| 1 |
<pre>Network Working Group R. Atkinson |
| 2 |
Request for Comments: 2230 NRL |
| 3 |
Category: Informational November 1997 |
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
<span class="h1">Key Exchange Delegation Record for the DNS</span> |
| 7 |
|
| 8 |
Status of this Memo |
| 9 |
|
| 10 |
This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does |
| 11 |
not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this |
| 12 |
memo is unlimited. |
| 13 |
|
| 14 |
Copyright Notice |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved. |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
ABSTRACT |
| 19 |
|
| 20 |
This note describes a mechanism whereby authorisation for one node to |
| 21 |
act as key exchanger for a second node is delegated and made |
| 22 |
available via the Secure DNS. This mechanism is intended to be used |
| 23 |
only with the Secure DNS. It can be used with several security |
| 24 |
services. For example, a system seeking to use IP Security [RFC- |
| 25 |
1825, <a href="./rfc1826">RFC-1826</a>, <a href="./rfc1827">RFC-1827</a>] to protect IP packets for a given |
| 26 |
destination can use this mechanism to determine the set of authorised |
| 27 |
remote key exchanger systems for that destination. |
| 28 |
|
| 29 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. INTRODUCTION</span> |
| 30 |
|
| 31 |
|
| 32 |
The Domain Name System (DNS) is the standard way that Internet nodes |
| 33 |
locate information about addresses, mail exchangers, and other data |
| 34 |
relating to remote Internet nodes. [RFC-1035, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC-1034</a>] More |
| 35 |
recently, Eastlake and Kaufman have defined standards-track security |
| 36 |
extensions to the DNS. [<a href="./rfc2065" title=""Domain Name System Security Extensions"">RFC-2065</a>] These security extensions can be |
| 37 |
used to authenticate signed DNS data records and can also be used to |
| 38 |
store signed public keys in the DNS. |
| 39 |
|
| 40 |
The KX record is useful in providing an authenticatible method of |
| 41 |
delegating authorisation for one node to provide key exchange |
| 42 |
services on behalf of one or more, possibly different, nodes. This |
| 43 |
note specifies the syntax and semantics of the KX record, which is |
| 44 |
currently in limited deployment in certain IP-based networks. The |
| 45 |
|
| 46 |
|
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
| 53 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
| 54 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
reader is assumed to be familiar with the basics of DNS, including |
| 58 |
familiarity with [RFC-1035, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC-1034</a>]. This document is not on the |
| 59 |
IETF standards-track and does not specify any level of standard. |
| 60 |
This document merely provides information for the Internet community. |
| 61 |
|
| 62 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Identity Terminology</span> |
| 63 |
|
| 64 |
This document relies upon the concept of "identity domination". This |
| 65 |
concept might be new to the reader and so is explained in this |
| 66 |
section. The subject of endpoint naming for security associations |
| 67 |
has historically been somewhat contentious. This document takes no |
| 68 |
position on what forms of identity should be used. In a network, |
| 69 |
there are several forms of identity that are possible. |
| 70 |
|
| 71 |
For example, IP Security has defined notions of identity that |
| 72 |
include: IP Address, IP Address Range, Connection ID, Fully-Qualified |
| 73 |
Domain Name (FQDN), and User with Fully Qualified Domain Name (USER |
| 74 |
FQDN). |
| 75 |
|
| 76 |
A USER FQDN identity dominates a FQDN identity. A FQDN identity in |
| 77 |
turn dominates an IP Address identity. Similarly, a Connection ID |
| 78 |
dominates an IP Address identity. An IP Address Range dominates each |
| 79 |
IP Address identity for each IP address within that IP address range. |
| 80 |
Also, for completeness, an IP Address identity is considered to |
| 81 |
dominate itself. |
| 82 |
|
| 83 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. APPROACH</span> |
| 84 |
|
| 85 |
This document specifies a new kind of DNS Resource Record (RR), known |
| 86 |
as the Key Exchanger (KX) record. A Key Exchanger Record has the |
| 87 |
mnemonic "KX" and the type code of 36. Each KX record is associated |
| 88 |
with a fully-qualified domain name. The KX record is modeled on the |
| 89 |
MX record described in [Part86]. Any given domain, subdomain, or host |
| 90 |
entry in the DNS might have a KX record. |
| 91 |
|
| 92 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> IPsec Examples</span> |
| 93 |
|
| 94 |
In these two examples, let S be the originating node and let D be the |
| 95 |
destination node. S2 is another node on the same subnet as S. D2 is |
| 96 |
another node on the same subnet as D. R1 and R2 are IPsec-capable |
| 97 |
routers. The path from S to D goes via first R1 and later R2. The |
| 98 |
return path from D to S goes via first R2 and later R1. |
| 99 |
|
| 100 |
IETF-standard IP Security uses unidirectional Security Associations |
| 101 |
[<a href="./rfc1825" title=""IP Authentication Header"">RFC-1825</a>]. Therefore, a typical IP session will use a pair of |
| 102 |
related Security Associations, one in each direction. The examples |
| 103 |
below talk about how to setup an example Security Association, but in |
| 104 |
practice a pair of matched Security Associations will normally be |
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
| 109 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
| 110 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
used. |
| 114 |
|
| 115 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.1" href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a> Subnet-to-Subnet Example</span> |
| 116 |
|
| 117 |
If neither S nor D implements IPsec, security can still be provided |
| 118 |
between R1 and R2 by building a secure tunnel. This can use either |
| 119 |
AH or ESP. |
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
S ---+ +----D |
| 122 |
| | |
| 123 |
+- R1 -----[zero or more routers]-------R2-+ |
| 124 |
| | |
| 125 |
S2---+ +----D2 |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
Figure 1: Network Diagram for Subnet-to-Subnet Example |
| 128 |
|
| 129 |
In this example, R1 makes the policy decision to provide the IPsec |
| 130 |
service for traffic from R1 destined for R2. Once R1 has decided |
| 131 |
that the packet from S to D should be protected, it performs a secure |
| 132 |
DNS lookup for the records associated with domain D. If R1 only |
| 133 |
knows the IP address for D, then a secure reverse DNS lookup will be |
| 134 |
necessary to determine the domain D, before that forward secure DNS |
| 135 |
lookup for records associated with domain D. If these DNS records of |
| 136 |
domain D include a KX record for the IPsec service, then R1 knows |
| 137 |
which set of nodes are authorised key exchanger nodes for the |
| 138 |
destination D. |
| 139 |
|
| 140 |
In this example, let there be at least one KX record for D and let |
| 141 |
the most preferred KX record for D point at R2. R1 then selects a |
| 142 |
key exchanger (in this example, R2) for D from the list obtained from |
| 143 |
the secure DNS. Then R1 initiates a key management session with that |
| 144 |
key exchanger (in this example, R2) to setup an IPsec Security |
| 145 |
Association between R1 and D. In this example, R1 knows (either by |
| 146 |
seeing an outbound packet arriving from S destined to D or via other |
| 147 |
methods) that S will be sending traffic to D. In this example R1's |
| 148 |
policy requires that traffic from S to D should be segregated at |
| 149 |
least on a host-to-host basis, so R1 desires an IPsec Security |
| 150 |
Association with source identity that dominates S, proxy identity |
| 151 |
that dominates R1, and destination identity that dominates R2. |
| 152 |
|
| 153 |
In turn, R2 is able to authenticate the delegation of Key Exchanger |
| 154 |
authorisation for target S to R1 by making an authenticated forward |
| 155 |
DNS lookup for KX records associated with S and verifying that at |
| 156 |
least one such record points to R1. The identity S is typically |
| 157 |
given to R2 as part of the key management process between R1 and R2. |
| 158 |
|
| 159 |
|
| 160 |
|
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
| 165 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
| 166 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
If D initially only knows the IP address of S, then it will need to |
| 170 |
perform a secure reverse DNS lookup to obtain the fully-qualified |
| 171 |
domain name for S prior to that secure forward DNS lookup. |
| 172 |
|
| 173 |
If R2 does not receive an authenticated DNS response indicating that |
| 174 |
R1 is an authorised key exchanger for S, then D will not accept the |
| 175 |
SA negotiation from R1 on behalf of identity S. |
| 176 |
|
| 177 |
If the proposed IPsec Security Association is acceptable to both R1 |
| 178 |
and R2, each of which might have separate policies, then they create |
| 179 |
that IPsec Security Association via Key Management. |
| 180 |
|
| 181 |
Note that for unicast traffic, Key Management will typically also |
| 182 |
setup a separate (but related) IPsec Security Association for the |
| 183 |
return traffic. That return IPsec Security Association will have |
| 184 |
equivalent identities. In this example, that return IPsec Security |
| 185 |
Association will have a source identity that dominates D, a proxy |
| 186 |
identity that dominates R2, and a destination identity that dominates |
| 187 |
R1. |
| 188 |
|
| 189 |
Once the IPsec Security Association has been created, then R1 uses it |
| 190 |
to protect traffic from S destined for D via a secure tunnel that |
| 191 |
originates at R1 and terminates at R2. For the case of unicast, R2 |
| 192 |
will use the return IPsec Security Association to protect traffic |
| 193 |
from D destined for S via a secure tunnel that originates at R2 and |
| 194 |
terminates at R1. |
| 195 |
|
| 196 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.2" href="#section-2.1.2">2.1.2</a> Subnet-to-Host Example</span> |
| 197 |
|
| 198 |
Consider the case where D and R1 implement IPsec, but S does not |
| 199 |
implement IPsec, which is an interesting variation on the previous |
| 200 |
example. This example is shown in Figure 2 below. |
| 201 |
|
| 202 |
S ---+ |
| 203 |
| |
| 204 |
+- R1 -----[zero or more routers]-------D |
| 205 |
| |
| 206 |
S2---+ |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
Figure 2: Network Diagram for Subnet-to-Host Example |
| 209 |
|
| 210 |
In this example, R1 makes the policy decision that IP Security is |
| 211 |
needed for the packet travelling from S to D. Then, R1 performs the |
| 212 |
secure DNS lookup for D and determines that D is its own key |
| 213 |
exchanger, either from the existence of a KX record for D pointing to |
| 214 |
D or from an authenticated DNS response indicating that no KX record |
| 215 |
exists for D. If R1 does not initially know the domain name of D, |
| 216 |
then prior to the above forward secure DNS lookup, R1 performs a |
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
|
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
| 221 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
| 222 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
secure reverse DNS lookup on the IP address of D to determine the |
| 226 |
fully-qualified domain name for that IP address. R1 then initiates |
| 227 |
key management with D to create an IPsec Security Association on |
| 228 |
behalf of S. |
| 229 |
|
| 230 |
In turn, D can verify that R1 is authorised to create an IPsec |
| 231 |
Security Association on behalf of S by performing a DNS KX record |
| 232 |
lookup for target S. R1 usually provides identity S to D via key |
| 233 |
management. If D only has the IP address of S, then D will need to |
| 234 |
perform a secure reverse lookup on the IP address of S to determine |
| 235 |
domain name S prior to the secure forward DNS lookup on S to locate |
| 236 |
the KX records for S. |
| 237 |
|
| 238 |
If D does not receive an authenticated DNS response indicating that |
| 239 |
R1 is an authorised key exchanger for S, then D will not accept the |
| 240 |
SA negotiation from R1 on behalf of identity S. |
| 241 |
|
| 242 |
If the IPsec Security Association is successfully established between |
| 243 |
R1 and D, that IPsec Security Association has a source identity that |
| 244 |
dominates S's IP address, a proxy identity that dominates R1's IP |
| 245 |
address, and a destination identity that dominates D's IP address. |
| 246 |
|
| 247 |
Finally, R1 begins providing the security service for packets from S |
| 248 |
that transit R1 destined for D. When D receives such packets, D |
| 249 |
examines the SA information during IPsec input processing and sees |
| 250 |
that R1's address is listed as valid proxy address for that SA and |
| 251 |
that S is the source address for that SA. Hence, D knows at input |
| 252 |
processing time that R1 is authorised to provide security on behalf |
| 253 |
of S. Therefore packets coming from R1 with valid IP security that |
| 254 |
claim to be from S are trusted by D to have really come from S. |
| 255 |
|
| 256 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.3" href="#section-2.1.3">2.1.3</a> Host to Subnet Example</span> |
| 257 |
|
| 258 |
Now consider the above case from D's perspective (i.e. where D is |
| 259 |
sending IP packets to S). This variant is sometimes known as the |
| 260 |
Mobile Host or "roadwarrier" case. The same basic concepts apply, but |
| 261 |
the details are covered here in hope of improved clarity. |
| 262 |
|
| 263 |
S ---+ |
| 264 |
| |
| 265 |
+- R1 -----[zero or more routers]-------D |
| 266 |
| |
| 267 |
S2---+ |
| 268 |
|
| 269 |
Figure 3: Network Diagram for Host-to-Subnet Example |
| 270 |
|
| 271 |
|
| 272 |
|
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
| 277 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
| 278 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 279 |
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
In this example, D makes the policy decision that IP Security is |
| 282 |
needed for the packets from D to S. Then D performs the secure DNS |
| 283 |
lookup for S and discovers that a KX record for S exists and points |
| 284 |
at R1. If D only has the IP address of S, then it performs a secure |
| 285 |
reverse DNS lookup on the IP address of S prior to the forward secure |
| 286 |
DNS lookup for S. |
| 287 |
|
| 288 |
D then initiates key management with R1, where R1 is acting on behalf |
| 289 |
of S, to create an appropriate Security Association. Because D is |
| 290 |
acting as its own key exchanger, R1 does not need to perform a secure |
| 291 |
DNS lookup for KX records associated with D. |
| 292 |
|
| 293 |
D and R1 then create an appropriate IPsec Security Security |
| 294 |
Association. This IPsec Security Association is setup as a secure |
| 295 |
tunnel with a source identity that dominates D's IP Address and a |
| 296 |
destination identity that dominates R1's IP Address. Because D |
| 297 |
performs IPsec for itself, no proxy identity is needed in this IPsec |
| 298 |
Security Association. If the proxy identity is non-null in this |
| 299 |
situation, then the proxy identity must dominate D's IP Address. |
| 300 |
|
| 301 |
Finally, D sends secured IP packets to R1. R1 receives those |
| 302 |
packets, provides IPsec input processing (including appropriate |
| 303 |
inner/outer IP address validation), and forwards valid packets along |
| 304 |
to S. |
| 305 |
|
| 306 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Other Examples</span> |
| 307 |
|
| 308 |
This mechanism can be extended for use with other services as well. |
| 309 |
To give some insight into other possible uses, this section discusses |
| 310 |
use of KX records in environments using a Key Distribution Center |
| 311 |
(KDC), such as Kerberos [KN93], and a possible use of KX records in |
| 312 |
conjunction with mobile nodes accessing the network via a dialup |
| 313 |
service. |
| 314 |
|
| 315 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.1" href="#section-2.2.1">2.2.1</a> KDC Examples</span> |
| 316 |
|
| 317 |
This example considers the situation of a destination node |
| 318 |
implementing IPsec that can only obtain its Security Association |
| 319 |
information from a Key Distribution Center (KDC). Let the KDC |
| 320 |
implement both the KDC protocol and also a non-KDC key management |
| 321 |
protocol (e.g. ISAKMP). In such a case, each client node of the KDC |
| 322 |
might have its own KX record pointing at the KDC so that nodes not |
| 323 |
implementing the KDC protocol can still create Security Associations |
| 324 |
with each of the client nodes of the KDC. |
| 325 |
|
| 326 |
In the event the session initiator were not using the KDC but the |
| 327 |
session target was an IPsec node that only used the KDC, the |
| 328 |
initiator would find the KX record for the target pointing at the |
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
KDC. Then, the external key management exchange (e.g. ISAKMP) would |
| 338 |
be between the initiator and the KDC. Then the KDC would distribute |
| 339 |
the IPsec SA to the KDC-only IPsec node using the KDC. The IPsec |
| 340 |
traffic itself could travel directly between the initiator and the |
| 341 |
destination node. |
| 342 |
|
| 343 |
In the event the initiator node could only use the KDC and the target |
| 344 |
were not using the KDC, the initiator would send its request for a |
| 345 |
key to the KDC. The KDC would then initiate an external key |
| 346 |
management exchange (e.g. ISAKMP) with a node that the target's KX |
| 347 |
record(s) pointed to, on behalf of the initiator node. |
| 348 |
|
| 349 |
The target node could verify that the KDC were allowed to proxy for |
| 350 |
the initiator node by looking up the KX records for the initiator |
| 351 |
node and finding a KX record for the initiator that listed the KDC. |
| 352 |
|
| 353 |
Then the external key exchange would be performed between the KDC and |
| 354 |
the target node. Then the KDC would distribute the resulting IPsec |
| 355 |
Security Association to the initiator. Again, IPsec traffic itself |
| 356 |
could travel directly between the initiator and the destination. |
| 357 |
|
| 358 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.2" href="#section-2.2.2">2.2.2</a> Dial-Up Host Example</span> |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
This example outlines a possible use of KX records with mobile hosts |
| 361 |
that dial into the network via PPP and are dynamically assigned an IP |
| 362 |
address and domain-name at dial-in time. |
| 363 |
|
| 364 |
Consider the situation where each mobile node is dynamically assigned |
| 365 |
both a domain name and an IP address at the time that node dials into |
| 366 |
the network. Let the policy require that each mobile node act as its |
| 367 |
own Key Exchanger. In this case, it is important that dial-in nodes |
| 368 |
use addresses from one or more well known IP subnets or address pools |
| 369 |
dedicated to dial-in access. If that is true, then no KX record or |
| 370 |
other action is needed to ensure that each node will act as its own |
| 371 |
Key Exchanger because lack of a KX record indicates that the node is |
| 372 |
its own Key Exchanger. |
| 373 |
|
| 374 |
Consider the situation where the mobile node's domain name remains |
| 375 |
constant but its IP address changes. Let the policy require that |
| 376 |
each mobile node act as its own Key Exchanger. In this case, there |
| 377 |
might be operational problems when another node attempts to perform a |
| 378 |
secure reverse DNS lookup on the IP address to determine the |
| 379 |
corresponding domain name. The authenticated DNS binding (in the |
| 380 |
form of a PTR record) between the mobile node's currently assigned IP |
| 381 |
address and its permanent domain name will need to be securely |
| 382 |
updated each time the node is assigned a new IP address. There are |
| 383 |
no mechanisms for accomplishing this that are both IETF-standard and |
| 384 |
widely deployed as of the time this note was written. Use of Dynamic |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
DNS Update without authentication is a significant security risk and |
| 394 |
hence is not recommended for this situation. |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. SYNTAX OF KX RECORD</span> |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
A KX record has the DNS TYPE of "KX" and a numeric value of 36. A KX |
| 399 |
record is a member of the Internet ("IN") CLASS in the DNS. Each KX |
| 400 |
record is associated with a <domain-name> entry in the DNS. A KX |
| 401 |
record has the following textual syntax: |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
<domain-name> IN KX <preference> <domain-name> |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
For this description, let the <domain-name> item to the left of the |
| 406 |
"KX" string be called <domain-name 1> and the <domain-name> item to |
| 407 |
the right of the "KX" string be called <domain-name 2>. <preference> |
| 408 |
is a non-negative integer. |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
Internet nodes about to initiate a key exchange with <domain-name 1> |
| 411 |
should instead contact <domain-name 2> to initiate the key exchange |
| 412 |
for a security service between the initiator and <domain-name 2>. If |
| 413 |
more than one KX record exists for <domain-name 1>, then the |
| 414 |
<preference> field is used to indicate preference among the systems |
| 415 |
delegated to. Lower values are preferred over higher values. The |
| 416 |
<domain-name 2> is authorised to provide key exchange services on |
| 417 |
behalf of <domain-name 1>. The <domain-name 2> MUST have a CNAME |
| 418 |
record, an A record, or an AAAA record associated with it. |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> KX RDATA format</span> |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
The KX DNS record has the following RDATA format: |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| 425 |
| PREFERENCE | |
| 426 |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| 427 |
/ EXCHANGER / |
| 428 |
/ / |
| 429 |
+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+ |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
where: |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
PREFERENCE A 16 bit non-negative integer which specifies the |
| 434 |
preference given to this RR among other KX records |
| 435 |
at the same owner. Lower values are preferred. |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
EXCHANGER A <domain-name> which specifies a host willing to |
| 438 |
act as a mail exchange for the owner name. |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
KX records MUST cause type A additional section processing for the |
| 450 |
host specified by EXCHANGER. In the event that the host processing |
| 451 |
the DNS transaction supports IPv6, KX records MUST also cause type |
| 452 |
AAAA additional section processing. |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
The KX RDATA field MUST NOT be compressed. |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</span> |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
KX records MUST always be signed using the method(s) defined by the |
| 459 |
DNS Security extensions specified in [<a href="./rfc2065" title=""Domain Name System Security Extensions"">RFC-2065</a>]. All unsigned KX |
| 460 |
records MUST be ignored because of the security vulnerability caused |
| 461 |
by assuming that unsigned records are valid. All signed KX records |
| 462 |
whose signatures do not correctly validate MUST be ignored because of |
| 463 |
the potential security vulnerability in trusting an invalid KX |
| 464 |
record. |
| 465 |
|
| 466 |
KX records MUST be ignored by systems not implementing Secure DNS |
| 467 |
because such systems have no mechanism to authenticate the KX record. |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
If a node does not have a permanent DNS entry and some form of |
| 470 |
Dynamic DNS Update is in use, then those dynamic DNS updates MUST be |
| 471 |
fully authenticated to prevent an adversary from injecting false DNS |
| 472 |
records (especially the KX, A, and PTR records) into the Domain Name |
| 473 |
System. If false records were inserted into the DNS without being |
| 474 |
signed by the Secure DNS mechanisms, then a denial-of-service attack |
| 475 |
results. If false records were inserted into the DNS and were |
| 476 |
(erroneously) signed by the signing authority, then an active attack |
| 477 |
results. |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
Myriad serious security vulnerabilities can arise if the restrictions |
| 480 |
throuhout this document are not strictly adhered to. Implementers |
| 481 |
should carefully consider the openly published issues relating to DNS |
| 482 |
security [<a href="#ref-Bell95" title=""Using the Domain Name System for System Break-ins"">Bell95</a>,<a href="#ref-Vixie95" title=""DNS and BIND Security Issues"">Vixie95</a>] as they build their implementations. |
| 483 |
Readers should also consider the security considerations discussed in |
| 484 |
the DNS Security Extensions document [<a href="./rfc2065" title=""Domain Name System Security Extensions"">RFC-2065</a>]. |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. REFERENCES</span> |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
[<a id="ref-RFC-1825">RFC-1825</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>, |
| 490 |
August 1995. |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
[<a id="ref-RFC-1827">RFC-1827</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload", |
| 493 |
<a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a>, August 1995. |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
[<a id="ref-Bell95">Bell95</a>] Bellovin, S., "Using the Domain Name System for System |
| 506 |
Break-ins", Proceedings of 5th USENIX UNIX Security |
| 507 |
Symposium, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, June 1995. |
| 508 |
<a href="ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/smb/dnshack.ps">ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/smb/dnshack.ps</a> |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
[<a id="ref-RFC-2065">RFC-2065</a>] Eastlake, D., and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System |
| 511 |
Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc2065">RFC 2065</a>, January 1997. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
[<a id="ref-RFC-1510">RFC-1510</a>] Kohl J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network |
| 514 |
Authentication Service", <a href="./rfc1510">RFC 1510</a>, September 1993. |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
[<a id="ref-RFC-1035">RFC-1035</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and |
| 517 |
specification", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1035">RFC 1035</a>, November 1987. |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
[<a id="ref-RFC-1034">RFC-1034</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and |
| 520 |
facilities", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC 1034</a>, November 1987. |
| 521 |
|
| 522 |
[<a id="ref-Vixie95">Vixie95</a>] P. Vixie, "DNS and BIND Security Issues", Proceedings of |
| 523 |
the 5th USENIX UNIX Security Symposium, USENIX |
| 524 |
Association, Berkeley, CA, June 1995. |
| 525 |
<a href="ftp://ftp.vix.com/pri/vixie/bindsec.psf">ftp://ftp.vix.com/pri/vixie/bindsec.psf</a> |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
Development of this DNS record was primarily performed during 1993 |
| 530 |
through 1995. The author's work on this was sponsored jointly by the |
| 531 |
Computing Systems Technology Office (CSTO) of the Advanced Research |
| 532 |
Projects Agency (ARPA) and by the Information Security Program Office |
| 533 |
(PD71E), Space & Naval Warface Systems Command (SPAWAR). In that |
| 534 |
era, Dave Mihelcic and others provided detailed review and |
| 535 |
constructive feedback. More recently, Bob Moscowitz and Todd Welch |
| 536 |
provided detailed review and constructive feedback of a work in |
| 537 |
progress version of this document. |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
AUTHOR'S ADDRESS |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
Randall Atkinson |
| 542 |
Code 5544 |
| 543 |
Naval Research Laboratory |
| 544 |
4555 Overlook Avenue, SW |
| 545 |
Washington, DC 20375-5337 |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
Phone: (DSN) 354-8590 |
| 548 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved. |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
| 566 |
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
| 567 |
or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published |
| 568 |
andand distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
| 569 |
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
| 570 |
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
| 571 |
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
| 572 |
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
| 573 |
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
| 574 |
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
| 575 |
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
| 576 |
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
| 577 |
English. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
| 580 |
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
| 583 |
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
| 584 |
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
| 585 |
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
| 586 |
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| 587 |
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
Atkinson Informational [Page 11] |
| 613 |
</pre> |