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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) T. Pauly
2 Request for Comments: 8598 Apple Inc.
3 Category: Standards Track P. Wouters
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Red Hat
5 May 2019
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Split DNS Configuration</span>
9 <span class="h1">for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)</span>
10
11 Abstract
12
13 This document defines two Configuration Payload Attribute Types
14 (INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA) for the Internet Key
15 Exchange Protocol version 2 (IKEv2). These payloads add support for
16 private (internal-only) DNS domains. These domains are intended to
17 be resolved using non-public DNS servers that are only reachable
18 through the IPsec connection. DNS resolution for other domains
19 remains unchanged. These Configuration Payloads only apply to split-
20 tunnel configurations.
21
22 Status of This Memo
23
24 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
25
26 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
27 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
28 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
29 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
30 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
31
32 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
33 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
34 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8598</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
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56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2019 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
76 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Applicability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Exchange . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Configuration Request . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Configuration Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example Exchanges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
82 <a href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a>. Simple Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
83 <a href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a>. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC Trust Anchors . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
84 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Payload Formats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
85 4.1. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type Request
86 and Reply . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
87 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
88 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Usage Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
89 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Usage Guidelines . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
90 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
91 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
92 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
93 <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
94 <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
95 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
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109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 Split-tunnel Virtual Private Network (VPN) configurations only send
116 packets with a specific destination IP range, usually chosen from
117 [<a href="./rfc1918" title="&quot;Address Allocation for Private Internets&quot;">RFC1918</a>], via the VPN. All other traffic is not sent via the VPN.
118 This allows an enterprise deployment to offer remote access VPN
119 services without needing to accept and forward all the non-
120 enterprise-related network traffic generated by their remote users.
121 Resources within the enterprise can be accessed by the user via the
122 VPN, while all other traffic generated by the user is not sent over
123 the VPN.
124
125 These internal resources tend to only have internal-only DNS names
126 and require the use of special internal-only DNS servers to get
127 resolved. Split DNS [<a href="./rfc2775" title="&quot;Internet Transparency&quot;">RFC2775</a>] is commonly configured as part of
128 split-tunnel VPN configurations to allow remote access users to use
129 special internal-only domain names.
130
131 The IKEv2 protocol [<a href="./rfc7296" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC7296</a>] negotiates configuration parameters
132 using Configuration Payload Attribute Types. This document defines
133 two Configuration Payload Attribute Types that add support for
134 trusted Split DNS domains.
135
136 The INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute type is used to convey that the
137 specified DNS domain MUST be resolved using the provided DNS
138 nameserver IP addresses as specified in the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and
139 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS Configuration Payloads, causing these requests to
140 use the IPsec connection.
141
142 The INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute type is used to convey a DNSSEC
143 trust anchor for such a domain. This is required if the external
144 view uses DNSSEC, which would prove the internal view does not exist
145 or would expect a different DNSSEC key on the different versions
146 (internal and external) of the enterprise domain.
147
148 If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN is sent by the responder, the responder
149 MUST also include one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS
150 attributes that contain the IPv4 or IPv6 address of the internal DNS
151 server.
152
153 For the purposes of this document, DNS resolution servers accessible
154 through an IPsec connection will be referred to as "internal DNS
155 servers", and other DNS servers will be referred to as "external DNS
156 servers".
157
158 Other tunnel-establishment protocols already support the assignment
159 of Split DNS domains. For example, there are proprietary extensions
160 to IKEv1 that allow a server to assign Split DNS domains to a client.
161
162
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168
169 However, the IKEv2 standard does not include a method to configure
170 this option. This document defines a standard way to negotiate this
171 option for IKEv2.
172
173 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
174
175 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
176 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
177 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
178 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
179 capitals, as shown here.
180
181 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Applicability</span>
182
183 If the negotiated IPsec connection is not a split-tunnel
184 configuration, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA
185 Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored. This prevents generic (non-
186 enterprise) VPN services from overriding the public DNS hierarchy,
187 which could lead to malicious overrides of DNS and DNSSEC.
188
189 Such configurations SHOULD instead use only the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and
190 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS Configuration Payloads to ensure all of the user's
191 DNS traffic is sent through the IPsec connection and does not leak
192 unencrypted information onto the local network, as the local network
193 is often explicitly exempted from IPsec encryption.
194
195 For split-tunnel configurations, an enterprise can require one or
196 more DNS domains to be resolved via internal DNS servers. This can
197 be a special domain, such as "corp.example.com" for an enterprise
198 that is publicly known to use "example.com". In this case, the
199 remote user needs to be informed what the internal-only domain names
200 are and what the IP addresses of the internal DNS servers are. An
201 enterprise can also run a different version of its public domain on
202 its internal network. In that case, the VPN client is instructed to
203 send DNS queries for the enterprise public domain (e.g.,
204 "example.com") to the internal DNS servers. A configuration for this
205 deployment scenario is referred to as a Split DNS configuration.
206
207 Split DNS configurations are often preferable to sending all DNS
208 queries to the enterprise. This allows the remote user to only send
209 DNS queries for the enterprise to the internal DNS servers. The
210 enterprise remains unaware of all non-enterprise (DNS) activity of
211 the user. It also allows the enterprise DNS servers to only be
212 configured for the enterprise DNS domains, which removes the legal
213 and technical responsibility of the enterprise to resolve every DNS
214 domain potentially asked for by the remote user.
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224
225 A client using these Configuration Payloads will be able to request
226 and receive Split DNS configurations using the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN
227 and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA configuration attributes. These attributes
228 MUST be accompanied by one or more INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or
229 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS configuration attributes. The client device can
230 then use the internal DNS server(s) for any DNS queries within the
231 assigned domains. DNS queries for other domains SHOULD be sent to
232 the regular DNS service of the client unless it prefers to use the
233 IPsec tunnel for all its DNS queries. For example, the client could
234 trust the IPsec-provided DNS servers more than the locally provided
235 DNS servers, especially in the case of connecting to unknown or
236 untrusted networks (e.g., coffee shops or hotel networks). Or the
237 client could prefer the IPsec-based DNS servers because they provide
238 additional features compared to the local DNS servers.
239
240 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Exchange</span>
241
242 In order to negotiate which domains are considered internal to an
243 IKEv2 tunnel, initiators indicate support for Split DNS in their
244 CFG_REQUEST payloads, and responders assign internal domains (and
245 DNSSEC trust anchors) in their CFG_REPLY payloads. When Split DNS
246 has been negotiated, the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS
247 server configuration attributes will be interpreted as internal DNS
248 servers that can resolve hostnames within the internal domains.
249
250 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Configuration Request</span>
251
252 To indicate support for Split DNS, an initiator includes one or more
253 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes as defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> as part of the
254 CFG_REQUEST payload. If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is included
255 in the CFG_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more
256 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the CFG_REQUEST.
257
258 The INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute sent by the initiator is usually
259 empty but MAY contain a suggested domain name.
260
261 The absence of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST
262 payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling
263 to accept a Split DNS configuration.
264
265 To indicate support for receiving DNSSEC trust anchors for Split DNS
266 domains, an initiator includes one or more INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA
267 attributes as defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> as part of the CFG_REQUEST
268 payload. If an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute is included in the
269 CFG_REQUEST, the initiator MUST also include one or more
270 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the CFG_REQUEST. If the initiator
271
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280
281 includes an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute but does not include an
282 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the responder MAY still respond with
283 both INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA and INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes.
284
285 An initiator MAY convey its current DNSSEC trust anchors for the
286 domain specified in the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute. A responder
287 can use this information to determine that it does not need to send a
288 different trust anchor. If the initiator does not wish to convey
289 this information, it MUST use a length of 0.
290
291 The absence of INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes in the CFG_REQUEST
292 payload indicates that the initiator does not support or is unwilling
293 to accept the DNSSEC trust anchor configuration.
294
295 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Configuration Reply</span>
296
297 Responders MAY send one or more INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in
298 their CFG_REPLY payload. If an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute is
299 included in the CFG_REPLY, the responder MUST also include one or
300 both of the INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes in the
301 CFG_REPLY. These DNS server configurations are necessary to define
302 which servers can receive queries for hostnames in internal domains.
303 If the CFG_REQUEST included an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute but the
304 CFG_REPLY does not include an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the
305 initiator MUST behave as if Split DNS configurations are not
306 supported by the server, unless the initiator has been configured
307 with local policy to define a set of Split DNS domains to use by
308 default.
309
310 Each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN represents a domain that the DNS server
311 addresses listed in INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS can
312 resolve.
313
314 If the CFG_REQUEST included INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes with non-
315 zero lengths, the content MAY be ignored or be interpreted as a
316 suggestion by the responder.
317
318 For each DNS domain specified in an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute,
319 one or more INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes MAY be included by the
320 responder. This attribute lists the corresponding internal DNSSEC
321 trust anchor information of a DS record (see [<a href="./rfc4034" title="&quot;Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions&quot;">RFC4034</a>]). The
322 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute MUST immediately follow the
323 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute that it applies to.
324
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336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Mapping DNS Servers to Domains</span>
338
339 All DNS servers provided in the CFG_REPLY MUST support resolving
340 hostnames within all INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains. In other words,
341 the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in a CFG_REPLY payload form a
342 single list of Split DNS domains that applies to the entire list of
343 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS attributes.
344
345 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example Exchanges</span>
346
347 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.1" href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a>. Simple Case</span>
348
349 In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL_IP4_DNS,
350 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS, and INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes in the
351 CFG_REQUEST but does not specify any value for either. This
352 indicates that it supports Split DNS but has no preference for which
353 DNS requests will be routed through the tunnel.
354
355 The responder replies with two DNS server addresses and two internal
356 domains, "example.com" and "city.other.test".
357
358 Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as
359 "www.example.com" SHOULD use 198.51.100.2 or 198.51.100.4 to resolve.
360
361 CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
362 INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS()
363 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS()
364 INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
365 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
366 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN()
367
368 CP(CFG_REPLY) =
369 INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(198.51.100.234)
370 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.2)
371 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.4)
372 INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
373 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)
374 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com)
375 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(city.other.test)
376
377 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.2" href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a>. Requesting Domains and DNSSEC Trust Anchors</span>
378
379 In this example exchange, the initiator requests INTERNAL_IP4_DNS,
380 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS, INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA
381 attributes in the CFG_REQUEST.
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392
393 Any subsequent DNS queries from the initiator for domains such as
394 "www.example.com" or "city.other.test" would be DNSSEC validated
395 using the DNSSEC trust anchor received in the CFG_REPLY.
396
397 In this example, the initiator has no existing DNSSEC trust anchors
398 for the requested domain. The "example.com" domain has DNSSEC trust
399 anchors that are returned, while the "other.test" domain has no
400 DNSSEC trust anchors.
401
402 CP(CFG_REQUEST) =
403 INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS()
404 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS()
405 INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS()
406 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS()
407 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN()
408 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA()
409
410 CP(CFG_REPLY) =
411 INTERNAL_IP4_ADDRESS(198.51.100.234)
412 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.2)
413 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS(198.51.100.4)
414 INTERNAL_IP6_ADDRESS(2001:DB8:0:1:2:3:4:5/64)
415 INTERNAL_IP6_DNS(2001:DB8:99:88:77:66:55:44)
416 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(example.com)
417 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA(43547,8,1,B6225AB2CC613E0DCA7962BDC2342EA4...)
418 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA(31406,8,2,F78CF3344F72137235098ECBBD08947C...)
419 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN(city.other.test)
420
421
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448
449 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Payload Formats</span>
450
451 All multi-octet fields representing integers are laid out in big-
452 endian order (also known as "most significant byte first" or "network
453 byte order").
454
455 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Attribute Type Request and Reply</span>
456
457 1 2 3
458 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
459 +-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
460 |R| Attribute Type | Length |
461 +-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
462 | |
463 ~ Domain Name in DNS presentation format ~
464 | |
465 +---------------------------------------------------------------+
466
467 o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [<a href="./rfc7296" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC7296</a>].
468
469 o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 25 for
470 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN.
471
472 o Length (2 octets) - Length of domain name.
473
474 o Domain Name (0 or more octets) - A Fully Qualified Domain Name
475 used for Split DNS rules, such as "example.com", in DNS
476 presentation format and using an Internationalized Domain Names
477 for Applications (IDNA) A-label [<a href="./rfc5890" title="&quot;Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework&quot;">RFC5890</a>]. Implementors need to
478 be careful that this value is not null terminated.
479
480 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute</span>
481
482 An INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Attribute can either be empty, or
483 it can contain one trust anchor by containing a non-zero Length with
484 a DNSKEY Key Tag, DNSKEY Algorithm, Digest Type and Digest Data
485 fields.
486
487
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504
505 An empty INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA CFG attribute:
506
507 1 2 3
508 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
509 +-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
510 |R| Attribute Type | Length (set to 0) |
511 +-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
512
513 o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [<a href="./rfc7296" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC7296</a>].
514
515 o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 26 for INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA.
516
517 o Length (2 octets) - Set to 0 for an empty attribute.
518
519 A non-empty INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA CFG attribute:
520
521 1 2 3
522 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
523 +-+-----------------------------+-------------------------------+
524 |R| Attribute Type | Length |
525 +-+-----------------------------+---------------+---------------+
526 | DNSKEY Key Tag | DNSKEY Alg | Digest Type |
527 +-------------------------------+---------------+---------------+
528 | |
529 ~ Digest Data ~
530 | |
531 +---------------------------------------------------------------+
532
533 o Reserved (1 bit) - Defined in IKEv2 RFC [<a href="./rfc7296" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC7296</a>].
534
535 o Attribute Type (15 bits) - set to value 26 for INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA.
536
537 o Length (2 octets) - Length of DNSSEC trust anchor data (4 octets
538 plus the length of the Digest Data).
539
540 o DNSKEY Key Tag (2 octets) - Delegation Signer (DS) Key Tag as
541 specified in <a href="./rfc4034#section-5.1">Section&nbsp;5.1 of [RFC4034]</a>.
542
543 o DNSKEY Algorithm (1 octet) - DNSKEY algorithm value from the IANA
544 DNS Security Algorithm Numbers Registry.
545
546 o Digest Type (1 octet) - DS algorithm value from the IANA
547 Delegation Signer (DS) Resource Record (RR) Type Digest Algorithms
548 Registry.
549
550 o Digest Data (1 or more octets) - The DNSKEY digest as specified in
551 <a href="./rfc4034#section-5.1">Section&nbsp;5.1 of [RFC4034]</a> in presentation format.
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
559
560
561 Each INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute in the CFG_REPLY payload MUST
562 immediately follow a corresponding INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute. As
563 the INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA format itself does not contain the domain
564 name, it relies on the preceding INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN to provide the
565 domain for which it specifies the trust anchor. Any
566 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute that is not immediately preceded by an
567 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN or another INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute applying
568 to the same domain name MUST be ignored.
569
570 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Usage Guidelines</span>
571
572 If a CFG_REPLY payload contains no INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes,
573 the client MAY use the provided INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS
574 servers as the default DNS server(s) for all queries.
575
576 If a client is configured by local policy to only accept a limited
577 set of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN values, the client MUST ignore any other
578 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN values.
579
580 For each INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN entry in a CFG_REPLY payload that is not
581 prohibited by local policy, the client MUST use the provided
582 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS or INTERNAL_IP6_DNS DNS servers as the only
583 resolvers for the listed domains and its subdomains, and it MUST NOT
584 attempt to resolve the provided DNS domains using its external DNS
585 servers. Other domain names SHOULD be resolved using some other
586 external DNS resolver(s) that are configured independently from IKE.
587 Queries for these other domains MAY be sent to the internal DNS
588 resolver(s) listed in that CFG_REPLY message, but they have no
589 guarantee of being answered. For example, if the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN
590 attribute specifies "example.test", then "example.test",
591 "www.example.test", and "mail.eng.example.test" MUST be resolved
592 using the internal DNS resolver(s), but "otherexample.test" and
593 "ple.test" MUST NOT be resolved using the internal resolver and MUST
594 use the system's external DNS resolver(s).
595
596 The initiator SHOULD allow the DNS domains listed in the
597 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes to resolve to special IP address
598 ranges, such as those of [<a href="./rfc1918" title="&quot;Address Allocation for Private Internets&quot;">RFC1918</a>], even if the initiator host is
599 otherwise configured to block a DNS answer containing these special
600 IP address ranges.
601
602 When an IKE Security Association (SA) is terminated, the DNS
603 forwarding MUST be unconfigured. This includes deleting the DNS
604 forwarding rules; flushing all cached data for DNS domains provided
605 by the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, including negative cache
606 entries; removing any obtained DNSSEC trust anchors from the list of
607 trust anchors; and clearing the outstanding DNS request queue.
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
615
616
617 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attributes SHOULD only be used on split-tunnel
618 configurations where only a subset of traffic is routed into a
619 private remote network using the IPsec connection. If all traffic is
620 routed over the IPsec connection, the existing global
621 INTERNAL_IP4_DNS and INTERNAL_IP6_DNS can be used without creating
622 specific DNS or DNSSEC exemptions.
623
624 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Usage Guidelines</span>
625
626 DNS records can be used to publish specific records containing trust
627 anchors for applications. The most common record type is the TLSA
628 record specified in [<a href="./rfc6698" title="&quot;The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA&quot;">RFC6698</a>]. This DNS record type publishes which
629 Certification Authority (CA) certificate or End Entity (EE)
630 certificate to expect for a certain host name. These records are
631 protected by DNSSEC and thus are trustable by the application.
632 Whether to trust TLSA records instead of the traditional Web PKI
633 depends on the local policy of the client. By accepting an
634 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA trust anchor via IKE from the remote IKE server,
635 the IPsec client might be allowing the remote IKE server to override
636 the trusted certificates for TLS. Similar override concerns apply to
637 other public key or fingerprint-based DNS records, such as
638 OPENPGPKEY, SMIMEA, or IPSECKEY records.
639
640 Thus, installing an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA trust anchor can be seen as
641 the equivalent of installing an Enterprise CA certificate. It allows
642 the remote IKE/IPsec server to modify DNS answers, including DNSSEC
643 cryptographic signatures, by overriding existing DNS information with
644 a trust anchor conveyed via IKE and (temporarily) installed on the
645 IKE client. Of specific concern is the overriding of TLSA records
646 based on [<a href="./rfc6698" title="&quot;The DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol: TLSA&quot;">RFC6698</a>], which represents a confirmation or override of an
647 existing Web PKI TLS certificate. Other DNS record types that convey
648 cryptographic materials (public keys or fingerprints) are OPENPGPKEY,
649 SMIMEA, SSHP, and IPSECKEY records.
650
651 IKE clients willing to accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes MUST use
652 a whitelist of one or more domains that can be updated out of band.
653 IKE clients with an empty whitelist MUST NOT use any
654 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes received over IKE. Such clients MAY
655 interpret receiving an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attribute for a non-
656 whitelisted domain as an indication that their local configuration
657 may need to be updated out of band.
658
659 IKE clients should take care to only whitelist domains that apply to
660 internal or managed domains rather than to generic Internet traffic.
661 The DNS root zone (".") MUST be ignored if it appears in a whitelist.
662 Other generic or public domains, such as Top-Level Domains (TLDs),
663 similarly MUST be ignored if they appear in a whitelist unless the
664 entity actually is the operator of the TLD. To determine this, an
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
671
672
673 implementation MAY interactively ask the user when a VPN profile is
674 installed or activated to confirm this. Alternatively, it MAY
675 provide a special override keyword in its provisioning configuration
676 to ensure non-interactive agreement can be achieved only by the party
677 provisioning the VPN client, who presumably is a trusted entity by
678 the end user. Similarly, an entity might be using a special domain
679 name, such as ".internal", for its internal-only view and might wish
680 to force its provisioning system to accept such a domain in a Split
681 DNS configuration.
682
683 Any updates to this whitelist of domain names MUST happen via
684 explicit human interaction or by a trusted automated provision system
685 to prevent malicious invisible installation of trust anchors in case
686 of an IKE server compromise.
687
688 IKE clients SHOULD accept any INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA updates for
689 subdomain names of the whitelisted domain names. For example, if
690 "example.net" is whitelisted, then INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA received for
691 "antartica.example.net" SHOULD be accepted.
692
693 IKE clients MUST ignore any received INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA attributes
694 for a Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) for which it did not receive
695 and accept an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Payload.
696
697 In most deployment scenarios, the IKE client has an expectation that
698 it is connecting to a specific organization or enterprise using a
699 split-network setup. A recommended policy would be to only accept
700 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA directives from that organization's DNS names.
701 However, this might not be possible in all deployment scenarios, such
702 as one where the IKE server is handing out a number of domains that
703 are not within one parent domain.
704
705 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
706
707 This document defines two new IKEv2 Configuration Payload Attribute
708 Types, which are allocated from the "IKEv2 Configuration Payload
709 Attribute Types" namespace.
710
711 Multi-
712 Value Attribute Type Valued Length Reference
713 ------ ------------------- ------ ---------- ---------------
714 25 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN YES 0 or more <a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a>
715 26 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA YES 0 or more <a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a>
716
717 Figure 1
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span>
730
731 As stated in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, if the negotiated IPsec connection is not a
732 split-tunnel configuration, the INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and
733 INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA Configuration Payloads MUST be ignored.
734 Otherwise, generic VPN service providers could maliciously override
735 DNSSEC-based trust anchors of public DNS domains.
736
737 An initiator MUST only accept INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TAs for which it has a
738 whitelist, since this mechanism allows the credential used to
739 authenticate an IKEv2 association to be leveraged into authenticating
740 credentials for other connections. Initiators should ensure that
741 they have sufficient trust in the responder when using this
742 mechanism. An initiator MAY treat a received INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA for
743 a non-whitelisted domain as a signal to update the whitelist via a
744 non-IKE provisioning mechanism. See <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> for additional
745 security considerations for DNSSEC trust anchors.
746
747 The use of Split DNS configurations assigned by an IKEv2 responder is
748 predicated on the trust established during IKE SA authentication.
749 However, if IKEv2 is being negotiated with an anonymous or unknown
750 endpoint (such as for Opportunistic Security [<a href="./rfc7435" title="&quot;Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time&quot;">RFC7435</a>]), the
751 initiator MUST ignore Split DNS configurations assigned by the
752 responder.
753
754 If a host connected to an authenticated IKE peer is connecting to
755 another IKE peer that attempts to claim the same domain via the
756 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN attribute, the IKE connection SHOULD only process
757 the DNS information if the two connections are part of the same
758 logical entity. Otherwise, the client SHOULD refuse the DNS
759 information and potentially warn the end user. For example, if a VPN
760 profile for "Example Corporation" is installed that provides two
761 IPsec connections, one covering 192.168.100.0/24 and one covering
762 10.13.14.0/24, it could be that both connections negotiate the same
763 INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA values. Since these are
764 part of the same remote organization (or provisioning profile), the
765 Configuration Payloads can be used. However, if a user installs two
766 VPN profiles from two different unrelated independent entities, both
767 could be configured to use the same domain -- for example,
768 ".internal". These two connections MUST NOT be allowed to be active
769 at the same time.
770
771 If the initiator is using DNSSEC validation for a domain in its
772 public DNS view and it requests and receives an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN
773 attribute without an INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA, it will need to reconfigure
774 its DNS resolver to allow for an insecure delegation. It SHOULD NOT
775 accept insecure delegations for domains that are DNSSEC signed in the
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
783
784
785 public DNS view for which it has not explicitly requested such
786 delegation, i.e., for which it has not used an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN
787 request to specify the domain.
788
789 Deployments that configure INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN domains should pay
790 close attention to their use of indirect reference RRtypes in their
791 internal-only domain names. Examples of such RRtypes are NS, CNAME,
792 DNAME, MX, or SRV records. For example, if the MX record for
793 "internal.example.com" points to "mx.internal.example.net", then both
794 "internal.example.com" and "internal.example.net" should be sent
795 using an INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN Configuration Payload.
796
797 IKE clients MAY want to require whitelisted domains for Top-Level
798 Domains (TLDs) and Second-Level Domains (SLDs) to further prevent
799 malicious DNS redirections for well-known domains. This prevents
800 users from unknowingly giving DNS queries to third parties. This is
801 even more important if those well-known domains are not deploying
802 DNSSEC, as the VPN service provider could then even modify the DNS
803 answers without detection.
804
805 The content of INTERNAL_DNS_DOMAIN and INTERNAL_DNSSEC_TA may be
806 passed to another (DNS) program for processing. As with any network
807 input, the content SHOULD be considered untrusted and handled
808 accordingly.
809
810 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
811
812 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
813
814 [<a id="ref-RFC1918">RFC1918</a>] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, B., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G.,
815 and E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets",
816 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp5">BCP 5</a>, <a href="./rfc1918">RFC 1918</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC1918, February 1996,
817 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1918</a>&gt;.
818
819 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
820 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
821 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
822 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
823
824 [<a id="ref-RFC4034">RFC4034</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S.
825 Rose, "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions",
826 <a href="./rfc4034">RFC 4034</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4034, March 2005,
827 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4034</a>&gt;.
828
829 [<a id="ref-RFC5890">RFC5890</a>] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
830 Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework",
831 <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5890, August 2010,
832 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5890</a>&gt;.
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8598">RFC 8598</a> Split DNS Configuration for IKEv2 May 2019</span>
839
840
841 [<a id="ref-RFC6698">RFC6698</a>] Hoffman, P. and J. Schlyter, "The DNS-Based Authentication
842 of Named Entities (DANE) Transport Layer Security (TLS)
843 Protocol: TLSA", <a href="./rfc6698">RFC 6698</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC6698, August
844 2012, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6698</a>&gt;.
845
846 [<a id="ref-RFC7296">RFC7296</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
847 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
848 (IKEv2)", STD 79, <a href="./rfc7296">RFC 7296</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
849 2014, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296</a>&gt;.
850
851 [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
852 <a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
853 May 2017, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.
854
855 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
856
857 [<a id="ref-RFC2775">RFC2775</a>] Carpenter, B., "Internet Transparency", <a href="./rfc2775">RFC 2775</a>,
858 DOI 10.17487/RFC2775, February 2000,
859 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2775</a>&gt;.
860
861 [<a id="ref-RFC7435">RFC7435</a>] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
862 Most of the Time", <a href="./rfc7435">RFC 7435</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
863 December 2014, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435</a>&gt;.
864
865 Authors' Addresses
866
867 Tommy Pauly
868 Apple Inc.
869 One Apple Park Way
870 Cupertino, California 95014
871 United States of America
872
873 Email: [email protected]
874
875
876 Paul Wouters
877 Red Hat
878
879 Email: [email protected]
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 Pauly &amp; Wouters Standards Track [Page 16]
893 </pre>