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1 <pre>Network Working Group R. Atkinson
2 Request for Comments: 2230 NRL
3 Category: Informational November 1997
4
5
6 <span class="h1">Key Exchange Delegation Record for the DNS</span>
7
8 Status of this Memo
9
10 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
11 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
12 memo is unlimited.
13
14 Copyright Notice
15
16 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved.
17
18 ABSTRACT
19
20 This note describes a mechanism whereby authorisation for one node to
21 act as key exchanger for a second node is delegated and made
22 available via the Secure DNS. This mechanism is intended to be used
23 only with the Secure DNS. It can be used with several security
24 services. For example, a system seeking to use IP Security [RFC-
25 1825, <a href="./rfc1826">RFC-1826</a>, <a href="./rfc1827">RFC-1827</a>] to protect IP packets for a given
26 destination can use this mechanism to determine the set of authorised
27 remote key exchanger systems for that destination.
28
29 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. INTRODUCTION</span>
30
31
32 The Domain Name System (DNS) is the standard way that Internet nodes
33 locate information about addresses, mail exchangers, and other data
34 relating to remote Internet nodes. [RFC-1035, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC-1034</a>] More
35 recently, Eastlake and Kaufman have defined standards-track security
36 extensions to the DNS. [<a href="./rfc2065" title="&quot;Domain Name System Security Extensions&quot;">RFC-2065</a>] These security extensions can be
37 used to authenticate signed DNS data records and can also be used to
38 store signed public keys in the DNS.
39
40 The KX record is useful in providing an authenticatible method of
41 delegating authorisation for one node to provide key exchange
42 services on behalf of one or more, possibly different, nodes. This
43 note specifies the syntax and semantics of the KX record, which is
44 currently in limited deployment in certain IP-based networks. The
45
46
47
48
49
50
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56
57 reader is assumed to be familiar with the basics of DNS, including
58 familiarity with [RFC-1035, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC-1034</a>]. This document is not on the
59 IETF standards-track and does not specify any level of standard.
60 This document merely provides information for the Internet community.
61
62 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Identity Terminology</span>
63
64 This document relies upon the concept of "identity domination". This
65 concept might be new to the reader and so is explained in this
66 section. The subject of endpoint naming for security associations
67 has historically been somewhat contentious. This document takes no
68 position on what forms of identity should be used. In a network,
69 there are several forms of identity that are possible.
70
71 For example, IP Security has defined notions of identity that
72 include: IP Address, IP Address Range, Connection ID, Fully-Qualified
73 Domain Name (FQDN), and User with Fully Qualified Domain Name (USER
74 FQDN).
75
76 A USER FQDN identity dominates a FQDN identity. A FQDN identity in
77 turn dominates an IP Address identity. Similarly, a Connection ID
78 dominates an IP Address identity. An IP Address Range dominates each
79 IP Address identity for each IP address within that IP address range.
80 Also, for completeness, an IP Address identity is considered to
81 dominate itself.
82
83 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. APPROACH</span>
84
85 This document specifies a new kind of DNS Resource Record (RR), known
86 as the Key Exchanger (KX) record. A Key Exchanger Record has the
87 mnemonic "KX" and the type code of 36. Each KX record is associated
88 with a fully-qualified domain name. The KX record is modeled on the
89 MX record described in [Part86]. Any given domain, subdomain, or host
90 entry in the DNS might have a KX record.
91
92 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> IPsec Examples</span>
93
94 In these two examples, let S be the originating node and let D be the
95 destination node. S2 is another node on the same subnet as S. D2 is
96 another node on the same subnet as D. R1 and R2 are IPsec-capable
97 routers. The path from S to D goes via first R1 and later R2. The
98 return path from D to S goes via first R2 and later R1.
99
100 IETF-standard IP Security uses unidirectional Security Associations
101 [<a href="./rfc1825" title="&quot;IP Authentication Header&quot;">RFC-1825</a>]. Therefore, a typical IP session will use a pair of
102 related Security Associations, one in each direction. The examples
103 below talk about how to setup an example Security Association, but in
104 practice a pair of matched Security Associations will normally be
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
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112
113 used.
114
115 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.1" href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a> Subnet-to-Subnet Example</span>
116
117 If neither S nor D implements IPsec, security can still be provided
118 between R1 and R2 by building a secure tunnel. This can use either
119 AH or ESP.
120
121 S ---+ +----D
122 | |
123 +- R1 -----[zero or more routers]-------R2-+
124 | |
125 S2---+ +----D2
126
127 Figure 1: Network Diagram for Subnet-to-Subnet Example
128
129 In this example, R1 makes the policy decision to provide the IPsec
130 service for traffic from R1 destined for R2. Once R1 has decided
131 that the packet from S to D should be protected, it performs a secure
132 DNS lookup for the records associated with domain D. If R1 only
133 knows the IP address for D, then a secure reverse DNS lookup will be
134 necessary to determine the domain D, before that forward secure DNS
135 lookup for records associated with domain D. If these DNS records of
136 domain D include a KX record for the IPsec service, then R1 knows
137 which set of nodes are authorised key exchanger nodes for the
138 destination D.
139
140 In this example, let there be at least one KX record for D and let
141 the most preferred KX record for D point at R2. R1 then selects a
142 key exchanger (in this example, R2) for D from the list obtained from
143 the secure DNS. Then R1 initiates a key management session with that
144 key exchanger (in this example, R2) to setup an IPsec Security
145 Association between R1 and D. In this example, R1 knows (either by
146 seeing an outbound packet arriving from S destined to D or via other
147 methods) that S will be sending traffic to D. In this example R1's
148 policy requires that traffic from S to D should be segregated at
149 least on a host-to-host basis, so R1 desires an IPsec Security
150 Association with source identity that dominates S, proxy identity
151 that dominates R1, and destination identity that dominates R2.
152
153 In turn, R2 is able to authenticate the delegation of Key Exchanger
154 authorisation for target S to R1 by making an authenticated forward
155 DNS lookup for KX records associated with S and verifying that at
156 least one such record points to R1. The identity S is typically
157 given to R2 as part of the key management process between R1 and R2.
158
159
160
161
162
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168
169 If D initially only knows the IP address of S, then it will need to
170 perform a secure reverse DNS lookup to obtain the fully-qualified
171 domain name for S prior to that secure forward DNS lookup.
172
173 If R2 does not receive an authenticated DNS response indicating that
174 R1 is an authorised key exchanger for S, then D will not accept the
175 SA negotiation from R1 on behalf of identity S.
176
177 If the proposed IPsec Security Association is acceptable to both R1
178 and R2, each of which might have separate policies, then they create
179 that IPsec Security Association via Key Management.
180
181 Note that for unicast traffic, Key Management will typically also
182 setup a separate (but related) IPsec Security Association for the
183 return traffic. That return IPsec Security Association will have
184 equivalent identities. In this example, that return IPsec Security
185 Association will have a source identity that dominates D, a proxy
186 identity that dominates R2, and a destination identity that dominates
187 R1.
188
189 Once the IPsec Security Association has been created, then R1 uses it
190 to protect traffic from S destined for D via a secure tunnel that
191 originates at R1 and terminates at R2. For the case of unicast, R2
192 will use the return IPsec Security Association to protect traffic
193 from D destined for S via a secure tunnel that originates at R2 and
194 terminates at R1.
195
196 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.2" href="#section-2.1.2">2.1.2</a> Subnet-to-Host Example</span>
197
198 Consider the case where D and R1 implement IPsec, but S does not
199 implement IPsec, which is an interesting variation on the previous
200 example. This example is shown in Figure 2 below.
201
202 S ---+
203 |
204 +- R1 -----[zero or more routers]-------D
205 |
206 S2---+
207
208 Figure 2: Network Diagram for Subnet-to-Host Example
209
210 In this example, R1 makes the policy decision that IP Security is
211 needed for the packet travelling from S to D. Then, R1 performs the
212 secure DNS lookup for D and determines that D is its own key
213 exchanger, either from the existence of a KX record for D pointing to
214 D or from an authenticated DNS response indicating that no KX record
215 exists for D. If R1 does not initially know the domain name of D,
216 then prior to the above forward secure DNS lookup, R1 performs a
217
218
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224
225 secure reverse DNS lookup on the IP address of D to determine the
226 fully-qualified domain name for that IP address. R1 then initiates
227 key management with D to create an IPsec Security Association on
228 behalf of S.
229
230 In turn, D can verify that R1 is authorised to create an IPsec
231 Security Association on behalf of S by performing a DNS KX record
232 lookup for target S. R1 usually provides identity S to D via key
233 management. If D only has the IP address of S, then D will need to
234 perform a secure reverse lookup on the IP address of S to determine
235 domain name S prior to the secure forward DNS lookup on S to locate
236 the KX records for S.
237
238 If D does not receive an authenticated DNS response indicating that
239 R1 is an authorised key exchanger for S, then D will not accept the
240 SA negotiation from R1 on behalf of identity S.
241
242 If the IPsec Security Association is successfully established between
243 R1 and D, that IPsec Security Association has a source identity that
244 dominates S's IP address, a proxy identity that dominates R1's IP
245 address, and a destination identity that dominates D's IP address.
246
247 Finally, R1 begins providing the security service for packets from S
248 that transit R1 destined for D. When D receives such packets, D
249 examines the SA information during IPsec input processing and sees
250 that R1's address is listed as valid proxy address for that SA and
251 that S is the source address for that SA. Hence, D knows at input
252 processing time that R1 is authorised to provide security on behalf
253 of S. Therefore packets coming from R1 with valid IP security that
254 claim to be from S are trusted by D to have really come from S.
255
256 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.3" href="#section-2.1.3">2.1.3</a> Host to Subnet Example</span>
257
258 Now consider the above case from D's perspective (i.e. where D is
259 sending IP packets to S). This variant is sometimes known as the
260 Mobile Host or "roadwarrier" case. The same basic concepts apply, but
261 the details are covered here in hope of improved clarity.
262
263 S ---+
264 |
265 +- R1 -----[zero or more routers]-------D
266 |
267 S2---+
268
269 Figure 3: Network Diagram for Host-to-Subnet Example
270
271
272
273
274
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280
281 In this example, D makes the policy decision that IP Security is
282 needed for the packets from D to S. Then D performs the secure DNS
283 lookup for S and discovers that a KX record for S exists and points
284 at R1. If D only has the IP address of S, then it performs a secure
285 reverse DNS lookup on the IP address of S prior to the forward secure
286 DNS lookup for S.
287
288 D then initiates key management with R1, where R1 is acting on behalf
289 of S, to create an appropriate Security Association. Because D is
290 acting as its own key exchanger, R1 does not need to perform a secure
291 DNS lookup for KX records associated with D.
292
293 D and R1 then create an appropriate IPsec Security Security
294 Association. This IPsec Security Association is setup as a secure
295 tunnel with a source identity that dominates D's IP Address and a
296 destination identity that dominates R1's IP Address. Because D
297 performs IPsec for itself, no proxy identity is needed in this IPsec
298 Security Association. If the proxy identity is non-null in this
299 situation, then the proxy identity must dominate D's IP Address.
300
301 Finally, D sends secured IP packets to R1. R1 receives those
302 packets, provides IPsec input processing (including appropriate
303 inner/outer IP address validation), and forwards valid packets along
304 to S.
305
306 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Other Examples</span>
307
308 This mechanism can be extended for use with other services as well.
309 To give some insight into other possible uses, this section discusses
310 use of KX records in environments using a Key Distribution Center
311 (KDC), such as Kerberos [KN93], and a possible use of KX records in
312 conjunction with mobile nodes accessing the network via a dialup
313 service.
314
315 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.1" href="#section-2.2.1">2.2.1</a> KDC Examples</span>
316
317 This example considers the situation of a destination node
318 implementing IPsec that can only obtain its Security Association
319 information from a Key Distribution Center (KDC). Let the KDC
320 implement both the KDC protocol and also a non-KDC key management
321 protocol (e.g. ISAKMP). In such a case, each client node of the KDC
322 might have its own KX record pointing at the KDC so that nodes not
323 implementing the KDC protocol can still create Security Associations
324 with each of the client nodes of the KDC.
325
326 In the event the session initiator were not using the KDC but the
327 session target was an IPsec node that only used the KDC, the
328 initiator would find the KX record for the target pointing at the
329
330
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336
337 KDC. Then, the external key management exchange (e.g. ISAKMP) would
338 be between the initiator and the KDC. Then the KDC would distribute
339 the IPsec SA to the KDC-only IPsec node using the KDC. The IPsec
340 traffic itself could travel directly between the initiator and the
341 destination node.
342
343 In the event the initiator node could only use the KDC and the target
344 were not using the KDC, the initiator would send its request for a
345 key to the KDC. The KDC would then initiate an external key
346 management exchange (e.g. ISAKMP) with a node that the target's KX
347 record(s) pointed to, on behalf of the initiator node.
348
349 The target node could verify that the KDC were allowed to proxy for
350 the initiator node by looking up the KX records for the initiator
351 node and finding a KX record for the initiator that listed the KDC.
352
353 Then the external key exchange would be performed between the KDC and
354 the target node. Then the KDC would distribute the resulting IPsec
355 Security Association to the initiator. Again, IPsec traffic itself
356 could travel directly between the initiator and the destination.
357
358 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.2" href="#section-2.2.2">2.2.2</a> Dial-Up Host Example</span>
359
360 This example outlines a possible use of KX records with mobile hosts
361 that dial into the network via PPP and are dynamically assigned an IP
362 address and domain-name at dial-in time.
363
364 Consider the situation where each mobile node is dynamically assigned
365 both a domain name and an IP address at the time that node dials into
366 the network. Let the policy require that each mobile node act as its
367 own Key Exchanger. In this case, it is important that dial-in nodes
368 use addresses from one or more well known IP subnets or address pools
369 dedicated to dial-in access. If that is true, then no KX record or
370 other action is needed to ensure that each node will act as its own
371 Key Exchanger because lack of a KX record indicates that the node is
372 its own Key Exchanger.
373
374 Consider the situation where the mobile node's domain name remains
375 constant but its IP address changes. Let the policy require that
376 each mobile node act as its own Key Exchanger. In this case, there
377 might be operational problems when another node attempts to perform a
378 secure reverse DNS lookup on the IP address to determine the
379 corresponding domain name. The authenticated DNS binding (in the
380 form of a PTR record) between the mobile node's currently assigned IP
381 address and its permanent domain name will need to be securely
382 updated each time the node is assigned a new IP address. There are
383 no mechanisms for accomplishing this that are both IETF-standard and
384 widely deployed as of the time this note was written. Use of Dynamic
385
386
387
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392
393 DNS Update without authentication is a significant security risk and
394 hence is not recommended for this situation.
395
396 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. SYNTAX OF KX RECORD</span>
397
398 A KX record has the DNS TYPE of "KX" and a numeric value of 36. A KX
399 record is a member of the Internet ("IN") CLASS in the DNS. Each KX
400 record is associated with a &lt;domain-name&gt; entry in the DNS. A KX
401 record has the following textual syntax:
402
403 &lt;domain-name&gt; IN KX &lt;preference&gt; &lt;domain-name&gt;
404
405 For this description, let the &lt;domain-name&gt; item to the left of the
406 "KX" string be called &lt;domain-name 1&gt; and the &lt;domain-name&gt; item to
407 the right of the "KX" string be called &lt;domain-name 2&gt;. &lt;preference&gt;
408 is a non-negative integer.
409
410 Internet nodes about to initiate a key exchange with &lt;domain-name 1&gt;
411 should instead contact &lt;domain-name 2&gt; to initiate the key exchange
412 for a security service between the initiator and &lt;domain-name 2&gt;. If
413 more than one KX record exists for &lt;domain-name 1&gt;, then the
414 &lt;preference&gt; field is used to indicate preference among the systems
415 delegated to. Lower values are preferred over higher values. The
416 &lt;domain-name 2&gt; is authorised to provide key exchange services on
417 behalf of &lt;domain-name 1&gt;. The &lt;domain-name 2&gt; MUST have a CNAME
418 record, an A record, or an AAAA record associated with it.
419
420 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> KX RDATA format</span>
421
422 The KX DNS record has the following RDATA format:
423
424 +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
425 | PREFERENCE |
426 +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
427 / EXCHANGER /
428 / /
429 +--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+--+
430
431 where:
432
433 PREFERENCE A 16 bit non-negative integer which specifies the
434 preference given to this RR among other KX records
435 at the same owner. Lower values are preferred.
436
437 EXCHANGER A &lt;domain-name&gt; which specifies a host willing to
438 act as a mail exchange for the owner name.
439
440
441
442
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448
449 KX records MUST cause type A additional section processing for the
450 host specified by EXCHANGER. In the event that the host processing
451 the DNS transaction supports IPv6, KX records MUST also cause type
452 AAAA additional section processing.
453
454 The KX RDATA field MUST NOT be compressed.
455
456 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</span>
457
458 KX records MUST always be signed using the method(s) defined by the
459 DNS Security extensions specified in [<a href="./rfc2065" title="&quot;Domain Name System Security Extensions&quot;">RFC-2065</a>]. All unsigned KX
460 records MUST be ignored because of the security vulnerability caused
461 by assuming that unsigned records are valid. All signed KX records
462 whose signatures do not correctly validate MUST be ignored because of
463 the potential security vulnerability in trusting an invalid KX
464 record.
465
466 KX records MUST be ignored by systems not implementing Secure DNS
467 because such systems have no mechanism to authenticate the KX record.
468
469 If a node does not have a permanent DNS entry and some form of
470 Dynamic DNS Update is in use, then those dynamic DNS updates MUST be
471 fully authenticated to prevent an adversary from injecting false DNS
472 records (especially the KX, A, and PTR records) into the Domain Name
473 System. If false records were inserted into the DNS without being
474 signed by the Secure DNS mechanisms, then a denial-of-service attack
475 results. If false records were inserted into the DNS and were
476 (erroneously) signed by the signing authority, then an active attack
477 results.
478
479 Myriad serious security vulnerabilities can arise if the restrictions
480 throuhout this document are not strictly adhered to. Implementers
481 should carefully consider the openly published issues relating to DNS
482 security [<a href="#ref-Bell95" title="&quot;Using the Domain Name System for System Break-ins&quot;">Bell95</a>,<a href="#ref-Vixie95" title="&quot;DNS and BIND Security Issues&quot;">Vixie95</a>] as they build their implementations.
483 Readers should also consider the security considerations discussed in
484 the DNS Security Extensions document [<a href="./rfc2065" title="&quot;Domain Name System Security Extensions&quot;">RFC-2065</a>].
485
486 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. REFERENCES</span>
487
488
489 [<a id="ref-RFC-1825">RFC-1825</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>,
490 August 1995.
491
492 [<a id="ref-RFC-1827">RFC-1827</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload",
493 <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a>, August 1995.
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
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503
504
505 [<a id="ref-Bell95">Bell95</a>] Bellovin, S., "Using the Domain Name System for System
506 Break-ins", Proceedings of 5th USENIX UNIX Security
507 Symposium, USENIX Association, Berkeley, CA, June 1995.
508 <a href="ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/smb/dnshack.ps">ftp://ftp.research.att.com/dist/smb/dnshack.ps</a>
509
510 [<a id="ref-RFC-2065">RFC-2065</a>] Eastlake, D., and C. Kaufman, "Domain Name System
511 Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc2065">RFC 2065</a>, January 1997.
512
513 [<a id="ref-RFC-1510">RFC-1510</a>] Kohl J., and C. Neuman, "The Kerberos Network
514 Authentication Service", <a href="./rfc1510">RFC 1510</a>, September 1993.
515
516 [<a id="ref-RFC-1035">RFC-1035</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and
517 specification", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1035">RFC 1035</a>, November 1987.
518
519 [<a id="ref-RFC-1034">RFC-1034</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - concepts and
520 facilities", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1034">RFC 1034</a>, November 1987.
521
522 [<a id="ref-Vixie95">Vixie95</a>] P. Vixie, "DNS and BIND Security Issues", Proceedings of
523 the 5th USENIX UNIX Security Symposium, USENIX
524 Association, Berkeley, CA, June 1995.
525 <a href="ftp://ftp.vix.com/pri/vixie/bindsec.psf">ftp://ftp.vix.com/pri/vixie/bindsec.psf</a>
526
527 ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
528
529 Development of this DNS record was primarily performed during 1993
530 through 1995. The author's work on this was sponsored jointly by the
531 Computing Systems Technology Office (CSTO) of the Advanced Research
532 Projects Agency (ARPA) and by the Information Security Program Office
533 (PD71E), Space &amp; Naval Warface Systems Command (SPAWAR). In that
534 era, Dave Mihelcic and others provided detailed review and
535 constructive feedback. More recently, Bob Moscowitz and Todd Welch
536 provided detailed review and constructive feedback of a work in
537 progress version of this document.
538
539 AUTHOR'S ADDRESS
540
541 Randall Atkinson
542 Code 5544
543 Naval Research Laboratory
544 4555 Overlook Avenue, SW
545 Washington, DC 20375-5337
546
547 Phone: (DSN) 354-8590
548 EMail: [email protected]
549
550
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556 <span class="grey">Atkinson Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2230">RFC 2230</a> DNS Key Exchange Delegation Record November 1997</span>
559
560
561 Full Copyright Statement
562
563 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1997). All Rights Reserved.
564
565 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
566 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
567 or assist in its implmentation may be prepared, copied, published
568 andand distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
569 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
570 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
571 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
572 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
573 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
574 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
575 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
576 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
577 English.
578
579 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
580 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
581
582 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
583 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
584 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
585 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
586 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
587 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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612 Atkinson Informational [Page 11]
613 </pre>