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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Winter
2 Request for Comments: 6614 RESTENA
3 Category: Experimental M. McCauley
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 OSC
5 S. Venaas
6 K. Wierenga
7 Cisco
8 May 2012
9
10
11 <span class="h1">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS</span>
12
13 Abstract
14
15 This document specifies a transport profile for RADIUS using
16 Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP as the transport protocol.
17 This enables dynamic trust relationships between RADIUS servers.
18
19 Status of This Memo
20
21 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
22 published for examination, experimental implementation, and
23 evaluation.
24
25 This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
26 community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering
27 Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF
28 community. It has received public review and has been approved for
29 publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not
30 all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of
31 Internet Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
32
33 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
34 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
35 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language ......................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
76 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Terminology ................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Document Status ............................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
78 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Normative: Transport Layer Security for RADIUS/TCP ..............<a href="#page-5">5</a>
79 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. TCP port and Packet Types ..................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
80 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. TLS Negotiation ............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
81 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Connection Setup ...........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
82 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Connecting Client Identity .................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
83 <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. RADIUS Datagrams ...........................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
84 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Informative: Design Decisions ..................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
85 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Implications of Dynamic Peer Discovery ....................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
86 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. X.509 Certificate Considerations ..........................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
87 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation Considerations ...<a href="#page-11">11</a>
88 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. RADIUS Datagram Considerations ............................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
89 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Compatibility with Other RADIUS Transports .....................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
90 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Diameter Compatibility .........................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
91 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
92 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations ............................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
93 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
94 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
95 <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
96 <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
97 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Implementation Overview: Radiator .....................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
98 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Implementation Overview: radsecproxy ..................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
99 <a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Assessment of Crypto-Agility Requirements .............<a href="#page-20">20</a>
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106
107
108 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 The RADIUS protocol [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>] is a widely deployed authentication and
116 authorization protocol. The supplementary RADIUS Accounting
117 specification [<a href="./rfc2866" title="&quot;RADIUS Accounting&quot;">RFC2866</a>] provides accounting mechanisms, thus
118 delivering a full Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA)
119 solution. However, RADIUS is experiencing several shortcomings, such
120 as its dependency on the unreliable transport protocol UDP and the
121 lack of security for large parts of its packet payload. RADIUS
122 security is based on the MD5 algorithm, which has been proven to be
123 insecure.
124
125 The main focus of RADIUS over TLS is to provide a means to secure the
126 communication between RADIUS/TCP peers using TLS. The most important
127 use of this specification lies in roaming environments where RADIUS
128 packets need to be transferred through different administrative
129 domains and untrusted, potentially hostile networks. An example for
130 a worldwide roaming environment that uses RADIUS over TLS to secure
131 communication is "eduroam", see [<a href="#ref-eduroam" title="&quot;eduroam Homepage&quot;">eduroam</a>].
132
133 There are multiple known attacks on the MD5 algorithm that is used in
134 RADIUS to provide integrity protection and a limited confidentiality
135 protection (see [<a href="#ref-MD5-attacks">MD5-attacks</a>]). RADIUS over TLS wraps the entire
136 RADIUS packet payload into a TLS stream and thus mitigates the risk
137 of attacks on MD5.
138
139 Because of the static trust establishment between RADIUS peers (IP
140 address and shared secret), the only scalable way of creating a
141 massive deployment of RADIUS servers under the control of different
142 administrative entities is to introduce some form of a proxy chain to
143 route the access requests to their home server. This creates a lot
144 of overhead in terms of possible points of failure, longer
145 transmission times, as well as middleboxes through which
146 authentication traffic flows. These middleboxes may learn privacy-
147 relevant data while forwarding requests. The new features in RADIUS
148 over TLS obsolete the use of IP addresses and shared MD5 secrets to
149 identify other peers and thus allow the use of more contemporary
150 trust models, e.g., checking a certificate by inspecting the issuer
151 and other certificate properties.
152
153 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
154
155 In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements
156 of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED",
157 "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT
158 RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be
159 interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Terminology</span>
170
171 RADIUS/TLS node: a RADIUS-over-TLS client or server
172
173 RADIUS/TLS Client: a RADIUS-over-TLS instance that initiates a new
174 connection.
175
176 RADIUS/TLS Server: a RADIUS-over-TLS instance that listens on a
177 RADIUS-over-TLS port and accepts new connections
178
179 RADIUS/UDP: a classic RADIUS transport over UDP as defined in
180 [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>]
181
182 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Document Status</span>
183
184 This document is an Experimental RFC.
185
186 It is one out of several approaches to address known cryptographic
187 weaknesses of the RADIUS protocol (see also <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). The
188 specification does not fulfill all recommendations on a AAA transport
189 profile as per [<a href="./rfc3539" title="&quot;Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile&quot;">RFC3539</a>]; in particular, by being based on TCP as a
190 transport layer, it does not prevent head-of-line blocking issues.
191
192 If this specification is indeed selected for advancement to Standards
193 Track, certificate verification options (<a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>, point 2) need
194 to be refined.
195
196 Another experimental characteristic of this specification is the
197 question of key management between RADIUS/TLS peers. RADIUS/UDP only
198 allowed for manual key management, i.e., distribution of a shared
199 secret between a client and a server. RADIUS/TLS allows manual
200 distribution of long-term proofs of peer identity as well (by using
201 TLS-PSK ciphersuites, or identifying clients by a certificate
202 fingerprint), but as a new feature enables use of X.509 certificates
203 in a PKIX infrastructure. It remains to be seen if one of these
204 methods will prevail or if both will find their place in real-life
205 deployments. The authors can imagine pre-shared keys (PSK) to be
206 popular in small-scale deployments (Small Office, Home Office (SOHO)
207 or isolated enterprise deployments) where scalability is not an issue
208 and the deployment of a Certification Authority (CA) is considered
209 too much of a hassle; however, the authors can also imagine large
210 roaming consortia to make use of PKIX. Readers of this specification
211 are encouraged to read the discussion of key management issues within
212 [<a href="./rfc6421" title="&quot;Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC6421</a>] as well as [<a href="./rfc4107" title="&quot;Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management&quot;">RFC4107</a>].
213
214
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216
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218
219
220 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
223
224
225 It has yet to be decided whether this approach is to be chosen for
226 Standards Track. One key aspect to judge whether the approach is
227 usable on a large scale is by observing the uptake, usability, and
228 operational behavior of the protocol in large-scale, real-life
229 deployments.
230
231 An example for a worldwide roaming environment that uses RADIUS over
232 TLS to secure communication is "eduroam", see [<a href="#ref-eduroam" title="&quot;eduroam Homepage&quot;">eduroam</a>].
233
234 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Normative: Transport Layer Security for RADIUS/TCP</span>
235
236 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. TCP port and Packet Types</span>
237
238 The default destination port number for RADIUS over TLS is TCP/2083.
239 There are no separate ports for authentication, accounting, and
240 dynamic authorization changes. The source port is arbitrary. See
241 <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> for considerations regarding the separation of
242 authentication, accounting, and dynamic authorization traffic.
243
244 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. TLS Negotiation</span>
245
246 RADIUS/TLS has no notion of negotiating TLS in an established
247 connection. Servers and clients need to be preconfigured to use
248 RADIUS/TLS for a given endpoint.
249
250 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Connection Setup</span>
251
252 RADIUS/TLS nodes
253
254 1. establish TCP connections as per [<a href="./rfc6613" title="&quot;RADIUS over TCP&quot;">RFC6613</a>]. Failure to connect
255 leads to continuous retries, with exponentially growing intervals
256 between every try. If multiple servers are defined, the node MAY
257 attempt to establish a connection to these other servers in
258 parallel, in order to implement quick failover.
259
260 2. after completing the TCP handshake, immediately negotiate TLS
261 sessions according to [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] or its predecessor TLS 1.1. The
262 following restrictions apply:
263
264 * Support for TLS v1.1 [<a href="./rfc4346" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1&quot;">RFC4346</a>] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2
265 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>]) is REQUIRED. To prevent known attacks on TLS
266 versions prior to 1.1, implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS
267 versions prior to 1.1.
268
269 * Support for certificate-based mutual authentication is
270 REQUIRED.
271
272 * Negotiation of mutual authentication is REQUIRED.
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
279
280
281 * Negotiation of a ciphersuite providing for confidentiality as
282 well as integrity protection is REQUIRED. Failure to comply
283 with this requirement can lead to severe security problems,
284 like user passwords being recoverable by third parties. See
285 <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> for details.
286
287 * Support for and negotiation of compression is OPTIONAL.
288
289 * Support for TLS-PSK mutual authentication [<a href="./rfc4279" title="&quot;Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)&quot;">RFC4279</a>] is
290 OPTIONAL.
291
292 * RADIUS/TLS implementations MUST, at a minimum, support
293 negotiation of the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, and SHOULD
294 support TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA and
295 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as well (see <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>.
296
297 * In addition, RADIUS/TLS implementations MUST support
298 negotiation of the mandatory-to-implement ciphersuites
299 required by the versions of TLS that they support.
300
301 3. Peer authentication can be performed in any of the following
302 three operation models:
303
304 * TLS with X.509 certificates using PKIX trust models (this
305 model is mandatory to implement):
306
307 + Implementations MUST allow the configuration of a list of
308 trusted Certification Authorities for incoming connections.
309
310 + Certificate validation MUST include the verification rules
311 as per [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>].
312
313 + Implementations SHOULD indicate their trusted Certification
314 Authorities (CAs). For TLS 1.2, this is done using
315 <a href="./rfc5246#section-7.4.4">[RFC5246], Section&nbsp;7.4.4</a>, "certificate_authorities" (server
316 side) and <a href="./rfc6066#section-6">[RFC6066], Section&nbsp;6</a> "Trusted CA Indication"
317 (client side). See also <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>.
318
319 + Peer validation always includes a check on whether the
320 locally configured expected DNS name or IP address of the
321 server that is contacted matches its presented certificate.
322 DNS names and IP addresses can be contained in the Common
323 Name (CN) or subjectAltName entries. For verification,
324 only one of these entries is to be considered. The
325 following precedence applies: for DNS name validation,
326 subjectAltName:DNS has precedence over CN; for IP address
327 validation, subjectAltName:iPAddr has precedence over CN.
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
335
336
337 Implementors of this specification are advised to read
338 <a href="./rfc6125#section-6">[RFC6125], Section&nbsp;6</a>, for more details on DNS name
339 validation.
340
341 + Implementations MAY allow the configuration of a set of
342 additional properties of the certificate to check for a
343 peer's authorization to communicate (e.g., a set of allowed
344 values in subjectAltName:URI or a set of allowed X509v3
345 Certificate Policies).
346
347 + When the configured trust base changes (e.g., removal of a
348 CA from the list of trusted CAs; issuance of a new CRL for
349 a given CA), implementations MAY renegotiate the TLS
350 session to reassess the connecting peer's continued
351 authorization.
352
353 * TLS with X.509 certificates using certificate fingerprints
354 (this model is optional to implement): Implementations SHOULD
355 allow the configuration of a list of trusted certificates,
356 identified via fingerprint of the DER encoded certificate
357 octets. Implementations MUST support SHA-1 as the hash
358 algorithm for the fingerprint. To prevent attacks based on
359 hash collisions, support for a more contemporary hash function
360 such as SHA-256 is RECOMMENDED.
361
362 * TLS using TLS-PSK (this model is optional to implement).
363
364 4. start exchanging RADIUS datagrams (note <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> (1)). The
365 shared secret to compute the (obsolete) MD5 integrity checks and
366 attribute encryption MUST be "radsec" (see <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> (2)).
367
368 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Connecting Client Identity</span>
369
370 In RADIUS/UDP, clients are uniquely identified by their IP address.
371 Since the shared secret is associated with the origin IP address, if
372 more than one RADIUS client is associated with the same IP address,
373 then those clients also must utilize the same shared secret, a
374 practice that is inherently insecure, as noted in [<a href="./rfc5247" title="&quot;Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework&quot;">RFC5247</a>].
375
376 RADIUS/TLS supports multiple operation modes.
377
378 In TLS-PSK operation, a client is uniquely identified by its TLS
379 identifier.
380
381 In TLS-X.509 mode using fingerprints, a client is uniquely identified
382 by the fingerprint of the presented client certificate.
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
391
392
393 In TLS-X.509 mode using PKIX trust models, a client is uniquely
394 identified by the tuple (serial number of presented client
395 certificate;Issuer).
396
397 Note well: having identified a connecting entity does not mean the
398 server necessarily wants to communicate with that client. For
399 example, if the Issuer is not in a trusted set of Issuers, the server
400 may decline to perform RADIUS transactions with this client.
401
402 There are numerous trust models in PKIX environments, and it is
403 beyond the scope of this document to define how a particular
404 deployment determines whether a client is trustworthy.
405 Implementations that want to support a wide variety of trust models
406 should expose as many details of the presented certificate to the
407 administrator as possible so that the trust model can be implemented
408 by the administrator. As a suggestion, at least the following
409 parameters of the X.509 client certificate should be exposed:
410
411 o Originating IP address
412
413 o Certificate Fingerprint
414
415 o Issuer
416
417 o Subject
418
419 o all X509v3 Extended Key Usage
420
421 o all X509v3 Subject Alternative Name
422
423 o all X509v3 Certificate Policies
424
425 In TLS-PSK operation, at least the following parameters of the TLS
426 connection should be exposed:
427
428 o Originating IP address
429
430 o TLS Identifier
431
432 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. RADIUS Datagrams</span>
433
434 Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting packets are sent
435 according to the following rules:
436
437 RADIUS/TLS clients transmit the same packet types on the connection
438 they initiated as a RADIUS/UDP client would (see <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> (3) and
439 (4)). For example, they send
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
447
448
449 o Access-Request
450
451 o Accounting-Request
452
453 o Status-Server
454
455 o Disconnect-ACK
456
457 o Disconnect-NAK
458
459 o ...
460
461 and they receive
462
463 o Access-Accept
464
465 o Accounting-Response
466
467 o Disconnect-Request
468
469 o ...
470
471 RADIUS/TLS servers transmit the same packet types on connections they
472 have accepted as a RADIUS/UDP server would. For example, they send
473
474 o Access-Challenge
475
476 o Access-Accept
477
478 o Access-Reject
479
480 o Accounting-Response
481
482 o Disconnect-Request
483
484 o ...
485
486 and they receive
487
488 o Access-Request
489
490 o Accounting-Request
491
492 o Status-Server
493
494 o Disconnect-ACK
495
496 o ...
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
503
504
505 Due to the use of one single TCP port for all packet types, it is
506 required that a RADIUS/TLS server signal which types of packets are
507 supported on a server to a connecting peer. See also <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> for
508 a discussion of signaling.
509
510 o When an unwanted packet of type 'CoA-Request' or 'Disconnect-
511 Request' is received, a RADIUS/TLS server needs to respond with a
512 'CoA-NAK' or 'Disconnect-NAK', respectively. The NAK SHOULD
513 contain an attribute Error-Cause with the value 406 ("Unsupported
514 Extension"); see [<a href="./rfc5176" title="&quot;Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC5176</a>] for details.
515
516 o When an unwanted packet of type 'Accounting-Request' is received,
517 the RADIUS/TLS server SHOULD reply with an Accounting-Response
518 containing an Error-Cause attribute with value 406 "Unsupported
519 Extension" as defined in [<a href="./rfc5176" title="&quot;Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC5176</a>]. A RADIUS/TLS accounting
520 client receiving such an Accounting-Response SHOULD log the error
521 and stop sending Accounting-Request packets.
522
523 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Informative: Design Decisions</span>
524
525 This section explains the design decisions that led to the rules
526 defined in the previous section.
527
528 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Implications of Dynamic Peer Discovery</span>
529
530 One mechanism to discover RADIUS-over-TLS peers dynamically via DNS
531 is specified in [<a href="#ref-DYNAMIC" title="&quot;NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS&quot;">DYNAMIC</a>]. While this mechanism is still under
532 development and therefore is not a normative dependency of RADIUS/
533 TLS, the use of dynamic discovery has potential future implications
534 that are important to understand.
535
536 Readers of this document who are considering the deployment of DNS-
537 based dynamic discovery are thus encouraged to read [<a href="#ref-DYNAMIC" title="&quot;NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS&quot;">DYNAMIC</a>] and
538 follow its future development.
539
540 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. X.509 Certificate Considerations</span>
541
542 (1) If a RADIUS/TLS client is in possession of multiple certificates
543 from different CAs (i.e., is part of multiple roaming consortia)
544 and dynamic discovery is used, the discovery mechanism possibly
545 does not yield sufficient information to identify the consortium
546 uniquely (e.g., DNS discovery). Subsequently, the client may
547 not know by itself which client certificate to use for the TLS
548 handshake. Then, it is necessary for the server to signal to
549 which consortium it belongs and which certificates it expects.
550 If there is no risk of confusing multiple roaming consortia,
551 providing this information in the handshake is not crucial.
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
559
560
561 (2) If a RADIUS/TLS server is in possession of multiple certificates
562 from different CAs (i.e., is part of multiple roaming
563 consortia), it will need to select one of its certificates to
564 present to the RADIUS/TLS client. If the client sends the
565 Trusted CA Indication, this hint can make the server select the
566 appropriate certificate and prevent a handshake failure.
567 Omitting this indication makes it impossible to
568 deterministically select the right certificate in this case. If
569 there is no risk of confusing multiple roaming consortia,
570 providing this indication in the handshake is not crucial.
571
572 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation Considerations</span>
573
574 Not all TLS ciphersuites in [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] are supported by available TLS
575 tool kits, and licenses may be required in some cases. The existing
576 implementations of RADIUS/TLS use OpenSSL as a cryptographic backend,
577 which supports all of the ciphersuites listed in the rules in the
578 normative section.
579
580 The TLS ciphersuite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is mandatory to
581 implement according to [<a href="./rfc4346" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1&quot;">RFC4346</a>]; thus, it has to be supported by
582 RADIUS/TLS nodes.
583
584 The two other ciphersuites in the normative section are widely
585 implemented in TLS tool kits and are considered good practice to
586 implement.
587
588 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. RADIUS Datagram Considerations</span>
589
590 (1) After the TLS session is established, RADIUS packet payloads are
591 exchanged over the encrypted TLS tunnel. In RADIUS/UDP, the
592 packet size can be determined by evaluating the size of the
593 datagram that arrived. Due to the stream nature of TCP and TLS,
594 this does not hold true for RADIUS/TLS packet exchange.
595 Instead, packet boundaries of RADIUS packets that arrive in the
596 stream are calculated by evaluating the packet's Length field.
597 Special care needs to be taken on the packet sender side that
598 the value of the Length field is indeed correct before sending
599 it over the TLS tunnel, because incorrect packet lengths can no
600 longer be detected by a differing datagram boundary. See
601 <a href="./rfc6613#section-2.6.4">Section&nbsp;2.6.4 of [RFC6613]</a> for more details.
602
603 (2) Within RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>], a shared secret is used for hiding
604 attributes such as User-Password, as well as in computation of
605 the Response Authenticator. In RADIUS accounting [<a href="./rfc2866" title="&quot;RADIUS Accounting&quot;">RFC2866</a>], the
606 shared secret is used in computation of both the Request
607 Authenticator and the Response Authenticator. Since TLS
608 provides integrity protection and encryption sufficient to
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
615
616
617 substitute for RADIUS application-layer security, it is not
618 necessary to configure a RADIUS shared secret. The use of a
619 fixed string for the obsolete shared secret eliminates possible
620 node misconfigurations.
621
622 (3) RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>] uses different UDP ports for
623 authentication, accounting, and dynamic authorization changes.
624 RADIUS/TLS allocates a single port for all RADIUS packet types.
625 Nevertheless, in RADIUS/TLS, the notion of a client that sends
626 authentication requests and processes replies associated with
627 its users' sessions and the notion of a server that receives
628 requests, processes them, and sends the appropriate replies is
629 to be preserved. The normative rules about acceptable packet
630 types for clients and servers mirror the packet flow behavior
631 from RADIUS/UDP.
632
633 (4) RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>] uses negative ICMP responses to a newly
634 allocated UDP port to signal that a peer RADIUS server does not
635 support the reception and processing of the packet types in
636 [<a href="./rfc5176" title="&quot;Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC5176</a>]. These packet types are listed as to be received in
637 RADIUS/TLS implementations. Note well: it is not required for
638 an implementation to actually process these packet types; it is
639 only required that the NAK be sent as defined above.
640
641 (5) RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>] uses negative ICMP responses to a newly
642 allocated UDP port to signal that a peer RADIUS server does not
643 support the reception and processing of RADIUS Accounting
644 packets. There is no RADIUS datagram to signal an Accounting
645 NAK. Clients may be misconfigured for sending Accounting
646 packets to a RADIUS/TLS server that does not wish to process
647 their Accounting packet. To prevent a regression of
648 detectability of this situation, the Accounting-Response +
649 Error-Cause signaling was introduced.
650
651 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Compatibility with Other RADIUS Transports</span>
652
653 The IETF defines multiple alternative transports to the classic UDP
654 transport model as defined in [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>], namely RADIUS over TCP
655 [<a href="./rfc6613" title="&quot;RADIUS over TCP&quot;">RFC6613</a>] and the present document on RADIUS over TLS. The IETF also
656 proposed RADIUS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
657 [<a href="#ref-RADEXT-DTLS">RADEXT-DTLS</a>].
658
659 RADIUS/TLS does not specify any inherent backward compatibility to
660 RADIUS/UDP or cross compatibility to the other transports, i.e., an
661 implementation that utilizes RADIUS/TLS only will not be able to
662 receive or send RADIUS packet payloads over other transports. An
663 implementation wishing to be backward or cross compatible (i.e.,
664 wishes to serve clients using other transports than RADIUS/TLS) will
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
671
672
673 need to implement these other transports along with the RADIUS/TLS
674 transport and be prepared to send and receive on all implemented
675 transports, which is called a "multi-stack implementation".
676
677 If a given IP device is able to receive RADIUS payloads on multiple
678 transports, this may or may not be the same instance of software, and
679 it may or may not serve the same purposes. It is not safe to assume
680 that both ports are interchangeable. In particular, it cannot be
681 assumed that state is maintained for the packet payloads between the
682 transports. Two such instances MUST be considered separate RADIUS
683 server entities.
684
685 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Diameter Compatibility</span>
686
687 Since RADIUS/TLS is only a new transport profile for RADIUS, the
688 compatibility of RADIUS/TLS - Diameter [<a href="./rfc3588" title="&quot;Diameter Base Protocol&quot;">RFC3588</a>] and RADIUS/UDP
689 [<a href="./rfc2865" title="&quot;Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC2865</a>] - Diameter [<a href="./rfc3588" title="&quot;Diameter Base Protocol&quot;">RFC3588</a>] is identical. The considerations
690 regarding payload size in [<a href="./rfc6613" title="&quot;RADIUS over TCP&quot;">RFC6613</a>] apply.
691
692 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span>
693
694 The computational resources to establish a TLS tunnel are
695 significantly higher than simply sending mostly unencrypted UDP
696 datagrams. Therefore, clients connecting to a RADIUS/TLS node will
697 more easily create high load conditions and a malicious client might
698 create a Denial-of-Service attack more easily.
699
700 Some TLS ciphersuites only provide integrity validation of their
701 payload, and provide no encryption. This specification forbids the
702 use of such ciphersuites. Since the RADIUS payload's shared secret
703 is fixed to the well-known term "radsec" (see <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a> (4)),
704 failure to comply with this requirement will expose the entire
705 datagram payload in plaintext, including User-Password, to
706 intermediate IP nodes.
707
708 By virtue of being based on TCP, there are several generic attack
709 vectors to slow down or prevent the TCP connection from being
710 established; see [<a href="./rfc4953" title="&quot;Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks&quot;">RFC4953</a>] for details. If a TCP connection is not
711 up when a packet is to be processed, it gets re-established, so such
712 attacks in general lead only to a minor performance degradation (the
713 time it takes to re-establish the connection). There is one notable
714 exception where an attacker might create a bidding-down attack
715 though. If peer communication between two devices is configured for
716 both RADIUS/TLS (i.e., TLS security over TCP as a transport, shared
717 secret fixed to "radsec") and RADIUS/UDP (i.e., shared secret
718 security with a secret manually configured by the administrator), and
719 the RADIUS/UDP transport is the failover option if the TLS session
720 cannot be established, a bidding-down attack can occur if an
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
727
728
729 adversary can maliciously close the TCP connection or prevent it from
730 being established. Situations where clients are configured in such a
731 way are likely to occur during a migration phase from RADIUS/UDP to
732 RADIUS/TLS. By preventing the TLS session setup, the attacker can
733 reduce the security of the packet payload from the selected TLS
734 ciphersuite packet encryption to the classic MD5 per-attribute
735 encryption. The situation should be avoided by disabling the weaker
736 RADIUS/UDP transport as soon as the new RADIUS/TLS connection is
737 established and tested. Disabling can happen at either the RADIUS
738 client or server side:
739
740 o Client side: de-configure the failover setup, leaving RADIUS/TLS
741 as the only communication option
742
743 o Server side: de-configure the RADIUS/UDP client from the list of
744 valid RADIUS clients
745
746 RADIUS/TLS provides authentication and encryption between RADIUS
747 peers. In the presence of proxies, the intermediate proxies can
748 still inspect the individual RADIUS packets, i.e., "end-to-end"
749 encryption is not provided. Where intermediate proxies are
750 untrusted, it is desirable to use other RADIUS mechanisms to prevent
751 RADIUS packet payload from inspection by such proxies. One common
752 method to protect passwords is the use of the Extensible
753 Authentication Protocol (EAP) and EAP methods that utilize TLS.
754
755 When using certificate fingerprints to identify RADIUS/TLS peers, any
756 two certificates that produce the same hash value (i.e., that have a
757 hash collision) will be considered the same client. Therefore, it is
758 important to make sure that the hash function used is
759 cryptographically uncompromised so that an attacker is very unlikely
760 to be able to produce a hash collision with a certificate of his
761 choice. While this specification mandates support for SHA-1, a later
762 revision will likely demand support for more contemporary hash
763 functions because as of issuance of this document, there are already
764 attacks on SHA-1.
765
766 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
767
768 No new RADIUS attributes or packet codes are defined. IANA has
769 updated the already assigned TCP port number 2083 to reflect the
770 following:
771
772 o Reference: [<a href="./rfc6614">RFC6614</a>]
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
783
784
785 o Assignment Notes: The TCP port 2083 was already previously
786 assigned by IANA for "RadSec", an early implementation of RADIUS/
787 TLS, prior to issuance of this RFC. This early implementation can
788 be configured to be compatible to RADIUS/TLS as specified by the
789 IETF. See <a href="./rfc6614#appendix-A">RFC 6614, Appendix&nbsp;A</a> for details.
790
791 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
792
793 RADIUS/TLS was first implemented as "RADSec" by Open Systems
794 Consultants, Currumbin Waters, Australia, for their "Radiator" RADIUS
795 server product (see [<a href="#ref-radsec-whitepaper">radsec-whitepaper</a>]).
796
797 Funding and input for the development of this document was provided
798 by the European Commission co-funded project "GEANT2" [<a href="#ref-geant2" title="&quot;European Commission Information Society and Media: GEANT2&quot;">geant2</a>] and
799 further feedback was provided by the TERENA Task Force on Mobility
800 and Network Middleware [<a href="#ref-terena" title="&quot;Task Force on Mobility and Network Middleware&quot;">terena</a>].
801
802
803 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
804
805 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
806
807 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
808 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
809
810 [<a id="ref-RFC2865">RFC2865</a>] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson,
811 "Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)",
812 <a href="./rfc2865">RFC 2865</a>, June 2000.
813
814 [<a id="ref-RFC2866">RFC2866</a>] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", <a href="./rfc2866">RFC 2866</a>, June 2000.
815
816 [<a id="ref-RFC4279">RFC4279</a>] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites
817 for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a>,
818 December 2005.
819
820 [<a id="ref-RFC5176">RFC5176</a>] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B.
821 Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote
822 Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", <a href="./rfc5176">RFC 5176</a>,
823 January 2008.
824
825 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
826 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008.
827
828 [<a id="ref-RFC5247">RFC5247</a>] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible
829 Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework",
830 <a href="./rfc5247">RFC 5247</a>, August 2008.
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
839
840
841 [<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
842 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
843 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List
844 (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, May 2008.
845
846 [<a id="ref-RFC6066">RFC6066</a>] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions:
847 Extension Definitions", <a href="./rfc6066">RFC 6066</a>, January 2011.
848
849 [<a id="ref-RFC6613">RFC6613</a>] DeKok, A., "RADIUS over TCP", <a href="./rfc6613">RFC 6613</a>, May 2012.
850
851 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
852
853 [<a id="ref-DYNAMIC">DYNAMIC</a>] Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "NAI-based Dynamic Peer
854 Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS", Work
855 in Progress, July 2011.
856
857 [<a id="ref-MD5-attacks">MD5-attacks</a>]
858 Black, J., Cochran, M., and T. Highland, "A Study of the
859 MD5 Attacks: Insights and Improvements", October 2006,
860 &lt;<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/40867l85727r7084/">http://www.springerlink.com/content/40867l85727r7084/</a>&gt;.
861
862 [<a id="ref-RADEXT-DTLS">RADEXT-DTLS</a>]
863 DeKok, A., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22DTLS+as+a+Transport+Layer+for+RADIUS%22'>"DTLS as a Transport Layer for RADIUS"</a>, Work
864 in Progress, October 2010.
865
866 [<a id="ref-RFC3539">RFC3539</a>] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and
867 Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", <a href="./rfc3539">RFC 3539</a>, June 2003.
868
869 [<a id="ref-RFC3588">RFC3588</a>] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J.
870 Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", <a href="./rfc3588">RFC 3588</a>, September 2003.
871
872 [<a id="ref-RFC4107">RFC4107</a>] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic
873 Key Management", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp107">BCP 107</a>, <a href="./rfc4107">RFC 4107</a>, June 2005.
874
875 [<a id="ref-RFC4346">RFC4346</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
876 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006.
877
878 [<a id="ref-RFC4953">RFC4953</a>] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks",
879 <a href="./rfc4953">RFC 4953</a>, July 2007.
880
881 [<a id="ref-RFC6125">RFC6125</a>] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and
882 Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity
883 within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509
884 (PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer
885 Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc6125">RFC 6125</a>, March 2011.
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
895
896
897 [<a id="ref-RFC6421">RFC6421</a>] Nelson, D., "Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote
898 Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)", <a href="./rfc6421">RFC 6421</a>,
899 November 2011.
900
901 [<a id="ref-eduroam">eduroam</a>] Trans-European Research and Education Networking
902 Association, "eduroam Homepage", 2007,
903 &lt;<a href="http://www.eduroam.org/">http://www.eduroam.org/</a>&gt;.
904
905 [<a id="ref-geant2">geant2</a>] Delivery of Advanced Network Technology to Europe,
906 "European Commission Information Society and Media:
907 GEANT2", 2008, &lt;<a href="http://www.geant2.net/">http://www.geant2.net/</a>&gt;.
908
909 [<a id="ref-radsec-whitepaper">radsec-whitepaper</a>]
910 Open System Consultants, "RadSec - a secure, reliable
911 RADIUS Protocol", May 2005,
912 &lt;<a href="http://www.open.com.au/radiator/radsec-whitepaper.pdf">http://www.open.com.au/radiator/radsec-whitepaper.pdf</a>&gt;.
913
914 [<a id="ref-radsecproxy-impl">radsecproxy-impl</a>]
915 Venaas, S., "radsecproxy Project Homepage", 2007,
916 &lt;<a href="http://software.uninett.no/radsecproxy/">http://software.uninett.no/radsecproxy/</a>&gt;.
917
918 [<a id="ref-terena">terena</a>] Trans-European Research and Education Networking
919 Association (TERENA), "Task Force on Mobility and Network
920 Middleware", 2008,
921 &lt;<a href="http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-mobility/">http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-mobility/</a>&gt;.
922
923
924
925
926
927
928
929
930
931
932
933
934
935
936
937
938
939
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
951
952
953 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Implementation Overview: Radiator</span>
954
955 Radiator implements the RadSec protocol for proxying requests with
956 the &lt;Authby RADSEC&gt; and &lt;ServerRADSEC&gt; clauses in the Radiator
957 configuration file.
958
959 The &lt;AuthBy RADSEC&gt; clause defines a RadSec client, and causes
960 Radiator to send RADIUS requests to the configured RadSec server
961 using the RadSec protocol.
962
963 The &lt;ServerRADSEC&gt; clause defines a RadSec server, and causes
964 Radiator to listen on the configured port and address(es) for
965 connections from &lt;Authby RADSEC&gt; clients. When an &lt;Authby RADSEC&gt;
966 client connects to a &lt;ServerRADSEC&gt; server, the client sends RADIUS
967 requests through the stream to the server. The server then handles
968 the request in the same way as if the request had been received from
969 a conventional UDP RADIUS client.
970
971 Radiator is compliant to RADIUS/TLS if the following options are
972 used:
973
974 &lt;AuthBy RADSEC&gt;
975
976 * Protocol tcp
977
978 * UseTLS
979
980 * TLS_CertificateFile
981
982 * Secret radsec
983
984 &lt;ServerRADSEC&gt;
985
986 * Protocol tcp
987
988 * UseTLS
989
990 * TLS_RequireClientCert
991
992 * Secret radsec
993
994 As of Radiator 3.15, the default shared secret for RadSec connections
995 is configurable and defaults to "mysecret" (without quotes). For
996 compliance with this document, this setting needs to be configured
997 for the shared secret "radsec". The implementation uses TCP
998 keepalive socket options, but does not send Status-Server packets.
999 Once established, TLS connections are kept open throughout the server
1000 instance lifetime.
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
1007
1008
1009 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Implementation Overview: radsecproxy</span>
1010
1011 The RADIUS proxy named radsecproxy was written in order to allow use
1012 of RadSec in current RADIUS deployments. This is a generic proxy
1013 that supports any number and combination of clients and servers,
1014 supporting RADIUS over UDP and RadSec. The main idea is that it can
1015 be used on the same host as a non-RadSec client or server to ensure
1016 RadSec is used on the wire; however, as a generic proxy, it can be
1017 used in other circumstances as well.
1018
1019 The configuration file consists of client and server clauses, where
1020 there is one such clause for each client or server. In such a
1021 clause, one specifies either "type tls" or "type udp" for TLS or UDP
1022 transport. Versions prior to 1.6 used "mysecret" as a default shared
1023 secret for RADIUS/TLS; version 1.6 and onwards uses "radsec". For
1024 backwards compatibility with older versions, the secret can be
1025 changed (which makes the configuration not compliant with this
1026 specification).
1027
1028 In order to use TLS for clients and/or servers, one must also specify
1029 where to locate CA certificates, as well as certificate and key for
1030 the client or server. This is done in a TLS clause. There may be
1031 one or several TLS clauses. A client or server clause may reference
1032 a particular TLS clause, or just use a default one. One use for
1033 multiple TLS clauses may be to present one certificate to clients and
1034 another to servers.
1035
1036 If any RadSec (TLS) clients are configured, the proxy will, at
1037 startup, listen on port 2083, as assigned by IANA for the OSC RadSec
1038 implementation. An alternative port may be specified. When a client
1039 connects, the client certificate will be verified, including checking
1040 that the configured Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or IP address
1041 matches what is in the certificate. Requests coming from a RadSec
1042 client are treated exactly like requests from UDP clients.
1043
1044 At startup, the proxy will try to establish a TLS connection to each
1045 (if any) of the configured RadSec (TLS) servers. If it fails to
1046 connect to a server, it will retry regularly. There is some back-off
1047 where it will retry quickly at first, and with longer intervals
1048 later. If a connection to a server goes down, it will also start
1049 retrying regularly. When setting up the TLS connection, the server
1050 certificate will be verified, including checking that the configured
1051 FQDN or IP address matches what is in the certificate. Requests are
1052 sent to a RadSec server, just like they would be to a UDP server.
1053
1054 The proxy supports Status-Server messages. They are only sent to a
1055 server if enabled for that particular server. Status-Server requests
1056 are always responded to.
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
1063
1064
1065 This RadSec implementation has been successfully tested together with
1066 Radiator. It is a freely available, open-source implementation. For
1067 source code and documentation, see [<a href="#ref-radsecproxy-impl">radsecproxy-impl</a>].
1068
1069 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Assessment of Crypto-Agility Requirements</span>
1070
1071 The RADIUS Crypto-Agility Requirements document [<a href="./rfc6421" title="&quot;Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC6421</a>] defines
1072 numerous classification criteria for protocols that strive to enhance
1073 the security of RADIUS. It contains mandatory (M) and recommended
1074 (R) criteria that crypto-agile protocols have to fulfill. The
1075 authors believe that the following assessment about the crypto-
1076 agility properties of RADIUS/TLS are true.
1077
1078 By virtue of being a transport profile using TLS over TCP as a
1079 transport protocol, the cryptographically agile properties of TLS are
1080 inherited, and RADIUS/TLS subsequently meets the following points:
1081
1082 (M) negotiation of cryptographic algorithms for integrity and auth
1083
1084 (M) negotiation of cryptographic algorithms for encryption
1085
1086 (M) replay protection
1087
1088 (M) define mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithms
1089
1090 (M) generate fresh session keys for use between client and server
1091
1092 (R) support for Perfect Forward Secrecy in session keys
1093
1094 (R) support X.509 certificate-based operation
1095
1096 (R) support Pre-Shared keys
1097
1098 (R) support for confidentiality of the entire packet
1099
1100 (M/R) support Automated Key Management
1101
1102 The remainder of the requirements is discussed individually below in
1103 more detail:
1104
1105 (M) "...avoid security compromise, even in situations where the
1106 existing cryptographic algorithms utilized by RADIUS
1107 implementations are shown to be weak enough to provide little or
1108 no security" [<a href="./rfc6421" title="&quot;Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)&quot;">RFC6421</a>]. The existing algorithm, based on MD5, is
1109 not of any significance in RADIUS/TLS; its compromise does not
1110 compromise the outer transport security.
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
1119
1120
1121 (R) mandatory-to-implement algorithms are to be NIST-Acceptable
1122 with no deprecation date - The mandatory-to-implement algorithm is
1123 TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. This ciphersuite supports three-
1124 key 3DES operation, which is classified as Acceptable with no
1125 known deprecation date by NIST.
1126
1127 (M) demonstrate backward compatibility with RADIUS - There are
1128 multiple implementations supporting both RADIUS and RADIUS/TLS,
1129 and the translation between them.
1130
1131 (M) After legacy mechanisms have been compromised, secure
1132 algorithms MUST be used, so that backward compatibility is no
1133 longer possible - In RADIUS, communication between client and
1134 server is always a manual configuration; after a compromise, the
1135 legacy client in question can be de-configured by the same manual
1136 configuration.
1137
1138 (M) indicate a willingness to cede change control to the IETF -
1139 Change control of this protocol is with the IETF.
1140
1141 (M) be interoperable between implementations based purely on the
1142 information in the specification - At least one implementation was
1143 created exclusively based on this specification and is
1144 interoperable with other RADIUS/TLS implementations.
1145
1146 (M) apply to all packet types - RADIUS/TLS operates on the
1147 transport layer, and can carry all packet types.
1148
1149 (R) message data exchanged with Diameter SHOULD NOT be affected -
1150 The solution is Diameter-agnostic.
1151
1152 (M) discuss any inherent assumptions - The authors are not aware
1153 of any implicit assumptions that would be yet-unarticulated in the
1154 document.
1155
1156 (R) provide recommendations for transition - The Security
1157 Considerations section contains a transition path.
1158
1159 (R) discuss legacy interoperability and potential for bidding-down
1160 attacks - The Security Considerations section contains a
1161 corresponding discussion.
1162
1163 Summarizing, it is believed that this specification fulfills all the
1164 mandatory and all the recommended requirements for a crypto-agile
1165 solution and should thus be considered UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIANT.
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span>
1175
1176
1177 Authors' Addresses
1178
1179 Stefan Winter
1180 Fondation RESTENA
1181 6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi
1182 Luxembourg 1359
1183 Luxembourg
1184
1185 Phone: +352 424409 1
1186 Fax: +352 422473
1187 EMail: [email protected]
1188 URI: <a href="http://www.restena.lu">http://www.restena.lu</a>.
1189
1190
1191 Mike McCauley
1192 Open Systems Consultants
1193 9 Bulbul Place
1194 Currumbin Waters QLD 4223
1195 Australia
1196
1197 Phone: +61 7 5598 7474
1198 Fax: +61 7 5598 7070
1199 EMail: [email protected]
1200 URI: <a href="http://www.open.com.au">http://www.open.com.au</a>.
1201
1202
1203 Stig Venaas
1204 Cisco Systems
1205 Tasman Drive
1206 San Jose, CA 95134
1207 USA
1208
1209 EMail: [email protected]
1210
1211
1212 Klaas Wierenga
1213 Cisco Systems International BV
1214 Haarlerbergweg 13-19
1215 Amsterdam 1101 CH
1216 The Netherlands
1217
1218 Phone: +31 (0)20 3571752
1219 EMail: [email protected]
1220 URI: <a href="http://www.cisco.com">http://www.cisco.com</a>
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 22]
1229 </pre>