy a security policy. |
| 580 |
The order of the sequence is defined by the policy. (Note that the |
| 581 |
SAs that comprise a bundle may terminate at different endpoints. For |
| 582 |
example, one SA may extend between a mobile host and a security |
| 583 |
gateway and a second, nested SA may extend to a host behind the |
| 584 |
gateway.) |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
Security associations may be combined into bundles in two ways: |
| 587 |
transport adjacency and iterated tunneling. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
o Transport adjacency refers to applying more than one |
| 590 |
security protocol to the same IP datagram, without invoking |
| 591 |
tunneling. This approach to combining AH and ESP allows |
| 592 |
for only one level of combination; further nesting yields |
| 593 |
no added benefit (assuming use of adequately strong |
| 594 |
algorithms in each protocol) since the processing is |
| 595 |
performed at one IPsec instance at the (ultimate) |
| 596 |
destination. |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 |
| 599 |
| | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | | |
| 600 |
| | | | |
| 601 |
| -----Security Association 1 (ESP transport)------- | |
| 602 |
| | |
| 603 |
-------Security Association 2 (AH transport)---------- |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
o Iterated tunneling refers to the application of multiple |
| 606 |
layers of security protocols effected through IP tunneling. |
| 607 |
This approach allows for multiple levels of nesting, since |
| 608 |
each tunnel can originate or terminate at a different IPsec |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
site along the path. No special treatment is expected for |
| 618 |
ISAKMP traffic at intermediate security gateways other than |
| 619 |
what can be specified through appropriate SPD entries (See |
| 620 |
Case 3 in <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a>) |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
There are 3 basic cases of iterated tunneling -- support is |
| 623 |
required only for cases 2 and 3.: |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
1. both endpoints for the SAs are the same -- The inner and |
| 626 |
outer tunnels could each be either AH or ESP, though it |
| 627 |
is unlikely that Host 1 would specify both to be the |
| 628 |
same, i.e., AH inside of AH or ESP inside of ESP. |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 |
| 631 |
| | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | | |
| 632 |
| | | | |
| 633 |
| -------Security Association 1 (tunnel)---------- | | |
| 634 |
| | |
| 635 |
---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-------------- |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
2. one endpoint of the SAs is the same -- The inner and |
| 638 |
uter tunnels could each be either AH or ESP. |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 |
| 641 |
| | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | |
| 642 |
| | | | |
| 643 |
| ----Security Association 1 (tunnel)---- | |
| 644 |
| | |
| 645 |
---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)------------- |
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
3. neither endpoint is the same -- The inner and outer |
| 648 |
tunnels could each be either AH or ESP. |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2 |
| 651 |
| Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | |
| 652 |
| | | | |
| 653 |
| --Security Assoc 1 (tunnel)- | |
| 654 |
| | |
| 655 |
-----------Security Association 2 (tunnel)----------- |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
These two approaches also can be combined, e.g., an SA bundle could |
| 658 |
be constructed from one tunnel mode SA and one or two transport mode |
| 659 |
SAs, applied in sequence. (See <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a> "Basic Combinations of |
| 660 |
Security Associations.") Note that nested tunnels can also occur |
| 661 |
where neither the source nor the destination endpoints of any of the |
| 662 |
tunnels are the same. In that case, there would be no host or |
| 663 |
security gateway with a bundle corresponding to the nested tunnels. |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
For transport mode SAs, only one ordering of security protocols seems |
| 674 |
appropriate. AH is applied to both the upper layer protocols and |
| 675 |
(parts of) the IP header. Thus if AH is used in a transport mode, in |
| 676 |
conjunction with ESP, AH SHOULD appear as the first header after IP, |
| 677 |
prior to the appearance of ESP. In that context, AH is applied to |
| 678 |
the ciphertext output of ESP. In contrast, for tunnel mode SAs, one |
| 679 |
can imagine uses for various orderings of AH and ESP. The required |
| 680 |
set of SA bundle types that MUST be supported by a compliant IPsec |
| 681 |
implementation is described in <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a>. |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a> Security Association Databases</span> |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
Many of the details associated with processing IP traffic in an IPsec |
| 686 |
implementation are largely a local matter, not subject to |
| 687 |
standardization. However, some external aspects of the processing |
| 688 |
must be standardized, to ensure interoperability and to provide a |
| 689 |
minimum management capability that is essential for productive use of |
| 690 |
IPsec. This section describes a general model for processing IP |
| 691 |
traffic relative to security associations, in support of these |
| 692 |
interoperability and functionality goals. The model described below |
| 693 |
is nominal; compliant implementations need not match details of this |
| 694 |
model as presented, but the external behavior of such implementations |
| 695 |
must be mappable to the externally observable characteristics of this |
| 696 |
model. |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
There are two nominal databases in this model: the Security Policy |
| 699 |
Database and the Security Association Database. The former specifies |
| 700 |
the policies that determine the disposition of all IP traffic inbound |
| 701 |
or outbound from a host, security gateway, or BITS or BITW IPsec |
| 702 |
implementation. The latter database contains parameters that are |
| 703 |
associated with each (active) security association. This section |
| 704 |
also defines the concept of a Selector, a set of IP and upper layer |
| 705 |
protocol field values that is used by the Security Policy Database to |
| 706 |
map traffic to a policy, i.e., an SA (or SA bundle). |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
Each interface for which IPsec is enabled requires nominally separate |
| 709 |
inbound vs. outbound databases (SAD and SPD), because of the |
| 710 |
directionality of many of the fields that are used as selectors. |
| 711 |
Typically there is just one such interface, for a host or security |
| 712 |
gateway (SG). Note that an SG would always have at least 2 |
| 713 |
interfaces, but the "internal" one to the corporate net, usually |
| 714 |
would not have IPsec enabled and so only one pair of SADs and one |
| 715 |
pair of SPDs would be needed. On the other hand, if a host had |
| 716 |
multiple interfaces or an SG had multiple external interfaces, it |
| 717 |
might be necessary to have separate SAD and SPD pairs for each |
| 718 |
interface. |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a> The Security Policy Database (SPD)</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
Ultimately, a security association is a management construct used to |
| 732 |
enforce a security policy in the IPsec environment. Thus an |
| 733 |
essential element of SA processing is an underlying Security Policy |
| 734 |
Database (SPD) that specifies what services are to be offered to IP |
| 735 |
datagrams and in what fashion. The form of the database and its |
| 736 |
interface are outside the scope of this specification. However, this |
| 737 |
section does specify certain minimum management functionality that |
| 738 |
must be provided, to allow a user or system administrator to control |
| 739 |
how IPsec is applied to traffic transmitted or received by a host or |
| 740 |
transiting a security gateway. |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
The SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic |
| 743 |
(INBOUND and OUTBOUND), including non-IPsec traffic. In order to |
| 744 |
support this, the SPD requires distinct entries for inbound and |
| 745 |
outbound traffic. One can think of this as separate SPDs (inbound |
| 746 |
vs. outbound). In addition, a nominally separate SPD must be |
| 747 |
provided for each IPsec-enabled interface. |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
An SPD must discriminate among traffic that is afforded IPsec |
| 750 |
protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. This applies |
| 751 |
to the IPsec protection to be applied by a sender and to the IPsec |
| 752 |
protection that must be present at the receiver. For any outbound or |
| 753 |
inbound datagram, three processing choices are possible: discard, |
| 754 |
bypass IPsec, or apply IPsec. The first choice refers to traffic |
| 755 |
that is not allowed to exit the host, traverse the security gateway, |
| 756 |
or be delivered to an application at all. The second choice refers |
| 757 |
to traffic that is allowed to pass without additional IPsec |
| 758 |
protection. The third choice refers to traffic that is afforded |
| 759 |
IPsec protection, and for such traffic the SPD must specify the |
| 760 |
security services to be provided, protocols to be employed, |
| 761 |
algorithms to be used, etc. |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
For every IPsec implementation, there MUST be an administrative |
| 764 |
interface that allows a user or system administrator to manage the |
| 765 |
SPD. Specifically, every inbound or outbound packet is subject to |
| 766 |
processing by IPsec and the SPD must specify what action will be |
| 767 |
taken in each case. Thus the administrative interface must allow the |
| 768 |
user (or system administrator) to specify the security processing to |
| 769 |
be applied to any packet entering or exiting the system, on a packet |
| 770 |
by packet basis. (In a host IPsec implementation making use of a |
| 771 |
socket interface, the SPD may not need to be consulted on a per |
| 772 |
packet basis, but the effect is still the same.) The management |
| 773 |
interface for the SPD MUST allow creation of entries consistent with |
| 774 |
the selectors defined in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>, and MUST support (total) |
| 775 |
ordering of these entries. It is expected that through the use of |
| 776 |
wildcards in various selector fields, and because all packets on a |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
single UDP or TCP connection will tend to match a single SPD entry, |
| 786 |
this requirement will not impose an unreasonably detailed level of |
| 787 |
SPD specification. The selectors are analogous to what are found in |
| 788 |
a stateless firewall or filtering router and which are currently |
| 789 |
manageable this way. |
| 790 |
|
| 791 |
In host systems, applications MAY be allowed to select what security |
| 792 |
processing is to be applied to the traffic they generate and consume. |
| 793 |
(Means of signalling such requests to the IPsec implementation are |
| 794 |
outside the scope of this standard.) However, the system |
| 795 |
administrator MUST be able to specify whether or not a user or |
| 796 |
application can override (default) system policies. Note that |
| 797 |
application specified policies may satisfy system requirements, so |
| 798 |
that the system may not need to do additional IPsec processing beyond |
| 799 |
that needed to meet an application's requirements. The form of the |
| 800 |
management interface is not specified by this document and may differ |
| 801 |
for hosts vs. security gateways, and within hosts the interface may |
| 802 |
differ for socket-based vs. BITS implementations. However, this |
| 803 |
document does specify a standard set of SPD elements that all IPsec |
| 804 |
implementations MUST support. |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
The SPD contains an ordered list of policy entries. Each policy |
| 807 |
entry is keyed by one or more selectors that define the set of IP |
| 808 |
traffic encompassed by this policy entry. (The required selector |
| 809 |
types are defined in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>.) These define the granularity of |
| 810 |
policies or SAs. Each entry includes an indication of whether |
| 811 |
traffic matching this policy will be bypassed, discarded, or subject |
| 812 |
to IPsec processing. If IPsec processing is to be applied, the entry |
| 813 |
includes an SA (or SA bundle) specification, listing the IPsec |
| 814 |
protocols, modes, and algorithms to be employed, including any |
| 815 |
nesting requirements. For example, an entry may call for all |
| 816 |
matching traffic to be protected by ESP in transport mode using |
| 817 |
3DES-CBC with an explicit IV, nested inside of AH in tunnel mode |
| 818 |
using HMAC/SHA-1. For each selector, the policy entry specifies how |
| 819 |
to derive the corresponding values for a new Security Association |
| 820 |
Database (SAD, see <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>) entry from those in the SPD and the |
| 821 |
packet (Note that at present, ranges are only supported for IP |
| 822 |
addresses; but wildcarding can be expressed for all selectors): |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
a. use the value in the packet itself -- This will limit use |
| 825 |
of the SA to those packets which have this packet's value |
| 826 |
for the selector even if the selector for the policy entry |
| 827 |
has a range of allowed values or a wildcard for this |
| 828 |
selector. |
| 829 |
b. use the value associated with the policy entry -- If this |
| 830 |
were to be just a single value, then there would be no |
| 831 |
difference between (b) and (a). However, if the allowed |
| 832 |
values for the selector are a range (for IP addresses) or |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
wildcard, then in the case of a range,(b) would enable use |
| 842 |
of the SA by any packet with a selector value within the |
| 843 |
range not just by packets with the selector value of the |
| 844 |
packet that triggered the creation of the SA. In the case |
| 845 |
of a wildcard, (b) would allow use of the SA by packets |
| 846 |
with any value for this selector. |
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
For example, suppose there is an SPD entry where the allowed value |
| 849 |
for source address is any of a range of hosts (192.168.2.1 to |
| 850 |
192.168.2.10). And suppose that a packet is to be sent that has a |
| 851 |
source address of 192.168.2.3. The value to be used for the SA could |
| 852 |
be any of the sample values below depending on what the policy entry |
| 853 |
for this selector says is the source of the selector value: |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
source for the example of |
| 856 |
value to be new SAD |
| 857 |
used in the SA selector value |
| 858 |
--------------- ------------ |
| 859 |
a. packet 192.168.2.3 (one host) |
| 860 |
b. SPD entry 192.168.2.1 to 192.168.2.10 (range of hosts) |
| 861 |
|
| 862 |
Note that if the SPD entry had an allowed value of wildcard for the |
| 863 |
source address, then the SAD selector value could be wildcard (any |
| 864 |
host). Case (a) can be used to prohibit sharing, even among packets |
| 865 |
that match the same SPD entry. |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
As described below in <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>, selectors may include "wildcard" |
| 868 |
entries and hence the selectors for two entries may overlap. (This |
| 869 |
is analogous to the overlap that arises with ACLs or filter entries |
| 870 |
in routers or packet filtering firewalls.) Thus, to ensure |
| 871 |
consistent, predictable processing, SPD entries MUST be ordered and |
| 872 |
the SPD MUST always be searched in the same order, so that the first |
| 873 |
matching entry is consistently selected. (This requirement is |
| 874 |
necessary as the effect of processing traffic against SPD entries |
| 875 |
must be deterministic, but there is no way to canonicalize SPD |
| 876 |
entries given the use of wildcards for some selectors.) More detail |
| 877 |
on matching of packets against SPD entries is provided in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. |
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
Note that if ESP is specified, either (but not both) authentication |
| 880 |
or encryption can be omitted. So it MUST be possible to configure |
| 881 |
the SPD value for the authentication or encryption algorithms to be |
| 882 |
"NULL". However, at least one of these services MUST be selected, |
| 883 |
i.e., it MUST NOT be possible to configure both of them as "NULL". |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
The SPD can be used to map traffic to specific SAs or SA bundles. |
| 886 |
Thus it can function both as the reference database for security |
| 887 |
policy and as the map to existing SAs (or SA bundles). (To |
| 888 |
accommodate the bypass and discard policies cited above, the SPD also |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
MUST provide a means of mapping traffic to these functions, even |
| 898 |
though they are not, per se, IPsec processing.) The way in which the |
| 899 |
SPD operates is different for inbound vs. outbound traffic and it |
| 900 |
also may differ for host vs. security gateway, BITS, and BITW |
| 901 |
implementations. Sections <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> and <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> describe the use of the SPD |
| 902 |
for outbound and inbound processing, respectively. |
| 903 |
|
| 904 |
Because a security policy may require that more than one SA be |
| 905 |
applied to a specified set of traffic, in a specific order, the |
| 906 |
policy entry in the SPD must preserve these ordering requirements, |
| 907 |
when present. Thus, it must be possible for an IPsec implementation |
| 908 |
to determine that an outbound or inbound packet must be processed |
| 909 |
thorough a sequence of SAs. Conceptually, for outbound processing, |
| 910 |
one might imagine links (to the SAD) from an SPD entry for which |
| 911 |
there are active SAs, and each entry would consist of either a single |
| 912 |
SA or an ordered list of SAs that comprise an SA bundle. When a |
| 913 |
packet is matched against an SPD entry and there is an existing SA or |
| 914 |
SA bundle that can be used to carry the traffic, the processing of |
| 915 |
the packet is controlled by the SA or SA bundle entry on the list. |
| 916 |
For an inbound IPsec packet for which multiple IPsec SAs are to be |
| 917 |
applied, the lookup based on destination address, IPsec protocol, and |
| 918 |
SPI should identify a single SA. |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
The SPD is used to control the flow of ALL traffic through an IPsec |
| 921 |
system, including security and key management traffic (e.g., ISAKMP) |
| 922 |
from/to entities behind a security gateway. This means that ISAKMP |
| 923 |
traffic must be explicitly accounted for in the SPD, else it will be |
| 924 |
discarded. Note that a security gateway could prohibit traversal of |
| 925 |
encrypted packets in various ways, e.g., having a DISCARD entry in |
| 926 |
the SPD for ESP packets or providing proxy key exchange. In the |
| 927 |
latter case, the traffic would be internally routed to the key |
| 928 |
management module in the security gateway. |
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.2" href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a> Selectors</span> |
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
An SA (or SA bundle) may be fine-grained or coarse-grained, depending |
| 933 |
on the selectors used to define the set of traffic for the SA. For |
| 934 |
example, all traffic between two hosts may be carried via a single |
| 935 |
SA, and afforded a uniform set of security services. Alternatively, |
| 936 |
traffic between a pair of hosts might be spread over multiple SAs, |
| 937 |
depending on the applications being used (as defined by the Next |
| 938 |
Protocol and Port fields), with different security services offered |
| 939 |
by different SAs. Similarly, all traffic between a pair of security |
| 940 |
gateways could be carried on a single SA, or one SA could be assigned |
| 941 |
for each communicating host pair. The following selector parameters |
| 942 |
MUST be supported for SA management to facilitate control of SA |
| 943 |
granularity. Note that in the case of receipt of a packet with an |
| 944 |
ESP header, e.g., at an encapsulating security gateway or BITW |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
implementation, the transport layer protocol, source/destination |
| 954 |
ports, and Name (if present) may be "OPAQUE", i.e., inaccessible |
| 955 |
because of encryption or fragmentation. Note also that both Source |
| 956 |
and Destination addresses should either be IPv4 or IPv6. |
| 957 |
|
| 958 |
- Destination IP Address (IPv4 or IPv6): this may be a single IP |
| 959 |
address (unicast, anycast, broadcast (IPv4 only), or multicast |
| 960 |
group), a range of addresses (high and low values (inclusive), |
| 961 |
address + mask, or a wildcard address. The last three are used |
| 962 |
to support more than one destination system sharing the same SA |
| 963 |
(e.g., behind a security gateway). Note that this selector is |
| 964 |
conceptually different from the "Destination IP Address" field |
| 965 |
in the <Destination IP Address, IPsec Protocol, SPI> tuple used |
| 966 |
to uniquely identify an SA. When a tunneled packet arrives at |
| 967 |
the tunnel endpoint, its SPI/Destination address/Protocol are |
| 968 |
used to look up the SA for this packet in the SAD. This |
| 969 |
destination address comes from the encapsulating IP header. |
| 970 |
Once the packet has been processed according to the tunnel SA |
| 971 |
and has come out of the tunnel, its selectors are "looked up" in |
| 972 |
the Inbound SPD. The Inbound SPD has a selector called |
| 973 |
destination address. This IP destination address is the one in |
| 974 |
the inner (encapsulated) IP header. In the case of a |
| 975 |
transport'd packet, there will be only one IP header and this |
| 976 |
ambiguity does not exist. [REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
- Source IP Address(es) (IPv4 or IPv6): this may be a single IP |
| 979 |
address (unicast, anycast, broadcast (IPv4 only), or multicast |
| 980 |
group), range of addresses (high and low values inclusive), |
| 981 |
address + mask, or a wildcard address. The last three are used |
| 982 |
to support more than one source system sharing the same SA |
| 983 |
(e.g., behind a security gateway or in a multihomed host). |
| 984 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
- Name: There are 2 cases (Note that these name forms are |
| 987 |
supported in the IPsec DOI.) |
| 988 |
1. User ID |
| 989 |
a. a fully qualified user name string (DNS), e.g., |
| 990 |
[email protected] |
| 991 |
b. X.500 distinguished name, e.g., C = US, SP = MA, |
| 992 |
O = GTE Internetworking, CN = Stephen T. Kent. |
| 993 |
2. System name (host, security gateway, etc.) |
| 994 |
a. a fully qualified DNS name, e.g., foo.bar.com |
| 995 |
b. X.500 distinguished name |
| 996 |
c. X.500 general name |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
NOTE: One of the possible values of this selector is "OPAQUE". |
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
[REQUIRED for the following cases. Note that support for name |
| 1010 |
forms other than addresses is not required for manually keyed |
| 1011 |
SAs. |
| 1012 |
o User ID |
| 1013 |
- native host implementations |
| 1014 |
- BITW and BITS implementations acting as HOSTS |
| 1015 |
with only one user |
| 1016 |
- security gateway implementations for INBOUND |
| 1017 |
processing. |
| 1018 |
o System names -- all implementations] |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
- Data sensitivity level: (IPSO/CIPSO labels) |
| 1021 |
[REQUIRED for all systems providing information flow security as |
| 1022 |
per <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>, OPTIONAL for all other systems.] |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
- Transport Layer Protocol: Obtained from the IPv4 "Protocol" or |
| 1025 |
the IPv6 "Next Header" fields. This may be an individual |
| 1026 |
protocol number. These packet fields may not contain the |
| 1027 |
Transport Protocol due to the presence of IP extension headers, |
| 1028 |
e.g., a Routing Header, AH, ESP, Fragmentation Header, |
| 1029 |
Destination Options, Hop-by-hop options, etc. Note that the |
| 1030 |
Transport Protocol may not be available in the case of receipt |
| 1031 |
of a packet with an ESP header, thus a value of "OPAQUE" SHOULD |
| 1032 |
be supported. |
| 1033 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 |
NOTE: To locate the transport protocol, a system has to chain |
| 1036 |
through the packet headers checking the "Protocol" or "Next |
| 1037 |
Header" field until it encounters either one it recognizes as a |
| 1038 |
transport protocol, or until it reaches one that isn't on its |
| 1039 |
list of extension headers, or until it encounters an ESP header |
| 1040 |
that renders the transport protocol opaque. |
| 1041 |
|
| 1042 |
- Source and Destination (e.g., TCP/UDP) Ports: These may be |
| 1043 |
individual UDP or TCP port values or a wildcard port. (The use |
| 1044 |
of the Next Protocol field and the Source and/or Destination |
| 1045 |
Port fields (in conjunction with the Source and/or Destination |
| 1046 |
Address fields), as an SA selector is sometimes referred to as |
| 1047 |
"session-oriented keying."). Note that the source and |
| 1048 |
destination ports may not be available in the case of receipt of |
| 1049 |
a packet with an ESP header, thus a value of "OPAQUE" SHOULD be |
| 1050 |
supported. |
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
The following table summarizes the relationship between the |
| 1053 |
"Next Header" value in the packet and SPD and the derived Port |
| 1054 |
Selector value for the SPD and SAD. |
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
Next Hdr Transport Layer Derived Port Selector Field |
| 1066 |
in Packet Protocol in SPD Value in SPD and SAD |
| 1067 |
-------- --------------- --------------------------- |
| 1068 |
ESP ESP or ANY ANY (i.e., don't look at it) |
| 1069 |
-don't care- ANY ANY (i.e., don't look at it) |
| 1070 |
specific value specific value NOT ANY (i.e., drop packet) |
| 1071 |
fragment |
| 1072 |
specific value specific value actual port selector field |
| 1073 |
not fragment |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
If the packet has been fragmented, then the port information may |
| 1076 |
not be available in the current fragment. If so, discard the |
| 1077 |
fragment. An ICMP PMTU should be sent for the first fragment, |
| 1078 |
which will have the port information. [MAY be supported] |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
The IPsec implementation context determines how selectors are used. |
| 1081 |
For example, a host implementation integrated into the stack may make |
| 1082 |
use of a socket interface. When a new connection is established the |
| 1083 |
SPD can be consulted and an SA (or SA bundle) bound to the socket. |
| 1084 |
Thus traffic sent via that socket need not result in additional |
| 1085 |
lookups to the SPD/SAD. In contrast, a BITS, BITW, or security |
| 1086 |
gateway implementation needs to look at each packet and perform an |
| 1087 |
SPD/SAD lookup based on the selectors. The allowable values for the |
| 1088 |
selector fields differ between the traffic flow, the security |
| 1089 |
association, and the security policy. |
| 1090 |
|
| 1091 |
The following table summarizes the kinds of entries that one needs to |
| 1092 |
be able to express in the SPD and SAD. It shows how they relate to |
| 1093 |
the fields in data traffic being subjected to IPsec screening. |
| 1094 |
(Note: the "wild" or "wildcard" entry for src and dst addresses |
| 1095 |
includes a mask, range, etc.) |
| 1096 |
|
| 1097 |
Field Traffic Value SAD Entry SPD Entry |
| 1098 |
-------- ------------- ---------------- -------------------- |
| 1099 |
src addr single IP addr single,range,wild single,range,wildcard |
| 1100 |
dst addr single IP addr single,range,wild single,range,wildcard |
| 1101 |
xpt protocol* xpt protocol single,wildcard single,wildcard |
| 1102 |
src port* single src port single,wildcard single,wildcard |
| 1103 |
dst port* single dst port single,wildcard single,wildcard |
| 1104 |
user id* single user id single,wildcard single,wildcard |
| 1105 |
sec. labels single value single,wildcard single,wildcard |
| 1106 |
|
| 1107 |
* The SAD and SPD entries for these fields could be "OPAQUE" |
| 1108 |
because the traffic value is encrypted. |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
NOTE: In principle, one could have selectors and/or selector values |
| 1111 |
in the SPD which cannot be negotiated for an SA or SA bundle. |
| 1112 |
Examples might include selector values used to select traffic for |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
discarding or enumerated lists which cause a separate SA to be |
| 1122 |
created for each item on the list. For now, this is left for future |
| 1123 |
versions of this document and the list of required selectors and |
| 1124 |
selector values is the same for the SPD and the SAD. However, it is |
| 1125 |
acceptable to have an administrative interface that supports use of |
| 1126 |
selector values which cannot be negotiated provided that it does not |
| 1127 |
mislead the user into believing it is creating an SA with these |
| 1128 |
selector values. For example, the interface may allow the user to |
| 1129 |
specify an enumerated list of values but would result in the creation |
| 1130 |
of a separate policy and SA for each item on the list. A vendor |
| 1131 |
might support such an interface to make it easier for its customers |
| 1132 |
to specify clear and concise policy specifications. |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.3" href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a> Security Association Database (SAD)</span> |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
In each IPsec implementation there is a nominal Security Association |
| 1137 |
Database, in which each entry defines the parameters associated with |
| 1138 |
one SA. Each SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound processing, |
| 1139 |
entries are pointed to by entries in the SPD. Note that if an SPD |
| 1140 |
entry does not currently point to an SA that is appropriate for the |
| 1141 |
packet, the implementation creates an appropriate SA (or SA Bundle) |
| 1142 |
and links the SPD entry to the SAD entry (see <a href="#section-5.1.1">Section 5.1.1</a>). For |
| 1143 |
inbound processing, each entry in the SAD is indexed by a destination |
| 1144 |
IP address, IPsec protocol type, and SPI. The following parameters |
| 1145 |
are associated with each entry in the SAD. This description does not |
| 1146 |
purport to be a MIB, but only a specification of the minimal data |
| 1147 |
items required to support an SA in an IPsec implementation. |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
For inbound processing: The following packet fields are used to look |
| 1150 |
up the SA in the SAD: |
| 1151 |
|
| 1152 |
o Outer Header's Destination IP address: the IPv4 or IPv6 |
| 1153 |
Destination address. |
| 1154 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 1155 |
o IPsec Protocol: AH or ESP, used as an index for SA lookup |
| 1156 |
in this database. Specifies the IPsec protocol to be |
| 1157 |
applied to the traffic on this SA. |
| 1158 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 1159 |
o SPI: the 32-bit value used to distinguish among different |
| 1160 |
SAs terminating at the same destination and using the same |
| 1161 |
IPsec protocol. |
| 1162 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
For each of the selectors defined in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>, the SA entry in |
| 1165 |
the SAD MUST contain the value or values which were negotiated at the |
| 1166 |
time the SA was created. For the sender, these values are used to |
| 1167 |
decide whether a given SA is appropriate for use with an outbound |
| 1168 |
packet. This is part of checking to see if there is an existing SA |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
that can be used. For the receiver, these values are used to check |
| 1178 |
that the selector values in an inbound packet match those for the SA |
| 1179 |
(and thus indirectly those for the matching policy). For the |
| 1180 |
receiver, this is part of verifying that the SA was appropriate for |
| 1181 |
this packet. (See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> for rules for ICMP messages.) These |
| 1182 |
fields can have the form of specific values, ranges, wildcards, or |
| 1183 |
"OPAQUE" as described in <a href="#section-4.4.2">section 4.4.2</a>, "Selectors". Note that for |
| 1184 |
an ESP SA, the encryption algorithm or the authentication algorithm |
| 1185 |
could be "NULL". However they MUST not both be "NULL". |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
The following SAD fields are used in doing IPsec processing: |
| 1188 |
|
| 1189 |
o Sequence Number Counter: a 32-bit value used to generate the |
| 1190 |
Sequence Number field in AH or ESP headers. |
| 1191 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations, but used only for outbound |
| 1192 |
traffic.] |
| 1193 |
o Sequence Counter Overflow: a flag indicating whether overflow |
| 1194 |
of the Sequence Number Counter should generate an auditable |
| 1195 |
event and prevent transmission of additional packets on the |
| 1196 |
SA. |
| 1197 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations, but used only for outbound |
| 1198 |
traffic.] |
| 1199 |
o Anti-Replay Window: a 32-bit counter and a bit-map (or |
| 1200 |
equivalent) used to determine whether an inbound AH or ESP |
| 1201 |
packet is a replay. |
| 1202 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations but used only for inbound |
| 1203 |
traffic. NOTE: If anti-replay has been disabled by the |
| 1204 |
receiver, e.g., in the case of a manually keyed SA, then the |
| 1205 |
Anti-Replay Window is not used.] |
| 1206 |
o AH Authentication algorithm, keys, etc. |
| 1207 |
[REQUIRED for AH implementations] |
| 1208 |
o ESP Encryption algorithm, keys, IV mode, IV, etc. |
| 1209 |
[REQUIRED for ESP implementations] |
| 1210 |
o ESP authentication algorithm, keys, etc. If the |
| 1211 |
authentication service is not selected, this field will be |
| 1212 |
null. |
| 1213 |
[REQUIRED for ESP implementations] |
| 1214 |
o Lifetime of this Security Association: a time interval after |
| 1215 |
which an SA must be replaced with a new SA (and new SPI) or |
| 1216 |
terminated, plus an indication of which of these actions |
| 1217 |
should occur. This may be expressed as a time or byte count, |
| 1218 |
or a simultaneous use of both, the first lifetime to expire |
| 1219 |
taking precedence. A compliant implementation MUST support |
| 1220 |
both types of lifetimes, and must support a simultaneous use |
| 1221 |
of both. If time is employed, and if IKE employs X.509 |
| 1222 |
certificates for SA establishment, the SA lifetime must be |
| 1223 |
constrained by the validity intervals of the certificates, |
| 1224 |
and the NextIssueDate of the CRLs used in the IKE exchange |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
for the SA. Both initiator and responder are responsible for |
| 1234 |
constraining SA lifetime in this fashion. |
| 1235 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations] |
| 1236 |
|
| 1237 |
NOTE: The details of how to handle the refreshing of keys |
| 1238 |
when SAs expire is a local matter. However, one reasonable |
| 1239 |
approach is: |
| 1240 |
(a) If byte count is used, then the implementation |
| 1241 |
SHOULD count the number of bytes to which the IPsec |
| 1242 |
algorithm is applied. For ESP, this is the encryption |
| 1243 |
algorithm (including Null encryption) and for AH, |
| 1244 |
this is the authentication algorithm. This includes |
| 1245 |
pad bytes, etc. Note that implementations SHOULD be |
| 1246 |
able to handle having the counters at the ends of an |
| 1247 |
SA get out of synch, e.g., because of packet loss or |
| 1248 |
because the implementations at each end of the SA |
| 1249 |
aren't doing things the same way. |
| 1250 |
(b) There SHOULD be two kinds of lifetime -- a soft |
| 1251 |
lifetime which warns the implementation to initiate |
| 1252 |
action such as setting up a replacement SA and a |
| 1253 |
hard lifetime when the current SA ends. |
| 1254 |
(c) If the entire packet does not get delivered during |
| 1255 |
the SAs lifetime, the packet SHOULD be discarded. |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
o IPsec protocol mode: tunnel, transport or wildcard. |
| 1258 |
Indicates which mode of AH or ESP is applied to traffic on |
| 1259 |
this SA. Note that if this field is "wildcard" at the |
| 1260 |
sending end of the SA, then the application has to specify |
| 1261 |
the mode to the IPsec implementation. This use of wildcard |
| 1262 |
allows the same SA to be used for either tunnel or transport |
| 1263 |
mode traffic on a per packet basis, e.g., by different |
| 1264 |
sockets. The receiver does not need to know the mode in |
| 1265 |
order to properly process the packet's IPsec headers. |
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 |
[REQUIRED as follows, unless implicitly defined by context: |
| 1268 |
- host implementations must support all modes |
| 1269 |
- gateway implementations must support tunnel mode] |
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
NOTE: The use of wildcard for the protocol mode of an inbound |
| 1272 |
SA may add complexity to the situation in the receiver (host |
| 1273 |
only). Since the packets on such an SA could be delivered in |
| 1274 |
either tunnel or transport mode, the security of an incoming |
| 1275 |
packet could depend in part on which mode had been used to |
| 1276 |
deliver it. If, as a result, an application cared about the |
| 1277 |
SA mode of a given packet, then the application would need a |
| 1278 |
mechanism to obtain this mode information. |
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
o Path MTU: any observed path MTU and aging variables. See |
| 1290 |
<a href="#section-6.1.2.4">Section 6.1.2.4</a> |
| 1291 |
[REQUIRED for all implementations but used only for outbound |
| 1292 |
traffic] |
| 1293 |
|
| 1294 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a> Basic Combinations of Security Associations</span> |
| 1295 |
|
| 1296 |
This section describes four examples of combinations of security |
| 1297 |
associations that MUST be supported by compliant IPsec hosts or |
| 1298 |
security gateways. Additional combinations of AH and/or ESP in |
| 1299 |
tunnel and/or transport modes MAY be supported at the discretion of |
| 1300 |
the implementor. Compliant implementations MUST be capable of |
| 1301 |
generating these four combinations and on receipt, of processing |
| 1302 |
them, but SHOULD be able to receive and process any combination. The |
| 1303 |
diagrams and text below describe the basic cases. The legend for the |
| 1304 |
diagrams is: |
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
==== = one or more security associations (AH or ESP, transport |
| 1307 |
or tunnel) |
| 1308 |
---- = connectivity (or if so labelled, administrative boundary) |
| 1309 |
Hx = host x |
| 1310 |
SGx = security gateway x |
| 1311 |
X* = X supports IPsec |
| 1312 |
|
| 1313 |
NOTE: The security associations below can be either AH or ESP. The |
| 1314 |
mode (tunnel vs transport) is determined by the nature of the |
| 1315 |
endpoints. For host-to-host SAs, the mode can be either transport or |
| 1316 |
tunnel. |
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 |
Case 1. The case of providing end-to-end security between 2 hosts |
| 1319 |
across the Internet (or an Intranet). |
| 1320 |
|
| 1321 |
==================================== |
| 1322 |
| | |
| 1323 |
H1* ------ (Inter/Intranet) ------ H2* |
| 1324 |
|
| 1325 |
Note that either transport or tunnel mode can be selected by the |
| 1326 |
hosts. So the headers in a packet between H1 and H2 could look |
| 1327 |
like any of the following: |
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 |
Transport Tunnel |
| 1330 |
----------------- --------------------- |
| 1331 |
1. [IP1][AH][upper] 4. [IP2][AH][IP1][upper] |
| 1332 |
2. [IP1][ESP][upper] 5. [IP2][ESP][IP1][upper] |
| 1333 |
3. [IP1][AH][ESP][upper] |
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
Note that there is no requirement to support general nesting, |
| 1346 |
but in transport mode, both AH and ESP can be applied to the |
| 1347 |
packet. In this event, the SA establishment procedure MUST |
| 1348 |
ensure that first ESP, then AH are applied to the packet. |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
Case 2. This case illustrates simple virtual private networks |
| 1351 |
support. |
| 1352 |
|
| 1353 |
=========================== |
| 1354 |
| | |
| 1355 |
---------------------|---- ---|----------------------- |
| 1356 |
| | | | | | |
| 1357 |
| H1 -- (Local --- SG1* |--- (Internet) ---| SG2* --- (Local --- H2 | |
| 1358 |
| Intranet) | | Intranet) | |
| 1359 |
-------------------------- --------------------------- |
| 1360 |
admin. boundary admin. boundary |
| 1361 |
|
| 1362 |
Only tunnel mode is required here. So the headers in a packet |
| 1363 |
between SG1 and SG2 could look like either of the following: |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
Tunnel |
| 1366 |
--------------------- |
| 1367 |
4. [IP2][AH][IP1][upper] |
| 1368 |
5. [IP2][ESP][IP1][upper] |
| 1369 |
|
| 1370 |
Case 3. This case combines cases 1 and 2, adding end-to-end security |
| 1371 |
between the sending and receiving hosts. It imposes no new |
| 1372 |
requirements on the hosts or security gateways, other than a |
| 1373 |
requirement for a security gateway to be configurable to pass |
| 1374 |
IPsec traffic (including ISAKMP traffic) for hosts behind it. |
| 1375 |
|
| 1376 |
=============================================================== |
| 1377 |
| | |
| 1378 |
| ========================= | |
| 1379 |
| | | | |
| 1380 |
---|-----------------|---- ---|-------------------|--- |
| 1381 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 1382 |
| H1* -- (Local --- SG1* |-- (Internet) --| SG2* --- (Local --- H2* | |
| 1383 |
| Intranet) | | Intranet) | |
| 1384 |
-------------------------- --------------------------- |
| 1385 |
admin. boundary admin. boundary |
| 1386 |
|
| 1387 |
Case 4. This covers the situation where a remote host (H1) uses the |
| 1388 |
Internet to reach an organization's firewall (SG2) and to then |
| 1389 |
gain access to some server or other machine (H2). The remote |
| 1390 |
host could be a mobile host (H1) dialing up to a local PPP/ARA |
| 1391 |
server (not shown) on the Internet and then crossing the |
| 1392 |
Internet to the home organization's firewall (SG2), etc. The |
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
details of support for this case, (how H1 locates SG2, |
| 1402 |
authenticates it, and verifies its authorization to represent |
| 1403 |
H2) are discussed in <a href="#section-4.6.3">Section 4.6.3</a>, "Locating a Security |
| 1404 |
Gateway". |
| 1405 |
|
| 1406 |
====================================================== |
| 1407 |
| | |
| 1408 |
|============================== | |
| 1409 |
|| | | |
| 1410 |
|| ---|----------------------|--- |
| 1411 |
|| | | | | |
| 1412 |
H1* ----- (Internet) ------| SG2* ---- (Local ----- H2* | |
| 1413 |
^ | Intranet) | |
| 1414 |
| ------------------------------ |
| 1415 |
could be dialup admin. boundary (optional) |
| 1416 |
to PPP/ARA server |
| 1417 |
|
| 1418 |
Only tunnel mode is required between H1 and SG2. So the choices |
| 1419 |
for the SA between H1 and SG2 would be one of the ones in case |
| 1420 |
2. The choices for the SA between H1 and H2 would be one of the |
| 1421 |
ones in case 1. |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
Note that in this case, the sender MUST apply the transport |
| 1424 |
header before the tunnel header. Therefore the management |
| 1425 |
interface to the IPsec implementation MUST support configuration |
| 1426 |
of the SPD and SAD to ensure this ordering of IPsec header |
| 1427 |
application. |
| 1428 |
|
| 1429 |
As noted above, support for additional combinations of AH and ESP is |
| 1430 |
optional. Use of other, optional combinations may adversely affect |
| 1431 |
interoperability. |
| 1432 |
|
| 1433 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a> SA and Key Management</span> |
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 |
IPsec mandates support for both manual and automated SA and |
| 1436 |
cryptographic key management. The IPsec protocols, AH and ESP, are |
| 1437 |
largely independent of the associated SA management techniques, |
| 1438 |
although the techniques involved do affect some of the security |
| 1439 |
services offered by the protocols. For example, the optional anti- |
| 1440 |
replay services available for AH and ESP require automated SA |
| 1441 |
management. Moreover, the granularity of key distribution employed |
| 1442 |
with IPsec determines the granularity of authentication provided. |
| 1443 |
(See also a discussion of this issue in <a href="#section-4.7">Section 4.7</a>.) In general, |
| 1444 |
data origin authentication in AH and ESP is limited by the extent to |
| 1445 |
which secrets used with the authentication algorithm (or with a key |
| 1446 |
management protocol that creates such secrets) are shared among |
| 1447 |
multiple possible sources. |
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
The following text describes the minimum requirements for both types |
| 1458 |
of SA management. |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.1" href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a> Manual Techniques</span> |
| 1461 |
|
| 1462 |
The simplest form of management is manual management, in which a |
| 1463 |
person manually configures each system with keying material and |
| 1464 |
security association management data relevant to secure communication |
| 1465 |
with other systems. Manual techniques are practical in small, static |
| 1466 |
environments but they do not scale well. For example, a company |
| 1467 |
could create a Virtual Private Network (VPN) using IPsec in security |
| 1468 |
gateways at several sites. If the number of sites is small, and |
| 1469 |
since all the sites come under the purview of a single administrative |
| 1470 |
domain, this is likely to be a feasible context for manual management |
| 1471 |
techniques. In this case, the security gateway might selectively |
| 1472 |
protect traffic to and from other sites within the organization using |
| 1473 |
a manually configured key, while not protecting traffic for other |
| 1474 |
destinations. It also might be appropriate when only selected |
| 1475 |
communications need to be secured. A similar argument might apply to |
| 1476 |
use of IPsec entirely within an organization for a small number of |
| 1477 |
hosts and/or gateways. Manual management techniques often employ |
| 1478 |
statically configured, symmetric keys, though other options also |
| 1479 |
exist. |
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.2" href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a> Automated SA and Key Management</span> |
| 1482 |
|
| 1483 |
Widespread deployment and use of IPsec requires an Internet-standard, |
| 1484 |
scalable, automated, SA management protocol. Such support is |
| 1485 |
required to facilitate use of the anti-replay features of AH and ESP, |
| 1486 |
and to accommodate on-demand creation of SAs, e.g., for user- and |
| 1487 |
session-oriented keying. (Note that the notion of "rekeying" an SA |
| 1488 |
actually implies creation of a new SA with a new SPI, a process that |
| 1489 |
generally implies use of an automated SA/key management protocol.) |
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
The default automated key management protocol selected for use with |
| 1492 |
IPsec is IKE [<a href="#ref-MSST97" title=""Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)"">MSST97</a>, <a href="#ref-Orm97" title=""The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol"">Orm97</a>, <a href="#ref-HC98" title=""The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">HC98</a>] under the IPsec domain of |
| 1493 |
interpretation [<a href="#ref-Pip98" title=""The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP"">Pip98</a>]. Other automated SA management protocols MAY |
| 1494 |
be employed. |
| 1495 |
|
| 1496 |
When an automated SA/key management protocol is employed, the output |
| 1497 |
from this protocol may be used to generate multiple keys, e.g., for a |
| 1498 |
single ESP SA. This may arise because: |
| 1499 |
|
| 1500 |
o the encryption algorithm uses multiple keys (e.g., triple DES) |
| 1501 |
o the authentication algorithm uses multiple keys |
| 1502 |
o both encryption and authentication algorithms are employed |
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
The Key Management System may provide a separate string of bits for |
| 1514 |
each key or it may generate one string of bits from which all of them |
| 1515 |
are extracted. If a single string of bits is provided, care needs to |
| 1516 |
be taken to ensure that the parts of the system that map the string |
| 1517 |
of bits to the required keys do so in the same fashion at both ends |
| 1518 |
of the SA. To ensure that the IPsec implementations at each end of |
| 1519 |
the SA use the same bits for the same keys, and irrespective of which |
| 1520 |
part of the system divides the string of bits into individual keys, |
| 1521 |
the encryption key(s) MUST be taken from the first (left-most, high- |
| 1522 |
order) bits and the authentication key(s) MUST be taken from the |
| 1523 |
remaining bits. The number of bits for each key is defined in the |
| 1524 |
relevant algorithm specification RFC. In the case of multiple |
| 1525 |
encryption keys or multiple authentication keys, the specification |
| 1526 |
for the algorithm must specify the order in which they are to be |
| 1527 |
selected from a single string of bits provided to the algorithm. |
| 1528 |
|
| 1529 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.3" href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a> Locating a Security Gateway</span> |
| 1530 |
|
| 1531 |
This section discusses issues relating to how a host learns about the |
| 1532 |
existence of relevant security gateways and once a host has contacted |
| 1533 |
these security gateways, how it knows that these are the correct |
| 1534 |
security gateways. The details of where the required information is |
| 1535 |
stored is a local matter. |
| 1536 |
|
| 1537 |
Consider a situation in which a remote host (H1) is using the |
| 1538 |
Internet to gain access to a server or other machine (H2) and there |
| 1539 |
is a security gateway (SG2), e.g., a firewall, through which H1's |
| 1540 |
traffic must pass. An example of this situation would be a mobile |
| 1541 |
host (Road Warrior) crossing the Internet to the home organization's |
| 1542 |
firewall (SG2). (See Case 4 in the <a href="#section-4.5">section 4.5</a> Basic Combinations of |
| 1543 |
Security Associations.) This situation raises several issues: |
| 1544 |
|
| 1545 |
1. How does H1 know/learn about the existence of the security |
| 1546 |
gateway SG2? |
| 1547 |
2. How does it authenticate SG2, and once it has authenticated |
| 1548 |
SG2, how does it confirm that SG2 has been authorized to |
| 1549 |
represent H2? |
| 1550 |
3. How does SG2 authenticate H1 and verify that H1 is authorized |
| 1551 |
to contact H2? |
| 1552 |
4. How does H1 know/learn about backup gateways which provide |
| 1553 |
alternate paths to H2? |
| 1554 |
|
| 1555 |
To address these problems, a host or security gateway MUST have an |
| 1556 |
administrative interface that allows the user/administrator to |
| 1557 |
configure the address of a security gateway for any sets of |
| 1558 |
destination addresses that require its use. This includes the ability |
| 1559 |
to configure: |
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 28]</span></pre> |
| 1565 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-29" ></span> |
| 1566 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
o the requisite information for locating and authenticating the |
| 1570 |
security gateway and verifying its authorization to represent |
| 1571 |
the destination host. |
| 1572 |
o the requisite information for locating and authenticating any |
| 1573 |
backup gateways and verifying their authorization to represent |
| 1574 |
the destination host. |
| 1575 |
|
| 1576 |
It is assumed that the SPD is also configured with policy information |
| 1577 |
that covers any other IPsec requirements for the path to the security |
| 1578 |
gateway and the destination host. |
| 1579 |
|
| 1580 |
This document does not address the issue of how to automate the |
| 1581 |
discovery/verification of security gateways. |
| 1582 |
|
| 1583 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7" href="#section-4.7">4.7</a> Security Associations and Multicast</span> |
| 1584 |
|
| 1585 |
The receiver-orientation of the Security Association implies that, in |
| 1586 |
the case of unicast traffic, the destination system will normally |
| 1587 |
select the SPI value. By having the destination select the SPI |
| 1588 |
value, there is no potential for manually configured Security |
| 1589 |
Associations to conflict with automatically configured (e.g., via a |
| 1590 |
key management protocol) Security Associations or for Security |
| 1591 |
Associations from multiple sources to conflict with each other. For |
| 1592 |
multicast traffic, there are multiple destination systems per |
| 1593 |
multicast group. So some system or person will need to coordinate |
| 1594 |
among all multicast groups to select an SPI or SPIs on behalf of each |
| 1595 |
multicast group and then communicate the group's IPsec information to |
| 1596 |
all of the legitimate members of that multicast group via mechanisms |
| 1597 |
not defined here. |
| 1598 |
|
| 1599 |
Multiple senders to a multicast group SHOULD use a single Security |
| 1600 |
Association (and hence Security Parameter Index) for all traffic to |
| 1601 |
that group when a symmetric key encryption or authentication |
| 1602 |
algorithm is employed. In such circumstances, the receiver knows only |
| 1603 |
that the message came from a system possessing the key for that |
| 1604 |
multicast group. In such circumstances, a receiver generally will |
| 1605 |
not be able to authenticate which system sent the multicast traffic. |
| 1606 |
Specifications for other, more general multicast cases are deferred |
| 1607 |
to later IPsec documents. |
| 1608 |
|
| 1609 |
At the time this specification was published, automated protocols for |
| 1610 |
multicast key distribution were not considered adequately mature for |
| 1611 |
standardization. For multicast groups having relatively few members, |
| 1612 |
manual key distribution or multiple use of existing unicast key |
| 1613 |
distribution algorithms such as modified Diffie-Hellman appears |
| 1614 |
feasible. For very large groups, new scalable techniques will be |
| 1615 |
needed. An example of current work in this area is the Group Key |
| 1616 |
Management Protocol (GKMP) [<a href="#ref-HM97" title=""Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) Architecture"">HM97</a>]. |
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 29]</span></pre> |
| 1621 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-30" ></span> |
| 1622 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1623 |
|
| 1624 |
|
| 1625 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IP Traffic Processing</span> |
| 1626 |
|
| 1627 |
As mentioned in <a href="#section-4.4.1">Section 4.4.1</a> "The Security Policy Database (SPD)", |
| 1628 |
the SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic |
| 1629 |
(INBOUND and OUTBOUND), including non-IPsec traffic. If no policy is |
| 1630 |
found in the SPD that matches the packet (for either inbound or |
| 1631 |
outbound traffic), the packet MUST be discarded. |
| 1632 |
|
| 1633 |
NOTE: All of the cryptographic algorithms used in IPsec expect their |
| 1634 |
input in canonical network byte order (see Appendix in <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>) and |
| 1635 |
generate their output in canonical network byte order. IP packets |
| 1636 |
are also transmitted in network byte order. |
| 1637 |
|
| 1638 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> Outbound IP Traffic Processing</span> |
| 1639 |
|
| 1640 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.1" href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle</span> |
| 1641 |
|
| 1642 |
In a security gateway or BITW implementation (and in many BITS |
| 1643 |
implementations), each outbound packet is compared against the SPD to |
| 1644 |
determine what processing is required for the packet. If the packet |
| 1645 |
is to be discarded, this is an auditable event. If the traffic is |
| 1646 |
allowed to bypass IPsec processing, the packet continues through |
| 1647 |
"normal" processing for the environment in which the IPsec processing |
| 1648 |
is taking place. If IPsec processing is required, the packet is |
| 1649 |
either mapped to an existing SA (or SA bundle), or a new SA (or SA |
| 1650 |
bundle) is created for the packet. Since a packet's selectors might |
| 1651 |
match multiple policies or multiple extant SAs and since the SPD is |
| 1652 |
ordered, but the SAD is not, IPsec MUST: |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
1. Match the packet's selector fields against the outbound |
| 1655 |
policies in the SPD to locate the first appropriate |
| 1656 |
policy, which will point to zero or more SA bundles in the |
| 1657 |
SAD. |
| 1658 |
|
| 1659 |
2. Match the packet's selector fields against those in the SA |
| 1660 |
bundles found in (1) to locate the first SA bundle that |
| 1661 |
matches. If no SAs were found or none match, create an |
| 1662 |
appropriate SA bundle and link the SPD entry to the SAD |
| 1663 |
entry. If no key management entity is found, drop the |
| 1664 |
packet. |
| 1665 |
|
| 1666 |
3. Use the SA bundle found/created in (2) to do the required |
| 1667 |
IPsec processing, e.g., authenticate and encrypt. |
| 1668 |
|
| 1669 |
In a host IPsec implementation based on sockets, the SPD will be |
| 1670 |
consulted whenever a new socket is created, to determine what, if |
| 1671 |
any, IPsec processing will be applied to the traffic that will flow |
| 1672 |
on that socket. |
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 30]</span></pre> |
| 1677 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-31" ></span> |
| 1678 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1679 |
|
| 1680 |
|
| 1681 |
NOTE: A compliant implementation MUST not allow instantiation of an |
| 1682 |
ESP SA that employs both a NULL encryption and a NULL authentication |
| 1683 |
algorithm. An attempt to negotiate such an SA is an auditable event. |
| 1684 |
|
| 1685 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2" href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a> Header Construction for Tunnel Mode</span> |
| 1686 |
|
| 1687 |
This section describes the handling of the inner and outer IP |
| 1688 |
headers, extension headers, and options for AH and ESP tunnels. This |
| 1689 |
includes how to construct the encapsulating (outer) IP header, how to |
| 1690 |
handle fields in the inner IP header, and what other actions should |
| 1691 |
be taken. The general idea is modeled after the one used in <a href="./rfc2003">RFC</a> |
| 1692 |
<a href="./rfc2003">2003</a>, "IP Encapsulation with IP": |
| 1693 |
|
| 1694 |
o The outer IP header Source Address and Destination Address |
| 1695 |
identify the "endpoints" of the tunnel (the encapsulator and |
| 1696 |
decapsulator). The inner IP header Source Address and |
| 1697 |
Destination Addresses identify the original sender and |
| 1698 |
recipient of the datagram, (from the perspective of this |
| 1699 |
tunnel), respectively. (see footnote 3 after the table in |
| 1700 |
5.1.2.1 for more details on the encapsulating source IP |
| 1701 |
address.) |
| 1702 |
o The inner IP header is not changed except to decrement the TTL |
| 1703 |
as noted below, and remains unchanged during its delivery to |
| 1704 |
the tunnel exit point. |
| 1705 |
o No change to IP options or extension headers in the inner |
| 1706 |
header occurs during delivery of the encapsulated datagram |
| 1707 |
through the tunnel. |
| 1708 |
o If need be, other protocol headers such as the IP |
| 1709 |
Authentication header may be inserted between the outer IP |
| 1710 |
header and the inner IP header. |
| 1711 |
|
| 1712 |
The tables in the following sub-sections show the handling for the |
| 1713 |
different header/option fields (constructed = the value in the outer |
| 1714 |
field is constructed independently of the value in the inner). |
| 1715 |
|
| 1716 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2.1" href="#section-5.1.2.1">5.1.2.1</a> IPv4 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode</span> |
| 1717 |
|
| 1718 |
<-- How Outer Hdr Relates to Inner Hdr --> |
| 1719 |
Outer Hdr at Inner Hdr at |
| 1720 |
IPv4 Encapsulator Decapsulator |
| 1721 |
Header fields: -------------------- ------------ |
| 1722 |
version 4 (1) no change |
| 1723 |
header length constructed no change |
| 1724 |
TOS copied from inner hdr (5) no change |
| 1725 |
total length constructed no change |
| 1726 |
ID constructed no change |
| 1727 |
flags (DF,MF) constructed, DF (4) no change |
| 1728 |
fragmt offset constructed no change |
| 1729 |
|
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 31]</span></pre> |
| 1733 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-32" ></span> |
| 1734 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
TTL constructed (2) decrement (2) |
| 1738 |
protocol AH, ESP, routing hdr no change |
| 1739 |
checksum constructed constructed (2) |
| 1740 |
src address constructed (3) no change |
| 1741 |
dest address constructed (3) no change |
| 1742 |
Options never copied no change |
| 1743 |
|
| 1744 |
1. The IP version in the encapsulating header can be different |
| 1745 |
from the value in the inner header. |
| 1746 |
|
| 1747 |
2. The TTL in the inner header is decremented by the |
| 1748 |
encapsulator prior to forwarding and by the decapsulator if |
| 1749 |
it forwards the packet. (The checksum changes when the TTL |
| 1750 |
changes.) |
| 1751 |
|
| 1752 |
Note: The decrementing of the TTL is one of the usual actions |
| 1753 |
that takes place when forwarding a packet. Packets |
| 1754 |
originating from the same node as the encapsulator do not |
| 1755 |
have their TTL's decremented, as the sending node is |
| 1756 |
originating the packet rather than forwarding it. |
| 1757 |
|
| 1758 |
3. src and dest addresses depend on the SA, which is used to |
| 1759 |
determine the dest address which in turn determines which src |
| 1760 |
address (net interface) is used to forward the packet. |
| 1761 |
|
| 1762 |
NOTE: In principle, the encapsulating IP source address can |
| 1763 |
be any of the encapsulator's interface addresses or even an |
| 1764 |
address different from any of the encapsulator's IP |
| 1765 |
addresses, (e.g., if it's acting as a NAT box) so long as the |
| 1766 |
address is reachable through the encapsulator from the |
| 1767 |
environment into which the packet is sent. This does not |
| 1768 |
cause a problem because IPsec does not currently have any |
| 1769 |
INBOUND processing requirement that involves the Source |
| 1770 |
Address of the encapsulating IP header. So while the |
| 1771 |
receiving tunnel endpoint looks at the Destination Address in |
| 1772 |
the encapsulating IP header, it only looks at the Source |
| 1773 |
Address in the inner (encapsulated) IP header. |
| 1774 |
|
| 1775 |
4. configuration determines whether to copy from the inner |
| 1776 |
header (IPv4 only), clear or set the DF. |
| 1777 |
|
| 1778 |
5. If Inner Hdr is IPv4 (Protocol = 4), copy the TOS. If Inner |
| 1779 |
Hdr is IPv6 (Protocol = 41), map the Class to TOS. |
| 1780 |
|
| 1781 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2.2" href="#section-5.1.2.2">5.1.2.2</a> IPv6 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode</span> |
| 1782 |
|
| 1783 |
See previous <a href="#section-5.1.2">section 5.1.2</a> for notes 1-5 indicated by (footnote |
| 1784 |
number). |
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 32]</span></pre> |
| 1789 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-33" ></span> |
| 1790 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 |
<-- How Outer Hdr Relates Inner Hdr ---> |
| 1794 |
Outer Hdr at Inner Hdr at |
| 1795 |
IPv6 Encapsulator Decapsulator |
| 1796 |
Header fields: -------------------- ------------ |
| 1797 |
version 6 (1) no change |
| 1798 |
class copied or configured (6) no change |
| 1799 |
flow id copied or configured no change |
| 1800 |
len constructed no change |
| 1801 |
next header AH,ESP,routing hdr no change |
| 1802 |
hop limit constructed (2) decrement (2) |
| 1803 |
src address constructed (3) no change |
| 1804 |
dest address constructed (3) no change |
| 1805 |
Extension headers never copied no change |
| 1806 |
|
| 1807 |
6. If Inner Hdr is IPv6 (Next Header = 41), copy the Class. If |
| 1808 |
Inner Hdr is IPv4 (Next Header = 4), map the TOS to Class. |
| 1809 |
|
| 1810 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> Processing Inbound IP Traffic</span> |
| 1811 |
|
| 1812 |
Prior to performing AH or ESP processing, any IP fragments are |
| 1813 |
reassembled. Each inbound IP datagram to which IPsec processing will |
| 1814 |
be applied is identified by the appearance of the AH or ESP values in |
| 1815 |
the IP Next Protocol field (or of AH or ESP as an extension header in |
| 1816 |
the IPv6 context). |
| 1817 |
|
| 1818 |
Note: <a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a> contains sample code for a bitmask check for a 32 |
| 1819 |
packet window that can be used for implementing anti-replay service. |
| 1820 |
|
| 1821 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.1" href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle</span> |
| 1822 |
|
| 1823 |
Mapping the IP datagram to the appropriate SA is simplified because |
| 1824 |
of the presence of the SPI in the AH or ESP header. Note that the |
| 1825 |
selector checks are made on the inner headers not the outer (tunnel) |
| 1826 |
headers. The steps followed are: |
| 1827 |
|
| 1828 |
1. Use the packet's destination address (outer IP header), |
| 1829 |
IPsec protocol, and SPI to look up the SA in the SAD. If |
| 1830 |
the SA lookup fails, drop the packet and log/report the |
| 1831 |
error. |
| 1832 |
|
| 1833 |
2. Use the SA found in (1) to do the IPsec processing, e.g., |
| 1834 |
authenticate and decrypt. This step includes matching the |
| 1835 |
packet's (Inner Header if tunneled) selectors to the |
| 1836 |
selectors in the SA. Local policy determines the |
| 1837 |
specificity of the SA selectors (single value, list, |
| 1838 |
range, wildcard). In general, a packet's source address |
| 1839 |
MUST match the SA selector value. However, an ICMP packet |
| 1840 |
received on a tunnel mode SA may have a source address |
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 33]</span></pre> |
| 1845 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-34" ></span> |
| 1846 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
other than that bound to the SA and thus such packets |
| 1850 |
should be permitted as exceptions to this check. For an |
| 1851 |
ICMP packet, the selectors from the enclosed problem |
| 1852 |
packet (the source and destination addresses and ports |
| 1853 |
should be swapped) should be checked against the selectors |
| 1854 |
for the SA. Note that some or all of these selectors may |
| 1855 |
be inaccessible because of limitations on how many bits of |
| 1856 |
the problem packet the ICMP packet is allowed to carry or |
| 1857 |
due to encryption. See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>. |
| 1858 |
|
| 1859 |
Do (1) and (2) for every IPsec header until a Transport |
| 1860 |
Protocol Header or an IP header that is NOT for this |
| 1861 |
system is encountered. Keep track of what SAs have been |
| 1862 |
used and their order of application. |
| 1863 |
|
| 1864 |
3. Find an incoming policy in the SPD that matches the |
| 1865 |
packet. This could be done, for example, by use of |
| 1866 |
backpointers from the SAs to the SPD or by matching the |
| 1867 |
packet's selectors (Inner Header if tunneled) against |
| 1868 |
those of the policy entries in the SPD. |
| 1869 |
|
| 1870 |
4. Check whether the required IPsec processing has been |
| 1871 |
applied, i.e., verify that the SA's found in (1) and (2) |
| 1872 |
match the kind and order of SAs required by the policy |
| 1873 |
found in (3). |
| 1874 |
|
| 1875 |
NOTE: The correct "matching" policy will not necessarily |
| 1876 |
be the first inbound policy found. If the check in (4) |
| 1877 |
fails, steps (3) and (4) are repeated until all policy |
| 1878 |
entries have been checked or until the check succeeds. |
| 1879 |
|
| 1880 |
At the end of these steps, pass the resulting packet to the Transport |
| 1881 |
Layer or forward the packet. Note that any IPsec headers processed |
| 1882 |
in these steps may have been removed, but that this information, |
| 1883 |
i.e., what SAs were used and the order of their application, may be |
| 1884 |
needed for subsequent IPsec or firewall processing. |
| 1885 |
|
| 1886 |
Note that in the case of a security gateway, if forwarding causes a |
| 1887 |
packet to exit via an IPsec-enabled interface, then additional IPsec |
| 1888 |
processing may be applied. |
| 1889 |
|
| 1890 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.2" href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a> Handling of AH and ESP tunnels</span> |
| 1891 |
|
| 1892 |
The handling of the inner and outer IP headers, extension headers, |
| 1893 |
and options for AH and ESP tunnels should be performed as described |
| 1894 |
in the tables in <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>. |
| 1895 |
|
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 34]</span></pre> |
| 1901 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-35" ></span> |
| 1902 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. ICMP Processing (relevant to IPsec)</span> |
| 1906 |
|
| 1907 |
The focus of this section is on the handling of ICMP error messages. |
| 1908 |
Other ICMP traffic, e.g., Echo/Reply, should be treated like other |
| 1909 |
traffic and can be protected on an end-to-end basis using SAs in the |
| 1910 |
usual fashion. |
| 1911 |
|
| 1912 |
An ICMP error message protected by AH or ESP and generated by a |
| 1913 |
router SHOULD be processed and forwarded in a tunnel mode SA. Local |
| 1914 |
policy determines whether or not it is subjected to source address |
| 1915 |
checks by the router at the destination end of the tunnel. Note that |
| 1916 |
if the router at the originating end of the tunnel is forwarding an |
| 1917 |
ICMP error message from another router, the source address check |
| 1918 |
would fail. An ICMP message protected by AH or ESP and generated by |
| 1919 |
a router MUST NOT be forwarded on a transport mode SA (unless the SA |
| 1920 |
has been established to the router acting as a host, e.g., a Telnet |
| 1921 |
connection used to manage a router). An ICMP message generated by a |
| 1922 |
host SHOULD be checked against the source IP address selectors bound |
| 1923 |
to the SA in which the message arrives. Note that even if the source |
| 1924 |
of an ICMP error message is authenticated, the returned IP header |
| 1925 |
could be invalid. Accordingly, the selector values in the IP header |
| 1926 |
SHOULD also be checked to be sure that they are consistent with the |
| 1927 |
selectors for the SA over which the ICMP message was received. |
| 1928 |
|
| 1929 |
The table in <a href="#appendix-D">Appendix D</a> characterize ICMP messages as being either |
| 1930 |
host generated, router generated, both, unknown/unassigned. ICMP |
| 1931 |
messages falling into the last two categories should be handled as |
| 1932 |
determined by the receiver's policy. |
| 1933 |
|
| 1934 |
An ICMP message not protected by AH or ESP is unauthenticated and its |
| 1935 |
processing and/or forwarding may result in denial of service. This |
| 1936 |
suggests that, in general, it would be desirable to ignore such |
| 1937 |
messages. However, it is expected that many routers (vs. security |
| 1938 |
gateways) will not implement IPsec for transit traffic and thus |
| 1939 |
strict adherence to this rule would cause many ICMP messages to be |
| 1940 |
discarded. The result is that some critical IP functions would be |
| 1941 |
lost, e.g., redirection and PMTU processing. Thus it MUST be |
| 1942 |
possible to configure an IPsec implementation to accept or reject |
| 1943 |
(router) ICMP traffic as per local security policy. |
| 1944 |
|
| 1945 |
The remainder of this section addresses how PMTU processing MUST be |
| 1946 |
performed at hosts and security gateways. It addresses processing of |
| 1947 |
both authenticated and unauthenticated ICMP PMTU messages. However, |
| 1948 |
as noted above, unauthenticated ICMP messages MAY be discarded based |
| 1949 |
on local policy. |
| 1950 |
|
| 1951 |
|
| 1952 |
|
| 1953 |
|
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
|
| 1956 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 35]</span></pre> |
| 1957 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-36" ></span> |
| 1958 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> PMTU/DF Processing</span> |
| 1962 |
|
| 1963 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.1" href="#section-6.1.1">6.1.1</a> DF Bit</span> |
| 1964 |
|
| 1965 |
In cases where a system (host or gateway) adds an encapsulating |
| 1966 |
header (ESP tunnel or AH tunnel), it MUST support the option of |
| 1967 |
copying the DF bit from the original packet to the encapsulating |
| 1968 |
header (and processing ICMP PMTU messages). This means that it MUST |
| 1969 |
be possible to configure the system's treatment of the DF bit (set, |
| 1970 |
clear, copy from encapsulated header) for each interface. (See |
| 1971 |
<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for rationale.) |
| 1972 |
|
| 1973 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2" href="#section-6.1.2">6.1.2</a> Path MTU Discovery (PMTU)</span> |
| 1974 |
|
| 1975 |
This section discusses IPsec handling for Path MTU Discovery |
| 1976 |
messages. ICMP PMTU is used here to refer to an ICMP message for: |
| 1977 |
|
| 1978 |
IPv4 (<a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>): |
| 1979 |
- Type = 3 (Destination Unreachable) |
| 1980 |
- Code = 4 (Fragmentation needed and DF set) |
| 1981 |
- Next-Hop MTU in the low-order 16 bits of the second |
| 1982 |
word of the ICMP header (labelled "unused" in <a href="./rfc792">RFC</a> |
| 1983 |
<a href="./rfc792">792</a>), with high-order 16 bits set to zero |
| 1984 |
|
| 1985 |
IPv6 (<a href="./rfc1885">RFC 1885</a>): |
| 1986 |
- Type = 2 (Packet Too Big) |
| 1987 |
- Code = 0 (Fragmentation needed) |
| 1988 |
- Next-Hop MTU in the 32 bit MTU field of the ICMP6 |
| 1989 |
message |
| 1990 |
|
| 1991 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.1" href="#section-6.1.2.1">6.1.2.1</a> Propagation of PMTU</span> |
| 1992 |
|
| 1993 |
The amount of information returned with the ICMP PMTU message (IPv4 |
| 1994 |
or IPv6) is limited and this affects what selectors are available for |
| 1995 |
use in further propagating the PMTU information. (See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for |
| 1996 |
more detailed discussion of this topic.) |
| 1997 |
|
| 1998 |
o PMTU message with 64 bits of IPsec header -- If the ICMP PMTU |
| 1999 |
message contains only 64 bits of the IPsec header (minimum for |
| 2000 |
IPv4), then a security gateway MUST support the following options |
| 2001 |
on a per SPI/SA basis: |
| 2002 |
|
| 2003 |
a. if the originating host can be determined (or the possible |
| 2004 |
sources narrowed down to a manageable number), send the PM |
| 2005 |
information to all the possible originating hosts. |
| 2006 |
b. if the originating host cannot be determined, store the PMTU |
| 2007 |
with the SA and wait until the next packet(s) arrive from the |
| 2008 |
originating host for the relevant security association. If |
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
|
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 36]</span></pre> |
| 2013 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-37" ></span> |
| 2014 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
|
| 2017 |
the packet(s) are bigger than the PMTU, drop the packet(s), |
| 2018 |
and compose ICMP PMTU message(s) with the new packet(s) and |
| 2019 |
the updated PMTU, and send the ICMP message(s) about the |
| 2020 |
problem to the originating host. Retain the PMTU information |
| 2021 |
for any message that might arrive subsequently (see <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">Section</a> |
| 2022 |
<a href="#section-6.1.2.4">6.1.2.4</a>, "PMTU Aging"). |
| 2023 |
|
| 2024 |
o PMTU message with >64 bits of IPsec header -- If the ICMP message |
| 2025 |
contains more information from the original packet then there may |
| 2026 |
be enough non-opaque information to immediately determine to which |
| 2027 |
host to propagate the ICMP/PMTU message and to provide that system |
| 2028 |
with the 5 fields (source address, destination address, source |
| 2029 |
port, destination port, transport protocol) needed to determine |
| 2030 |
where to store/update the PMTU. Under such circumstances, a |
| 2031 |
security gateway MUST generate an ICMP PMTU message immediately |
| 2032 |
upon receipt of an ICMP PMTU from further down the path. |
| 2033 |
|
| 2034 |
o Distributing the PMTU to the Transport Layer -- The host mechanism |
| 2035 |
for getting the updated PMTU to the transport layer is unchanged, |
| 2036 |
as specified in <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a> (Path MTU Discovery). |
| 2037 |
|
| 2038 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.2" href="#section-6.1.2.2">6.1.2.2</a> Calculation of PMTU</span> |
| 2039 |
|
| 2040 |
The calculation of PMTU from an ICMP PMTU MUST take into account the |
| 2041 |
addition of any IPsec header -- AH transport, ESP transport, AH/ESP |
| 2042 |
transport, ESP tunnel, AH tunnel. (See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for discussion of |
| 2043 |
implementation issues.) |
| 2044 |
|
| 2045 |
Note: In some situations the addition of IPsec headers could result |
| 2046 |
in an effective PMTU (as seen by the host or application) that is |
| 2047 |
unacceptably small. To avoid this problem, the implementation may |
| 2048 |
establish a threshold below which it will not report a reduced PMTU. |
| 2049 |
In such cases, the implementation would apply IPsec and then fragment |
| 2050 |
the resulting packet according to the PMTU. This would result in a |
| 2051 |
more efficient use of the available bandwidth. |
| 2052 |
|
| 2053 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.3" href="#section-6.1.2.3">6.1.2.3</a> Granularity of PMTU Processing</span> |
| 2054 |
|
| 2055 |
In hosts, the granularity with which ICMP PMTU processing can be done |
| 2056 |
differs depending on the implementation situation. Looking at a |
| 2057 |
host, there are 3 situations that are of interest with respect to |
| 2058 |
PMTU issues (See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for additional details on this topic.): |
| 2059 |
|
| 2060 |
a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation |
| 2061 |
b. Bump-in-the-stack implementations, where IPsec is implemented |
| 2062 |
"underneath" an existing implementation of a TCP/IP protocol |
| 2063 |
stack, between the native IP and the local network drivers |
| 2064 |
|
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 37]</span></pre> |
| 2069 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-38" ></span> |
| 2070 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 |
c. No IPsec implementation -- This case is included because it |
| 2074 |
is relevant in cases where a security gateway is sending PMTU |
| 2075 |
information back to a host. |
| 2076 |
|
| 2077 |
Only in case (a) can the PMTU data be maintained at the same |
| 2078 |
granularity as communication associations. In (b) and (c), the IP |
| 2079 |
layer will only be able to maintain PMTU data at the granularity of |
| 2080 |
source and destination IP addresses (and optionally TOS), as |
| 2081 |
described in <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>. This is an important difference, because more |
| 2082 |
than one communication association may map to the same source and |
| 2083 |
destination IP addresses, and each communication association may have |
| 2084 |
a different amount of IPsec header overhead (e.g., due to use of |
| 2085 |
different transforms or different algorithms). |
| 2086 |
|
| 2087 |
Implementation of the calculation of PMTU and support for PMTUs at |
| 2088 |
the granularity of individual communication associations is a local |
| 2089 |
matter. However, a socket-based implementation of IPsec in a host |
| 2090 |
SHOULD maintain the information on a per socket basis. Bump in the |
| 2091 |
stack systems MUST pass an ICMP PMTU to the host IP implementation, |
| 2092 |
after adjusting it for any IPsec header overhead added by these |
| 2093 |
systems. The calculation of the overhead SHOULD be determined by |
| 2094 |
analysis of the SPI and any other selector information present in a |
| 2095 |
returned ICMP PMTU message. |
| 2096 |
|
| 2097 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.4" href="#section-6.1.2.4">6.1.2.4</a> PMTU Aging</span> |
| 2098 |
|
| 2099 |
In all systems (host or gateway) implementing IPsec and maintaining |
| 2100 |
PMTU information, the PMTU associated with a security association |
| 2101 |
(transport or tunnel) MUST be "aged" and some mechanism put in place |
| 2102 |
for updating the PMTU in a timely manner, especially for discovering |
| 2103 |
if the PMTU is smaller than it needs to be. A given PMTU has to |
| 2104 |
remain in place long enough for a packet to get from the source end |
| 2105 |
of the security association to the system at the other end of the |
| 2106 |
security association and propagate back an ICMP error message if the |
| 2107 |
current PMTU is too big. Note that if there are nested tunnels, |
| 2108 |
multiple packets and round trip times might be required to get an |
| 2109 |
ICMP message back to an encapsulator or originating host. |
| 2110 |
|
| 2111 |
Systems SHOULD use the approach described in the Path MTU Discovery |
| 2112 |
document (<a href="./rfc1191#section-6.3">RFC 1191, Section 6.3</a>), which suggests periodically |
| 2113 |
resetting the PMTU to the first-hop data-link MTU and then letting |
| 2114 |
the normal PMTU Discovery processes update the PMTU as necessary. |
| 2115 |
The period SHOULD be configurable. |
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 |
|
| 2118 |
|
| 2119 |
|
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 |
|
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 38]</span></pre> |
| 2125 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-39" ></span> |
| 2126 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2127 |
|
| 2128 |
|
| 2129 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Auditing</span> |
| 2130 |
|
| 2131 |
Not all systems that implement IPsec will implement auditing. For |
| 2132 |
the most part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter. |
| 2133 |
However, several auditable events are identified in the AH and ESP |
| 2134 |
specifications and for each of these events a minimum set of |
| 2135 |
information that SHOULD be included in an audit log is defined. |
| 2136 |
Additional information also MAY be included in the audit log for each |
| 2137 |
of these events, and additional events, not explicitly called out in |
| 2138 |
this specification, also MAY result in audit log entries. There is |
| 2139 |
no requirement for the receiver to transmit any message to the |
| 2140 |
purported transmitter in response to the detection of an auditable |
| 2141 |
event, because of the potential to induce denial of service via such |
| 2142 |
action. |
| 2143 |
|
| 2144 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Use in Systems Supporting Information Flow Security</span> |
| 2145 |
|
| 2146 |
Information of various sensitivity levels may be carried over a |
| 2147 |
single network. Information labels (e.g., Unclassified, Company |
| 2148 |
Proprietary, Secret) [<a href="#ref-DoD85" title=""Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria"">DoD85</a>, <a href="#ref-DoD87" title=""Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria"">DoD87</a>] are often employed to distinguish |
| 2149 |
such information. The use of labels facilitates segregation of |
| 2150 |
information, in support of information flow security models, e.g., |
| 2151 |
the Bell-LaPadula model [<a href="#ref-BL73" title=""Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations and Model"">BL73</a>]. Such models, and corresponding |
| 2152 |
supporting technology, are designed to prevent the unauthorized flow |
| 2153 |
of sensitive information, even in the face of Trojan Horse attacks. |
| 2154 |
Conventional, discretionary access control (DAC) mechanisms, e.g., |
| 2155 |
based on access control lists, generally are not sufficient to |
| 2156 |
support such policies, and thus facilities such as the SPD do not |
| 2157 |
suffice in such environments. |
| 2158 |
|
| 2159 |
In the military context, technology that supports such models is |
| 2160 |
often referred to as multi-level security (MLS). Computers and |
| 2161 |
networks often are designated "multi-level secure" if they support |
| 2162 |
the separation of labelled data in conjunction with information flow |
| 2163 |
security policies. Although such technology is more broadly |
| 2164 |
applicable than just military applications, this document uses the |
| 2165 |
acronym "MLS" to designate the technology, consistent with much |
| 2166 |
extant literature. |
| 2167 |
|
| 2168 |
IPsec mechanisms can easily support MLS networking. MLS networking |
| 2169 |
requires the use of strong Mandatory Access Controls (MAC), which |
| 2170 |
unprivileged users or unprivileged processes are incapable of |
| 2171 |
controlling or violating. This section pertains only to the use of |
| 2172 |
these IP security mechanisms in MLS (information flow security |
| 2173 |
policy) environments. Nothing in this section applies to systems not |
| 2174 |
claiming to provide MLS. |
| 2175 |
|
| 2176 |
|
| 2177 |
|
| 2178 |
|
| 2179 |
|
| 2180 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 39]</span></pre> |
| 2181 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-40" ></span> |
| 2182 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2183 |
|
| 2184 |
|
| 2185 |
As used in this section, "sensitivity information" might include |
| 2186 |
implementation-defined hierarchic levels, categories, and/or |
| 2187 |
releasability information. |
| 2188 |
|
| 2189 |
AH can be used to provide strong authentication in support of |
| 2190 |
mandatory access control decisions in MLS environments. If explicit |
| 2191 |
IP sensitivity information (e.g., IPSO [<a href="#ref-Ken91" title=""US DoD Security Options for the Internet Protocol"">Ken91</a>]) is used and |
| 2192 |
confidentiality is not considered necessary within the particular |
| 2193 |
operational environment, AH can be used to authenticate the binding |
| 2194 |
between sensitivity labels in the IP header and the IP payload |
| 2195 |
(including user data). This is a significant improvement over |
| 2196 |
labeled IPv4 networks where the sensitivity information is trusted |
| 2197 |
even though there is no authentication or cryptographic binding of |
| 2198 |
the information to the IP header and user data. IPv4 networks might |
| 2199 |
or might not use explicit labelling. IPv6 will normally use implicit |
| 2200 |
sensitivity information that is part of the IPsec Security |
| 2201 |
Association but not transmitted with each packet instead of using |
| 2202 |
explicit sensitivity information. All explicit IP sensitivity |
| 2203 |
information MUST be authenticated using either ESP, AH, or both. |
| 2204 |
|
| 2205 |
Encryption is useful and can be desirable even when all of the hosts |
| 2206 |
are within a protected environment, for example, behind a firewall or |
| 2207 |
disjoint from any external connectivity. ESP can be used, in |
| 2208 |
conjunction with appropriate key management and encryption |
| 2209 |
algorithms, in support of both DAC and MAC. (The choice of |
| 2210 |
encryption and authentication algorithms, and the assurance level of |
| 2211 |
an IPsec implementation will determine the environments in which an |
| 2212 |
implementation may be deemed sufficient to satisfy MLS requirements.) |
| 2213 |
Key management can make use of sensitivity information to provide |
| 2214 |
MAC. IPsec implementations on systems claiming to provide MLS SHOULD |
| 2215 |
be capable of using IPsec to provide MAC for IP-based communications. |
| 2216 |
|
| 2217 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a> Relationship Between Security Associations and Data Sensitivity</span> |
| 2218 |
|
| 2219 |
Both the Encapsulating Security Payload and the Authentication Header |
| 2220 |
can be combined with appropriate Security Association policies to |
| 2221 |
provide multi-level secure networking. In this case each SA (or SA |
| 2222 |
bundle) is normally used for only a single instance of sensitivity |
| 2223 |
information. For example, "PROPRIETARY - Internet Engineering" must |
| 2224 |
be associated with a different SA (or SA bundle) from "PROPRIETARY - |
| 2225 |
Finance". |
| 2226 |
|
| 2227 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a> Sensitivity Consistency Checking</span> |
| 2228 |
|
| 2229 |
An MLS implementation (both host and router) MAY associate |
| 2230 |
sensitivity information, or a range of sensitivity information with |
| 2231 |
an interface, or a configured IP address with its associated prefix |
| 2232 |
(the latter is sometimes referred to as a logical interface, or an |
| 2233 |
|
| 2234 |
|
| 2235 |
|
| 2236 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 40]</span></pre> |
| 2237 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-41" ></span> |
| 2238 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2239 |
|
| 2240 |
|
| 2241 |
interface alias). If such properties exist, an implementation SHOULD |
| 2242 |
compare the sensitivity information associated with the packet |
| 2243 |
against the sensitivity information associated with the interface or |
| 2244 |
address/prefix from which the packet arrived, or through which the |
| 2245 |
packet will depart. This check will either verify that the |
| 2246 |
sensitivities match, or that the packet's sensitivity falls within |
| 2247 |
the range of the interface or address/prefix. |
| 2248 |
|
| 2249 |
The checking SHOULD be done on both inbound and outbound processing. |
| 2250 |
|
| 2251 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.3" href="#section-8.3">8.3</a> Additional MLS Attributes for Security Association Databases</span> |
| 2252 |
|
| 2253 |
<a href="#section-4.4">Section 4.4</a> discussed two Security Association databases (the |
| 2254 |
Security Policy Database (SPD) and the Security Association Database |
| 2255 |
(SAD)) and the associated policy selectors and SA attributes. MLS |
| 2256 |
networking introduces an additional selector/attribute: |
| 2257 |
|
| 2258 |
- Sensitivity information. |
| 2259 |
|
| 2260 |
The Sensitivity information aids in selecting the appropriate |
| 2261 |
algorithms and key strength, so that the traffic gets a level of |
| 2262 |
protection appropriate to its importance or sensitivity as described |
| 2263 |
in <a href="#section-8.1">section 8.1</a>. The exact syntax of the sensitivity information is |
| 2264 |
implementation defined. |
| 2265 |
|
| 2266 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.4" href="#section-8.4">8.4</a> Additional Inbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking</span> |
| 2267 |
|
| 2268 |
After an inbound packet has passed through IPsec processing, an MLS |
| 2269 |
implementation SHOULD first check the packet's sensitivity (as |
| 2270 |
defined by the SA (or SA bundle) used for the packet) with the |
| 2271 |
interface or address/prefix as described in <a href="#section-8.2">section 8.2</a> before |
| 2272 |
delivering the datagram to an upper-layer protocol or forwarding it. |
| 2273 |
|
| 2274 |
The MLS system MUST retain the binding between the data received in |
| 2275 |
an IPsec protected packet and the sensitivity information in the SA |
| 2276 |
or SAs used for processing, so appropriate policy decisions can be |
| 2277 |
made when delivering the datagram to an application or forwarding |
| 2278 |
engine. The means for maintaining this binding are implementation |
| 2279 |
specific. |
| 2280 |
|
| 2281 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.5" href="#section-8.5">8.5</a> Additional Outbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking</span> |
| 2282 |
|
| 2283 |
An MLS implementation of IPsec MUST perform two additional checks |
| 2284 |
besides the normal steps detailed in <a href="#section-5.1.1">section 5.1.1</a>. When consulting |
| 2285 |
the SPD or the SAD to find an outbound security association, the MLS |
| 2286 |
implementation MUST use the sensitivity of the data to select an |
| 2287 |
|
| 2288 |
|
| 2289 |
|
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 |
|
| 2292 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 41]</span></pre> |
| 2293 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-42" ></span> |
| 2294 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2295 |
|
| 2296 |
|
| 2297 |
appropriate outbound SA or SA bundle. The second check comes before |
| 2298 |
forwarding the packet out to its destination, and is the sensitivity |
| 2299 |
consistency checking described in <a href="#section-8.2">section 8.2</a>. |
| 2300 |
|
| 2301 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.6" href="#section-8.6">8.6</a> Additional MLS Processing for Security Gateways</span> |
| 2302 |
|
| 2303 |
An MLS security gateway MUST follow the previously mentioned inbound |
| 2304 |
and outbound processing rules as well as perform some additional |
| 2305 |
processing specific to the intermediate protection of packets in an |
| 2306 |
MLS environment. |
| 2307 |
|
| 2308 |
A security gateway MAY act as an outbound proxy, creating SAs for MLS |
| 2309 |
systems that originate packets forwarded by the gateway. These MLS |
| 2310 |
systems may explicitly label the packets to be forwarded, or the |
| 2311 |
whole originating network may have sensitivity characteristics |
| 2312 |
associated with it. The security gateway MUST create and use |
| 2313 |
appropriate SAs for AH, ESP, or both, to protect such traffic it |
| 2314 |
forwards. |
| 2315 |
|
| 2316 |
Similarly such a gateway SHOULD accept and process inbound AH and/or |
| 2317 |
ESP packets and forward appropriately, using explicit packet |
| 2318 |
labeling, or relying on the sensitivity characteristics of the |
| 2319 |
destination network. |
| 2320 |
|
| 2321 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Performance Issues</span> |
| 2322 |
|
| 2323 |
The use of IPsec imposes computational performance costs on the hosts |
| 2324 |
or security gateways that implement these protocols. These costs are |
| 2325 |
associated with the memory needed for IPsec code and data structures, |
| 2326 |
and the computation of integrity check values, encryption and |
| 2327 |
decryption, and added per-packet handling. The per-packet |
| 2328 |
computational costs will be manifested by increased latency and, |
| 2329 |
possibly, reduced throughout. Use of SA/key management protocols, |
| 2330 |
especially ones that employ public key cryptography, also adds |
| 2331 |
computational performance costs to use of IPsec. These per- |
| 2332 |
association computational costs will be manifested in terms of |
| 2333 |
increased latency in association establishment. For many hosts, it |
| 2334 |
is anticipated that software-based cryptography will not appreciably |
| 2335 |
reduce throughput, but hardware may be required for security gateways |
| 2336 |
(since they represent aggregation points), and for some hosts. |
| 2337 |
|
| 2338 |
The use of IPsec also imposes bandwidth utilization costs on |
| 2339 |
transmission, switching, and routing components of the Internet |
| 2340 |
infrastructure, components not implementing IPsec. This is due to |
| 2341 |
the increase in the packet size resulting from the addition of AH |
| 2342 |
and/or ESP headers, AH and ESP tunneling (which adds a second IP |
| 2343 |
header), and the increased packet traffic associated with key |
| 2344 |
management protocols. It is anticipated that, in most instances, |
| 2345 |
|
| 2346 |
|
| 2347 |
|
| 2348 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 42]</span></pre> |
| 2349 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-43" ></span> |
| 2350 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2351 |
|
| 2352 |
|
| 2353 |
this increased bandwidth demand will not noticeably affect the |
| 2354 |
Internet infrastructure. However, in some instances, the effects may |
| 2355 |
be significant, e.g., transmission of ESP encrypted traffic over a |
| 2356 |
dialup link that otherwise would have compressed the traffic. |
| 2357 |
|
| 2358 |
Note: The initial SA establishment overhead will be felt in the first |
| 2359 |
packet. This delay could impact the transport layer and application. |
| 2360 |
For example, it could cause TCP to retransmit the SYN before the |
| 2361 |
ISAKMP exchange is done. The effect of the delay would be different |
| 2362 |
on UDP than TCP because TCP shouldn't transmit anything other than |
| 2363 |
the SYN until the connection is set up whereas UDP will go ahead and |
| 2364 |
transmit data beyond the first packet. |
| 2365 |
|
| 2366 |
Note: As discussed earlier, compression can still be employed at |
| 2367 |
layers above IP. There is an IETF working group (IP Payload |
| 2368 |
Compression Protocol (ippcp)) working on "protocol specifications |
| 2369 |
that make it possible to perform lossless compression on individual |
| 2370 |
payloads before the payload is processed by a protocol that encrypts |
| 2371 |
it. These specifications will allow for compression operations to be |
| 2372 |
performed prior to the encryption of a payload by IPsec protocols." |
| 2373 |
|
| 2374 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Conformance Requirements</span> |
| 2375 |
|
| 2376 |
All IPv4 systems that claim to implement IPsec MUST comply with all |
| 2377 |
requirements of the Security Architecture document. All IPv6 systems |
| 2378 |
MUST comply with all requirements of the Security Architecture |
| 2379 |
document. |
| 2380 |
|
| 2381 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 2382 |
|
| 2383 |
The focus of this document is security; hence security considerations |
| 2384 |
permeate this specification. |
| 2385 |
|
| 2386 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1825">RFC 1825</a></span> |
| 2387 |
|
| 2388 |
This architecture document differs substantially from <a href="./rfc1825">RFC 1825</a> in |
| 2389 |
detail and in organization, but the fundamental notions are |
| 2390 |
unchanged. This document provides considerable additional detail in |
| 2391 |
terms of compliance specifications. It introduces the SPD and SAD, |
| 2392 |
and the notion of SA selectors. It is aligned with the new versions |
| 2393 |
of AH and ESP, which also differ from their predecessors. Specific |
| 2394 |
requirements for supported combinations of AH and ESP are newly |
| 2395 |
added, as are details of PMTU management. |
| 2396 |
|
| 2397 |
|
| 2398 |
|
| 2399 |
|
| 2400 |
|
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
|
| 2403 |
|
| 2404 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 43]</span></pre> |
| 2405 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-44" ></span> |
| 2406 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2407 |
|
| 2408 |
|
| 2409 |
Acknowledgements |
| 2410 |
|
| 2411 |
Many of the concepts embodied in this specification were derived from |
| 2412 |
or influenced by the US Government's SP3 security protocol, ISO/IEC's |
| 2413 |
NLSP, the proposed swIPe security protocol [<a href="#ref-SDNS" title="15 May 1989">SDNS</a>, <a href="#ref-ISO" title="Network Layer Security Protocol">ISO</a>, <a href="#ref-IB93" title=""Architecture and Implementation of Network-layer Security Under Unix"">IB93</a>, <a href="#ref-IBK93" title=""swIPe: Network- Layer Security for IP"">IBK93</a>], |
| 2414 |
and the work done for SNMP Security and SNMPv2 Security. |
| 2415 |
|
| 2416 |
For over 3 years (although it sometimes seems *much* longer), this |
| 2417 |
document has evolved through multiple versions and iterations. |
| 2418 |
During this time, many people have contributed significant ideas and |
| 2419 |
energy to the process and the documents themselves. The authors |
| 2420 |
would like to thank Karen Seo for providing extensive help in the |
| 2421 |
review, editing, background research, and coordination for this |
| 2422 |
version of the specification. The authors would also like to thank |
| 2423 |
the members of the IPsec and IPng working groups, with special |
| 2424 |
mention of the efforts of (in alphabetic order): Steve Bellovin, |
| 2425 |
Steve Deering, James Hughes, Phil Karn, Frank Kastenholz, Perry |
| 2426 |
Metzger, David Mihelcic, Hilarie Orman, Norman Shulman, William |
| 2427 |
Simpson, Harry Varnis, and Nina Yuan. |
| 2428 |
|
| 2429 |
|
| 2430 |
|
| 2431 |
|
| 2432 |
|
| 2433 |
|
| 2434 |
|
| 2435 |
|
| 2436 |
|
| 2437 |
|
| 2438 |
|
| 2439 |
|
| 2440 |
|
| 2441 |
|
| 2442 |
|
| 2443 |
|
| 2444 |
|
| 2445 |
|
| 2446 |
|
| 2447 |
|
| 2448 |
|
| 2449 |
|
| 2450 |
|
| 2451 |
|
| 2452 |
|
| 2453 |
|
| 2454 |
|
| 2455 |
|
| 2456 |
|
| 2457 |
|
| 2458 |
|
| 2459 |
|
| 2460 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 44]</span></pre> |
| 2461 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-45" ></span> |
| 2462 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2463 |
|
| 2464 |
|
| 2465 |
Appendix A -- Glossary |
| 2466 |
|
| 2467 |
This section provides definitions for several key terms that are |
| 2468 |
employed in this document. Other documents provide additional |
| 2469 |
definitions and background information relevant to this technology, |
| 2470 |
e.g., [<a href="#ref-VK83" title=""Security Mechanisms in High- level Networks"">VK83</a>, <a href="#ref-HA94" title=""On Internet Authentication"">HA94</a>]. Included in this glossary are generic security |
| 2471 |
service and security mechanism terms, plus IPsec-specific terms. |
| 2472 |
|
| 2473 |
Access Control |
| 2474 |
Access control is a security service that prevents unauthorized |
| 2475 |
use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource |
| 2476 |
in an unauthorized manner. In the IPsec context, the resource |
| 2477 |
to which access is being controlled is often: |
| 2478 |
o for a host, computing cycles or data |
| 2479 |
o for a security gateway, a network behind the gateway |
| 2480 |
or |
| 2481 |
bandwidth on that network. |
| 2482 |
|
| 2483 |
Anti-replay |
| 2484 |
[See "Integrity" below] |
| 2485 |
|
| 2486 |
Authentication |
| 2487 |
This term is used informally to refer to the combination of two |
| 2488 |
nominally distinct security services, data origin authentication |
| 2489 |
and connectionless integrity. See the definitions below for |
| 2490 |
each of these services. |
| 2491 |
|
| 2492 |
Availability |
| 2493 |
Availability, when viewed as a security service, addresses the |
| 2494 |
security concerns engendered by attacks against networks that |
| 2495 |
deny or degrade service. For example, in the IPsec context, the |
| 2496 |
use of anti-replay mechanisms in AH and ESP support |
| 2497 |
availability. |
| 2498 |
|
| 2499 |
Confidentiality |
| 2500 |
Confidentiality is the security service that protects data from |
| 2501 |
unauthorized disclosure. The primary confidentiality concern in |
| 2502 |
most instances is unauthorized disclosure of application level |
| 2503 |
data, but disclosure of the external characteristics of |
| 2504 |
communication also can be a concern in some circumstances. |
| 2505 |
Traffic flow confidentiality is the service that addresses this |
| 2506 |
latter concern by concealing source and destination addresses, |
| 2507 |
message length, or frequency of communication. In the IPsec |
| 2508 |
context, using ESP in tunnel mode, especially at a security |
| 2509 |
gateway, can provide some level of traffic flow confidentiality. |
| 2510 |
(See also traffic analysis, below.) |
| 2511 |
|
| 2512 |
|
| 2513 |
|
| 2514 |
|
| 2515 |
|
| 2516 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 45]</span></pre> |
| 2517 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-46" ></span> |
| 2518 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2519 |
|
| 2520 |
|
| 2521 |
Encryption |
| 2522 |
Encryption is a security mechanism used to transform data from |
| 2523 |
an intelligible form (plaintext) into an unintelligible form |
| 2524 |
(ciphertext), to provide confidentiality. The inverse |
| 2525 |
transformation process is designated "decryption". Oftimes the |
| 2526 |
term "encryption" is used to generically refer to both |
| 2527 |
processes. |
| 2528 |
|
| 2529 |
Data Origin Authentication |
| 2530 |
Data origin authentication is a security service that verifies |
| 2531 |
the identity of the claimed source of data. This service is |
| 2532 |
usually bundled with connectionless integrity service. |
| 2533 |
|
| 2534 |
Integrity |
| 2535 |
Integrity is a security service that ensures that modifications |
| 2536 |
to data are detectable. Integrity comes in various flavors to |
| 2537 |
match application requirements. IPsec supports two forms of |
| 2538 |
integrity: connectionless and a form of partial sequence |
| 2539 |
integrity. Connectionless integrity is a service that detects |
| 2540 |
modification of an individual IP datagram, without regard to the |
| 2541 |
ordering of the datagram in a stream of traffic. The form of |
| 2542 |
partial sequence integrity offered in IPsec is referred to as |
| 2543 |
anti-replay integrity, and it detects arrival of duplicate IP |
| 2544 |
datagrams (within a constrained window). This is in contrast to |
| 2545 |
connection-oriented integrity, which imposes more stringent |
| 2546 |
sequencing requirements on traffic, e.g., to be able to detect |
| 2547 |
lost or re-ordered messages. Although authentication and |
| 2548 |
integrity services often are cited separately, in practice they |
| 2549 |
are intimately connected and almost always offered in tandem. |
| 2550 |
|
| 2551 |
Security Association (SA) |
| 2552 |
A simplex (uni-directional) logical connection, created for |
| 2553 |
security purposes. All traffic traversing an SA is provided the |
| 2554 |
same security processing. In IPsec, an SA is an internet layer |
| 2555 |
abstraction implemented through the use of AH or ESP. |
| 2556 |
|
| 2557 |
Security Gateway |
| 2558 |
A security gateway is an intermediate system that acts as the |
| 2559 |
communications interface between two networks. The set of hosts |
| 2560 |
(and networks) on the external side of the security gateway is |
| 2561 |
viewed as untrusted (or less trusted), while the networks and |
| 2562 |
hosts and on the internal side are viewed as trusted (or more |
| 2563 |
trusted). The internal subnets and hosts served by a security |
| 2564 |
gateway are presumed to be trusted by virtue of sharing a |
| 2565 |
common, local, security administration. (See "Trusted |
| 2566 |
Subnetwork" below.) In the IPsec context, a security gateway is |
| 2567 |
a point at which AH and/or ESP is implemented in order to serve |
| 2568 |
|
| 2569 |
|
| 2570 |
|
| 2571 |
|
| 2572 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 46]</span></pre> |
| 2573 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-47" ></span> |
| 2574 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2575 |
|
| 2576 |
|
| 2577 |
a set of internal hosts, providing security services for these |
| 2578 |
hosts when they communicate with external hosts also employing |
| 2579 |
IPsec (either directly or via another security gateway). |
| 2580 |
|
| 2581 |
SPI |
| 2582 |
Acronym for "Security Parameters Index". The combination of a |
| 2583 |
destination address, a security protocol, and an SPI uniquely |
| 2584 |
identifies a security association (SA, see above). The SPI is |
| 2585 |
carried in AH and ESP protocols to enable the receiving system |
| 2586 |
to select the SA under which a received packet will be |
| 2587 |
processed. An SPI has only local significance, as defined by |
| 2588 |
the creator of the SA (usually the receiver of the packet |
| 2589 |
carrying the SPI); thus an SPI is generally viewed as an opaque |
| 2590 |
bit string. However, the creator of an SA may choose to |
| 2591 |
interpret the bits in an SPI to facilitate local processing. |
| 2592 |
|
| 2593 |
Traffic Analysis |
| 2594 |
The analysis of network traffic flow for the purpose of deducing |
| 2595 |
information that is useful to an adversary. Examples of such |
| 2596 |
information are frequency of transmission, the identities of the |
| 2597 |
conversing parties, sizes of packets, flow identifiers, etc. |
| 2598 |
[<a href="#ref-Sch94" title="">Sch94</a>] |
| 2599 |
|
| 2600 |
Trusted Subnetwork |
| 2601 |
A subnetwork containing hosts and routers that trust each other |
| 2602 |
not to engage in active or passive attacks. There also is an |
| 2603 |
assumption that the underlying communications channel (e.g., a |
| 2604 |
LAN or CAN) isn't being attacked by other means. |
| 2605 |
|
| 2606 |
|
| 2607 |
|
| 2608 |
|
| 2609 |
|
| 2610 |
|
| 2611 |
|
| 2612 |
|
| 2613 |
|
| 2614 |
|
| 2615 |
|
| 2616 |
|
| 2617 |
|
| 2618 |
|
| 2619 |
|
| 2620 |
|
| 2621 |
|
| 2622 |
|
| 2623 |
|
| 2624 |
|
| 2625 |
|
| 2626 |
|
| 2627 |
|
| 2628 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 47]</span></pre> |
| 2629 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-48" ></span> |
| 2630 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2631 |
|
| 2632 |
|
| 2633 |
Appendix B -- Analysis/Discussion of PMTU/DF/Fragmentation Issues |
| 2634 |
|
| 2635 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.1" href="#appendix-B.1">B.1</a> DF bit</span> |
| 2636 |
|
| 2637 |
In cases where a system (host or gateway) adds an encapsulating |
| 2638 |
header (e.g., ESP tunnel), should/must the DF bit in the original |
| 2639 |
packet be copied to the encapsulating header? |
| 2640 |
|
| 2641 |
Fragmenting seems correct for some situations, e.g., it might be |
| 2642 |
appropriate to fragment packets over a network with a very small MTU, |
| 2643 |
e.g., a packet radio network, or a cellular phone hop to mobile node, |
| 2644 |
rather than propagate back a very small PMTU for use over the rest of |
| 2645 |
the path. In other situations, it might be appropriate to set the DF |
| 2646 |
bit in order to get feedback from later routers about PMTU |
| 2647 |
constraints which require fragmentation. The existence of both of |
| 2648 |
these situations argues for enabling a system to decide whether or |
| 2649 |
not to fragment over a particular network "link", i.e., for requiring |
| 2650 |
an implementation to be able to copy the DF bit (and to process ICMP |
| 2651 |
PMTU messages), but making it an option to be selected on a per |
| 2652 |
interface basis. In other words, an administrator should be able to |
| 2653 |
configure the router's treatment of the DF bit (set, clear, copy from |
| 2654 |
encapsulated header) for each interface. |
| 2655 |
|
| 2656 |
Note: If a bump-in-the-stack implementation of IPsec attempts to |
| 2657 |
apply different IPsec algorithms based on source/destination ports, |
| 2658 |
it will be difficult to apply Path MTU adjustments. |
| 2659 |
|
| 2660 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.2" href="#appendix-B.2">B.2</a> Fragmentation</span> |
| 2661 |
|
| 2662 |
If required, IP fragmentation occurs after IPsec processing within an |
| 2663 |
IPsec implementation. Thus, transport mode AH or ESP is applied only |
| 2664 |
to whole IP datagrams (not to IP fragments). An IP packet to which |
| 2665 |
AH or ESP has been applied may itself be fragmented by routers en |
| 2666 |
route, and such fragments MUST be reassembled prior to IPsec |
| 2667 |
processing at a receiver. In tunnel mode, AH or ESP is applied to an |
| 2668 |
IP packet, the payload of which may be a fragmented IP packet. For |
| 2669 |
example, a security gateway, "bump-in-the-stack" (BITS), or "bump- |
| 2670 |
in-the-wire" (BITW) IPsec implementation may apply tunnel mode AH to |
| 2671 |
such fragments. Note that BITS or BITW implementations are examples |
| 2672 |
of where a host IPsec implementation might receive fragments to which |
| 2673 |
tunnel mode is to be applied. However, if transport mode is to be |
| 2674 |
applied, then these implementations MUST reassemble the fragments |
| 2675 |
prior to applying IPsec. |
| 2676 |
|
| 2677 |
|
| 2678 |
|
| 2679 |
|
| 2680 |
|
| 2681 |
|
| 2682 |
|
| 2683 |
|
| 2684 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 48]</span></pre> |
| 2685 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-49" ></span> |
| 2686 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2687 |
|
| 2688 |
|
| 2689 |
NOTE: IPsec always has to figure out what the encapsulating IP header |
| 2690 |
fields are. This is independent of where you insert IPsec and is |
| 2691 |
intrinsic to the definition of IPsec. Therefore any IPsec |
| 2692 |
implementation that is not integrated into an IP implementation must |
| 2693 |
include code to construct the necessary IP headers (e.g., IP2): |
| 2694 |
|
| 2695 |
o AH-tunnel --> IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data |
| 2696 |
o ESP-tunnel --> IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer |
| 2697 |
|
| 2698 |
********************************************************************* |
| 2699 |
|
| 2700 |
Overall, the fragmentation/reassembly approach described above works |
| 2701 |
for all cases examined. |
| 2702 |
|
| 2703 |
AH Xport AH Tunnel ESP Xport ESP Tunnel |
| 2704 |
Implementation approach IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6 |
| 2705 |
----------------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- |
| 2706 |
Hosts (integr w/ IP stack) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y |
| 2707 |
Hosts (betw/ IP and drivers) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y |
| 2708 |
S. Gwy (integr w/ IP stack) Y Y Y Y |
| 2709 |
Outboard crypto processor * |
| 2710 |
|
| 2711 |
* If the crypto processor system has its own IP address, then it |
| 2712 |
is covered by the security gateway case. This box receives |
| 2713 |
the packet from the host and performs IPsec processing. It |
| 2714 |
has to be able to handle the same AH, ESP, and related |
| 2715 |
IPv4/IPv6 tunnel processing that a security gateway would have |
| 2716 |
to handle. If it doesn't have it's own address, then it is |
| 2717 |
similar to the bump-in-the stack implementation between IP and |
| 2718 |
the network drivers. |
| 2719 |
|
| 2720 |
The following analysis assumes that: |
| 2721 |
|
| 2722 |
1. There is only one IPsec module in a given system's stack. |
| 2723 |
There isn't an IPsec module A (adding ESP/encryption and |
| 2724 |
thus) hiding the transport protocol, SRC port, and DEST port |
| 2725 |
from IPsec module B. |
| 2726 |
2. There are several places where IPsec could be implemented (as |
| 2727 |
shown in the table above). |
| 2728 |
a. Hosts with integration of IPsec into the native IP |
| 2729 |
implementation. Implementer has access to the source |
| 2730 |
for the stack. |
| 2731 |
b. Hosts with bump-in-the-stack implementations, where |
| 2732 |
IPsec is implemented between IP and the local network |
| 2733 |
drivers. Source access for stack is not available; |
| 2734 |
but there are well-defined interfaces that allows the |
| 2735 |
IPsec code to be incorporated into the system. |
| 2736 |
|
| 2737 |
|
| 2738 |
|
| 2739 |
|
| 2740 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 49]</span></pre> |
| 2741 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-50" ></span> |
| 2742 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2743 |
|
| 2744 |
|
| 2745 |
c. Security gateways and outboard crypto processors with |
| 2746 |
integration of IPsec into the stack. |
| 2747 |
3. Not all of the above approaches are feasible in all hosts. |
| 2748 |
But it was assumed that for each approach, there are some |
| 2749 |
hosts for whom the approach is feasible. |
| 2750 |
|
| 2751 |
For each of the above 3 categories, there are IPv4 and IPv6, AH |
| 2752 |
transport and tunnel modes, and ESP transport and tunnel modes -- for |
| 2753 |
a total of 24 cases (3 x 2 x 4). |
| 2754 |
|
| 2755 |
Some header fields and interface fields are listed here for ease of |
| 2756 |
reference -- they're not in the header order, but instead listed to |
| 2757 |
allow comparison between the columns. (* = not covered by AH |
| 2758 |
authentication. ESP authentication doesn't cover any headers that |
| 2759 |
precede it.) |
| 2760 |
|
| 2761 |
IP/Transport Interface |
| 2762 |
IPv4 IPv6 (<a href="./rfc1122">RFC 1122</a> -- Sec 3.4) |
| 2763 |
---- ---- ---------------------- |
| 2764 |
Version = 4 Version = 6 |
| 2765 |
Header Len |
| 2766 |
*TOS Class,Flow Lbl TOS |
| 2767 |
Packet Len Payload Len Len |
| 2768 |
ID ID (optional) |
| 2769 |
*Flags DF |
| 2770 |
*Offset |
| 2771 |
*TTL *Hop Limit TTL |
| 2772 |
Protocol Next Header |
| 2773 |
*Checksum |
| 2774 |
Src Address Src Address Src Address |
| 2775 |
Dst Address Dst Address Dst Address |
| 2776 |
Options? Options? Opt |
| 2777 |
|
| 2778 |
? = AH covers Option-Type and Option-Length, but |
| 2779 |
might not cover Option-Data. |
| 2780 |
|
| 2781 |
The results for each of the 20 cases is shown below ("works" = will |
| 2782 |
work if system fragments after outbound IPsec processing, reassembles |
| 2783 |
before inbound IPsec processing). Notes indicate implementation |
| 2784 |
issues. |
| 2785 |
|
| 2786 |
a. Hosts (integrated into IP stack) |
| 2787 |
o AH-transport --> (IP1-AH-Transport-Data) |
| 2788 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2789 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2790 |
o AH-tunnel --> (IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data) |
| 2791 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2792 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2793 |
|
| 2794 |
|
| 2795 |
|
| 2796 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 50]</span></pre> |
| 2797 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-51" ></span> |
| 2798 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2799 |
|
| 2800 |
|
| 2801 |
o ESP-transport --> (IP1-ESP_hdr-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer) |
| 2802 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2803 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2804 |
o ESP-tunnel --> (IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer) |
| 2805 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2806 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2807 |
|
| 2808 |
b. Hosts (Bump-in-the-stack) -- put IPsec between IP layer and |
| 2809 |
network drivers. In this case, the IPsec module would have to do |
| 2810 |
something like one of the following for fragmentation and |
| 2811 |
reassembly. |
| 2812 |
- do the fragmentation/reassembly work itself and |
| 2813 |
send/receive the packet directly to/from the network |
| 2814 |
layer. In AH or ESP transport mode, this is fine. In AH |
| 2815 |
or ESP tunnel mode where the tunnel end is at the ultimate |
| 2816 |
destination, this is fine. But in AH or ESP tunnel modes |
| 2817 |
where the tunnel end is different from the ultimate |
| 2818 |
destination and where the source host is multi-homed, this |
| 2819 |
approach could result in sub-optimal routing because the |
| 2820 |
IPsec module may be unable to obtain the information |
| 2821 |
needed (LAN interface and next-hop gateway) to direct the |
| 2822 |
packet to the appropriate network interface. This is not |
| 2823 |
a problem if the interface and next-hop gateway are the |
| 2824 |
same for the ultimate destination and for the tunnel end. |
| 2825 |
But if they are different, then IPsec would need to know |
| 2826 |
the LAN interface and the next-hop gateway for the tunnel |
| 2827 |
end. (Note: The tunnel end (security gateway) is highly |
| 2828 |
likely to be on the regular path to the ultimate |
| 2829 |
destination. But there could also be more than one path |
| 2830 |
to the destination, e.g., the host could be at an |
| 2831 |
organization with 2 firewalls. And the path being used |
| 2832 |
could involve the less commonly chosen firewall.) OR |
| 2833 |
- pass the IPsec'd packet back to the IP layer where an |
| 2834 |
extra IP header would end up being pre-pended and the |
| 2835 |
IPsec module would have to check and let IPsec'd fragments |
| 2836 |
go by. |
| 2837 |
OR |
| 2838 |
- pass the packet contents to the IP layer in a form such |
| 2839 |
that the IP layer recreates an appropriate IP header |
| 2840 |
|
| 2841 |
At the network layer, the IPsec module will have access to the |
| 2842 |
following selectors from the packet -- SRC address, DST address, |
| 2843 |
Next Protocol, and if there's a transport layer header --> SRC |
| 2844 |
port and DST port. One cannot assume IPsec has access to the |
| 2845 |
Name. It is assumed that the available selector information is |
| 2846 |
sufficient to figure out the relevant Security Policy entry and |
| 2847 |
Security Association(s). |
| 2848 |
|
| 2849 |
|
| 2850 |
|
| 2851 |
|
| 2852 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 51]</span></pre> |
| 2853 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-52" ></span> |
| 2854 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2855 |
|
| 2856 |
|
| 2857 |
o AH-transport --> (IP1-AH-Transport-Data) |
| 2858 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2859 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2860 |
o AH-tunnel --> (IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data) |
| 2861 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2862 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2863 |
o ESP-transport --> (IP1-ESP_hdr-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer) |
| 2864 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2865 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2866 |
o ESP-tunnel --> (IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer) |
| 2867 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2868 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2869 |
|
| 2870 |
c. Security gateways -- integrate IPsec into the IP stack |
| 2871 |
|
| 2872 |
NOTE: The IPsec module will have access to the following |
| 2873 |
selectors from the packet -- SRC address, DST address, Next |
| 2874 |
Protocol, and if there's a transport layer header --> SRC port |
| 2875 |
and DST port. It won't have access to the User ID (only Hosts |
| 2876 |
have access to User ID information.) Unlike some Bump-in-the- |
| 2877 |
stack implementations, security gateways may be able to look up |
| 2878 |
the Source Address in the DNS to provide a System Name, e.g., in |
| 2879 |
situations involving use of dynamically assigned IP addresses in |
| 2880 |
conjunction with dynamically updated DNS entries. It also won't |
| 2881 |
have access to the transport layer information if there is an ESP |
| 2882 |
header, or if it's not the first fragment of a fragmented |
| 2883 |
message. It is assumed that the available selector information |
| 2884 |
is sufficient to figure out the relevant Security Policy entry |
| 2885 |
and Security Association(s). |
| 2886 |
|
| 2887 |
o AH-tunnel --> (IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data) |
| 2888 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2889 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2890 |
o ESP-tunnel --> (IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer) |
| 2891 |
- IPv4 -- works |
| 2892 |
- IPv6 -- works |
| 2893 |
|
| 2894 |
********************************************************************** |
| 2895 |
|
| 2896 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3" href="#appendix-B.3">B.3</a> Path MTU Discovery</span> |
| 2897 |
|
| 2898 |
As mentioned earlier, "ICMP PMTU" refers to an ICMP message used for |
| 2899 |
Path MTU Discovery. |
| 2900 |
|
| 2901 |
The legend for the diagrams below in B.3.1 and B.3.3 (but not B.3.2) |
| 2902 |
is: |
| 2903 |
|
| 2904 |
==== = security association (AH or ESP, transport or tunnel) |
| 2905 |
|
| 2906 |
|
| 2907 |
|
| 2908 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 52]</span></pre> |
| 2909 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-53" ></span> |
| 2910 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2911 |
|
| 2912 |
|
| 2913 |
---- = connectivity (or if so labelled, administrative boundary) |
| 2914 |
.... = ICMP message (hereafter referred to as ICMP PMTU) for |
| 2915 |
|
| 2916 |
IPv4: |
| 2917 |
- Type = 3 (Destination Unreachable) |
| 2918 |
- Code = 4 (Fragmentation needed and DF set) |
| 2919 |
- Next-Hop MTU in the low-order 16 bits of the second |
| 2920 |
word of the ICMP header (labelled unused in <a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>), |
| 2921 |
with high-order 16 bits set to zero |
| 2922 |
|
| 2923 |
IPv6 (<a href="./rfc1885">RFC 1885</a>): |
| 2924 |
- Type = 2 (Packet Too Big) |
| 2925 |
- Code = 0 (Fragmentation needed and DF set) |
| 2926 |
- Next-Hop MTU in the 32 bit MTU field of the ICMP6 |
| 2927 |
|
| 2928 |
Hx = host x |
| 2929 |
Rx = router x |
| 2930 |
SGx = security gateway x |
| 2931 |
X* = X supports IPsec |
| 2932 |
|
| 2933 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.1" href="#appendix-B.3.1">B.3.1</a> Identifying the Originating Host(s)</span> |
| 2934 |
|
| 2935 |
The amount of information returned with the ICMP message is limited |
| 2936 |
and this affects what selectors are available to identify security |
| 2937 |
associations, originating hosts, etc. for use in further propagating |
| 2938 |
the PMTU information. |
| 2939 |
|
| 2940 |
In brief... An ICMP message must contain the following information |
| 2941 |
from the "offending" packet: |
| 2942 |
- IPv4 (<a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>) -- IP header plus a minimum of 64 bits |
| 2943 |
|
| 2944 |
Accordingly, in the IPv4 context, an ICMP PMTU may identify only the |
| 2945 |
first (outermost) security association. This is because the ICMP |
| 2946 |
PMTU may contain only 64 bits of the "offending" packet beyond the IP |
| 2947 |
header, which would capture only the first SPI from AH or ESP. In |
| 2948 |
the IPv6 context, an ICMP PMTU will probably provide all the SPIs and |
| 2949 |
the selectors in the IP header, but maybe not the SRC/DST ports (in |
| 2950 |
the transport header) or the encapsulated (TCP, UDP, etc.) protocol. |
| 2951 |
Moreover, if ESP is used, the transport ports and protocol selectors |
| 2952 |
may be encrypted. |
| 2953 |
|
| 2954 |
Looking at the diagram below of a security gateway tunnel (as |
| 2955 |
mentioned elsewhere, security gateways do not use transport mode)... |
| 2956 |
|
| 2957 |
|
| 2958 |
|
| 2959 |
|
| 2960 |
|
| 2961 |
|
| 2962 |
|
| 2963 |
|
| 2964 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 53]</span></pre> |
| 2965 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-54" ></span> |
| 2966 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 2967 |
|
| 2968 |
|
| 2969 |
H1 =================== H3 |
| 2970 |
\ | | / |
| 2971 |
H0 -- SG1* ---- R1 ---- SG2* ---- R2 -- H5 |
| 2972 |
/ ^ | \ |
| 2973 |
H2 |........| H4 |
| 2974 |
|
| 2975 |
Suppose that the security policy for SG1 is to use a single SA to SG2 |
| 2976 |
for all the traffic between hosts H0, H1, and H2 and hosts H3, H4, |
| 2977 |
and H5. And suppose H0 sends a data packet to H5 which causes R1 to |
| 2978 |
send an ICMP PMTU message to SG1. If the PMTU message has only the |
| 2979 |
SPI, SG1 will be able to look up the SA and find the list of possible |
| 2980 |
hosts (H0, H1, H2, wildcard); but SG1 will have no way to figure out |
| 2981 |
that H0 sent the traffic that triggered the ICMP PMTU message. |
| 2982 |
|
| 2983 |
original after IPsec ICMP |
| 2984 |
packet processing packet |
| 2985 |
-------- ----------- ------ |
| 2986 |
IP-3 header (S = R1, D = SG1) |
| 2987 |
ICMP header (includes PMTU) |
| 2988 |
IP-2 header IP-2 header (S = SG1, D = SG2) |
| 2989 |
ESP header minimum of 64 bits of ESP hdr (*) |
| 2990 |
IP-1 header IP-1 header |
| 2991 |
TCP header TCP header |
| 2992 |
TCP data TCP data |
| 2993 |
ESP trailer |
| 2994 |
|
| 2995 |
(*) The 64 bits will include enough of the ESP (or AH) header to |
| 2996 |
include the SPI. |
| 2997 |
- ESP -- SPI (32 bits), Seq number (32 bits) |
| 2998 |
- AH -- Next header (8 bits), Payload Len (8 bits), |
| 2999 |
Reserved (16 bits), SPI (32 bits) |
| 3000 |
|
| 3001 |
This limitation on the amount of information returned with an ICMP |
| 3002 |
message creates a problem in identifying the originating hosts for |
| 3003 |
the packet (so as to know where to further propagate the ICMP PMTU |
| 3004 |
information). If the ICMP message contains only 64 bits of the IPsec |
| 3005 |
header (minimum for IPv4), then the IPsec selectors (e.g., Source and |
| 3006 |
Destination addresses, Next Protocol, Source and Destination ports, |
| 3007 |
etc.) will have been lost. But the ICMP error message will still |
| 3008 |
provide SG1 with the SPI, the PMTU information and the source and |
| 3009 |
destination gateways for the relevant security association. |
| 3010 |
|
| 3011 |
The destination security gateway and SPI uniquely define a security |
| 3012 |
association which in turn defines a set of possible originating |
| 3013 |
hosts. At this point, SG1 could: |
| 3014 |
|
| 3015 |
|
| 3016 |
|
| 3017 |
|
| 3018 |
|
| 3019 |
|
| 3020 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 54]</span></pre> |
| 3021 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-55" ></span> |
| 3022 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3023 |
|
| 3024 |
|
| 3025 |
a. send the PMTU information to all the possible originating hosts. |
| 3026 |
This would not work well if the host list is a wild card or if |
| 3027 |
many/most of the hosts weren't sending to SG1; but it might work |
| 3028 |
if the SPI/destination/etc mapped to just one or a small number of |
| 3029 |
hosts. |
| 3030 |
b. store the PMTU with the SPI/etc and wait until the next packet(s) |
| 3031 |
arrive from the originating host(s) for the relevant security |
| 3032 |
association. If it/they are bigger than the PMTU, drop the |
| 3033 |
packet(s), and compose ICMP PMTU message(s) with the new packet(s) |
| 3034 |
and the updated PMTU, and send the originating host(s) the ICMP |
| 3035 |
message(s) about the problem. This involves a delay in notifying |
| 3036 |
the originating host(s), but avoids the problems of (a). |
| 3037 |
|
| 3038 |
Since only the latter approach is feasible in all instances, a |
| 3039 |
security gateway MUST provide such support, as an option. However, |
| 3040 |
if the ICMP message contains more information from the original |
| 3041 |
packet, then there may be enough information to immediately determine |
| 3042 |
to which host to propagate the ICMP/PMTU message and to provide that |
| 3043 |
system with the 5 fields (source address, destination address, source |
| 3044 |
port, destination port, and transport protocol) needed to determine |
| 3045 |
where to store/update the PMTU. Under such circumstances, a security |
| 3046 |
gateway MUST generate an ICMP PMTU message immediately upon receipt |
| 3047 |
of an ICMP PMTU from further down the path. NOTE: The Next Protocol |
| 3048 |
field may not be contained in the ICMP message and the use of ESP |
| 3049 |
encryption may hide the selector fields that have been encrypted. |
| 3050 |
|
| 3051 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.2" href="#appendix-B.3.2">B.3.2</a> Calculation of PMTU</span> |
| 3052 |
|
| 3053 |
The calculation of PMTU from an ICMP PMTU has to take into account |
| 3054 |
the addition of any IPsec header by H1 -- AH and/or ESP transport, or |
| 3055 |
ESP or AH tunnel. Within a single host, multiple applications may |
| 3056 |
share an SPI and nesting of security associations may occur. (See |
| 3057 |
<a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a> Basic Combinations of Security Associations for |
| 3058 |
description of the combinations that MUST be supported). The diagram |
| 3059 |
below illustrates an example of security associations between a pair |
| 3060 |
of hosts (as viewed from the perspective of one of the hosts.) (ESPx |
| 3061 |
or AHx = transport mode) |
| 3062 |
|
| 3063 |
Socket 1 -------------------------| |
| 3064 |
| |
| 3065 |
Socket 2 (ESPx/SPI-A) ---------- AHx (SPI-B) -- Internet |
| 3066 |
|
| 3067 |
In order to figure out the PMTU for each socket that maps to SPI-B, |
| 3068 |
it will be necessary to have backpointers from SPI-B to each of the 2 |
| 3069 |
paths that lead to it -- Socket 1 and Socket 2/SPI-A. |
| 3070 |
|
| 3071 |
|
| 3072 |
|
| 3073 |
|
| 3074 |
|
| 3075 |
|
| 3076 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 55]</span></pre> |
| 3077 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-56" ></span> |
| 3078 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3079 |
|
| 3080 |
|
| 3081 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.3" href="#appendix-B.3.3">B.3.3</a> Granularity of Maintaining PMTU Data</span> |
| 3082 |
|
| 3083 |
In hosts, the granularity with which PMTU ICMP processing can be done |
| 3084 |
differs depending on the implementation situation. Looking at a |
| 3085 |
host, there are three situations that are of interest with respect to |
| 3086 |
PMTU issues: |
| 3087 |
|
| 3088 |
a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation |
| 3089 |
b. Bump-in-the-stack implementations, where IPsec is implemented |
| 3090 |
"underneath" an existing implementation of a TCP/IP protocol |
| 3091 |
stack, between the native IP and the local network drivers |
| 3092 |
c. No IPsec implementation -- This case is included because it is |
| 3093 |
relevant in cases where a security gateway is sending PMTU |
| 3094 |
information back to a host. |
| 3095 |
|
| 3096 |
Only in case (a) can the PMTU data be maintained at the same |
| 3097 |
granularity as communication associations. In the other cases, the |
| 3098 |
IP layer will maintain PMTU data at the granularity of Source and |
| 3099 |
Destination IP addresses (and optionally TOS/Class), as described in |
| 3100 |
<a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>. This is an important difference, because more than one |
| 3101 |
communication association may map to the same source and destination |
| 3102 |
IP addresses, and each communication association may have a different |
| 3103 |
amount of IPsec header overhead (e.g., due to use of different |
| 3104 |
transforms or different algorithms). The examples below illustrate |
| 3105 |
this. |
| 3106 |
|
| 3107 |
In cases (a) and (b)... Suppose you have the following situation. |
| 3108 |
H1 is sending to H2 and the packet to be sent from R1 to R2 exceeds |
| 3109 |
the PMTU of the network hop between them. |
| 3110 |
|
| 3111 |
================================== |
| 3112 |
| | |
| 3113 |
H1* --- R1 ----- R2 ---- R3 ---- H2* |
| 3114 |
^ | |
| 3115 |
|.......| |
| 3116 |
|
| 3117 |
If R1 is configured to not fragment subscriber traffic, then R1 sends |
| 3118 |
an ICMP PMTU message with the appropriate PMTU to H1. H1's |
| 3119 |
processing would vary with the nature of the implementation. In case |
| 3120 |
(a) (native IP), the security services are bound to sockets or the |
| 3121 |
equivalent. Here the IP/IPsec implementation in H1 can store/update |
| 3122 |
the PMTU for the associated socket. In case (b), the IP layer in H1 |
| 3123 |
can store/update the PMTU but only at the granularity of Source and |
| 3124 |
Destination addresses and possibly TOS/Class, as noted above. So the |
| 3125 |
result may be sub-optimal, since the PMTU for a given |
| 3126 |
SRC/DST/TOS/Class will be the subtraction of the largest amount of |
| 3127 |
IPsec header used for any communication association between a given |
| 3128 |
source and destination. |
| 3129 |
|
| 3130 |
|
| 3131 |
|
| 3132 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 56]</span></pre> |
| 3133 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-57" ></span> |
| 3134 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3135 |
|
| 3136 |
|
| 3137 |
In case (c), there has to be a security gateway to have any IPsec |
| 3138 |
processing. So suppose you have the following situation. H1 is |
| 3139 |
sending to H2 and the packet to be sent from SG1 to R exceeds the |
| 3140 |
PMTU of the network hop between them. |
| 3141 |
|
| 3142 |
================ |
| 3143 |
| | |
| 3144 |
H1 ---- SG1* --- R --- SG2* ---- H2 |
| 3145 |
^ | |
| 3146 |
|.......| |
| 3147 |
|
| 3148 |
As described above for case (b), the IP layer in H1 can store/update |
| 3149 |
the PMTU but only at the granularity of Source and Destination |
| 3150 |
addresses, and possibly TOS/Class. So the result may be sub-optimal, |
| 3151 |
since the PMTU for a given SRC/DST/TOS/Class will be the subtraction |
| 3152 |
of the largest amount of IPsec header used for any communication |
| 3153 |
association between a given source and destination. |
| 3154 |
|
| 3155 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.4" href="#appendix-B.3.4">B.3.4</a> Per Socket Maintenance of PMTU Data</span> |
| 3156 |
|
| 3157 |
Implementation of the calculation of PMTU (Section B.3.2) and support |
| 3158 |
for PMTUs at the granularity of individual "communication |
| 3159 |
associations" (Section B.3.3) is a local matter. However, a socket- |
| 3160 |
based implementation of IPsec in a host SHOULD maintain the |
| 3161 |
information on a per socket basis. Bump in the stack systems MUST |
| 3162 |
pass an ICMP PMTU to the host IP implementation, after adjusting it |
| 3163 |
for any IPsec header overhead added by these systems. The |
| 3164 |
determination of the overhead SHOULD be determined by analysis of the |
| 3165 |
SPI and any other selector information present in a returned ICMP |
| 3166 |
PMTU message. |
| 3167 |
|
| 3168 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.5" href="#appendix-B.3.5">B.3.5</a> Delivery of PMTU Data to the Transport Layer</span> |
| 3169 |
|
| 3170 |
The host mechanism for getting the updated PMTU to the transport |
| 3171 |
layer is unchanged, as specified in <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a> (Path MTU Discovery). |
| 3172 |
|
| 3173 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.6" href="#appendix-B.3.6">B.3.6</a> Aging of PMTU Data</span> |
| 3174 |
|
| 3175 |
This topic is covered in <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">Section 6.1.2.4</a>. |
| 3176 |
|
| 3177 |
|
| 3178 |
|
| 3179 |
|
| 3180 |
|
| 3181 |
|
| 3182 |
|
| 3183 |
|
| 3184 |
|
| 3185 |
|
| 3186 |
|
| 3187 |
|
| 3188 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 57]</span></pre> |
| 3189 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-58" ></span> |
| 3190 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3191 |
|
| 3192 |
|
| 3193 |
Appendix C -- Sequence Space Window Code Example |
| 3194 |
|
| 3195 |
This appendix contains a routine that implements a bitmask check for |
| 3196 |
a 32 packet window. It was provided by James Hughes |
| 3197 |
([email protected]) and Harry Varnis ([email protected]) |
| 3198 |
and is intended as an implementation example. Note that this code |
| 3199 |
both checks for a replay and updates the window. Thus the algorithm, |
| 3200 |
as shown, should only be called AFTER the packet has been |
| 3201 |
authenticated. Implementers might wish to consider splitting the |
| 3202 |
code to do the check for replays before computing the ICV. If the |
| 3203 |
packet is not a replay, the code would then compute the ICV, (discard |
| 3204 |
any bad packets), and if the packet is OK, update the window. |
| 3205 |
|
| 3206 |
#include <stdio.h> |
| 3207 |
#include <stdlib.h> |
| 3208 |
typedef unsigned long u_long; |
| 3209 |
|
| 3210 |
enum { |
| 3211 |
ReplayWindowSize = 32 |
| 3212 |
}; |
| 3213 |
|
| 3214 |
u_long bitmap = 0; /* session state - must be 32 bits */ |
| 3215 |
u_long lastSeq = 0; /* session state */ |
| 3216 |
|
| 3217 |
/* Returns 0 if packet disallowed, 1 if packet permitted */ |
| 3218 |
int ChkReplayWindow(u_long seq); |
| 3219 |
|
| 3220 |
int ChkReplayWindow(u_long seq) { |
| 3221 |
u_long diff; |
| 3222 |
|
| 3223 |
if (seq == 0) return 0; /* first == 0 or wrapped */ |
| 3224 |
if (seq > lastSeq) { /* new larger sequence number */ |
| 3225 |
diff = seq - lastSeq; |
| 3226 |
if (diff < ReplayWindowSize) { /* In window */ |
| 3227 |
bitmap <<= diff; |
| 3228 |
bitmap |= 1; /* set bit for this packet */ |
| 3229 |
} else bitmap = 1; /* This packet has a "way larger" */ |
| 3230 |
lastSeq = seq; |
| 3231 |
return 1; /* larger is good */ |
| 3232 |
} |
| 3233 |
diff = lastSeq - seq; |
| 3234 |
if (diff >= ReplayWindowSize) return 0; /* too old or wrapped */ |
| 3235 |
if (bitmap & ((u_long)1 << diff)) return 0; /* already seen */ |
| 3236 |
bitmap |= ((u_long)1 << diff); /* mark as seen */ |
| 3237 |
return 1; /* out of order but good */ |
| 3238 |
} |
| 3239 |
|
| 3240 |
char string_buffer[512]; |
| 3241 |
|
| 3242 |
|
| 3243 |
|
| 3244 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 58]</span></pre> |
| 3245 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-59" ></span> |
| 3246 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3247 |
|
| 3248 |
|
| 3249 |
#define STRING_BUFFER_SIZE sizeof(string_buffer) |
| 3250 |
|
| 3251 |
int main() { |
| 3252 |
int result; |
| 3253 |
u_long last, current, bits; |
| 3254 |
|
| 3255 |
printf("Input initial state (bits in hex, last msgnum):\n"); |
| 3256 |
if (!fgets(string_buffer, STRING_BUFFER_SIZE, stdin)) exit(0); |
| 3257 |
sscanf(string_buffer, "%lx %lu", &bits, &last); |
| 3258 |
if (last != 0) |
| 3259 |
bits |= 1; |
| 3260 |
bitmap = bits; |
| 3261 |
lastSeq = last; |
| 3262 |
printf("bits:%08lx last:%lu\n", bitmap, lastSeq); |
| 3263 |
printf("Input value to test (current):\n"); |
| 3264 |
|
| 3265 |
while (1) { |
| 3266 |
if (!fgets(string_buffer, STRING_BUFFER_SIZE, stdin)) break; |
| 3267 |
sscanf(string_buffer, "%lu", &current); |
| 3268 |
result = ChkReplayWindow(current); |
| 3269 |
printf("%-3s", result ? "OK" : "BAD"); |
| 3270 |
printf(" bits:%08lx last:%lu\n", bitmap, lastSeq); |
| 3271 |
} |
| 3272 |
return 0; |
| 3273 |
} |
| 3274 |
|
| 3275 |
|
| 3276 |
|
| 3277 |
|
| 3278 |
|
| 3279 |
|
| 3280 |
|
| 3281 |
|
| 3282 |
|
| 3283 |
|
| 3284 |
|
| 3285 |
|
| 3286 |
|
| 3287 |
|
| 3288 |
|
| 3289 |
|
| 3290 |
|
| 3291 |
|
| 3292 |
|
| 3293 |
|
| 3294 |
|
| 3295 |
|
| 3296 |
|
| 3297 |
|
| 3298 |
|
| 3299 |
|
| 3300 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 59]</span></pre> |
| 3301 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3302 |
|
| 3303 |
|
| 3304 |
Appendix D -- Categorization of ICMP messages |
| 3305 |
|
| 3306 |
The tables below characterize ICMP messages as being either host |
| 3307 |
generated, router generated, both, unassigned/unknown. The first set |
| 3308 |
are IPv4. The second set are IPv6. |
| 3309 |
|
| 3310 |
IPv4 |
| 3311 |
|
| 3312 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3313 |
======================================================================== |
| 3314 |
HOST GENERATED: |
| 3315 |
3 Destination Unreachable |
| 3316 |
2 Protocol Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3317 |
3 Port Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3318 |
8 Source Host Isolated [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3319 |
14 Host Precedence Violation [<a href="./rfc1812">RFC1812</a>] |
| 3320 |
10 Router Selection [<a href="./rfc1256">RFC1256</a>] |
| 3321 |
|
| 3322 |
|
| 3323 |
|
| 3324 |
|
| 3325 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3326 |
======================================================================== |
| 3327 |
ROUTER GENERATED: |
| 3328 |
3 Destination Unreachable |
| 3329 |
0 Net Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3330 |
4 Fragmentation Needed, Don't Fragment was Set [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3331 |
5 Source Route Failed [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3332 |
6 Destination Network Unknown [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3333 |
7 Destination Host Unknown [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3334 |
9 Comm. w/Dest. Net. is Administratively Prohibited [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3335 |
11 Destination Network Unreachable for Type of Service[RFC792] |
| 3336 |
5 Redirect |
| 3337 |
0 Redirect Datagram for the Network (or subnet) [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3338 |
2 Redirect Datagram for the Type of Service & Network[RFC792] |
| 3339 |
9 Router Advertisement [<a href="./rfc1256">RFC1256</a>] |
| 3340 |
18 Address Mask Reply [<a href="./rfc950">RFC950</a>] |
| 3341 |
|
| 3342 |
|
| 3343 |
|
| 3344 |
|
| 3345 |
|
| 3346 |
|
| 3347 |
|
| 3348 |
|
| 3349 |
|
| 3350 |
|
| 3351 |
|
| 3352 |
|
| 3353 |
|
| 3354 |
|
| 3355 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 60]</span></pre> |
| 3356 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3357 |
|
| 3358 |
|
| 3359 |
IPv4 |
| 3360 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3361 |
======================================================================== |
| 3362 |
BOTH ROUTER AND HOST GENERATED: |
| 3363 |
0 Echo Reply [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3364 |
3 Destination Unreachable |
| 3365 |
1 Host Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3366 |
10 Comm. w/Dest. Host is Administratively Prohibited [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3367 |
12 Destination Host Unreachable for Type of Service [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3368 |
13 Communication Administratively Prohibited [<a href="./rfc1812">RFC1812</a>] |
| 3369 |
15 Precedence cutoff in effect [<a href="./rfc1812">RFC1812</a>] |
| 3370 |
4 Source Quench [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3371 |
5 Redirect |
| 3372 |
1 Redirect Datagram for the Host [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3373 |
3 Redirect Datagram for the Type of Service and Host [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3374 |
6 Alternate Host Address [JBP] |
| 3375 |
8 Echo [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3376 |
11 Time Exceeded [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3377 |
12 Parameter Problem [RFC792,<a href="./rfc1108">RFC1108</a>] |
| 3378 |
13 Timestamp [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3379 |
14 Timestamp Reply [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3380 |
15 Information Request [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3381 |
16 Information Reply [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>] |
| 3382 |
17 Address Mask Request [<a href="./rfc950">RFC950</a>] |
| 3383 |
30 Traceroute [<a href="./rfc1393">RFC1393</a>] |
| 3384 |
31 Datagram Conversion Error [<a href="./rfc1475">RFC1475</a>] |
| 3385 |
32 Mobile Host Redirect [Johnson] |
| 3386 |
39 SKIP [Markson] |
| 3387 |
40 Photuris [Simpson] |
| 3388 |
|
| 3389 |
|
| 3390 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3391 |
======================================================================== |
| 3392 |
UNASSIGNED TYPE OR UNKNOWN GENERATOR: |
| 3393 |
1 Unassigned [JBP] |
| 3394 |
2 Unassigned [JBP] |
| 3395 |
7 Unassigned [JBP] |
| 3396 |
19 Reserved (for Security) [Solo] |
| 3397 |
20-29 Reserved (for Robustness Experiment) [ZSu] |
| 3398 |
33 IPv6 Where-Are-You [Simpson] |
| 3399 |
34 IPv6 I-Am-Here [Simpson] |
| 3400 |
35 Mobile Registration Request [Simpson] |
| 3401 |
36 Mobile Registration Reply [Simpson] |
| 3402 |
37 Domain Name Request [Simpson] |
| 3403 |
38 Domain Name Reply [Simpson] |
| 3404 |
41-255 Reserved [JBP] |
| 3405 |
|
| 3406 |
|
| 3407 |
|
| 3408 |
|
| 3409 |
|
| 3410 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 61]</span></pre> |
| 3411 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3412 |
|
| 3413 |
|
| 3414 |
IPv6 |
| 3415 |
|
| 3416 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3417 |
======================================================================== |
| 3418 |
HOST GENERATED: |
| 3419 |
1 Destination Unreachable [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC 1885</a>] |
| 3420 |
4 Port Unreachable |
| 3421 |
|
| 3422 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3423 |
======================================================================== |
| 3424 |
ROUTER GENERATED: |
| 3425 |
1 Destination Unreachable [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>] |
| 3426 |
0 No Route to Destination |
| 3427 |
1 Comm. w/Destination is Administratively Prohibited |
| 3428 |
2 Not a Neighbor |
| 3429 |
3 Address Unreachable |
| 3430 |
2 Packet Too Big [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>] |
| 3431 |
0 |
| 3432 |
3 Time Exceeded [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>] |
| 3433 |
0 Hop Limit Exceeded in Transit |
| 3434 |
1 Fragment reassembly time exceeded |
| 3435 |
|
| 3436 |
|
| 3437 |
Type Name/Codes Reference |
| 3438 |
======================================================================== |
| 3439 |
BOTH ROUTER AND HOST GENERATED: |
| 3440 |
4 Parameter Problem [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>] |
| 3441 |
0 Erroneous Header Field Encountered |
| 3442 |
1 Unrecognized Next Header Type Encountered |
| 3443 |
2 Unrecognized IPv6 Option Encountered |
| 3444 |
|
| 3445 |
|
| 3446 |
|
| 3447 |
|
| 3448 |
|
| 3449 |
|
| 3450 |
|
| 3451 |
|
| 3452 |
|
| 3453 |
|
| 3454 |
|
| 3455 |
|
| 3456 |
|
| 3457 |
|
| 3458 |
|
| 3459 |
|
| 3460 |
|
| 3461 |
|
| 3462 |
|
| 3463 |
|
| 3464 |
|
| 3465 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 62]</span></pre> |
| 3466 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-63" ></span> |
| 3467 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3468 |
|
| 3469 |
|
| 3470 |
References |
| 3471 |
|
| 3472 |
[<a id="ref-BL73">BL73</a>] Bell, D.E. & LaPadula, L.J., "Secure Computer Systems: |
| 3473 |
Mathematical Foundations and Model", Technical Report M74- |
| 3474 |
244, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, May 1973. |
| 3475 |
|
| 3476 |
[<a id="ref-Bra97">Bra97</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 3477 |
Requirement Level", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 3478 |
|
| 3479 |
[<a id="ref-DoD85">DoD85</a>] US National Computer Security Center, "Department of |
| 3480 |
Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria", DoD |
| 3481 |
5200.28-STD, US Department of Defense, Ft. Meade, MD., |
| 3482 |
December 1985. |
| 3483 |
|
| 3484 |
[<a id="ref-DoD87">DoD87</a>] US National Computer Security Center, "Trusted Network |
| 3485 |
Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation |
| 3486 |
Criteria", NCSC-TG-005, Version 1, US Department of |
| 3487 |
Defense, Ft. Meade, MD., 31 July 1987. |
| 3488 |
|
| 3489 |
[<a id="ref-HA94">HA94</a>] Haller, N., and R. Atkinson, "On Internet Authentication", |
| 3490 |
<a href="./rfc1704">RFC 1704</a>, October 1994. |
| 3491 |
|
| 3492 |
[<a id="ref-HC98">HC98</a>] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange |
| 3493 |
(IKE)", <a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998. |
| 3494 |
|
| 3495 |
[<a id="ref-HM97">HM97</a>] Harney, H., and C. Muckenhirn, "Group Key Management |
| 3496 |
Protocol (GKMP) Architecture", <a href="./rfc2094">RFC 2094</a>, July 1997. |
| 3497 |
|
| 3498 |
[<a id="ref-ISO">ISO</a>] ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6, Network Layer Security Protocol, ISO-IEC |
| 3499 |
DIS 11577, International Standards Organisation, Geneva, |
| 3500 |
Switzerland, 29 November 1992. |
| 3501 |
|
| 3502 |
[<a id="ref-IB93">IB93</a>] John Ioannidis and Matt Blaze, "Architecture and |
| 3503 |
Implementation of Network-layer Security Under Unix", |
| 3504 |
Proceedings of USENIX Security Symposium, Santa Clara, CA, |
| 3505 |
October 1993. |
| 3506 |
|
| 3507 |
[<a id="ref-IBK93">IBK93</a>] John Ioannidis, Matt Blaze, & Phil Karn, "swIPe: Network- |
| 3508 |
Layer Security for IP", presentation at the Spring 1993 |
| 3509 |
IETF Meeting, Columbus, Ohio |
| 3510 |
|
| 3511 |
[<a id="ref-KA98a">KA98a</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc2402">RFC</a> |
| 3512 |
<a href="./rfc2402">2402</a>, November 1998. |
| 3513 |
|
| 3514 |
[<a id="ref-KA98b">KA98b</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security |
| 3515 |
Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a>, November 1998. |
| 3516 |
|
| 3517 |
|
| 3518 |
|
| 3519 |
|
| 3520 |
|
| 3521 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 63]</span></pre> |
| 3522 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-64" ></span> |
| 3523 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3524 |
|
| 3525 |
|
| 3526 |
[<a id="ref-Ken91">Ken91</a>] Kent, S., "US DoD Security Options for the Internet |
| 3527 |
Protocol", <a href="./rfc1108">RFC 1108</a>, November 1991. |
| 3528 |
|
| 3529 |
[<a id="ref-MSST97">MSST97</a>] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J. Turner, |
| 3530 |
"Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol |
| 3531 |
(ISAKMP)", <a href="./rfc2408">RFC 2408</a>, November 1998. |
| 3532 |
|
| 3533 |
[<a id="ref-Orm97">Orm97</a>] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", <a href="./rfc2412">RFC</a> |
| 3534 |
<a href="./rfc2412">2412</a>, November 1998. |
| 3535 |
|
| 3536 |
[<a id="ref-Pip98">Pip98</a>] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of |
| 3537 |
Interpretation for ISAKMP", <a href="./rfc2407">RFC 2407</a>, November 1998. |
| 3538 |
|
| 3539 |
[<a id="ref-Sch94">Sch94</a>] Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, <a href="#section-8.6">Section 8.6</a>, John |
| 3540 |
Wiley & Sons, New York, NY, 1994. |
| 3541 |
|
| 3542 |
[<a id="ref-SDNS">SDNS</a>] SDNS Secure Data Network System, Security Protocol 3, SP3, |
| 3543 |
Document SDN.301, Revision 1.5, 15 May 1989, published in |
| 3544 |
NIST Publication NIST-IR-90-4250, February 1990. |
| 3545 |
|
| 3546 |
[<a id="ref-SMPT98">SMPT98</a>] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas, "IP |
| 3547 |
Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", <a href="./rfc2393">RFC 2393</a>, August |
| 3548 |
1998. |
| 3549 |
|
| 3550 |
[<a id="ref-TDG97">TDG97</a>] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., and R. Glenn, "IP Security |
| 3551 |
Document Roadmap", <a href="./rfc2411">RFC 2411</a>, November 1998. |
| 3552 |
|
| 3553 |
[<a id="ref-VK83">VK83</a>] V.L. Voydock & S.T. Kent, "Security Mechanisms in High- |
| 3554 |
level Networks", ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 15, No. 2, |
| 3555 |
June 1983. |
| 3556 |
|
| 3557 |
Disclaimer |
| 3558 |
|
| 3559 |
The views and specification expressed in this document are those of |
| 3560 |
the authors and are not necessarily those of their employers. The |
| 3561 |
authors and their employers specifically disclaim responsibility for |
| 3562 |
any problems arising from correct or incorrect implementation or use |
| 3563 |
of this design. |
| 3564 |
|
| 3565 |
|
| 3566 |
|
| 3567 |
|
| 3568 |
|
| 3569 |
|
| 3570 |
|
| 3571 |
|
| 3572 |
|
| 3573 |
|
| 3574 |
|
| 3575 |
|
| 3576 |
|
| 3577 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 64]</span></pre> |
| 3578 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-65" ></span> |
| 3579 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3580 |
|
| 3581 |
|
| 3582 |
Author Information |
| 3583 |
|
| 3584 |
Stephen Kent |
| 3585 |
BBN Corporation |
| 3586 |
70 Fawcett Street |
| 3587 |
Cambridge, MA 02140 |
| 3588 |
USA |
| 3589 |
|
| 3590 |
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 |
| 3591 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 3592 |
|
| 3593 |
|
| 3594 |
Randall Atkinson |
| 3595 |
@Home Network |
| 3596 |
425 Broadway |
| 3597 |
Redwood City, CA 94063 |
| 3598 |
USA |
| 3599 |
|
| 3600 |
Phone: +1 (415) 569-5000 |
| 3601 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 3602 |
|
| 3603 |
|
| 3604 |
|
| 3605 |
|
| 3606 |
|
| 3607 |
|
| 3608 |
|
| 3609 |
|
| 3610 |
|
| 3611 |
|
| 3612 |
|
| 3613 |
|
| 3614 |
|
| 3615 |
|
| 3616 |
|
| 3617 |
|
| 3618 |
|
| 3619 |
|
| 3620 |
|
| 3621 |
|
| 3622 |
|
| 3623 |
|
| 3624 |
|
| 3625 |
|
| 3626 |
|
| 3627 |
|
| 3628 |
|
| 3629 |
|
| 3630 |
|
| 3631 |
|
| 3632 |
|
| 3633 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 65]</span></pre> |
| 3634 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-66" ></span> |
| 3635 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span> |
| 3636 |
|
| 3637 |
|
| 3638 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
| 3639 |
|
| 3640 |
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
| 3641 |
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
| 3642 |
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published |
| 3643 |
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
| 3644 |
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
| 3645 |
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
| 3646 |
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
| 3647 |
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
| 3648 |
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
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developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
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copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
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followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
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English. |
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
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revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
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This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
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"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
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BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| 3662 |
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
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Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 66] |
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</pre> |