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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Winter |
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Request for Comments: 6614 RESTENA |
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Category: Experimental M. McCauley |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 OSC |
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S. Venaas |
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K. Wierenga |
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Cisco |
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May 2012 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Encryption for RADIUS</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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This document specifies a transport profile for RADIUS using |
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) over TCP as the transport protocol. |
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This enables dynamic trust relationships between RADIUS servers. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for examination, experimental implementation, and |
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evaluation. |
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|
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This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet |
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community. This document is a product of the Internet Engineering |
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Task Force (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF |
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community. It has received public review and has been approved for |
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publication by the Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not |
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all documents approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of |
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Internet Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6614</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
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|
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language ......................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Terminology ................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Document Status ............................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Normative: Transport Layer Security for RADIUS/TCP ..............<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. TCP port and Packet Types ..................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. TLS Negotiation ............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Connection Setup ...........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Connecting Client Identity .................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. RADIUS Datagrams ...........................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Informative: Design Decisions ..................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Implications of Dynamic Peer Discovery ....................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. X.509 Certificate Considerations ..........................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation Considerations ...<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. RADIUS Datagram Considerations ............................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Compatibility with Other RADIUS Transports .....................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Diameter Compatibility .........................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations ............................................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Implementation Overview: Radiator .....................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Implementation Overview: radsecproxy ..................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Assessment of Crypto-Agility Requirements .............<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The RADIUS protocol [<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>] is a widely deployed authentication and |
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authorization protocol. The supplementary RADIUS Accounting |
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specification [<a href="./rfc2866" title=""RADIUS Accounting"">RFC2866</a>] provides accounting mechanisms, thus |
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delivering a full Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting (AAA) |
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solution. However, RADIUS is experiencing several shortcomings, such |
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as its dependency on the unreliable transport protocol UDP and the |
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lack of security for large parts of its packet payload. RADIUS |
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security is based on the MD5 algorithm, which has been proven to be |
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insecure. |
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The main focus of RADIUS over TLS is to provide a means to secure the |
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communication between RADIUS/TCP peers using TLS. The most important |
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use of this specification lies in roaming environments where RADIUS |
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packets need to be transferred through different administrative |
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domains and untrusted, potentially hostile networks. An example for |
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a worldwide roaming environment that uses RADIUS over TLS to secure |
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communication is "eduroam", see [<a href="#ref-eduroam" title=""eduroam Homepage"">eduroam</a>]. |
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There are multiple known attacks on the MD5 algorithm that is used in |
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RADIUS to provide integrity protection and a limited confidentiality |
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protection (see [<a href="#ref-MD5-attacks">MD5-attacks</a>]). RADIUS over TLS wraps the entire |
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RADIUS packet payload into a TLS stream and thus mitigates the risk |
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of attacks on MD5. |
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Because of the static trust establishment between RADIUS peers (IP |
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address and shared secret), the only scalable way of creating a |
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massive deployment of RADIUS servers under the control of different |
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administrative entities is to introduce some form of a proxy chain to |
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route the access requests to their home server. This creates a lot |
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of overhead in terms of possible points of failure, longer |
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transmission times, as well as middleboxes through which |
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authentication traffic flows. These middleboxes may learn privacy- |
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relevant data while forwarding requests. The new features in RADIUS |
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over TLS obsolete the use of IP addresses and shared MD5 secrets to |
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identify other peers and thus allow the use of more contemporary |
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trust models, e.g., checking a certificate by inspecting the issuer |
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and other certificate properties. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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In this document, several words are used to signify the requirements |
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of the specification. The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", |
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"SHALL", "SHALL NOT", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT |
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RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be |
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interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Terminology</span> |
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RADIUS/TLS node: a RADIUS-over-TLS client or server |
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RADIUS/TLS Client: a RADIUS-over-TLS instance that initiates a new |
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connection. |
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RADIUS/TLS Server: a RADIUS-over-TLS instance that listens on a |
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RADIUS-over-TLS port and accepts new connections |
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RADIUS/UDP: a classic RADIUS transport over UDP as defined in |
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[<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>] |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Document Status</span> |
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This document is an Experimental RFC. |
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It is one out of several approaches to address known cryptographic |
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weaknesses of the RADIUS protocol (see also <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). The |
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specification does not fulfill all recommendations on a AAA transport |
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profile as per [<a href="./rfc3539" title=""Authentication, Authorization and Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile"">RFC3539</a>]; in particular, by being based on TCP as a |
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transport layer, it does not prevent head-of-line blocking issues. |
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If this specification is indeed selected for advancement to Standards |
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Track, certificate verification options (<a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>, point 2) need |
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to be refined. |
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Another experimental characteristic of this specification is the |
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question of key management between RADIUS/TLS peers. RADIUS/UDP only |
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allowed for manual key management, i.e., distribution of a shared |
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secret between a client and a server. RADIUS/TLS allows manual |
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distribution of long-term proofs of peer identity as well (by using |
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TLS-PSK ciphersuites, or identifying clients by a certificate |
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fingerprint), but as a new feature enables use of X.509 certificates |
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in a PKIX infrastructure. It remains to be seen if one of these |
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methods will prevail or if both will find their place in real-life |
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deployments. The authors can imagine pre-shared keys (PSK) to be |
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popular in small-scale deployments (Small Office, Home Office (SOHO) |
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or isolated enterprise deployments) where scalability is not an issue |
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and the deployment of a Certification Authority (CA) is considered |
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too much of a hassle; however, the authors can also imagine large |
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roaming consortia to make use of PKIX. Readers of this specification |
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are encouraged to read the discussion of key management issues within |
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[<a href="./rfc6421" title=""Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC6421</a>] as well as [<a href="./rfc4107" title=""Guidelines for Cryptographic Key Management"">RFC4107</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
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It has yet to be decided whether this approach is to be chosen for |
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Standards Track. One key aspect to judge whether the approach is |
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usable on a large scale is by observing the uptake, usability, and |
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operational behavior of the protocol in large-scale, real-life |
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deployments. |
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An example for a worldwide roaming environment that uses RADIUS over |
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TLS to secure communication is "eduroam", see [<a href="#ref-eduroam" title=""eduroam Homepage"">eduroam</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Normative: Transport Layer Security for RADIUS/TCP</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. TCP port and Packet Types</span> |
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The default destination port number for RADIUS over TLS is TCP/2083. |
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There are no separate ports for authentication, accounting, and |
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dynamic authorization changes. The source port is arbitrary. See |
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<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> for considerations regarding the separation of |
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authentication, accounting, and dynamic authorization traffic. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. TLS Negotiation</span> |
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RADIUS/TLS has no notion of negotiating TLS in an established |
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connection. Servers and clients need to be preconfigured to use |
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RADIUS/TLS for a given endpoint. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Connection Setup</span> |
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RADIUS/TLS nodes |
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1. establish TCP connections as per [<a href="./rfc6613" title=""RADIUS over TCP"">RFC6613</a>]. Failure to connect |
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leads to continuous retries, with exponentially growing intervals |
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between every try. If multiple servers are defined, the node MAY |
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attempt to establish a connection to these other servers in |
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parallel, in order to implement quick failover. |
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2. after completing the TCP handshake, immediately negotiate TLS |
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sessions according to [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] or its predecessor TLS 1.1. The |
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following restrictions apply: |
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* Support for TLS v1.1 [<a href="./rfc4346" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1"">RFC4346</a>] or later (e.g., TLS 1.2 |
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[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>]) is REQUIRED. To prevent known attacks on TLS |
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versions prior to 1.1, implementations MUST NOT negotiate TLS |
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versions prior to 1.1. |
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* Support for certificate-based mutual authentication is |
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REQUIRED. |
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* Negotiation of mutual authentication is REQUIRED. |
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<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
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* Negotiation of a ciphersuite providing for confidentiality as |
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well as integrity protection is REQUIRED. Failure to comply |
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with this requirement can lead to severe security problems, |
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like user passwords being recoverable by third parties. See |
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<a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> for details. |
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* Support for and negotiation of compression is OPTIONAL. |
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* Support for TLS-PSK mutual authentication [<a href="./rfc4279" title=""Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">RFC4279</a>] is |
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OPTIONAL. |
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* RADIUS/TLS implementations MUST, at a minimum, support |
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negotiation of the TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA, and SHOULD |
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support TLS_RSA_WITH_RC4_128_SHA and |
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TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA as well (see <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>. |
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* In addition, RADIUS/TLS implementations MUST support |
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negotiation of the mandatory-to-implement ciphersuites |
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required by the versions of TLS that they support. |
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3. Peer authentication can be performed in any of the following |
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three operation models: |
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* TLS with X.509 certificates using PKIX trust models (this |
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model is mandatory to implement): |
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+ Implementations MUST allow the configuration of a list of |
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trusted Certification Authorities for incoming connections. |
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+ Certificate validation MUST include the verification rules |
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as per [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]. |
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+ Implementations SHOULD indicate their trusted Certification |
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Authorities (CAs). For TLS 1.2, this is done using |
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<a href="./rfc5246#section-7.4.4">[RFC5246], Section 7.4.4</a>, "certificate_authorities" (server |
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side) and <a href="./rfc6066#section-6">[RFC6066], Section 6</a> "Trusted CA Indication" |
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(client side). See also <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>. |
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+ Peer validation always includes a check on whether the |
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locally configured expected DNS name or IP address of the |
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server that is contacted matches its presented certificate. |
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DNS names and IP addresses can be contained in the Common |
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Name (CN) or subjectAltName entries. For verification, |
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only one of these entries is to be considered. The |
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following precedence applies: for DNS name validation, |
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subjectAltName:DNS has precedence over CN; for IP address |
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validation, subjectAltName:iPAddr has precedence over CN. |
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<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
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|
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Implementors of this specification are advised to read |
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<a href="./rfc6125#section-6">[RFC6125], Section 6</a>, for more details on DNS name |
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validation. |
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+ Implementations MAY allow the configuration of a set of |
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additional properties of the certificate to check for a |
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peer's authorization to communicate (e.g., a set of allowed |
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values in subjectAltName:URI or a set of allowed X509v3 |
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Certificate Policies). |
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+ When the configured trust base changes (e.g., removal of a |
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CA from the list of trusted CAs; issuance of a new CRL for |
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a given CA), implementations MAY renegotiate the TLS |
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session to reassess the connecting peer's continued |
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authorization. |
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* TLS with X.509 certificates using certificate fingerprints |
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(this model is optional to implement): Implementations SHOULD |
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allow the configuration of a list of trusted certificates, |
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identified via fingerprint of the DER encoded certificate |
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octets. Implementations MUST support SHA-1 as the hash |
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algorithm for the fingerprint. To prevent attacks based on |
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hash collisions, support for a more contemporary hash function |
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such as SHA-256 is RECOMMENDED. |
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* TLS using TLS-PSK (this model is optional to implement). |
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4. start exchanging RADIUS datagrams (note <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> (1)). The |
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shared secret to compute the (obsolete) MD5 integrity checks and |
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attribute encryption MUST be "radsec" (see <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> (2)). |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Connecting Client Identity</span> |
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In RADIUS/UDP, clients are uniquely identified by their IP address. |
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Since the shared secret is associated with the origin IP address, if |
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more than one RADIUS client is associated with the same IP address, |
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then those clients also must utilize the same shared secret, a |
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practice that is inherently insecure, as noted in [<a href="./rfc5247" title=""Extensible Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework"">RFC5247</a>]. |
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RADIUS/TLS supports multiple operation modes. |
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In TLS-PSK operation, a client is uniquely identified by its TLS |
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identifier. |
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In TLS-X.509 mode using fingerprints, a client is uniquely identified |
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by the fingerprint of the presented client certificate. |
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| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
In TLS-X.509 mode using PKIX trust models, a client is uniquely |
| 394 |
identified by the tuple (serial number of presented client |
| 395 |
certificate;Issuer). |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
Note well: having identified a connecting entity does not mean the |
| 398 |
server necessarily wants to communicate with that client. For |
| 399 |
example, if the Issuer is not in a trusted set of Issuers, the server |
| 400 |
may decline to perform RADIUS transactions with this client. |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
There are numerous trust models in PKIX environments, and it is |
| 403 |
beyond the scope of this document to define how a particular |
| 404 |
deployment determines whether a client is trustworthy. |
| 405 |
Implementations that want to support a wide variety of trust models |
| 406 |
should expose as many details of the presented certificate to the |
| 407 |
administrator as possible so that the trust model can be implemented |
| 408 |
by the administrator. As a suggestion, at least the following |
| 409 |
parameters of the X.509 client certificate should be exposed: |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
o Originating IP address |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
o Certificate Fingerprint |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
o Issuer |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
o Subject |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
o all X509v3 Extended Key Usage |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
o all X509v3 Subject Alternative Name |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
o all X509v3 Certificate Policies |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
In TLS-PSK operation, at least the following parameters of the TLS |
| 426 |
connection should be exposed: |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
o Originating IP address |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
o TLS Identifier |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. RADIUS Datagrams</span> |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
Authentication, Authorization, and Accounting packets are sent |
| 435 |
according to the following rules: |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
RADIUS/TLS clients transmit the same packet types on the connection |
| 438 |
they initiated as a RADIUS/UDP client would (see <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> (3) and |
| 439 |
(4)). For example, they send |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
o Access-Request |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
o Accounting-Request |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
o Status-Server |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
o Disconnect-ACK |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
o Disconnect-NAK |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
o ... |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
and they receive |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
o Access-Accept |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
o Accounting-Response |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
o Disconnect-Request |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
o ... |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
RADIUS/TLS servers transmit the same packet types on connections they |
| 472 |
have accepted as a RADIUS/UDP server would. For example, they send |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
o Access-Challenge |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
o Access-Accept |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
o Access-Reject |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
o Accounting-Response |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
o Disconnect-Request |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
o ... |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
and they receive |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
o Access-Request |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
o Accounting-Request |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
o Status-Server |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
o Disconnect-ACK |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
o ... |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
Due to the use of one single TCP port for all packet types, it is |
| 506 |
required that a RADIUS/TLS server signal which types of packets are |
| 507 |
supported on a server to a connecting peer. See also <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a> for |
| 508 |
a discussion of signaling. |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
o When an unwanted packet of type 'CoA-Request' or 'Disconnect- |
| 511 |
Request' is received, a RADIUS/TLS server needs to respond with a |
| 512 |
'CoA-NAK' or 'Disconnect-NAK', respectively. The NAK SHOULD |
| 513 |
contain an attribute Error-Cause with the value 406 ("Unsupported |
| 514 |
Extension"); see [<a href="./rfc5176" title=""Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC5176</a>] for details. |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
o When an unwanted packet of type 'Accounting-Request' is received, |
| 517 |
the RADIUS/TLS server SHOULD reply with an Accounting-Response |
| 518 |
containing an Error-Cause attribute with value 406 "Unsupported |
| 519 |
Extension" as defined in [<a href="./rfc5176" title=""Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC5176</a>]. A RADIUS/TLS accounting |
| 520 |
client receiving such an Accounting-Response SHOULD log the error |
| 521 |
and stop sending Accounting-Request packets. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Informative: Design Decisions</span> |
| 524 |
|
| 525 |
This section explains the design decisions that led to the rules |
| 526 |
defined in the previous section. |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Implications of Dynamic Peer Discovery</span> |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
One mechanism to discover RADIUS-over-TLS peers dynamically via DNS |
| 531 |
is specified in [<a href="#ref-DYNAMIC" title=""NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS"">DYNAMIC</a>]. While this mechanism is still under |
| 532 |
development and therefore is not a normative dependency of RADIUS/ |
| 533 |
TLS, the use of dynamic discovery has potential future implications |
| 534 |
that are important to understand. |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
Readers of this document who are considering the deployment of DNS- |
| 537 |
based dynamic discovery are thus encouraged to read [<a href="#ref-DYNAMIC" title=""NAI-based Dynamic Peer Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS"">DYNAMIC</a>] and |
| 538 |
follow its future development. |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. X.509 Certificate Considerations</span> |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
(1) If a RADIUS/TLS client is in possession of multiple certificates |
| 543 |
from different CAs (i.e., is part of multiple roaming consortia) |
| 544 |
and dynamic discovery is used, the discovery mechanism possibly |
| 545 |
does not yield sufficient information to identify the consortium |
| 546 |
uniquely (e.g., DNS discovery). Subsequently, the client may |
| 547 |
not know by itself which client certificate to use for the TLS |
| 548 |
handshake. Then, it is necessary for the server to signal to |
| 549 |
which consortium it belongs and which certificates it expects. |
| 550 |
If there is no risk of confusing multiple roaming consortia, |
| 551 |
providing this information in the handshake is not crucial. |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
(2) If a RADIUS/TLS server is in possession of multiple certificates |
| 562 |
from different CAs (i.e., is part of multiple roaming |
| 563 |
consortia), it will need to select one of its certificates to |
| 564 |
present to the RADIUS/TLS client. If the client sends the |
| 565 |
Trusted CA Indication, this hint can make the server select the |
| 566 |
appropriate certificate and prevent a handshake failure. |
| 567 |
Omitting this indication makes it impossible to |
| 568 |
deterministically select the right certificate in this case. If |
| 569 |
there is no risk of confusing multiple roaming consortia, |
| 570 |
providing this indication in the handshake is not crucial. |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Ciphersuites and Compression Negotiation Considerations</span> |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
Not all TLS ciphersuites in [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] are supported by available TLS |
| 575 |
tool kits, and licenses may be required in some cases. The existing |
| 576 |
implementations of RADIUS/TLS use OpenSSL as a cryptographic backend, |
| 577 |
which supports all of the ciphersuites listed in the rules in the |
| 578 |
normative section. |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
The TLS ciphersuite TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA is mandatory to |
| 581 |
implement according to [<a href="./rfc4346" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1"">RFC4346</a>]; thus, it has to be supported by |
| 582 |
RADIUS/TLS nodes. |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
The two other ciphersuites in the normative section are widely |
| 585 |
implemented in TLS tool kits and are considered good practice to |
| 586 |
implement. |
| 587 |
|
| 588 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. RADIUS Datagram Considerations</span> |
| 589 |
|
| 590 |
(1) After the TLS session is established, RADIUS packet payloads are |
| 591 |
exchanged over the encrypted TLS tunnel. In RADIUS/UDP, the |
| 592 |
packet size can be determined by evaluating the size of the |
| 593 |
datagram that arrived. Due to the stream nature of TCP and TLS, |
| 594 |
this does not hold true for RADIUS/TLS packet exchange. |
| 595 |
Instead, packet boundaries of RADIUS packets that arrive in the |
| 596 |
stream are calculated by evaluating the packet's Length field. |
| 597 |
Special care needs to be taken on the packet sender side that |
| 598 |
the value of the Length field is indeed correct before sending |
| 599 |
it over the TLS tunnel, because incorrect packet lengths can no |
| 600 |
longer be detected by a differing datagram boundary. See |
| 601 |
<a href="./rfc6613#section-2.6.4">Section 2.6.4 of [RFC6613]</a> for more details. |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
(2) Within RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>], a shared secret is used for hiding |
| 604 |
attributes such as User-Password, as well as in computation of |
| 605 |
the Response Authenticator. In RADIUS accounting [<a href="./rfc2866" title=""RADIUS Accounting"">RFC2866</a>], the |
| 606 |
shared secret is used in computation of both the Request |
| 607 |
Authenticator and the Response Authenticator. Since TLS |
| 608 |
provides integrity protection and encryption sufficient to |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
substitute for RADIUS application-layer security, it is not |
| 618 |
necessary to configure a RADIUS shared secret. The use of a |
| 619 |
fixed string for the obsolete shared secret eliminates possible |
| 620 |
node misconfigurations. |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
(3) RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>] uses different UDP ports for |
| 623 |
authentication, accounting, and dynamic authorization changes. |
| 624 |
RADIUS/TLS allocates a single port for all RADIUS packet types. |
| 625 |
Nevertheless, in RADIUS/TLS, the notion of a client that sends |
| 626 |
authentication requests and processes replies associated with |
| 627 |
its users' sessions and the notion of a server that receives |
| 628 |
requests, processes them, and sends the appropriate replies is |
| 629 |
to be preserved. The normative rules about acceptable packet |
| 630 |
types for clients and servers mirror the packet flow behavior |
| 631 |
from RADIUS/UDP. |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
(4) RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>] uses negative ICMP responses to a newly |
| 634 |
allocated UDP port to signal that a peer RADIUS server does not |
| 635 |
support the reception and processing of the packet types in |
| 636 |
[<a href="./rfc5176" title=""Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC5176</a>]. These packet types are listed as to be received in |
| 637 |
RADIUS/TLS implementations. Note well: it is not required for |
| 638 |
an implementation to actually process these packet types; it is |
| 639 |
only required that the NAK be sent as defined above. |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
(5) RADIUS/UDP [<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>] uses negative ICMP responses to a newly |
| 642 |
allocated UDP port to signal that a peer RADIUS server does not |
| 643 |
support the reception and processing of RADIUS Accounting |
| 644 |
packets. There is no RADIUS datagram to signal an Accounting |
| 645 |
NAK. Clients may be misconfigured for sending Accounting |
| 646 |
packets to a RADIUS/TLS server that does not wish to process |
| 647 |
their Accounting packet. To prevent a regression of |
| 648 |
detectability of this situation, the Accounting-Response + |
| 649 |
Error-Cause signaling was introduced. |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Compatibility with Other RADIUS Transports</span> |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
The IETF defines multiple alternative transports to the classic UDP |
| 654 |
transport model as defined in [<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>], namely RADIUS over TCP |
| 655 |
[<a href="./rfc6613" title=""RADIUS over TCP"">RFC6613</a>] and the present document on RADIUS over TLS. The IETF also |
| 656 |
proposed RADIUS over Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) |
| 657 |
[<a href="#ref-RADEXT-DTLS">RADEXT-DTLS</a>]. |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
RADIUS/TLS does not specify any inherent backward compatibility to |
| 660 |
RADIUS/UDP or cross compatibility to the other transports, i.e., an |
| 661 |
implementation that utilizes RADIUS/TLS only will not be able to |
| 662 |
receive or send RADIUS packet payloads over other transports. An |
| 663 |
implementation wishing to be backward or cross compatible (i.e., |
| 664 |
wishes to serve clients using other transports than RADIUS/TLS) will |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
need to implement these other transports along with the RADIUS/TLS |
| 674 |
transport and be prepared to send and receive on all implemented |
| 675 |
transports, which is called a "multi-stack implementation". |
| 676 |
|
| 677 |
If a given IP device is able to receive RADIUS payloads on multiple |
| 678 |
transports, this may or may not be the same instance of software, and |
| 679 |
it may or may not serve the same purposes. It is not safe to assume |
| 680 |
that both ports are interchangeable. In particular, it cannot be |
| 681 |
assumed that state is maintained for the packet payloads between the |
| 682 |
transports. Two such instances MUST be considered separate RADIUS |
| 683 |
server entities. |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Diameter Compatibility</span> |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
Since RADIUS/TLS is only a new transport profile for RADIUS, the |
| 688 |
compatibility of RADIUS/TLS - Diameter [<a href="./rfc3588" title=""Diameter Base Protocol"">RFC3588</a>] and RADIUS/UDP |
| 689 |
[<a href="./rfc2865" title=""Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC2865</a>] - Diameter [<a href="./rfc3588" title=""Diameter Base Protocol"">RFC3588</a>] is identical. The considerations |
| 690 |
regarding payload size in [<a href="./rfc6613" title=""RADIUS over TCP"">RFC6613</a>] apply. |
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
The computational resources to establish a TLS tunnel are |
| 695 |
significantly higher than simply sending mostly unencrypted UDP |
| 696 |
datagrams. Therefore, clients connecting to a RADIUS/TLS node will |
| 697 |
more easily create high load conditions and a malicious client might |
| 698 |
create a Denial-of-Service attack more easily. |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
Some TLS ciphersuites only provide integrity validation of their |
| 701 |
payload, and provide no encryption. This specification forbids the |
| 702 |
use of such ciphersuites. Since the RADIUS payload's shared secret |
| 703 |
is fixed to the well-known term "radsec" (see <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a> (4)), |
| 704 |
failure to comply with this requirement will expose the entire |
| 705 |
datagram payload in plaintext, including User-Password, to |
| 706 |
intermediate IP nodes. |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
By virtue of being based on TCP, there are several generic attack |
| 709 |
vectors to slow down or prevent the TCP connection from being |
| 710 |
established; see [<a href="./rfc4953" title=""Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks"">RFC4953</a>] for details. If a TCP connection is not |
| 711 |
up when a packet is to be processed, it gets re-established, so such |
| 712 |
attacks in general lead only to a minor performance degradation (the |
| 713 |
time it takes to re-establish the connection). There is one notable |
| 714 |
exception where an attacker might create a bidding-down attack |
| 715 |
though. If peer communication between two devices is configured for |
| 716 |
both RADIUS/TLS (i.e., TLS security over TCP as a transport, shared |
| 717 |
secret fixed to "radsec") and RADIUS/UDP (i.e., shared secret |
| 718 |
security with a secret manually configured by the administrator), and |
| 719 |
the RADIUS/UDP transport is the failover option if the TLS session |
| 720 |
cannot be established, a bidding-down attack can occur if an |
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
adversary can maliciously close the TCP connection or prevent it from |
| 730 |
being established. Situations where clients are configured in such a |
| 731 |
way are likely to occur during a migration phase from RADIUS/UDP to |
| 732 |
RADIUS/TLS. By preventing the TLS session setup, the attacker can |
| 733 |
reduce the security of the packet payload from the selected TLS |
| 734 |
ciphersuite packet encryption to the classic MD5 per-attribute |
| 735 |
encryption. The situation should be avoided by disabling the weaker |
| 736 |
RADIUS/UDP transport as soon as the new RADIUS/TLS connection is |
| 737 |
established and tested. Disabling can happen at either the RADIUS |
| 738 |
client or server side: |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
o Client side: de-configure the failover setup, leaving RADIUS/TLS |
| 741 |
as the only communication option |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
o Server side: de-configure the RADIUS/UDP client from the list of |
| 744 |
valid RADIUS clients |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
RADIUS/TLS provides authentication and encryption between RADIUS |
| 747 |
peers. In the presence of proxies, the intermediate proxies can |
| 748 |
still inspect the individual RADIUS packets, i.e., "end-to-end" |
| 749 |
encryption is not provided. Where intermediate proxies are |
| 750 |
untrusted, it is desirable to use other RADIUS mechanisms to prevent |
| 751 |
RADIUS packet payload from inspection by such proxies. One common |
| 752 |
method to protect passwords is the use of the Extensible |
| 753 |
Authentication Protocol (EAP) and EAP methods that utilize TLS. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
When using certificate fingerprints to identify RADIUS/TLS peers, any |
| 756 |
two certificates that produce the same hash value (i.e., that have a |
| 757 |
hash collision) will be considered the same client. Therefore, it is |
| 758 |
important to make sure that the hash function used is |
| 759 |
cryptographically uncompromised so that an attacker is very unlikely |
| 760 |
to be able to produce a hash collision with a certificate of his |
| 761 |
choice. While this specification mandates support for SHA-1, a later |
| 762 |
revision will likely demand support for more contemporary hash |
| 763 |
functions because as of issuance of this document, there are already |
| 764 |
attacks on SHA-1. |
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
No new RADIUS attributes or packet codes are defined. IANA has |
| 769 |
updated the already assigned TCP port number 2083 to reflect the |
| 770 |
following: |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
o Reference: [<a href="./rfc6614">RFC6614</a>] |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
o Assignment Notes: The TCP port 2083 was already previously |
| 786 |
assigned by IANA for "RadSec", an early implementation of RADIUS/ |
| 787 |
TLS, prior to issuance of this RFC. This early implementation can |
| 788 |
be configured to be compatible to RADIUS/TLS as specified by the |
| 789 |
IETF. See <a href="./rfc6614#appendix-A">RFC 6614, Appendix A</a> for details. |
| 790 |
|
| 791 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
RADIUS/TLS was first implemented as "RADSec" by Open Systems |
| 794 |
Consultants, Currumbin Waters, Australia, for their "Radiator" RADIUS |
| 795 |
server product (see [<a href="#ref-radsec-whitepaper">radsec-whitepaper</a>]). |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
Funding and input for the development of this document was provided |
| 798 |
by the European Commission co-funded project "GEANT2" [<a href="#ref-geant2" title=""European Commission Information Society and Media: GEANT2"">geant2</a>] and |
| 799 |
further feedback was provided by the TERENA Task Force on Mobility |
| 800 |
and Network Middleware [<a href="#ref-terena" title=""Task Force on Mobility and Network Middleware"">terena</a>]. |
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 808 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2865">RFC2865</a>] Rigney, C., Willens, S., Rubens, A., and W. Simpson, |
| 811 |
"Remote Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", |
| 812 |
<a href="./rfc2865">RFC 2865</a>, June 2000. |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2866">RFC2866</a>] Rigney, C., "RADIUS Accounting", <a href="./rfc2866">RFC 2866</a>, June 2000. |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4279">RFC4279</a>] Eronen, P. and H. Tschofenig, "Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites |
| 817 |
for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a>, |
| 818 |
December 2005. |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5176">RFC5176</a>] Chiba, M., Dommety, G., Eklund, M., Mitton, D., and B. |
| 821 |
Aboba, "Dynamic Authorization Extensions to Remote |
| 822 |
Authentication Dial In User Service (RADIUS)", <a href="./rfc5176">RFC 5176</a>, |
| 823 |
January 2008. |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
| 826 |
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008. |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5247">RFC5247</a>] Aboba, B., Simon, D., and P. Eronen, "Extensible |
| 829 |
Authentication Protocol (EAP) Key Management Framework", |
| 830 |
<a href="./rfc5247">RFC 5247</a>, August 2008. |
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., |
| 842 |
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key |
| 843 |
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List |
| 844 |
(CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, May 2008. |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6066">RFC6066</a>] Eastlake, D., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Extensions: |
| 847 |
Extension Definitions", <a href="./rfc6066">RFC 6066</a>, January 2011. |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6613">RFC6613</a>] DeKok, A., "RADIUS over TCP", <a href="./rfc6613">RFC 6613</a>, May 2012. |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
[<a id="ref-DYNAMIC">DYNAMIC</a>] Winter, S. and M. McCauley, "NAI-based Dynamic Peer |
| 854 |
Discovery for RADIUS/TLS and RADIUS/DTLS", Work |
| 855 |
in Progress, July 2011. |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
[<a id="ref-MD5-attacks">MD5-attacks</a>] |
| 858 |
Black, J., Cochran, M., and T. Highland, "A Study of the |
| 859 |
MD5 Attacks: Insights and Improvements", October 2006, |
| 860 |
<<a href="http://www.springerlink.com/content/40867l85727r7084/">http://www.springerlink.com/content/40867l85727r7084/</a>>. |
| 861 |
|
| 862 |
[<a id="ref-RADEXT-DTLS">RADEXT-DTLS</a>] |
| 863 |
DeKok, A., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22DTLS+as+a+Transport+Layer+for+RADIUS%22'>"DTLS as a Transport Layer for RADIUS"</a>, Work |
| 864 |
in Progress, October 2010. |
| 865 |
|
| 866 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3539">RFC3539</a>] Aboba, B. and J. Wood, "Authentication, Authorization and |
| 867 |
Accounting (AAA) Transport Profile", <a href="./rfc3539">RFC 3539</a>, June 2003. |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3588">RFC3588</a>] Calhoun, P., Loughney, J., Guttman, E., Zorn, G., and J. |
| 870 |
Arkko, "Diameter Base Protocol", <a href="./rfc3588">RFC 3588</a>, September 2003. |
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4107">RFC4107</a>] Bellovin, S. and R. Housley, "Guidelines for Cryptographic |
| 873 |
Key Management", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp107">BCP 107</a>, <a href="./rfc4107">RFC 4107</a>, June 2005. |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4346">RFC4346</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
| 876 |
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006. |
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4953">RFC4953</a>] Touch, J., "Defending TCP Against Spoofing Attacks", |
| 879 |
<a href="./rfc4953">RFC 4953</a>, July 2007. |
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6125">RFC6125</a>] Saint-Andre, P. and J. Hodges, "Representation and |
| 882 |
Verification of Domain-Based Application Service Identity |
| 883 |
within Internet Public Key Infrastructure Using X.509 |
| 884 |
(PKIX) Certificates in the Context of Transport Layer |
| 885 |
Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc6125">RFC 6125</a>, March 2011. |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6421">RFC6421</a>] Nelson, D., "Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote |
| 898 |
Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)", <a href="./rfc6421">RFC 6421</a>, |
| 899 |
November 2011. |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
[<a id="ref-eduroam">eduroam</a>] Trans-European Research and Education Networking |
| 902 |
Association, "eduroam Homepage", 2007, |
| 903 |
<<a href="http://www.eduroam.org/">http://www.eduroam.org/</a>>. |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
[<a id="ref-geant2">geant2</a>] Delivery of Advanced Network Technology to Europe, |
| 906 |
"European Commission Information Society and Media: |
| 907 |
GEANT2", 2008, <<a href="http://www.geant2.net/">http://www.geant2.net/</a>>. |
| 908 |
|
| 909 |
[<a id="ref-radsec-whitepaper">radsec-whitepaper</a>] |
| 910 |
Open System Consultants, "RadSec - a secure, reliable |
| 911 |
RADIUS Protocol", May 2005, |
| 912 |
<<a href="http://www.open.com.au/radiator/radsec-whitepaper.pdf">http://www.open.com.au/radiator/radsec-whitepaper.pdf</a>>. |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
[<a id="ref-radsecproxy-impl">radsecproxy-impl</a>] |
| 915 |
Venaas, S., "radsecproxy Project Homepage", 2007, |
| 916 |
<<a href="http://software.uninett.no/radsecproxy/">http://software.uninett.no/radsecproxy/</a>>. |
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
[<a id="ref-terena">terena</a>] Trans-European Research and Education Networking |
| 919 |
Association (TERENA), "Task Force on Mobility and Network |
| 920 |
Middleware", 2008, |
| 921 |
<<a href="http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-mobility/">http://www.terena.org/activities/tf-mobility/</a>>. |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
|
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
|
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
|
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
|
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Implementation Overview: Radiator</span> |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
Radiator implements the RadSec protocol for proxying requests with |
| 956 |
the <Authby RADSEC> and <ServerRADSEC> clauses in the Radiator |
| 957 |
configuration file. |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
The <AuthBy RADSEC> clause defines a RadSec client, and causes |
| 960 |
Radiator to send RADIUS requests to the configured RadSec server |
| 961 |
using the RadSec protocol. |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
The <ServerRADSEC> clause defines a RadSec server, and causes |
| 964 |
Radiator to listen on the configured port and address(es) for |
| 965 |
connections from <Authby RADSEC> clients. When an <Authby RADSEC> |
| 966 |
client connects to a <ServerRADSEC> server, the client sends RADIUS |
| 967 |
requests through the stream to the server. The server then handles |
| 968 |
the request in the same way as if the request had been received from |
| 969 |
a conventional UDP RADIUS client. |
| 970 |
|
| 971 |
Radiator is compliant to RADIUS/TLS if the following options are |
| 972 |
used: |
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
<AuthBy RADSEC> |
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
* Protocol tcp |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
* UseTLS |
| 979 |
|
| 980 |
* TLS_CertificateFile |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
* Secret radsec |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
<ServerRADSEC> |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
* Protocol tcp |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
* UseTLS |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
* TLS_RequireClientCert |
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
* Secret radsec |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
As of Radiator 3.15, the default shared secret for RadSec connections |
| 995 |
is configurable and defaults to "mysecret" (without quotes). For |
| 996 |
compliance with this document, this setting needs to be configured |
| 997 |
for the shared secret "radsec". The implementation uses TCP |
| 998 |
keepalive socket options, but does not send Status-Server packets. |
| 999 |
Once established, TLS connections are kept open throughout the server |
| 1000 |
instance lifetime. |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Implementation Overview: radsecproxy</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
The RADIUS proxy named radsecproxy was written in order to allow use |
| 1012 |
of RadSec in current RADIUS deployments. This is a generic proxy |
| 1013 |
that supports any number and combination of clients and servers, |
| 1014 |
supporting RADIUS over UDP and RadSec. The main idea is that it can |
| 1015 |
be used on the same host as a non-RadSec client or server to ensure |
| 1016 |
RadSec is used on the wire; however, as a generic proxy, it can be |
| 1017 |
used in other circumstances as well. |
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
The configuration file consists of client and server clauses, where |
| 1020 |
there is one such clause for each client or server. In such a |
| 1021 |
clause, one specifies either "type tls" or "type udp" for TLS or UDP |
| 1022 |
transport. Versions prior to 1.6 used "mysecret" as a default shared |
| 1023 |
secret for RADIUS/TLS; version 1.6 and onwards uses "radsec". For |
| 1024 |
backwards compatibility with older versions, the secret can be |
| 1025 |
changed (which makes the configuration not compliant with this |
| 1026 |
specification). |
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 |
In order to use TLS for clients and/or servers, one must also specify |
| 1029 |
where to locate CA certificates, as well as certificate and key for |
| 1030 |
the client or server. This is done in a TLS clause. There may be |
| 1031 |
one or several TLS clauses. A client or server clause may reference |
| 1032 |
a particular TLS clause, or just use a default one. One use for |
| 1033 |
multiple TLS clauses may be to present one certificate to clients and |
| 1034 |
another to servers. |
| 1035 |
|
| 1036 |
If any RadSec (TLS) clients are configured, the proxy will, at |
| 1037 |
startup, listen on port 2083, as assigned by IANA for the OSC RadSec |
| 1038 |
implementation. An alternative port may be specified. When a client |
| 1039 |
connects, the client certificate will be verified, including checking |
| 1040 |
that the configured Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN) or IP address |
| 1041 |
matches what is in the certificate. Requests coming from a RadSec |
| 1042 |
client are treated exactly like requests from UDP clients. |
| 1043 |
|
| 1044 |
At startup, the proxy will try to establish a TLS connection to each |
| 1045 |
(if any) of the configured RadSec (TLS) servers. If it fails to |
| 1046 |
connect to a server, it will retry regularly. There is some back-off |
| 1047 |
where it will retry quickly at first, and with longer intervals |
| 1048 |
later. If a connection to a server goes down, it will also start |
| 1049 |
retrying regularly. When setting up the TLS connection, the server |
| 1050 |
certificate will be verified, including checking that the configured |
| 1051 |
FQDN or IP address matches what is in the certificate. Requests are |
| 1052 |
sent to a RadSec server, just like they would be to a UDP server. |
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
The proxy supports Status-Server messages. They are only sent to a |
| 1055 |
server if enabled for that particular server. Status-Server requests |
| 1056 |
are always responded to. |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
This RadSec implementation has been successfully tested together with |
| 1066 |
Radiator. It is a freely available, open-source implementation. For |
| 1067 |
source code and documentation, see [<a href="#ref-radsecproxy-impl">radsecproxy-impl</a>]. |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Assessment of Crypto-Agility Requirements</span> |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
The RADIUS Crypto-Agility Requirements document [<a href="./rfc6421" title=""Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC6421</a>] defines |
| 1072 |
numerous classification criteria for protocols that strive to enhance |
| 1073 |
the security of RADIUS. It contains mandatory (M) and recommended |
| 1074 |
(R) criteria that crypto-agile protocols have to fulfill. The |
| 1075 |
authors believe that the following assessment about the crypto- |
| 1076 |
agility properties of RADIUS/TLS are true. |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
By virtue of being a transport profile using TLS over TCP as a |
| 1079 |
transport protocol, the cryptographically agile properties of TLS are |
| 1080 |
inherited, and RADIUS/TLS subsequently meets the following points: |
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 |
(M) negotiation of cryptographic algorithms for integrity and auth |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
(M) negotiation of cryptographic algorithms for encryption |
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 |
(M) replay protection |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
(M) define mandatory-to-implement cryptographic algorithms |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
(M) generate fresh session keys for use between client and server |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
(R) support for Perfect Forward Secrecy in session keys |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
(R) support X.509 certificate-based operation |
| 1095 |
|
| 1096 |
(R) support Pre-Shared keys |
| 1097 |
|
| 1098 |
(R) support for confidentiality of the entire packet |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
(M/R) support Automated Key Management |
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
The remainder of the requirements is discussed individually below in |
| 1103 |
more detail: |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
(M) "...avoid security compromise, even in situations where the |
| 1106 |
existing cryptographic algorithms utilized by RADIUS |
| 1107 |
implementations are shown to be weak enough to provide little or |
| 1108 |
no security" [<a href="./rfc6421" title=""Crypto-Agility Requirements for Remote Authentication Dial-In User Service (RADIUS)"">RFC6421</a>]. The existing algorithm, based on MD5, is |
| 1109 |
not of any significance in RADIUS/TLS; its compromise does not |
| 1110 |
compromise the outer transport security. |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
(R) mandatory-to-implement algorithms are to be NIST-Acceptable |
| 1122 |
with no deprecation date - The mandatory-to-implement algorithm is |
| 1123 |
TLS_RSA_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA. This ciphersuite supports three- |
| 1124 |
key 3DES operation, which is classified as Acceptable with no |
| 1125 |
known deprecation date by NIST. |
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 |
(M) demonstrate backward compatibility with RADIUS - There are |
| 1128 |
multiple implementations supporting both RADIUS and RADIUS/TLS, |
| 1129 |
and the translation between them. |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
(M) After legacy mechanisms have been compromised, secure |
| 1132 |
algorithms MUST be used, so that backward compatibility is no |
| 1133 |
longer possible - In RADIUS, communication between client and |
| 1134 |
server is always a manual configuration; after a compromise, the |
| 1135 |
legacy client in question can be de-configured by the same manual |
| 1136 |
configuration. |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
(M) indicate a willingness to cede change control to the IETF - |
| 1139 |
Change control of this protocol is with the IETF. |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
(M) be interoperable between implementations based purely on the |
| 1142 |
information in the specification - At least one implementation was |
| 1143 |
created exclusively based on this specification and is |
| 1144 |
interoperable with other RADIUS/TLS implementations. |
| 1145 |
|
| 1146 |
(M) apply to all packet types - RADIUS/TLS operates on the |
| 1147 |
transport layer, and can carry all packet types. |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
(R) message data exchanged with Diameter SHOULD NOT be affected - |
| 1150 |
The solution is Diameter-agnostic. |
| 1151 |
|
| 1152 |
(M) discuss any inherent assumptions - The authors are not aware |
| 1153 |
of any implicit assumptions that would be yet-unarticulated in the |
| 1154 |
document. |
| 1155 |
|
| 1156 |
(R) provide recommendations for transition - The Security |
| 1157 |
Considerations section contains a transition path. |
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
(R) discuss legacy interoperability and potential for bidding-down |
| 1160 |
attacks - The Security Considerations section contains a |
| 1161 |
corresponding discussion. |
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
Summarizing, it is believed that this specification fulfills all the |
| 1164 |
mandatory and all the recommended requirements for a crypto-agile |
| 1165 |
solution and should thus be considered UNCONDITIONALLY COMPLIANT. |
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6614">RFC 6614</a> RADIUS over TLS May 2012</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
Stefan Winter |
| 1180 |
Fondation RESTENA |
| 1181 |
6, rue Richard Coudenhove-Kalergi |
| 1182 |
Luxembourg 1359 |
| 1183 |
Luxembourg |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
Phone: +352 424409 1 |
| 1186 |
Fax: +352 422473 |
| 1187 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1188 |
URI: <a href="http://www.restena.lu">http://www.restena.lu</a>. |
| 1189 |
|
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
Mike McCauley |
| 1192 |
Open Systems Consultants |
| 1193 |
9 Bulbul Place |
| 1194 |
Currumbin Waters QLD 4223 |
| 1195 |
Australia |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
Phone: +61 7 5598 7474 |
| 1198 |
Fax: +61 7 5598 7070 |
| 1199 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1200 |
URI: <a href="http://www.open.com.au">http://www.open.com.au</a>. |
| 1201 |
|
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
Stig Venaas |
| 1204 |
Cisco Systems |
| 1205 |
Tasman Drive |
| 1206 |
San Jose, CA 95134 |
| 1207 |
USA |
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1210 |
|
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
Klaas Wierenga |
| 1213 |
Cisco Systems International BV |
| 1214 |
Haarlerbergweg 13-19 |
| 1215 |
Amsterdam 1101 CH |
| 1216 |
The Netherlands |
| 1217 |
|
| 1218 |
Phone: +31 (0)20 3571752 |
| 1219 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1220 |
URI: <a href="http://www.cisco.com">http://www.cisco.com</a> |
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
Winter, et al. Experimental [Page 22] |
| 1229 |
</pre> |