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1 <pre>Network Working Group D. Taylor
2 Request for Comments: 5054 Independent
3 Category: Informational T. Wu
4 Cisco
5 N. Mavrogiannopoulos
6 T. Perrin
7 Independent
8 November 2007
9
10
11 <span class="h1">Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS Authentication</span>
12
13 Status of This Memo
14
15 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
16 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
17 memo is unlimited.
18
19 Abstract
20
21 This memo presents a technique for using the Secure Remote Password
22 protocol as an authentication method for the Transport Layer Security
23 protocol.
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52 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
60 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. SRP Authentication in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
61 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
62 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Handshake Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
63 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Text Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
64 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. SRP Verifier Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
65 <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Changes to the Handshake Message Contents . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
66 <a href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
67 <a href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
68 <a href="#section-2.5.3">2.5.3</a>. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
69 <a href="#section-2.5.4">2.5.4</a>. Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
70 <a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Calculating the Premaster Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
71 <a href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. Ciphersuite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
72 <a href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. New Message Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
73 <a href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
74 <a href="#section-2.8.2">2.8.2</a>. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
75 <a href="#section-2.8.3">2.8.3</a>. Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
76 <a href="#section-2.9">2.9</a>. Error Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
77 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. General Considerations for Implementors . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Accepting Group Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Protocol Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Hash Function Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
82 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
83 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
84 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
85 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
86 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. SRP Group Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
87 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. SRP Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
88 <a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
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109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 At the time of writing TLS [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>] uses public key certificates, pre-
116 shared keys, or Kerberos for authentication.
117
118 These authentication methods do not seem well suited to certain
119 applications now being adapted to use TLS ([<a href="#ref-IMAP" title="&quot;Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP&quot;">IMAP</a>], for example).
120 Given that many protocols are designed to use the user name and
121 password method of authentication, being able to safely use user
122 names and passwords provides an easier route to additional security.
123
124 SRP ([<a href="#ref-SRP" title="&quot;The Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP</a>], [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>]) is an authentication method that allows the use
125 of user names and passwords over unencrypted channels without
126 revealing the password to an eavesdropper. SRP also supplies a
127 shared secret at the end of the authentication sequence that can be
128 used to generate encryption keys.
129
130 This document describes the use of the SRP authentication method for
131 TLS.
132
133 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
134 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
135 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-REQ" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">REQ</a>].
136
137 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. SRP Authentication in TLS</span>
138
139 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Notation and Terminology</span>
140
141 The version of SRP used here is sometimes referred to as "SRP-6"
142 [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>]. This version is a slight improvement over "SRP-3", which
143 was described in [<a href="#ref-SRP" title="&quot;The Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP</a>] and [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title="&quot;The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System&quot;">SRP-RFC</a>]. For convenience, this document
144 and [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title="&quot;The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System&quot;">SRP-RFC</a>] include the details necessary to implement SRP-6;
145 [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>] is cited for informative purposes only.
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168
169 This document uses the variable names defined in [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>]:
170
171 N, g: group parameters (prime and generator)
172
173 s: salt
174
175 B, b: server's public and private values
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177 A, a: client's public and private values
178
179 I: user name (aka "identity")
180
181 P: password
182
183 v: verifier
184
185 k: SRP-6 multiplier
186
187 The | symbol indicates string concatenation, the ^ operator is the
188 exponentiation operation, and the % operator is the integer remainder
189 operation.
190
191 Conversion between integers and byte-strings assumes the most
192 significant bytes are stored first, as per [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>] and [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title="&quot;The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System&quot;">SRP-RFC</a>]. In
193 the following text, if a conversion from integer to byte-string is
194 implicit, the most significant byte in the resultant byte-string MUST
195 be non-zero. If a conversion is explicitly specified with the
196 operator PAD(), the integer will first be implicitly converted, then
197 the resultant byte-string will be left-padded with zeros (if
198 necessary) until its length equals the implicitly-converted length of
199 N.
200
201 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Handshake Protocol Overview</span>
202
203 The advent of [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>] allows the SRP protocol to be implemented using
204 the standard sequence of handshake messages defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>].
205
206 The parameters to various messages are given in the following
207 diagram.
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222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
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224
225 Client Server
226
227 Client Hello (I) --------&gt;
228 Server Hello
229 Certificate*
230 Server Key Exchange (N, g, s, B)
231 &lt;-------- Server Hello Done
232 Client Key Exchange (A) --------&gt;
233 [Change cipher spec]
234 Finished --------&gt;
235 [Change cipher spec]
236 &lt;-------- Finished
237
238 Application Data &lt;-------&gt; Application Data
239
240 * Indicates an optional message that is not always sent.
241
242 Figure 1
243
244 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Text Preparation</span>
245
246 The user name and password strings SHALL be UTF-8 encoded Unicode,
247 prepared using the [<a href="#ref-SASLPREP" title="&quot;SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords&quot;">SASLPREP</a>] profile of [<a href="#ref-STRINGPREP" title="&quot;Preparation of Internationalized Strings (&quot;">STRINGPREP</a>].
248
249 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. SRP Verifier Creation</span>
250
251 The verifier is calculated as described in Section 3 of [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title="&quot;The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System&quot;">SRP-RFC</a>].
252 We give the algorithm here for convenience.
253
254 The verifier (v) is computed based on the salt (s), user name (I),
255 password (P), and group parameters (N, g). The computation uses the
256 [<a href="#ref-SHA1" title="&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">SHA1</a>] hash algorithm:
257
258 x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P))
259 v = g^x % N
260
261 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Changes to the Handshake Message Contents</span>
262
263 This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message
264 contents when SRP is being used for authentication. The definitions
265 of the new message contents and the on-the-wire changes are given in
266 <a href="#section-2.8">Section 2.8</a>.
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279
280
281 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1" href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. Client Hello</span>
282
283 The user name is appended to the standard client hello message using
284 the extension mechanism defined in [<a href="#ref-TLSEXT" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions&quot;">TLSEXT</a>] (see <a href="#section-2.8.1">Section 2.8.1</a>).
285 This user name extension is henceforth called the "SRP extension".
286 The following subsections give details of its use.
287
288 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1.1" href="#section-2.5.1.1">2.5.1.1</a>. Session Resumption</span>
289
290 When a client attempts to resume a session that uses SRP
291 authentication, the client MUST include the SRP extension in the
292 client hello message, in case the server cannot or will not allow
293 session resumption, meaning a full handshake is required.
294
295 If the server does agree to resume an existing session, the server
296 MUST ignore the information in the SRP extension of the client hello
297 message, except for its inclusion in the finished message hashes.
298 This is to ensure that attackers cannot replace the authenticated
299 identity without supplying the proper authentication information.
300
301 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1.2" href="#section-2.5.1.2">2.5.1.2</a>. Missing SRP Extension</span>
302
303 The client may offer SRP cipher suites in the hello message but omit
304 the SRP extension. If the server would like to select an SRP cipher
305 suite in this case, the server SHOULD return a fatal
306 "unknown_psk_identity" alert (see <a href="#section-2.9">Section 2.9</a>) immediately after
307 processing the client hello message.
308
309 A client receiving this alert MAY choose to reconnect and resend the
310 hello message, this time with the SRP extension. This allows the
311 client to advertise that it supports SRP, but not have to prompt the
312 user for his user name and password, nor expose the user name in the
313 clear, unless necessary.
314
315 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1.3" href="#section-2.5.1.3">2.5.1.3</a>. Unknown SRP </span> User Name
316
317 If the server doesn't have a verifier for the user name in the SRP
318 extension, the server MAY abort the handshake with an
319 "unknown_psk_identity" alert (see <a href="#section-2.9">Section 2.9</a>). Alternatively, if
320 the server wishes to hide the fact that this user name doesn't have a
321 verifier, the server MAY simulate the protocol as if a verifier
322 existed, but then reject the client's finished message with a
323 "bad_record_mac" alert, as if the password was incorrect.
324
325 To simulate the existence of an entry for each user name, the server
326 must consistently return the same salt (s) and group (N, g) values
327 for the same user name. For example, the server could store a secret
328 "seed key" and then use HMAC-SHA1(seed_key, "salt" | user_name) to
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336
337 generate the salts [<a href="#ref-HMAC" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">HMAC</a>]. For B, the server can return a random
338 value between 1 and N-1 inclusive. However, the server should take
339 care to simulate computation delays. One way to do this is to
340 generate a fake verifier using the "seed key" approach, and then
341 proceed with the protocol as usual.
342
343 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.2" href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Server Certificate</span>
344
345 The server MUST send a certificate if it agrees to an SRP cipher
346 suite that requires the server to provide additional authentication
347 in the form of a digital signature. See <a href="#section-2.7">Section 2.7</a> for details of
348 which cipher suites defined in this document require a server
349 certificate to be sent.
350
351 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.3" href="#section-2.5.3">2.5.3</a>. Server Key Exchange</span>
352
353 The server key exchange message contains the prime (N), the generator
354 (g), and the salt value (s) read from the SRP password file based on
355 the user name (I) received in the client hello extension.
356
357 The server key exchange message also contains the server's public
358 value (B). The server calculates this value as B = k*v + g^b % N,
359 where b is a random number that SHOULD be at least 256 bits in length
360 and k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)).
361
362 If the server has sent a certificate message, the server key exchange
363 message MUST be signed.
364
365 The group parameters (N, g) sent in this message MUST have N as a
366 safe prime (a prime of the form N=2q+1, where q is also prime). The
367 integers from 1 to N-1 will form a group under multiplication % N,
368 and g MUST be a generator of this group. In addition, the group
369 parameters MUST NOT be specially chosen to allow efficient
370 computation of discrete logarithms.
371
372 The SRP group parameters in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> satisfy the above
373 requirements, so the client SHOULD accept any parameters from this
374 appendix that have large enough N values to meet her security
375 requirements.
376
377 The client MAY accept other group parameters from the server, if the
378 client has reason to believe that these parameters satisfy the above
379 requirements, and the parameters have large enough N values. For
380 example, if the parameters transmitted by the server match parameters
381 on a "known-good" list, the client may choose to accept them. See
382 <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> for additional security considerations relevant to the
383 acceptance of the group parameters.
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392
393 Group parameters that are not accepted via one of the above methods
394 MUST be rejected with an "insufficient_security" alert (see
395 <a href="#section-2.9">Section 2.9</a>).
396
397 The client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert
398 if B % N = 0.
399
400 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.4" href="#section-2.5.4">2.5.4</a>. Client Key Exchange</span>
401
402 The client key exchange message carries the client's public value
403 (A). The client calculates this value as A = g^a % N, where a is a
404 random number that SHOULD be at least 256 bits in length.
405
406 The server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert
407 if A % N = 0.
408
409 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Calculating the Premaster Secret</span>
410
411 The premaster secret is calculated by the client as follows:
412
413 I, P = &lt;read from user&gt;
414 N, g, s, B = &lt;read from server&gt;
415 a = random()
416 A = g^a % N
417 u = SHA1(PAD(A) | PAD(B))
418 k = SHA1(N | PAD(g))
419 x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P))
420 &lt;premaster secret&gt; = (B - (k * g^x)) ^ (a + (u * x)) % N
421
422 The premaster secret is calculated by the server as follows:
423
424 N, g, s, v = &lt;read from password file&gt;
425 b = random()
426 k = SHA1(N | PAD(g))
427 B = k*v + g^b % N
428 A = &lt;read from client&gt;
429 u = SHA1(PAD(A) | PAD(B))
430 &lt;premaster secret&gt; = (A * v^u) ^ b % N
431
432 The finished messages perform the same function as the client and
433 server evidence messages (M1 and M2) specified in [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title="&quot;The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System&quot;">SRP-RFC</a>]. If
434 either the client or the server calculates an incorrect premaster
435 secret, the finished messages will fail to decrypt properly, and the
436 other party will return a "bad_record_mac" alert.
437
438 If a client application receives a "bad_record_mac" alert when
439 performing an SRP handshake, it should inform the user that the
440 entered user name and password are incorrect.
441
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446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. Ciphersuite Definitions</span>
450
451 The following cipher suites are added by this document. The usage of
452 Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher suites is as defined in
453 [<a href="#ref-AESCIPH" title="&quot;Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">AESCIPH</a>].
454
455 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1A };
456
457 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1B };
458
459 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1C };
460
461 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1D };
462
463 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1E };
464
465 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1F };
466
467 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x20 };
468
469 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x21 };
470
471 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x22 };
472
473 Cipher suites that begin with TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA or TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS
474 require the server to send a certificate message containing a
475 certificate with the specified type of public key, and to sign the
476 server key exchange message using a matching private key.
477
478 Cipher suites that do not include a digital signature algorithm
479 identifier assume that the server is authenticated by its possession
480 of the SRP verifier.
481
482 Implementations conforming to this specification MUST implement the
483 TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite, SHOULD implement the
484 TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA
485 cipher suites, and MAY implement the remaining cipher suites.
486
487 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8" href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. New Message Structures</span>
488
489 This section shows the structure of the messages passed during a
490 handshake that uses SRP for authentication. The representation
491 language used is the same as that used in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>].
492
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498
499
500 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
503
504
505 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.1" href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Client Hello</span>
506
507 A new extension "srp", with value 12, has been added to the
508 enumerated ExtensionType defined in [<a href="#ref-TLSEXT" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions&quot;">TLSEXT</a>]. This value MUST be
509 used as the extension number for the SRP extension.
510
511 The "extension_data" field of the SRP extension SHALL contain:
512
513 opaque srp_I&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
514
515 where srp_I is the user name, encoded per <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>.
516
517 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.2" href="#section-2.8.2">2.8.2</a>. Server Key Exchange</span>
518
519 A new value, "srp", has been added to the enumerated
520 KeyExchangeAlgorithm originally defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>].
521
522 When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the server's
523 SRP parameters are sent in the server key exchange message, encoded
524 in a ServerSRPParams structure.
525
526 If a certificate is sent to the client, the server key exchange
527 message must be signed.
528
529 enum { rsa, diffie_hellman, srp } KeyExchangeAlgorithm;
530
531 struct {
532 select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
533 case diffie_hellman:
534 ServerDHParams params;
535 Signature signed_params;
536 case rsa:
537 ServerRSAParams params;
538 Signature signed_params;
539 case srp: /* new entry */
540 ServerSRPParams params;
541 Signature signed_params;
542 };
543 } ServerKeyExchange;
544
545 struct {
546 opaque srp_N&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
547 opaque srp_g&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
548 opaque srp_s&lt;1..2^8-1&gt;;
549 opaque srp_B&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
550 } ServerSRPParams; /* SRP parameters */
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.3" href="#section-2.8.3">2.8.3</a>. Client Key Exchange</span>
562
563 When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the client's
564 public value (A) is sent in the client key exchange message, encoded
565 in a ClientSRPPublic structure.
566
567 struct {
568 select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) {
569 case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret;
570 case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic;
571 case srp: ClientSRPPublic; /* new entry */
572 } exchange_keys;
573 } ClientKeyExchange;
574
575 struct {
576 opaque srp_A&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
577 } ClientSRPPublic;
578
579 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.9" href="#section-2.9">2.9</a>. Error Alerts</span>
580
581 This document introduces four new uses of alerts:
582
583 o "unknown_psk_identity" (115) - this alert MAY be sent by a server
584 that would like to select an offered SRP cipher suite, if the SRP
585 extension is absent from the client's hello message. This alert
586 is always fatal. See <a href="#section-2.5.1.2">Section 2.5.1.2</a> for details.
587
588 o "unknown_psk_identity" (115) - this alert MAY be sent by a server
589 that receives an unknown user name. This alert is always fatal.
590 See <a href="#section-2.5.1.3">Section 2.5.1.3</a> for details.
591
592 o "insufficient_security" (71) - this alert MUST be sent by a client
593 that receives unknown or untrusted (N, g) values. This alert is
594 always fatal. See <a href="#section-2.5.3">Section 2.5.3</a> for details.
595
596 o "illegal_parameter" (47) - this alert MUST be sent by a client or
597 server that receives a key exchange message with A % N = 0 or B %
598 N = 0. This alert is always fatal. See <a href="#section-2.5.3">Section 2.5.3</a> and
599 <a href="#section-2.5.4">Section 2.5.4</a> and for details.
600
601 The "insufficient_security" and "illegal_parameter" alerts are
602 defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>]. The "unknown_psk_identity" alert is defined in
603 [<a href="#ref-PSK" title="&quot;Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">PSK</a>].
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Security Considerations</span>
618
619 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. General Considerations for Implementors</span>
620
621 The checks described in <a href="#section-2.5.3">Section 2.5.3</a> and <a href="#section-2.5.4">Section 2.5.4</a> on the
622 received values for A and B are CRUCIAL for security and MUST be
623 performed.
624
625 The private values a and b SHOULD be at least 256-bit random numbers,
626 to give approximately 128 bits of security against certain methods of
627 calculating discrete logarithms. See [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>], Section D.1, for advice
628 on choosing cryptographically secure random numbers.
629
630 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Accepting Group Parameters</span>
631
632 An attacker who could calculate discrete logarithms % N could
633 compromise user passwords, and could also compromise the
634 confidentiality and integrity of TLS sessions. Clients MUST ensure
635 that the received parameter N is large enough to make calculating
636 discrete logarithms computationally infeasible.
637
638 An attacker may try to send a prime value N that is large enough to
639 be secure, but that has a special form for which the attacker can
640 more easily compute discrete logarithms (e.g., using the algorithm
641 discussed in [<a href="#ref-TRAPDOOR" title="&quot;Designing and Detecting Trapdoors for Discrete Log Cryptosystems&quot;">TRAPDOOR</a>]). If the client executes the protocol using
642 such a prime, the client's password could be compromised. Because of
643 the difficulty of checking for such primes in real time, clients
644 SHOULD only accept group parameters that come from a trusted source,
645 such as those listed in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>, or parameters configured locally
646 by a trusted administrator.
647
648 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Protocol Characteristics</span>
649
650 If an attacker learns a user's SRP verifier (e.g., by gaining access
651 to a server's password file), the attacker can masquerade as the real
652 server to that user, and can also attempt a dictionary attack to
653 recover that user's password.
654
655 An attacker could repeatedly contact an SRP server and try to guess a
656 legitimate user's password. Servers SHOULD take steps to prevent
657 this, such as limiting the rate of authentication attempts from a
658 particular IP address or against a particular user name.
659
660 The client's user name is sent in the clear in the Client Hello
661 message. To avoid sending the user name in the clear, the client
662 could first open a conventional anonymous or server-authenticated
663 connection, then renegotiate an SRP-authenticated connection with the
664 handshake protected by the first connection.
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
671
672
673 If the client receives an "unknown_psk_identity" alert in response to
674 a client hello, this alert may have been inserted by an attacker.
675 The client should be careful about making any decisions, or forming
676 any conclusions, based on receiving this alert.
677
678 It is possible to choose a (user name, password) pair such that the
679 resulting verifier will also match other, related, (user name,
680 password) pairs. Thus, anyone using verifiers should be careful not
681 to assume that only a single (user name, password) pair matches the
682 verifier.
683
684 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Hash Function Considerations</span>
685
686 This protocol uses SHA-1 to derive several values:
687
688 o u prevents an attacker who learns a user's verifier from being
689 able to authenticate as that user (see [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>]).
690
691 o k prevents an attacker who can select group parameters from being
692 able to launch a 2-for-1 guessing attack (see [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title="&quot;SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol&quot;">SRP-6</a>]).
693
694 o x contains the user's password mixed with a salt.
695
696 Cryptanalytic attacks against SHA-1 that only affect its collision-
697 resistance do not compromise these uses. If attacks against SHA-1
698 are discovered that do compromise these uses, new cipher suites
699 should be specified to use a different hash algorithm.
700
701 In this situation, clients could send a Client Hello message
702 containing new and/or old SRP cipher suites along with a single SRP
703 extension. The server could then select the appropriate cipher suite
704 based on the type of verifier it has stored for this user.
705
706 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
707
708 This document defines a new TLS extension "srp" (value 12), whose
709 value has been assigned from the TLS ExtensionType Registry defined
710 in [<a href="#ref-TLSEXT" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions&quot;">TLSEXT</a>].
711
712 This document defines nine new cipher suites, whose values have been
713 assigned from the TLS Ciphersuite registry defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol version 1.1&quot;">TLS</a>].
714
715 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1A };
716
717 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1B };
718
719 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1C };
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
727
728
729 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1D };
730
731 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1E };
732
733 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1F };
734
735 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x20 };
736
737 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x21 };
738
739 CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x22 };
740
741 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. References</span>
742
743 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References</span>
744
745 [<a id="ref-REQ">REQ</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
746 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
747
748 [<a id="ref-TLS">TLS</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol version
749 1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006.
750
751 [<a id="ref-TLSEXT">TLSEXT</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen,
752 J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
753 Extensions", <a href="./rfc4366">RFC 4366</a>, April 2006.
754
755 [<a id="ref-STRINGPREP">STRINGPREP</a>] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of
756 Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", <a href="./rfc3454">RFC 3454</a>,
757 December 2002.
758
759 [<a id="ref-SASLPREP">SASLPREP</a>] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user
760 names and passwords", <a href="./rfc4013">RFC 4013</a>, February 2005.
761
762 [<a id="ref-SRP-RFC">SRP-RFC</a>] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange
763 System", <a href="./rfc2945">RFC 2945</a>, September 2000.
764
765 [<a id="ref-SHA1">SHA1</a>] "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS 180-2, August 2002.
766
767 [<a id="ref-HMAC">HMAC</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC:
768 Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>,
769 February 1997.
770
771 [<a id="ref-AESCIPH">AESCIPH</a>] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)
772 Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
773 <a href="./rfc3268">RFC 3268</a>, June 2002.
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
783
784
785 [<a id="ref-PSK">PSK</a>] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key
786 Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)",
787 <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a>, December 2005.
788
789 [<a id="ref-MODP">MODP</a>] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponentiation
790 (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange
791 (IKE)", <a href="./rfc3526">RFC 3526</a>, May 2003.
792
793 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References</span>
794
795 [<a id="ref-IMAP">IMAP</a>] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP",
796 <a href="./rfc2595">RFC 2595</a>, June 1999.
797
798 [<a id="ref-SRP-6">SRP-6</a>] Wu, T., "SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the
799 Secure Remote Password Protocol", Submission to IEEE
800 P1363.2 working group, October 2002,
801 &lt;<a href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/">http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/</a>&gt;.
802
803 [<a id="ref-SRP">SRP</a>] Wu, T., "The Secure Remote Password Protocol",
804 Proceedings of the 1998 Internet Society Network and
805 Distributed System Security Symposium pp. 97-111,
806 March 1998.
807
808 [<a id="ref-TRAPDOOR">TRAPDOOR</a>] Gordon, D., "Designing and Detecting Trapdoors for
809 Discrete Log Cryptosystems", Springer-Verlag Advances
810 in Cryptology - Crypto '92, pp. 66-75, 1993.
811
812
813
814
815
816
817
818
819
820
821
822
823
824
825
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. SRP Group Parameters</span>
842
843 The 1024-, 1536-, and 2048-bit groups are taken from software
844 developed by Tom Wu and Eugene Jhong for the Stanford SRP
845 distribution, and subsequently proven to be prime. The larger primes
846 are taken from [<a href="#ref-MODP" title="&quot;More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)&quot;">MODP</a>], but generators have been calculated that are
847 primitive roots of N, unlike the generators in [<a href="#ref-MODP" title="&quot;More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)&quot;">MODP</a>].
848
849 The 1024-bit and 1536-bit groups MUST be supported.
850
851 1. 1024-bit Group
852
853 The hexadecimal value for the prime is:
854
855 EEAF0AB9 ADB38DD6 9C33F80A FA8FC5E8 60726187 75FF3C0B 9EA2314C
856 9C256576 D674DF74 96EA81D3 383B4813 D692C6E0 E0D5D8E2 50B98BE4
857 8E495C1D 6089DAD1 5DC7D7B4 6154D6B6 CE8EF4AD 69B15D49 82559B29
858 7BCF1885 C529F566 660E57EC 68EDBC3C 05726CC0 2FD4CBF4 976EAA9A
859 FD5138FE 8376435B 9FC61D2F C0EB06E3
860
861 The generator is: 2.
862
863 2. 1536-bit Group
864
865 The hexadecimal value for the prime is:
866
867 9DEF3CAF B939277A B1F12A86 17A47BBB DBA51DF4 99AC4C80 BEEEA961
868 4B19CC4D 5F4F5F55 6E27CBDE 51C6A94B E4607A29 1558903B A0D0F843
869 80B655BB 9A22E8DC DF028A7C EC67F0D0 8134B1C8 B9798914 9B609E0B
870 E3BAB63D 47548381 DBC5B1FC 764E3F4B 53DD9DA1 158BFD3E 2B9C8CF5
871 6EDF0195 39349627 DB2FD53D 24B7C486 65772E43 7D6C7F8C E442734A
872 F7CCB7AE 837C264A E3A9BEB8 7F8A2FE9 B8B5292E 5A021FFF 5E91479E
873 8CE7A28C 2442C6F3 15180F93 499A234D CF76E3FE D135F9BB
874
875 The generator is: 2.
876
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
895
896
897 3. 2048-bit Group
898
899 The hexadecimal value for the prime is:
900
901 AC6BDB41 324A9A9B F166DE5E 1389582F AF72B665 1987EE07 FC319294
902 3DB56050 A37329CB B4A099ED 8193E075 7767A13D D52312AB 4B03310D
903 CD7F48A9 DA04FD50 E8083969 EDB767B0 CF609517 9A163AB3 661A05FB
904 D5FAAAE8 2918A996 2F0B93B8 55F97993 EC975EEA A80D740A DBF4FF74
905 7359D041 D5C33EA7 1D281E44 6B14773B CA97B43A 23FB8016 76BD207A
906 436C6481 F1D2B907 8717461A 5B9D32E6 88F87748 544523B5 24B0D57D
907 5EA77A27 75D2ECFA 032CFBDB F52FB378 61602790 04E57AE6 AF874E73
908 03CE5329 9CCC041C 7BC308D8 2A5698F3 A8D0C382 71AE35F8 E9DBFBB6
909 94B5C803 D89F7AE4 35DE236D 525F5475 9B65E372 FCD68EF2 0FA7111F
910 9E4AFF73
911
912 The generator is: 2.
913
914 4. 3072-bit Group
915
916 This prime is: 2^3072 - 2^3008 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^2942 pi] +
917 1690314 }
918
919 Its hexadecimal value is:
920
921 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
922 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
923 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
924 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6
925 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8
926 FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
927 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C
928 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718
929 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D
930 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D
931 B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226
932 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C
933 BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC
934 E0FD108E 4B82D120 A93AD2CA FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
935
936 The generator is: 5.
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
951
952
953 5. 4096-bit Group
954
955 This prime is: 2^4096 - 2^4032 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^3966 pi] +
956 240904 }
957
958 Its hexadecimal value is:
959
960 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
961 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
962 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
963 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6
964 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8
965 FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
966 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C
967 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718
968 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D
969 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D
970 B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226
971 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C
972 BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC
973 E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26
974 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB
975 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2
976 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127
977 D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34063199
978 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
979
980 The generator is: 5.
981
982
983
984
985
986
987
988
989
990
991
992
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
1007
1008
1009 6. 6144-bit Group
1010
1011 This prime is: 2^6144 - 2^6080 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^6014 pi] +
1012 929484 }
1013
1014 Its hexadecimal value is:
1015
1016 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
1017 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
1018 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
1019 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6
1020 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8
1021 FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
1022 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C
1023 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718
1024 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D
1025 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D
1026 B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226
1027 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C
1028 BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC
1029 E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26
1030 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB
1031 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2
1032 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127
1033 D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492
1034 36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406
1035 AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918
1036 DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151
1037 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03
1038 F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F
1039 BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA
1040 CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B
1041 B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632
1042 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E
1043 6DCC4024 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
1044
1045 The generator is: 5.
1046
1047
1048
1049
1050
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
1063
1064
1065 7. 8192-bit Group
1066
1067 This prime is: 2^8192 - 2^8128 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^8062 pi] +
1068 4743158 }
1069
1070 Its hexadecimal value is:
1071
1072 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08
1073 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B
1074 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9
1075 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6
1076 49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8
1077 FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D
1078 670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C
1079 180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718
1080 3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D
1081 04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D
1082 B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226
1083 1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C
1084 BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC
1085 E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26
1086 99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB
1087 04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2
1088 233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127
1089 D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492
1090 36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406
1091 AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918
1092 DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151
1093 2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03
1094 F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F
1095 BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA
1096 CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B
1097 B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632
1098 387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E
1099 6DBE1159 74A3926F 12FEE5E4 38777CB6 A932DF8C D8BEC4D0 73B931BA
1100 3BC832B6 8D9DD300 741FA7BF 8AFC47ED 2576F693 6BA42466 3AAB639C
1101 5AE4F568 3423B474 2BF1C978 238F16CB E39D652D E3FDB8BE FC848AD9
1102 22222E04 A4037C07 13EB57A8 1A23F0C7 3473FC64 6CEA306B 4BCBC886
1103 2F8385DD FA9D4B7F A2C087E8 79683303 ED5BDD3A 062B3CF5 B3A278A6
1104 6D2A13F8 3F44F82D DF310EE0 74AB6A36 4597E899 A0255DC1 64F31CC5
1105 0846851D F9AB4819 5DED7EA1 B1D510BD 7EE74D73 FAF36BC3 1ECFA268
1106 359046F4 EB879F92 4009438B 481C6CD7 889A002E D5EE382B C9190DA6
1107 FC026E47 9558E447 5677E9AA 9E3050E2 765694DF C81F56E8 80B96E71
1108 60C980DD 98EDD3DF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
1109
1110 The generator is: 19 (decimal).
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
1119
1120
1121 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. SRP Test Vectors</span>
1122
1123 The following test vectors demonstrate calculation of the verifier
1124 and premaster secret.
1125
1126 I = "alice"
1127
1128 P = "password123"
1129
1130 s = BEB25379 D1A8581E B5A72767 3A2441EE
1131
1132 N, g = &lt;1024-bit parameters from <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>&gt;
1133
1134 k = 7556AA04 5AEF2CDD 07ABAF0F 665C3E81 8913186F
1135
1136 x = 94B7555A ABE9127C C58CCF49 93DB6CF8 4D16C124
1137
1138 v =
1139
1140 7E273DE8 696FFC4F 4E337D05 B4B375BE B0DDE156 9E8FA00A 9886D812
1141 9BADA1F1 822223CA 1A605B53 0E379BA4 729FDC59 F105B478 7E5186F5
1142 C671085A 1447B52A 48CF1970 B4FB6F84 00BBF4CE BFBB1681 52E08AB5
1143 EA53D15C 1AFF87B2 B9DA6E04 E058AD51 CC72BFC9 033B564E 26480D78
1144 E955A5E2 9E7AB245 DB2BE315 E2099AFB
1145
1146 a =
1147
1148 60975527 035CF2AD 1989806F 0407210B C81EDC04 E2762A56 AFD529DD
1149 DA2D4393
1150
1151 b =
1152
1153 E487CB59 D31AC550 471E81F0 0F6928E0 1DDA08E9 74A004F4 9E61F5D1
1154 05284D20
1155
1156 A =
1157
1158 61D5E490 F6F1B795 47B0704C 436F523D D0E560F0 C64115BB 72557EC4
1159 4352E890 3211C046 92272D8B 2D1A5358 A2CF1B6E 0BFCF99F 921530EC
1160 8E393561 79EAE45E 42BA92AE ACED8251 71E1E8B9 AF6D9C03 E1327F44
1161 BE087EF0 6530E69F 66615261 EEF54073 CA11CF58 58F0EDFD FE15EFEA
1162 B349EF5D 76988A36 72FAC47B 0769447B
1163
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
1175
1176
1177 B =
1178
1179 BD0C6151 2C692C0C B6D041FA 01BB152D 4916A1E7 7AF46AE1 05393011
1180 BAF38964 DC46A067 0DD125B9 5A981652 236F99D9 B681CBF8 7837EC99
1181 6C6DA044 53728610 D0C6DDB5 8B318885 D7D82C7F 8DEB75CE 7BD4FBAA
1182 37089E6F 9C6059F3 88838E7A 00030B33 1EB76840 910440B1 B27AAEAE
1183 EB4012B7 D7665238 A8E3FB00 4B117B58
1184
1185 u =
1186
1187 CE38B959 3487DA98 554ED47D 70A7AE5F 462EF019
1188
1189 &lt;premaster secret&gt; =
1190
1191 B0DC82BA BCF30674 AE450C02 87745E79 90A3381F 63B387AA F271A10D
1192 233861E3 59B48220 F7C4693C 9AE12B0A 6F67809F 0876E2D0 13800D6C
1193 41BB59B6 D5979B5C 00A172B4 A2A5903A 0BDCAF8A 709585EB 2AFAFA8F
1194 3499B200 210DCC1F 10EB3394 3CD67FC8 8A2F39A4 BE5BEC4E C0A3212D
1195 C346D7E4 74B29EDE 8A469FFE CA686E5A
1196
1197 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
1198
1199 Thanks to all on the IETF TLS mailing list for ideas and analysis.
1200
1201
1202
1203
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
1231
1232
1233 Authors' Addresses
1234
1235 David Taylor
1236 Independent
1237
1238 EMail: [email protected]
1239
1240
1241 Tom Wu
1242 Cisco
1243
1244 EMail: [email protected]
1245
1246
1247 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos
1248 Independent
1249
1250 EMail: [email protected]
1251 URI: <a href="http://www.gnutls.org/">http://www.gnutls.org/</a>
1252
1253
1254 Trevor Perrin
1255 Independent
1256
1257 EMail: [email protected]
1258 URI: <a href="http://trevp.net/">http://trevp.net/</a>
1259
1260
1261
1262
1263
1264
1265
1266
1267
1268
1269
1270
1271
1272
1273
1274
1275
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span>
1287
1288
1289 Full Copyright Statement
1290
1291 Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007).
1292
1293 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
1294 contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
1295 retain all their rights.
1296
1297 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
1298 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
1299 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND
1300 THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS
1301 OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF
1302 THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
1303 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
1304
1305 Intellectual Property
1306
1307 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
1308 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
1309 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
1310 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
1311 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
1312 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
1313 on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be
1314 found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>.
1315
1316 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
1317 assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
1318 attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
1319 such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
1320 specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
1321 <a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>.
1322
1323 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
1324 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
1325 rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
1326 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at
1327 [email protected].
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 24]
1341 </pre>