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<pre>Network Working Group D. Taylor |
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Request for Comments: 5054 Independent |
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Category: Informational T. Wu |
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Cisco |
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N. Mavrogiannopoulos |
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T. Perrin |
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Independent |
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November 2007 |
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<span class="h1">Using the Secure Remote Password (SRP) Protocol for TLS Authentication</span> |
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Status of This Memo |
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does |
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not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this |
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memo is unlimited. |
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Abstract |
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This memo presents a technique for using the Secure Remote Password |
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protocol as an authentication method for the Transport Layer Security |
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protocol. |
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<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. SRP Authentication in TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Notation and Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Handshake Protocol Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Text Preparation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. SRP Verifier Creation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Changes to the Handshake Message Contents . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Server Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5.3">2.5.3</a>. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5.4">2.5.4</a>. Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Calculating the Premaster Secret . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. Ciphersuite Definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. New Message Structures . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Client Hello . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.8.2">2.8.2</a>. Server Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.8.3">2.8.3</a>. Client Key Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.9">2.9</a>. Error Alerts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. General Considerations for Implementors . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Accepting Group Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Protocol Characteristics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Hash Function Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. SRP Group Parameters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. SRP Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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At the time of writing TLS [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>] uses public key certificates, pre- |
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shared keys, or Kerberos for authentication. |
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These authentication methods do not seem well suited to certain |
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applications now being adapted to use TLS ([<a href="#ref-IMAP" title=""Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP"">IMAP</a>], for example). |
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Given that many protocols are designed to use the user name and |
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password method of authentication, being able to safely use user |
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names and passwords provides an easier route to additional security. |
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SRP ([<a href="#ref-SRP" title=""The Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP</a>], [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>]) is an authentication method that allows the use |
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of user names and passwords over unencrypted channels without |
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revealing the password to an eavesdropper. SRP also supplies a |
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shared secret at the end of the authentication sequence that can be |
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used to generate encryption keys. |
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This document describes the use of the SRP authentication method for |
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TLS. |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-REQ" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">REQ</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. SRP Authentication in TLS</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Notation and Terminology</span> |
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The version of SRP used here is sometimes referred to as "SRP-6" |
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[<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>]. This version is a slight improvement over "SRP-3", which |
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was described in [<a href="#ref-SRP" title=""The Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP</a>] and [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title=""The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System"">SRP-RFC</a>]. For convenience, this document |
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and [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title=""The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System"">SRP-RFC</a>] include the details necessary to implement SRP-6; |
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[<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>] is cited for informative purposes only. |
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<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
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This document uses the variable names defined in [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>]: |
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N, g: group parameters (prime and generator) |
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s: salt |
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B, b: server's public and private values |
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A, a: client's public and private values |
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I: user name (aka "identity") |
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P: password |
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v: verifier |
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k: SRP-6 multiplier |
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The | symbol indicates string concatenation, the ^ operator is the |
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exponentiation operation, and the % operator is the integer remainder |
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operation. |
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Conversion between integers and byte-strings assumes the most |
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significant bytes are stored first, as per [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>] and [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title=""The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System"">SRP-RFC</a>]. In |
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the following text, if a conversion from integer to byte-string is |
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implicit, the most significant byte in the resultant byte-string MUST |
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be non-zero. If a conversion is explicitly specified with the |
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operator PAD(), the integer will first be implicitly converted, then |
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the resultant byte-string will be left-padded with zeros (if |
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necessary) until its length equals the implicitly-converted length of |
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N. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Handshake Protocol Overview</span> |
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The advent of [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>] allows the SRP protocol to be implemented using |
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the standard sequence of handshake messages defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>]. |
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The parameters to various messages are given in the following |
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diagram. |
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<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
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Client Server |
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Client Hello (I) --------> |
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Server Hello |
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Certificate* |
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Server Key Exchange (N, g, s, B) |
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<-------- Server Hello Done |
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Client Key Exchange (A) --------> |
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[Change cipher spec] |
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Finished --------> |
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[Change cipher spec] |
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<-------- Finished |
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Application Data <-------> Application Data |
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* Indicates an optional message that is not always sent. |
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Figure 1 |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Text Preparation</span> |
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The user name and password strings SHALL be UTF-8 encoded Unicode, |
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prepared using the [<a href="#ref-SASLPREP" title=""SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user names and passwords"">SASLPREP</a>] profile of [<a href="#ref-STRINGPREP" title=""Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("">STRINGPREP</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. SRP Verifier Creation</span> |
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The verifier is calculated as described in Section 3 of [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title=""The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System"">SRP-RFC</a>]. |
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We give the algorithm here for convenience. |
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The verifier (v) is computed based on the salt (s), user name (I), |
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password (P), and group parameters (N, g). The computation uses the |
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[<a href="#ref-SHA1" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">SHA1</a>] hash algorithm: |
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x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P)) |
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v = g^x % N |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Changes to the Handshake Message Contents</span> |
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This section describes the changes to the TLS handshake message |
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contents when SRP is being used for authentication. The definitions |
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of the new message contents and the on-the-wire changes are given in |
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<a href="#section-2.8">Section 2.8</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1" href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. Client Hello</span> |
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The user name is appended to the standard client hello message using |
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the extension mechanism defined in [<a href="#ref-TLSEXT" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions"">TLSEXT</a>] (see <a href="#section-2.8.1">Section 2.8.1</a>). |
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This user name extension is henceforth called the "SRP extension". |
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The following subsections give details of its use. |
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<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1.1" href="#section-2.5.1.1">2.5.1.1</a>. Session Resumption</span> |
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When a client attempts to resume a session that uses SRP |
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authentication, the client MUST include the SRP extension in the |
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client hello message, in case the server cannot or will not allow |
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session resumption, meaning a full handshake is required. |
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If the server does agree to resume an existing session, the server |
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MUST ignore the information in the SRP extension of the client hello |
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message, except for its inclusion in the finished message hashes. |
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This is to ensure that attackers cannot replace the authenticated |
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identity without supplying the proper authentication information. |
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<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1.2" href="#section-2.5.1.2">2.5.1.2</a>. Missing SRP Extension</span> |
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The client may offer SRP cipher suites in the hello message but omit |
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the SRP extension. If the server would like to select an SRP cipher |
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suite in this case, the server SHOULD return a fatal |
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"unknown_psk_identity" alert (see <a href="#section-2.9">Section 2.9</a>) immediately after |
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processing the client hello message. |
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A client receiving this alert MAY choose to reconnect and resend the |
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hello message, this time with the SRP extension. This allows the |
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client to advertise that it supports SRP, but not have to prompt the |
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user for his user name and password, nor expose the user name in the |
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clear, unless necessary. |
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<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1.3" href="#section-2.5.1.3">2.5.1.3</a>. Unknown SRP </span> User Name |
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If the server doesn't have a verifier for the user name in the SRP |
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extension, the server MAY abort the handshake with an |
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"unknown_psk_identity" alert (see <a href="#section-2.9">Section 2.9</a>). Alternatively, if |
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the server wishes to hide the fact that this user name doesn't have a |
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verifier, the server MAY simulate the protocol as if a verifier |
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existed, but then reject the client's finished message with a |
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"bad_record_mac" alert, as if the password was incorrect. |
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To simulate the existence of an entry for each user name, the server |
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must consistently return the same salt (s) and group (N, g) values |
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for the same user name. For example, the server could store a secret |
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"seed key" and then use HMAC-SHA1(seed_key, "salt" | user_name) to |
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<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
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generate the salts [<a href="#ref-HMAC" title=""HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication"">HMAC</a>]. For B, the server can return a random |
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value between 1 and N-1 inclusive. However, the server should take |
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care to simulate computation delays. One way to do this is to |
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generate a fake verifier using the "seed key" approach, and then |
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proceed with the protocol as usual. |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.2" href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Server Certificate</span> |
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The server MUST send a certificate if it agrees to an SRP cipher |
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suite that requires the server to provide additional authentication |
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in the form of a digital signature. See <a href="#section-2.7">Section 2.7</a> for details of |
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which cipher suites defined in this document require a server |
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certificate to be sent. |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.3" href="#section-2.5.3">2.5.3</a>. Server Key Exchange</span> |
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The server key exchange message contains the prime (N), the generator |
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(g), and the salt value (s) read from the SRP password file based on |
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the user name (I) received in the client hello extension. |
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The server key exchange message also contains the server's public |
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value (B). The server calculates this value as B = k*v + g^b % N, |
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where b is a random number that SHOULD be at least 256 bits in length |
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and k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)). |
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If the server has sent a certificate message, the server key exchange |
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message MUST be signed. |
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The group parameters (N, g) sent in this message MUST have N as a |
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safe prime (a prime of the form N=2q+1, where q is also prime). The |
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integers from 1 to N-1 will form a group under multiplication % N, |
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and g MUST be a generator of this group. In addition, the group |
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parameters MUST NOT be specially chosen to allow efficient |
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computation of discrete logarithms. |
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The SRP group parameters in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> satisfy the above |
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requirements, so the client SHOULD accept any parameters from this |
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appendix that have large enough N values to meet her security |
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requirements. |
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The client MAY accept other group parameters from the server, if the |
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client has reason to believe that these parameters satisfy the above |
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requirements, and the parameters have large enough N values. For |
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example, if the parameters transmitted by the server match parameters |
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on a "known-good" list, the client may choose to accept them. See |
| 382 |
<a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> for additional security considerations relevant to the |
| 383 |
acceptance of the group parameters. |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Group parameters that are not accepted via one of the above methods |
| 394 |
MUST be rejected with an "insufficient_security" alert (see |
| 395 |
<a href="#section-2.9">Section 2.9</a>). |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
The client MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert |
| 398 |
if B % N = 0. |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.4" href="#section-2.5.4">2.5.4</a>. Client Key Exchange</span> |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
The client key exchange message carries the client's public value |
| 403 |
(A). The client calculates this value as A = g^a % N, where a is a |
| 404 |
random number that SHOULD be at least 256 bits in length. |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
The server MUST abort the handshake with an "illegal_parameter" alert |
| 407 |
if A % N = 0. |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Calculating the Premaster Secret</span> |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
The premaster secret is calculated by the client as follows: |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
I, P = <read from user> |
| 414 |
N, g, s, B = <read from server> |
| 415 |
a = random() |
| 416 |
A = g^a % N |
| 417 |
u = SHA1(PAD(A) | PAD(B)) |
| 418 |
k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) |
| 419 |
x = SHA1(s | SHA1(I | ":" | P)) |
| 420 |
<premaster secret> = (B - (k * g^x)) ^ (a + (u * x)) % N |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
The premaster secret is calculated by the server as follows: |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
N, g, s, v = <read from password file> |
| 425 |
b = random() |
| 426 |
k = SHA1(N | PAD(g)) |
| 427 |
B = k*v + g^b % N |
| 428 |
A = <read from client> |
| 429 |
u = SHA1(PAD(A) | PAD(B)) |
| 430 |
<premaster secret> = (A * v^u) ^ b % N |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
The finished messages perform the same function as the client and |
| 433 |
server evidence messages (M1 and M2) specified in [<a href="#ref-SRP-RFC" title=""The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange System"">SRP-RFC</a>]. If |
| 434 |
either the client or the server calculates an incorrect premaster |
| 435 |
secret, the finished messages will fail to decrypt properly, and the |
| 436 |
other party will return a "bad_record_mac" alert. |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
If a client application receives a "bad_record_mac" alert when |
| 439 |
performing an SRP handshake, it should inform the user that the |
| 440 |
entered user name and password are incorrect. |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. Ciphersuite Definitions</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
The following cipher suites are added by this document. The usage of |
| 452 |
Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cipher suites is as defined in |
| 453 |
[<a href="#ref-AESCIPH" title=""Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">AESCIPH</a>]. |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1A }; |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1B }; |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1C }; |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1D }; |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1E }; |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1F }; |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x20 }; |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x21 }; |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x22 }; |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
Cipher suites that begin with TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA or TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS |
| 474 |
require the server to send a certificate message containing a |
| 475 |
certificate with the specified type of public key, and to sign the |
| 476 |
server key exchange message using a matching private key. |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
Cipher suites that do not include a digital signature algorithm |
| 479 |
identifier assume that the server is authenticated by its possession |
| 480 |
of the SRP verifier. |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
Implementations conforming to this specification MUST implement the |
| 483 |
TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA cipher suite, SHOULD implement the |
| 484 |
TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA and TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA |
| 485 |
cipher suites, and MAY implement the remaining cipher suites. |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8" href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. New Message Structures</span> |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
This section shows the structure of the messages passed during a |
| 490 |
handshake that uses SRP for authentication. The representation |
| 491 |
language used is the same as that used in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>]. |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.1" href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Client Hello</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
A new extension "srp", with value 12, has been added to the |
| 508 |
enumerated ExtensionType defined in [<a href="#ref-TLSEXT" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions"">TLSEXT</a>]. This value MUST be |
| 509 |
used as the extension number for the SRP extension. |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
The "extension_data" field of the SRP extension SHALL contain: |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
opaque srp_I<1..2^8-1>; |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
where srp_I is the user name, encoded per <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>. |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.2" href="#section-2.8.2">2.8.2</a>. Server Key Exchange</span> |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
A new value, "srp", has been added to the enumerated |
| 520 |
KeyExchangeAlgorithm originally defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>]. |
| 521 |
|
| 522 |
When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the server's |
| 523 |
SRP parameters are sent in the server key exchange message, encoded |
| 524 |
in a ServerSRPParams structure. |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
If a certificate is sent to the client, the server key exchange |
| 527 |
message must be signed. |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
enum { rsa, diffie_hellman, srp } KeyExchangeAlgorithm; |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
struct { |
| 532 |
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
| 533 |
case diffie_hellman: |
| 534 |
ServerDHParams params; |
| 535 |
Signature signed_params; |
| 536 |
case rsa: |
| 537 |
ServerRSAParams params; |
| 538 |
Signature signed_params; |
| 539 |
case srp: /* new entry */ |
| 540 |
ServerSRPParams params; |
| 541 |
Signature signed_params; |
| 542 |
}; |
| 543 |
} ServerKeyExchange; |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
struct { |
| 546 |
opaque srp_N<1..2^16-1>; |
| 547 |
opaque srp_g<1..2^16-1>; |
| 548 |
opaque srp_s<1..2^8-1>; |
| 549 |
opaque srp_B<1..2^16-1>; |
| 550 |
} ServerSRPParams; /* SRP parameters */ |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.3" href="#section-2.8.3">2.8.3</a>. Client Key Exchange</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
When the value of KeyExchangeAlgorithm is set to "srp", the client's |
| 564 |
public value (A) is sent in the client key exchange message, encoded |
| 565 |
in a ClientSRPPublic structure. |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
struct { |
| 568 |
select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
| 569 |
case rsa: EncryptedPreMasterSecret; |
| 570 |
case diffie_hellman: ClientDiffieHellmanPublic; |
| 571 |
case srp: ClientSRPPublic; /* new entry */ |
| 572 |
} exchange_keys; |
| 573 |
} ClientKeyExchange; |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
struct { |
| 576 |
opaque srp_A<1..2^16-1>; |
| 577 |
} ClientSRPPublic; |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.9" href="#section-2.9">2.9</a>. Error Alerts</span> |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
This document introduces four new uses of alerts: |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
o "unknown_psk_identity" (115) - this alert MAY be sent by a server |
| 584 |
that would like to select an offered SRP cipher suite, if the SRP |
| 585 |
extension is absent from the client's hello message. This alert |
| 586 |
is always fatal. See <a href="#section-2.5.1.2">Section 2.5.1.2</a> for details. |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
o "unknown_psk_identity" (115) - this alert MAY be sent by a server |
| 589 |
that receives an unknown user name. This alert is always fatal. |
| 590 |
See <a href="#section-2.5.1.3">Section 2.5.1.3</a> for details. |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
o "insufficient_security" (71) - this alert MUST be sent by a client |
| 593 |
that receives unknown or untrusted (N, g) values. This alert is |
| 594 |
always fatal. See <a href="#section-2.5.3">Section 2.5.3</a> for details. |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
o "illegal_parameter" (47) - this alert MUST be sent by a client or |
| 597 |
server that receives a key exchange message with A % N = 0 or B % |
| 598 |
N = 0. This alert is always fatal. See <a href="#section-2.5.3">Section 2.5.3</a> and |
| 599 |
<a href="#section-2.5.4">Section 2.5.4</a> and for details. |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
The "insufficient_security" and "illegal_parameter" alerts are |
| 602 |
defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>]. The "unknown_psk_identity" alert is defined in |
| 603 |
[<a href="#ref-PSK" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">PSK</a>]. |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. General Considerations for Implementors</span> |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
The checks described in <a href="#section-2.5.3">Section 2.5.3</a> and <a href="#section-2.5.4">Section 2.5.4</a> on the |
| 622 |
received values for A and B are CRUCIAL for security and MUST be |
| 623 |
performed. |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
The private values a and b SHOULD be at least 256-bit random numbers, |
| 626 |
to give approximately 128 bits of security against certain methods of |
| 627 |
calculating discrete logarithms. See [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>], Section D.1, for advice |
| 628 |
on choosing cryptographically secure random numbers. |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Accepting Group Parameters</span> |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
An attacker who could calculate discrete logarithms % N could |
| 633 |
compromise user passwords, and could also compromise the |
| 634 |
confidentiality and integrity of TLS sessions. Clients MUST ensure |
| 635 |
that the received parameter N is large enough to make calculating |
| 636 |
discrete logarithms computationally infeasible. |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
An attacker may try to send a prime value N that is large enough to |
| 639 |
be secure, but that has a special form for which the attacker can |
| 640 |
more easily compute discrete logarithms (e.g., using the algorithm |
| 641 |
discussed in [<a href="#ref-TRAPDOOR" title=""Designing and Detecting Trapdoors for Discrete Log Cryptosystems"">TRAPDOOR</a>]). If the client executes the protocol using |
| 642 |
such a prime, the client's password could be compromised. Because of |
| 643 |
the difficulty of checking for such primes in real time, clients |
| 644 |
SHOULD only accept group parameters that come from a trusted source, |
| 645 |
such as those listed in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>, or parameters configured locally |
| 646 |
by a trusted administrator. |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Protocol Characteristics</span> |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
If an attacker learns a user's SRP verifier (e.g., by gaining access |
| 651 |
to a server's password file), the attacker can masquerade as the real |
| 652 |
server to that user, and can also attempt a dictionary attack to |
| 653 |
recover that user's password. |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
An attacker could repeatedly contact an SRP server and try to guess a |
| 656 |
legitimate user's password. Servers SHOULD take steps to prevent |
| 657 |
this, such as limiting the rate of authentication attempts from a |
| 658 |
particular IP address or against a particular user name. |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
The client's user name is sent in the clear in the Client Hello |
| 661 |
message. To avoid sending the user name in the clear, the client |
| 662 |
could first open a conventional anonymous or server-authenticated |
| 663 |
connection, then renegotiate an SRP-authenticated connection with the |
| 664 |
handshake protected by the first connection. |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
If the client receives an "unknown_psk_identity" alert in response to |
| 674 |
a client hello, this alert may have been inserted by an attacker. |
| 675 |
The client should be careful about making any decisions, or forming |
| 676 |
any conclusions, based on receiving this alert. |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
It is possible to choose a (user name, password) pair such that the |
| 679 |
resulting verifier will also match other, related, (user name, |
| 680 |
password) pairs. Thus, anyone using verifiers should be careful not |
| 681 |
to assume that only a single (user name, password) pair matches the |
| 682 |
verifier. |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Hash Function Considerations</span> |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
This protocol uses SHA-1 to derive several values: |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
o u prevents an attacker who learns a user's verifier from being |
| 689 |
able to authenticate as that user (see [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>]). |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
o k prevents an attacker who can select group parameters from being |
| 692 |
able to launch a 2-for-1 guessing attack (see [<a href="#ref-SRP-6" title=""SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the Secure Remote Password Protocol"">SRP-6</a>]). |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
o x contains the user's password mixed with a salt. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
Cryptanalytic attacks against SHA-1 that only affect its collision- |
| 697 |
resistance do not compromise these uses. If attacks against SHA-1 |
| 698 |
are discovered that do compromise these uses, new cipher suites |
| 699 |
should be specified to use a different hash algorithm. |
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
In this situation, clients could send a Client Hello message |
| 702 |
containing new and/or old SRP cipher suites along with a single SRP |
| 703 |
extension. The server could then select the appropriate cipher suite |
| 704 |
based on the type of verifier it has stored for this user. |
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
This document defines a new TLS extension "srp" (value 12), whose |
| 709 |
value has been assigned from the TLS ExtensionType Registry defined |
| 710 |
in [<a href="#ref-TLSEXT" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions"">TLSEXT</a>]. |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
This document defines nine new cipher suites, whose values have been |
| 713 |
assigned from the TLS Ciphersuite registry defined in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol version 1.1"">TLS</a>]. |
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1A }; |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1B }; |
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1C }; |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1D }; |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1E }; |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x1F }; |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x20 }; |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x21 }; |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
CipherSuite TLS_SRP_SHA_DSS_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0xC0,0x22 }; |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. References</span> |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
[<a id="ref-REQ">REQ</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 746 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
[<a id="ref-TLS">TLS</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol version |
| 749 |
1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006. |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
[<a id="ref-TLSEXT">TLSEXT</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, |
| 752 |
J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 753 |
Extensions", <a href="./rfc4366">RFC 4366</a>, April 2006. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
[<a id="ref-STRINGPREP">STRINGPREP</a>] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of |
| 756 |
Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", <a href="./rfc3454">RFC 3454</a>, |
| 757 |
December 2002. |
| 758 |
|
| 759 |
[<a id="ref-SASLPREP">SASLPREP</a>] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep profile for user |
| 760 |
names and passwords", <a href="./rfc4013">RFC 4013</a>, February 2005. |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
[<a id="ref-SRP-RFC">SRP-RFC</a>] Wu, T., "The SRP Authentication and Key Exchange |
| 763 |
System", <a href="./rfc2945">RFC 2945</a>, September 2000. |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
[<a id="ref-SHA1">SHA1</a>] "Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", FIPS 180-2, August 2002. |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
[<a id="ref-HMAC">HMAC</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: |
| 768 |
Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, |
| 769 |
February 1997. |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
[<a id="ref-AESCIPH">AESCIPH</a>] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) |
| 772 |
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", |
| 773 |
<a href="./rfc3268">RFC 3268</a>, June 2002. |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
[<a id="ref-PSK">PSK</a>] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key |
| 786 |
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", |
| 787 |
<a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a>, December 2005. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
[<a id="ref-MODP">MODP</a>] Kivinen, T. and M. Kojo, "More Modular Exponentiation |
| 790 |
(MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange |
| 791 |
(IKE)", <a href="./rfc3526">RFC 3526</a>, May 2003. |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 794 |
|
| 795 |
[<a id="ref-IMAP">IMAP</a>] Newman, C., "Using TLS with IMAP, POP3 and ACAP", |
| 796 |
<a href="./rfc2595">RFC 2595</a>, June 1999. |
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
[<a id="ref-SRP-6">SRP-6</a>] Wu, T., "SRP-6: Improvements and Refinements to the |
| 799 |
Secure Remote Password Protocol", Submission to IEEE |
| 800 |
P1363.2 working group, October 2002, |
| 801 |
<<a href="http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/">http://grouper.ieee.org/groups/1363/</a>>. |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
[<a id="ref-SRP">SRP</a>] Wu, T., "The Secure Remote Password Protocol", |
| 804 |
Proceedings of the 1998 Internet Society Network and |
| 805 |
Distributed System Security Symposium pp. 97-111, |
| 806 |
March 1998. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
[<a id="ref-TRAPDOOR">TRAPDOOR</a>] Gordon, D., "Designing and Detecting Trapdoors for |
| 809 |
Discrete Log Cryptosystems", Springer-Verlag Advances |
| 810 |
in Cryptology - Crypto '92, pp. 66-75, 1993. |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. SRP Group Parameters</span> |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
The 1024-, 1536-, and 2048-bit groups are taken from software |
| 844 |
developed by Tom Wu and Eugene Jhong for the Stanford SRP |
| 845 |
distribution, and subsequently proven to be prime. The larger primes |
| 846 |
are taken from [<a href="#ref-MODP" title=""More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">MODP</a>], but generators have been calculated that are |
| 847 |
primitive roots of N, unlike the generators in [<a href="#ref-MODP" title=""More Modular Exponentiation (MODP) Diffie-Hellman groups for Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">MODP</a>]. |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
The 1024-bit and 1536-bit groups MUST be supported. |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
1. 1024-bit Group |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
The hexadecimal value for the prime is: |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
EEAF0AB9 ADB38DD6 9C33F80A FA8FC5E8 60726187 75FF3C0B 9EA2314C |
| 856 |
9C256576 D674DF74 96EA81D3 383B4813 D692C6E0 E0D5D8E2 50B98BE4 |
| 857 |
8E495C1D 6089DAD1 5DC7D7B4 6154D6B6 CE8EF4AD 69B15D49 82559B29 |
| 858 |
7BCF1885 C529F566 660E57EC 68EDBC3C 05726CC0 2FD4CBF4 976EAA9A |
| 859 |
FD5138FE 8376435B 9FC61D2F C0EB06E3 |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
The generator is: 2. |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
2. 1536-bit Group |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
The hexadecimal value for the prime is: |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
9DEF3CAF B939277A B1F12A86 17A47BBB DBA51DF4 99AC4C80 BEEEA961 |
| 868 |
4B19CC4D 5F4F5F55 6E27CBDE 51C6A94B E4607A29 1558903B A0D0F843 |
| 869 |
80B655BB 9A22E8DC DF028A7C EC67F0D0 8134B1C8 B9798914 9B609E0B |
| 870 |
E3BAB63D 47548381 DBC5B1FC 764E3F4B 53DD9DA1 158BFD3E 2B9C8CF5 |
| 871 |
6EDF0195 39349627 DB2FD53D 24B7C486 65772E43 7D6C7F8C E442734A |
| 872 |
F7CCB7AE 837C264A E3A9BEB8 7F8A2FE9 B8B5292E 5A021FFF 5E91479E |
| 873 |
8CE7A28C 2442C6F3 15180F93 499A234D CF76E3FE D135F9BB |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
The generator is: 2. |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
3. 2048-bit Group |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
The hexadecimal value for the prime is: |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
AC6BDB41 324A9A9B F166DE5E 1389582F AF72B665 1987EE07 FC319294 |
| 902 |
3DB56050 A37329CB B4A099ED 8193E075 7767A13D D52312AB 4B03310D |
| 903 |
CD7F48A9 DA04FD50 E8083969 EDB767B0 CF609517 9A163AB3 661A05FB |
| 904 |
D5FAAAE8 2918A996 2F0B93B8 55F97993 EC975EEA A80D740A DBF4FF74 |
| 905 |
7359D041 D5C33EA7 1D281E44 6B14773B CA97B43A 23FB8016 76BD207A |
| 906 |
436C6481 F1D2B907 8717461A 5B9D32E6 88F87748 544523B5 24B0D57D |
| 907 |
5EA77A27 75D2ECFA 032CFBDB F52FB378 61602790 04E57AE6 AF874E73 |
| 908 |
03CE5329 9CCC041C 7BC308D8 2A5698F3 A8D0C382 71AE35F8 E9DBFBB6 |
| 909 |
94B5C803 D89F7AE4 35DE236D 525F5475 9B65E372 FCD68EF2 0FA7111F |
| 910 |
9E4AFF73 |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
The generator is: 2. |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
4. 3072-bit Group |
| 915 |
|
| 916 |
This prime is: 2^3072 - 2^3008 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^2942 pi] + |
| 917 |
1690314 } |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
Its hexadecimal value is: |
| 920 |
|
| 921 |
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 |
| 922 |
8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B |
| 923 |
302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 |
| 924 |
A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 |
| 925 |
49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 |
| 926 |
FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D |
| 927 |
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C |
| 928 |
180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 |
| 929 |
3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D |
| 930 |
04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D |
| 931 |
B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 |
| 932 |
1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C |
| 933 |
BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC |
| 934 |
E0FD108E 4B82D120 A93AD2CA FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF |
| 935 |
|
| 936 |
The generator is: 5. |
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
5. 4096-bit Group |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
This prime is: 2^4096 - 2^4032 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^3966 pi] + |
| 956 |
240904 } |
| 957 |
|
| 958 |
Its hexadecimal value is: |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 |
| 961 |
8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B |
| 962 |
302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 |
| 963 |
A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 |
| 964 |
49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 |
| 965 |
FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D |
| 966 |
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C |
| 967 |
180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 |
| 968 |
3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D |
| 969 |
04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D |
| 970 |
B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 |
| 971 |
1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C |
| 972 |
BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC |
| 973 |
E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 |
| 974 |
99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB |
| 975 |
04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 |
| 976 |
233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 |
| 977 |
D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34063199 |
| 978 |
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF |
| 979 |
|
| 980 |
The generator is: 5. |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
|
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
6. 6144-bit Group |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
This prime is: 2^6144 - 2^6080 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^6014 pi] + |
| 1012 |
929484 } |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
Its hexadecimal value is: |
| 1015 |
|
| 1016 |
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 |
| 1017 |
8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B |
| 1018 |
302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 |
| 1019 |
A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 |
| 1020 |
49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 |
| 1021 |
FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D |
| 1022 |
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C |
| 1023 |
180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 |
| 1024 |
3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D |
| 1025 |
04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D |
| 1026 |
B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 |
| 1027 |
1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C |
| 1028 |
BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC |
| 1029 |
E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 |
| 1030 |
99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB |
| 1031 |
04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 |
| 1032 |
233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 |
| 1033 |
D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492 |
| 1034 |
36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406 |
| 1035 |
AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918 |
| 1036 |
DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 |
| 1037 |
2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 |
| 1038 |
F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F |
| 1039 |
BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA |
| 1040 |
CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B |
| 1041 |
B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632 |
| 1042 |
387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E |
| 1043 |
6DCC4024 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF |
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 |
The generator is: 5. |
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
|
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
7. 8192-bit Group |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
This prime is: 2^8192 - 2^8128 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^8062 pi] + |
| 1068 |
4743158 } |
| 1069 |
|
| 1070 |
Its hexadecimal value is: |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1 29024E08 |
| 1073 |
8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD EF9519B3 CD3A431B |
| 1074 |
302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 |
| 1075 |
A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 |
| 1076 |
49286651 ECE45B3D C2007CB8 A163BF05 98DA4836 1C55D39A 69163FA8 |
| 1077 |
FD24CF5F 83655D23 DCA3AD96 1C62F356 208552BB 9ED52907 7096966D |
| 1078 |
670C354E 4ABC9804 F1746C08 CA18217C 32905E46 2E36CE3B E39E772C |
| 1079 |
180E8603 9B2783A2 EC07A28F B5C55DF0 6F4C52C9 DE2BCBF6 95581718 |
| 1080 |
3995497C EA956AE5 15D22618 98FA0510 15728E5A 8AAAC42D AD33170D |
| 1081 |
04507A33 A85521AB DF1CBA64 ECFB8504 58DBEF0A 8AEA7157 5D060C7D |
| 1082 |
B3970F85 A6E1E4C7 ABF5AE8C DB0933D7 1E8C94E0 4A25619D CEE3D226 |
| 1083 |
1AD2EE6B F12FFA06 D98A0864 D8760273 3EC86A64 521F2B18 177B200C |
| 1084 |
BBE11757 7A615D6C 770988C0 BAD946E2 08E24FA0 74E5AB31 43DB5BFC |
| 1085 |
E0FD108E 4B82D120 A9210801 1A723C12 A787E6D7 88719A10 BDBA5B26 |
| 1086 |
99C32718 6AF4E23C 1A946834 B6150BDA 2583E9CA 2AD44CE8 DBBBC2DB |
| 1087 |
04DE8EF9 2E8EFC14 1FBECAA6 287C5947 4E6BC05D 99B2964F A090C3A2 |
| 1088 |
233BA186 515BE7ED 1F612970 CEE2D7AF B81BDD76 2170481C D0069127 |
| 1089 |
D5B05AA9 93B4EA98 8D8FDDC1 86FFB7DC 90A6C08F 4DF435C9 34028492 |
| 1090 |
36C3FAB4 D27C7026 C1D4DCB2 602646DE C9751E76 3DBA37BD F8FF9406 |
| 1091 |
AD9E530E E5DB382F 413001AE B06A53ED 9027D831 179727B0 865A8918 |
| 1092 |
DA3EDBEB CF9B14ED 44CE6CBA CED4BB1B DB7F1447 E6CC254B 33205151 |
| 1093 |
2BD7AF42 6FB8F401 378CD2BF 5983CA01 C64B92EC F032EA15 D1721D03 |
| 1094 |
F482D7CE 6E74FEF6 D55E702F 46980C82 B5A84031 900B1C9E 59E7C97F |
| 1095 |
BEC7E8F3 23A97A7E 36CC88BE 0F1D45B7 FF585AC5 4BD407B2 2B4154AA |
| 1096 |
CC8F6D7E BF48E1D8 14CC5ED2 0F8037E0 A79715EE F29BE328 06A1D58B |
| 1097 |
B7C5DA76 F550AA3D 8A1FBFF0 EB19CCB1 A313D55C DA56C9EC 2EF29632 |
| 1098 |
387FE8D7 6E3C0468 043E8F66 3F4860EE 12BF2D5B 0B7474D6 E694F91E |
| 1099 |
6DBE1159 74A3926F 12FEE5E4 38777CB6 A932DF8C D8BEC4D0 73B931BA |
| 1100 |
3BC832B6 8D9DD300 741FA7BF 8AFC47ED 2576F693 6BA42466 3AAB639C |
| 1101 |
5AE4F568 3423B474 2BF1C978 238F16CB E39D652D E3FDB8BE FC848AD9 |
| 1102 |
22222E04 A4037C07 13EB57A8 1A23F0C7 3473FC64 6CEA306B 4BCBC886 |
| 1103 |
2F8385DD FA9D4B7F A2C087E8 79683303 ED5BDD3A 062B3CF5 B3A278A6 |
| 1104 |
6D2A13F8 3F44F82D DF310EE0 74AB6A36 4597E899 A0255DC1 64F31CC5 |
| 1105 |
0846851D F9AB4819 5DED7EA1 B1D510BD 7EE74D73 FAF36BC3 1ECFA268 |
| 1106 |
359046F4 EB879F92 4009438B 481C6CD7 889A002E D5EE382B C9190DA6 |
| 1107 |
FC026E47 9558E447 5677E9AA 9E3050E2 765694DF C81F56E8 80B96E71 |
| 1108 |
60C980DD 98EDD3DF FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
The generator is: 19 (decimal). |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. SRP Test Vectors</span> |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
The following test vectors demonstrate calculation of the verifier |
| 1124 |
and premaster secret. |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
I = "alice" |
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
P = "password123" |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
s = BEB25379 D1A8581E B5A72767 3A2441EE |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
N, g = <1024-bit parameters from <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>> |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
k = 7556AA04 5AEF2CDD 07ABAF0F 665C3E81 8913186F |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
x = 94B7555A ABE9127C C58CCF49 93DB6CF8 4D16C124 |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
v = |
| 1139 |
|
| 1140 |
7E273DE8 696FFC4F 4E337D05 B4B375BE B0DDE156 9E8FA00A 9886D812 |
| 1141 |
9BADA1F1 822223CA 1A605B53 0E379BA4 729FDC59 F105B478 7E5186F5 |
| 1142 |
C671085A 1447B52A 48CF1970 B4FB6F84 00BBF4CE BFBB1681 52E08AB5 |
| 1143 |
EA53D15C 1AFF87B2 B9DA6E04 E058AD51 CC72BFC9 033B564E 26480D78 |
| 1144 |
E955A5E2 9E7AB245 DB2BE315 E2099AFB |
| 1145 |
|
| 1146 |
a = |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
60975527 035CF2AD 1989806F 0407210B C81EDC04 E2762A56 AFD529DD |
| 1149 |
DA2D4393 |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
b = |
| 1152 |
|
| 1153 |
E487CB59 D31AC550 471E81F0 0F6928E0 1DDA08E9 74A004F4 9E61F5D1 |
| 1154 |
05284D20 |
| 1155 |
|
| 1156 |
A = |
| 1157 |
|
| 1158 |
61D5E490 F6F1B795 47B0704C 436F523D D0E560F0 C64115BB 72557EC4 |
| 1159 |
4352E890 3211C046 92272D8B 2D1A5358 A2CF1B6E 0BFCF99F 921530EC |
| 1160 |
8E393561 79EAE45E 42BA92AE ACED8251 71E1E8B9 AF6D9C03 E1327F44 |
| 1161 |
BE087EF0 6530E69F 66615261 EEF54073 CA11CF58 58F0EDFD FE15EFEA |
| 1162 |
B349EF5D 76988A36 72FAC47B 0769447B |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
B = |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
BD0C6151 2C692C0C B6D041FA 01BB152D 4916A1E7 7AF46AE1 05393011 |
| 1180 |
BAF38964 DC46A067 0DD125B9 5A981652 236F99D9 B681CBF8 7837EC99 |
| 1181 |
6C6DA044 53728610 D0C6DDB5 8B318885 D7D82C7F 8DEB75CE 7BD4FBAA |
| 1182 |
37089E6F 9C6059F3 88838E7A 00030B33 1EB76840 910440B1 B27AAEAE |
| 1183 |
EB4012B7 D7665238 A8E3FB00 4B117B58 |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
u = |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
CE38B959 3487DA98 554ED47D 70A7AE5F 462EF019 |
| 1188 |
|
| 1189 |
<premaster secret> = |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
B0DC82BA BCF30674 AE450C02 87745E79 90A3381F 63B387AA F271A10D |
| 1192 |
233861E3 59B48220 F7C4693C 9AE12B0A 6F67809F 0876E2D0 13800D6C |
| 1193 |
41BB59B6 D5979B5C 00A172B4 A2A5903A 0BDCAF8A 709585EB 2AFAFA8F |
| 1194 |
3499B200 210DCC1F 10EB3394 3CD67FC8 8A2F39A4 BE5BEC4E C0A3212D |
| 1195 |
C346D7E4 74B29EDE 8A469FFE CA686E5A |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 1198 |
|
| 1199 |
Thanks to all on the IETF TLS mailing list for ideas and analysis. |
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
|
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 |
|
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
|
| 1210 |
|
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
|
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
|
| 1215 |
|
| 1216 |
|
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 |
|
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
David Taylor |
| 1236 |
Independent |
| 1237 |
|
| 1238 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1239 |
|
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
Tom Wu |
| 1242 |
Cisco |
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1245 |
|
| 1246 |
|
| 1247 |
Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos |
| 1248 |
Independent |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1251 |
URI: <a href="http://www.gnutls.org/">http://www.gnutls.org/</a> |
| 1252 |
|
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
Trevor Perrin |
| 1255 |
Independent |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1258 |
URI: <a href="http://trevp.net/">http://trevp.net/</a> |
| 1259 |
|
| 1260 |
|
| 1261 |
|
| 1262 |
|
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
|
| 1265 |
|
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 |
|
| 1268 |
|
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
|
| 1272 |
|
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
|
| 1275 |
|
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
|
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5054">RFC 5054</a> Using SRP for TLS Authentication November 2007</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 1290 |
|
| 1291 |
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2007). |
| 1292 |
|
| 1293 |
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions |
| 1294 |
contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors |
| 1295 |
retain all their rights. |
| 1296 |
|
| 1297 |
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an |
| 1298 |
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS |
| 1299 |
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND |
| 1300 |
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS |
| 1301 |
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF |
| 1302 |
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED |
| 1303 |
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
Intellectual Property |
| 1306 |
|
| 1307 |
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any |
| 1308 |
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to |
| 1309 |
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in |
| 1310 |
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights |
| 1311 |
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has |
| 1312 |
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information |
| 1313 |
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be |
| 1314 |
found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>. |
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 |
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any |
| 1317 |
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an |
| 1318 |
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of |
| 1319 |
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this |
| 1320 |
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at |
| 1321 |
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>. |
| 1322 |
|
| 1323 |
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any |
| 1324 |
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary |
| 1325 |
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement |
| 1326 |
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at |
| 1327 |
[email protected]. |
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
|
| 1331 |
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
Taylor, et al. Informational [Page 24] |
| 1341 |
</pre> |