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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Pauly |
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Request for Comments: 8598 Apple Inc. |
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Category: Standards Track P. Wouters |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Red Hat |
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May 2019 |
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<span class="h1">Split DNS Configuration</span> |
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<span class="h1">for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</span> |
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Abstract |
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This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types |
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(INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA) for the Internet Key |
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Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). These payloads add support for |
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private (internal-only) DNS domains. These domains are intended to |
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be resolved using non-public DNS servers that are only reachable |
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through the IPsec connection. DNS resolution for other domains |
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remains unchanged. These Configuration Payloads only apply to split- |
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tunnel configurations. |
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Status of This Memo |
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Configuration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Configuration Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a>. Simple Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a>. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC Trust Anchors . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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4.1. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type Request |
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and Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Usage Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Usage Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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Split-tunnel Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations only send |
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packets with a specific destination IP range, usually chosen from |
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[<a href="./rfc1918" title=""Address Allocation for Private Internets"">RFC1918</a>], via the VPN. All other traffic is not sent via the VPN. |
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This allows an enterprise deployment to offer remote access VPN |
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services without needing to accept and forward all the non- |
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enterprise-related network traffic generated by their remote users. |
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Resources within the enterprise can be accessed by the user via the |
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VPN, while all other traffic generated by the user is not sent over |
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the VPN. |
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These internal resources tend to only have internal-only DNS names |
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and require the use of special internal-only DNS servers to get |
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resolved. Split DNS [<a href="./rfc2775" title=""Internet Transparency"">RFC2775</a>] is commonly configured as part of |
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split-tunnel VPN configurations to allow remote access users to use |
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special internal-only domain names. |
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The IKEv2 protocol [<a href="./rfc7296" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC7296</a>] negotiates configuration parameters |
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using Configuration Payload Attribute Types. This document defines |
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two Configuration Payload Attribute Types that add support for |
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trusted Split DNS domains. |
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The INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute type is used to convey that the |
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specified DNS domain MUST be resolved using the provided DNS |
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nameserver IP addresses as specified in the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and |
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INTERNAL_IP6_DNS Configuration Payloads, causing these requests to |
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use the IPsec connection. |
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The INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute type is used to convey a DNSSEC |
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trust anchor for such a domain. This is required if the external |
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view uses DNSSEC, which would prove the internal view does not exist |
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or would expect a different DNSSEC key on the different versions |
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(internal and external) of the enterprise domain. |
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If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN is sent by the responder, the responder |
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MUST also include one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS |
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attributes that contain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the internal DNS |
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server. |
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For the purposes of this document, DNS resolution servers accessible |
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through an IPsec connection will be referred to as "internal DNS |
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servers", and other DNS servers will be referred to as "external DNS |
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servers". |
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Other tunnel-establishment protocols already support the assignment |
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of Split DNS domains. For example, there are proprietary extensions |
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to IKEv1 that allow a server to assign Split DNS domains to a client. |
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<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
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However, the IKEv2 standard does not include a method to configure |
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this option. This document defines a standard way to negotiate this |
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option for IKEv2. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and |
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title=""Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all |
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capitals, as shown here. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Applicability</span> |
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If the negotiated IPsec connection is not a split-tunnel |
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configuration, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA |
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Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored. This prevents generic (non- |
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enterprise) VPN services from overriding the public DNS hierarchy, |
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which could lead to malicious overrides of DNS and DNSSEC. |
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Such configurations SHOULD instead use only the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and |
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INTERNAL_IP6_DNS Configuration Payloads to ensure all of the user's |
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DNS traffic is sent through the IPsec connection and does not leak |
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unencrypted information onto the local network, as the local network |
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is often explicitly exempted from IPsec encryption. |
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For split-tunnel configurations, an enterprise can require one or |
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more DNS domains to be resolved via internal DNS servers. This can |
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be a special domain, such as "corp.example.com" for an enterprise |
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that is publicly known to use "example.com". In this case, the |
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remote user needs to be informed what the internal-only domain names |
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are and what the IP addresses of the internal DNS servers are. An |
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enterprise can also run a different version of its public domain on |
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its internal network. In that case, the VPN client is instructed to |
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send DNS queries for the enterprise public domain (e.g., |
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"example.com") to the internal DNS servers. A configuration for this |
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deployment scenario is referred to as a Split DNS configuration. |
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Split DNS configurations are often preferable to sending all DNS |
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queries to the enterprise. This allows the remote user to only send |
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DNS queries for the enterprise to the internal DNS servers. The |
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enterprise remains unaware of all non-enterprise (DNS) activity of |
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the user. It also allows the enterprise DNS servers to only be |
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configured for the enterprise DNS domains, which removes the legal |
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and technical responsibility of the enterprise to resolve every DNS |
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domain potentially asked for by the remote user. |
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<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
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A client using these Configuration Payloads will be able to request |
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and receive Split DNS configurations using the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN |
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and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA configuration attributes. These attributes |
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MUST be accompanied by one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or |
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INTERNAL_IP6_DNS configuration attributes. The client device can |
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then use the internal DNS server(s) for any DNS queries within the |
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assigned domains. DNS queries for other domains SHOULD be sent to |
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the regular DNS service of the client unless it prefers to use the |
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IPsec tunnel for all its DNS queries. For example, the client could |
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trust the IPsec-provided DNS servers more than the locally provided |
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DNS servers, especially in the case of connecting to unknown or |
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untrusted networks (e.g., coffee shops or hotel networks). Or the |
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client could prefer the IPsec-based DNS servers because they provide |
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additional features compared to the local DNS servers. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Exchange</span> |
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In order to negotiate which domains are considered internal to an |
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IKEv2 tunnel, initiators indicate support for Split DNS in their |
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CFG_REQUEST payloads, and responders assign internal domains (and |
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DNSSEC trust anchors) in their CFG_REPLY payloads. When Split DNS |
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has been negotiated, the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS |
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server configuration attributes will be interpreted as internal DNS |
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servers that can resolve hostnames within the internal domains. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Configuration Request</span> |
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To indicate support for Split DNS, an initiator includes one or more |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes as defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> as part of the |
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CFG_REQUEST payload. If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is included |
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in the CFG_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more |
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INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the CFG_REQUEST. |
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The INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute sent by the initiator is usually |
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empty but MAY contain a suggested domain name. |
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The absence of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST |
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payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling |
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to accept a Split DNS configuration. |
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To indicate support for receiving DNSSEC trust anchors for Split DNS |
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domains, an initiator includes one or more INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA |
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attributes as defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> as part of the CFG_REQUEST |
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payload. If an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute is included in the |
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CFG_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST. If the initiator |
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<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
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includes an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute but does not include an |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the responder MAY still respond with |
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both INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA and INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes. |
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An initiator MAY convey its current DNSSEC trust anchors for the |
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domain specified in the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute. A responder |
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can use this information to determine that it does not need to send a |
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different trust anchor. If the initiator does not wish to convey |
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this information, it MUST use a length of 0. |
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The absence of INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes in the CFG_REQUEST |
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payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling |
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to accept the DNSSEC trust anchor configuration. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Configuration Reply</span> |
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Responders MAY send one or more INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in |
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their CFG_REPLY payload. If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is |
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included in the CFG_REPLY, the responder MUST also include one or |
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both of the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the |
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CFG_REPLY. These DNS server configurations are necessary to define |
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which servers can receive queries for hostnames in internal domains. |
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If the CFG_REQUEST included an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute but the |
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CFG_REPLY does not include an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the |
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initiator MUST behave as if Split DNS configurations are not |
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supported by the server, unless the initiator has been configured |
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with local policy to define a set of Split DNS domains to use by |
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default. |
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Each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN represents a domain that the DNS server |
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addresses listed in INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS can |
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resolve. |
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If the CFG_REQUEST included INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes with non- |
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zero lengths, the content MAY be ignored or be interpreted as a |
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suggestion by the responder. |
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For each DNS domain specified in an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, |
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one or more INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes MAY be included by the |
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responder. This attribute lists the corresponding internal DNSSEC |
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trust anchor information of a DS record (see [<a href="./rfc4034" title=""Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions"">RFC4034</a>]). The |
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INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute MUST immediately follow the |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute that it applies to. |
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<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains</span> |
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All DNS servers provided in the CFG_REPLY MUST support resolving |
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hostnames within all INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains. In other words, |
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the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in a CFG_REPLY payload form a |
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single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of |
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INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example Exchanges</span> |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.1" href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a>. Simple Case</span> |
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In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL_IP4_DNS, |
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INTERNAL_IP6_DNS, and INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the |
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CFG_REQUEST but does not specify any value for either. This |
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indicates that it supports Split DNS but has no preference for which |
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DNS requests will be routed through the tunnel. |
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The responder replies with two DNS server addresses and two internal |
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domains, "example.com" and "city.other.test". |
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Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as |
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"www.example.com" SHOULD use 198.51.100.2 or 198.51.100.4 to resolve. |
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CP(CFG_REQUEST) = |
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INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS() |
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INTERNAL_IP4_DNS() |
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INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS() |
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INTERNAL_IP6_DNS() |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN() |
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CP(CFG_REPLY) = |
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INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(198.51.100.234) |
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INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.2) |
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INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.4) |
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INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64) |
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INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44) |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com) |
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INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(city.other.test) |
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|
| 377 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.2" href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a>. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC Trust Anchors</span> |
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL_IP4_DNS, |
| 380 |
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS, INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA |
| 381 |
attributes in the CFG_REQUEST. |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as |
| 394 |
"www.example.com" or "city.other.test" would be DNSSEC validated |
| 395 |
using the DNSSEC trust anchor received in the CFG_REPLY. |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
In this example, the initiator has no existing DNSSEC trust anchors |
| 398 |
for the requested domain. The "example.com" domain has DNSSEC trust |
| 399 |
anchors that are returned, while the "other.test" domain has no |
| 400 |
DNSSEC trust anchors. |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
CP(CFG_REQUEST) = |
| 403 |
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS() |
| 404 |
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS() |
| 405 |
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS() |
| 406 |
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS() |
| 407 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN() |
| 408 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA() |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
CP(CFG_REPLY) = |
| 411 |
INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(198.51.100.234) |
| 412 |
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.2) |
| 413 |
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.4) |
| 414 |
INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64) |
| 415 |
INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44) |
| 416 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com) |
| 417 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA(43547,8,1,B6225AB2CC613E0DCA7962BDC2342EA4...) |
| 418 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA(31406,8,2,F78CF3344F72137235098ECBBD08947C...) |
| 419 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(city.other.test) |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Payload Formats</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big- |
| 452 |
endian order (also known as "most significant byte first" or "network |
| 453 |
byte order"). |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type Request and Reply</span> |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
1 2 3 |
| 458 |
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 |
| 459 |
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 460 |
|R| Attribute Type | Length | |
| 461 |
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 462 |
| | |
| 463 |
~ Domain Name in DNS presentation format ~ |
| 464 |
| | |
| 465 |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [<a href="./rfc7296" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC7296</a>]. |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 25 for |
| 470 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN. |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
o Length (2 octets) - Length of domain name. |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
o Domain Name (0 or more octets) - A Fully Qualified Domain Name |
| 475 |
used for Split DNS rules, such as "example.com", in DNS |
| 476 |
presentation format and using an Internationalized Domain Names |
| 477 |
for Applications (IDNA) A-label [<a href="./rfc5890" title=""Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework"">RFC5890</a>]. Implementors need to |
| 478 |
be careful that this value is not null terminated. |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute</span> |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
An INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute can either be empty, or |
| 483 |
it can contain one trust anchor by containing a non-zero Length with |
| 484 |
a DNSKEY Key Tag, DNSKEY Algorithm, Digest Type and Digest Data |
| 485 |
fields. |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
An empty INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA CFG attribute: |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
1 2 3 |
| 508 |
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 |
| 509 |
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 510 |
|R| Attribute Type | Length (set to 0) | |
| 511 |
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [<a href="./rfc7296" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC7296</a>]. |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 26 for INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA. |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
o Length (2 octets) - Set to 0 for an empty attribute. |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
A non-empty INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA CFG attribute: |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
1 2 3 |
| 522 |
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 |
| 523 |
+-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+ |
| 524 |
|R| Attribute Type | Length | |
| 525 |
+-+-----------------------------+---------------+---------------+ |
| 526 |
| DNSKEY Key Tag | DNSKEY Alg | Digest Type | |
| 527 |
+-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+ |
| 528 |
| | |
| 529 |
~ Digest Data ~ |
| 530 |
| | |
| 531 |
+---------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [<a href="./rfc7296" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC7296</a>]. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 26 for INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA. |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
o Length (2 octets) - Length of DNSSEC trust anchor data (4 octets |
| 538 |
plus the length of the Digest Data). |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
o DNSKEY Key Tag (2 octets) - Delegation Signer (DS) Key Tag as |
| 541 |
specified in <a href="./rfc4034#section-5.1">Section 5.1 of [RFC4034]</a>. |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
o DNSKEY Algorithm (1 octet) - DNSKEY algorithm value from the IANA |
| 544 |
DNS Security Algorithm Numbers Registry. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
o Digest Type (1 octet) - DS algorithm value from the IANA |
| 547 |
Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms |
| 548 |
Registry. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
o Digest Data (1 or more octets) - The DNSKEY digest as specified in |
| 551 |
<a href="./rfc4034#section-5.1">Section 5.1 of [RFC4034]</a> in presentation format. |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
Each INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute in the CFG_REPLY payload MUST |
| 562 |
immediately follow a corresponding INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute. As |
| 563 |
the INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA format itself does not contain the domain |
| 564 |
name, it relies on the preceding INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN to provide the |
| 565 |
domain for which it specifies the trust anchor. Any |
| 566 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute that is not immediately preceded by an |
| 567 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN or another INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute applying |
| 568 |
to the same domain name MUST be ignored. |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Usage Guidelines</span> |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
If a CFG_REPLY payload contains no INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes, |
| 573 |
the client MAY use the provided INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS |
| 574 |
servers as the default DNS server(s) for all queries. |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
If a client is configured by local policy to only accept a limited |
| 577 |
set of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN values, the client MUST ignore any other |
| 578 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN values. |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
For each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN entry in a CFG_REPLY payload that is not |
| 581 |
prohibited by local policy, the client MUST use the provided |
| 582 |
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS servers as the only |
| 583 |
resolvers for the listed domains and its subdomains, and it MUST NOT |
| 584 |
attempt to resolve the provided DNS domains using its external DNS |
| 585 |
servers. Other domain names SHOULD be resolved using some other |
| 586 |
external DNS resolver(s) that are configured independently from IKE. |
| 587 |
Queries for these other domains MAY be sent to the internal DNS |
| 588 |
resolver(s) listed in that CFG_REPLY message, but they have no |
| 589 |
guarantee of being answered. For example, if the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN |
| 590 |
attribute specifies "example.test", then "example.test", |
| 591 |
"www.example.test", and "mail.eng.example.test" MUST be resolved |
| 592 |
using the internal DNS resolver(s), but "otherexample.test" and |
| 593 |
"ple.test" MUST NOT be resolved using the internal resolver and MUST |
| 594 |
use the system's external DNS resolver(s). |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
The initiator SHOULD allow the DNS domains listed in the |
| 597 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes to resolve to special IP address |
| 598 |
ranges, such as those of [<a href="./rfc1918" title=""Address Allocation for Private Internets"">RFC1918</a>], even if the initiator host is |
| 599 |
otherwise configured to block a DNS answer containing these special |
| 600 |
IP address ranges. |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
When an IKE Security Association (SA) is terminated, the DNS |
| 603 |
forwarding MUST be unconfigured. This includes deleting the DNS |
| 604 |
forwarding rules; flushing all cached data for DNS domains provided |
| 605 |
by the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, including negative cache |
| 606 |
entries; removing any obtained DNSSEC trust anchors from the list of |
| 607 |
trust anchors; and clearing the outstanding DNS request queue. |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes SHOULD only be used on split-tunnel |
| 618 |
configurations where only a subset of traffic is routed into a |
| 619 |
private remote network using the IPsec connection. If all traffic is |
| 620 |
routed over the IPsec connection, the existing global |
| 621 |
INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS can be used without creating |
| 622 |
specific DNS or DNSSEC exemptions. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Usage Guidelines</span> |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
DNS records can be used to publish specific records containing trust |
| 627 |
anchors for applications. The most common record type is the TLSA |
| 628 |
record specified in [<a href="./rfc6698" title=""The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA"">RFC6698</a>]. This DNS record type publishes which |
| 629 |
Certification Authority (CA) certificate or End Entity (EE) |
| 630 |
certificate to expect for a certain host name. These records are |
| 631 |
protected by DNSSEC and thus are trustable by the application. |
| 632 |
Whether to trust TLSA records instead of the traditional Web PKI |
| 633 |
depends on the local policy of the client. By accepting an |
| 634 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA trust anchor via IKE from the remote IKE server, |
| 635 |
the IPsec client might be allowing the remote IKE server to override |
| 636 |
the trusted certificates for TLS. Similar override concerns apply to |
| 637 |
other public key or fingerprint-based DNS records, such as |
| 638 |
OPENPGPKEY, SMIMEA, or IPSECKEY records. |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
Thus, installing an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA trust anchor can be seen as |
| 641 |
the equivalent of installing an Enterprise CA certificate. It allows |
| 642 |
the remote IKE/IPsec server to modify DNS answers, including DNSSEC |
| 643 |
cryptographic signatures, by overriding existing DNS information with |
| 644 |
a trust anchor conveyed via IKE and (temporarily) installed on the |
| 645 |
IKE client. Of specific concern is the overriding of TLSA records |
| 646 |
based on [<a href="./rfc6698" title=""The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA"">RFC6698</a>], which represents a confirmation or override of an |
| 647 |
existing Web PKI TLS certificate. Other DNS record types that convey |
| 648 |
cryptographic materials (public keys or fingerprints) are OPENPGPKEY, |
| 649 |
SMIMEA, SSHP, and IPSECKEY records. |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
IKE clients willing to accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes MUST use |
| 652 |
a whitelist of one or more domains that can be updated out of band. |
| 653 |
IKE clients with an empty whitelist MUST NOT use any |
| 654 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes received over IKE. Such clients MAY |
| 655 |
interpret receiving an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute for a non- |
| 656 |
whitelisted domain as an indication that their local configuration |
| 657 |
may need to be updated out of band. |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
IKE clients should take care to only whitelist domains that apply to |
| 660 |
internal or managed domains rather than to generic Internet traffic. |
| 661 |
The DNS root zone (".") MUST be ignored if it appears in a whitelist. |
| 662 |
Other generic or public domains, such as Top-Level Domains (TLDs), |
| 663 |
similarly MUST be ignored if they appear in a whitelist unless the |
| 664 |
entity actually is the operator of the TLD. To determine this, an |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
implementation MAY interactively ask the user when a VPN profile is |
| 674 |
installed or activated to confirm this. Alternatively, it MAY |
| 675 |
provide a special override keyword in its provisioning configuration |
| 676 |
to ensure non-interactive agreement can be achieved only by the party |
| 677 |
provisioning the VPN client, who presumably is a trusted entity by |
| 678 |
the end user. Similarly, an entity might be using a special domain |
| 679 |
name, such as ".internal", for its internal-only view and might wish |
| 680 |
to force its provisioning system to accept such a domain in a Split |
| 681 |
DNS configuration. |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
Any updates to this whitelist of domain names MUST happen via |
| 684 |
explicit human interaction or by a trusted automated provision system |
| 685 |
to prevent malicious invisible installation of trust anchors in case |
| 686 |
of an IKE server compromise. |
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
IKE clients SHOULD accept any INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA updates for |
| 689 |
subdomain names of the whitelisted domain names. For example, if |
| 690 |
"example.net" is whitelisted, then INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA received for |
| 691 |
"antartica.example.net" SHOULD be accepted. |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
IKE clients MUST ignore any received INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes |
| 694 |
for a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) for which it did not receive |
| 695 |
and accept an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Payload. |
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
In most deployment scenarios, the IKE client has an expectation that |
| 698 |
it is connecting to a specific organization or enterprise using a |
| 699 |
split-network setup. A recommended policy would be to only accept |
| 700 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA directives from that organization's DNS names. |
| 701 |
However, this might not be possible in all deployment scenarios, such |
| 702 |
as one where the IKE server is handing out a number of domains that |
| 703 |
are not within one parent domain. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
This document defines two new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute |
| 708 |
Types, which are allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload |
| 709 |
Attribute Types" namespace. |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
Multi- |
| 712 |
Value Attribute Type Valued Length Reference |
| 713 |
------ ------------------- ------ ---------- --------------- |
| 714 |
25 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN YES 0 or more <a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> |
| 715 |
26 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA YES 0 or more <a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> |
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
Figure 1 |
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
As stated in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, if the negotiated IPsec connection is not a |
| 732 |
split-tunnel configuration, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and |
| 733 |
INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored. |
| 734 |
Otherwise, generic VPN service providers could maliciously override |
| 735 |
DNSSEC-based trust anchors of public DNS domains. |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
An initiator MUST only accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TAs for which it has a |
| 738 |
whitelist, since this mechanism allows the credential used to |
| 739 |
authenticate an IKEv2 association to be leveraged into authenticating |
| 740 |
credentials for other connections. Initiators should ensure that |
| 741 |
they have sufficient trust in the responder when using this |
| 742 |
mechanism. An initiator MAY treat a received INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA for |
| 743 |
a non-whitelisted domain as a signal to update the whitelist via a |
| 744 |
non-IKE provisioning mechanism. See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> for additional |
| 745 |
security considerations for DNSSEC trust anchors. |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
The use of Split DNS configurations assigned by an IKEv2 responder is |
| 748 |
predicated on the trust established during IKE SA authentication. |
| 749 |
However, if IKEv2 is being negotiated with an anonymous or unknown |
| 750 |
endpoint (such as for Opportunistic Security [<a href="./rfc7435" title=""Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time"">RFC7435</a>]), the |
| 751 |
initiator MUST ignore Split DNS configurations assigned by the |
| 752 |
responder. |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
If a host connected to an authenticated IKE peer is connecting to |
| 755 |
another IKE peer that attempts to claim the same domain via the |
| 756 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the IKE connection SHOULD only process |
| 757 |
the DNS information if the two connections are part of the same |
| 758 |
logical entity. Otherwise, the client SHOULD refuse the DNS |
| 759 |
information and potentially warn the end user. For example, if a VPN |
| 760 |
profile for "Example Corporation" is installed that provides two |
| 761 |
IPsec connections, one covering 192.168.100.0/24 and one covering |
| 762 |
10.13.14.0/24, it could be that both connections negotiate the same |
| 763 |
INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA values. Since these are |
| 764 |
part of the same remote organization (or provisioning profile), the |
| 765 |
Configuration Payloads can be used. However, if a user installs two |
| 766 |
VPN profiles from two different unrelated independent entities, both |
| 767 |
could be configured to use the same domain -- for example, |
| 768 |
".internal". These two connections MUST NOT be allowed to be active |
| 769 |
at the same time. |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
If the initiator is using DNSSEC validation for a domain in its |
| 772 |
public DNS view and it requests and receives an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN |
| 773 |
attribute without an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA, it will need to reconfigure |
| 774 |
its DNS resolver to allow for an insecure delegation. It SHOULD NOT |
| 775 |
accept insecure delegations for domains that are DNSSEC signed in the |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
public DNS view for which it has not explicitly requested such |
| 786 |
delegation, i.e., for which it has not used an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN |
| 787 |
request to specify the domain. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
Deployments that configure INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains should pay |
| 790 |
close attention to their use of indirect reference RRtypes in their |
| 791 |
internal-only domain names. Examples of such RRtypes are NS, CNAME, |
| 792 |
DNAME, MX, or SRV records. For example, if the MX record for |
| 793 |
"internal.example.com" points to "mx.internal.example.net", then both |
| 794 |
"internal.example.com" and "internal.example.net" should be sent |
| 795 |
using an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Payload. |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
IKE clients MAY want to require whitelisted domains for Top-Level |
| 798 |
Domains (TLDs) and Second-Level Domains (SLDs) to further prevent |
| 799 |
malicious DNS redirections for well-known domains. This prevents |
| 800 |
users from unknowingly giving DNS queries to third parties. This is |
| 801 |
even more important if those well-known domains are not deploying |
| 802 |
DNSSEC, as the VPN service provider could then even modify the DNS |
| 803 |
answers without detection. |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
The content of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA may be |
| 806 |
passed to another (DNS) program for processing. As with any network |
| 807 |
input, the content SHOULD be considered untrusted and handled |
| 808 |
accordingly. |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1918">RFC1918</a>] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., |
| 815 |
and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", |
| 816 |
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp5">BCP 5</a>, <a href="./rfc1918">RFC 1918</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996, |
| 817 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918</a>>. |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 820 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 821 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 822 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4034">RFC4034</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. |
| 825 |
Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", |
| 826 |
<a href="./rfc4034">RFC 4034</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005, |
| 827 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034</a>>. |
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5890">RFC5890</a>] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for |
| 830 |
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework", |
| 831 |
<a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010, |
| 832 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890</a>>. |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6698">RFC6698</a>] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication |
| 842 |
of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 843 |
Protocol: TLSA", <a href="./rfc6698">RFC 6698</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August |
| 844 |
2012, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698</a>>. |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7296">RFC7296</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. |
| 847 |
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 |
| 848 |
(IKEv2)", STD 79, <a href="./rfc7296">RFC 7296</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October |
| 849 |
2014, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296</a>>. |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a> |
| 852 |
<a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, |
| 853 |
May 2017, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>>. |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2775">RFC2775</a>] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", <a href="./rfc2775">RFC 2775</a>, |
| 858 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000, |
| 859 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775</a>>. |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7435">RFC7435</a>] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection |
| 862 |
Most of the Time", <a href="./rfc7435">RFC 7435</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, |
| 863 |
December 2014, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435</a>>. |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
Tommy Pauly |
| 868 |
Apple Inc. |
| 869 |
One Apple Park Way |
| 870 |
Cupertino, California 95014 |
| 871 |
United States of America |
| 872 |
|
| 873 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
Paul Wouters |
| 877 |
Red Hat |
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
Pauly & Wouters Standards Track [Page 16] |
| 893 |
</pre> |