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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Appelbaum
2 Request for Comments: 7686 The Tor Project, Inc.
3 Category: Standards Track A. Muffett
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Facebook
5 October 2015
6
7
8 <span class="h1">The ".onion" Special-Use Domain Name</span>
9
10 Abstract
11
12 This document registers the ".onion" Special-Use Domain Name.
13
14 Status of This Memo
15
16 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
17
18 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
19 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
20 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
21 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
22 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
23
24 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
25 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
26 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7686">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7686</a>.
27
28 Copyright Notice
29
30 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
31 document authors. All rights reserved.
32
33 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
34 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
35 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
36 publication of this document. Please review these documents
37 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
38 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
39 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
40 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
41 described in the Simplified BSD License.
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52 <span class="grey">Appelbaum &amp; Muffett Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7686">RFC 7686</a> .onion October 2015</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Notational Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
61 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. The ".onion" Special-Use Domain Name . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
62 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
63 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
64 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
65 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
66 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
67 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
68 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
69
70 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
71
72 The Tor network [<a href="#ref-Dingledine2004">Dingledine2004</a>] has the ability to host network
73 services using the ".onion" Special-Use Top-Level Domain Name. Such
74 names can be used as other domain names would be (e.g., in URLs
75 [<a href="./rfc3986" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;">RFC3986</a>]), but instead of using the DNS infrastructure, .onion names
76 functionally correspond to the identity of a given service, thereby
77 combining location and authentication.
78
79 .onion names are used to provide access to end to end encrypted,
80 secure, anonymized services; that is, the identity and location of
81 the server is obscured from the client. The location of the client
82 is obscured from the server. The identity of the client may or may
83 not be disclosed through an optional cryptographic authentication
84 process.
85
86 .onion names are self-authenticating, in that they are derived from
87 the cryptographic keys used by the server in a client-verifiable
88 manner during connection establishment. As a result, the
89 cryptographic label component of a .onion name is not intended to be
90 human-meaningful.
91
92 The Tor network is designed to not be subject to any central
93 controlling authorities with regards to routing and service
94 publication, so .onion names cannot be registered, assigned,
95 transferred or revoked. "Ownership" of a .onion name is derived
96 solely from control of a public/private key pair that corresponds to
97 the algorithmic derivation of the name.
98
99 In this way, .onion names are "special" in the sense defined by
100 <a href="./rfc6761#section-3">Section&nbsp;3 of [RFC6761]</a>; they require hardware and software
101 implementations to change their handling in order to achieve the
102 desired properties of the name (see <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). These differences
103 are listed in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>.
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108 <span class="grey">Appelbaum &amp; Muffett Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7686">RFC 7686</a> .onion October 2015</span>
111
112
113 Like Top-Level Domain Names, .onion names can have an arbitrary
114 number of subdomain components. This information is not meaningful
115 to the Tor protocol, but can be used in application protocols like
116 HTTP [<a href="./rfc7230" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing&quot;">RFC7230</a>].
117
118 Note that .onion names are required to conform with DNS name syntax
119 (as defined in <a href="./rfc1034#section-3.5">Section&nbsp;3.5 of [RFC1034]</a> and <a href="./rfc1123#section-2.1">Section&nbsp;2.1 of
120 [RFC1123]</a>), as they will still be exposed to DNS implementations.
121
122 See [<a href="#ref-tor-address">tor-address</a>] and [<a href="#ref-tor-rendezvous">tor-rendezvous</a>] for the details of the
123 creation and use of .onion names.
124
125 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Notational Conventions</span>
126
127 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
128 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
129 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
130
131 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The ".onion" Special-Use Domain Name</span>
132
133 These properties have the following effects upon parties using or
134 processing .onion names (as per [<a href="./rfc6761" title="&quot;Special-Use Domain Names&quot;">RFC6761</a>]):
135
136 1. Users: Human users are expected to recognize .onion names as
137 having different security properties (see <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>) and also as
138 being only available through software that is aware of .onion
139 names.
140
141 2. Application Software: Applications (including proxies) that
142 implement the Tor protocol MUST recognize .onion names as special
143 by either accessing them directly or using a proxy (e.g., SOCKS
144 [<a href="./rfc1928" title="&quot;SOCKS Protocol Version 5&quot;">RFC1928</a>]) to do so. Applications that do not implement the Tor
145 protocol SHOULD generate an error upon the use of .onion and
146 SHOULD NOT perform a DNS lookup.
147
148 3. Name Resolution APIs and Libraries: Resolvers MUST either respond
149 to requests for .onion names by resolving them according to
150 [<a href="#ref-tor-rendezvous">tor-rendezvous</a>] or by responding with NXDOMAIN [<a href="./rfc1035" title="&quot;Domain names - implementation and specification&quot;">RFC1035</a>].
151
152 4. Caching DNS Servers: Caching servers, where not explicitly
153 adapted to interoperate with Tor, SHOULD NOT attempt to look up
154 records for .onion names. They MUST generate NXDOMAIN for all
155 such queries.
156
157 5. Authoritative DNS Servers: Authoritative servers MUST respond to
158 queries for .onion with NXDOMAIN.
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166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7686">RFC 7686</a> .onion October 2015</span>
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168
169 6. DNS Server Operators: Operators MUST NOT configure an
170 authoritative DNS server to answer queries for .onion. If they
171 do so, client software is likely to ignore any results (see
172 above).
173
174 7. DNS Registries/Registrars: Registrars MUST NOT register .onion
175 names; all such requests MUST be denied.
176
177 Note that the restriction upon the registration of .onion names does
178 not prohibit IANA from inserting a record into the root zone database
179 to reserve the name.
180
181 Likewise, it does not prevent non-DNS service providers (such as
182 trust providers) from supporting .onion names in their applications.
183
184 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
185
186 This document registers ".onion" in the registry of Special-Use
187 Domain Names [<a href="./rfc6761" title="&quot;Special-Use Domain Names&quot;">RFC6761</a>]. See <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> for the registration template.
188
189 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span>
190
191 The security properties of .onion names can be compromised if, for
192 example:
193
194 o The server "leaks" its identity in another way (e.g., in an
195 application-level message), or
196
197 o The access protocol is implemented or deployed incorrectly, or
198
199 o The access protocol itself is found to have a flaw.
200
201 Users must take special precautions to ensure that the .onion name
202 they are communicating with is the intended one, as attackers may be
203 able to find keys that produce service names that are visually or
204 semantically similar to the desired service. This risk is magnified
205 because .onion names are typically not human-meaningful. It can be
206 mitigated by generating human-meaningful .onion names (at
207 considerable computing expense) or through users using bookmarks and
208 other trusted stores when following links.
209
210 Also, users need to understand the difference between a .onion name
211 used and accessed directly via Tor-capable software, versus .onion
212 subdomains of other top-level domain names and providers (e.g., the
213 difference between example.onion and example.onion.tld).
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222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7686">RFC 7686</a> .onion October 2015</span>
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224
225 The cryptographic label for a .onion name is constructed by applying
226 a function to the public key of the server, the output of which is
227 rendered as a string and concatenated with the string .onion.
228 Dependent upon the specifics of the function used, an attacker may be
229 able to find a key that produces a collision with the same .onion
230 name with substantially less work than a cryptographic attack on the
231 full strength key. If this is possible the attacker may be able to
232 impersonate the service on the network.
233
234 A legacy client may inadvertently attempt to resolve a .onion name
235 through the DNS. This causes a disclosure that the client is
236 attempting to use Tor to reach a specific service. Malicious
237 resolvers could be engineered to capture and record such leaks, which
238 might have very adverse consequences for the well-being of the user.
239 This issue is mitigated if the client's software is updated to not
240 leak such queries or updated to support [<a href="#ref-tor-rendezvous">tor-rendezvous</a>], or if the
241 client's DNS software is updated to drop any request to the .onion
242 special-use domain name.
243
244 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. References</span>
245
246 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References</span>
247
248 [<a id="ref-Dingledine2004">Dingledine2004</a>]
249 Dingledine, R., Mathewson, N., and P. Syverson, "Tor: The
250 Second-Generation Onion Router", August 2004,
251 &lt;<a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.html">https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/</a>
252 <a href="https://svn.torproject.org/svn/projects/design-paper/tor-design.html">tor-design.html</a>&gt;.
253
254 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
255 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
256 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
257 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
258
259 [<a id="ref-RFC6761">RFC6761</a>] Cheshire, S. and M. Krochmal, "Special-Use Domain Names",
260 <a href="./rfc6761">RFC 6761</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6761, February 2013,
261 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6761">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6761</a>&gt;.
262
263 [<a id="ref-tor-address">tor-address</a>]
264 Mathewson, N. and The Tor Project, "Special Hostnames in
265 Tor", 2006, &lt;<a href="https://spec.torproject.org/address-spec">https://spec.torproject.org/address-spec</a>&gt;.
266
267 [<a id="ref-tor-rendezvous">tor-rendezvous</a>]
268 The Tor Project, "Tor Rendezvous Specification", April
269 2014, &lt;<a href="https://spec.torproject.org/rend-spec">https://spec.torproject.org/rend-spec</a>&gt;.
270
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278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7686">RFC 7686</a> .onion October 2015</span>
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280
281 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References</span>
282
283 [<a id="ref-RFC1034">RFC1034</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and facilities",
284 STD 13, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC 1034</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC1034, November 1987,
285 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034</a>&gt;.
286
287 [<a id="ref-RFC1035">RFC1035</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
288 specification", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1035">RFC 1035</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC1035,
289 November 1987, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035</a>&gt;.
290
291 [<a id="ref-RFC1123">RFC1123</a>] Braden, R., Ed., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
292 Application and Support", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>,
293 DOI 10.17487/RFC1123, October 1989,
294 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1123</a>&gt;.
295
296 [<a id="ref-RFC1928">RFC1928</a>] Leech, M., Ganis, M., Lee, Y., Kuris, R., Koblas, D., and
297 L. Jones, "SOCKS Protocol Version 5", <a href="./rfc1928">RFC 1928</a>,
298 DOI 10.17487/RFC1928, March 1996,
299 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1928">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1928</a>&gt;.
300
301 [<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
302 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
303 <a href="./rfc3986">RFC 3986</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3986, January 2005,
304 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3986</a>&gt;.
305
306 [<a id="ref-RFC7230">RFC7230</a>] Fielding, R., Ed. and J. Reschke, Ed., "Hypertext Transfer
307 Protocol (HTTP/1.1): Message Syntax and Routing",
308 <a href="./rfc7230">RFC 7230</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7230, June 2014,
309 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7230</a>&gt;.
310
311 Acknowledgements
312
313 Thanks to Roger Dingledine, Linus Nordberg, and Seth David Schoen for
314 their input and review.
315
316 This specification builds upon previous work by Christian Grothoff,
317 Matthias Wachs, Hellekin O. Wolf, Jacob Appelbaum, and Leif Ryge to
318 register .onion in conjunction with other, similar Special-Use Top-
319 Level Domain Names.
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334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7686">RFC 7686</a> .onion October 2015</span>
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337 Authors' Addresses
338
339 Jacob Appelbaum
340 The Tor Project, Inc. &amp; Technische Universiteit Eindhoven
341
342 Email: [email protected]
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345 Alec Muffett
346 Facebook
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348 Email: [email protected]
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388 Appelbaum &amp; Muffett Standards Track [Page 7]
389 </pre>