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1 <pre>Network Working Group S. Kent
2 Request for Comments: 2401 BBN Corp
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc1825">1825</a> R. Atkinson
4 Category: Standards Track @Home Network
5 November 1998
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol</span>
9
10 Status of this Memo
11
12 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
13 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
14 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
15 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
16 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
17
18 Copyright Notice
19
20 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
21
22 Table of Contents
23
24 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction........................................................<a href="#page-1-3">3</a>
25 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Summary of Contents of Document..................................<a href="#page-1-3">3</a>
26 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a> Audience.........................................................<a href="#page-1-3">3</a>
27 <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a> Related Documents................................................<a href="#page-1-4">4</a>
28 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Design Objectives...................................................<a href="#page-1-4">4</a>
29 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description................<a href="#page-1-4">4</a>
30 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Caveats and Assumptions..........................................<a href="#page-1-5">5</a>
31 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. System Overview.....................................................<a href="#page-1-5">5</a>
32 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> What IPsec Does..................................................<a href="#page-1-6">6</a>
33 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> How IPsec Works..................................................<a href="#page-1-6">6</a>
34 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Where IPsec May Be Implemented...................................<a href="#page-1-7">7</a>
35 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Associations...............................................<a href="#page-1-8">8</a>
36 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Definition and Scope.............................................<a href="#page-1-8">8</a>
37 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Security Association Functionality..............................<a href="#page-1-10">10</a>
38 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Combining Security Associations.................................<a href="#page-1-11">11</a>
39 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a> Security Association Databases..................................<a href="#page-1-13">13</a>
40 <a href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a> The Security Policy Database (SPD).........................<a href="#page-1-14">14</a>
41 <a href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a> Selectors..................................................<a href="#page-1-17">17</a>
42 <a href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a> Security Association Database (SAD)........................<a href="#page-1-21">21</a>
43 <a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a> Basic Combinations of Security Associations.....................<a href="#page-1-24">24</a>
44 <a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a> SA and Key Management...........................................<a href="#page-1-26">26</a>
45 <a href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a> Manual Techniques..........................................<a href="#page-1-27">27</a>
46 <a href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a> Automated SA and Key Management............................<a href="#page-1-27">27</a>
47 <a href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a> Locating a Security Gateway................................<a href="#page-1-28">28</a>
48 <a href="#section-4.7">4.7</a> Security Associations and Multicast.............................<a href="#page-1-29">29</a>
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
55
56
57 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. IP Traffic Processing..............................................<a href="#page-1-30">30</a>
58 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> Outbound IP Traffic Processing..................................<a href="#page-1-30">30</a>
59 <a href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle.....................<a href="#page-1-30">30</a>
60 <a href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a> Header Construction for Tunnel Mode........................<a href="#page-1-31">31</a>
61 <a href="#section-5.1.2.1">5.1.2.1</a> IPv4 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode...........<a href="#page-1-31">31</a>
62 <a href="#section-5.1.2.2">5.1.2.2</a> IPv6 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode...........<a href="#page-1-32">32</a>
63 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> Processing Inbound IP Traffic...................................<a href="#page-1-33">33</a>
64 <a href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle.....................<a href="#page-1-33">33</a>
65 <a href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a> Handling of AH and ESP tunnels.............................<a href="#page-1-34">34</a>
66 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. ICMP Processing (relevant to IPsec)................................<a href="#page-1-35">35</a>
67 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> PMTU/DF Processing..............................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a>
68 <a href="#section-6.1.1">6.1.1</a> DF Bit.....................................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a>
69 <a href="#section-6.1.2">6.1.2</a> Path MTU Discovery (PMTU)..................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a>
70 <a href="#section-6.1.2.1">6.1.2.1</a> Propagation of PMTU...................................<a href="#page-1-36">36</a>
71 <a href="#section-6.1.2.2">6.1.2.2</a> Calculation of PMTU...................................<a href="#page-1-37">37</a>
72 <a href="#section-6.1.2.3">6.1.2.3</a> Granularity of PMTU Processing........................<a href="#page-1-37">37</a>
73 <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">6.1.2.4</a> PMTU Aging............................................<a href="#page-1-38">38</a>
74 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Auditing...........................................................<a href="#page-1-39">39</a>
75 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Use in Systems Supporting Information Flow Security................<a href="#page-1-39">39</a>
76 8.1 Relationship Between Security Associations and Data Sensitivity.40
77 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a> Sensitivity Consistency Checking................................<a href="#page-1-40">40</a>
78 <a href="#section-8.3">8.3</a> Additional MLS Attributes for Security Association Databases....<a href="#page-1-41">41</a>
79 <a href="#section-8.4">8.4</a> Additional Inbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking..........<a href="#page-1-41">41</a>
80 <a href="#section-8.5">8.5</a> Additional Outbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking.........<a href="#page-1-41">41</a>
81 <a href="#section-8.6">8.6</a> Additional MLS Processing for Security Gateways.................<a href="#page-1-42">42</a>
82 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Performance Issues.................................................<a href="#page-1-42">42</a>
83 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. Conformance Requirements..........................................<a href="#page-1-43">43</a>
84 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Security Considerations...........................................<a href="#page-1-43">43</a>
85 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1825">RFC 1825</a>.........................................<a href="#page-1-43">43</a>
86 Acknowledgements......................................................<a href="#page-1-44">44</a>
87 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> -- Glossary................................................<a href="#page-1-45">45</a>
88 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> -- Analysis/Discussion of PMTU/DF/Fragmentation Issues.....<a href="#page-1-48">48</a>
89 <a href="#appendix-B.1">B.1</a> DF bit..........................................................<a href="#page-1-48">48</a>
90 <a href="#appendix-B.2">B.2</a> Fragmentation...................................................<a href="#page-1-48">48</a>
91 <a href="#appendix-B.3">B.3</a> Path MTU Discovery..............................................<a href="#page-1-52">52</a>
92 <a href="#appendix-B.3.1">B.3.1</a> Identifying the Originating Host(s)........................<a href="#page-1-53">53</a>
93 <a href="#appendix-B.3.2">B.3.2</a> Calculation of PMTU........................................<a href="#page-1-55">55</a>
94 <a href="#appendix-B.3.3">B.3.3</a> Granularity of Maintaining PMTU Data.......................<a href="#page-1-56">56</a>
95 <a href="#appendix-B.3.4">B.3.4</a> Per Socket Maintenance of PMTU Data........................<a href="#page-1-57">57</a>
96 <a href="#appendix-B.3.5">B.3.5</a> Delivery of PMTU Data to the Transport Layer...............<a href="#page-1-57">57</a>
97 <a href="#appendix-B.3.6">B.3.6</a> Aging of PMTU Data.........................................<a href="#page-1-57">57</a>
98 <a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a> -- Sequence Space Window Code Example......................<a href="#page-1-58">58</a>
99 <a href="#appendix-D">Appendix D</a> -- Categorization of ICMP messages.........................<a href="#page-1-60">60</a>
100 References............................................................<a href="#page-1-63">63</a>
101 Disclaimer............................................................<a href="#page-1-64">64</a>
102 Author Information....................................................<a href="#page-1-65">65</a>
103 Full Copyright Statement..............................................<a href="#page-1-66">66</a>
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Summary of Contents of Document</span>
116
117 This memo specifies the base architecture for IPsec compliant
118 systems. The goal of the architecture is to provide various security
119 services for traffic at the IP layer, in both the IPv4 and IPv6
120 environments. This document describes the goals of such systems,
121 their components and how they fit together with each other and into
122 the IP environment. It also describes the security services offered
123 by the IPsec protocols, and how these services can be employed in the
124 IP environment. This document does not address all aspects of IPsec
125 architecture. Subsequent documents will address additional
126 architectural details of a more advanced nature, e.g., use of IPsec
127 in NAT environments and more complete support for IP multicast. The
128 following fundamental components of the IPsec security architecture
129 are discussed in terms of their underlying, required functionality.
130 Additional RFCs (see <a href="#section-1.3">Section 1.3</a> for pointers to other documents)
131 define the protocols in (a), (c), and (d).
132
133 a. Security Protocols -- Authentication Header (AH) and
134 Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
135 b. Security Associations -- what they are and how they work,
136 how they are managed, associated processing
137 c. Key Management -- manual and automatic (The Internet Key
138 Exchange (IKE))
139 d. Algorithms for authentication and encryption
140
141 This document is not an overall Security Architecture for the
142 Internet; it addresses security only at the IP layer, provided
143 through the use of a combination of cryptographic and protocol
144 security mechanisms.
145
146 The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
147 SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this
148 document, are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-Bra97" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Level&quot;">Bra97</a>].
149
150 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a> Audience</span>
151
152 The target audience for this document includes implementers of this
153 IP security technology and others interested in gaining a general
154 background understanding of this system. In particular, prospective
155 users of this technology (end users or system administrators) are
156 part of the target audience. A glossary is provided as an appendix
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
167
168
169 to help fill in gaps in background/vocabulary. This document assumes
170 that the reader is familiar with the Internet Protocol, related
171 networking technology, and general security terms and concepts.
172
173 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a> Related Documents</span>
174
175 As mentioned above, other documents provide detailed definitions of
176 some of the components of IPsec and of their inter-relationship.
177 They include RFCs on the following topics:
178
179 a. "IP Security Document Roadmap" [<a href="#ref-TDG97" title="&quot;IP Security Document Roadmap&quot;">TDG97</a>] -- a document
180 providing guidelines for specifications describing encryption
181 and authentication algorithms used in this system.
182 b. security protocols -- RFCs describing the Authentication
183 Header (AH) [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">KA98a</a>] and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)
184 [<a href="#ref-KA98b" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">KA98b</a>] protocols.
185 c. algorithms for authentication and encryption -- a separate
186 RFC for each algorithm.
187 d. automatic key management -- RFCs on "The Internet Key
188 Exchange (IKE)" [<a href="#ref-HC98" title="&quot;The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)&quot;">HC98</a>], "Internet Security Association and
189 Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)" [<a href="#ref-MSST97" title="&quot;Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)&quot;">MSST97</a>],"The OAKLEY Key
190 Determination Protocol" [<a href="#ref-Orm97" title="&quot;The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol&quot;">Orm97</a>], and "The Internet IP
191 Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP" [<a href="#ref-Pip98" title="&quot;The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP&quot;">Pip98</a>].
192
193 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Design Objectives</span>
194
195 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Goals/Objectives/Requirements/Problem Description</span>
196
197 IPsec is designed to provide interoperable, high quality,
198 cryptographically-based security for IPv4 and IPv6. The set of
199 security services offered includes access control, connectionless
200 integrity, data origin authentication, protection against replays (a
201 form of partial sequence integrity), confidentiality (encryption),
202 and limited traffic flow confidentiality. These services are
203 provided at the IP layer, offering protection for IP and/or upper
204 layer protocols.
205
206 These objectives are met through the use of two traffic security
207 protocols, the Authentication Header (AH) and the Encapsulating
208 Security Payload (ESP), and through the use of cryptographic key
209 management procedures and protocols. The set of IPsec protocols
210 employed in any context, and the ways in which they are employed,
211 will be determined by the security and system requirements of users,
212 applications, and/or sites/organizations.
213
214 When these mechanisms are correctly implemented and deployed, they
215 ought not to adversely affect users, hosts, and other Internet
216 components that do not employ these security mechanisms for
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
223
224
225 protection of their traffic. These mechanisms also are designed to
226 be algorithm-independent. This modularity permits selection of
227 different sets of algorithms without affecting the other parts of the
228 implementation. For example, different user communities may select
229 different sets of algorithms (creating cliques) if required.
230
231 A standard set of default algorithms is specified to facilitate
232 interoperability in the global Internet. The use of these
233 algorithms, in conjunction with IPsec traffic protection and key
234 management protocols, is intended to permit system and application
235 developers to deploy high quality, Internet layer, cryptographic
236 security technology.
237
238 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Caveats and Assumptions</span>
239
240 The suite of IPsec protocols and associated default algorithms are
241 designed to provide high quality security for Internet traffic.
242 However, the security offered by use of these protocols ultimately
243 depends on the quality of the their implementation, which is outside
244 the scope of this set of standards. Moreover, the security of a
245 computer system or network is a function of many factors, including
246 personnel, physical, procedural, compromising emanations, and
247 computer security practices. Thus IPsec is only one part of an
248 overall system security architecture.
249
250 Finally, the security afforded by the use of IPsec is critically
251 dependent on many aspects of the operating environment in which the
252 IPsec implementation executes. For example, defects in OS security,
253 poor quality of random number sources, sloppy system management
254 protocols and practices, etc. can all degrade the security provided
255 by IPsec. As above, none of these environmental attributes are
256 within the scope of this or other IPsec standards.
257
258 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. System Overview</span>
259
260 This section provides a high level description of how IPsec works,
261 the components of the system, and how they fit together to provide
262 the security services noted above. The goal of this description is
263 to enable the reader to "picture" the overall process/system, see how
264 it fits into the IP environment, and to provide context for later
265 sections of this document, which describe each of the components in
266 more detail.
267
268 An IPsec implementation operates in a host or a security gateway
269 environment, affording protection to IP traffic. The protection
270 offered is based on requirements defined by a Security Policy
271 Database (SPD) established and maintained by a user or system
272 administrator, or by an application operating within constraints
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
279
280
281 established by either of the above. In general, packets are selected
282 for one of three processing modes based on IP and transport layer
283 header information (Selectors, <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>) matched against entries
284 in the database (SPD). Each packet is either afforded IPsec security
285 services, discarded, or allowed to bypass IPsec, based on the
286 applicable database policies identified by the Selectors.
287
288 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> What IPsec Does</span>
289
290 IPsec provides security services at the IP layer by enabling a system
291 to select required security protocols, determine the algorithm(s) to
292 use for the service(s), and put in place any cryptographic keys
293 required to provide the requested services. IPsec can be used to
294 protect one or more "paths" between a pair of hosts, between a pair
295 of security gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. (The
296 term "security gateway" is used throughout the IPsec documents to
297 refer to an intermediate system that implements IPsec protocols. For
298 example, a router or a firewall implementing IPsec is a security
299 gateway.)
300
301 The set of security services that IPsec can provide includes access
302 control, connectionless integrity, data origin authentication,
303 rejection of replayed packets (a form of partial sequence integrity),
304 confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow
305 confidentiality. Because these services are provided at the IP
306 layer, they can be used by any higher layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP,
307 ICMP, BGP, etc.
308
309 The IPsec DOI also supports negotiation of IP compression [<a href="#ref-SMPT98" title="&quot;IP Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)&quot;">SMPT98</a>],
310 motivated in part by the observation that when encryption is employed
311 within IPsec, it prevents effective compression by lower protocol
312 layers.
313
314 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> How IPsec Works</span>
315
316 IPsec uses two protocols to provide traffic security --
317 Authentication Header (AH) and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP).
318 Both protocols are described in more detail in their respective RFCs
319 [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">KA98a</a>, <a href="#ref-KA98b" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">KA98b</a>].
320
321 o The IP Authentication Header (AH) [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">KA98a</a>] provides
322 connectionless integrity, data origin authentication, and an
323 optional anti-replay service.
324 o The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocol [<a href="#ref-KA98b" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">KA98b</a>] may
325 provide confidentiality (encryption), and limited traffic flow
326 confidentiality. It also may provide connectionless
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
335
336
337 integrity, data origin authentication, and an anti-replay
338 service. (One or the other set of these security services
339 must be applied whenever ESP is invoked.)
340 o Both AH and ESP are vehicles for access control, based on the
341 distribution of cryptographic keys and the management of
342 traffic flows relative to these security protocols.
343
344 These protocols may be applied alone or in combination with each
345 other to provide a desired set of security services in IPv4 and IPv6.
346 Each protocol supports two modes of use: transport mode and tunnel
347 mode. In transport mode the protocols provide protection primarily
348 for upper layer protocols; in tunnel mode, the protocols are applied
349 to tunneled IP packets. The differences between the two modes are
350 discussed in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.
351
352 IPsec allows the user (or system administrator) to control the
353 granularity at which a security service is offered. For example, one
354 can create a single encrypted tunnel to carry all the traffic between
355 two security gateways or a separate encrypted tunnel can be created
356 for each TCP connection between each pair of hosts communicating
357 across these gateways. IPsec management must incorporate facilities
358 for specifying:
359
360 o which security services to use and in what combinations
361 o the granularity at which a given security protection should be
362 applied
363 o the algorithms used to effect cryptographic-based security
364
365 Because these security services use shared secret values
366 (cryptographic keys), IPsec relies on a separate set of mechanisms
367 for putting these keys in place. (The keys are used for
368 authentication/integrity and encryption services.) This document
369 requires support for both manual and automatic distribution of keys.
370 It specifies a specific public-key based approach (IKE -- [MSST97,
371 Orm97, HC98]) for automatic key management, but other automated key
372 distribution techniques MAY be used. For example, KDC-based systems
373 such as Kerberos and other public-key systems such as SKIP could be
374 employed.
375
376 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Where IPsec May Be Implemented</span>
377
378 There are several ways in which IPsec may be implemented in a host or
379 in conjunction with a router or firewall (to create a security
380 gateway). Several common examples are provided below:
381
382 a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation. This
383 requires access to the IP source code and is applicable to
384 both hosts and security gateways.
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
391
392
393 b. "Bump-in-the-stack" (BITS) implementations, where IPsec is
394 implemented "underneath" an existing implementation of an IP
395 protocol stack, between the native IP and the local network
396 drivers. Source code access for the IP stack is not required
397 in this context, making this implementation approach
398 appropriate for use with legacy systems. This approach, when
399 it is adopted, is usually employed in hosts.
400
401 c. The use of an outboard crypto processor is a common design
402 feature of network security systems used by the military, and
403 of some commercial systems as well. It is sometimes referred
404 to as a "Bump-in-the-wire" (BITW) implementation. Such
405 implementations may be designed to serve either a host or a
406 gateway (or both). Usually the BITW device is IP
407 addressable. When supporting a single host, it may be quite
408 analogous to a BITS implementation, but in supporting a
409 router or firewall, it must operate like a security gateway.
410
411 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Associations</span>
412
413 This section defines Security Association management requirements for
414 all IPv6 implementations and for those IPv4 implementations that
415 implement AH, ESP, or both. The concept of a "Security Association"
416 (SA) is fundamental to IPsec. Both AH and ESP make use of SAs and a
417 major function of IKE is the establishment and maintenance of
418 Security Associations. All implementations of AH or ESP MUST support
419 the concept of a Security Association as described below. The
420 remainder of this section describes various aspects of Security
421 Association management, defining required characteristics for SA
422 policy management, traffic processing, and SA management techniques.
423
424 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a> Definition and Scope</span>
425
426 A Security Association (SA) is a simplex "connection" that affords
427 security services to the traffic carried by it. Security services
428 are afforded to an SA by the use of AH, or ESP, but not both. If
429 both AH and ESP protection is applied to a traffic stream, then two
430 (or more) SAs are created to afford protection to the traffic stream.
431 To secure typical, bi-directional communication between two hosts, or
432 between two security gateways, two Security Associations (one in each
433 direction) are required.
434
435 A security association is uniquely identified by a triple consisting
436 of a Security Parameter Index (SPI), an IP Destination Address, and a
437 security protocol (AH or ESP) identifier. In principle, the
438 Destination Address may be a unicast address, an IP broadcast
439 address, or a multicast group address. However, IPsec SA management
440 mechanisms currently are defined only for unicast SAs. Hence, in the
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
447
448
449 discussions that follow, SAs will be described in the context of
450 point-to-point communication, even though the concept is applicable
451 in the point-to-multipoint case as well.
452
453 As noted above, two types of SAs are defined: transport mode and
454 tunnel mode. A transport mode SA is a security association between
455 two hosts. In IPv4, a transport mode security protocol header
456 appears immediately after the IP header and any options, and before
457 any higher layer protocols (e.g., TCP or UDP). In IPv6, the security
458 protocol header appears after the base IP header and extensions, but
459 may appear before or after destination options, and before higher
460 layer protocols. In the case of ESP, a transport mode SA provides
461 security services only for these higher layer protocols, not for the
462 IP header or any extension headers preceding the ESP header. In the
463 case of AH, the protection is also extended to selected portions of
464 the IP header, selected portions of extension headers, and selected
465 options (contained in the IPv4 header, IPv6 Hop-by-Hop extension
466 header, or IPv6 Destination extension headers). For more details on
467 the coverage afforded by AH, see the AH specification [<a href="#ref-KA98a" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">KA98a</a>].
468
469 A tunnel mode SA is essentially an SA applied to an IP tunnel.
470 Whenever either end of a security association is a security gateway,
471 the SA MUST be tunnel mode. Thus an SA between two security gateways
472 is always a tunnel mode SA, as is an SA between a host and a security
473 gateway. Note that for the case where traffic is destined for a
474 security gateway, e.g., SNMP commands, the security gateway is acting
475 as a host and transport mode is allowed. But in that case, the
476 security gateway is not acting as a gateway, i.e., not transiting
477 traffic. Two hosts MAY establish a tunnel mode SA between
478 themselves. The requirement for any (transit traffic) SA involving a
479 security gateway to be a tunnel SA arises due to the need to avoid
480 potential problems with regard to fragmentation and reassembly of
481 IPsec packets, and in circumstances where multiple paths (e.g., via
482 different security gateways) exist to the same destination behind the
483 security gateways.
484
485 For a tunnel mode SA, there is an "outer" IP header that specifies
486 the IPsec processing destination, plus an "inner" IP header that
487 specifies the (apparently) ultimate destination for the packet. The
488 security protocol header appears after the outer IP header, and
489 before the inner IP header. If AH is employed in tunnel mode,
490 portions of the outer IP header are afforded protection (as above),
491 as well as all of the tunneled IP packet (i.e., all of the inner IP
492 header is protected, as well as higher layer protocols). If ESP is
493 employed, the protection is afforded only to the tunneled packet, not
494 to the outer header.
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
503
504
505 In summary,
506 a) A host MUST support both transport and tunnel mode.
507 b) A security gateway is required to support only tunnel
508 mode. If it supports transport mode, that should be used
509 only when the security gateway is acting as a host, e.g.,
510 for network management.
511
512 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a> Security Association Functionality</span>
513
514 The set of security services offered by an SA depends on the security
515 protocol selected, the SA mode, the endpoints of the SA, and on the
516 election of optional services within the protocol. For example, AH
517 provides data origin authentication and connectionless integrity for
518 IP datagrams (hereafter referred to as just "authentication"). The
519 "precision" of the authentication service is a function of the
520 granularity of the security association with which AH is employed, as
521 discussed in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>, "Selectors".
522
523 AH also offers an anti-replay (partial sequence integrity) service at
524 the discretion of the receiver, to help counter denial of service
525 attacks. AH is an appropriate protocol to employ when
526 confidentiality is not required (or is not permitted, e.g , due to
527 government restrictions on use of encryption). AH also provides
528 authentication for selected portions of the IP header, which may be
529 necessary in some contexts. For example, if the integrity of an IPv4
530 option or IPv6 extension header must be protected en route between
531 sender and receiver, AH can provide this service (except for the
532 non-predictable but mutable parts of the IP header.)
533
534 ESP optionally provides confidentiality for traffic. (The strength
535 of the confidentiality service depends in part, on the encryption
536 algorithm employed.) ESP also may optionally provide authentication
537 (as defined above). If authentication is negotiated for an ESP SA,
538 the receiver also may elect to enforce an anti-replay service with
539 the same features as the AH anti-replay service. The scope of the
540 authentication offered by ESP is narrower than for AH, i.e., the IP
541 header(s) "outside" the ESP header is(are) not protected. If only
542 the upper layer protocols need to be authenticated, then ESP
543 authentication is an appropriate choice and is more space efficient
544 than use of AH encapsulating ESP. Note that although both
545 confidentiality and authentication are optional, they cannot both be
546 omitted. At least one of them MUST be selected.
547
548 If confidentiality service is selected, then an ESP (tunnel mode) SA
549 between two security gateways can offer partial traffic flow
550 confidentiality. The use of tunnel mode allows the inner IP headers
551 to be encrypted, concealing the identities of the (ultimate) traffic
552 source and destination. Moreover, ESP payload padding also can be
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
559
560
561 invoked to hide the size of the packets, further concealing the
562 external characteristics of the traffic. Similar traffic flow
563 confidentiality services may be offered when a mobile user is
564 assigned a dynamic IP address in a dialup context, and establishes a
565 (tunnel mode) ESP SA to a corporate firewall (acting as a security
566 gateway). Note that fine granularity SAs generally are more
567 vulnerable to traffic analysis than coarse granularity ones which are
568 carrying traffic from many subscribers.
569
570 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a> Combining Security Associations</span>
571
572 The IP datagrams transmitted over an individual SA are afforded
573 protection by exactly one security protocol, either AH or ESP, but
574 not both. Sometimes a security policy may call for a combination of
575 services for a particular traffic flow that is not achievable with a
576 single SA. In such instances it will be necessary to employ multiple
577 SAs to implement the required security policy. The term "security
578 association bundle" or "SA bundle" is applied to a sequence of SAs
579 through which traffic must be processed to satisfy a security policy.
580 The order of the sequence is defined by the policy. (Note that the
581 SAs that comprise a bundle may terminate at different endpoints. For
582 example, one SA may extend between a mobile host and a security
583 gateway and a second, nested SA may extend to a host behind the
584 gateway.)
585
586 Security associations may be combined into bundles in two ways:
587 transport adjacency and iterated tunneling.
588
589 o Transport adjacency refers to applying more than one
590 security protocol to the same IP datagram, without invoking
591 tunneling. This approach to combining AH and ESP allows
592 for only one level of combination; further nesting yields
593 no added benefit (assuming use of adequately strong
594 algorithms in each protocol) since the processing is
595 performed at one IPsec instance at the (ultimate)
596 destination.
597
598 Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
599 | | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | |
600 | | | |
601 | -----Security Association 1 (ESP transport)------- |
602 | |
603 -------Security Association 2 (AH transport)----------
604
605 o Iterated tunneling refers to the application of multiple
606 layers of security protocols effected through IP tunneling.
607 This approach allows for multiple levels of nesting, since
608 each tunnel can originate or terminate at a different IPsec
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
615
616
617 site along the path. No special treatment is expected for
618 ISAKMP traffic at intermediate security gateways other than
619 what can be specified through appropriate SPD entries (See
620 Case 3 in <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a>)
621
622 There are 3 basic cases of iterated tunneling -- support is
623 required only for cases 2 and 3.:
624
625 1. both endpoints for the SAs are the same -- The inner and
626 outer tunnels could each be either AH or ESP, though it
627 is unlikely that Host 1 would specify both to be the
628 same, i.e., AH inside of AH or ESP inside of ESP.
629
630 Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
631 | | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 | |
632 | | | |
633 | -------Security Association 1 (tunnel)---------- | |
634 | |
635 ---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)--------------
636
637 2. one endpoint of the SAs is the same -- The inner and
638 uter tunnels could each be either AH or ESP.
639
640 Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
641 | | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 |
642 | | | |
643 | ----Security Association 1 (tunnel)---- |
644 | |
645 ---------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-------------
646
647 3. neither endpoint is the same -- The inner and outer
648 tunnels could each be either AH or ESP.
649
650 Host 1 --- Security ---- Internet -- Security --- Host 2
651 | Gwy 1 Gwy 2 |
652 | | | |
653 | --Security Assoc 1 (tunnel)- |
654 | |
655 -----------Security Association 2 (tunnel)-----------
656
657 These two approaches also can be combined, e.g., an SA bundle could
658 be constructed from one tunnel mode SA and one or two transport mode
659 SAs, applied in sequence. (See <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a> "Basic Combinations of
660 Security Associations.") Note that nested tunnels can also occur
661 where neither the source nor the destination endpoints of any of the
662 tunnels are the same. In that case, there would be no host or
663 security gateway with a bundle corresponding to the nested tunnels.
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
671
672
673 For transport mode SAs, only one ordering of security protocols seems
674 appropriate. AH is applied to both the upper layer protocols and
675 (parts of) the IP header. Thus if AH is used in a transport mode, in
676 conjunction with ESP, AH SHOULD appear as the first header after IP,
677 prior to the appearance of ESP. In that context, AH is applied to
678 the ciphertext output of ESP. In contrast, for tunnel mode SAs, one
679 can imagine uses for various orderings of AH and ESP. The required
680 set of SA bundle types that MUST be supported by a compliant IPsec
681 implementation is described in <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a>.
682
683 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a> Security Association Databases</span>
684
685 Many of the details associated with processing IP traffic in an IPsec
686 implementation are largely a local matter, not subject to
687 standardization. However, some external aspects of the processing
688 must be standardized, to ensure interoperability and to provide a
689 minimum management capability that is essential for productive use of
690 IPsec. This section describes a general model for processing IP
691 traffic relative to security associations, in support of these
692 interoperability and functionality goals. The model described below
693 is nominal; compliant implementations need not match details of this
694 model as presented, but the external behavior of such implementations
695 must be mappable to the externally observable characteristics of this
696 model.
697
698 There are two nominal databases in this model: the Security Policy
699 Database and the Security Association Database. The former specifies
700 the policies that determine the disposition of all IP traffic inbound
701 or outbound from a host, security gateway, or BITS or BITW IPsec
702 implementation. The latter database contains parameters that are
703 associated with each (active) security association. This section
704 also defines the concept of a Selector, a set of IP and upper layer
705 protocol field values that is used by the Security Policy Database to
706 map traffic to a policy, i.e., an SA (or SA bundle).
707
708 Each interface for which IPsec is enabled requires nominally separate
709 inbound vs. outbound databases (SAD and SPD), because of the
710 directionality of many of the fields that are used as selectors.
711 Typically there is just one such interface, for a host or security
712 gateway (SG). Note that an SG would always have at least 2
713 interfaces, but the "internal" one to the corporate net, usually
714 would not have IPsec enabled and so only one pair of SADs and one
715 pair of SPDs would be needed. On the other hand, if a host had
716 multiple interfaces or an SG had multiple external interfaces, it
717 might be necessary to have separate SAD and SPD pairs for each
718 interface.
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a> The Security Policy Database (SPD)</span>
730
731 Ultimately, a security association is a management construct used to
732 enforce a security policy in the IPsec environment. Thus an
733 essential element of SA processing is an underlying Security Policy
734 Database (SPD) that specifies what services are to be offered to IP
735 datagrams and in what fashion. The form of the database and its
736 interface are outside the scope of this specification. However, this
737 section does specify certain minimum management functionality that
738 must be provided, to allow a user or system administrator to control
739 how IPsec is applied to traffic transmitted or received by a host or
740 transiting a security gateway.
741
742 The SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic
743 (INBOUND and OUTBOUND), including non-IPsec traffic. In order to
744 support this, the SPD requires distinct entries for inbound and
745 outbound traffic. One can think of this as separate SPDs (inbound
746 vs. outbound). In addition, a nominally separate SPD must be
747 provided for each IPsec-enabled interface.
748
749 An SPD must discriminate among traffic that is afforded IPsec
750 protection and traffic that is allowed to bypass IPsec. This applies
751 to the IPsec protection to be applied by a sender and to the IPsec
752 protection that must be present at the receiver. For any outbound or
753 inbound datagram, three processing choices are possible: discard,
754 bypass IPsec, or apply IPsec. The first choice refers to traffic
755 that is not allowed to exit the host, traverse the security gateway,
756 or be delivered to an application at all. The second choice refers
757 to traffic that is allowed to pass without additional IPsec
758 protection. The third choice refers to traffic that is afforded
759 IPsec protection, and for such traffic the SPD must specify the
760 security services to be provided, protocols to be employed,
761 algorithms to be used, etc.
762
763 For every IPsec implementation, there MUST be an administrative
764 interface that allows a user or system administrator to manage the
765 SPD. Specifically, every inbound or outbound packet is subject to
766 processing by IPsec and the SPD must specify what action will be
767 taken in each case. Thus the administrative interface must allow the
768 user (or system administrator) to specify the security processing to
769 be applied to any packet entering or exiting the system, on a packet
770 by packet basis. (In a host IPsec implementation making use of a
771 socket interface, the SPD may not need to be consulted on a per
772 packet basis, but the effect is still the same.) The management
773 interface for the SPD MUST allow creation of entries consistent with
774 the selectors defined in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>, and MUST support (total)
775 ordering of these entries. It is expected that through the use of
776 wildcards in various selector fields, and because all packets on a
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
783
784
785 single UDP or TCP connection will tend to match a single SPD entry,
786 this requirement will not impose an unreasonably detailed level of
787 SPD specification. The selectors are analogous to what are found in
788 a stateless firewall or filtering router and which are currently
789 manageable this way.
790
791 In host systems, applications MAY be allowed to select what security
792 processing is to be applied to the traffic they generate and consume.
793 (Means of signalling such requests to the IPsec implementation are
794 outside the scope of this standard.) However, the system
795 administrator MUST be able to specify whether or not a user or
796 application can override (default) system policies. Note that
797 application specified policies may satisfy system requirements, so
798 that the system may not need to do additional IPsec processing beyond
799 that needed to meet an application's requirements. The form of the
800 management interface is not specified by this document and may differ
801 for hosts vs. security gateways, and within hosts the interface may
802 differ for socket-based vs. BITS implementations. However, this
803 document does specify a standard set of SPD elements that all IPsec
804 implementations MUST support.
805
806 The SPD contains an ordered list of policy entries. Each policy
807 entry is keyed by one or more selectors that define the set of IP
808 traffic encompassed by this policy entry. (The required selector
809 types are defined in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>.) These define the granularity of
810 policies or SAs. Each entry includes an indication of whether
811 traffic matching this policy will be bypassed, discarded, or subject
812 to IPsec processing. If IPsec processing is to be applied, the entry
813 includes an SA (or SA bundle) specification, listing the IPsec
814 protocols, modes, and algorithms to be employed, including any
815 nesting requirements. For example, an entry may call for all
816 matching traffic to be protected by ESP in transport mode using
817 3DES-CBC with an explicit IV, nested inside of AH in tunnel mode
818 using HMAC/SHA-1. For each selector, the policy entry specifies how
819 to derive the corresponding values for a new Security Association
820 Database (SAD, see <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>) entry from those in the SPD and the
821 packet (Note that at present, ranges are only supported for IP
822 addresses; but wildcarding can be expressed for all selectors):
823
824 a. use the value in the packet itself -- This will limit use
825 of the SA to those packets which have this packet's value
826 for the selector even if the selector for the policy entry
827 has a range of allowed values or a wildcard for this
828 selector.
829 b. use the value associated with the policy entry -- If this
830 were to be just a single value, then there would be no
831 difference between (b) and (a). However, if the allowed
832 values for the selector are a range (for IP addresses) or
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
839
840
841 wildcard, then in the case of a range,(b) would enable use
842 of the SA by any packet with a selector value within the
843 range not just by packets with the selector value of the
844 packet that triggered the creation of the SA. In the case
845 of a wildcard, (b) would allow use of the SA by packets
846 with any value for this selector.
847
848 For example, suppose there is an SPD entry where the allowed value
849 for source address is any of a range of hosts (192.168.2.1 to
850 192.168.2.10). And suppose that a packet is to be sent that has a
851 source address of 192.168.2.3. The value to be used for the SA could
852 be any of the sample values below depending on what the policy entry
853 for this selector says is the source of the selector value:
854
855 source for the example of
856 value to be new SAD
857 used in the SA selector value
858 --------------- ------------
859 a. packet 192.168.2.3 (one host)
860 b. SPD entry 192.168.2.1 to 192.168.2.10 (range of hosts)
861
862 Note that if the SPD entry had an allowed value of wildcard for the
863 source address, then the SAD selector value could be wildcard (any
864 host). Case (a) can be used to prohibit sharing, even among packets
865 that match the same SPD entry.
866
867 As described below in <a href="#section-4.4.3">Section 4.4.3</a>, selectors may include "wildcard"
868 entries and hence the selectors for two entries may overlap. (This
869 is analogous to the overlap that arises with ACLs or filter entries
870 in routers or packet filtering firewalls.) Thus, to ensure
871 consistent, predictable processing, SPD entries MUST be ordered and
872 the SPD MUST always be searched in the same order, so that the first
873 matching entry is consistently selected. (This requirement is
874 necessary as the effect of processing traffic against SPD entries
875 must be deterministic, but there is no way to canonicalize SPD
876 entries given the use of wildcards for some selectors.) More detail
877 on matching of packets against SPD entries is provided in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
878
879 Note that if ESP is specified, either (but not both) authentication
880 or encryption can be omitted. So it MUST be possible to configure
881 the SPD value for the authentication or encryption algorithms to be
882 "NULL". However, at least one of these services MUST be selected,
883 i.e., it MUST NOT be possible to configure both of them as "NULL".
884
885 The SPD can be used to map traffic to specific SAs or SA bundles.
886 Thus it can function both as the reference database for security
887 policy and as the map to existing SAs (or SA bundles). (To
888 accommodate the bypass and discard policies cited above, the SPD also
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
895
896
897 MUST provide a means of mapping traffic to these functions, even
898 though they are not, per se, IPsec processing.) The way in which the
899 SPD operates is different for inbound vs. outbound traffic and it
900 also may differ for host vs. security gateway, BITS, and BITW
901 implementations. Sections <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> and <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> describe the use of the SPD
902 for outbound and inbound processing, respectively.
903
904 Because a security policy may require that more than one SA be
905 applied to a specified set of traffic, in a specific order, the
906 policy entry in the SPD must preserve these ordering requirements,
907 when present. Thus, it must be possible for an IPsec implementation
908 to determine that an outbound or inbound packet must be processed
909 thorough a sequence of SAs. Conceptually, for outbound processing,
910 one might imagine links (to the SAD) from an SPD entry for which
911 there are active SAs, and each entry would consist of either a single
912 SA or an ordered list of SAs that comprise an SA bundle. When a
913 packet is matched against an SPD entry and there is an existing SA or
914 SA bundle that can be used to carry the traffic, the processing of
915 the packet is controlled by the SA or SA bundle entry on the list.
916 For an inbound IPsec packet for which multiple IPsec SAs are to be
917 applied, the lookup based on destination address, IPsec protocol, and
918 SPI should identify a single SA.
919
920 The SPD is used to control the flow of ALL traffic through an IPsec
921 system, including security and key management traffic (e.g., ISAKMP)
922 from/to entities behind a security gateway. This means that ISAKMP
923 traffic must be explicitly accounted for in the SPD, else it will be
924 discarded. Note that a security gateway could prohibit traversal of
925 encrypted packets in various ways, e.g., having a DISCARD entry in
926 the SPD for ESP packets or providing proxy key exchange. In the
927 latter case, the traffic would be internally routed to the key
928 management module in the security gateway.
929
930 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.2" href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a> Selectors</span>
931
932 An SA (or SA bundle) may be fine-grained or coarse-grained, depending
933 on the selectors used to define the set of traffic for the SA. For
934 example, all traffic between two hosts may be carried via a single
935 SA, and afforded a uniform set of security services. Alternatively,
936 traffic between a pair of hosts might be spread over multiple SAs,
937 depending on the applications being used (as defined by the Next
938 Protocol and Port fields), with different security services offered
939 by different SAs. Similarly, all traffic between a pair of security
940 gateways could be carried on a single SA, or one SA could be assigned
941 for each communicating host pair. The following selector parameters
942 MUST be supported for SA management to facilitate control of SA
943 granularity. Note that in the case of receipt of a packet with an
944 ESP header, e.g., at an encapsulating security gateway or BITW
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
951
952
953 implementation, the transport layer protocol, source/destination
954 ports, and Name (if present) may be "OPAQUE", i.e., inaccessible
955 because of encryption or fragmentation. Note also that both Source
956 and Destination addresses should either be IPv4 or IPv6.
957
958 - Destination IP Address (IPv4 or IPv6): this may be a single IP
959 address (unicast, anycast, broadcast (IPv4 only), or multicast
960 group), a range of addresses (high and low values (inclusive),
961 address + mask, or a wildcard address. The last three are used
962 to support more than one destination system sharing the same SA
963 (e.g., behind a security gateway). Note that this selector is
964 conceptually different from the "Destination IP Address" field
965 in the &lt;Destination IP Address, IPsec Protocol, SPI&gt; tuple used
966 to uniquely identify an SA. When a tunneled packet arrives at
967 the tunnel endpoint, its SPI/Destination address/Protocol are
968 used to look up the SA for this packet in the SAD. This
969 destination address comes from the encapsulating IP header.
970 Once the packet has been processed according to the tunnel SA
971 and has come out of the tunnel, its selectors are "looked up" in
972 the Inbound SPD. The Inbound SPD has a selector called
973 destination address. This IP destination address is the one in
974 the inner (encapsulated) IP header. In the case of a
975 transport'd packet, there will be only one IP header and this
976 ambiguity does not exist. [REQUIRED for all implementations]
977
978 - Source IP Address(es) (IPv4 or IPv6): this may be a single IP
979 address (unicast, anycast, broadcast (IPv4 only), or multicast
980 group), range of addresses (high and low values inclusive),
981 address + mask, or a wildcard address. The last three are used
982 to support more than one source system sharing the same SA
983 (e.g., behind a security gateway or in a multihomed host).
984 [REQUIRED for all implementations]
985
986 - Name: There are 2 cases (Note that these name forms are
987 supported in the IPsec DOI.)
988 1. User ID
989 a. a fully qualified user name string (DNS), e.g.,
990 [email protected]
991 b. X.500 distinguished name, e.g., C = US, SP = MA,
992 O = GTE Internetworking, CN = Stephen T. Kent.
993 2. System name (host, security gateway, etc.)
994 a. a fully qualified DNS name, e.g., foo.bar.com
995 b. X.500 distinguished name
996 c. X.500 general name
997
998 NOTE: One of the possible values of this selector is "OPAQUE".
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1007
1008
1009 [REQUIRED for the following cases. Note that support for name
1010 forms other than addresses is not required for manually keyed
1011 SAs.
1012 o User ID
1013 - native host implementations
1014 - BITW and BITS implementations acting as HOSTS
1015 with only one user
1016 - security gateway implementations for INBOUND
1017 processing.
1018 o System names -- all implementations]
1019
1020 - Data sensitivity level: (IPSO/CIPSO labels)
1021 [REQUIRED for all systems providing information flow security as
1022 per <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>, OPTIONAL for all other systems.]
1023
1024 - Transport Layer Protocol: Obtained from the IPv4 "Protocol" or
1025 the IPv6 "Next Header" fields. This may be an individual
1026 protocol number. These packet fields may not contain the
1027 Transport Protocol due to the presence of IP extension headers,
1028 e.g., a Routing Header, AH, ESP, Fragmentation Header,
1029 Destination Options, Hop-by-hop options, etc. Note that the
1030 Transport Protocol may not be available in the case of receipt
1031 of a packet with an ESP header, thus a value of "OPAQUE" SHOULD
1032 be supported.
1033 [REQUIRED for all implementations]
1034
1035 NOTE: To locate the transport protocol, a system has to chain
1036 through the packet headers checking the "Protocol" or "Next
1037 Header" field until it encounters either one it recognizes as a
1038 transport protocol, or until it reaches one that isn't on its
1039 list of extension headers, or until it encounters an ESP header
1040 that renders the transport protocol opaque.
1041
1042 - Source and Destination (e.g., TCP/UDP) Ports: These may be
1043 individual UDP or TCP port values or a wildcard port. (The use
1044 of the Next Protocol field and the Source and/or Destination
1045 Port fields (in conjunction with the Source and/or Destination
1046 Address fields), as an SA selector is sometimes referred to as
1047 "session-oriented keying."). Note that the source and
1048 destination ports may not be available in the case of receipt of
1049 a packet with an ESP header, thus a value of "OPAQUE" SHOULD be
1050 supported.
1051
1052 The following table summarizes the relationship between the
1053 "Next Header" value in the packet and SPD and the derived Port
1054 Selector value for the SPD and SAD.
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1063
1064
1065 Next Hdr Transport Layer Derived Port Selector Field
1066 in Packet Protocol in SPD Value in SPD and SAD
1067 -------- --------------- ---------------------------
1068 ESP ESP or ANY ANY (i.e., don't look at it)
1069 -don't care- ANY ANY (i.e., don't look at it)
1070 specific value specific value NOT ANY (i.e., drop packet)
1071 fragment
1072 specific value specific value actual port selector field
1073 not fragment
1074
1075 If the packet has been fragmented, then the port information may
1076 not be available in the current fragment. If so, discard the
1077 fragment. An ICMP PMTU should be sent for the first fragment,
1078 which will have the port information. [MAY be supported]
1079
1080 The IPsec implementation context determines how selectors are used.
1081 For example, a host implementation integrated into the stack may make
1082 use of a socket interface. When a new connection is established the
1083 SPD can be consulted and an SA (or SA bundle) bound to the socket.
1084 Thus traffic sent via that socket need not result in additional
1085 lookups to the SPD/SAD. In contrast, a BITS, BITW, or security
1086 gateway implementation needs to look at each packet and perform an
1087 SPD/SAD lookup based on the selectors. The allowable values for the
1088 selector fields differ between the traffic flow, the security
1089 association, and the security policy.
1090
1091 The following table summarizes the kinds of entries that one needs to
1092 be able to express in the SPD and SAD. It shows how they relate to
1093 the fields in data traffic being subjected to IPsec screening.
1094 (Note: the "wild" or "wildcard" entry for src and dst addresses
1095 includes a mask, range, etc.)
1096
1097 Field Traffic Value SAD Entry SPD Entry
1098 -------- ------------- ---------------- --------------------
1099 src addr single IP addr single,range,wild single,range,wildcard
1100 dst addr single IP addr single,range,wild single,range,wildcard
1101 xpt protocol* xpt protocol single,wildcard single,wildcard
1102 src port* single src port single,wildcard single,wildcard
1103 dst port* single dst port single,wildcard single,wildcard
1104 user id* single user id single,wildcard single,wildcard
1105 sec. labels single value single,wildcard single,wildcard
1106
1107 * The SAD and SPD entries for these fields could be "OPAQUE"
1108 because the traffic value is encrypted.
1109
1110 NOTE: In principle, one could have selectors and/or selector values
1111 in the SPD which cannot be negotiated for an SA or SA bundle.
1112 Examples might include selector values used to select traffic for
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1119
1120
1121 discarding or enumerated lists which cause a separate SA to be
1122 created for each item on the list. For now, this is left for future
1123 versions of this document and the list of required selectors and
1124 selector values is the same for the SPD and the SAD. However, it is
1125 acceptable to have an administrative interface that supports use of
1126 selector values which cannot be negotiated provided that it does not
1127 mislead the user into believing it is creating an SA with these
1128 selector values. For example, the interface may allow the user to
1129 specify an enumerated list of values but would result in the creation
1130 of a separate policy and SA for each item on the list. A vendor
1131 might support such an interface to make it easier for its customers
1132 to specify clear and concise policy specifications.
1133
1134 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.3" href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a> Security Association Database (SAD)</span>
1135
1136 In each IPsec implementation there is a nominal Security Association
1137 Database, in which each entry defines the parameters associated with
1138 one SA. Each SA has an entry in the SAD. For outbound processing,
1139 entries are pointed to by entries in the SPD. Note that if an SPD
1140 entry does not currently point to an SA that is appropriate for the
1141 packet, the implementation creates an appropriate SA (or SA Bundle)
1142 and links the SPD entry to the SAD entry (see <a href="#section-5.1.1">Section 5.1.1</a>). For
1143 inbound processing, each entry in the SAD is indexed by a destination
1144 IP address, IPsec protocol type, and SPI. The following parameters
1145 are associated with each entry in the SAD. This description does not
1146 purport to be a MIB, but only a specification of the minimal data
1147 items required to support an SA in an IPsec implementation.
1148
1149 For inbound processing: The following packet fields are used to look
1150 up the SA in the SAD:
1151
1152 o Outer Header's Destination IP address: the IPv4 or IPv6
1153 Destination address.
1154 [REQUIRED for all implementations]
1155 o IPsec Protocol: AH or ESP, used as an index for SA lookup
1156 in this database. Specifies the IPsec protocol to be
1157 applied to the traffic on this SA.
1158 [REQUIRED for all implementations]
1159 o SPI: the 32-bit value used to distinguish among different
1160 SAs terminating at the same destination and using the same
1161 IPsec protocol.
1162 [REQUIRED for all implementations]
1163
1164 For each of the selectors defined in <a href="#section-4.4.2">Section 4.4.2</a>, the SA entry in
1165 the SAD MUST contain the value or values which were negotiated at the
1166 time the SA was created. For the sender, these values are used to
1167 decide whether a given SA is appropriate for use with an outbound
1168 packet. This is part of checking to see if there is an existing SA
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1175
1176
1177 that can be used. For the receiver, these values are used to check
1178 that the selector values in an inbound packet match those for the SA
1179 (and thus indirectly those for the matching policy). For the
1180 receiver, this is part of verifying that the SA was appropriate for
1181 this packet. (See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> for rules for ICMP messages.) These
1182 fields can have the form of specific values, ranges, wildcards, or
1183 "OPAQUE" as described in <a href="#section-4.4.2">section 4.4.2</a>, "Selectors". Note that for
1184 an ESP SA, the encryption algorithm or the authentication algorithm
1185 could be "NULL". However they MUST not both be "NULL".
1186
1187 The following SAD fields are used in doing IPsec processing:
1188
1189 o Sequence Number Counter: a 32-bit value used to generate the
1190 Sequence Number field in AH or ESP headers.
1191 [REQUIRED for all implementations, but used only for outbound
1192 traffic.]
1193 o Sequence Counter Overflow: a flag indicating whether overflow
1194 of the Sequence Number Counter should generate an auditable
1195 event and prevent transmission of additional packets on the
1196 SA.
1197 [REQUIRED for all implementations, but used only for outbound
1198 traffic.]
1199 o Anti-Replay Window: a 32-bit counter and a bit-map (or
1200 equivalent) used to determine whether an inbound AH or ESP
1201 packet is a replay.
1202 [REQUIRED for all implementations but used only for inbound
1203 traffic. NOTE: If anti-replay has been disabled by the
1204 receiver, e.g., in the case of a manually keyed SA, then the
1205 Anti-Replay Window is not used.]
1206 o AH Authentication algorithm, keys, etc.
1207 [REQUIRED for AH implementations]
1208 o ESP Encryption algorithm, keys, IV mode, IV, etc.
1209 [REQUIRED for ESP implementations]
1210 o ESP authentication algorithm, keys, etc. If the
1211 authentication service is not selected, this field will be
1212 null.
1213 [REQUIRED for ESP implementations]
1214 o Lifetime of this Security Association: a time interval after
1215 which an SA must be replaced with a new SA (and new SPI) or
1216 terminated, plus an indication of which of these actions
1217 should occur. This may be expressed as a time or byte count,
1218 or a simultaneous use of both, the first lifetime to expire
1219 taking precedence. A compliant implementation MUST support
1220 both types of lifetimes, and must support a simultaneous use
1221 of both. If time is employed, and if IKE employs X.509
1222 certificates for SA establishment, the SA lifetime must be
1223 constrained by the validity intervals of the certificates,
1224 and the NextIssueDate of the CRLs used in the IKE exchange
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1231
1232
1233 for the SA. Both initiator and responder are responsible for
1234 constraining SA lifetime in this fashion.
1235 [REQUIRED for all implementations]
1236
1237 NOTE: The details of how to handle the refreshing of keys
1238 when SAs expire is a local matter. However, one reasonable
1239 approach is:
1240 (a) If byte count is used, then the implementation
1241 SHOULD count the number of bytes to which the IPsec
1242 algorithm is applied. For ESP, this is the encryption
1243 algorithm (including Null encryption) and for AH,
1244 this is the authentication algorithm. This includes
1245 pad bytes, etc. Note that implementations SHOULD be
1246 able to handle having the counters at the ends of an
1247 SA get out of synch, e.g., because of packet loss or
1248 because the implementations at each end of the SA
1249 aren't doing things the same way.
1250 (b) There SHOULD be two kinds of lifetime -- a soft
1251 lifetime which warns the implementation to initiate
1252 action such as setting up a replacement SA and a
1253 hard lifetime when the current SA ends.
1254 (c) If the entire packet does not get delivered during
1255 the SAs lifetime, the packet SHOULD be discarded.
1256
1257 o IPsec protocol mode: tunnel, transport or wildcard.
1258 Indicates which mode of AH or ESP is applied to traffic on
1259 this SA. Note that if this field is "wildcard" at the
1260 sending end of the SA, then the application has to specify
1261 the mode to the IPsec implementation. This use of wildcard
1262 allows the same SA to be used for either tunnel or transport
1263 mode traffic on a per packet basis, e.g., by different
1264 sockets. The receiver does not need to know the mode in
1265 order to properly process the packet's IPsec headers.
1266
1267 [REQUIRED as follows, unless implicitly defined by context:
1268 - host implementations must support all modes
1269 - gateway implementations must support tunnel mode]
1270
1271 NOTE: The use of wildcard for the protocol mode of an inbound
1272 SA may add complexity to the situation in the receiver (host
1273 only). Since the packets on such an SA could be delivered in
1274 either tunnel or transport mode, the security of an incoming
1275 packet could depend in part on which mode had been used to
1276 deliver it. If, as a result, an application cared about the
1277 SA mode of a given packet, then the application would need a
1278 mechanism to obtain this mode information.
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1287
1288
1289 o Path MTU: any observed path MTU and aging variables. See
1290 <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">Section 6.1.2.4</a>
1291 [REQUIRED for all implementations but used only for outbound
1292 traffic]
1293
1294 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a> Basic Combinations of Security Associations</span>
1295
1296 This section describes four examples of combinations of security
1297 associations that MUST be supported by compliant IPsec hosts or
1298 security gateways. Additional combinations of AH and/or ESP in
1299 tunnel and/or transport modes MAY be supported at the discretion of
1300 the implementor. Compliant implementations MUST be capable of
1301 generating these four combinations and on receipt, of processing
1302 them, but SHOULD be able to receive and process any combination. The
1303 diagrams and text below describe the basic cases. The legend for the
1304 diagrams is:
1305
1306 ==== = one or more security associations (AH or ESP, transport
1307 or tunnel)
1308 ---- = connectivity (or if so labelled, administrative boundary)
1309 Hx = host x
1310 SGx = security gateway x
1311 X* = X supports IPsec
1312
1313 NOTE: The security associations below can be either AH or ESP. The
1314 mode (tunnel vs transport) is determined by the nature of the
1315 endpoints. For host-to-host SAs, the mode can be either transport or
1316 tunnel.
1317
1318 Case 1. The case of providing end-to-end security between 2 hosts
1319 across the Internet (or an Intranet).
1320
1321 ====================================
1322 | |
1323 H1* ------ (Inter/Intranet) ------ H2*
1324
1325 Note that either transport or tunnel mode can be selected by the
1326 hosts. So the headers in a packet between H1 and H2 could look
1327 like any of the following:
1328
1329 Transport Tunnel
1330 ----------------- ---------------------
1331 1. [IP1][AH][upper] 4. [IP2][AH][IP1][upper]
1332 2. [IP1][ESP][upper] 5. [IP2][ESP][IP1][upper]
1333 3. [IP1][AH][ESP][upper]
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1343
1344
1345 Note that there is no requirement to support general nesting,
1346 but in transport mode, both AH and ESP can be applied to the
1347 packet. In this event, the SA establishment procedure MUST
1348 ensure that first ESP, then AH are applied to the packet.
1349
1350 Case 2. This case illustrates simple virtual private networks
1351 support.
1352
1353 ===========================
1354 | |
1355 ---------------------|---- ---|-----------------------
1356 | | | | | |
1357 | H1 -- (Local --- SG1* |--- (Internet) ---| SG2* --- (Local --- H2 |
1358 | Intranet) | | Intranet) |
1359 -------------------------- ---------------------------
1360 admin. boundary admin. boundary
1361
1362 Only tunnel mode is required here. So the headers in a packet
1363 between SG1 and SG2 could look like either of the following:
1364
1365 Tunnel
1366 ---------------------
1367 4. [IP2][AH][IP1][upper]
1368 5. [IP2][ESP][IP1][upper]
1369
1370 Case 3. This case combines cases 1 and 2, adding end-to-end security
1371 between the sending and receiving hosts. It imposes no new
1372 requirements on the hosts or security gateways, other than a
1373 requirement for a security gateway to be configurable to pass
1374 IPsec traffic (including ISAKMP traffic) for hosts behind it.
1375
1376 ===============================================================
1377 | |
1378 | ========================= |
1379 | | | |
1380 ---|-----------------|---- ---|-------------------|---
1381 | | | | | | | |
1382 | H1* -- (Local --- SG1* |-- (Internet) --| SG2* --- (Local --- H2* |
1383 | Intranet) | | Intranet) |
1384 -------------------------- ---------------------------
1385 admin. boundary admin. boundary
1386
1387 Case 4. This covers the situation where a remote host (H1) uses the
1388 Internet to reach an organization's firewall (SG2) and to then
1389 gain access to some server or other machine (H2). The remote
1390 host could be a mobile host (H1) dialing up to a local PPP/ARA
1391 server (not shown) on the Internet and then crossing the
1392 Internet to the home organization's firewall (SG2), etc. The
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1399
1400
1401 details of support for this case, (how H1 locates SG2,
1402 authenticates it, and verifies its authorization to represent
1403 H2) are discussed in <a href="#section-4.6.3">Section 4.6.3</a>, "Locating a Security
1404 Gateway".
1405
1406 ======================================================
1407 | |
1408 |============================== |
1409 || | |
1410 || ---|----------------------|---
1411 || | | | |
1412 H1* ----- (Internet) ------| SG2* ---- (Local ----- H2* |
1413 ^ | Intranet) |
1414 | ------------------------------
1415 could be dialup admin. boundary (optional)
1416 to PPP/ARA server
1417
1418 Only tunnel mode is required between H1 and SG2. So the choices
1419 for the SA between H1 and SG2 would be one of the ones in case
1420 2. The choices for the SA between H1 and H2 would be one of the
1421 ones in case 1.
1422
1423 Note that in this case, the sender MUST apply the transport
1424 header before the tunnel header. Therefore the management
1425 interface to the IPsec implementation MUST support configuration
1426 of the SPD and SAD to ensure this ordering of IPsec header
1427 application.
1428
1429 As noted above, support for additional combinations of AH and ESP is
1430 optional. Use of other, optional combinations may adversely affect
1431 interoperability.
1432
1433 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a> SA and Key Management</span>
1434
1435 IPsec mandates support for both manual and automated SA and
1436 cryptographic key management. The IPsec protocols, AH and ESP, are
1437 largely independent of the associated SA management techniques,
1438 although the techniques involved do affect some of the security
1439 services offered by the protocols. For example, the optional anti-
1440 replay services available for AH and ESP require automated SA
1441 management. Moreover, the granularity of key distribution employed
1442 with IPsec determines the granularity of authentication provided.
1443 (See also a discussion of this issue in <a href="#section-4.7">Section 4.7</a>.) In general,
1444 data origin authentication in AH and ESP is limited by the extent to
1445 which secrets used with the authentication algorithm (or with a key
1446 management protocol that creates such secrets) are shared among
1447 multiple possible sources.
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1455
1456
1457 The following text describes the minimum requirements for both types
1458 of SA management.
1459
1460 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.1" href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a> Manual Techniques</span>
1461
1462 The simplest form of management is manual management, in which a
1463 person manually configures each system with keying material and
1464 security association management data relevant to secure communication
1465 with other systems. Manual techniques are practical in small, static
1466 environments but they do not scale well. For example, a company
1467 could create a Virtual Private Network (VPN) using IPsec in security
1468 gateways at several sites. If the number of sites is small, and
1469 since all the sites come under the purview of a single administrative
1470 domain, this is likely to be a feasible context for manual management
1471 techniques. In this case, the security gateway might selectively
1472 protect traffic to and from other sites within the organization using
1473 a manually configured key, while not protecting traffic for other
1474 destinations. It also might be appropriate when only selected
1475 communications need to be secured. A similar argument might apply to
1476 use of IPsec entirely within an organization for a small number of
1477 hosts and/or gateways. Manual management techniques often employ
1478 statically configured, symmetric keys, though other options also
1479 exist.
1480
1481 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.2" href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a> Automated SA and Key Management</span>
1482
1483 Widespread deployment and use of IPsec requires an Internet-standard,
1484 scalable, automated, SA management protocol. Such support is
1485 required to facilitate use of the anti-replay features of AH and ESP,
1486 and to accommodate on-demand creation of SAs, e.g., for user- and
1487 session-oriented keying. (Note that the notion of "rekeying" an SA
1488 actually implies creation of a new SA with a new SPI, a process that
1489 generally implies use of an automated SA/key management protocol.)
1490
1491 The default automated key management protocol selected for use with
1492 IPsec is IKE [<a href="#ref-MSST97" title="&quot;Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)&quot;">MSST97</a>, <a href="#ref-Orm97" title="&quot;The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol&quot;">Orm97</a>, <a href="#ref-HC98" title="&quot;The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)&quot;">HC98</a>] under the IPsec domain of
1493 interpretation [<a href="#ref-Pip98" title="&quot;The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP&quot;">Pip98</a>]. Other automated SA management protocols MAY
1494 be employed.
1495
1496 When an automated SA/key management protocol is employed, the output
1497 from this protocol may be used to generate multiple keys, e.g., for a
1498 single ESP SA. This may arise because:
1499
1500 o the encryption algorithm uses multiple keys (e.g., triple DES)
1501 o the authentication algorithm uses multiple keys
1502 o both encryption and authentication algorithms are employed
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1511
1512
1513 The Key Management System may provide a separate string of bits for
1514 each key or it may generate one string of bits from which all of them
1515 are extracted. If a single string of bits is provided, care needs to
1516 be taken to ensure that the parts of the system that map the string
1517 of bits to the required keys do so in the same fashion at both ends
1518 of the SA. To ensure that the IPsec implementations at each end of
1519 the SA use the same bits for the same keys, and irrespective of which
1520 part of the system divides the string of bits into individual keys,
1521 the encryption key(s) MUST be taken from the first (left-most, high-
1522 order) bits and the authentication key(s) MUST be taken from the
1523 remaining bits. The number of bits for each key is defined in the
1524 relevant algorithm specification RFC. In the case of multiple
1525 encryption keys or multiple authentication keys, the specification
1526 for the algorithm must specify the order in which they are to be
1527 selected from a single string of bits provided to the algorithm.
1528
1529 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.3" href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a> Locating a Security Gateway</span>
1530
1531 This section discusses issues relating to how a host learns about the
1532 existence of relevant security gateways and once a host has contacted
1533 these security gateways, how it knows that these are the correct
1534 security gateways. The details of where the required information is
1535 stored is a local matter.
1536
1537 Consider a situation in which a remote host (H1) is using the
1538 Internet to gain access to a server or other machine (H2) and there
1539 is a security gateway (SG2), e.g., a firewall, through which H1's
1540 traffic must pass. An example of this situation would be a mobile
1541 host (Road Warrior) crossing the Internet to the home organization's
1542 firewall (SG2). (See Case 4 in the <a href="#section-4.5">section 4.5</a> Basic Combinations of
1543 Security Associations.) This situation raises several issues:
1544
1545 1. How does H1 know/learn about the existence of the security
1546 gateway SG2?
1547 2. How does it authenticate SG2, and once it has authenticated
1548 SG2, how does it confirm that SG2 has been authorized to
1549 represent H2?
1550 3. How does SG2 authenticate H1 and verify that H1 is authorized
1551 to contact H2?
1552 4. How does H1 know/learn about backup gateways which provide
1553 alternate paths to H2?
1554
1555 To address these problems, a host or security gateway MUST have an
1556 administrative interface that allows the user/administrator to
1557 configure the address of a security gateway for any sets of
1558 destination addresses that require its use. This includes the ability
1559 to configure:
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1567
1568
1569 o the requisite information for locating and authenticating the
1570 security gateway and verifying its authorization to represent
1571 the destination host.
1572 o the requisite information for locating and authenticating any
1573 backup gateways and verifying their authorization to represent
1574 the destination host.
1575
1576 It is assumed that the SPD is also configured with policy information
1577 that covers any other IPsec requirements for the path to the security
1578 gateway and the destination host.
1579
1580 This document does not address the issue of how to automate the
1581 discovery/verification of security gateways.
1582
1583 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7" href="#section-4.7">4.7</a> Security Associations and Multicast</span>
1584
1585 The receiver-orientation of the Security Association implies that, in
1586 the case of unicast traffic, the destination system will normally
1587 select the SPI value. By having the destination select the SPI
1588 value, there is no potential for manually configured Security
1589 Associations to conflict with automatically configured (e.g., via a
1590 key management protocol) Security Associations or for Security
1591 Associations from multiple sources to conflict with each other. For
1592 multicast traffic, there are multiple destination systems per
1593 multicast group. So some system or person will need to coordinate
1594 among all multicast groups to select an SPI or SPIs on behalf of each
1595 multicast group and then communicate the group's IPsec information to
1596 all of the legitimate members of that multicast group via mechanisms
1597 not defined here.
1598
1599 Multiple senders to a multicast group SHOULD use a single Security
1600 Association (and hence Security Parameter Index) for all traffic to
1601 that group when a symmetric key encryption or authentication
1602 algorithm is employed. In such circumstances, the receiver knows only
1603 that the message came from a system possessing the key for that
1604 multicast group. In such circumstances, a receiver generally will
1605 not be able to authenticate which system sent the multicast traffic.
1606 Specifications for other, more general multicast cases are deferred
1607 to later IPsec documents.
1608
1609 At the time this specification was published, automated protocols for
1610 multicast key distribution were not considered adequately mature for
1611 standardization. For multicast groups having relatively few members,
1612 manual key distribution or multiple use of existing unicast key
1613 distribution algorithms such as modified Diffie-Hellman appears
1614 feasible. For very large groups, new scalable techniques will be
1615 needed. An example of current work in this area is the Group Key
1616 Management Protocol (GKMP) [<a href="#ref-HM97" title="&quot;Group Key Management Protocol (GKMP) Architecture&quot;">HM97</a>].
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1623
1624
1625 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IP Traffic Processing</span>
1626
1627 As mentioned in <a href="#section-4.4.1">Section 4.4.1</a> "The Security Policy Database (SPD)",
1628 the SPD must be consulted during the processing of all traffic
1629 (INBOUND and OUTBOUND), including non-IPsec traffic. If no policy is
1630 found in the SPD that matches the packet (for either inbound or
1631 outbound traffic), the packet MUST be discarded.
1632
1633 NOTE: All of the cryptographic algorithms used in IPsec expect their
1634 input in canonical network byte order (see Appendix in <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>) and
1635 generate their output in canonical network byte order. IP packets
1636 are also transmitted in network byte order.
1637
1638 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> Outbound IP Traffic Processing</span>
1639
1640 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.1" href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle</span>
1641
1642 In a security gateway or BITW implementation (and in many BITS
1643 implementations), each outbound packet is compared against the SPD to
1644 determine what processing is required for the packet. If the packet
1645 is to be discarded, this is an auditable event. If the traffic is
1646 allowed to bypass IPsec processing, the packet continues through
1647 "normal" processing for the environment in which the IPsec processing
1648 is taking place. If IPsec processing is required, the packet is
1649 either mapped to an existing SA (or SA bundle), or a new SA (or SA
1650 bundle) is created for the packet. Since a packet's selectors might
1651 match multiple policies or multiple extant SAs and since the SPD is
1652 ordered, but the SAD is not, IPsec MUST:
1653
1654 1. Match the packet's selector fields against the outbound
1655 policies in the SPD to locate the first appropriate
1656 policy, which will point to zero or more SA bundles in the
1657 SAD.
1658
1659 2. Match the packet's selector fields against those in the SA
1660 bundles found in (1) to locate the first SA bundle that
1661 matches. If no SAs were found or none match, create an
1662 appropriate SA bundle and link the SPD entry to the SAD
1663 entry. If no key management entity is found, drop the
1664 packet.
1665
1666 3. Use the SA bundle found/created in (2) to do the required
1667 IPsec processing, e.g., authenticate and encrypt.
1668
1669 In a host IPsec implementation based on sockets, the SPD will be
1670 consulted whenever a new socket is created, to determine what, if
1671 any, IPsec processing will be applied to the traffic that will flow
1672 on that socket.
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1679
1680
1681 NOTE: A compliant implementation MUST not allow instantiation of an
1682 ESP SA that employs both a NULL encryption and a NULL authentication
1683 algorithm. An attempt to negotiate such an SA is an auditable event.
1684
1685 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2" href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a> Header Construction for Tunnel Mode</span>
1686
1687 This section describes the handling of the inner and outer IP
1688 headers, extension headers, and options for AH and ESP tunnels. This
1689 includes how to construct the encapsulating (outer) IP header, how to
1690 handle fields in the inner IP header, and what other actions should
1691 be taken. The general idea is modeled after the one used in <a href="./rfc2003">RFC</a>
1692 <a href="./rfc2003">2003</a>, "IP Encapsulation with IP":
1693
1694 o The outer IP header Source Address and Destination Address
1695 identify the "endpoints" of the tunnel (the encapsulator and
1696 decapsulator). The inner IP header Source Address and
1697 Destination Addresses identify the original sender and
1698 recipient of the datagram, (from the perspective of this
1699 tunnel), respectively. (see footnote 3 after the table in
1700 5.1.2.1 for more details on the encapsulating source IP
1701 address.)
1702 o The inner IP header is not changed except to decrement the TTL
1703 as noted below, and remains unchanged during its delivery to
1704 the tunnel exit point.
1705 o No change to IP options or extension headers in the inner
1706 header occurs during delivery of the encapsulated datagram
1707 through the tunnel.
1708 o If need be, other protocol headers such as the IP
1709 Authentication header may be inserted between the outer IP
1710 header and the inner IP header.
1711
1712 The tables in the following sub-sections show the handling for the
1713 different header/option fields (constructed = the value in the outer
1714 field is constructed independently of the value in the inner).
1715
1716 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2.1" href="#section-5.1.2.1">5.1.2.1</a> IPv4 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode</span>
1717
1718 &lt;-- How Outer Hdr Relates to Inner Hdr --&gt;
1719 Outer Hdr at Inner Hdr at
1720 IPv4 Encapsulator Decapsulator
1721 Header fields: -------------------- ------------
1722 version 4 (1) no change
1723 header length constructed no change
1724 TOS copied from inner hdr (5) no change
1725 total length constructed no change
1726 ID constructed no change
1727 flags (DF,MF) constructed, DF (4) no change
1728 fragmt offset constructed no change
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1735
1736
1737 TTL constructed (2) decrement (2)
1738 protocol AH, ESP, routing hdr no change
1739 checksum constructed constructed (2)
1740 src address constructed (3) no change
1741 dest address constructed (3) no change
1742 Options never copied no change
1743
1744 1. The IP version in the encapsulating header can be different
1745 from the value in the inner header.
1746
1747 2. The TTL in the inner header is decremented by the
1748 encapsulator prior to forwarding and by the decapsulator if
1749 it forwards the packet. (The checksum changes when the TTL
1750 changes.)
1751
1752 Note: The decrementing of the TTL is one of the usual actions
1753 that takes place when forwarding a packet. Packets
1754 originating from the same node as the encapsulator do not
1755 have their TTL's decremented, as the sending node is
1756 originating the packet rather than forwarding it.
1757
1758 3. src and dest addresses depend on the SA, which is used to
1759 determine the dest address which in turn determines which src
1760 address (net interface) is used to forward the packet.
1761
1762 NOTE: In principle, the encapsulating IP source address can
1763 be any of the encapsulator's interface addresses or even an
1764 address different from any of the encapsulator's IP
1765 addresses, (e.g., if it's acting as a NAT box) so long as the
1766 address is reachable through the encapsulator from the
1767 environment into which the packet is sent. This does not
1768 cause a problem because IPsec does not currently have any
1769 INBOUND processing requirement that involves the Source
1770 Address of the encapsulating IP header. So while the
1771 receiving tunnel endpoint looks at the Destination Address in
1772 the encapsulating IP header, it only looks at the Source
1773 Address in the inner (encapsulated) IP header.
1774
1775 4. configuration determines whether to copy from the inner
1776 header (IPv4 only), clear or set the DF.
1777
1778 5. If Inner Hdr is IPv4 (Protocol = 4), copy the TOS. If Inner
1779 Hdr is IPv6 (Protocol = 41), map the Class to TOS.
1780
1781 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2.2" href="#section-5.1.2.2">5.1.2.2</a> IPv6 -- Header Construction for Tunnel Mode</span>
1782
1783 See previous <a href="#section-5.1.2">section 5.1.2</a> for notes 1-5 indicated by (footnote
1784 number).
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1791
1792
1793 &lt;-- How Outer Hdr Relates Inner Hdr ---&gt;
1794 Outer Hdr at Inner Hdr at
1795 IPv6 Encapsulator Decapsulator
1796 Header fields: -------------------- ------------
1797 version 6 (1) no change
1798 class copied or configured (6) no change
1799 flow id copied or configured no change
1800 len constructed no change
1801 next header AH,ESP,routing hdr no change
1802 hop limit constructed (2) decrement (2)
1803 src address constructed (3) no change
1804 dest address constructed (3) no change
1805 Extension headers never copied no change
1806
1807 6. If Inner Hdr is IPv6 (Next Header = 41), copy the Class. If
1808 Inner Hdr is IPv4 (Next Header = 4), map the TOS to Class.
1809
1810 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> Processing Inbound IP Traffic</span>
1811
1812 Prior to performing AH or ESP processing, any IP fragments are
1813 reassembled. Each inbound IP datagram to which IPsec processing will
1814 be applied is identified by the appearance of the AH or ESP values in
1815 the IP Next Protocol field (or of AH or ESP as an extension header in
1816 the IPv6 context).
1817
1818 Note: <a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a> contains sample code for a bitmask check for a 32
1819 packet window that can be used for implementing anti-replay service.
1820
1821 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.1" href="#section-5.2.1">5.2.1</a> Selecting and Using an SA or SA Bundle</span>
1822
1823 Mapping the IP datagram to the appropriate SA is simplified because
1824 of the presence of the SPI in the AH or ESP header. Note that the
1825 selector checks are made on the inner headers not the outer (tunnel)
1826 headers. The steps followed are:
1827
1828 1. Use the packet's destination address (outer IP header),
1829 IPsec protocol, and SPI to look up the SA in the SAD. If
1830 the SA lookup fails, drop the packet and log/report the
1831 error.
1832
1833 2. Use the SA found in (1) to do the IPsec processing, e.g.,
1834 authenticate and decrypt. This step includes matching the
1835 packet's (Inner Header if tunneled) selectors to the
1836 selectors in the SA. Local policy determines the
1837 specificity of the SA selectors (single value, list,
1838 range, wildcard). In general, a packet's source address
1839 MUST match the SA selector value. However, an ICMP packet
1840 received on a tunnel mode SA may have a source address
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1847
1848
1849 other than that bound to the SA and thus such packets
1850 should be permitted as exceptions to this check. For an
1851 ICMP packet, the selectors from the enclosed problem
1852 packet (the source and destination addresses and ports
1853 should be swapped) should be checked against the selectors
1854 for the SA. Note that some or all of these selectors may
1855 be inaccessible because of limitations on how many bits of
1856 the problem packet the ICMP packet is allowed to carry or
1857 due to encryption. See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>.
1858
1859 Do (1) and (2) for every IPsec header until a Transport
1860 Protocol Header or an IP header that is NOT for this
1861 system is encountered. Keep track of what SAs have been
1862 used and their order of application.
1863
1864 3. Find an incoming policy in the SPD that matches the
1865 packet. This could be done, for example, by use of
1866 backpointers from the SAs to the SPD or by matching the
1867 packet's selectors (Inner Header if tunneled) against
1868 those of the policy entries in the SPD.
1869
1870 4. Check whether the required IPsec processing has been
1871 applied, i.e., verify that the SA's found in (1) and (2)
1872 match the kind and order of SAs required by the policy
1873 found in (3).
1874
1875 NOTE: The correct "matching" policy will not necessarily
1876 be the first inbound policy found. If the check in (4)
1877 fails, steps (3) and (4) are repeated until all policy
1878 entries have been checked or until the check succeeds.
1879
1880 At the end of these steps, pass the resulting packet to the Transport
1881 Layer or forward the packet. Note that any IPsec headers processed
1882 in these steps may have been removed, but that this information,
1883 i.e., what SAs were used and the order of their application, may be
1884 needed for subsequent IPsec or firewall processing.
1885
1886 Note that in the case of a security gateway, if forwarding causes a
1887 packet to exit via an IPsec-enabled interface, then additional IPsec
1888 processing may be applied.
1889
1890 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2.2" href="#section-5.2.2">5.2.2</a> Handling of AH and ESP tunnels</span>
1891
1892 The handling of the inner and outer IP headers, extension headers,
1893 and options for AH and ESP tunnels should be performed as described
1894 in the tables in <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>.
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1903
1904
1905 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. ICMP Processing (relevant to IPsec)</span>
1906
1907 The focus of this section is on the handling of ICMP error messages.
1908 Other ICMP traffic, e.g., Echo/Reply, should be treated like other
1909 traffic and can be protected on an end-to-end basis using SAs in the
1910 usual fashion.
1911
1912 An ICMP error message protected by AH or ESP and generated by a
1913 router SHOULD be processed and forwarded in a tunnel mode SA. Local
1914 policy determines whether or not it is subjected to source address
1915 checks by the router at the destination end of the tunnel. Note that
1916 if the router at the originating end of the tunnel is forwarding an
1917 ICMP error message from another router, the source address check
1918 would fail. An ICMP message protected by AH or ESP and generated by
1919 a router MUST NOT be forwarded on a transport mode SA (unless the SA
1920 has been established to the router acting as a host, e.g., a Telnet
1921 connection used to manage a router). An ICMP message generated by a
1922 host SHOULD be checked against the source IP address selectors bound
1923 to the SA in which the message arrives. Note that even if the source
1924 of an ICMP error message is authenticated, the returned IP header
1925 could be invalid. Accordingly, the selector values in the IP header
1926 SHOULD also be checked to be sure that they are consistent with the
1927 selectors for the SA over which the ICMP message was received.
1928
1929 The table in <a href="#appendix-D">Appendix D</a> characterize ICMP messages as being either
1930 host generated, router generated, both, unknown/unassigned. ICMP
1931 messages falling into the last two categories should be handled as
1932 determined by the receiver's policy.
1933
1934 An ICMP message not protected by AH or ESP is unauthenticated and its
1935 processing and/or forwarding may result in denial of service. This
1936 suggests that, in general, it would be desirable to ignore such
1937 messages. However, it is expected that many routers (vs. security
1938 gateways) will not implement IPsec for transit traffic and thus
1939 strict adherence to this rule would cause many ICMP messages to be
1940 discarded. The result is that some critical IP functions would be
1941 lost, e.g., redirection and PMTU processing. Thus it MUST be
1942 possible to configure an IPsec implementation to accept or reject
1943 (router) ICMP traffic as per local security policy.
1944
1945 The remainder of this section addresses how PMTU processing MUST be
1946 performed at hosts and security gateways. It addresses processing of
1947 both authenticated and unauthenticated ICMP PMTU messages. However,
1948 as noted above, unauthenticated ICMP messages MAY be discarded based
1949 on local policy.
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
1959
1960
1961 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> PMTU/DF Processing</span>
1962
1963 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.1" href="#section-6.1.1">6.1.1</a> DF Bit</span>
1964
1965 In cases where a system (host or gateway) adds an encapsulating
1966 header (ESP tunnel or AH tunnel), it MUST support the option of
1967 copying the DF bit from the original packet to the encapsulating
1968 header (and processing ICMP PMTU messages). This means that it MUST
1969 be possible to configure the system's treatment of the DF bit (set,
1970 clear, copy from encapsulated header) for each interface. (See
1971 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for rationale.)
1972
1973 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2" href="#section-6.1.2">6.1.2</a> Path MTU Discovery (PMTU)</span>
1974
1975 This section discusses IPsec handling for Path MTU Discovery
1976 messages. ICMP PMTU is used here to refer to an ICMP message for:
1977
1978 IPv4 (<a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>):
1979 - Type = 3 (Destination Unreachable)
1980 - Code = 4 (Fragmentation needed and DF set)
1981 - Next-Hop MTU in the low-order 16 bits of the second
1982 word of the ICMP header (labelled "unused" in <a href="./rfc792">RFC</a>
1983 <a href="./rfc792">792</a>), with high-order 16 bits set to zero
1984
1985 IPv6 (<a href="./rfc1885">RFC 1885</a>):
1986 - Type = 2 (Packet Too Big)
1987 - Code = 0 (Fragmentation needed)
1988 - Next-Hop MTU in the 32 bit MTU field of the ICMP6
1989 message
1990
1991 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.1" href="#section-6.1.2.1">6.1.2.1</a> Propagation of PMTU</span>
1992
1993 The amount of information returned with the ICMP PMTU message (IPv4
1994 or IPv6) is limited and this affects what selectors are available for
1995 use in further propagating the PMTU information. (See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for
1996 more detailed discussion of this topic.)
1997
1998 o PMTU message with 64 bits of IPsec header -- If the ICMP PMTU
1999 message contains only 64 bits of the IPsec header (minimum for
2000 IPv4), then a security gateway MUST support the following options
2001 on a per SPI/SA basis:
2002
2003 a. if the originating host can be determined (or the possible
2004 sources narrowed down to a manageable number), send the PM
2005 information to all the possible originating hosts.
2006 b. if the originating host cannot be determined, store the PMTU
2007 with the SA and wait until the next packet(s) arrive from the
2008 originating host for the relevant security association. If
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2015
2016
2017 the packet(s) are bigger than the PMTU, drop the packet(s),
2018 and compose ICMP PMTU message(s) with the new packet(s) and
2019 the updated PMTU, and send the ICMP message(s) about the
2020 problem to the originating host. Retain the PMTU information
2021 for any message that might arrive subsequently (see <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">Section</a>
2022 <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">6.1.2.4</a>, "PMTU Aging").
2023
2024 o PMTU message with &gt;64 bits of IPsec header -- If the ICMP message
2025 contains more information from the original packet then there may
2026 be enough non-opaque information to immediately determine to which
2027 host to propagate the ICMP/PMTU message and to provide that system
2028 with the 5 fields (source address, destination address, source
2029 port, destination port, transport protocol) needed to determine
2030 where to store/update the PMTU. Under such circumstances, a
2031 security gateway MUST generate an ICMP PMTU message immediately
2032 upon receipt of an ICMP PMTU from further down the path.
2033
2034 o Distributing the PMTU to the Transport Layer -- The host mechanism
2035 for getting the updated PMTU to the transport layer is unchanged,
2036 as specified in <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a> (Path MTU Discovery).
2037
2038 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.2" href="#section-6.1.2.2">6.1.2.2</a> Calculation of PMTU</span>
2039
2040 The calculation of PMTU from an ICMP PMTU MUST take into account the
2041 addition of any IPsec header -- AH transport, ESP transport, AH/ESP
2042 transport, ESP tunnel, AH tunnel. (See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for discussion of
2043 implementation issues.)
2044
2045 Note: In some situations the addition of IPsec headers could result
2046 in an effective PMTU (as seen by the host or application) that is
2047 unacceptably small. To avoid this problem, the implementation may
2048 establish a threshold below which it will not report a reduced PMTU.
2049 In such cases, the implementation would apply IPsec and then fragment
2050 the resulting packet according to the PMTU. This would result in a
2051 more efficient use of the available bandwidth.
2052
2053 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.3" href="#section-6.1.2.3">6.1.2.3</a> Granularity of PMTU Processing</span>
2054
2055 In hosts, the granularity with which ICMP PMTU processing can be done
2056 differs depending on the implementation situation. Looking at a
2057 host, there are 3 situations that are of interest with respect to
2058 PMTU issues (See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for additional details on this topic.):
2059
2060 a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation
2061 b. Bump-in-the-stack implementations, where IPsec is implemented
2062 "underneath" an existing implementation of a TCP/IP protocol
2063 stack, between the native IP and the local network drivers
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2071
2072
2073 c. No IPsec implementation -- This case is included because it
2074 is relevant in cases where a security gateway is sending PMTU
2075 information back to a host.
2076
2077 Only in case (a) can the PMTU data be maintained at the same
2078 granularity as communication associations. In (b) and (c), the IP
2079 layer will only be able to maintain PMTU data at the granularity of
2080 source and destination IP addresses (and optionally TOS), as
2081 described in <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>. This is an important difference, because more
2082 than one communication association may map to the same source and
2083 destination IP addresses, and each communication association may have
2084 a different amount of IPsec header overhead (e.g., due to use of
2085 different transforms or different algorithms).
2086
2087 Implementation of the calculation of PMTU and support for PMTUs at
2088 the granularity of individual communication associations is a local
2089 matter. However, a socket-based implementation of IPsec in a host
2090 SHOULD maintain the information on a per socket basis. Bump in the
2091 stack systems MUST pass an ICMP PMTU to the host IP implementation,
2092 after adjusting it for any IPsec header overhead added by these
2093 systems. The calculation of the overhead SHOULD be determined by
2094 analysis of the SPI and any other selector information present in a
2095 returned ICMP PMTU message.
2096
2097 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1.2.4" href="#section-6.1.2.4">6.1.2.4</a> PMTU Aging</span>
2098
2099 In all systems (host or gateway) implementing IPsec and maintaining
2100 PMTU information, the PMTU associated with a security association
2101 (transport or tunnel) MUST be "aged" and some mechanism put in place
2102 for updating the PMTU in a timely manner, especially for discovering
2103 if the PMTU is smaller than it needs to be. A given PMTU has to
2104 remain in place long enough for a packet to get from the source end
2105 of the security association to the system at the other end of the
2106 security association and propagate back an ICMP error message if the
2107 current PMTU is too big. Note that if there are nested tunnels,
2108 multiple packets and round trip times might be required to get an
2109 ICMP message back to an encapsulator or originating host.
2110
2111 Systems SHOULD use the approach described in the Path MTU Discovery
2112 document (<a href="./rfc1191#section-6.3">RFC 1191, Section&nbsp;6.3</a>), which suggests periodically
2113 resetting the PMTU to the first-hop data-link MTU and then letting
2114 the normal PMTU Discovery processes update the PMTU as necessary.
2115 The period SHOULD be configurable.
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2127
2128
2129 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Auditing</span>
2130
2131 Not all systems that implement IPsec will implement auditing. For
2132 the most part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter.
2133 However, several auditable events are identified in the AH and ESP
2134 specifications and for each of these events a minimum set of
2135 information that SHOULD be included in an audit log is defined.
2136 Additional information also MAY be included in the audit log for each
2137 of these events, and additional events, not explicitly called out in
2138 this specification, also MAY result in audit log entries. There is
2139 no requirement for the receiver to transmit any message to the
2140 purported transmitter in response to the detection of an auditable
2141 event, because of the potential to induce denial of service via such
2142 action.
2143
2144 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Use in Systems Supporting Information Flow Security</span>
2145
2146 Information of various sensitivity levels may be carried over a
2147 single network. Information labels (e.g., Unclassified, Company
2148 Proprietary, Secret) [<a href="#ref-DoD85" title="&quot;Department of Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria&quot;">DoD85</a>, <a href="#ref-DoD87" title="&quot;Trusted Network Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria&quot;">DoD87</a>] are often employed to distinguish
2149 such information. The use of labels facilitates segregation of
2150 information, in support of information flow security models, e.g.,
2151 the Bell-LaPadula model [<a href="#ref-BL73" title="&quot;Secure Computer Systems: Mathematical Foundations and Model&quot;">BL73</a>]. Such models, and corresponding
2152 supporting technology, are designed to prevent the unauthorized flow
2153 of sensitive information, even in the face of Trojan Horse attacks.
2154 Conventional, discretionary access control (DAC) mechanisms, e.g.,
2155 based on access control lists, generally are not sufficient to
2156 support such policies, and thus facilities such as the SPD do not
2157 suffice in such environments.
2158
2159 In the military context, technology that supports such models is
2160 often referred to as multi-level security (MLS). Computers and
2161 networks often are designated "multi-level secure" if they support
2162 the separation of labelled data in conjunction with information flow
2163 security policies. Although such technology is more broadly
2164 applicable than just military applications, this document uses the
2165 acronym "MLS" to designate the technology, consistent with much
2166 extant literature.
2167
2168 IPsec mechanisms can easily support MLS networking. MLS networking
2169 requires the use of strong Mandatory Access Controls (MAC), which
2170 unprivileged users or unprivileged processes are incapable of
2171 controlling or violating. This section pertains only to the use of
2172 these IP security mechanisms in MLS (information flow security
2173 policy) environments. Nothing in this section applies to systems not
2174 claiming to provide MLS.
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2183
2184
2185 As used in this section, "sensitivity information" might include
2186 implementation-defined hierarchic levels, categories, and/or
2187 releasability information.
2188
2189 AH can be used to provide strong authentication in support of
2190 mandatory access control decisions in MLS environments. If explicit
2191 IP sensitivity information (e.g., IPSO [<a href="#ref-Ken91" title="&quot;US DoD Security Options for the Internet Protocol&quot;">Ken91</a>]) is used and
2192 confidentiality is not considered necessary within the particular
2193 operational environment, AH can be used to authenticate the binding
2194 between sensitivity labels in the IP header and the IP payload
2195 (including user data). This is a significant improvement over
2196 labeled IPv4 networks where the sensitivity information is trusted
2197 even though there is no authentication or cryptographic binding of
2198 the information to the IP header and user data. IPv4 networks might
2199 or might not use explicit labelling. IPv6 will normally use implicit
2200 sensitivity information that is part of the IPsec Security
2201 Association but not transmitted with each packet instead of using
2202 explicit sensitivity information. All explicit IP sensitivity
2203 information MUST be authenticated using either ESP, AH, or both.
2204
2205 Encryption is useful and can be desirable even when all of the hosts
2206 are within a protected environment, for example, behind a firewall or
2207 disjoint from any external connectivity. ESP can be used, in
2208 conjunction with appropriate key management and encryption
2209 algorithms, in support of both DAC and MAC. (The choice of
2210 encryption and authentication algorithms, and the assurance level of
2211 an IPsec implementation will determine the environments in which an
2212 implementation may be deemed sufficient to satisfy MLS requirements.)
2213 Key management can make use of sensitivity information to provide
2214 MAC. IPsec implementations on systems claiming to provide MLS SHOULD
2215 be capable of using IPsec to provide MAC for IP-based communications.
2216
2217 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a> Relationship Between Security Associations and Data Sensitivity</span>
2218
2219 Both the Encapsulating Security Payload and the Authentication Header
2220 can be combined with appropriate Security Association policies to
2221 provide multi-level secure networking. In this case each SA (or SA
2222 bundle) is normally used for only a single instance of sensitivity
2223 information. For example, "PROPRIETARY - Internet Engineering" must
2224 be associated with a different SA (or SA bundle) from "PROPRIETARY -
2225 Finance".
2226
2227 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a> Sensitivity Consistency Checking</span>
2228
2229 An MLS implementation (both host and router) MAY associate
2230 sensitivity information, or a range of sensitivity information with
2231 an interface, or a configured IP address with its associated prefix
2232 (the latter is sometimes referred to as a logical interface, or an
2233
2234
2235
2236 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2239
2240
2241 interface alias). If such properties exist, an implementation SHOULD
2242 compare the sensitivity information associated with the packet
2243 against the sensitivity information associated with the interface or
2244 address/prefix from which the packet arrived, or through which the
2245 packet will depart. This check will either verify that the
2246 sensitivities match, or that the packet's sensitivity falls within
2247 the range of the interface or address/prefix.
2248
2249 The checking SHOULD be done on both inbound and outbound processing.
2250
2251 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.3" href="#section-8.3">8.3</a> Additional MLS Attributes for Security Association Databases</span>
2252
2253 <a href="#section-4.4">Section 4.4</a> discussed two Security Association databases (the
2254 Security Policy Database (SPD) and the Security Association Database
2255 (SAD)) and the associated policy selectors and SA attributes. MLS
2256 networking introduces an additional selector/attribute:
2257
2258 - Sensitivity information.
2259
2260 The Sensitivity information aids in selecting the appropriate
2261 algorithms and key strength, so that the traffic gets a level of
2262 protection appropriate to its importance or sensitivity as described
2263 in <a href="#section-8.1">section 8.1</a>. The exact syntax of the sensitivity information is
2264 implementation defined.
2265
2266 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.4" href="#section-8.4">8.4</a> Additional Inbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking</span>
2267
2268 After an inbound packet has passed through IPsec processing, an MLS
2269 implementation SHOULD first check the packet's sensitivity (as
2270 defined by the SA (or SA bundle) used for the packet) with the
2271 interface or address/prefix as described in <a href="#section-8.2">section 8.2</a> before
2272 delivering the datagram to an upper-layer protocol or forwarding it.
2273
2274 The MLS system MUST retain the binding between the data received in
2275 an IPsec protected packet and the sensitivity information in the SA
2276 or SAs used for processing, so appropriate policy decisions can be
2277 made when delivering the datagram to an application or forwarding
2278 engine. The means for maintaining this binding are implementation
2279 specific.
2280
2281 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.5" href="#section-8.5">8.5</a> Additional Outbound Processing Steps for MLS Networking</span>
2282
2283 An MLS implementation of IPsec MUST perform two additional checks
2284 besides the normal steps detailed in <a href="#section-5.1.1">section 5.1.1</a>. When consulting
2285 the SPD or the SAD to find an outbound security association, the MLS
2286 implementation MUST use the sensitivity of the data to select an
2287
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 41]</span></pre>
2293 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-42" ></span>
2294 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2295
2296
2297 appropriate outbound SA or SA bundle. The second check comes before
2298 forwarding the packet out to its destination, and is the sensitivity
2299 consistency checking described in <a href="#section-8.2">section 8.2</a>.
2300
2301 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.6" href="#section-8.6">8.6</a> Additional MLS Processing for Security Gateways</span>
2302
2303 An MLS security gateway MUST follow the previously mentioned inbound
2304 and outbound processing rules as well as perform some additional
2305 processing specific to the intermediate protection of packets in an
2306 MLS environment.
2307
2308 A security gateway MAY act as an outbound proxy, creating SAs for MLS
2309 systems that originate packets forwarded by the gateway. These MLS
2310 systems may explicitly label the packets to be forwarded, or the
2311 whole originating network may have sensitivity characteristics
2312 associated with it. The security gateway MUST create and use
2313 appropriate SAs for AH, ESP, or both, to protect such traffic it
2314 forwards.
2315
2316 Similarly such a gateway SHOULD accept and process inbound AH and/or
2317 ESP packets and forward appropriately, using explicit packet
2318 labeling, or relying on the sensitivity characteristics of the
2319 destination network.
2320
2321 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Performance Issues</span>
2322
2323 The use of IPsec imposes computational performance costs on the hosts
2324 or security gateways that implement these protocols. These costs are
2325 associated with the memory needed for IPsec code and data structures,
2326 and the computation of integrity check values, encryption and
2327 decryption, and added per-packet handling. The per-packet
2328 computational costs will be manifested by increased latency and,
2329 possibly, reduced throughout. Use of SA/key management protocols,
2330 especially ones that employ public key cryptography, also adds
2331 computational performance costs to use of IPsec. These per-
2332 association computational costs will be manifested in terms of
2333 increased latency in association establishment. For many hosts, it
2334 is anticipated that software-based cryptography will not appreciably
2335 reduce throughput, but hardware may be required for security gateways
2336 (since they represent aggregation points), and for some hosts.
2337
2338 The use of IPsec also imposes bandwidth utilization costs on
2339 transmission, switching, and routing components of the Internet
2340 infrastructure, components not implementing IPsec. This is due to
2341 the increase in the packet size resulting from the addition of AH
2342 and/or ESP headers, AH and ESP tunneling (which adds a second IP
2343 header), and the increased packet traffic associated with key
2344 management protocols. It is anticipated that, in most instances,
2345
2346
2347
2348 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 42]</span></pre>
2349 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-43" ></span>
2350 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2351
2352
2353 this increased bandwidth demand will not noticeably affect the
2354 Internet infrastructure. However, in some instances, the effects may
2355 be significant, e.g., transmission of ESP encrypted traffic over a
2356 dialup link that otherwise would have compressed the traffic.
2357
2358 Note: The initial SA establishment overhead will be felt in the first
2359 packet. This delay could impact the transport layer and application.
2360 For example, it could cause TCP to retransmit the SYN before the
2361 ISAKMP exchange is done. The effect of the delay would be different
2362 on UDP than TCP because TCP shouldn't transmit anything other than
2363 the SYN until the connection is set up whereas UDP will go ahead and
2364 transmit data beyond the first packet.
2365
2366 Note: As discussed earlier, compression can still be employed at
2367 layers above IP. There is an IETF working group (IP Payload
2368 Compression Protocol (ippcp)) working on "protocol specifications
2369 that make it possible to perform lossless compression on individual
2370 payloads before the payload is processed by a protocol that encrypts
2371 it. These specifications will allow for compression operations to be
2372 performed prior to the encryption of a payload by IPsec protocols."
2373
2374 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Conformance Requirements</span>
2375
2376 All IPv4 systems that claim to implement IPsec MUST comply with all
2377 requirements of the Security Architecture document. All IPv6 systems
2378 MUST comply with all requirements of the Security Architecture
2379 document.
2380
2381 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Security Considerations</span>
2382
2383 The focus of this document is security; hence security considerations
2384 permeate this specification.
2385
2386 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1825">RFC 1825</a></span>
2387
2388 This architecture document differs substantially from <a href="./rfc1825">RFC 1825</a> in
2389 detail and in organization, but the fundamental notions are
2390 unchanged. This document provides considerable additional detail in
2391 terms of compliance specifications. It introduces the SPD and SAD,
2392 and the notion of SA selectors. It is aligned with the new versions
2393 of AH and ESP, which also differ from their predecessors. Specific
2394 requirements for supported combinations of AH and ESP are newly
2395 added, as are details of PMTU management.
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 43]</span></pre>
2405 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-44" ></span>
2406 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2407
2408
2409 Acknowledgements
2410
2411 Many of the concepts embodied in this specification were derived from
2412 or influenced by the US Government's SP3 security protocol, ISO/IEC's
2413 NLSP, the proposed swIPe security protocol [<a href="#ref-SDNS" title="15 May 1989">SDNS</a>, <a href="#ref-ISO" title="Network Layer Security Protocol">ISO</a>, <a href="#ref-IB93" title="&quot;Architecture and Implementation of Network-layer Security Under Unix&quot;">IB93</a>, <a href="#ref-IBK93" title="&quot;swIPe: Network- Layer Security for IP&quot;">IBK93</a>],
2414 and the work done for SNMP Security and SNMPv2 Security.
2415
2416 For over 3 years (although it sometimes seems *much* longer), this
2417 document has evolved through multiple versions and iterations.
2418 During this time, many people have contributed significant ideas and
2419 energy to the process and the documents themselves. The authors
2420 would like to thank Karen Seo for providing extensive help in the
2421 review, editing, background research, and coordination for this
2422 version of the specification. The authors would also like to thank
2423 the members of the IPsec and IPng working groups, with special
2424 mention of the efforts of (in alphabetic order): Steve Bellovin,
2425 Steve Deering, James Hughes, Phil Karn, Frank Kastenholz, Perry
2426 Metzger, David Mihelcic, Hilarie Orman, Norman Shulman, William
2427 Simpson, Harry Varnis, and Nina Yuan.
2428
2429
2430
2431
2432
2433
2434
2435
2436
2437
2438
2439
2440
2441
2442
2443
2444
2445
2446
2447
2448
2449
2450
2451
2452
2453
2454
2455
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 44]</span></pre>
2461 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-45" ></span>
2462 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2463
2464
2465 Appendix A -- Glossary
2466
2467 This section provides definitions for several key terms that are
2468 employed in this document. Other documents provide additional
2469 definitions and background information relevant to this technology,
2470 e.g., [<a href="#ref-VK83" title="&quot;Security Mechanisms in High- level Networks&quot;">VK83</a>, <a href="#ref-HA94" title="&quot;On Internet Authentication&quot;">HA94</a>]. Included in this glossary are generic security
2471 service and security mechanism terms, plus IPsec-specific terms.
2472
2473 Access Control
2474 Access control is a security service that prevents unauthorized
2475 use of a resource, including the prevention of use of a resource
2476 in an unauthorized manner. In the IPsec context, the resource
2477 to which access is being controlled is often:
2478 o for a host, computing cycles or data
2479 o for a security gateway, a network behind the gateway
2480 or
2481 bandwidth on that network.
2482
2483 Anti-replay
2484 [See "Integrity" below]
2485
2486 Authentication
2487 This term is used informally to refer to the combination of two
2488 nominally distinct security services, data origin authentication
2489 and connectionless integrity. See the definitions below for
2490 each of these services.
2491
2492 Availability
2493 Availability, when viewed as a security service, addresses the
2494 security concerns engendered by attacks against networks that
2495 deny or degrade service. For example, in the IPsec context, the
2496 use of anti-replay mechanisms in AH and ESP support
2497 availability.
2498
2499 Confidentiality
2500 Confidentiality is the security service that protects data from
2501 unauthorized disclosure. The primary confidentiality concern in
2502 most instances is unauthorized disclosure of application level
2503 data, but disclosure of the external characteristics of
2504 communication also can be a concern in some circumstances.
2505 Traffic flow confidentiality is the service that addresses this
2506 latter concern by concealing source and destination addresses,
2507 message length, or frequency of communication. In the IPsec
2508 context, using ESP in tunnel mode, especially at a security
2509 gateway, can provide some level of traffic flow confidentiality.
2510 (See also traffic analysis, below.)
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 45]</span></pre>
2517 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-46" ></span>
2518 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2519
2520
2521 Encryption
2522 Encryption is a security mechanism used to transform data from
2523 an intelligible form (plaintext) into an unintelligible form
2524 (ciphertext), to provide confidentiality. The inverse
2525 transformation process is designated "decryption". Oftimes the
2526 term "encryption" is used to generically refer to both
2527 processes.
2528
2529 Data Origin Authentication
2530 Data origin authentication is a security service that verifies
2531 the identity of the claimed source of data. This service is
2532 usually bundled with connectionless integrity service.
2533
2534 Integrity
2535 Integrity is a security service that ensures that modifications
2536 to data are detectable. Integrity comes in various flavors to
2537 match application requirements. IPsec supports two forms of
2538 integrity: connectionless and a form of partial sequence
2539 integrity. Connectionless integrity is a service that detects
2540 modification of an individual IP datagram, without regard to the
2541 ordering of the datagram in a stream of traffic. The form of
2542 partial sequence integrity offered in IPsec is referred to as
2543 anti-replay integrity, and it detects arrival of duplicate IP
2544 datagrams (within a constrained window). This is in contrast to
2545 connection-oriented integrity, which imposes more stringent
2546 sequencing requirements on traffic, e.g., to be able to detect
2547 lost or re-ordered messages. Although authentication and
2548 integrity services often are cited separately, in practice they
2549 are intimately connected and almost always offered in tandem.
2550
2551 Security Association (SA)
2552 A simplex (uni-directional) logical connection, created for
2553 security purposes. All traffic traversing an SA is provided the
2554 same security processing. In IPsec, an SA is an internet layer
2555 abstraction implemented through the use of AH or ESP.
2556
2557 Security Gateway
2558 A security gateway is an intermediate system that acts as the
2559 communications interface between two networks. The set of hosts
2560 (and networks) on the external side of the security gateway is
2561 viewed as untrusted (or less trusted), while the networks and
2562 hosts and on the internal side are viewed as trusted (or more
2563 trusted). The internal subnets and hosts served by a security
2564 gateway are presumed to be trusted by virtue of sharing a
2565 common, local, security administration. (See "Trusted
2566 Subnetwork" below.) In the IPsec context, a security gateway is
2567 a point at which AH and/or ESP is implemented in order to serve
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 46]</span></pre>
2573 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-47" ></span>
2574 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2575
2576
2577 a set of internal hosts, providing security services for these
2578 hosts when they communicate with external hosts also employing
2579 IPsec (either directly or via another security gateway).
2580
2581 SPI
2582 Acronym for "Security Parameters Index". The combination of a
2583 destination address, a security protocol, and an SPI uniquely
2584 identifies a security association (SA, see above). The SPI is
2585 carried in AH and ESP protocols to enable the receiving system
2586 to select the SA under which a received packet will be
2587 processed. An SPI has only local significance, as defined by
2588 the creator of the SA (usually the receiver of the packet
2589 carrying the SPI); thus an SPI is generally viewed as an opaque
2590 bit string. However, the creator of an SA may choose to
2591 interpret the bits in an SPI to facilitate local processing.
2592
2593 Traffic Analysis
2594 The analysis of network traffic flow for the purpose of deducing
2595 information that is useful to an adversary. Examples of such
2596 information are frequency of transmission, the identities of the
2597 conversing parties, sizes of packets, flow identifiers, etc.
2598 [<a href="#ref-Sch94" title="">Sch94</a>]
2599
2600 Trusted Subnetwork
2601 A subnetwork containing hosts and routers that trust each other
2602 not to engage in active or passive attacks. There also is an
2603 assumption that the underlying communications channel (e.g., a
2604 LAN or CAN) isn't being attacked by other means.
2605
2606
2607
2608
2609
2610
2611
2612
2613
2614
2615
2616
2617
2618
2619
2620
2621
2622
2623
2624
2625
2626
2627
2628 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 47]</span></pre>
2629 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-48" ></span>
2630 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2631
2632
2633 Appendix B -- Analysis/Discussion of PMTU/DF/Fragmentation Issues
2634
2635 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.1" href="#appendix-B.1">B.1</a> DF bit</span>
2636
2637 In cases where a system (host or gateway) adds an encapsulating
2638 header (e.g., ESP tunnel), should/must the DF bit in the original
2639 packet be copied to the encapsulating header?
2640
2641 Fragmenting seems correct for some situations, e.g., it might be
2642 appropriate to fragment packets over a network with a very small MTU,
2643 e.g., a packet radio network, or a cellular phone hop to mobile node,
2644 rather than propagate back a very small PMTU for use over the rest of
2645 the path. In other situations, it might be appropriate to set the DF
2646 bit in order to get feedback from later routers about PMTU
2647 constraints which require fragmentation. The existence of both of
2648 these situations argues for enabling a system to decide whether or
2649 not to fragment over a particular network "link", i.e., for requiring
2650 an implementation to be able to copy the DF bit (and to process ICMP
2651 PMTU messages), but making it an option to be selected on a per
2652 interface basis. In other words, an administrator should be able to
2653 configure the router's treatment of the DF bit (set, clear, copy from
2654 encapsulated header) for each interface.
2655
2656 Note: If a bump-in-the-stack implementation of IPsec attempts to
2657 apply different IPsec algorithms based on source/destination ports,
2658 it will be difficult to apply Path MTU adjustments.
2659
2660 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.2" href="#appendix-B.2">B.2</a> Fragmentation</span>
2661
2662 If required, IP fragmentation occurs after IPsec processing within an
2663 IPsec implementation. Thus, transport mode AH or ESP is applied only
2664 to whole IP datagrams (not to IP fragments). An IP packet to which
2665 AH or ESP has been applied may itself be fragmented by routers en
2666 route, and such fragments MUST be reassembled prior to IPsec
2667 processing at a receiver. In tunnel mode, AH or ESP is applied to an
2668 IP packet, the payload of which may be a fragmented IP packet. For
2669 example, a security gateway, "bump-in-the-stack" (BITS), or "bump-
2670 in-the-wire" (BITW) IPsec implementation may apply tunnel mode AH to
2671 such fragments. Note that BITS or BITW implementations are examples
2672 of where a host IPsec implementation might receive fragments to which
2673 tunnel mode is to be applied. However, if transport mode is to be
2674 applied, then these implementations MUST reassemble the fragments
2675 prior to applying IPsec.
2676
2677
2678
2679
2680
2681
2682
2683
2684 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 48]</span></pre>
2685 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-49" ></span>
2686 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2687
2688
2689 NOTE: IPsec always has to figure out what the encapsulating IP header
2690 fields are. This is independent of where you insert IPsec and is
2691 intrinsic to the definition of IPsec. Therefore any IPsec
2692 implementation that is not integrated into an IP implementation must
2693 include code to construct the necessary IP headers (e.g., IP2):
2694
2695 o AH-tunnel --&gt; IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data
2696 o ESP-tunnel --&gt; IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer
2697
2698 *********************************************************************
2699
2700 Overall, the fragmentation/reassembly approach described above works
2701 for all cases examined.
2702
2703 AH Xport AH Tunnel ESP Xport ESP Tunnel
2704 Implementation approach IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6 IPv4 IPv6
2705 ----------------------- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ---- ----
2706 Hosts (integr w/ IP stack) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2707 Hosts (betw/ IP and drivers) Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
2708 S. Gwy (integr w/ IP stack) Y Y Y Y
2709 Outboard crypto processor *
2710
2711 * If the crypto processor system has its own IP address, then it
2712 is covered by the security gateway case. This box receives
2713 the packet from the host and performs IPsec processing. It
2714 has to be able to handle the same AH, ESP, and related
2715 IPv4/IPv6 tunnel processing that a security gateway would have
2716 to handle. If it doesn't have it's own address, then it is
2717 similar to the bump-in-the stack implementation between IP and
2718 the network drivers.
2719
2720 The following analysis assumes that:
2721
2722 1. There is only one IPsec module in a given system's stack.
2723 There isn't an IPsec module A (adding ESP/encryption and
2724 thus) hiding the transport protocol, SRC port, and DEST port
2725 from IPsec module B.
2726 2. There are several places where IPsec could be implemented (as
2727 shown in the table above).
2728 a. Hosts with integration of IPsec into the native IP
2729 implementation. Implementer has access to the source
2730 for the stack.
2731 b. Hosts with bump-in-the-stack implementations, where
2732 IPsec is implemented between IP and the local network
2733 drivers. Source access for stack is not available;
2734 but there are well-defined interfaces that allows the
2735 IPsec code to be incorporated into the system.
2736
2737
2738
2739
2740 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 49]</span></pre>
2741 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-50" ></span>
2742 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2743
2744
2745 c. Security gateways and outboard crypto processors with
2746 integration of IPsec into the stack.
2747 3. Not all of the above approaches are feasible in all hosts.
2748 But it was assumed that for each approach, there are some
2749 hosts for whom the approach is feasible.
2750
2751 For each of the above 3 categories, there are IPv4 and IPv6, AH
2752 transport and tunnel modes, and ESP transport and tunnel modes -- for
2753 a total of 24 cases (3 x 2 x 4).
2754
2755 Some header fields and interface fields are listed here for ease of
2756 reference -- they're not in the header order, but instead listed to
2757 allow comparison between the columns. (* = not covered by AH
2758 authentication. ESP authentication doesn't cover any headers that
2759 precede it.)
2760
2761 IP/Transport Interface
2762 IPv4 IPv6 (<a href="./rfc1122">RFC 1122</a> -- Sec 3.4)
2763 ---- ---- ----------------------
2764 Version = 4 Version = 6
2765 Header Len
2766 *TOS Class,Flow Lbl TOS
2767 Packet Len Payload Len Len
2768 ID ID (optional)
2769 *Flags DF
2770 *Offset
2771 *TTL *Hop Limit TTL
2772 Protocol Next Header
2773 *Checksum
2774 Src Address Src Address Src Address
2775 Dst Address Dst Address Dst Address
2776 Options? Options? Opt
2777
2778 ? = AH covers Option-Type and Option-Length, but
2779 might not cover Option-Data.
2780
2781 The results for each of the 20 cases is shown below ("works" = will
2782 work if system fragments after outbound IPsec processing, reassembles
2783 before inbound IPsec processing). Notes indicate implementation
2784 issues.
2785
2786 a. Hosts (integrated into IP stack)
2787 o AH-transport --&gt; (IP1-AH-Transport-Data)
2788 - IPv4 -- works
2789 - IPv6 -- works
2790 o AH-tunnel --&gt; (IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data)
2791 - IPv4 -- works
2792 - IPv6 -- works
2793
2794
2795
2796 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 50]</span></pre>
2797 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-51" ></span>
2798 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2799
2800
2801 o ESP-transport --&gt; (IP1-ESP_hdr-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer)
2802 - IPv4 -- works
2803 - IPv6 -- works
2804 o ESP-tunnel --&gt; (IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer)
2805 - IPv4 -- works
2806 - IPv6 -- works
2807
2808 b. Hosts (Bump-in-the-stack) -- put IPsec between IP layer and
2809 network drivers. In this case, the IPsec module would have to do
2810 something like one of the following for fragmentation and
2811 reassembly.
2812 - do the fragmentation/reassembly work itself and
2813 send/receive the packet directly to/from the network
2814 layer. In AH or ESP transport mode, this is fine. In AH
2815 or ESP tunnel mode where the tunnel end is at the ultimate
2816 destination, this is fine. But in AH or ESP tunnel modes
2817 where the tunnel end is different from the ultimate
2818 destination and where the source host is multi-homed, this
2819 approach could result in sub-optimal routing because the
2820 IPsec module may be unable to obtain the information
2821 needed (LAN interface and next-hop gateway) to direct the
2822 packet to the appropriate network interface. This is not
2823 a problem if the interface and next-hop gateway are the
2824 same for the ultimate destination and for the tunnel end.
2825 But if they are different, then IPsec would need to know
2826 the LAN interface and the next-hop gateway for the tunnel
2827 end. (Note: The tunnel end (security gateway) is highly
2828 likely to be on the regular path to the ultimate
2829 destination. But there could also be more than one path
2830 to the destination, e.g., the host could be at an
2831 organization with 2 firewalls. And the path being used
2832 could involve the less commonly chosen firewall.) OR
2833 - pass the IPsec'd packet back to the IP layer where an
2834 extra IP header would end up being pre-pended and the
2835 IPsec module would have to check and let IPsec'd fragments
2836 go by.
2837 OR
2838 - pass the packet contents to the IP layer in a form such
2839 that the IP layer recreates an appropriate IP header
2840
2841 At the network layer, the IPsec module will have access to the
2842 following selectors from the packet -- SRC address, DST address,
2843 Next Protocol, and if there's a transport layer header --&gt; SRC
2844 port and DST port. One cannot assume IPsec has access to the
2845 Name. It is assumed that the available selector information is
2846 sufficient to figure out the relevant Security Policy entry and
2847 Security Association(s).
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 51]</span></pre>
2853 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-52" ></span>
2854 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2855
2856
2857 o AH-transport --&gt; (IP1-AH-Transport-Data)
2858 - IPv4 -- works
2859 - IPv6 -- works
2860 o AH-tunnel --&gt; (IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data)
2861 - IPv4 -- works
2862 - IPv6 -- works
2863 o ESP-transport --&gt; (IP1-ESP_hdr-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer)
2864 - IPv4 -- works
2865 - IPv6 -- works
2866 o ESP-tunnel --&gt; (IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer)
2867 - IPv4 -- works
2868 - IPv6 -- works
2869
2870 c. Security gateways -- integrate IPsec into the IP stack
2871
2872 NOTE: The IPsec module will have access to the following
2873 selectors from the packet -- SRC address, DST address, Next
2874 Protocol, and if there's a transport layer header --&gt; SRC port
2875 and DST port. It won't have access to the User ID (only Hosts
2876 have access to User ID information.) Unlike some Bump-in-the-
2877 stack implementations, security gateways may be able to look up
2878 the Source Address in the DNS to provide a System Name, e.g., in
2879 situations involving use of dynamically assigned IP addresses in
2880 conjunction with dynamically updated DNS entries. It also won't
2881 have access to the transport layer information if there is an ESP
2882 header, or if it's not the first fragment of a fragmented
2883 message. It is assumed that the available selector information
2884 is sufficient to figure out the relevant Security Policy entry
2885 and Security Association(s).
2886
2887 o AH-tunnel --&gt; (IP2-AH-IP1-Transport-Data)
2888 - IPv4 -- works
2889 - IPv6 -- works
2890 o ESP-tunnel --&gt; (IP2-ESP_hdr-IP1-Transport-Data-ESP_trailer)
2891 - IPv4 -- works
2892 - IPv6 -- works
2893
2894 **********************************************************************
2895
2896 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3" href="#appendix-B.3">B.3</a> Path MTU Discovery</span>
2897
2898 As mentioned earlier, "ICMP PMTU" refers to an ICMP message used for
2899 Path MTU Discovery.
2900
2901 The legend for the diagrams below in B.3.1 and B.3.3 (but not B.3.2)
2902 is:
2903
2904 ==== = security association (AH or ESP, transport or tunnel)
2905
2906
2907
2908 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 52]</span></pre>
2909 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-53" ></span>
2910 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2911
2912
2913 ---- = connectivity (or if so labelled, administrative boundary)
2914 .... = ICMP message (hereafter referred to as ICMP PMTU) for
2915
2916 IPv4:
2917 - Type = 3 (Destination Unreachable)
2918 - Code = 4 (Fragmentation needed and DF set)
2919 - Next-Hop MTU in the low-order 16 bits of the second
2920 word of the ICMP header (labelled unused in <a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>),
2921 with high-order 16 bits set to zero
2922
2923 IPv6 (<a href="./rfc1885">RFC 1885</a>):
2924 - Type = 2 (Packet Too Big)
2925 - Code = 0 (Fragmentation needed and DF set)
2926 - Next-Hop MTU in the 32 bit MTU field of the ICMP6
2927
2928 Hx = host x
2929 Rx = router x
2930 SGx = security gateway x
2931 X* = X supports IPsec
2932
2933 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.1" href="#appendix-B.3.1">B.3.1</a> Identifying the Originating Host(s)</span>
2934
2935 The amount of information returned with the ICMP message is limited
2936 and this affects what selectors are available to identify security
2937 associations, originating hosts, etc. for use in further propagating
2938 the PMTU information.
2939
2940 In brief... An ICMP message must contain the following information
2941 from the "offending" packet:
2942 - IPv4 (<a href="./rfc792">RFC 792</a>) -- IP header plus a minimum of 64 bits
2943
2944 Accordingly, in the IPv4 context, an ICMP PMTU may identify only the
2945 first (outermost) security association. This is because the ICMP
2946 PMTU may contain only 64 bits of the "offending" packet beyond the IP
2947 header, which would capture only the first SPI from AH or ESP. In
2948 the IPv6 context, an ICMP PMTU will probably provide all the SPIs and
2949 the selectors in the IP header, but maybe not the SRC/DST ports (in
2950 the transport header) or the encapsulated (TCP, UDP, etc.) protocol.
2951 Moreover, if ESP is used, the transport ports and protocol selectors
2952 may be encrypted.
2953
2954 Looking at the diagram below of a security gateway tunnel (as
2955 mentioned elsewhere, security gateways do not use transport mode)...
2956
2957
2958
2959
2960
2961
2962
2963
2964 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 53]</span></pre>
2965 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-54" ></span>
2966 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
2967
2968
2969 H1 =================== H3
2970 \ | | /
2971 H0 -- SG1* ---- R1 ---- SG2* ---- R2 -- H5
2972 / ^ | \
2973 H2 |........| H4
2974
2975 Suppose that the security policy for SG1 is to use a single SA to SG2
2976 for all the traffic between hosts H0, H1, and H2 and hosts H3, H4,
2977 and H5. And suppose H0 sends a data packet to H5 which causes R1 to
2978 send an ICMP PMTU message to SG1. If the PMTU message has only the
2979 SPI, SG1 will be able to look up the SA and find the list of possible
2980 hosts (H0, H1, H2, wildcard); but SG1 will have no way to figure out
2981 that H0 sent the traffic that triggered the ICMP PMTU message.
2982
2983 original after IPsec ICMP
2984 packet processing packet
2985 -------- ----------- ------
2986 IP-3 header (S = R1, D = SG1)
2987 ICMP header (includes PMTU)
2988 IP-2 header IP-2 header (S = SG1, D = SG2)
2989 ESP header minimum of 64 bits of ESP hdr (*)
2990 IP-1 header IP-1 header
2991 TCP header TCP header
2992 TCP data TCP data
2993 ESP trailer
2994
2995 (*) The 64 bits will include enough of the ESP (or AH) header to
2996 include the SPI.
2997 - ESP -- SPI (32 bits), Seq number (32 bits)
2998 - AH -- Next header (8 bits), Payload Len (8 bits),
2999 Reserved (16 bits), SPI (32 bits)
3000
3001 This limitation on the amount of information returned with an ICMP
3002 message creates a problem in identifying the originating hosts for
3003 the packet (so as to know where to further propagate the ICMP PMTU
3004 information). If the ICMP message contains only 64 bits of the IPsec
3005 header (minimum for IPv4), then the IPsec selectors (e.g., Source and
3006 Destination addresses, Next Protocol, Source and Destination ports,
3007 etc.) will have been lost. But the ICMP error message will still
3008 provide SG1 with the SPI, the PMTU information and the source and
3009 destination gateways for the relevant security association.
3010
3011 The destination security gateway and SPI uniquely define a security
3012 association which in turn defines a set of possible originating
3013 hosts. At this point, SG1 could:
3014
3015
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 54]</span></pre>
3021 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-55" ></span>
3022 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3023
3024
3025 a. send the PMTU information to all the possible originating hosts.
3026 This would not work well if the host list is a wild card or if
3027 many/most of the hosts weren't sending to SG1; but it might work
3028 if the SPI/destination/etc mapped to just one or a small number of
3029 hosts.
3030 b. store the PMTU with the SPI/etc and wait until the next packet(s)
3031 arrive from the originating host(s) for the relevant security
3032 association. If it/they are bigger than the PMTU, drop the
3033 packet(s), and compose ICMP PMTU message(s) with the new packet(s)
3034 and the updated PMTU, and send the originating host(s) the ICMP
3035 message(s) about the problem. This involves a delay in notifying
3036 the originating host(s), but avoids the problems of (a).
3037
3038 Since only the latter approach is feasible in all instances, a
3039 security gateway MUST provide such support, as an option. However,
3040 if the ICMP message contains more information from the original
3041 packet, then there may be enough information to immediately determine
3042 to which host to propagate the ICMP/PMTU message and to provide that
3043 system with the 5 fields (source address, destination address, source
3044 port, destination port, and transport protocol) needed to determine
3045 where to store/update the PMTU. Under such circumstances, a security
3046 gateway MUST generate an ICMP PMTU message immediately upon receipt
3047 of an ICMP PMTU from further down the path. NOTE: The Next Protocol
3048 field may not be contained in the ICMP message and the use of ESP
3049 encryption may hide the selector fields that have been encrypted.
3050
3051 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.2" href="#appendix-B.3.2">B.3.2</a> Calculation of PMTU</span>
3052
3053 The calculation of PMTU from an ICMP PMTU has to take into account
3054 the addition of any IPsec header by H1 -- AH and/or ESP transport, or
3055 ESP or AH tunnel. Within a single host, multiple applications may
3056 share an SPI and nesting of security associations may occur. (See
3057 <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a> Basic Combinations of Security Associations for
3058 description of the combinations that MUST be supported). The diagram
3059 below illustrates an example of security associations between a pair
3060 of hosts (as viewed from the perspective of one of the hosts.) (ESPx
3061 or AHx = transport mode)
3062
3063 Socket 1 -------------------------|
3064 |
3065 Socket 2 (ESPx/SPI-A) ---------- AHx (SPI-B) -- Internet
3066
3067 In order to figure out the PMTU for each socket that maps to SPI-B,
3068 it will be necessary to have backpointers from SPI-B to each of the 2
3069 paths that lead to it -- Socket 1 and Socket 2/SPI-A.
3070
3071
3072
3073
3074
3075
3076 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 55]</span></pre>
3077 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-56" ></span>
3078 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3079
3080
3081 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.3" href="#appendix-B.3.3">B.3.3</a> Granularity of Maintaining PMTU Data</span>
3082
3083 In hosts, the granularity with which PMTU ICMP processing can be done
3084 differs depending on the implementation situation. Looking at a
3085 host, there are three situations that are of interest with respect to
3086 PMTU issues:
3087
3088 a. Integration of IPsec into the native IP implementation
3089 b. Bump-in-the-stack implementations, where IPsec is implemented
3090 "underneath" an existing implementation of a TCP/IP protocol
3091 stack, between the native IP and the local network drivers
3092 c. No IPsec implementation -- This case is included because it is
3093 relevant in cases where a security gateway is sending PMTU
3094 information back to a host.
3095
3096 Only in case (a) can the PMTU data be maintained at the same
3097 granularity as communication associations. In the other cases, the
3098 IP layer will maintain PMTU data at the granularity of Source and
3099 Destination IP addresses (and optionally TOS/Class), as described in
3100 <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>. This is an important difference, because more than one
3101 communication association may map to the same source and destination
3102 IP addresses, and each communication association may have a different
3103 amount of IPsec header overhead (e.g., due to use of different
3104 transforms or different algorithms). The examples below illustrate
3105 this.
3106
3107 In cases (a) and (b)... Suppose you have the following situation.
3108 H1 is sending to H2 and the packet to be sent from R1 to R2 exceeds
3109 the PMTU of the network hop between them.
3110
3111 ==================================
3112 | |
3113 H1* --- R1 ----- R2 ---- R3 ---- H2*
3114 ^ |
3115 |.......|
3116
3117 If R1 is configured to not fragment subscriber traffic, then R1 sends
3118 an ICMP PMTU message with the appropriate PMTU to H1. H1's
3119 processing would vary with the nature of the implementation. In case
3120 (a) (native IP), the security services are bound to sockets or the
3121 equivalent. Here the IP/IPsec implementation in H1 can store/update
3122 the PMTU for the associated socket. In case (b), the IP layer in H1
3123 can store/update the PMTU but only at the granularity of Source and
3124 Destination addresses and possibly TOS/Class, as noted above. So the
3125 result may be sub-optimal, since the PMTU for a given
3126 SRC/DST/TOS/Class will be the subtraction of the largest amount of
3127 IPsec header used for any communication association between a given
3128 source and destination.
3129
3130
3131
3132 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 56]</span></pre>
3133 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-57" ></span>
3134 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3135
3136
3137 In case (c), there has to be a security gateway to have any IPsec
3138 processing. So suppose you have the following situation. H1 is
3139 sending to H2 and the packet to be sent from SG1 to R exceeds the
3140 PMTU of the network hop between them.
3141
3142 ================
3143 | |
3144 H1 ---- SG1* --- R --- SG2* ---- H2
3145 ^ |
3146 |.......|
3147
3148 As described above for case (b), the IP layer in H1 can store/update
3149 the PMTU but only at the granularity of Source and Destination
3150 addresses, and possibly TOS/Class. So the result may be sub-optimal,
3151 since the PMTU for a given SRC/DST/TOS/Class will be the subtraction
3152 of the largest amount of IPsec header used for any communication
3153 association between a given source and destination.
3154
3155 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.4" href="#appendix-B.3.4">B.3.4</a> Per Socket Maintenance of PMTU Data</span>
3156
3157 Implementation of the calculation of PMTU (Section B.3.2) and support
3158 for PMTUs at the granularity of individual "communication
3159 associations" (Section B.3.3) is a local matter. However, a socket-
3160 based implementation of IPsec in a host SHOULD maintain the
3161 information on a per socket basis. Bump in the stack systems MUST
3162 pass an ICMP PMTU to the host IP implementation, after adjusting it
3163 for any IPsec header overhead added by these systems. The
3164 determination of the overhead SHOULD be determined by analysis of the
3165 SPI and any other selector information present in a returned ICMP
3166 PMTU message.
3167
3168 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.5" href="#appendix-B.3.5">B.3.5</a> Delivery of PMTU Data to the Transport Layer</span>
3169
3170 The host mechanism for getting the updated PMTU to the transport
3171 layer is unchanged, as specified in <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a> (Path MTU Discovery).
3172
3173 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B.3.6" href="#appendix-B.3.6">B.3.6</a> Aging of PMTU Data</span>
3174
3175 This topic is covered in <a href="#section-6.1.2.4">Section 6.1.2.4</a>.
3176
3177
3178
3179
3180
3181
3182
3183
3184
3185
3186
3187
3188 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 57]</span></pre>
3189 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-58" ></span>
3190 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3191
3192
3193 Appendix C -- Sequence Space Window Code Example
3194
3195 This appendix contains a routine that implements a bitmask check for
3196 a 32 packet window. It was provided by James Hughes
3197 ([email protected]) and Harry Varnis ([email protected])
3198 and is intended as an implementation example. Note that this code
3199 both checks for a replay and updates the window. Thus the algorithm,
3200 as shown, should only be called AFTER the packet has been
3201 authenticated. Implementers might wish to consider splitting the
3202 code to do the check for replays before computing the ICV. If the
3203 packet is not a replay, the code would then compute the ICV, (discard
3204 any bad packets), and if the packet is OK, update the window.
3205
3206 #include &lt;stdio.h&gt;
3207 #include &lt;stdlib.h&gt;
3208 typedef unsigned long u_long;
3209
3210 enum {
3211 ReplayWindowSize = 32
3212 };
3213
3214 u_long bitmap = 0; /* session state - must be 32 bits */
3215 u_long lastSeq = 0; /* session state */
3216
3217 /* Returns 0 if packet disallowed, 1 if packet permitted */
3218 int ChkReplayWindow(u_long seq);
3219
3220 int ChkReplayWindow(u_long seq) {
3221 u_long diff;
3222
3223 if (seq == 0) return 0; /* first == 0 or wrapped */
3224 if (seq &gt; lastSeq) { /* new larger sequence number */
3225 diff = seq - lastSeq;
3226 if (diff &lt; ReplayWindowSize) { /* In window */
3227 bitmap &lt;&lt;= diff;
3228 bitmap |= 1; /* set bit for this packet */
3229 } else bitmap = 1; /* This packet has a "way larger" */
3230 lastSeq = seq;
3231 return 1; /* larger is good */
3232 }
3233 diff = lastSeq - seq;
3234 if (diff &gt;= ReplayWindowSize) return 0; /* too old or wrapped */
3235 if (bitmap &amp; ((u_long)1 &lt;&lt; diff)) return 0; /* already seen */
3236 bitmap |= ((u_long)1 &lt;&lt; diff); /* mark as seen */
3237 return 1; /* out of order but good */
3238 }
3239
3240 char string_buffer[512];
3241
3242
3243
3244 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 58]</span></pre>
3245 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-1-59" ></span>
3246 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3247
3248
3249 #define STRING_BUFFER_SIZE sizeof(string_buffer)
3250
3251 int main() {
3252 int result;
3253 u_long last, current, bits;
3254
3255 printf("Input initial state (bits in hex, last msgnum):\n");
3256 if (!fgets(string_buffer, STRING_BUFFER_SIZE, stdin)) exit(0);
3257 sscanf(string_buffer, "%lx %lu", &amp;bits, &amp;last);
3258 if (last != 0)
3259 bits |= 1;
3260 bitmap = bits;
3261 lastSeq = last;
3262 printf("bits:%08lx last:%lu\n", bitmap, lastSeq);
3263 printf("Input value to test (current):\n");
3264
3265 while (1) {
3266 if (!fgets(string_buffer, STRING_BUFFER_SIZE, stdin)) break;
3267 sscanf(string_buffer, "%lu", &amp;current);
3268 result = ChkReplayWindow(current);
3269 printf("%-3s", result ? "OK" : "BAD");
3270 printf(" bits:%08lx last:%lu\n", bitmap, lastSeq);
3271 }
3272 return 0;
3273 }
3274
3275
3276
3277
3278
3279
3280
3281
3282
3283
3284
3285
3286
3287
3288
3289
3290
3291
3292
3293
3294
3295
3296
3297
3298
3299
3300 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 59]</span></pre>
3301 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3302
3303
3304 Appendix D -- Categorization of ICMP messages
3305
3306 The tables below characterize ICMP messages as being either host
3307 generated, router generated, both, unassigned/unknown. The first set
3308 are IPv4. The second set are IPv6.
3309
3310 IPv4
3311
3312 Type Name/Codes Reference
3313 ========================================================================
3314 HOST GENERATED:
3315 3 Destination Unreachable
3316 2 Protocol Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3317 3 Port Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3318 8 Source Host Isolated [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3319 14 Host Precedence Violation [<a href="./rfc1812">RFC1812</a>]
3320 10 Router Selection [<a href="./rfc1256">RFC1256</a>]
3321
3322
3323
3324
3325 Type Name/Codes Reference
3326 ========================================================================
3327 ROUTER GENERATED:
3328 3 Destination Unreachable
3329 0 Net Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3330 4 Fragmentation Needed, Don't Fragment was Set [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3331 5 Source Route Failed [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3332 6 Destination Network Unknown [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3333 7 Destination Host Unknown [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3334 9 Comm. w/Dest. Net. is Administratively Prohibited [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3335 11 Destination Network Unreachable for Type of Service[RFC792]
3336 5 Redirect
3337 0 Redirect Datagram for the Network (or subnet) [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3338 2 Redirect Datagram for the Type of Service &amp; Network[RFC792]
3339 9 Router Advertisement [<a href="./rfc1256">RFC1256</a>]
3340 18 Address Mask Reply [<a href="./rfc950">RFC950</a>]
3341
3342
3343
3344
3345
3346
3347
3348
3349
3350
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 60]</span></pre>
3356 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3357
3358
3359 IPv4
3360 Type Name/Codes Reference
3361 ========================================================================
3362 BOTH ROUTER AND HOST GENERATED:
3363 0 Echo Reply [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3364 3 Destination Unreachable
3365 1 Host Unreachable [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3366 10 Comm. w/Dest. Host is Administratively Prohibited [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3367 12 Destination Host Unreachable for Type of Service [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3368 13 Communication Administratively Prohibited [<a href="./rfc1812">RFC1812</a>]
3369 15 Precedence cutoff in effect [<a href="./rfc1812">RFC1812</a>]
3370 4 Source Quench [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3371 5 Redirect
3372 1 Redirect Datagram for the Host [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3373 3 Redirect Datagram for the Type of Service and Host [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3374 6 Alternate Host Address [JBP]
3375 8 Echo [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3376 11 Time Exceeded [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3377 12 Parameter Problem [RFC792,<a href="./rfc1108">RFC1108</a>]
3378 13 Timestamp [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3379 14 Timestamp Reply [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3380 15 Information Request [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3381 16 Information Reply [<a href="./rfc792">RFC792</a>]
3382 17 Address Mask Request [<a href="./rfc950">RFC950</a>]
3383 30 Traceroute [<a href="./rfc1393">RFC1393</a>]
3384 31 Datagram Conversion Error [<a href="./rfc1475">RFC1475</a>]
3385 32 Mobile Host Redirect [Johnson]
3386 39 SKIP [Markson]
3387 40 Photuris [Simpson]
3388
3389
3390 Type Name/Codes Reference
3391 ========================================================================
3392 UNASSIGNED TYPE OR UNKNOWN GENERATOR:
3393 1 Unassigned [JBP]
3394 2 Unassigned [JBP]
3395 7 Unassigned [JBP]
3396 19 Reserved (for Security) [Solo]
3397 20-29 Reserved (for Robustness Experiment) [ZSu]
3398 33 IPv6 Where-Are-You [Simpson]
3399 34 IPv6 I-Am-Here [Simpson]
3400 35 Mobile Registration Request [Simpson]
3401 36 Mobile Registration Reply [Simpson]
3402 37 Domain Name Request [Simpson]
3403 38 Domain Name Reply [Simpson]
3404 41-255 Reserved [JBP]
3405
3406
3407
3408
3409
3410 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 61]</span></pre>
3411 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3412
3413
3414 IPv6
3415
3416 Type Name/Codes Reference
3417 ========================================================================
3418 HOST GENERATED:
3419 1 Destination Unreachable [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC 1885</a>]
3420 4 Port Unreachable
3421
3422 Type Name/Codes Reference
3423 ========================================================================
3424 ROUTER GENERATED:
3425 1 Destination Unreachable [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>]
3426 0 No Route to Destination
3427 1 Comm. w/Destination is Administratively Prohibited
3428 2 Not a Neighbor
3429 3 Address Unreachable
3430 2 Packet Too Big [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>]
3431 0
3432 3 Time Exceeded [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>]
3433 0 Hop Limit Exceeded in Transit
3434 1 Fragment reassembly time exceeded
3435
3436
3437 Type Name/Codes Reference
3438 ========================================================================
3439 BOTH ROUTER AND HOST GENERATED:
3440 4 Parameter Problem [<a href="./rfc1885">RFC1885</a>]
3441 0 Erroneous Header Field Encountered
3442 1 Unrecognized Next Header Type Encountered
3443 2 Unrecognized IPv6 Option Encountered
3444
3445
3446
3447
3448
3449
3450
3451
3452
3453
3454
3455
3456
3457
3458
3459
3460
3461
3462
3463
3464
3465 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 62]</span></pre>
3466 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-63" ></span>
3467 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3468
3469
3470 References
3471
3472 [<a id="ref-BL73">BL73</a>] Bell, D.E. &amp; LaPadula, L.J., "Secure Computer Systems:
3473 Mathematical Foundations and Model", Technical Report M74-
3474 244, The MITRE Corporation, Bedford, MA, May 1973.
3475
3476 [<a id="ref-Bra97">Bra97</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
3477 Requirement Level", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
3478
3479 [<a id="ref-DoD85">DoD85</a>] US National Computer Security Center, "Department of
3480 Defense Trusted Computer System Evaluation Criteria", DoD
3481 5200.28-STD, US Department of Defense, Ft. Meade, MD.,
3482 December 1985.
3483
3484 [<a id="ref-DoD87">DoD87</a>] US National Computer Security Center, "Trusted Network
3485 Interpretation of the Trusted Computer System Evaluation
3486 Criteria", NCSC-TG-005, Version 1, US Department of
3487 Defense, Ft. Meade, MD., 31 July 1987.
3488
3489 [<a id="ref-HA94">HA94</a>] Haller, N., and R. Atkinson, "On Internet Authentication",
3490 <a href="./rfc1704">RFC 1704</a>, October 1994.
3491
3492 [<a id="ref-HC98">HC98</a>] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange
3493 (IKE)", <a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998.
3494
3495 [<a id="ref-HM97">HM97</a>] Harney, H., and C. Muckenhirn, "Group Key Management
3496 Protocol (GKMP) Architecture", <a href="./rfc2094">RFC 2094</a>, July 1997.
3497
3498 [<a id="ref-ISO">ISO</a>] ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6, Network Layer Security Protocol, ISO-IEC
3499 DIS 11577, International Standards Organisation, Geneva,
3500 Switzerland, 29 November 1992.
3501
3502 [<a id="ref-IB93">IB93</a>] John Ioannidis and Matt Blaze, "Architecture and
3503 Implementation of Network-layer Security Under Unix",
3504 Proceedings of USENIX Security Symposium, Santa Clara, CA,
3505 October 1993.
3506
3507 [<a id="ref-IBK93">IBK93</a>] John Ioannidis, Matt Blaze, &amp; Phil Karn, "swIPe: Network-
3508 Layer Security for IP", presentation at the Spring 1993
3509 IETF Meeting, Columbus, Ohio
3510
3511 [<a id="ref-KA98a">KA98a</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc2402">RFC</a>
3512 <a href="./rfc2402">2402</a>, November 1998.
3513
3514 [<a id="ref-KA98b">KA98b</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security
3515 Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a>, November 1998.
3516
3517
3518
3519
3520
3521 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 63]</span></pre>
3522 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-64" ></span>
3523 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3524
3525
3526 [<a id="ref-Ken91">Ken91</a>] Kent, S., "US DoD Security Options for the Internet
3527 Protocol", <a href="./rfc1108">RFC 1108</a>, November 1991.
3528
3529 [<a id="ref-MSST97">MSST97</a>] Maughan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J. Turner,
3530 "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
3531 (ISAKMP)", <a href="./rfc2408">RFC 2408</a>, November 1998.
3532
3533 [<a id="ref-Orm97">Orm97</a>] Orman, H., "The OAKLEY Key Determination Protocol", <a href="./rfc2412">RFC</a>
3534 <a href="./rfc2412">2412</a>, November 1998.
3535
3536 [<a id="ref-Pip98">Pip98</a>] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of
3537 Interpretation for ISAKMP", <a href="./rfc2407">RFC 2407</a>, November 1998.
3538
3539 [<a id="ref-Sch94">Sch94</a>] Bruce Schneier, Applied Cryptography, <a href="#section-8.6">Section 8.6</a>, John
3540 Wiley &amp; Sons, New York, NY, 1994.
3541
3542 [<a id="ref-SDNS">SDNS</a>] SDNS Secure Data Network System, Security Protocol 3, SP3,
3543 Document SDN.301, Revision 1.5, 15 May 1989, published in
3544 NIST Publication NIST-IR-90-4250, February 1990.
3545
3546 [<a id="ref-SMPT98">SMPT98</a>] Shacham, A., Monsour, R., Pereira, R., and M. Thomas, "IP
3547 Payload Compression Protocol (IPComp)", <a href="./rfc2393">RFC 2393</a>, August
3548 1998.
3549
3550 [<a id="ref-TDG97">TDG97</a>] Thayer, R., Doraswamy, N., and R. Glenn, "IP Security
3551 Document Roadmap", <a href="./rfc2411">RFC 2411</a>, November 1998.
3552
3553 [<a id="ref-VK83">VK83</a>] V.L. Voydock &amp; S.T. Kent, "Security Mechanisms in High-
3554 level Networks", ACM Computing Surveys, Vol. 15, No. 2,
3555 June 1983.
3556
3557 Disclaimer
3558
3559 The views and specification expressed in this document are those of
3560 the authors and are not necessarily those of their employers. The
3561 authors and their employers specifically disclaim responsibility for
3562 any problems arising from correct or incorrect implementation or use
3563 of this design.
3564
3565
3566
3567
3568
3569
3570
3571
3572
3573
3574
3575
3576
3577 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 64]</span></pre>
3578 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-65" ></span>
3579 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3580
3581
3582 Author Information
3583
3584 Stephen Kent
3585 BBN Corporation
3586 70 Fawcett Street
3587 Cambridge, MA 02140
3588 USA
3589
3590 Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988
3591 EMail: [email protected]
3592
3593
3594 Randall Atkinson
3595 @Home Network
3596 425 Broadway
3597 Redwood City, CA 94063
3598 USA
3599
3600 Phone: +1 (415) 569-5000
3601 EMail: [email protected]
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
3609
3610
3611
3612
3613
3614
3615
3616
3617
3618
3619
3620
3621
3622
3623
3624
3625
3626
3627
3628
3629
3630
3631
3632
3633 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 65]</span></pre>
3634 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8-66" ></span>
3635 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a> Security Architecture for IP November 1998</span>
3636
3637
3638 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
3639
3640 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
3641 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
3642 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
3643 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
3644 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
3645 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
3646 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
3647 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
3648 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
3649 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
3650 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
3651 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
3652 English.
3653
3654 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
3655 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
3656
3657 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
3658 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
3659 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
3660 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
3661 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
3662 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
3663
3664
3665
3666
3667
3668
3669
3670
3671
3672
3673
3674
3675
3676
3677
3678
3679
3680
3681
3682
3683
3684
3685
3686
3687
3688
3689 Kent &amp; Atkinson Standards Track [Page 66]
3690 </pre>