Debian Codegraph @

rfc3647.html

raw
1 <pre>Network Working Group S. Chokhani
2 Request for Comments: 3647 Orion Security Solutions, Inc.
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc2527">2527</a> W. Ford
4 Category: Informational VeriSign, Inc.
5 R. Sabett
6 Cooley Godward LLP
7 C. Merrill
8 McCarter &amp; English, LLP
9 S. Wu
10 Infoliance, Inc.
11 November 2003
12
13
14 <span class="h1">Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure</span>
15 <span class="h1">Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework</span>
16
17 Status of this Memo
18
19 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
20 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
21 memo is unlimited.
22
23 Copyright Notice
24
25 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
26
27 Abstract
28
29 This document presents a framework to assist the writers of
30 certificate policies or certification practice statements for
31 participants within public key infrastructures, such as certification
32 authorities, policy authorities, and communities of interest that
33 wish to rely on certificates. In particular, the framework provides
34 a comprehensive list of topics that potentially (at the writer's
35 discretion) need to be covered in a certificate policy or a
36 certification practice statement. This document supersedes <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>.
37
38 Table of Contents
39
40 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
41 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
42 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Purpose. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
43 <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Scope. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
44 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Definitions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
45 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Concepts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
46 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Certificate Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
47 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Certificate Policy Examples. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
48 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. X.509 Certificate Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
55
56
57 <a href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. Certificate Policies Extension . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
58 <a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Policy Mappings Extension. . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
59 <a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Policy Constraints Extension . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
60 <a href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a>. Policy Qualifiers. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
61 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Certification Practice Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
62 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Relationship Between CP and CPS. . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
63 3.6. Relationship Among CPs, CPSs, Agreements, and
64 Other Documents. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
65 <a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Set of Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
66 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Contents of a Set of Provisions. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
67 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
68 <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
69 <a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Document Name and Identification . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
70 <a href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. PKI Participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
71 <a href="#section-4.1.4">4.1.4</a>. Certificate Usage. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
72 <a href="#section-4.1.5">4.1.5</a>. Policy Administration. . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
73 <a href="#section-4.1.6">4.1.6</a>. Definitions and Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
74 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Publication and Repository Responsibilities. . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
75 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Identification and Authentication (I&amp;A). . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
76 <a href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. Naming . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
77 <a href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. Initial Identity Validation. . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
78 <a href="#section-4.3.3">4.3.3</a>. I&amp;A for Re-key Requests. . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
79 <a href="#section-4.3.4">4.3.4</a>. I&amp;A for Revocation Requests. . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
80 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements. . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
81 <a href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. Certificate Application. . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
82 <a href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a>. Certificate Application Processing . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
83 <a href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a>. Certificate Issuance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
84 <a href="#section-4.4.4">4.4.4</a>. Certificate Acceptance . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
85 <a href="#section-4.4.5">4.4.5</a>. Key Pair and Certificate Usage . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
86 <a href="#section-4.4.6">4.4.6</a>. Certificate Renewal. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
87 <a href="#section-4.4.7">4.4.7</a>. Certificate Re-key . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
88 <a href="#section-4.4.8">4.4.8</a>. Certificate Modification . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
89 <a href="#section-4.4.9">4.4.9</a>. Certificate Revocation and Suspension. . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
90 <a href="#section-4.4.10">4.4.10</a>. Certificate Status Services. . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
91 <a href="#section-4.4.11">4.4.11</a>. End of Subscription. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
92 <a href="#section-4.4.12">4.4.12</a>. Key Escrow and Recovery. . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
93 <a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
94 <a href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Physical Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>
95 <a href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Procedural Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-35">35</a>
96 <a href="#section-4.5.3">4.5.3</a>. Personnel Controls . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-35">35</a>
97 <a href="#section-4.5.4">4.5.4</a>. Audit Logging Procedures . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-36">36</a>
98 <a href="#section-4.5.5">4.5.5</a>. Records Archival . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-37">37</a>
99 <a href="#section-4.5.6">4.5.6</a>. Key Changeover . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-38">38</a>
100 <a href="#section-4.5.7">4.5.7</a>. Compromise and Disaster Recovery . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-38">38</a>
101 <a href="#section-4.5.8">4.5.8</a>. CA or RA Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-38">38</a>
102 <a href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Technical Security Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-39">39</a>
103 <a href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Key Pair Generation and Installation . . . . . . <a href="#page-39">39</a>
104 4.6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
111
112
113 Module Engineering Controls. . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-40">40</a>
114 <a href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a>
115 <a href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>. Activation Data. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a>
116 <a href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>. Computer Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a>
117 <a href="#section-4.6.6">4.6.6</a>. Life Cycle Security Controls . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-43">43</a>
118 <a href="#section-4.6.7">4.6.7</a>. Network Security Controls. . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-43">43</a>
119 <a href="#section-4.6.8">4.6.8</a>. Timestamping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-43">43</a>
120 <a href="#section-4.7">4.7</a>. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles. . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-44">44</a>
121 <a href="#section-4.7.1">4.7.1</a>. Certificate Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-44">44</a>
122 <a href="#section-4.7.2">4.7.2</a>. CRL Profile. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-44">44</a>
123 <a href="#section-4.7.3">4.7.3</a>. OCSP Profile . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-44">44</a>
124 <a href="#section-4.8">4.8</a>. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment. . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-45">45</a>
125 <a href="#section-4.9">4.9</a>. Other Business and Legal Matters . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-45">45</a>
126 <a href="#section-4.9.1">4.9.1</a>. Fees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-46">46</a>
127 <a href="#section-4.9.2">4.9.2</a>. Financial Responsibility . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-47">47</a>
128 <a href="#section-4.9.3">4.9.3</a>. Confidentiality of Business Information. . . . . <a href="#page-47">47</a>
129 <a href="#section-4.9.4">4.9.4</a>. Privacy of Personal Information. . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-48">48</a>
130 <a href="#section-4.9.5">4.9.5</a>. Intellectual Property Rights . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-48">48</a>
131 <a href="#section-4.9.6">4.9.6</a>. Representations and Warranties . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-48">48</a>
132 <a href="#section-4.9.7">4.9.7</a>. Disclaimers of Warranties. . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-49">49</a>
133 <a href="#section-4.9.8">4.9.8</a>. Limitations of Liability . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-49">49</a>
134 <a href="#section-4.9.9">4.9.9</a>. Indemnities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-49">49</a>
135 <a href="#section-4.9.10">4.9.10</a>. Term and Termination . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-50">50</a>
136 4.9.11. Individual notices and communications
137 with participants. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-50">50</a>
138 <a href="#section-4.9.12">4.9.12</a>. Amendments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-50">50</a>
139 <a href="#section-4.9.13">4.9.13</a>. Dispute Resolution Procedures. . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-51">51</a>
140 <a href="#section-4.9.14">4.9.14</a>. Governing Law. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-51">51</a>
141 <a href="#section-4.9.15">4.9.15</a>. Compliance with Applicable Law . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-51">51</a>
142 <a href="#section-4.9.16">4.9.16</a>. Miscellaneous Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-51">51</a>
143 <a href="#section-4.9.17">4.9.17</a>. Other Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-53">53</a>
144 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-53">53</a>
145 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Outline of a Set of Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-53">53</a>
146 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Comparison to <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-60">60</a>
147 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-88">88</a>
148 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-88">88</a>
149 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. Notes. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-89">89</a>
150 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. List of Acronyms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-91">91</a>
151 <a href="#section-13">13</a>. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-92">92</a>
152 <a href="#section-14">14</a>. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-94">94</a>
153
154
155
156
157
158
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
170
171 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Background</span>
172
173 In general, a public-key certificate (hereinafter "certificate")
174 binds a public key held by an entity (such as person, organization,
175 account, device, or site) to a set of information that identifies the
176 entity associated with use of the corresponding private key. In most
177 cases involving identity certificates, this entity is known as the
178 "subject" or "subscriber" of the certificate. Two exceptions,
179 however, include devices (in which the subscriber is usually the
180 individual or organization controlling the device) and anonymous
181 certificates (in which the identity of the individual or organization
182 is not available from the certificate itself). Other types of
183 certificates bind public keys to attributes of an entity other than
184 the entity's identity, such as a role, a title, or creditworthiness
185 information.
186
187 A certificate is used by a "certificate user" or "relying party" that
188 needs to use, and rely upon the accuracy of, the binding between the
189 subject public key distributed via that certificate and the identity
190 and/or other attributes of the subject contained in that certificate.
191 A relying party is frequently an entity that verifies a digital
192 signature from the certificate's subject where the digital signature
193 is associated with an email, web form, electronic document, or other
194 data. Other examples of relying parties can include a sender of
195 encrypted email to the subscriber, a user of a web browser relying on
196 a server certificate during a secure sockets layer (SSL) session, and
197 an entity operating a server that controls access to online
198 information using client certificates as an access control mechanism.
199 In summary, a relying party is an entity that uses a public key in a
200 certificate (for signature verification and/or encryption). The
201 degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in a
202 certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
203 the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
204 authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
205 and security controls; the scope of the subscriber's responsibilities
206 (for example, in protecting the private key); and the stated
207 responsibilities and liability terms and conditions of the CA (for
208 example, warranties, disclaimers of warranties, and limitations of
209 liability).
210
211 A Version 3 X.509 certificate may contain a field declaring that one
212 or more specific certificate policies apply to that certificate
213 [<a href="#ref-ISO1" title="&quot;Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory: Authentication Framework,&quot;">ISO1</a>]. According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named
214 set of rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
215 particular community and/or class of applications with common
216 security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
223
224
225 in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
226 sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
227 application. The CP concept is an outgrowth of the policy statement
228 concept developed for Internet Privacy Enhanced Mail [<a href="#ref-PEM1" title="&quot;Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail: Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management&quot;">PEM1</a>] and
229 expanded upon in [<a href="#ref-BAU1" title="June 1994">BAU1</a>]. The legal and liability aspects presented
230 in <a href="#section-4.9">Section 4.9</a> are outcomes of a collaborative effort between IETF
231 PKIX working group and the American Bar Association (ABA) members who
232 have worked on legal acceptance of digital signature and role of PKI
233 in that acceptance.
234
235 A more detailed description of the practices followed by a CA in
236 issuing and otherwise managing certificates may be contained in a
237 certification practice statement (CPS) published by or referenced by
238 the CA. According to the American Bar Association Information
239 Security Committee's Digital Signature Guidelines (hereinafter
240 "DSG")(1) and the Information Security Committee's PKI Assessment
241 Guidelines (hereinafter "PAG")(2), "a CPS is a statement of the
242 practices which a certification authority employs in issuing
243 certificates." [<a href="#ref-ABA1" title="Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce">ABA1</a>, <a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>] In general, CPSs also describe practices
244 relating to all certificate lifecycle services (e.g., issuance,
245 management, revocation, and renewal or re-keying), and CPSs provide
246 details concerning other business, legal, and technical matters. The
247 terms contained in a CP or CPS may or may not be binding upon a PKI's
248 participants as a contract. A CP or CPS may itself purport to be a
249 contract. More commonly, however, an agreement may incorporate a CP
250 or CPS by reference and therefore attempt to bind the parties of the
251 agreement to some or all of its terms. For example, some PKIs may
252 utilize a CP or (more commonly) a CPS that is incorporated by
253 reference in the agreement between a subscriber and a CA or RA
254 (called a "subscriber agreement") or the agreement between a relying
255 party and a CA (called a "relying party agreement" or "RPA"). In
256 other cases, however, a CP or CPS has no contractual significance at
257 all. A PKI may intend these CPs and CPSs to be strictly
258 informational or disclosure documents.
259
260 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Purpose</span>
261
262 The purpose of this document is twofold. First, the document aims to
263 explain the concepts of a CP and a CPS, describe the differences
264 between these two concepts, and describe their relationship to
265 subscriber and relying party agreements. Second, this document aims
266 to present a framework to assist the writers and users of certificate
267 policies or CPSs in drafting and understanding these documents. In
268 particular, the framework identifies the elements that may need to be
269 considered in formulating a CP or a CPS. The purpose is not to
270 define particular certificate policies or CPSs, per se. Moreover,
271 this document does not aim to provide legal advice or recommendations
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
279
280
281 as to particular requirements or practices that should be contained
282 within CPs or CPSs. (Such recommendations, however, appear in
283 [<a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>].)
284
285 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Scope</span>
286
287 The scope of this document is limited to discussion of the topics
288 that can be covered in a CP (as defined in X.509) or CPS (as defined
289 in the DSG and PAG). In particular, this document describes the
290 types of information that should be considered for inclusion in a CP
291 or a CPS. While the framework as presented generally assumes use of
292 the X.509 version 3 certificate format for the purpose of providing
293 assurances of identity, it is not intended that the material be
294 restricted to use of that certificate format or identity
295 certificates. Rather, it is intended that this framework be
296 adaptable to other certificate formats and to certificates providing
297 assurances other than identity that may come into use.
298
299 The scope does not extend to defining security policies generally
300 (such as organization security policy, system security policy, or
301 data labeling policy). Further, this document does not define a
302 specific CP or CPS. Moreover, in presenting a framework, this
303 document should be viewed and used as a flexible tool presenting
304 topics that should be considered of particular relevance to CPs or
305 CPSs, and not as a rigid formula for producing CPs or CPSs.
306
307 This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the general
308 concepts of digital signatures, certificates, and public-key
309 infrastructure (PKI), as used in X.509, the DSG, and the PAG.
310
311 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Definitions</span>
312
313 This document makes use of the following defined terms:
314
315 Activation data - Data values, other than keys, that are required to
316 operate cryptographic modules and that need to be protected (e.g., a
317 PIN, a passphrase, or a manually-held key share).
318
319 Authentication - The process of establishing that individuals,
320 organizations, or things are who or what they claim to be. In the
321 context of a PKI, authentication can be the process of establishing
322 that an individual or organization applying for or seeking access to
323 something under a certain name is, in fact, the proper individual or
324 organization. This corresponds to the second process involved with
325 identification, as shown in the definition of "identification" below.
326 Authentication can also refer to a security service that provides
327 assurances that individuals, organizations, or things are who or what
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
335
336
337 they claim to be or that a message or other data originated from a
338 specific individual, organization, or device. Thus, it is said that
339 a digital signature of a message authenticates the message's sender.
340
341 CA-certificate - A certificate for one CA's public key issued by
342 another CA.
343
344 Certificate policy (CP) - A named set of rules that indicates the
345 applicability of a certificate to a particular community and/or class
346 of application with common security requirements. For example, a
347 particular CP might indicate applicability of a type of certificate
348 to the authentication of parties engaging in business-to-business
349 transactions for the trading of goods or services within a given
350 price range.
351
352 Certification path - An ordered sequence of certificates that,
353 together with the public key of the initial object in the path, can
354 be processed to obtain that of the final object in the path.
355
356 Certification Practice Statement (CPS) - A statement of the practices
357 that a certification authority employs in issuing, managing,
358 revoking, and renewing or re-keying certificates.
359
360 CPS Summary (or CPS Abstract) - A subset of the provisions of a
361 complete CPS that is made public by a CA.
362
363 Identification - The process of establishing the identity of an
364 individual or organization, i.e., to show that an individual or
365 organization is a specific individual or organization. In the
366 context of a PKI, identification refers to two processes:
367
368 (1) establishing that a given name of an individual or organization
369 corresponds to a real-world identity of an individual or
370 organization, and
371
372 (2) establishing that an individual or organization applying for or
373 seeking access to something under that name is, in fact, the
374 named individual or organization. A person seeking
375 identification may be a certificate applicant, an applicant for
376 employment in a trusted position within a PKI participant, or a
377 person seeking access to a network or software application, such
378 as a CA administrator seeking access to CA systems.
379
380 Issuing certification authority (issuing CA) - In the context of a
381 particular certificate, the issuing CA is the CA that issued the
382 certificate (see also Subject certification authority).
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
391
392
393 Participant - An individual or organization that plays a role within
394 a given PKI as a subscriber, relying party, CA, RA, certificate
395 manufacturing authority, repository service provider, or similar
396 entity.
397
398 PKI Disclosure Statement (PDS) - An instrument that supplements a CP
399 or CPS by disclosing critical information about the policies and
400 practices of a CA/PKI. A PDS is a vehicle for disclosing and
401 emphasizing information normally covered in detail by associated CP
402 and/or CPS documents. Consequently, a PDS is not intended to replace
403 a CP or CPS.
404
405 Policy qualifier - Policy-dependent information that may accompany a
406 CP identifier in an X.509 certificate. Such information can include
407 a pointer to the URL of the applicable CPS or relying party
408 agreement. It may also include text (or number causing the
409 appearance of text) that contains terms of the use of the certificate
410 or other legal information.
411
412 Registration authority (RA) - An entity that is responsible for one
413 or more of the following functions: the identification and
414 authentication of certificate applicants, the approval or rejection
415 of certificate applications, initiating certificate revocations or
416 suspensions under certain circumstances, processing subscriber
417 requests to revoke or suspend their certificates, and approving or
418 rejecting requests by subscribers to renew or re-key their
419 certificates. RAs, however, do not sign or issue certificates (i.e.,
420 an RA is delegated certain tasks on behalf of a CA). [Note: The term
421 Local Registration Authority (LRA) is sometimes used in other
422 documents for the same concept.]
423
424 Relying party - A recipient of a certificate who acts in reliance on
425 that certificate and/or any digital signatures verified using that
426 certificate. In this document, the terms "certificate user" and
427 "relying party" are used interchangeably.
428
429 Relying party agreement (RPA) - An agreement between a certification
430 authority and relying party that typically establishes the rights and
431 responsibilities between those parties regarding the verification of
432 digital signatures or other uses of certificates.
433
434 Set of provisions - A collection of practice and/or policy
435 statements, spanning a range of standard topics, for use in
436 expressing a CP or CPS employing the approach described in this
437 framework.
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
447
448
449 Subject certification authority (subject CA) - In the context of a
450 particular CA-certificate, the subject CA is the CA whose public key
451 is certified in the certificate (see also Issuing certification
452 authority).
453
454 Subscriber - A subject of a certificate who is issued a certificate.
455
456 Subscriber Agreement - An agreement between a CA and a subscriber
457 that establishes the right and responsibilities of the parties
458 regarding the issuance and management of certificates.
459
460 Validation - The process of identification of certificate applicants.
461 "Validation" is a subset of "identification" and refers to
462 identification in the context of establishing the identity of
463 certificate applicants.
464
465 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Concepts</span>
466
467 This section explains the concepts of CP and CPS, and describes their
468 relationship with other PKI documents, such as subscriber agreements
469 and relying party agreements. Other related concepts are also
470 described. Some of the material covered in this section and in some
471 other sections is specific to certificate policies extensions as
472 defined X.509 version 3. Except for those sections, this framework
473 is intended to be adaptable to other certificate formats that may
474 come into use.
475
476 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Certificate Policy</span>
477
478 When a certification authority issues a certificate, it is providing
479 a statement to a certificate user (i.e., a relying party) that a
480 particular public key is bound to the identity and/or other
481 attributes of a particular entity (the certificate subject, which is
482 usually also the subscriber). The extent to which the relying party
483 should rely on that statement by the CA, however, needs to be
484 assessed by the relying party or entity controlling or coordinating
485 the way relying parties or relying party applications use
486 certificates. Different certificates are issued following different
487 practices and procedures, and may be suitable for different
488 applications and/or purposes.
489
490 The X.509 standard defines a CP as "a named set of rules that
491 indicates the applicability of a certificate to a particular
492 community and/or class of application with common security
493 requirements" [<a href="#ref-ISO1" title="&quot;Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory: Authentication Framework,&quot;">ISO1</a>]. An X.509 Version 3 certificate may identify a
494 specific applicable CP, which may be used by a relying party to
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
503
504
505 decide whether or not to trust a certificate, associated public key,
506 or any digital signatures verified using the public key for a
507 particular purpose.
508
509 CPs typically fall into two major categories. First, some CPs
510 "indicate the applicability of a certificate to a particular
511 community" [<a href="#ref-ISO1" title="&quot;Information Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory: Authentication Framework,&quot;">ISO1</a>]. These CPs set forth requirements for certificate
512 usage and requirements on members of a community. For instance, a CP
513 may focus on the needs of a geographical community, such as the ETSI
514 policy requirements for CAs issuing qualified certificates [<a href="#ref-ETS" title="&quot;Policy Requirements for Certification Authorities Issuing Qualified Certificates,&quot;">ETS</a>].
515 Also, a CP of this kind may focus on the needs of a specific
516 vertical-market community, such as financial services [<a href="#ref-IDT" title="&quot;Identrus Identity Certificate Policy&quot;">IDT</a>].
517
518 The second category of typical CPs "indicate the applicability of a
519 certificate to a . . . class of application with common security
520 requirements." These CPs identify a set of applications or uses for
521 certificates and say that these applications or uses require a
522 certain level of security. They then set forth PKI requirements that
523 are appropriate for these applications or uses. A CP within this
524 category often makes sets requirements appropriate for a certain
525 "level of assurance" provided by certificates, relative to
526 certificates issued pursuant to related CPs. These levels of
527 assurance may correspond to "classes" or "types" of certificates.
528
529 For instance, the Government of Canada PKI Policy Management
530 Authority (GOC PMA) has established eight certificate policies in a
531 single document [<a href="#ref-GOC" title="&quot;Digital Signature and Confidentiality Certificate Policies for the Government of Canada Public Key Infrastructure,&quot;">GOC</a>], four policies for certificates used for
532 digital signatures and four policies for certificates used for
533 confidentiality encryption. For each of these applications, the
534 document establishes four levels of assurances: rudimentary, basic,
535 medium, and high. The GOC PMA described certain types of digital
536 signature and confidentiality uses in the document, each with a
537 certain set of security requirements, and grouped them into eight
538 categories. The GOC PMA then established PKI requirements for each
539 of these categories, thereby creating eight types of certificates,
540 each providing rudimentary, basic, medium, or high levels of
541 assurance. The progression from rudimentary to high levels
542 corresponds to increasing security requirements and corresponding
543 increasing levels of assurance.
544
545 A CP is represented in a certificate by a unique number called an
546 "Object Identifier" (OID). That OID, or at least an "arc", can be
547 registered. An "arc" is the beginning of the numerical sequence of
548 an OID and is assigned to a particular organization. The
549 registration process follows the procedures specified in ISO/IEC and
550 ITU standards. The party that registers the OID or arc also can
551 publish the text of the CP, for examination by relying parties. Any
552 one certificate will typically declare a single CP or, possibly, be
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
559
560
561 issued consistent with a small number of different policies. Such
562 declaration appears in the Certificate Policies extension of a X.509
563 Version 3 certificate. When a CA places multiple CPs within a
564 certificate's Certificate Policies extension, the CA is asserting
565 that the certificate is appropriate for use in accordance with any of
566 the listed CPs.
567
568 CPs also constitute a basis for an audit, accreditation, or another
569 assessment of a CA. Each CA can be assessed against one or more
570 certificate policies or CPSs that it is recognized as implementing.
571 When one CA issues a CA-certificate for another CA, the issuing CA
572 must assess the set of certificate policies for which it trusts the
573 subject CA (such assessment may be based upon an assessment with
574 respect to the certificate policies involved). The assessed set of
575 certificate policies is then indicated by the issuing CA in the CA-
576 certificate. The X.509 certification path processing logic employs
577 these CP indications in its well-defined trust model.
578
579 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Certificate Policy Examples</span>
580
581 For example purposes, suppose that the International Air Transport
582 Association (IATA) undertakes to define some certificate policies for
583 use throughout the airline industry, in a PKI operated by IATA in
584 combination with PKIs operated by individual airlines. Two CPs might
585 be defined - the IATA General-Purpose CP, and the IATA Commercial-
586 Grade CP.
587
588 The IATA General-Purpose CP could be used by industry personnel for
589 protecting routine information (e.g., casual electronic mail) and for
590 authenticating connections from World Wide Web browsers to servers
591 for general information retrieval purposes. The key pairs may be
592 generated, stored, and managed using low-cost, software-based
593 systems, such as commercial browsers. Under this policy, a
594 certificate may be automatically issued to anybody listed as an
595 employee in the corporate directory of IATA or any member airline who
596 submits a signed certificate request form to a network administrator
597 in his or her organization.
598
599 The IATA Commercial-Grade CP could be used to protect financial
600 transactions or binding contractual exchanges between airlines.
601 Under this policy, IATA could require that certified key pairs be
602 generated and stored in approved cryptographic hardware tokens.
603 Certificates and tokens could be provided to airline employees with
604 disbursement authority. These authorized individuals might then be
605 required to present themselves to the corporate security office, show
606 a valid identification badge, and sign a subscriber agreement
607 requiring them to protect the token and use it only for authorized
608 purposes, as a condition of being issued a token and a certificate.
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. X.509 Certificate Fields</span>
618
619 The following extension fields in an X.509 certificate are used to
620 support CPs:
621
622 * Certificate Policies extension;
623 * Policy Mappings extension; and
624 * Policy Constraints extension.
625
626 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. Certificate Policies Extension</span>
627
628 A Certificate Policies field lists CPs that the certification
629 authority declares are applicable. Using the example of the IATA
630 General-Purpose and Commercial-Grade policies defined in <a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>,
631 the certificates issued to regular airline employees would contain
632 the object identifier for General-Purpose policy. The certificates
633 issued to the employees with disbursement authority would contain the
634 object identifiers for both the General-Purpose policy and the
635 Commercial-Grade policy. The inclusion of both object identifiers in
636 the certificates means that they would be appropriate for either the
637 General-Purpose or Commercial-Grade policies. The Certificate
638 Policies field may also optionally convey qualifier values for each
639 identified policy; the use of qualifiers is discussed in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>.
640
641 When processing a certification path, a CP that is acceptable to the
642 relying party application must be present in every certificate in the
643 path, i.e., in CA-certificates as well as end entity certificates.
644
645 If the Certificate Policies field is flagged critical, it serves the
646 same purpose as described above but also has an additional role.
647 Specifically, it indicates that the use of the certificate is
648 restricted to one of the identified policies, i.e., the certification
649 authority is declaring that the certificate must only be used in
650 accordance with the provisions of at least one of the listed CPs.
651 This field is intended to protect the certification authority against
652 claims for damages asserted by a relying party who has used the
653 certificate for an inappropriate purpose or in an inappropriate
654 manner, as stipulated in the applicable CP.
655
656 For example, the Internal Revenue Service might issue certificates to
657 taxpayers for the purpose of protecting tax filings. The Internal
658 Revenue Service understands and can accommodate the risks of
659 erroneously issuing a bad certificate, e.g., to an imposter.
660 Suppose, however, that someone used an Internal Revenue Service tax-
661 filing certificate as the basis for encrypting multi-million-dollar-
662 value proprietary trade secrets, which subsequently fell into the
663 wrong hands because of a cryptanalytic attack by an attacker who is
664 able to decrypt the message. The Internal Revenue Service may want
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
671
672
673 to defend itself against claims for damages in such circumstances by
674 pointing to the criticality of the Certificate Policies extension to
675 show that the subscriber and relying party misused the certificate.
676 The critical-flagged Certificate Policies extension is intended to
677 mitigate the risk to the CA in such situations.
678
679 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Policy Mappings Extension</span>
680
681 The Policy Mappings extension may only be used in CA-certificates.
682 This field allows a certification authority to indicate that certain
683 policies in its own domain can be considered equivalent to certain
684 other policies in the subject certification authority's domain.
685
686 For example, suppose that for purposes of facilitating
687 interoperability, the ACE Corporation establishes an agreement with
688 the ABC Corporation to cross-certify the public keys of each others'
689 certification authorities for the purposes of mutually securing their
690 respective business-to-business exchanges. Further, suppose that
691 both companies have pre-existing financial transaction protection
692 policies called ace-e-commerce and abc-e-commerce, respectively. One
693 can see that simply generating cross-certificates between the two
694 domains will not provide the necessary interoperability, as the two
695 companies' applications are configured with, and employee
696 certificates are populated with, their respective certificate
697 policies. One possible solution is to reconfigure all of the
698 financial applications to require either policy and to reissue all
699 the certificates with both policies appearing in their Certificate
700 Policies extensions. Another solution, which may be easier to
701 administer, uses the Policy Mapping field. If this field is included
702 in a cross-certificate for the ABC Corporation certification
703 authority issued by the ACE Corporation certification authority, it
704 can provide a statement that the ABC's financial transaction
705 protection policy (i.e., abc-e-commerce) can be considered equivalent
706 to that of the ACE Corporation (i.e., ace-e-commerce). With such a
707 statement included in the cross-certificate issued to ABC, relying
708 party applications in the ACE domain requiring the presence of the
709 object identifier for the ace-e-commerce CP can also accept, process,
710 and rely upon certificates issued within the ABC domain containing
711 the object identifier for the abc-e-commerce CP.
712
713 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3" href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Policy Constraints Extension</span>
714
715 The Policy Constraints extension supports two optional features. The
716 first is the ability for a certification authority to require that
717 explicit CP indications be present in all subsequent certificates in
718 a certification path. Certificates at the start of a certification
719 path may be considered by a relying party to be part of a trusted
720 domain, i.e., certification authorities are trusted for all purposes
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
727
728
729 so no particular CP is needed in the Certificate Policies extension.
730 Such certificates need not contain explicit indications of CP. When
731 a certification authority in the trusted domain, however, certifies
732 outside the domain, it can activate the requirement that a specific
733 CP's object identifier appear in subsequent certificates in the
734 certification path.
735
736 The other optional feature in the Policy Constraints field is the
737 ability for a certification authority to disable policy mapping by
738 subsequent certification authorities in a certification path. It may
739 be prudent to disable policy mapping when certifying outside the
740 domain. This can assist in controlling risks due to transitive
741 trust, e.g., a domain A trusts domain B, domain B trusts domain C,
742 but domain A does not want to be forced to trust domain C.
743
744 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.4" href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a>. Policy Qualifiers</span>
745
746 The Certificate Policies extension field has a provision for
747 conveying, along with each CP identifier, additional policy-dependent
748 information in a qualifier field. The X.509 standard does not
749 mandate the purpose for which this field is to be used, nor does it
750 prescribe the syntax for this field. Policy qualifier types can be
751 registered by any organization.
752
753 The following policy qualifier types are defined in PKIX <a href="./rfc3280">RFC 3280</a>
754 [<a href="#ref-PKI1" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">PKI1</a>]:
755
756 (a) The CPS Pointer qualifier contains a pointer to a CPS, CPS
757 Summary, RPA, or PDS published by the CA. The pointer is in the
758 form of a uniform resource identifier (URI).
759
760 (b) The User Notice qualifier contains a text string that is to be
761 displayed to subscribers and relying parties prior to the use of
762 the certificate. The text string may be an IA5String or a
763 BMPString - a subset of the ISO 100646-1 multiple octet coded
764 character set. A CA may invoke a procedure that requires that
765 the relying party acknowledge that the applicable terms and
766 conditions have been disclosed and/or accepted.
767
768 Policy qualifiers can be used to support the definition of generic,
769 or parameterized, CPs. Provided the base CP so provides, policy
770 qualifier types can be defined to convey, on a per-certificate basis,
771 additional specific policy details that fill in the generic
772 definition.
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
783
784
785 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Certification Practice Statement</span>
786
787 The term certification practice statement (CPS) is defined by the DSG
788 and PAG as: "A statement of the practices which a certification
789 authority employs in issuing certificates." [<a href="#ref-ABA1" title="Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure Electronic Commerce">ABA1</a>, <a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>] As stated
790 above, a CPS establishes practices concerning lifecycle services in
791 addition to issuance, such as certificate management (including
792 publication and archiving), revocation, and renewal or re-keying. In
793 the DSG, the ABA expands this definition with the following comments:
794
795 "A certification practice statement may take the form of a
796 declaration by the certification authority of the details of its
797 trustworthy system and the practices it employs in its operations and
798 in support of issuance of a certificate . . . ." This form of CPS is
799 the most common type, and can vary in length and level of detail.
800
801 Some PKIs may not have the need to create a thorough and detailed
802 statement of practices. For example, the CA may itself be the
803 relying party and would already be aware of the nature and
804 trustworthiness of its services. In other cases, a PKI may provide
805 certificates providing only a very low level of assurances where the
806 applications being secured may pose only marginal risks if
807 compromised. In these cases, an organization establishing a PKI may
808 only want to write or have CAs use a subscriber agreement, relying
809 party agreement, or agreement combining subscriber and relying party
810 terms, depending on the role of the different PKI participants. In
811 such a PKI, that agreement may serve as the only "statement of
812 practices" used by one or more CAs within that PKI. Consequently,
813 that agreement may also be considered a CPS and can be entitled or
814 subtitled as such.
815
816 Likewise, since a detailed CPS may contain sensitive details of its
817 system, a CA may elect not to publish its entire CPS. It may instead
818 opt to publish a CPS Summary (or CPS Abstract). The CPS Summary
819 would contain only those provisions from the CPS that the CA
820 considers to be relevant to the participants in the PKI (such as the
821 responsibilities of the parties or the stages of the certificate
822 lifecycle). A CPS Summary, however, would not contain those
823 sensitive provisions of the full CPS that might provide an attacker
824 with useful information about the CA's operations. Throughout this
825 document, the use of "CPS" includes both a detailed CPS and a CPS
826 Summary (unless otherwise specified).
827
828 CPSs do not automatically constitute contracts and do not
829 automatically bind PKI participants as a contract would. Where a
830 document serves the dual purpose of being a subscriber or relying
831 party agreement and CPS, the document is intended to be a contract
832 and constitutes a binding contract to the extent that a subscriber or
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
839
840
841 relying party agreement would ordinarily be considered as such. Most
842 CPSs, however, do not serve such a dual purpose. Therefore, in most
843 cases, a CPS's terms have a binding effect as contract terms only if
844 a separate document creates a contractual relationship between the
845 parties and that document incorporates part or all of the CPS by
846 reference. Further, if a particular PKI employs a CPS Summary (as
847 opposed to the entire CPS), the CPS Summary could be incorporated
848 into any applicable subscriber or relying party agreement.
849
850 In the future, a court or applicable statutory or regulatory law may
851 declare that a certificate itself is a document that is capable of
852 creating a contractual relationship, to the extent its mechanisms
853 designed for incorporation by reference (such as the Certificate
854 Policies extension and its qualifiers) indicate that terms of its use
855 appear in certain documents. In the meantime, however, some
856 subscriber agreements and relying party agreements may incorporate a
857 CPS by reference and therefore make its terms binding on the parties
858 to such agreements.
859
860 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Relationship Between Certificate Policy and Certification</span>
861 <span class="h3"> Practice Statement</span>
862
863 The CP and CPS address the same set of topics that are of interest to
864 the relying party in terms of the degree to and purpose for which a
865 public key certificate should be trusted. Their primary difference
866 is in the focus of their provisions. A CP sets forth the
867 requirements and standards imposed by the PKI with respect to the
868 various topics. In other words, the purpose of the CP is to
869 establish what participants must do. A CPS, by contrast, states how
870 a CA and other participants in a given domain implement procedures
871 and controls to meet the requirements stated in the CP. In other
872 words, the purpose of the CPS is to disclose how the participants
873 perform their functions and implement controls.
874
875 An additional difference between a CP and CPS relates the scope of
876 coverage of the two kinds of documents. Since a CP is a statement of
877 requirements, it best serves as the vehicle for communicating minimum
878 operating guidelines that must be met by interoperating PKIs. Thus,
879 a CP generally applies to multiple CAs, multiple organizations, or
880 multiple domains. By contrast, a CPS applies only to a single CA or
881 single organization and is not generally a vehicle to facilitate
882 interoperation.
883
884 A CA with a single CPS may support multiple CPs (used for different
885 application purposes and/or by different relying party communities).
886 Also, multiple CAs, with non-identical CPSs, may support the same CP.
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
895
896
897 For example, the Federal Government might define a government-wide CP
898 for handling confidential human resources information. The CP will
899 be a broad statement of the general requirements for participants
900 within the Government's PKI, and an indication of the types of
901 applications for which it is suitable for use. Each department or
902 agency wishing to operate a certification authority in this PKI may
903 be required to write its own certification practice statement to
904 support this CP by explaining how it meets the requirements of the
905 CP. At the same time, a department's or agency's CPS may support
906 other certificate policies.
907
908 An additional difference between a CP and CPS concerns the level of
909 detail of the provisions in each. Although the level of detail may
910 vary among CPSs, a CPS will generally be more detailed than a CP. A
911 CPS provides a detailed description of procedures and controls in
912 place to meet the CP requirements, while a CP is more general.
913
914 The main differences between CPs and CPSs can therefore be summarized
915 as follows:
916
917 (a) A PKI uses a CP to establish requirements that state what
918 participants within it must do. A single CA or organization can
919 use a CPS to disclose how it meets the requirements of a CP or
920 how it implements its practices and controls.
921
922 (b) A CP facilitates interoperation through cross-certification,
923 unilateral certification, or other means. Therefore, it is
924 intended to cover multiple CAs. By contrast, a CPS is a
925 statement of a single CA or organization. Its purpose is not to
926 facilitate interoperation (since doing so is the function of a
927 CP).
928
929 (c) A CPS is generally more detailed than a CP and specifies how the
930 CA meets the requirements specified in the one or more CPs under
931 which it issues certificates.
932
933 In addition to populating the certificate policies extension with the
934 applicable CP object identifier, a certification authority may
935 include, in certificates it issues, a reference to its certification
936 practice statement. A standard way to do this, using a CP qualifier,
937 is described in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>.
938
939 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Relationship Among CPs, CPSs, Agreements, and Other Documents</span>
940
941 CPs and CPSs play a central role in documenting the requirements and
942 practices of a PKI. Nonetheless, they are not the only documents
943 relevant to a PKI. For instance, subscriber agreements and relying
944 party agreements play a critical role in allocating responsibilities
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
951
952
953 to subscribers and relying parties relating to the use of
954 certificates and key pairs. They establish the terms and conditions
955 under which certificates are issued, managed, and used. The term
956 subscriber agreement is defined by the PAG as: "An agreement between
957 a CA and a subscriber that establishes the right and obligations of
958 the parties regarding the issuance and management of certificates."
959 [<a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>] The PAG defines a relying party agreement as: "An agreement
960 between a certification authority and relying party that typically
961 establishes the rights and obligations between those parties
962 regarding the verification of digital signatures or other uses of
963 certificates." [<a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>]
964
965 As mentioned in <a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>, a subscriber agreement, relying party
966 agreement, or an agreement that combines subscriber and relying party
967 terms may also serve as a CPS. In other PKIs, however, a subscriber
968 or relying party agreement may incorporate some or all of the terms
969 of a CP or CPS by reference. Yet other PKIs may distill from a CP
970 and/or CPS the terms that are applicable to a subscriber and place
971 such terms in a self-contained subscriber agreement, without
972 incorporating a CP or CPS by reference. They may use the same method
973 to distill relying party terms from a CP and/or CPS and place such
974 terms in a self-contained relying party agreement. Creating such
975 self-contained agreements has the advantage of creating documents
976 that are easier for consumers to review. In some cases, subscribers
977 or relying parties may be deemed to be "consumers" under applicable
978 law, who are subject to certain statutory or regulatory protections.
979 Under the legal systems of civil law countries, incorporating a CP or
980 CPS by reference may not be effective to bind consumers to the terms
981 of an incorporated CP or CPS.
982
983 CPs and CPSs may be incorporated by reference in other documents,
984 including:
985
986 * Interoperability agreements (including agreements between CAs for
987 cross-certification, unilateral certification, or other forms of
988 interoperation),
989
990 * Vendor agreements (under which a PKI vendor agrees to meet
991 standards set forth in a CP or CPS), or
992
993 * A PDS. See [<a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>]
994
995 A PDS serves a similar function to a CPS Summary. It is a relatively
996 short document containing only a subset of critical details about a
997 PKI or CA. It may differ from a CPS Summary, however, in that its
998 purpose is to act as a summary of information about the overall
999 nature of the PKI, as opposed to simply a condensed form of the CPS.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1007
1008
1009 Moreover, its purpose is to distill information about the PKI, as
1010 opposed to protecting security sensitive information contained in an
1011 unpublished CPS, although a PDS could also serve that function.
1012
1013 Just as writers may wish to refer to a CP or CPS or incorporate it by
1014 reference in an agreement or PDS, a CP or CPS may refer to other
1015 documents when establishing requirements or making disclosures. For
1016 instance, a CP may set requirements for certificate content by
1017 referring to an external document setting forth a standard
1018 certificate profile. Referencing external documents permits a CP or
1019 CPS to impose detailed requirements or make detailed disclosures
1020 without having to reprint lengthy provisions from other documents
1021 within the CP or CPS. Moreover, referencing a document in a CP or
1022 CPS is another useful way of dividing disclosures between public
1023 information and security sensitive confidential information (in
1024 addition to or as an alternative to publishing a CPS Summary). For
1025 example, a PKI may want to publish a CP or CPS, but maintain site
1026 construction parameters for CA high security zones as confidential
1027 information. In that case, the CP or CPS could reference an external
1028 manual or document containing the detailed site construction
1029 parameters.
1030
1031 Documents that a PKI may wish to refer to in a CP or CPS include:
1032
1033 * A security policy,
1034
1035 * Training, operational, installation, and user manuals (which may
1036 contain operational requirements),
1037
1038 * Standards documents that apply to particular aspects of the PKI
1039 (such as standards specifying the level of protection offered by
1040 any hardware tokens used in the PKI or standards applicable to the
1041 site construction),
1042
1043 * Key management plans,
1044
1045 * Human resource guides and employment manuals (which may describe
1046 some aspects of personnel security practices), and
1047
1048 * E-mail policies (which may discuss subscriber and relying party
1049 responsibilities, as well as the implications of key management,
1050 if applicable). See [<a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>]
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1063
1064
1065 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Set of Provisions</span>
1066
1067 A set of provisions is a collection of practice and/or policy
1068 statements, spanning a range of standard topics for use in expressing
1069 a CP or CPS employing the approach described in this framework by
1070 covering the topic appearing in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> below. They are also
1071 described in detail in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> below.
1072
1073 A CP can be expressed as a single set of provisions.
1074
1075 A CPS can be expressed as a single set of provisions with each
1076 component addressing the requirements of one or more certificate
1077 policies, or, alternatively, as an organized collection of sets of
1078 provisions. For example, a CPS could be expressed as a combination
1079 of the following:
1080
1081 (a) a list of certificate policies supported by the CPS;
1082
1083 (b) for each CP in (a), a set of provisions that contains statements
1084 responding to that CP by filling in details not stipulated in
1085 that policy or expressly left to the discretion of the CA (in its
1086 CPS) ; such statements serve to state how this particular CPS
1087 implements the requirements of the particular CP; or
1088
1089 (c) a set of provisions that contains statements regarding the
1090 certification practices on the CA, regardless of CP.
1091
1092 The statements provided in (b) and (c) may augment or refine the
1093 stipulations of the applicable CP, but generally must not conflict
1094 with any of the stipulations of such CP. In certain cases, however,
1095 a policy authority may permit exceptions to the requirements in a CP,
1096 because certain compensating controls of the CA are disclosed in its
1097 CPS that allow the CA to provide assurances that are equivalent to
1098 the assurances provided by CAs that are in full compliance with the
1099 CP.
1100
1101 This framework outlines the contents of a set of provisions, in terms
1102 of nine primary components, as follows:
1103
1104 1. Introduction
1105 2. Publication and Repository
1106 3. Identification and Authentication
1107 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements
1108 5. Facilities, Management, and Operational Controls
1109 6. Technical Security Controls
1110 7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profile
1111 8. Compliance audit
1112 9. Other Business and Legal Matters
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1119
1120
1121 PKIs can use this simple framework of nine primary components to
1122 write a simple CP or CPS. Moreover, a CA can use this same framework
1123 to write a subscriber agreement, relying party agreement, or
1124 agreement containing subscriber and relying party terms. If a CA
1125 uses this simple framework to construct an agreement, it can use
1126 paragraph 1 as an introduction or recitals, it can set forth the
1127 responsibilities of the parties in paragraphs 2-8, and it can use
1128 paragraph 9 to cover the business and legal issues described in more
1129 detail, using the ordering of <a href="#section-4.9">Section 4.9</a> below (such as
1130 representations and warranties, disclaimers, and liability
1131 limitations). The ordering of topics in this simple framework and
1132 the business and legal matters <a href="#section-4.9">Section 4.9</a> is the same as (or similar
1133 to) the ordering of topics in a typical software or other technology
1134 agreement. Therefore, a PKI can establish a set of core documents
1135 (with a CP, CPS, subscriber agreement, and relying party agreement)
1136 all having the same structure and ordering of topics, thereby
1137 facilitating comparisons and mappings among these documents and among
1138 the corresponding documents of other PKIs.
1139
1140 This simple framework may also be useful for agreements other than
1141 subscriber agreements and relying party agreements. For instance, a
1142 CA wishing to outsource certain services to an RA or certificate
1143 manufacturing authority (CMA) may find it useful to use this
1144 framework as a checklist to write a registration authority agreement
1145 or outsourcing agreement. Similarly, two CAs may wish to use this
1146 simple framework for the purpose of drafting a cross-certification,
1147 unilateral certification, or other interoperability agreement.
1148
1149 In short, the primary components of the simple framework (specified
1150 above) may meet the needs of drafters of short CPs, CPSs, subscriber
1151 agreements, and relying party agreements. Nonetheless, this
1152 framework is extensible, and its coverage of the nine components is
1153 flexible enough to meet the needs of drafters of comprehensive CPs
1154 and CPSs. Specifically, components appearing above can be further
1155 divided into subcomponents, and a subcomponent may comprise multiple
1156 elements. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> provides a more detailed description of the
1157 contents of the above components, and their subcomponents. Drafters
1158 of CPs and CPSs are permitted to add additional levels of
1159 subcomponents below the subcomponents described in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> for the
1160 purpose of meeting the needs of the drafter's particular PKI.
1161
1162 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Contents of a Set of Provisions</span>
1163
1164 This section expands upon the contents of the simple framework of
1165 provisions, as introduced in <a href="#section-3.7">Section 3.7</a>. The topics identified in
1166 this section are, consequently, candidate topics for inclusion in a
1167 detailed CP or CPS.
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1175
1176
1177 While many topics are identified, it is not necessary for a CP or a
1178 CPS to include a concrete statement for every such topic. Rather, a
1179 particular CP or CPS may state "no stipulation" for a component,
1180 subcomponent, or element on which the particular CP or CPS imposes no
1181 requirements or makes no disclosure. In this sense, the list of
1182 topics can be considered a checklist of topics for consideration by
1183 the CP or CPS writer.
1184
1185 It is recommended that each and every component and subcomponent be
1186 included in a CP or CPS, even if there is "no stipulation"; this will
1187 indicate to the reader that a conscious decision was made to include
1188 or exclude a provision concerning that topic. This drafting style
1189 protects against inadvertent omission of a topic, while facilitating
1190 comparison of different certificate policies or CPSs, e.g., when
1191 making policy mapping decisions.
1192
1193 In a CP, it is possible to leave certain components, subcomponents,
1194 and/or elements unspecified, and to stipulate that the required
1195 information will be indicated in a policy qualifier, or the document
1196 to which a policy qualifier points. Such CPs can be considered
1197 parameterized definitions. The set of provisions should reference or
1198 define the required policy qualifier types and should specify any
1199 applicable default values.
1200
1201 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Introductions</span>
1202
1203 This component identifies and introduces the set of provisions, and
1204 indicates the types of entities and applications for which the
1205 document (either the CP or the CPS being written) is targeted.
1206
1207 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Overview</span>
1208
1209 This subcomponent provides a general introduction to the document
1210 being written. This subcomponent can also be used to provide a
1211 synopsis of the PKI to which the CP or CPS applies. For example, it
1212 may set out different levels of assurance provided by certificates
1213 within the PKI. Depending on the complexity and scope of the
1214 particular PKI, a diagrammatic representation of the PKI might be
1215 useful here.
1216
1217 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Document Name and Identification</span>
1218
1219 This subcomponent provides any applicable names or other identifiers,
1220 including ASN.1 object identifiers, for the document. An example of
1221 such a document name would be the US Federal Government Policy for
1222 Secure E-mail.
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1231
1232
1233 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.3" href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. PKI Participants</span>
1234
1235 This subcomponent describes the identity or types of entities that
1236 fill the roles of participants within a PKI, namely:
1237
1238 * Certification authorities, i.e., the entities that issue
1239 certificates. A CA is the issuing CA with respect to the
1240 certificates it issues and is the subject CA with respect to the
1241 CA certificate issued to it. CAs may be organized in a hierarchy
1242 in which an organization's CA issues certificates to CAs operated
1243 by subordinate organizations, such as a branch, division, or
1244 department within a larger organization.
1245
1246 * Registration authorities, i.e., the entities that establish
1247 enrollment procedures for end-user certificate applicants, perform
1248 identification and authentication of certificate applicants,
1249 initiate or pass along revocation requests for certificates, and
1250 approve applications for renewal or re-keying certificates on
1251 behalf of a CA. Subordinate organizations within a larger
1252 organization can act as RAs for the CA serving the entire
1253 organization, but RAs may also be external to the CA.
1254
1255 * Subscribers. Examples of subscribers who receive certificates
1256 from a CA include employees of an organization with its own CA,
1257 banking or brokerage customers, organizations hosting e-commerce
1258 sites, organizations participating in a business-to-business
1259 exchange, and members of the public receiving certificates from a
1260 CA issuing certificates to the public at large.
1261
1262 * Relying parties. Examples of relying parties include employees of
1263 an organization having its own CA who receive digitally signed e-
1264 mails from other employees, persons buying goods and services from
1265 e-commerce sites, organizations participating in a business-to-
1266 business exchange who receive bids or orders from other
1267 participating organizations, and individuals and organizations
1268 doing business with subscribers who have received their
1269 certificates from a CA issuing certificates to the public.
1270 Relying parties may or may not also be subscribers within a given
1271 PKI.
1272
1273 * Other participants, such as certificate manufacturing authorities,
1274 providers of repository services, and other entities providing
1275 PKI-related services.
1276
1277
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1287
1288
1289 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.4" href="#section-4.1.4">4.1.4</a>. Certificate Usage</span>
1290
1291 This subcomponent contains:
1292
1293 * A list or the types of applications for which the issued
1294 certificates are suitable, such as electronic mail, retail
1295 transactions, contracts, and a travel order, and/or
1296
1297 * A list or the types of applications for which use of the issued
1298 certificates is prohibited.
1299
1300 In the case of a CP or CPS describing different levels of assurance,
1301 this subcomponent can describe applications or types of applications
1302 that are appropriate or inappropriate for the different levels of
1303 assurance.
1304
1305 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.5" href="#section-4.1.5">4.1.5</a>. Policy Administration</span>
1306
1307 This subcomponent includes the name and mailing address of the
1308 organization that is responsible for the drafting, registering,
1309 maintaining, and updating of this CP or CPS. It also includes the
1310 name, electronic mail address, telephone number, and fax number of a
1311 contact person. As an alternative to naming an actual person, the
1312 document may name a title or role, an e-mail alias, and other
1313 generalized contact information. In some cases, the organization may
1314 state that its contact person, alone or in combination with others,
1315 is available to answer questions about the document.
1316
1317 Moreover, when a formal or informal policy authority is responsible
1318 for determining whether a CA should be allowed to operate within or
1319 interoperate with a PKI, it may wish to approve the CPS of the CA as
1320 being suitable for the policy authority's CP. If so, this
1321 subcomponent can include the name or title, electronic mail address
1322 (or alias), telephone number, fax number, and other generalized
1323 information of the entity in charge of making such a determination.
1324 Finally, in this case, this subcomponent also includes the procedures
1325 by which this determination is made.
1326
1327 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.6" href="#section-4.1.6">4.1.6</a>. Definitions and Acronyms</span>
1328
1329 This subcomponent contains a list of definitions for defined terms
1330 used within the document, as well as a list of acronyms in the
1331 document and their meanings.
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1343
1344
1345 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Publication and Repository Responsibilities</span>
1346
1347 This component contains any applicable provisions regarding:
1348
1349 * An identification of the entity or entities that operate
1350 repositories within the PKI, such as a CA, certificate
1351 manufacturing authority, or independent repository service
1352 provider;
1353
1354 * The responsibility of a PKI participant to publish information
1355 regarding its practices, certificates, and the current status of
1356 such certificates, which may include the responsibilities of
1357 making the CP or CPS publicly available using various mechanisms
1358 and of identifying components, subcomponents, and elements of such
1359 documents that exist but are not made publicly available, for
1360 instance, security controls, clearance procedures, or trade secret
1361 information due to their sensitivity;
1362
1363 * When information must be published and the frequency of
1364 publication; and
1365
1366 * Access control on published information objects including CPs,
1367 CPS, certificates, certificate status, and CRLs.
1368
1369 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Identification and Authentication</span>
1370
1371 This component describes the procedures used to authenticate the
1372 identity and/or other attributes of an end-user certificate applicant
1373 to a CA or RA prior to certificate issuance. In addition, the
1374 component sets forth the procedures for authenticating the identity
1375 and the criteria for accepting applicants of entities seeking to
1376 become CAs, RAs, or other entities operating in or interoperating
1377 with a PKI. It also describes how parties requesting re-key or
1378 revocation are authenticated. This component also addresses naming
1379 practices, including the recognition of trademark rights in certain
1380 names.
1381
1382 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.1" href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. Naming</span>
1383
1384 This subcomponent includes the following elements regarding naming
1385 and identification of the subscribers:
1386
1387 * Types of names assigned to the subject, such as X.500
1388 distinguished names; <a href="./rfc822">RFC-822</a> names; and X.400 names;
1389
1390 * Whether names have to be meaningful or not;(3)
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1399
1400
1401 * Whether or not subscribers can be anonymous or pseudonymous, and
1402 if they can, what names are assigned to or can be used by
1403 anonymous subscribers;
1404
1405 * Rules for interpreting various name forms, such as the X.500
1406 standard and <a href="./rfc822">RFC-822</a>;
1407
1408 * Whether names have to be unique; and
1409
1410 * Recognition, authentication, and the role of trademarks.
1411
1412 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.2" href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. Initial Identity Validation</span>
1413
1414 This subcomponent contains the following elements for the
1415 identification and authentication procedures for the initial
1416 registration for each subject type (CA, RA, subscriber, or other
1417 participant):
1418
1419 * If and how the subject must prove possession of the companion
1420 private key for the public key being registered, for example, a
1421 digital signature in the certificate request message;(4)
1422
1423 * Identification and authentication requirements for organizational
1424 identity of subscriber or participant (CA; RA; subscriber (in the
1425 case of certificates issued to organizations or devices controlled
1426 by an organization), or other participant), for example,
1427 consulting the database of a service that identifies organizations
1428 or inspecting an organization's articles of incorporation;
1429
1430 * Identification and authentication requirements for an individual
1431 subscriber or a person acting on behalf of an organizational
1432 subscriber or participant (CA, RA, in the case of certificates
1433 issued to organizations or devices controlled by an organization,
1434 the subscriber, or other participant),(5) including:
1435
1436 * Type of documentation and/or number of identification
1437 credentials required;
1438
1439 * How a CA or RA authenticates the identity of the organization
1440 or individual based on the documentation or credentials
1441 provided;
1442
1443 * If the individual must personally present to the authenticating
1444 CA or RA;
1445
1446 * How an individual as an organizational person is authenticated,
1447 such as by reference to duly signed authorization documents or
1448 a corporate identification badge.
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1455
1456
1457 * List of subscriber information that is not verified (called "non-
1458 verified subscriber information") during the initial registration;
1459
1460 * Validation of authority involves a determination of whether a
1461 person has specific rights, entitlements, or permissions,
1462 including the permission to act on behalf of an organization to
1463 obtain a certificate; and
1464
1465 * In the case of applications by a CA wishing to operate within, or
1466 interoperate with, a PKI, this subcomponent contains the criteria
1467 by which a PKI, CA, or policy authority determines whether or not
1468 the CA is suitable for such operations or interoperation. Such
1469 interoperation may include cross-certification, unilateral
1470 certification, or other forms of interoperation.
1471
1472 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.3" href="#section-4.3.3">4.3.3</a>. Identification and Authentication for Re-key Requests</span>
1473
1474 This subcomponent addresses the following elements for the
1475 identification and authentication procedures for re-key for each
1476 subject type (CA, RA, subscriber, and other participants):
1477
1478 * Identification and authentication requirements for routine re-key,
1479 such as a re-key request that contains the new key and is signed
1480 using the current valid key; and
1481
1482 * Identification and authentication requirements for re-key after
1483 certificate revocation. One example is the use of the same
1484 process as the initial identity validation.
1485
1486 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.4" href="#section-4.3.4">4.3.4</a>. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Requests</span>
1487
1488 This subcomponent describes the identification and authentication
1489 procedures for a revocation request by each subject type (CA, RA,
1490 subscriber, and other participant). Examples include a revocation
1491 request digitally signed with the private key whose companion public
1492 key needs to be revoked, and a digitally signed request by the RA.
1493
1494 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements</span>
1495
1496 This component is used to specify requirements imposed upon issuing
1497 CA, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, or other participants with respect
1498 to the life-cycle of a certificate.
1499
1500 Within each subcomponent, separate consideration may need to be given
1501 to subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other participants.
1502
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1511
1512
1513 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. Certificate Application</span>
1514
1515 This subcomponent is used to address the following requirements
1516 regarding subject certificate application:
1517
1518 * Who can submit a certificate application, such as a certificate
1519 subject or the RA; and
1520
1521 * Enrollment process used by subjects to submit certificate
1522 applications and responsibilities in connection with this process.
1523 An example of this process is where the subject generates the key
1524 pair and sends a certificate request to the RA. The RA validates
1525 and signs the request and sends it to the CA. A CA or RA may have
1526 the responsibility of establishing an enrollment process in order
1527 to receive certificate applications. Likewise, certificate
1528 applicants may have the responsibility of providing accurate
1529 information on their certificate applications.
1530
1531 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.2" href="#section-4.4.2">4.4.2</a>. Certificate Application Processing</span>
1532
1533 This subcomponent is used to describe the procedure for processing
1534 certificate applications. For example, the issuing CA and RA may
1535 perform identification and authentication procedures to validate the
1536 certificate application. Following such steps, the CA or RA will
1537 either approve or reject the certificate application, perhaps upon
1538 the application of certain criteria. Finally, this subcomponent sets
1539 a time limit during which a CA and/or RA must act on and process a
1540 certificate application.
1541
1542 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.3" href="#section-4.4.3">4.4.3</a>. Certificate Issuance</span>
1543
1544 This subcomponent is used to describe the following certificate
1545 issuance related elements:
1546
1547 * Actions performed by the CA during the issuance of the
1548 certificate, for example a procedure whereby the CA validates the
1549 RA signature and RA authority and generates a certificate; and
1550
1551 * Notification mechanisms, if any, used by the CA to notify the
1552 subscriber of the issuance of the certificate; an example is a
1553 procedure under which the CA e-mails the certificate to the
1554 subscriber or the RA or e-mails information permitting the
1555 subscriber to download the certificate from a web site.
1556
1557
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1567
1568
1569 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.4" href="#section-4.4.4">4.4.4</a>. Certificate Acceptance</span>
1570
1571 This subcomponent addresses the following:
1572
1573 * The conduct of an applicant that will be deemed to constitute
1574 acceptance of the certificate. Such conduct may include
1575 affirmative steps to indicate acceptance, actions implying
1576 acceptance, or a failure to object to the certificate or its
1577 content. For instance, acceptance may be deemed to occur if the
1578 CA does not receive any notice from the subscriber within a
1579 certain time period; a subscriber may send a signed message
1580 accepting the certificate; or a subscriber may send a signed
1581 message rejecting the certificate where the message includes the
1582 reason for rejection and identifies the fields in the certificate
1583 that are incorrect or incomplete.
1584
1585 * Publication of the certificate by the CA. For example, the CA may
1586 post the certificate to an X.500 or LDAP repository.
1587
1588 * Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
1589 As an example, the CA may send the certificate to the RA.
1590
1591 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.5" href="#section-4.4.5">4.4.5</a>. Key Pair and Certificate Usage</span>
1592
1593 This subcomponent is used to describe the responsibilities relating
1594 to the use of keys and certificates, including:
1595
1596 * Subscriber responsibilities relating to use of the subscriber's
1597 private key and certificate. For example, the subscriber may be
1598 required to use a private key and certificate only for appropriate
1599 applications as set forth in the CP and in consistency with
1600 applicable certificate content (e.g., key usage field). Use of a
1601 private key and certificate are subject to the terms of the
1602 subscriber agreement, the use of a private key is permitted only
1603 after the subscriber has accepted the corresponding certificate,
1604 or the subscriber must discontinue use of the private key
1605 following the expiration or revocation of the certificate.
1606
1607 * Relying party responsibilities relating to the use of a
1608 subscriber's public key and certificate. For instance, a relying
1609 party may be obligated to rely on certificates only for
1610 appropriate applications as set forth in the CP and in consistency
1611 with applicable certificate content (e.g., key usage field),
1612 successfully perform public key operations as a condition of
1613 relying on a certificate, assume responsibility to check the
1614 status of a certificate using one of the required or permitted
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1623
1624
1625 mechanisms set forth in the CP/CPS (see <a href="#section-4.4.9">Section 4.4.9</a> below), and
1626 assent to the terms of the applicable relying party agreement as a
1627 condition of relying on the certificate.
1628
1629 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.6" href="#section-4.4.6">4.4.6</a>. Certificate Renewal</span>
1630
1631 This subcomponent is used to describe the following elements related
1632 to certificate renewal. Certificate renewal means the issuance of a
1633 new certificate to the subscriber without changing the subscriber or
1634 other participant's public key or any other information in the
1635 certificate:
1636
1637 * Circumstances under which certificate renewal takes place, such as
1638 where the certificate life has expired, but the policy permits the
1639 same key pair to be reused;
1640
1641 * Who may request certificate renewal, for instance, the subscriber,
1642 RA, or the CA may automatically renew an end-user subscriber
1643 certificate;
1644
1645 * A CA or RA's procedures to process renewal requests to issue the
1646 new certificate, for example, the use of a token, such as a
1647 password, to re-authenticate the subscriber, or procedures that
1648 are the same as the initial certificate issuance;
1649
1650 * Notification of the new certificate to the subscriber;
1651
1652 * Conduct constituting acceptance of the certificate;
1653
1654 * Publication of the certificate by the CA; and
1655
1656 * Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
1657
1658 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.7" href="#section-4.4.7">4.4.7</a>. Certificate Re-key</span>
1659
1660 This subcomponent is used to describe the following elements related
1661 to a subscriber or other participant generating a new key pair and
1662 applying for the issuance of a new certificate that certifies the new
1663 public key:
1664
1665 * Circumstances under which certificate re-key can or must take
1666 place, such as after a certificate is revoked for reasons of key
1667 compromise or after a certificate has expired and the usage period
1668 of the key pair has also expired;
1669
1670 * Who may request certificate re-key, for example, the subscriber;
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1679
1680
1681 * A CA or RA's procedures to process re-keying requests to issue the
1682 new certificate, such as procedures that are the same as the
1683 initial certificate issuance;
1684
1685 * Notification of the new certificate to the subscriber;
1686
1687 * Conduct constituting acceptance of the certificate;
1688
1689 * Publication of the certificate by the CA; and
1690
1691 * Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
1692
1693 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.8" href="#section-4.4.8">4.4.8</a>. Certificate Modification</span>
1694
1695 This subcomponent is used to describe the following elements related
1696 to the issuance of a new certificate (6) due to changes in the
1697 information in the certificate other than the subscriber public key:
1698
1699 * Circumstances under which certificate modification can take place,
1700 such as name change, role change, reorganization resulting in a
1701 change in the DN;
1702
1703 * Who may request certificate modification, for instance,
1704 subscribers, human resources personnel, or the RA;
1705
1706 * A CA or RA's procedures to process modification requests to issue
1707 the new certificate, such as procedures that are the same as the
1708 initial certificate issuance;
1709
1710 * Notification of the new certificate to the subscriber;
1711
1712 * Conduct constituting acceptance of the certificate;
1713
1714 * Publication of the certificate by the CA; and
1715
1716 * Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other entities.
1717
1718 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.9" href="#section-4.4.9">4.4.9</a>. Certificate Revocation and Suspension</span>
1719
1720 This subcomponent addresses the following:
1721
1722 * Circumstances under which a certificate may be suspended and
1723 circumstances under which it must be revoked, for instance, in
1724 cases of subscriber employment termination, loss of cryptographic
1725 token, or suspected compromise of the private key;
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1735
1736
1737 * Who can request the revocation of the participant's certificate,
1738 for example, the subscriber, RA, or CA in the case of an end-user
1739 subscriber certificate.
1740
1741 * Procedures used for certificate revocation request, such as a
1742 digitally signed message from the RA, a digitally signed message
1743 from the subscriber, or a phone call from the RA;
1744
1745 * The grace period available to the subscriber, within which the
1746 subscriber must make a revocation request;
1747
1748 * The time within which CA must process the revocation request;
1749
1750 * The mechanisms, if any, that a relying party may use or must use
1751 in order to check the status of certificates on which they wish to
1752 rely;
1753
1754 * If a CRL mechanism is used, the issuance frequency;
1755
1756 * If a CRL mechanism is used, maximum latency between the generation
1757 of CRLs and posting of the CRLs to the repository (in other words,
1758 the maximum amount of processing- and communication-related delays
1759 in posting CRLs to the repository after the CRLs are generated);
1760
1761 * On-line revocation/status checking availability, for instance,
1762 OCSP and a web site to which status inquiries can be submitted;
1763
1764 * Requirements on relying parties to perform on-line
1765 revocation/status checks;
1766
1767 * Other forms of revocation advertisements available;
1768
1769 * Any variations of the above stipulations for which suspension or
1770 revocation is the result of private key compromise (as opposed to
1771 other reasons for suspension or revocation).
1772
1773 * Circumstances under which a certificate may be suspended;
1774
1775 * Who can request the suspension of a certificate, for example, the
1776 subscriber, human resources personnel, a supervisor of the
1777 subscriber, or the RA in the case of an end-user subscriber
1778 certificate;
1779
1780 * Procedures to request certificate suspension, such as a digitally
1781 signed message from the subscriber or RA, or a phone call from the
1782 RA; and
1783
1784 * How long the suspension may last.
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1791
1792
1793 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.10" href="#section-4.4.10">4.4.10</a>. Certificate Status Services</span>
1794
1795 This subcomponent addresses the certificate status checking services
1796 available to the relying parties, including:
1797
1798 * The operational characteristics of certificate status checking
1799 services;
1800
1801 * The availability of such services, and any applicable policies on
1802 unavailability; and
1803
1804 * Any optional features of such services.
1805
1806 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.11" href="#section-4.4.11">4.4.11</a>. End of Subscription</span>
1807
1808 This subcomponent addresses procedures used by the subscriber to end
1809 subscription to the CA services, including:
1810
1811 * The revocation of certificates at the end of subscription (which
1812 may differ, depending on whether the end of subscription was due
1813 to the expiration of the certificate or termination of the
1814 service).
1815
1816 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.12" href="#section-4.4.12">4.4.12</a>. Key Escrow and Recovery</span>
1817
1818 This subcomponent contains the following elements to identify the
1819 policies and practices relating to the escrowing, and/or recovery of
1820 private keys where private key escrow services are available (through
1821 the CA or other trusted third parties):
1822
1823 * Identification of the document containing private key escrow and
1824 recovery policies and practices or a listing of such policies and
1825 practices; and
1826
1827 * Identification of the document containing session key
1828 encapsulation and recovery policies and practices or a listing of
1829 such policies and practices.
1830
1831 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Management, Operational, and Physical Controls</span>
1832
1833 This component describes non-technical security controls (that is,
1834 physical, procedural, and personnel controls) used by the issuing CA
1835 to securely perform the functions of key generation, subject
1836 authentication, certificate issuance, certificate revocation,
1837 auditing, and archiving.
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1847
1848
1849 This component can also be used to define non-technical security
1850 controls on repositories, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other
1851 participants. The non-technical security controls for the subject
1852 CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other participants could be the same,
1853 similar, or very different.
1854
1855 These non-technical security controls are critical to trusting the
1856 certificates since lack of security may compromise CA operations
1857 resulting for example, in the creation of certificates or CRLs with
1858 erroneous information or compromising the CA private key.
1859
1860 Within each subcomponent, separate consideration will, in general,
1861 need to be given to each entity type, that is, the issuing CA,
1862 repository, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other participants.
1863
1864 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.1" href="#section-4.5.1">4.5.1</a>. Physical Security Controls</span>
1865
1866 In this subcomponent, the physical controls on the facility housing
1867 the entity systems are described. Topics addressed may include:
1868
1869 * Site location and construction, such as the construction
1870 requirements for high-security zones and the use of locked rooms,
1871 cages, safes, and cabinets;
1872
1873 * Physical access, i.e., mechanisms to control access from one area
1874 of the facility to another or access into high-security zones,
1875 such as locating CA operations in a secure computer room monitored
1876 by guards or security alarms and requiring movement from zone to
1877 zone to be accomplished using a token, biometric readers, and/or
1878 access control lists;
1879
1880 * Power and air conditioning;
1881
1882 * Water exposures;
1883
1884 * Fire prevention and protection;
1885
1886 * Media storage, for example, requiring the storage of backup media
1887 in a separate location that is physically secure and protected
1888 from fire and water damage;
1889
1890 * Waste disposal; and
1891
1892 * Off-site backup.
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1903
1904
1905 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.2" href="#section-4.5.2">4.5.2</a>. Procedural Controls</span>
1906
1907 In this subcomponent, requirements for recognizing trusted roles are
1908 described, together with the responsibilities for each role.
1909 Examples of trusted roles include system administrators, security
1910 officers, and system auditors.
1911
1912 For each task identified, the number of individuals required to
1913 perform the task (n out m rule) should be stated for each role.
1914 Identification and authentication requirements for each role may also
1915 be defined.
1916
1917 This component also includes the separation of duties in terms of the
1918 roles that cannot be performed by the same individuals.
1919
1920 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.3" href="#section-4.5.3">4.5.3</a>. Personnel Security Controls</span>
1921
1922 This subcomponent addresses the following:
1923
1924 * Qualifications, experience, and clearances that personnel must
1925 have as a condition of filling trusted roles or other important
1926 roles. Examples include credentials, job experiences, and
1927 official government clearances that candidates for these positions
1928 must have before being hired;
1929
1930 * Background checks and clearance procedures that are required in
1931 connection with the hiring of personnel filling trusted roles or
1932 perhaps other important roles; such roles may require a check of
1933 their criminal records, references, and additional clearances that
1934 a participant undertakes after a decision has been made to hire a
1935 particular person;
1936
1937 * Training requirements and training procedures for each role
1938 following the hiring of personnel;
1939
1940 * Any retraining period and retraining procedures for each role
1941 after completion of initial training;
1942
1943 * Frequency and sequence for job rotation among various roles;
1944
1945 * Sanctions against personnel for unauthorized actions, unauthorized
1946 use of authority, and unauthorized use of entity systems for the
1947 purpose of imposing accountability on a participant's personnel;
1948
1949 * Controls on personnel that are independent contractors rather than
1950 employees of the entity; examples include:
1951
1952 - Bonding requirements on contract personnel;
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
1959
1960
1961 - Contractual requirements including indemnification for damages
1962 due to the actions of the contractor personnel;
1963
1964 - Auditing and monitoring of contractor personnel; and
1965
1966 - Other controls on contracting personnel.
1967
1968 * Documentation to be supplied to personnel during initial training,
1969 retraining, or otherwise.
1970
1971 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.4" href="#section-4.5.4">4.5.4</a>. Audit Logging Procedures</span>
1972
1973 This subcomponent is used to describe event logging and audit
1974 systems, implemented for the purpose of maintaining a secure
1975 environment. Elements include the following:
1976
1977 * Types of events recorded, such as certificate lifecycle
1978 operations, attempts to access the system, and requests made to
1979 the system;
1980
1981 * Frequency with which audit logs are processed or archived, for
1982 example, weekly, following an alarm or anomalous event, or when
1983 ever the audit log is n% full;
1984
1985 * Period for which audit logs are kept;
1986
1987 * Protection of audit logs:
1988
1989 - Who can view audit logs, for example only the audit
1990 administrator;
1991
1992 - Protection against modification of audit logs, for instance a
1993 requirement that no one may modify or delete the audit records
1994 or that only an audit administrator may delete an audit file as
1995 part of rotating the audit file; and
1996
1997 - Protection against deletion of audit logs.
1998
1999 * Audit log back up procedures;
2000
2001 * Whether the audit log accumulation system is internal or external
2002 to the entity;
2003
2004 * Whether the subject who caused an audit event to occur is notified
2005 of the audit action; and
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2015
2016
2017 * Vulnerability assessments, for example, where audit data is run
2018 through a tool that identifies potential attempts to breach the
2019 security of the system.
2020
2021 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.5" href="#section-4.5.5">4.5.5</a>. Records Archival</span>
2022
2023 This subcomponent is used to describe general records archival (or
2024 records retention) policies, including the following:
2025
2026 * Types of records that are archived, for example, all audit data,
2027 certificate application information, and documentation supporting
2028 certificate applications;
2029
2030 * Retention period for an archive;
2031
2032 * Protection of an archive:
2033
2034 - Who can view the archive, for example, a requirement that only
2035 the audit administrator may view the archive;
2036
2037 - Protection against modification of the archive, such as
2038 securely storing the data on a write once medium;
2039
2040 - Protection against deletion of the archive;
2041
2042 - Protection against the deterioration of the media on which the
2043 archive is stored, such as a requirement for data to be
2044 migrated periodically to fresh media; and
2045
2046 - Protection against obsolescence of hardware, operating systems,
2047 and other software, by, for example, retaining as part of the
2048 archive the hardware, operating systems, and/or other software
2049 in order to permit access to and use of archived records over
2050 time.
2051
2052 * Archive backup procedures;
2053
2054 * Requirements for time-stamping of records;
2055
2056 * Whether the archive collection system is internal or external; and
2057
2058 * Procedures to obtain and verify archive information, such as a
2059 requirement that two separate copies of the archive data be kept
2060 under the control of two persons, and that the two copies be
2061 compared in order to ensure that the archive information is
2062 accurate.
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2071
2072
2073 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.6" href="#section-4.5.6">4.5.6</a>. Key Changeover</span>
2074
2075 This subcomponent describes the procedures to provide a new public
2076 key to a CA's users following a re-key by the CA. These procedures
2077 may be the same as the procedure for providing the current key.
2078 Also, the new key may be certified in a certificate signed using the
2079 old key.
2080
2081 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.7" href="#section-4.5.7">4.5.7</a>. Compromise and Disaster Recovery</span>
2082
2083 This subcomponent describes requirements relating to notification and
2084 recovery procedures in the event of compromise or disaster. Each of
2085 the following may need to be addressed separately:
2086
2087 * Identification or listing of the applicable incident and
2088 compromise reporting and handling procedures.
2089
2090 * The recovery procedures used if computing resources, software,
2091 and/or data are corrupted or suspected to be corrupted. These
2092 procedures describe how a secure environment is re-established,
2093 which certificates are revoked, whether the entity key is revoked,
2094 how the new entity public key is provided to the users, and how
2095 the subjects are re-certified.
2096
2097 * The recovery procedures used if the entity key is compromised.
2098 These procedures describe how a secure environment is re-
2099 established, how the new entity public key is provided to the
2100 users, and how the subjects are re-certified.
2101
2102 * The entity's capabilities to ensure business continuity following
2103 a natural or other disaster. Such capabilities may include the
2104 availability of a remote hot-site at which operations may be
2105 recovered. They may also include procedures for securing its
2106 facility during the period of time following a natural or other
2107 disaster and before a secure environment is re-established, either
2108 at the original site or at a remote site. For example, procedures
2109 to protect against theft of sensitive materials from an
2110 earthquake-damaged site.
2111
2112 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5.8" href="#section-4.5.8">4.5.8</a>. CA or RA Termination</span>
2113
2114 This subcomponent describes requirements relating to procedures for
2115 termination and termination notification of a CA or RA, including the
2116 identity of the custodian of CA and RA archival records.
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2127
2128
2129 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6" href="#section-4.6">4.6</a>. Technical Security Controls</span>
2130
2131 This component is used to define the security measures taken by the
2132 issuing CA to protect its cryptographic keys and activation data
2133 (e.g., PINs, passwords, or manually-held key shares). This component
2134 may also be used to impose constraints on repositories, subject CAs,
2135 subscribers, and other participants to protect their private keys,
2136 activation data for their private keys, and critical security
2137 parameters. Secure key management is critical to ensure that all
2138 secret and private keys and activation data are protected and used
2139 only by authorized personnel.
2140
2141 This component also describes other technical security controls used
2142 by the issuing CA to perform securely the functions of key
2143 generation, user authentication, certificate registration,
2144 certificate revocation, auditing, and archiving. Technical controls
2145 include life-cycle security controls (including software development
2146 environment security, trusted software development methodology) and
2147 operational security controls.
2148
2149 This component can also be used to define other technical security
2150 controls on repositories, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other
2151 participants.
2152
2153 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.1" href="#section-4.6.1">4.6.1</a>. Key Pair Generation and Installation</span>
2154
2155 Key pair generation and installation need to be considered for the
2156 issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, and subscribers. For
2157 each of these types of entities, the following questions potentially
2158 need to be answered:
2159
2160 1. Who generates the entity public, private key pair? Possibilities
2161 include the subscriber, RA, or CA. Also, how is the key
2162 generation performed? Is the key generation performed by hardware
2163 or software?
2164
2165 2. How is the private key provided securely to the entity?
2166 Possibilities include a situation where the entity has generated
2167 it and therefore already has it, handing the entity the private
2168 key physically, mailing a token containing the private key
2169 securely, or delivering it in an SSL session.
2170
2171 3. How is the entity's public key provided securely to the
2172 certification authority? Some possibilities are in an online SSL
2173 session or in a message signed by the RA.
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2183
2184
2185 4. In the case of issuing CAs, how is the CA's public key provided
2186 securely to potential relying parties? Possibilities include
2187 handing the public key to the relying party securely in person,
2188 physically mailing a copy securely to the relying party, or
2189 delivering it in a SSL session.
2190
2191 5. What are the key sizes? Examples include a 1,024 bit RSA modulus
2192 and a 1,024 bit DSA large prime.
2193
2194 6. Who generates the public key parameters, and is the quality of the
2195 parameters checked during key generation?
2196
2197 7. For what purposes may the key be used, or for what purposes should
2198 usage of the key be restricted? For X.509 certificates, these
2199 purposes should map to the key usage flags in X.509 Version 3
2200 certificates.
2201
2202 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.2" href="#section-4.6.2">4.6.2</a>. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering</span>
2203 <span class="h4"> Controls</span>
2204
2205 Requirements for private key protection and cryptographic modules
2206 need to be considered for the issuing CA, repositories, subject CAs,
2207 RAs, and subscribers. For each of these types of entities, the
2208 following questions potentially need to be answered:
2209
2210 1. What standards, if any, are required for the cryptographic module
2211 used to generate the keys? A cryptographic module can be
2212 composed of hardware, software, firmware, or any combination of
2213 them. For example, are the keys certified by the infrastructure
2214 required to be generated using modules compliant with the US FIPS
2215 140-1? If so, what is the required FIPS 140-1 level of the
2216 module? Are there any other engineering or other controls
2217 relating to a cryptographic module, such as the identification of
2218 the cryptographic module boundary, input/output, roles and
2219 services, finite state machine, physical security, software
2220 security, operating system security, algorithm compliance,
2221 electromagnetic compatibility, and self tests.
2222
2223 2. Is the private key under n out of m multi-person control?(7) If
2224 yes, provide n and m (two person control is a special case of n
2225 out of m, where n = m = 2)?
2226
2227 3. Is the private key escrowed?(8) If so, who is the escrow agent,
2228 what form is the key escrowed in (examples include plaintext,
2229 encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on the
2230 escrow system?
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2239
2240
2241 4. Is the private key backed up? If so, who is the backup agent,
2242 what form is the key backed up in (examples include plaintext,
2243 encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on the
2244 backup system?
2245
2246 5. Is the private key archived? If so, who is the archival agent,
2247 what form is the key archived in (examples include plaintext,
2248 encrypted, split key), and what are the security controls on the
2249 archival system?
2250
2251 6. Under what circumstances, if any, can a private key be
2252 transferred into or from a cryptographic module? Who is
2253 permitted to perform such a transfer operation? In what form is
2254 the private key during the transfer (i.e., plaintext, encrypted,
2255 or split key)?
2256
2257 7. How is the private key stored in the module (i.e., plaintext,
2258 encrypted, or split key)?
2259
2260 8. Who can activate (use) the private key? What actions must be
2261 performed to activate the private key (e.g., login, power on,
2262 supply PIN, insert token/key, automatic, etc.)? Once the key is
2263 activated, is the key active for an indefinite period, active for
2264 one time, or active for a defined time period?
2265
2266 9. Who can deactivate the private key and how? Examples of methods
2267 of deactivating private keys include logging out, turning the
2268 power off, removing the token/key, automatic deactivation, and
2269 time expiration.
2270
2271 10. Who can destroy the private key and how? Examples of methods of
2272 destroying private keys include token surrender, token
2273 destruction, and overwriting the key.
2274
2275 11. Provide the capabilities of the cryptographic module in the
2276 following areas: identification of the cryptographic module
2277 boundary, input/output, roles and services, finite state machine,
2278 physical security, software security, operating system security,
2279 algorithm compliance, electromagnetic compatibility, and self
2280 tests. Capability may be expressed through reference to
2281 compliance with a standard such as U.S. FIPS 140-1, associated
2282 level, and rating.
2283
2284
2285
2286
2287
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 41]</span></pre>
2293 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span>
2294 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2295
2296
2297 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.3" href="#section-4.6.3">4.6.3</a>. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management</span>
2298
2299 Other aspects of key management need to be considered for the issuing
2300 CA, repositories, subject CAs, RAs, subscribers, and other
2301 participants. For each of these types of entities, the following
2302 questions potentially need to be answered:
2303
2304 1. Is the public key archived? If so, who is the archival agent and
2305 what are the security controls on the archival system? Also,
2306 what software and hardware need to be preserved as part of the
2307 archive to permit use of the public key over time? Note: this
2308 subcomponent is not limited to requiring or describing the use of
2309 digital signatures with archival data, but rather can address
2310 integrity controls other than digital signatures when an archive
2311 requires tamper protection. Digital signatures do not provide
2312 tamper protection or protect the integrity of data; they merely
2313 verify data integrity. Moreover, the archival period may be
2314 greater than the cryptanalysis period for the public key needed
2315 to verify any digital signature applied to archival data.
2316
2317 2. What is the operational period of the certificates issued to the
2318 subscriber. What are the usage periods, or active lifetimes, for
2319 the subscriber's key pair?
2320
2321 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.4" href="#section-4.6.4">4.6.4</a>. Activation Data</span>
2322
2323 Activation data refers to data values other than whole private keys
2324 that are required to operate private keys or cryptographic modules
2325 containing private keys, such as a PIN, passphrase, or portions of a
2326 private key used in a key-splitting scheme. Protection of activation
2327 data prevents unauthorized use of the private key, and potentially
2328 needs to be considered for the issuing CA, subject CAs, RAs, and
2329 subscribers. Such consideration potentially needs to address the
2330 entire life-cycle of the activation data from generation through
2331 archival and destruction. For each of the entity types (issuing CA,
2332 repository, subject CA, RA, subscriber, and other participants), all
2333 of the questions listed in 4.6.1 through 4.6.3 potentially need to be
2334 answered with respect to activation data rather than with respect to
2335 keys.
2336
2337 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.5" href="#section-4.6.5">4.6.5</a>. Computer Security Controls</span>
2338
2339 This subcomponent is used to describe computer security controls such
2340 as: use of the trusted computing base concept, discretionary access
2341 control, labels, mandatory access controls, object re-use, audit,
2342 identification and authentication, trusted path, security testing,
2343 and penetration testing. Product assurance may also be addressed.
2344
2345
2346
2347
2348 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 42]</span></pre>
2349 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-43" ></span>
2350 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2351
2352
2353 A computer security rating for computer systems may be required. The
2354 rating could be based, for example, on the Trusted System Evaluation
2355 Criteria (TCSEC), Canadian Trusted Products Evaluation Criteria,
2356 European Information Technology Security Evaluation Criteria (ITSEC),
2357 or the Common Criteria for Information Technology Security
2358 Evaluation, ISO/IEC 15408:1999. This subcomponent can also address
2359 requirements for product evaluation analysis, testing, profiling,
2360 product certification, and/or product accreditation related activity
2361 undertaken.
2362
2363 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.6" href="#section-4.6.6">4.6.6</a>. Life Cycle Security Controls</span>
2364
2365 This subcomponent addresses system development controls and security
2366 management controls.
2367
2368 System development controls include development environment security,
2369 development personnel security, configuration management security
2370 during product maintenance, software engineering practices, software
2371 development methodology, modularity, layering, use of failsafe design
2372 and implementation techniques (e.g., defensive programming) and
2373 development facility security.
2374
2375 Security management controls include execution of tools and
2376 procedures to ensure that the operational systems and networks adhere
2377 to configured security. These tools and procedures include checking
2378 the integrity of the security software, firmware, and hardware to
2379 ensure their correct operation.
2380
2381 This subcomponent can also address life-cycle security ratings based,
2382 for example, on the Trusted Software Development Methodology (TSDM)
2383 level IV and V, independent life-cycle security controls audit, and
2384 the Software Engineering Institute's Capability Maturity Model (SEI-
2385 CMM).
2386
2387 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.7" href="#section-4.6.7">4.6.7</a>. Network Security Controls</span>
2388
2389 This subcomponent addresses network security related controls,
2390 including firewalls.
2391
2392 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.6.8" href="#section-4.6.8">4.6.8</a>. Time-stamping</span>
2393
2394 This subcomponent addresses requirements or practices relating to the
2395 use of timestamps on various data. It may also discuss whether or
2396 not the time-stamping application must use a trusted time source.
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 43]</span></pre>
2405 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-44" ></span>
2406 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2407
2408
2409 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7" href="#section-4.7">4.7</a>. Certificate and CRL Profiles</span>
2410
2411 This component is used to specify the certificate format and, if CRLs
2412 and/or OCSP are used, the CRL and/or OCSP format. This includes
2413 information on profiles, versions, and extensions used.
2414
2415 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.1" href="#section-4.7.1">4.7.1</a>. Certificate Profile</span>
2416
2417 This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following (potentially
2418 by reference to a separate profile definition, such as the one
2419 defined in IETF PKIX <a href="./rfc3280">RFC 3280</a>):
2420
2421 * Version number(s) supported;
2422
2423 * Certificate extensions populated and their criticality;
2424
2425 * Cryptographic algorithm object identifiers;
2426
2427 * Name forms used for the CA, RA, and subscriber names;
2428
2429 * Name constraints used and the name forms used in the name
2430 constraints;
2431
2432 * Applicable CP OID(s);
2433
2434 * Usage of the policy constraints extension;
2435
2436 * Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics; and
2437
2438 * Processing semantics for the critical CP extension.
2439
2440 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.2" href="#section-4.7.2">4.7.2</a>. CRL Profile</span>
2441
2442 This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following (potentially
2443 by reference to a separate profile definition, such as the one
2444 defined in IETF PKIX <a href="./rfc3280">RFC 3280</a>):
2445
2446 * Version numbers supported for CRLs; and
2447
2448 * CRL and CRL entry extensions populated and their criticality.
2449
2450 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.7.3" href="#section-4.7.3">4.7.3</a>. OCSP Profile</span>
2451
2452 This subcomponent addresses such topics as the following (potentially
2453 by reference to a separate profile definition, such as the IETF <a href="./rfc2560">RFC</a>
2454 <a href="./rfc2560">2560</a> profile):
2455
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 44]</span></pre>
2461 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-45" ></span>
2462 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2463
2464
2465 * Version of OCSP that is being used as the basis for establishing
2466 an OCSP system; and
2467
2468 * OCSP extensions populated and their criticality.
2469
2470 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.8" href="#section-4.8">4.8</a>. Compliance Audit and Other Assessment</span>
2471
2472 This component addresses the following:
2473
2474 * The list of topics covered by the assessment and/or the assessment
2475 methodology used to perform the assessment; examples include
2476 WebTrust for CAs (9) and SAS 70 (10).
2477
2478 * Frequency of compliance audit or other assessment for each entity
2479 that must be assessed pursuant to a CP or CPS, or the
2480 circumstances that will trigger an assessment; possibilities
2481 include an annual audit, pre-operational assessment as a condition
2482 of allowing an entity to be operational, or investigation
2483 following a possible or actual compromise of security.
2484
2485 * The identity and/or qualifications of the personnel performing the
2486 audit or other assessment.
2487
2488 * The relationship between the assessor and the entity being
2489 assessed, including the degree of independence of the assessor.
2490
2491 * Actions taken as a result of deficiencies found during the
2492 assessment; examples include a temporary suspension of operations
2493 until deficiencies are corrected, revocation of certificates
2494 issued to the assessed entity, changes in personnel, triggering
2495 special investigations or more frequent subsequent compliance
2496 assessments, and claims for damages against the assessed entity.
2497
2498 * Who is entitled to see results of an assessment (e.g., assessed
2499 entity, other participants, the general public), who provides them
2500 (e.g., the assessor or the assessed entity), and how they are
2501 communicated.
2502
2503 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9" href="#section-4.9">4.9</a>. Other Business and Legal Matters</span>
2504
2505 This component covers general business and legal matters. Sections
2506 9.1 and 9.2 of the framework discuss the business issues of fees to
2507 be charged for various services and the financial responsibility of
2508 participants to maintain resources for ongoing operations and for
2509 paying judgments or settlements in response to claims asserted
2510 against them. The remaining sections are generally concerned with
2511 legal topics.
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 45]</span></pre>
2517 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-46" ></span>
2518 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2519
2520
2521 Starting with <a href="#section-9.3">Section 9.3</a> of the framework, the ordering of topics is
2522 the same as or similar to the ordering of topics in a typical
2523 software licensing agreement or other technology agreement.
2524 Consequently, this framework may not only be used for CPs and CPSs,
2525 but also associated PKI-related agreements, especially subscriber
2526 agreements, and relying party agreements. This ordering is intended
2527 help lawyers review CPs, CPSs, and other documents adhering to this
2528 framework.
2529
2530 With respect to many of the legal subcomponents within this
2531 component, a CP or CPS drafter may choose to include in the document
2532 terms and conditions that apply directly to subscribers or relying
2533 parties. For instance, a CP or CPS may set forth limitations of
2534 liability that apply to subscribers and relying parties. The
2535 inclusion of terms and conditions is likely to be appropriate where
2536 the CP or CPS is itself a contract or part of a contract.
2537
2538 In other cases, however, the CP or CPS is not a contract or part of a
2539 contract; instead, it is configured so that its terms and conditions
2540 are applied to the parties by separate documents, which may include
2541 associated agreements, such as subscriber or relying party
2542 agreements. In that event, a CP drafter may write a CP so as to
2543 require that certain legal terms and conditions appear (or not
2544 appear) in such associated agreements. For example, a CP might
2545 include a subcomponent stating that a certain limitation of liability
2546 term must appear in a CA's subscriber and relying party agreements.
2547 Another example is a CP that contains a subcomponent prohibiting the
2548 use of a subscriber or relying party agreement containing a
2549 limitation upon CA liability inconsistent with the provisions of the
2550 CP. A CPS drafter may use legal subcomponents to disclose that
2551 certain terms and conditions appear in associated subscriber, relying
2552 party, or other agreements in use by the CA. A CPS might explain,
2553 for instance, that the CA writing it uses an associated subscriber or
2554 relying party agreement that applies a particular provision for
2555 limiting liability.
2556
2557 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.1" href="#section-4.9.1">4.9.1</a>. Fees</span>
2558
2559 This subcomponent contains any applicable provisions regarding fees
2560 charged by CAs, repositories, or RAs, such as:
2561
2562 * Certificate issuance or renewal fees;
2563
2564 * Certificate access fees;
2565
2566 * Revocation or status information access fees;
2567
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 46]</span></pre>
2573 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-47" ></span>
2574 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2575
2576
2577 * Fees for other services such as providing access to the relevant
2578 CP or CPS; and
2579
2580 * Refund policy.
2581
2582 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.2" href="#section-4.9.2">4.9.2</a>. Financial Responsibility</span>
2583
2584 This subcomponent contains requirements or disclosures relating to
2585 the resources available to CAs, RAs, and other participants providing
2586 certification services to support performance of their operational
2587 PKI responsibilities, and to remain solvent and pay damages in the
2588 event they are liable to pay a judgment or settlement in connection
2589 with a claim arising out of such operations. Such provisions
2590 include:
2591
2592 * A statement that the participant maintains a certain amount of
2593 insurance coverage for its liabilities to other participants;
2594
2595 * A statement that a participant has access to other resources to
2596 support operations and pay damages for potential liability, which
2597 may be couched in terms of a minimum level of assets necessary to
2598 operate and cover contingencies that might occur within a PKI,
2599 where examples include assets on the balance sheet of an
2600 organization, a surety bond, a letter of credit, and a right under
2601 an agreement to an indemnity under certain circumstances; and
2602
2603 * A statement that a participant has a program that offers first-
2604 party insurance or warranty protection to other participants in
2605 connection with their use of the PKI.
2606
2607 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.3" href="#section-4.9.3">4.9.3</a>. Confidentiality of Business Information</span>
2608
2609 This subcomponent contains provisions relating to the treatment of
2610 confidential business information that participants may communicate
2611 to each other, such as business plans, sales information, trade
2612 secrets, and information received from a third party under a
2613 nondisclosure agreement. Specifically, this subcomponent addresses:
2614
2615 * The scope of what is considered confidential information,
2616
2617 * The types of information that are considered to be outside the
2618 scope of confidential information, and
2619
2620 * The responsibilities of participants that receive confidential
2621 information to secure it from compromise, and refrain from using
2622 it or disclosing it to third parties.
2623
2624
2625
2626
2627
2628 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 47]</span></pre>
2629 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-48" ></span>
2630 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2631
2632
2633 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.4" href="#section-4.9.4">4.9.4</a>. Privacy of Personal Information</span>
2634
2635 This subcomponent relates to the protection that participants,
2636 particularly CAs, RAs, and repositories, may be required to afford to
2637 personally identifiable private information of certificate
2638 applicants, subscribers, and other participants. Specifically, this
2639 subcomponent addresses the following, to the extent pertinent under
2640 applicable law:
2641
2642 * The designation and disclosure of the applicable privacy plan that
2643 applies to a participant's activities, if required by applicable
2644 law or policy;
2645
2646 * Information that is or is not considered private within the PKI;
2647
2648 * Any responsibility of participants that receive private
2649 information to secure it, and refrain from using it and from
2650 disclosing it to third parties;
2651
2652 * Any requirements as to notices to, or consent from individuals
2653 regarding use or disclosure of private information; and
2654
2655 * Any circumstances under which a participant is entitled or
2656 required to disclose private information pursuant to judicial,
2657 administrative process in a private or governmental proceeding, or
2658 in any legal proceeding.
2659
2660 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.5" href="#section-4.9.5">4.9.5</a>. Intellectual Property Rights</span>
2661
2662 This subcomponent addresses the intellectual property rights, such as
2663 copyright, patent, trademarks, or trade secrets, that certain
2664 participants may have or claim in a CP, CPS, certificates, names, and
2665 keys, or are the subject of a license to or from participants.
2666
2667 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.6" href="#section-4.9.6">4.9.6</a>. Representations and Warranties</span>
2668
2669 This subcomponent can include representations and warranties of
2670 various entities that are being made pursuant to the CP or CPS. For
2671 example, a CPS that serves as a contract might contain a CA's
2672 warranty that information contained in the certificate is accurate.
2673 Alternatively, a CPS might contain a less extensive warranty to the
2674 effect that the information in the certificate is true to the best of
2675 the CA's knowledge after performing certain identity authentication
2676 procedures with due diligence. This subcomponent can also include
2677 requirements that representations and warranties appear in certain
2678 agreements, such as subscriber or relying party agreements. For
2679 instance, a CP may contain a requirement that all CAs utilize a
2680 subscriber agreement, and that a subscriber agreement must contain a
2681
2682
2683
2684 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 48]</span></pre>
2685 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-49" ></span>
2686 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2687
2688
2689 warranty by the CA that information in the certificate is accurate.
2690 Participants that may make representations and warranties include
2691 CAs, RAs, subscribers, relying parties, and other participants.
2692
2693 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.7" href="#section-4.9.7">4.9.7</a>. Disclaimers of Warranties</span>
2694
2695 This subcomponent can include disclaimers of express warranties that
2696 may otherwise be deemed to exist in an agreement, and disclaimers of
2697 implied warranties that may otherwise be imposed by applicable law,
2698 such as warranties of merchantability or fitness for a particular
2699 purpose. The CP or CPS may directly impose such disclaimers, or the
2700 CP or CPS may contain a requirement that disclaimers appear in
2701 associated agreements, such as subscriber or relying party
2702 agreements.
2703
2704 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.8" href="#section-4.9.8">4.9.8</a>. Limitations of Liability</span>
2705
2706 This subcomponent can include limitations of liability in a CP or CPS
2707 or limitations that appear or must appear in an agreement associated
2708 with the CP or CPS, such as a subscriber or relying party agreement.
2709 These limitations may fall into one of two categories: limitations
2710 on the elements of damages recoverable and limitations on the amount
2711 of damages recoverable, also known as liability caps. Often,
2712 contracts contain clauses preventing the recovery of elements of
2713 damages such as incidental and consequential damages, and sometimes
2714 punitive damages. Frequently, contracts contain clauses that limit
2715 the possible recovery of one party or the other to an amount certain
2716 or to an amount corresponding to a benchmark, such as the amount a
2717 vendor was paid under the contract.
2718
2719 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.9" href="#section-4.9.9">4.9.9</a>. Indemnities</span>
2720
2721 This subcomponent includes provisions by which one party makes a
2722 second party whole for losses or damage incurred by the second party,
2723 typically arising out of the first party's conduct. They may appear
2724 in a CP, CPS, or agreement. For example, a CP may require that
2725 subscriber agreements contain a term under which a subscriber is
2726 responsible for indemnifying a CA for losses the CA sustains arising
2727 out of a subscriber's fraudulent misrepresentations on the
2728 certificate application under which the CA issued the subscriber an
2729 inaccurate certificate. Similarly, a CPS may say that a CA uses a
2730 relying party agreement, under which relying parties are responsible
2731 for indemnifying a CA for losses the CA sustains arising out of use
2732 of a certificate without properly checking revocation information or
2733 use of a certificate for purposes beyond what the CA permits.
2734
2735
2736
2737
2738
2739
2740 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 49]</span></pre>
2741 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-50" ></span>
2742 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2743
2744
2745 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.10" href="#section-4.9.10">4.9.10</a>. Term and Termination</span>
2746
2747 This subcomponent can include the time period in which a CP or a CPS
2748 remains in force and the circumstances under which the document,
2749 portions of the document, or its applicability to a particular
2750 participant can be terminated. In addition or alternatively, the CP
2751 or CPS may include requirements that certain term and termination
2752 clauses appear in agreements, such as subscriber or relying party
2753 agreements. In particular, such terms can include:
2754
2755 * The term of a document or agreement, that is, when the document
2756 becomes effective and when it expires if it is not terminated
2757 earlier.
2758
2759 * Termination provisions stating circumstances under which the
2760 document, certain portions of it, or its application to a
2761 particular participant ceases to remain in effect.
2762
2763 * Any consequences of termination of the document. For example,
2764 certain provisions of an agreement may survive its termination and
2765 remain in force. Examples include acknowledgements of
2766 intellectual property rights and confidentiality provisions.
2767 Also, termination may trigger a responsibility of parties to
2768 return confidential information to the party that disclosed it.
2769
2770 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.11" href="#section-4.9.11">4.9.11</a>. Individual notices and communications with participants</span>
2771
2772 This subcomponent discusses the way in which one participant can or
2773 must communicate with another participant on a one-to-one basis in
2774 order for such communications to be legally effective. For example,
2775 an RA may wish to inform the CA that it wishes to terminate its
2776 agreement with the CA. This subcomponent is different from
2777 publication and repository functions, because unlike individual
2778 communications described in this subcomponent, publication and
2779 posting to a repository are for the purpose of communicating to a
2780 wide audience of recipients, such as all relying parties. This
2781 subcomponent may establish mechanisms for communication and indicate
2782 the contact information to be used to route such communications, such
2783 as digitally signed e-mail notices to a specified address, followed
2784 by a signed e-mail acknowledgement of receipt.
2785
2786 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.12" href="#section-4.9.12">4.9.12</a>. Amendments</span>
2787
2788 It will occasionally be necessary to amend a CP or CPS. Some of
2789 these changes will not materially reduce the assurance that a CP or
2790 its implementation provides, and will be judged by the policy
2791 administrator to have an insignificant effect on the acceptability of
2792 certificates. Such changes to a CP or CPS need not require a change
2793
2794
2795
2796 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 50]</span></pre>
2797 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-51" ></span>
2798 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2799
2800
2801 in the CP OID or the CPS pointer (URL). On the other hand, some
2802 changes to a specification will materially change the acceptability
2803 of certificates for specific purposes, and these changes may require
2804 corresponding changes to the CP OID or CPS pointer qualifier (URL).
2805
2806 This subcomponent may also contain the following information:
2807
2808 * The procedures by which the CP or CPS and/or other documents must,
2809 may be, or are amended. In the case of CP or CPS amendments,
2810 change procedures may include a notification mechanism to provide
2811 notice of proposed amendments to affected parties, such as
2812 subscribers and relying parties, a comment period, a mechanism by
2813 which comments are received, reviewed and incorporated into the
2814 document, and a mechanism by which amendments become final and
2815 effective.
2816
2817 * The circumstances under which amendments to the CP or CPS would
2818 require a change in CP OID or CPS pointer (URL).
2819
2820 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.13" href="#section-4.9.13">4.9.13</a>. Dispute Resolution Procedures</span>
2821
2822 This subcomponent discusses procedures utilized to resolve disputes
2823 arising out of the CP, CPS, and/or agreements. Examples of such
2824 procedures include requirements that disputes be resolved in a
2825 certain forum or by alternative dispute resolution mechanisms.
2826
2827 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.14" href="#section-4.9.14">4.9.14</a>. Governing Law</span>
2828
2829 This subcomponent sets forth a statement that the law of a certain
2830 jurisdiction governs the interpretation and enforcement of the
2831 subject CP or CPS or agreements.
2832
2833 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.15" href="#section-4.9.15">4.9.15</a>. Compliance with Applicable Law</span>
2834
2835 This subcomponent relates to stated requirements that participants
2836 comply with applicable law, for example, laws relating to
2837 cryptographic hardware and software that may be subject to the export
2838 control laws of a given jurisdiction. The CP or CPS could purport to
2839 impose such requirements or may require that such provisions appear
2840 in other agreements.
2841
2842 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.16" href="#section-4.9.16">4.9.16</a>. Miscellaneous Provisions</span>
2843
2844 This subcomponent contains miscellaneous provisions, sometimes called
2845 "boilerplate provisions," in contracts. The clauses covered in this
2846 subcomponent may appear in a CP, CPS, or agreements and include:
2847
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 51]</span></pre>
2853 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-52" ></span>
2854 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2855
2856
2857 * An entire agreement clause, which typically identifies the
2858 document or documents comprising the entire agreement between the
2859 parties and states that such agreements supersede all prior and
2860 contemporaneous written or oral understandings relating to the
2861 same subject matter;
2862
2863 * An assignment clause, which may act to limit the ability of a
2864 party in an agreement, assigning its rights under the agreement to
2865 another party (such as the right to receive a stream of payments
2866 in the future) or limiting the ability of a party to delegate its
2867 obligations under the agreement;
2868
2869 * A severability clause, which sets forth the intentions of the
2870 parties in the event that a court or other tribunal determines
2871 that a clause within an agreement is, for some reason, invalid or
2872 unenforceable, and whose purpose is frequently to prevent the
2873 unenforceability of one clause from causing the whole agreement to
2874 be unenforceable; and
2875
2876 * An enforcement clause, which may state that a party prevailing in
2877 any dispute arising out of an agreement is entitled to attorneys'
2878 fees as part of its recovery, or may state that a party's waiver
2879 of one breach of contract does not constitute a continuing waiver
2880 or a future waiver of other breaches of contract.
2881
2882 * A force majeure clause, commonly used to excuse the performance of
2883 one or more parties to an agreement due to an event outside the
2884 reasonable control of the affected party or parties. Typically,
2885 the duration of the excused performance is commensurate with the
2886 duration of the delay caused by the event. The clause may also
2887 provide for the termination of the agreement under specified
2888 circumstances and conditions. Events considered to constitute a
2889 "force majeure" may include so-called "Acts of God," wars,
2890 terrorism, strikes, natural disasters, failures of suppliers or
2891 vendors to perform, or failures of the Internet or other
2892 infrastructure. Force majeure clauses should be drafted so as to
2893 be consistent with other portions of the framework and applicable
2894 service level agreements. For instance, responsibilities and
2895 capabilities for business continuity and disaster recovery may
2896 place some events within the reasonable control of the parties,
2897 such as an obligation to maintain backup electrical power in the
2898 face of power outages.
2899
2900
2901
2902
2903
2904
2905
2906
2907
2908 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 52]</span></pre>
2909 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-53" ></span>
2910 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2911
2912
2913 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.9.17" href="#section-4.9.17">4.9.17</a>. Other Provisions</span>
2914
2915 This subcomponent is a "catchall" location where additional
2916 responsibilities and terms can be imposed on PKI participants that do
2917 not neatly fit within one of the other components or subcomponents of
2918 the framework. CP and CPS writers can place any provision within
2919 this subcomponent that is not covered by another subcomponent.
2920
2921 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
2922
2923 According to X.509, a certificate policy (CP) is "a named set of
2924 rules that indicates the applicability of a certificate to a
2925 particular community and/or class of applications with common
2926 security requirements." A CP may be used by a relying party to help
2927 in deciding whether a certificate, and the binding therein, are
2928 sufficiently trustworthy and otherwise appropriate for a particular
2929 application.
2930
2931 The degree to which a relying party can trust the binding embodied in
2932 a certificate depends on several factors. These factors can include
2933 the practices followed by the certification authority (CA) in
2934 authenticating the subject; the CA's operating policy, procedures,
2935 and technical security controls, including the scope of the
2936 subscriber's responsibilities (for example, in protecting the private
2937 key), and the stated responsibilities and liability terms and
2938 conditions of the CA (for example, warranties, disclaimers of
2939 warranties, and limitations of liability).
2940
2941 This document provides a framework to address technical, procedural,
2942 personnel, and physical security aspects of Certification
2943 Authorities, Registration Authorities, repositories, subscribers, and
2944 relying party cryptographic modules, in order to ensure that the
2945 certificate generation, publication, renewal, re-key, usage, and
2946 revocation is done in a secure manner. Specifically, <a href="#section-4.3">Section 4.3</a>
2947 Identification and Authentication (I&amp;A); <a href="#section-4.4">Section 4.4</a> Certificate
2948 Life-Cycle Operational Requirements; <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a> Facility Management,
2949 and Operational Controls; <a href="#section-4.6">Section 4.6</a> Technical Security Controls;
2950 <a href="#section-4.7">Section 4.7</a> Certificate CRL, and OCSP Profiles; and <a href="#section-4.8">Section 4.8</a>
2951 Compliance Audit and Other Assessment, are oriented towards ensuring
2952 secure operation of the PKI entities such as CA, RA, repository,
2953 subscriber systems, and relying party systems.
2954
2955 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Outline of a Set of Provisions</span>
2956
2957 This section contains a recommended outline for a set of provisions,
2958 intended to serve as a checklist or (with some further development) a
2959 standard template for use by CP or CPS writers. Such a common
2960 outline will facilitate:
2961
2962
2963
2964 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 53]</span></pre>
2965 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-54" ></span>
2966 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
2967
2968
2969 (a) Comparison of two certificate policies during cross-
2970 certification or other forms of interoperation (for the purpose
2971 of equivalency mapping).
2972
2973 (b) Comparison of a CPS with a CP to ensure that the CPS faithfully
2974 implements the policy.
2975
2976 (c) Comparison of two CPSs.
2977
2978 In order to comply with the RFC, the drafters of a compliant CP or
2979 CPS are strongly advised to adhere to this outline. While use of an
2980 alternate outline is discouraged, it may be accepted if a proper
2981 justification is provided for the deviation and a mapping table is
2982 provided to readily discern where each of the items described in this
2983 outline is provided.
2984
2985 1. INTRODUCTION
2986 1.1 Overview
2987 1.2 Document name and identification
2988 1.3 PKI participants
2989 1.3.1 Certification authorities
2990 1.3.2 Registration authorities
2991 1.3.3 Subscribers
2992 1.3.4 Relying parties
2993 1.3.5 Other participants
2994 1.4 Certificate usage
2995 1.4.1. Appropriate certificate uses
2996 1.4.2 Prohibited certificate uses
2997 1.5 Policy administration
2998 1.5.1 Organization administering the document
2999 1.5.2 Contact person
3000 1.5.3 Person determining CPS suitability for the policy
3001 1.5.4 CPS approval procedures
3002 1.6 Definitions and acronyms
3003 2. PUBLICATION AND REPOSITORY RESPONSIBILITIES
3004 2.1 Repositories
3005 2.2 Publication of certification information
3006 2.3 Time or frequency of publication
3007 2.4 Access controls on repositories
3008 3. IDENTIFICATION AND AUTHENTICATION (11)
3009 3.1 Naming
3010 3.1.1 Types of names
3011 3.1.2 Need for names to be meaningful
3012 3.1.3 Anonymity or pseudonymity of subscribers
3013 3.1.4 Rules for interpreting various name forms
3014 3.1.5 Uniqueness of names
3015 3.1.6 Recognition, authentication, and role of trademarks
3016 3.2 Initial identity validation
3017
3018
3019
3020 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 54]</span></pre>
3021 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-55" ></span>
3022 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3023
3024
3025 3.2.1 Method to prove possession of private key
3026 3.2.2 Authentication of organization identity
3027 3.2.3 Authentication of individual identity
3028 3.2.4 Non-verified subscriber information
3029 3.2.5 Validation of authority
3030 3.2.6 Criteria for interoperation
3031 3.3 Identification and authentication for re-key requests
3032 3.3.1 Identification and authentication for routine re-key
3033 3.3.2 Identification and authentication for re-key after revocation
3034 3.4 Identification and authentication for revocation request
3035 4. CERTIFICATE LIFE-CYCLE OPERATIONAL REQUIREMENTS (11)
3036 4.1 Certificate Application
3037 4.1.1 Who can submit a certificate application
3038 4.1.2 Enrollment process and responsibilities
3039 4.2 Certificate application processing
3040 4.2.1 Performing identification and authentication functions
3041 4.2.2 Approval or rejection of certificate applications
3042 4.2.3 Time to process certificate applications
3043 4.3 Certificate issuance
3044 4.3.1 CA actions during certificate issuance
3045 4.3.2 Notification to subscriber by the CA of issuance of
3046 certificate
3047 4.4 Certificate acceptance
3048 4.4.1 Conduct constituting certificate acceptance
3049 4.4.2 Publication of the certificate by the CA
3050 4.4.3 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
3051 entities
3052 4.5 Key pair and certificate usage
3053 4.5.1 Subscriber private key and certificate usage
3054 4.5.2 Relying party public key and certificate usage
3055 4.6 Certificate renewal
3056 4.6.1 Circumstance for certificate renewal
3057 4.6.2 Who may request renewal
3058 4.6.3 Processing certificate renewal requests
3059 4.6.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
3060 4.6.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a renewal certificate
3061 4.6.6 Publication of the renewal certificate by the CA
3062 4.6.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
3063 entities
3064 4.7 Certificate re-key
3065 4.7.1 Circumstance for certificate re-key
3066 4.7.2 Who may request certification of a new public key
3067 4.7.3 Processing certificate re-keying requests
3068 4.7.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
3069 4.7.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of a re-keyed certificate
3070 4.7.6 Publication of the re-keyed certificate by the CA
3071 4.7.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
3072 entities
3073
3074
3075
3076 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 55]</span></pre>
3077 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-56" ></span>
3078 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3079
3080
3081 4.8 Certificate modification
3082 4.8.1 Circumstance for certificate modification
3083 4.8.2 Who may request certificate modification
3084 4.8.3 Processing certificate modification requests
3085 4.8.4 Notification of new certificate issuance to subscriber
3086 4.8.5 Conduct constituting acceptance of modified certificate
3087 4.8.6 Publication of the modified certificate by the CA
3088 4.8.7 Notification of certificate issuance by the CA to other
3089 entities
3090 4.9 Certificate revocation and suspension
3091 4.9.1 Circumstances for revocation
3092 4.9.2 Who can request revocation
3093 4.9.3 Procedure for revocation request
3094 4.9.4 Revocation request grace period
3095 4.9.5 Time within which CA must process the revocation request
3096 4.9.6 Revocation checking requirement for relying parties
3097 4.9.7 CRL issuance frequency (if applicable)
3098 4.9.8 Maximum latency for CRLs (if applicable)
3099 4.9.9 On-line revocation/status checking availability
3100 4.9.10 On-line revocation checking requirements
3101 4.9.11 Other forms of revocation advertisements available
3102 4.9.12 Special requirements re key compromise
3103 4.9.13 Circumstances for suspension
3104 4.9.14 Who can request suspension
3105 4.9.15 Procedure for suspension request
3106 4.9.16 Limits on suspension period
3107 4.10 Certificate status services
3108 4.10.1 Operational characteristics
3109 4.10.2 Service availability
3110 4.10.3 Optional features
3111 4.11 End of subscription
3112 4.12 Key escrow and recovery
3113 4.12.1 Key escrow and recovery policy and practices
3114 4.12.2 Session key encapsulation and recovery policy and practices
3115 5. FACILITY, MANAGEMENT, AND OPERATIONAL CONTROLS (11)
3116 5.1 Physical controls
3117 5.1.1 Site location and construction
3118 5.1.2 Physical access
3119 5.1.3 Power and air conditioning
3120 5.1.4 Water exposures
3121 5.1.5 Fire prevention and protection
3122 5.1.6 Media storage
3123 5.1.7 Waste disposal
3124 5.1.8 Off-site backup
3125 5.2 Procedural controls
3126 5.2.1 Trusted roles
3127 5.2.2 Number of persons required per task
3128 5.2.3 Identification and authentication for each role
3129
3130
3131
3132 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 56]</span></pre>
3133 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-57" ></span>
3134 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3135
3136
3137 5.2.4 Roles requiring separation of duties
3138 5.3 Personnel controls
3139 5.3.1 Qualifications, experience, and clearance requirements
3140 5.3.2 Background check procedures
3141 5.3.3 Training requirements
3142 5.3.4 Retraining frequency and requirements
3143 5.3.5 Job rotation frequency and sequence
3144 5.3.6 Sanctions for unauthorized actions
3145 5.3.7 Independent contractor requirements
3146 5.3.8 Documentation supplied to personnel
3147 5.4 Audit logging procedures
3148 5.4.1 Types of events recorded
3149 5.4.2 Frequency of processing log
3150 5.4.3 Retention period for audit log
3151 5.4.4 Protection of audit log
3152 5.4.5 Audit log backup procedures
3153 5.4.6 Audit collection system (internal vs. external)
3154 5.4.7 Notification to event-causing subject
3155 5.4.8 Vulnerability assessments
3156 5.5 Records archival
3157 5.5.1 Types of records archived
3158 5.5.2 Retention period for archive
3159 5.5.3 Protection of archive
3160 5.5.4 Archive backup procedures
3161 5.5.5 Requirements for time-stamping of records
3162 5.5.6 Archive collection system (internal or external)
3163 5.5.7 Procedures to obtain and verify archive information
3164 5.6 Key changeover
3165 5.7 Compromise and disaster recovery
3166 5.7.1 Incident and compromise handling procedures
3167 5.7.2 Computing resources, software, and/or data are corrupted
3168 5.7.3 Entity private key compromise procedures
3169 5.7.4 Business continuity capabilities after a disaster
3170 5.8 CA or RA termination
3171 6. TECHNICAL SECURITY CONTROLS (11)
3172 6.1 Key pair generation and installation
3173 6.1.1 Key pair generation
3174 6.1.2 Private key delivery to subscriber
3175 6.1.3 Public key delivery to certificate issuer
3176 6.1.4 CA public key delivery to relying parties
3177 6.1.5 Key sizes
3178 6.1.6 Public key parameters generation and quality checking
3179 6.1.7 Key usage purposes (as per X.509 v3 key usage field)
3180 6.2 Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering
3181 Controls
3182 6.2.1 Cryptographic module standards and controls
3183 6.2.2 Private key (n out of m) multi-person control
3184 6.2.3 Private key escrow
3185
3186
3187
3188 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 57]</span></pre>
3189 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-58" ></span>
3190 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3191
3192
3193 6.2.4 Private key backup
3194 6.2.5 Private key archival
3195 6.2.6 Private key transfer into or from a cryptographic module
3196 6.2.7 Private key storage on cryptographic module
3197 6.2.8 Method of activating private key
3198 6.2.9 Method of deactivating private key
3199 6.2.10 Method of destroying private key
3200 6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating
3201 6.3 Other aspects of key pair management
3202 6.3.1 Public key archival
3203 6.3.2 Certificate operational periods and key pair usage periods
3204 6.4 Activation data
3205 6.4.1 Activation data generation and installation
3206 6.4.2 Activation data protection
3207 6.4.3 Other aspects of activation data
3208 6.5 Computer security controls
3209 6.5.1 Specific computer security technical requirements
3210 6.5.2 Computer security rating
3211 6.6 Life cycle technical controls
3212 6.6.1 System development controls
3213 6.6.2 Security management controls
3214 6.6.3 Life cycle security controls
3215 6.7 Network security controls
3216 6.8 Time-stamping
3217 7. CERTIFICATE, CRL, AND OCSP PROFILES
3218 7.1 Certificate profile
3219 7.1.1 Version number(s)
3220 7.1.2 Certificate extensions
3221 7.1.3 Algorithm object identifiers
3222 7.1.4 Name forms
3223 7.1.5 Name constraints
3224 7.1.6 Certificate policy object identifier
3225 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints extension
3226 7.1.8 Policy qualifiers syntax and semantics
3227 7.1.9 Processing semantics for the critical Certificate Policies
3228 extension
3229 7.2 CRL profile
3230 7.2.1 Version number(s)
3231 7.2.2 CRL and CRL entry extensions
3232 7.3 OCSP profile
3233 7.3.1 Version number(s)
3234 7.3.2 OCSP extensions
3235 8. COMPLIANCE AUDIT AND OTHER ASSESSMENTS
3236 8.1 Frequency or circumstances of assessment
3237 8.2 Identity/qualifications of assessor
3238 8.3 Assessor's relationship to assessed entity
3239 8.4 Topics covered by assessment
3240 8.5 Actions taken as a result of deficiency
3241
3242
3243
3244 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 58]</span></pre>
3245 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-59" ></span>
3246 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3247
3248
3249 8.6 Communication of results
3250 9. OTHER BUSINESS AND LEGAL MATTERS
3251 9.1 Fees
3252 9.1.1 Certificate issuance or renewal fees
3253 9.1.2 Certificate access fees
3254 9.1.3 Revocation or status information access fees
3255 9.1.4 Fees for other services
3256 9.1.5 Refund policy
3257 9.2 Financial responsibility
3258 9.2.1 Insurance coverage
3259 9.2.2 Other assets
3260 9.2.3 Insurance or warranty coverage for end-entities
3261 9.3 Confidentiality of business information
3262 9.3.1 Scope of confidential information
3263 9.3.2 Information not within the scope of confidential information
3264 9.3.3 Responsibility to protect confidential information
3265 9.4 Privacy of personal information
3266 9.4.1 Privacy plan
3267 9.4.2 Information treated as private
3268 9.4.3 Information not deemed private
3269 9.4.4 Responsibility to protect private information
3270 9.4.5 Notice and consent to use private information
3271 9.4.6 Disclosure pursuant to judicial or administrative process
3272 9.4.7 Other information disclosure circumstances
3273 9.5 Intellectual property rights
3274 9.6 Representations and warranties
3275 9.6.1 CA representations and warranties
3276 9.6.2 RA representations and warranties
3277 9.6.3 Subscriber representations and warranties
3278 9.6.4 Relying party representations and warranties
3279 9.6.5 Representations and warranties of other participants
3280 9.7 Disclaimers of warranties
3281 9.8 Limitations of liability
3282 9.9 Indemnities
3283 9.10 Term and termination
3284 9.10.1 Term
3285 9.10.2 Termination
3286 9.10.3 Effect of termination and survival
3287 9.11 Individual notices and communications with participants
3288 9.12 Amendments
3289 9.12.1 Procedure for amendment
3290 9.12.2 Notification mechanism and period
3291 9.12.3 Circumstances under which OID must be changed
3292 9.13 Dispute resolution provisions
3293 9.14 Governing law
3294 9.15 Compliance with applicable law
3295 9.16 Miscellaneous provisions
3296 9.16.1 Entire agreement
3297
3298
3299
3300 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 59]</span></pre>
3301 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-60" ></span>
3302 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3303
3304
3305 9.16.2 Assignment
3306 9.16.3 Severability
3307 9.16.4 Enforcement (attorneys' fees and waiver of rights)
3308 9.16.5 Force Majeure
3309 9.17 Other provisions
3310
3311 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Comparison to <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a></span>
3312
3313 This framework represents an incremental improvement over <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>.
3314 The new framework benefits from the experience gained in the course
3315 of deploying CP and CPS documents under <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>. Further, this new
3316 framework is based on coordination with the American Bar Association
3317 Information Security Committee within the Section of Science and
3318 Technology Law. The ISC wrote the PKI Assessment Guidelines [<a href="#ref-ABA2" title=" Public Draft For Comment">ABA2</a>],
3319 which embodies a great deal of technical, business, and legal
3320 experience in PKI operations. In particular, representatives of the
3321 ISC made changes to the framework to better suite it to the legal
3322 environment and make it more accessible to lawyers.
3323
3324 &gt;From a technical perspective, the changes to the <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a> framework
3325 were minimal and incremental, rather than revolutionary. Sections
3326 3-7 have largely been preserved, with modest reorganization and new
3327 topics. For example, the new framework includes a revision of
3328 <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> of the framework to include a full treatment of the
3329 certificate life-cycle, the addition of key escrow, key
3330 encapsulation, and key recovery policies and practices, and OCSP.
3331 <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> audit functions now appear alone in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>, and <a href="#section-2">Section</a>
3332 <a href="#section-2">2</a> focuses exclusively on repository functions. The business and
3333 legal matters in <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>'s <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> now appear in a new <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>.
3334
3335 From a legal perspective, the new <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> is useful because it
3336 places topics in the framework in an ordering that is similar to
3337 software licensing and other technology agreements and thus is
3338 familiar to technology lawyers. Moreover, the framework as a whole
3339 can double as a framework for a subscriber, relying party, or other
3340 PKI-related agreement. The changes are intended to make legal review
3341 of, and input into, CP and CPS documents more efficient. <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>
3342 also adds new legal topics, such as the privacy of personal
3343 information, liability terms, and duration of the effectiveness of
3344 the document.
3345
3346 <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a> of the new framework is largely the same as <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>,
3347 although it increases coverage of PKI participants by breaking out
3348 subscribers from relying parties and adding a section for other
3349 participants. It changes the "applicability" section to one covering
3350 appropriate and prohibited uses of certificates. Also, it moves CPS
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355
3356 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 60]</span></pre>
3357 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-61" ></span>
3358 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3359
3360
3361 approval procedures from <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>'s <a href="#section-8.3">Section 8.3</a> into a collected
3362 policy administration section. Finally, <a href="#section-1.6">Section 1.6</a> adds a place to
3363 list definitions and acronyms.
3364
3365 <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> of the new framework is a reorganization of <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a> of
3366 the old framework. <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> of the new framework is based on a
3367 division of the old <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a> into two parts for naming and
3368 identification and authentication issues. It adds new issues, such
3369 as the permissibility of pseudonyms and anonymity. Old <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>
3370 topics on audit logging, record archives, key changeover, compromise
3371 and disaster recovery, and CA termination have moved to <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
3372 The remaining <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> topics have been expanded and reorganized to
3373 cover a complete certificate lifecycle. New topics include items
3374 implicit in the <a href="./rfc2527#section-4">RFC 2527 Section&nbsp;4</a>, but now explicit, such as
3375 certificate application processing, certificate modification, and the
3376 end of subscription.
3377
3378 New Sections <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> through <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a> are almost identical to their
3379 counterparts in <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>. The remainder of the new <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> is the
3380 topics moved from <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>'s <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>, in the order that they
3381 appeared in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> of the new framework is almost the
3382 same as the old <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>, with some exceptions, such as the
3383 consolidation of old <a href="#section-6.8">Section 6.8</a> (cryptographic module engineering
3384 controls) into <a href="#section-6.2.1">Section 6.2.1</a> (now called "cryptographic module
3385 standards and controls") and the addition of time-stamping in a new
3386 <a href="#section-6.8">Section 6.8</a>. <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> is almost identical to the old <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>, the
3387 major change being the addition of a section covering OCSP profile.
3388 <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a> is almost identical to <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>'s <a href="#section-2.7">Section 2.7</a>.
3389
3390 New <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> contains business and legal topics that were covered in
3391 <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>'s <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, including fees, financial responsibility,
3392 confidentiality, and intellectual property. It adds a section on the
3393 privacy of personal information, which has become a significant
3394 policy issue. The "liability" <a href="./rfc2527#section-2.2">Section&nbsp;2.2 in RFC 2527</a> now appears in
3395 Sections <a href="#section-9.6">9.6</a> through <a href="#section-9.9">9.9</a>, covering representations and warranties,
3396 disclaimers, limitations of liability, and indemnities. <a href="#section-9.10">Section 9.10</a>
3397 adds a section concerning the duration of the effectiveness of
3398 documentation. <a href="#section-9.12">Section 9.12</a> collects terms concerning the way in
3399 which a document (CP, CPS, agreement, or other document) may be
3400 amended, formerly appearing in <a href="#section-8.1">Section 8.1</a>. <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> includes
3401 "legal boilerplate" topics, some of which were in the old <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>.
3402 Finally, <a href="#section-9.17">Section 9.17</a> is a catch-all "other provisions" section where
3403 drafters can place information that does not fit well into any other
3404 section of the framework.
3405
3406 The following matrix shows the sections in the old <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a> framework
3407 and their successor sections in the new framework.
3408
3409
3410
3411
3412 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 61]</span></pre>
3413 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-62" ></span>
3414 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3415
3416
3417 ORIGINAL <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a> NEW RFC SECTION
3418 SECTION
3419 ------------------------------------------------------
3420 1. Introduction 1.
3421 ------------------------------------------------------
3422 1.1 Overview 1.1
3423 ------------------------------------------------------
3424 1.2 Identification 1.2
3425 ------------------------------------------------------
3426 1.3 Community and
3427 Applicability 1.3
3428 ------------------------------------------------------
3429 1.3.1 Certification
3430 Authorities 1.3.1
3431 ------------------------------------------------------
3432 1.3.2 Registration Authorities 1.3.2
3433 ------------------------------------------------------
3434 1.3.3 End entities 1.3.3,
3435 1.3.4
3436 ------------------------------------------------------
3437 1.3.4 Applicability 1.4, 4.5
3438 ------------------------------------------------------
3439 1.4 Contact Details 1.5
3440 ------------------------------------------------------
3441 1.4.1 Specification Administration
3442 Organization 1.5.1
3443 ------------------------------------------------------
3444 1.4.2 Contact Person 1.5.2
3445 ------------------------------------------------------
3446 1.4.3 Person Determining CPS
3447 Suitability for the Policy 1.5.3
3448 ------------------------------------------------------
3449 2. General Provisions 2, 8, 9
3450 ------------------------------------------------------
3451 2.1 Obligations 2.6.4
3452 ------------------------------------------------------
3453 2.1.1 1A Obligations Integrated
3454 throughout
3455 portions of the
3456 framework that
3457 apply to CAs
3458 ------------------------------------------------------
3459 2.1.2 RA Obligations Integrated
3460 throughout
3461 portions of the
3462 framework that
3463 apply to RAs
3464
3465
3466
3467
3468 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 62]</span></pre>
3469 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-63" ></span>
3470 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3471
3472
3473 ------------------------------------------------------
3474 2.1.3 Subscriber Obligations 4.1.2, 4.4, 4.5,
3475 4.5.1, 4.6.5,
3476 4.7.5, 4.8.1,
3477 4.8.5, 4.9.1,
3478 4.9.2, 4.9.13,
3479 4.9.15, 5., 6.,
3480 9.6.3, 9.9
3481 ------------------------------------------------------
3482 2.1.4 Relying Party Obligations 4.5, 4.5.2, 4.9.6,
3483 5., 6., 9.6.4, 9.9
3484 ------------------------------------------------------
3485 2.1.5 Repository Obligations 2., 4.4.2, 4.4.3,
3486 4.6.6, 4.6.7,
3487 4.7.6, 4.7.7,
3488 4.8.6, 4.8.7
3489 ------------------------------------------------------
3490 2.2 Liability 9.6, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9
3491 ------------------------------------------------------
3492 2.2.1 CA Liability 9.6.1, 9.7., 9.8,
3493 9.9
3494 ------------------------------------------------------
3495 2.2.2 RA Liability 9.6.2, 9.7, 9.8, 9.9
3496 ------------------------------------------------------
3497 2.3 Financial Responsibility 9.2
3498 ------------------------------------------------------
3499 2.3.1 Indemnification by Relying
3500 Parties 9.9
3501 ------------------------------------------------------
3502 2.3.2 Fiduciary Relationships 9.7
3503 ------------------------------------------------------
3504 2.4 Interpretation and Enforcement 9.16
3505 ------------------------------------------------------
3506 2.4.1 Governing Law 9.14, 9.15
3507 ------------------------------------------------------
3508 2.4.2 Severability, Survival,
3509 Merger, Notice 9.10.3, 9.11,
3510 9.16.1,9.16.3
3511 ------------------------------------------------------
3512 2.4.3 Dispute Resolution
3513 Procedures 9.13, 9.16.4
3514 ------------------------------------------------------
3515 2.5 Fees 9.1
3516 ------------------------------------------------------
3517 2.5.1 Certificate Issuance
3518 or Renewal Fees 9.1.1
3519 ------------------------------------------------------
3520 2.5.2 Certificate Access Fees 9.1.2
3521
3522
3523
3524 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 63]</span></pre>
3525 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-64" ></span>
3526 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3527
3528
3529 ------------------------------------------------------
3530 2.5.3 Revocation or Status
3531 Information Access Fees 9.1.3
3532 ------------------------------------------------------
3533 2.5.4 Fees for Other Services Such
3534 as Policy Information 9.1.4
3535 ------------------------------------------------------
3536 2.5.5 Refund Policy 9.1.5
3537 ------------------------------------------------------
3538 2.6 Publication and Repository 2.
3539 ------------------------------------------------------
3540 2.6.1 Publication of CA
3541 Information 2.2, 4.4.2,
3542 4.4.3, 4.6.6,
3543 4.6.7, 4.7.6,
3544 4.7.7, 4.8.6,
3545 4.8.7
3546 ------------------------------------------------------
3547 2.6.2 Frequency of Publication 2.3
3548 ------------------------------------------------------
3549 2.6.3 Access Controls 2.4
3550 ------------------------------------------------------
3551 2.6.4 Repositories 2.1
3552 ------------------------------------------------------
3553 2.7 Compliance Audit 8.
3554 ------------------------------------------------------
3555 2.7.1 Frequency of Entity Compliance
3556 Audit 8.1
3557 ------------------------------------------------------
3558 2.7.2 Identity/Qualifications of
3559 Auditor 8.2
3560 ------------------------------------------------------
3561 2.7.3 Auditor's Relationship to Audited
3562 Party 8.3
3563 ------------------------------------------------------
3564 2.7.4 Topics Covered by Audit 8.4
3565 ------------------------------------------------------
3566 2.7.5 Actions Taken as a Result of
3567 Deficiency 8.5
3568 ------------------------------------------------------
3569 2.7.6 Communications of Results 8.6
3570 ------------------------------------------------------
3571 2.8 Confidentiality 9.3, 9.4
3572 ------------------------------------------------------
3573 2.8.1 Types of Information to be
3574 Kept Confidential 9.3.1, 9.4.2
3575
3576
3577
3578
3579
3580 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 64]</span></pre>
3581 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-65" ></span>
3582 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3583
3584
3585 ------------------------------------------------------
3586 2.8.2 Types of Information Not
3587 Considered Confidential 9.3.2, 9.4.3
3588 ------------------------------------------------------
3589 2.8.3 Disclosure of Certificate
3590 Revocation/Suspension
3591 Information 9.3.1, 9.3.2,
3592 9.3.3, 9.4.2,
3593 9.4.3, 9.4.4
3594 ------------------------------------------------------
3595 2.8.4 Release to Law Enforcement
3596 Officials 9.3.3, 9.4.6
3597 ------------------------------------------------------
3598 2.8.5 Release as Part of Civil
3599 Discovery 9.3.3, 9.4.6
3600 ------------------------------------------------------
3601 2.8.6 Disclosure Upon Owner's
3602 Request 9.3.3, 9.4.7
3603 ------------------------------------------------------
3604 2.8.7 Other Information Release
3605 Circumstances 9.3.3, 9.4.7
3606 ------------------------------------------------------
3607 2.9 Intellectual Property Rights 9.5
3608 ------------------------------------------------------
3609 3. Identification and Authentication 3.
3610 ------------------------------------------------------
3611 3.1 Initial Registration 3.1, 3.2
3612 ------------------------------------------------------
3613 3.1.1 Type of Names 3.1.1
3614 ------------------------------------------------------
3615 3.1.2 Need for Names to be
3616 Meaningful 3.1.2, 3.1.3
3617 ------------------------------------------------------
3618 3.1.3 Rules for Interpreting
3619 Various Name Forms 3.1.4
3620 ------------------------------------------------------
3621 3.1.4 Uniqueness of Names 3.1.5
3622 ------------------------------------------------------
3623 3.1.5 Name Claim Dispute
3624 Resolution Procedure 3.1.6
3625 ------------------------------------------------------
3626 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication,
3627 and Role of Trademarks 3.1.6
3628 ------------------------------------------------------
3629 3.1.7 Method to Prove Possession
3630 of Private Key 3.2.1
3631
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 65]</span></pre>
3637 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-66" ></span>
3638 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3639
3640
3641 ------------------------------------------------------
3642 3.1.8 Authentication of
3643 Organization Identity 3.2.2
3644 ------------------------------------------------------
3645 3.1.9 Authentication of
3646 Individual Identity 3.2.3
3647 ------------------------------------------------------
3648 3.2 Routine Rekey 3.3.1, 4.6, 4.7
3649 ------------------------------------------------------
3650 3.3 Rekey After Revocation 3.3.2
3651 ------------------------------------------------------
3652 3.4 Revocation Request 3.4
3653 ------------------------------------------------------
3654 4. Operational Requirements 4., 5.
3655 ------------------------------------------------------
3656 4.1 Certificate Application 4.1, 4.2, 4.6,
3657 4.7
3658 ------------------------------------------------------
3659 4.2 Certificate Issuance 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.3,
3660 4.6, 4.7, 4.8.4,
3661 4.8.6, 4.8.7
3662 ------------------------------------------------------
3663 4.3 Certificate Acceptance 4.3.2, 4.4, 4.6,
3664 4.7, 4.8.4-4.8.7
3665 ------------------------------------------------------
3666 4.4 Certificate Suspension
3667 and Revocation 4.8, 4.9
3668 ------------------------------------------------------
3669 4.4.1 Circumstances for Revocation 4.8.1, 4.9.1
3670 ------------------------------------------------------
3671 4.4.2 Who Can Request Revocation 4.8.2, 4.9.2
3672 ------------------------------------------------------
3673 4.4.3 Procedure for Revocation
3674 Request 4.8.3-4.8.7,
3675 4.9.3
3676 ------------------------------------------------------
3677 4.4.4 Revocation Request
3678 Grace Period 4.9.4
3679 ------------------------------------------------------
3680 4.4.5 Circumstances for Suspension 4.9.13
3681 ------------------------------------------------------
3682 4.4.6 Who Can Request Suspension 4.9.14
3683 ------------------------------------------------------
3684 4.4.7 Procedure for Suspension
3685 Request 4.9.15
3686 ------------------------------------------------------
3687 4.4.8 Limits on Suspension Period 4.9.16
3688
3689
3690
3691
3692 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 66]</span></pre>
3693 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-67" ></span>
3694 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3695
3696
3697 ------------------------------------------------------
3698 4.4.9 CRL Issuance Frequency
3699 (If Applicable) 4.9.7, 4.9.8,
3700 4.10
3701 ------------------------------------------------------
3702 4.4.10 CRL Checking Requirements 4.9.6, 4.10
3703 ------------------------------------------------------
3704 4.4.11 On-Line Revocation/
3705 Status Checking
3706 Availability 4.9.9, 4.10
3707 ------------------------------------------------------
3708 4.4.12 On-Line Revocation
3709 Checking Requirements 4.9.6, 4.9.10,
3710 4.10
3711 ------------------------------------------------------
3712 4.4.13 Other Forms
3713 of Revocation
3714 Advertisements 4.9.11, 4.10
3715 ------------------------------------------------------
3716 4.4.14 Checking Requirements
3717 for Other Forms of
3718 Revocation
3719 Advertisements 4.9.6, 4.9.11,
3720 4.10
3721 ------------------------------------------------------
3722 4.4.15 Special Requirements re
3723 Key Compromise 4.9.12
3724 ------------------------------------------------------
3725 4.5 Security Audit Procedures 5.4
3726 ------------------------------------------------------
3727 4.5.1 Types of Events Recorded 5.4.1
3728 ------------------------------------------------------
3729 4.5.2 Frequency of Processing Log 5.4.2
3730 ------------------------------------------------------
3731 4.5.3 Retention Period for Audit
3732 Log 5.4.3
3733 ------------------------------------------------------
3734 4.5.4 Protection of Audit Log 5.4.4
3735 ------------------------------------------------------
3736 4.5.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures 5.4.5
3737 ------------------------------------------------------
3738 4.5.6 Audit Collection System
3739 (Internal vs. External) 5.4.6
3740 ------------------------------------------------------
3741 4.5.7 Notification to Event-Causing
3742 Subject 5.4.7
3743 ------------------------------------------------------
3744 4.5.8 Vulnerability Assessments 5.4.8
3745
3746
3747
3748 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 67]</span></pre>
3749 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-68" ></span>
3750 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3751
3752
3753 ------------------------------------------------------
3754 4.6 Records Archival 5.5
3755 ------------------------------------------------------
3756 4.6.1 Types of Records Archived 5.5.1
3757 ------------------------------------------------------
3758 4.6.2 Retention Period for Archive 5.5.2
3759 ------------------------------------------------------
3760 4.6.3 Protection of Archive 5.5.3
3761 ------------------------------------------------------
3762 4.6.4 Archive Backup Procedures 5.5.4
3763 ------------------------------------------------------
3764 4.6.5 Requirements for
3765 Time-Stamping of Records 5.5.5
3766 ------------------------------------------------------
3767 4.6.6 Archive Collection System
3768 (Internal or External) 5.5.6
3769 ------------------------------------------------------
3770 4.6.6 Procedures to Obtain and
3771 Verify Archive Information 5.5.7
3772 ------------------------------------------------------
3773 4.7 Key Changeover 5.6
3774 ------------------------------------------------------
3775 4.8 Compromise and Disaster
3776 Recovery 5.7, 5.7.1
3777 ------------------------------------------------------
3778 4.8.1 Computing Resources, Software,
3779 and/or Data Are Corrupted 5.7.2
3780 ------------------------------------------------------
3781 4.8.2 Entity Public
3782 Key is Revoked 4.9.7, 4.9.9,
3783 4.9.11
3784 ------------------------------------------------------
3785 4.8.3 Entity Key is Compromised 5.7.3
3786 ------------------------------------------------------
3787 4.8.4 Secure Facility After a Natural
3788 or Other Type of Disaster 5.7.4
3789 ------------------------------------------------------
3790 4.9 CA Termination 5.8
3791 ------------------------------------------------------
3792 5. Physical, Procedural, and
3793 Personnel Security Controls 5.
3794 ------------------------------------------------------
3795 5.1 Physical Controls 5.1
3796 ------------------------------------------------------
3797 5.1.1 Site Location and Construction 5.1.1
3798 ------------------------------------------------------
3799 5.1.2 Physical Access 5.1.2
3800
3801
3802
3803
3804 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 68]</span></pre>
3805 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-69" ></span>
3806 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3807
3808
3809 ------------------------------------------------------
3810 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning 5.1.3
3811 ------------------------------------------------------
3812
3813 5.1.4 Water Exposures 5.1.4
3814 ------------------------------------------------------
3815 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection 5.1.5
3816 ------------------------------------------------------
3817 5.1.6 Media Storage 5.1.6
3818 ------------------------------------------------------
3819 5.1.7 Waste Disposal 5.1.7
3820 ------------------------------------------------------
3821 5.1.8 Off-Site Backup 5.1.8
3822 ------------------------------------------------------
3823 5.2 Procedural Controls 5.2
3824 ------------------------------------------------------
3825 5.2.1 Trusted Roles 5.2.1, 5.2.4
3826 ------------------------------------------------------
3827 5.2.2 Number of Persons
3828 Required per Task 5.2.2, 5.2.4
3829 ------------------------------------------------------
3830 5.2.3 Identification and
3831 Authentication for Each Role 5.2.3
3832 ------------------------------------------------------
3833 5.3 Personnel Controls 5.3
3834 ------------------------------------------------------
3835 5.3.1 Background, Qualifications,
3836 Experience, and Clearance
3837 Requirements 5.3.1
3838 ------------------------------------------------------
3839 5.3.2 Background Check Procedures 5.3.2
3840 ------------------------------------------------------
3841 5.3.3 Training Requirements 5.3.3
3842 ------------------------------------------------------
3843 5.3.4 Retraining Frequency
3844 and Requirements 5.3.4
3845 ------------------------------------------------------
3846 5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency
3847 and Sequence 5.3.5
3848 ------------------------------------------------------
3849 5.3.6 Sanctions for
3850 Unauthorized Actions 5.3.6
3851 ------------------------------------------------------
3852 5.3.7 Contracting Personnel
3853 Requirements 5.3.7
3854 ------------------------------------------------------
3855 5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to
3856 Personnel 5.3.8
3857
3858
3859
3860 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 69]</span></pre>
3861 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-70" ></span>
3862 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3863
3864
3865 ------------------------------------------------------
3866 6. Technical Security Controls 6.
3867 ------------------------------------------------------
3868 6.1 Key Pair Generation and
3869 Installation 6.1
3870 ------------------------------------------------------
3871 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation 6.1.1
3872 ------------------------------------------------------
3873 6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to Entity 6.1.2
3874 ------------------------------------------------------
3875 6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to
3876 Certificate Issuer 6.1.3
3877 ------------------------------------------------------
3878 6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to Users 6.1.4
3879 ------------------------------------------------------
3880 6.1.5 Key Sizes 6.1.5
3881 ------------------------------------------------------
3882 6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation 6.1.6
3883 ------------------------------------------------------
3884 6.1.7 Parameter Quality Checking 6.1.6
3885 ------------------------------------------------------
3886 6.1.8 Hardware/Software Key Generation 6.1.1
3887 ------------------------------------------------------
3888 6.1.9 Key Usage Purposes
3889 (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field) 6.1.9
3890 ------------------------------------------------------
3891 6.2 Private Key Protection 6.2
3892 ------------------------------------------------------
3893 6.2.1 Standards for Cryptographic
3894 Module 6.2.1
3895 ------------------------------------------------------
3896
3897 6.2.2 Private Key (n out of m)
3898 Multi-Person Control 6.2.2
3899 ------------------------------------------------------
3900 6.2.3 Private Key Escrow 6.2.3
3901 ------------------------------------------------------
3902 6.2.4 Private Key Backup 6.2.4
3903 ------------------------------------------------------
3904 6.2.5 Private Key Archival 6.2.5
3905 ------------------------------------------------------
3906 6.2.6 Private Key Entry Into
3907 Cryptographic Module 6.2.6, 6.2.7
3908 ------------------------------------------------------
3909 6.2.7 Method of Activating
3910 Private Key 6.2.8
3911
3912
3913
3914
3915
3916 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 70]</span></pre>
3917 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-71" ></span>
3918 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3919
3920
3921 ------------------------------------------------------
3922 6.2.8 Method of Deactivating
3923 Private Key 6.2.9
3924 ------------------------------------------------------
3925 6.2.9 Method of Destroying Private
3926 Key 6.2.10
3927 ------------------------------------------------------
3928 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair
3929 Management 6.3
3930 ------------------------------------------------------
3931 6.3.1 Public Key Archival 6.3.1
3932 ------------------------------------------------------
3933 6.3.2 Usage Periods for the Public
3934 and Private Keys 6.3.2
3935 ------------------------------------------------------
3936 6.4 Activation Data 6.4
3937 ------------------------------------------------------
3938 6.4.1 Activation Data Generation
3939 and Installation 6.4.1
3940 ------------------------------------------------------
3941 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection 6.4.2
3942 ------------------------------------------------------
3943 6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation
3944 Data 6.4.3
3945 ------------------------------------------------------
3946 6.5 Computer Security Controls 6.5
3947 ------------------------------------------------------
3948 6.5.1 Specific Computer Security
3949 Technical Requirements 6.5.1
3950 ------------------------------------------------------
3951 6.5.2 Computer Security Rating 6.5.2
3952 ------------------------------------------------------
3953 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls 6.6
3954 ------------------------------------------------------
3955 6.6.1 System Development Controls 6.6.1
3956 ------------------------------------------------------
3957 6.6.2 Security Management Controls 6.6.2
3958 ------------------------------------------------------
3959 6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls 6.6.3
3960 ------------------------------------------------------
3961 6.7 Network Security Controls 6.7
3962 ------------------------------------------------------
3963 6.8 Cryptographic Module
3964 Engineering Controls 6.2.1, 6.2,
3965 6.2.1, 6.2.11
3966 ------------------------------------------------------
3967 7.Certificate and CRL Profiles 7.
3968
3969
3970
3971
3972 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 71]</span></pre>
3973 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-72" ></span>
3974 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
3975
3976
3977 ------------------------------------------------------
3978 7.1 Certificate Profile 7.1
3979 ------------------------------------------------------
3980 7.1.1 Version Number(s) 7.1.1
3981 ------------------------------------------------------
3982 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions 7.1.2
3983 ------------------------------------------------------
3984 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers 7.1.3
3985 ------------------------------------------------------
3986 7.1.4 Name Forms 7.1.4
3987 ------------------------------------------------------
3988 7.1.5 Name Constraints 7.1.5
3989 ------------------------------------------------------
3990 7.1.6 Certificate Policy Object
3991 Identifier 7.1.6
3992 ------------------------------------------------------
3993 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints
3994 Extension 7.1.7
3995 ------------------------------------------------------
3996 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax
3997 and Semantics 7.1.8
3998 ------------------------------------------------------
3999 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for
4000 the Critical Certificate
4001 Policies Extension 7.1.9
4002 ------------------------------------------------------
4003 7.2 CRL Profile 7.2
4004 ------------------------------------------------------
4005 7.2.1 Version Number(s) 7.2.1
4006 ------------------------------------------------------
4007 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions 7.2.1
4008 ------------------------------------------------------
4009 8. Specification Administration N/A
4010 ------------------------------------------------------
4011 8.1 Specification Change
4012 Procedures 9.12
4013 ------------------------------------------------------
4014 8.2 Publication and Notification
4015 Policies 2.2, 2.3
4016 ------------------------------------------------------
4017 8.3 CPS Approval Procedures 1.5.4
4018 ------------------------------------------------------
4019
4020
4021
4022
4023
4024
4025
4026
4027
4028 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 72]</span></pre>
4029 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-73" ></span>
4030 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4031
4032
4033 The following matrix shows the sections in the new framework and the
4034 sections in <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a> to which the headings in the new framework
4035 correspond.
4036
4037 NEW RFC SECTION ORIGINAL <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>
4038 SECTION
4039 ------------------------------------------------------
4040 1. Introduction 1.
4041 ------------------------------------------------------
4042 1.1 Overview 1.1
4043 ------------------------------------------------------
4044 1.2 Document Name and Identification 1.2
4045 ------------------------------------------------------
4046 1.3 PKI Participants 1.3
4047 ------------------------------------------------------
4048 1.3.1 Certification Authorities 1.3.1
4049 ------------------------------------------------------
4050 1.3.2 Registration Authorities 1.3.2
4051 ------------------------------------------------------
4052 1.3.3 Subscribers 1.3.3
4053 ------------------------------------------------------
4054 1.3.4 Relying Parties 1.3.3
4055 ------------------------------------------------------
4056 1.3.5 Other Participants N/A
4057 ------------------------------------------------------
4058 1.4 Certificate Usage 1.3.4
4059 ------------------------------------------------------
4060 1.4.1 Appropriate Certificate Uses 1.3.4
4061 ------------------------------------------------------
4062 1.4.2 Prohibited Certificate Uses 1.3.4
4063 ------------------------------------------------------
4064 1.5 Policy Administration 1.4
4065 ------------------------------------------------------
4066 1.5.1 Organization Administering
4067 the Document 1.4.1
4068 ------------------------------------------------------
4069 1.5.2 Contact Person 1.4.2
4070 ------------------------------------------------------
4071 1.5.3 Person Determining CPS
4072 Suitability for the Policy 1.4.3
4073 ------------------------------------------------------
4074 1.5.4 CPS Approval Procedures 8.3
4075 ------------------------------------------------------
4076 1.6 Definitions and Acronyms N/A
4077 ------------------------------------------------------
4078 2. Publication and Repository
4079 Responsibilities 2.1.5, 2.6
4080
4081
4082
4083
4084 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 73]</span></pre>
4085 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-74" ></span>
4086 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4087
4088
4089 ------------------------------------------------------
4090 2.1 Repositories 2.6.4
4091 ------------------------------------------------------
4092 2.2 Publication of Certification
4093 Information 2.6.1, 8.2
4094 ------------------------------------------------------
4095 2.3 Time or Frequency of
4096 Publication 2.6.2, 8.2
4097 ------------------------------------------------------
4098 2.4 Access Controls on Repositories 2.6.3
4099 ------------------------------------------------------
4100 3. Identification and Authentication 3.
4101 ------------------------------------------------------
4102 3.1 Naming 3.1
4103 ------------------------------------------------------
4104 3.1.1 Type of Names 3.1.1
4105 ------------------------------------------------------
4106 3.1.2 Need for Names to be Meaningful 3.1.2
4107 ------------------------------------------------------
4108 3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of
4109 Subscribers 3.1.2
4110 ------------------------------------------------------
4111 3.1.4 Rules for Interpreting Various
4112 Name Forms 3.1.3
4113 ------------------------------------------------------
4114 3.1.5 Uniqueness of Names 3.1.4
4115 ------------------------------------------------------
4116 3.1.6 Recognition, Authentication,
4117 and Role of Trademarks 3.1.5, 3.1.6
4118 ------------------------------------------------------
4119 3.2 Initial Identity Validation 3.1
4120 ------------------------------------------------------
4121 3.2.1 Method to Prove Possession
4122 of Private Key 3.1.7
4123 ------------------------------------------------------
4124 3.2.2 Authentication of
4125 Organization Identity 3.1.8
4126 ------------------------------------------------------
4127 3.2.3 Authentication of Individual
4128 Identity 3.1.9
4129 ------------------------------------------------------
4130 3.2.4 Non-Verified Subscriber
4131 Information N/A
4132 ------------------------------------------------------
4133 3.2.5 Validation of Authority 3.1.9
4134
4135
4136
4137
4138
4139
4140 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 74]</span></pre>
4141 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-75" ></span>
4142 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4143
4144
4145 ------------------------------------------------------
4146 3.2.6 Criteria for Interoperation 4.1
4147 ------------------------------------------------------
4148 3.3 Identification and Authentication
4149 for Re-Key Requests 3.2, 3.3
4150 ------------------------------------------------------
4151 3.3.1 Identification and
4152 Authentication for Routine
4153 Re-Key 3.2
4154 ------------------------------------------------------
4155 3.3.2 Identification and
4156 Authentication for Re-Key
4157 After Revocation 3.3
4158 ------------------------------------------------------
4159 3.4 Identification and Authentication
4160 for Revocation Request 3.4
4161 ------------------------------------------------------
4162 4. Certificate Life-Cycle
4163 Operational Requirements 4.
4164 ------------------------------------------------------
4165 4.1 Certificate Application 4.1
4166 ------------------------------------------------------
4167 4.1.1 Who Can Submit a Certificate
4168 Application 4.1
4169 ------------------------------------------------------
4170 4.1.2 Enrollment Process and
4171 Responsibilities 2.1.3, 4.1
4172 ------------------------------------------------------
4173 4.2 Certificate Application
4174 Processing 4.1, 4.2
4175 ------------------------------------------------------
4176 4.2.1 Performing Identification
4177 and Authentication Functions 4.1, 4.2
4178 ------------------------------------------------------
4179 4.2.2 Approval or Rejection of
4180 Certificate Applications 4.1, 4.2
4181 ------------------------------------------------------
4182 4.2.3 Time to Process
4183 Certificate Applications 4.1, 4.2
4184 ------------------------------------------------------
4185 4.3 Certificate Issuance 4.2
4186 ------------------------------------------------------
4187 4.3.1 CA Actions During
4188 Certificate Issuance 4.2
4189 ------------------------------------------------------
4190 4.3.2 Notifications to Subscriber by
4191 the CA of Issuance of Certificate 4.2, 4.3
4192
4193
4194
4195
4196 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 75]</span></pre>
4197 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-76" ></span>
4198 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4199
4200
4201 ------------------------------------------------------
4202 4.4 Certificate Acceptance 2.1.3, 4.3
4203 ------------------------------------------------------
4204 4.4.1 Conduct Constituting
4205 Certificate Acceptance 4.3
4206 ------------------------------------------------------
4207 4.4.2 Publication of the
4208 Certificate by the CA 2.1.5, 2.6.1, 4.3
4209 ------------------------------------------------------
4210 4.4.3 Notification of
4211 Certificate Issuance by
4212 the CA to Other Entities 2.1.5, 2.6.1,
4213 4.2, 4.3
4214 ------------------------------------------------------
4215 4.5 Key Pair and
4216 Certificate Usage 1.3.4, 2.1.3,
4217 2.1.4
4218 ------------------------------------------------------
4219 4.5.1 Subscriber Private Key
4220 and Certificate Usage 1.3.4, 2.1.3
4221 ------------------------------------------------------
4222 4.5.2 Relying Party Public
4223 Key and Certificate
4224 Usage 1.3.4, 2.1.4
4225 ------------------------------------------------------
4226 4.6 Certificate Renewal 3.2, 4.1, 4.2,
4227 4.3
4228 ------------------------------------------------------
4229 4.6.1 Circumstances for
4230 Certificate Renewal 3.2, 4.1
4231 ------------------------------------------------------
4232 4.6.2 Who May Request Renewal 3.2, 4.1
4233 ------------------------------------------------------
4234 4.6.3 Processing Certificate
4235 Renewal Requests 3.2, 4.1, 4.2
4236 ------------------------------------------------------
4237 4.6.4 Notification of New
4238 Certificate Issuance to
4239 Subscriber 3.2, 4.2, 4.3
4240 ------------------------------------------------------
4241 4.6.5 Conduct Constituting
4242 Acceptance of a Renewal
4243 Certificate 2.1.3, 3.2, 4.3
4244 ------------------------------------------------------
4245 4.6.6 Publication of the
4246 Renewal Certificate
4247 by the CA 2.1.5, 2.6.1,
4248 3.2, 4.3
4249
4250
4251
4252 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 76]</span></pre>
4253 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-77" ></span>
4254 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4255
4256
4257 ------------------------------------------------------
4258 4.6.7 Notification of
4259 Certificate Issuance by
4260 the CA to Other Entities 2.1.5, 2.6.1, 3.2,
4261 4.2, 4.3
4262 ------------------------------------------------------
4263 4.7 Certificate Re-Key 3.2, 4.1, 4.2, 4.3
4264 ------------------------------------------------------
4265 4.7.1 Circumstances for
4266 Certificate Re-Key 3.2, 4.1
4267 ------------------------------------------------------
4268 4.7.2 Who May Request Certification
4269 of a New Public Key 3.2, 4.1
4270 ------------------------------------------------------
4271 4.7.3 Processing Certificate
4272 Re-Keying Requests 3.2, 4.1, 4.2
4273 ------------------------------------------------------
4274 4.7.4 Notification of New
4275 Certificate Issuance to
4276 Subscriber 3.2, 4.2, 4.3
4277 ------------------------------------------------------
4278 4.7.5 Conduct Constituting
4279 Acceptance of a
4280 Re-Keyed Certificate 2.1.3, 3.2, 4.3
4281 ------------------------------------------------------
4282 4.7.6 Publication of the
4283 Re-Keyed Certificate
4284 by the CA 2.1.5, 2.6.1,
4285 3.2, 4.3
4286 ------------------------------------------------------
4287 4.7.7 Notification of Certificate
4288 Issuance by the CA
4289 to Other Entities 2.1.5, 2.6.1,
4290 3.2, 4.2, 4.3
4291 ------------------------------------------------------
4292 4.8 Certificate Modification 4.4
4293 ------------------------------------------------------
4294 4.8.1 Circumstances for
4295 Certificate Modification 2.1.3, 4.4.1
4296 ------------------------------------------------------
4297 4.8.2 Who May Request Certificate
4298 Modification 4.4.2
4299 ------------------------------------------------------
4300 4.8.3 Processing Certificate
4301 Modification Requests 4.4.3
4302
4303
4304
4305
4306
4307
4308 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 77]</span></pre>
4309 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-78" ></span>
4310 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4311
4312
4313 ------------------------------------------------------
4314 4.8.4 Notification of New
4315 Certificate Issuance to
4316 Subscriber 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.3
4317 ------------------------------------------------------
4318 4.8.5 Conduct Constituting
4319 Acceptance of Modified
4320 Certificate 2.1.3, 4.3, 4.4.3
4321 ------------------------------------------------------
4322 4.8.6 Publication of the Modified
4323 Certificate by
4324 the CA 2.1.5, 2.6.1,
4325 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.3
4326 ------------------------------------------------------
4327 4.8.7 Notification of
4328 Certificate Issuance by
4329 the CA to Other
4330 Entities 2.1.5, 2.6.1,
4331 4.2, 4.3, 4.4.3
4332 ------------------------------------------------------
4333 4.9 Certificate Revocation
4334 and Suspension 4.4
4335 ------------------------------------------------------
4336 4.9.1 Circumstances for Revocation 2.1.3, 4.4.1
4337 ------------------------------------------------------
4338 4.9.2 Who Can Request Revocation 4.4.2
4339 ------------------------------------------------------
4340 4.9.3 Procedure for Revocation
4341 Request 2.1.3, 4.4.3
4342 ------------------------------------------------------
4343 4.9.4 Revocation Request Grace
4344 Period 4.4.4
4345 ------------------------------------------------------
4346 4.9.5 Time Within Which CA Must
4347 Process the Revocation Request N/A
4348 ------------------------------------------------------
4349 4.9.6 Revocation Checking
4350 Requirements for Relying
4351 Parties 2.1.4, 4.4.10,
4352 4.4.12, 4.4.14
4353 ------------------------------------------------------
4354 4.9.7 CRL Issuance Frequency 4.4.9, 4.8.3
4355 ------------------------------------------------------
4356 4.9.8 Maximum Latency for CRLs 4.4.9
4357 ------------------------------------------------------
4358 4.9.9 On-Line Revocation/Status
4359 Checking Availability 4.4.11, 4.8.3
4360
4361
4362
4363
4364 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 78]</span></pre>
4365 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-79" ></span>
4366 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4367
4368
4369 ------------------------------------------------------
4370 4.9.10 On-Line Revocation
4371 Checking Requirements 4.4.12
4372 ------------------------------------------------------
4373 4.9.11 Other Forms of Revocation
4374 Advertisements Available 4.4.13, 4.4.14,
4375 4.8.3
4376 ------------------------------------------------------
4377 4.9.12 Special Requirements re
4378 Key Compromise 4.4.15
4379 ------------------------------------------------------
4380 4.9.13 Circumstances for Suspension 2.1.3, 4.4.5
4381 ------------------------------------------------------
4382 4.9.14 Who Can Request Suspension 4.4.6
4383 ------------------------------------------------------
4384 4.9.15 Procedure for
4385 Suspension Request 2.1.3, 4.4.7
4386 ------------------------------------------------------
4387 4.9.16 Limits on Suspension Period 4.4.8
4388 ------------------------------------------------------
4389 4.10 Certificate Status Services 4.4.9-4.4.14
4390 ------------------------------------------------------
4391 4.10.1 Operational
4392 Characteristics 4.4.9, 4.4.11,
4393 4.4.13
4394 ------------------------------------------------------
4395 4.10.2 Service Availability 4.4.9, 4.4.11,
4396 4.4.13
4397 ------------------------------------------------------
4398 4.10.3 Operational Features 4.4.9, 4.4.11,
4399 4.4.13
4400 ------------------------------------------------------
4401 4.11 End of Subscription N/A
4402 ------------------------------------------------------
4403 4.12 Key Escrow and Recovery 6.2.3
4404 ------------------------------------------------------
4405 4.12.1 Key Escrow and Recovery Policy
4406 and Practices 6.2.3
4407 ------------------------------------------------------
4408 4.12.2 Session Key Encapsulation
4409 and Recovery Policy and
4410 Practices 6.2.3
4411 ------------------------------------------------------
4412 5. Facility, Management, and
4413 Operational Controls 2.1.3, 2.1.4,
4414 4., 5.
4415 ------------------------------------------------------
4416 5.1 Physical Controls 5.1
4417
4418
4419
4420 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 79]</span></pre>
4421 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-80" ></span>
4422 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4423
4424
4425 ------------------------------------------------------
4426 5.1.1 Site Location and Construction 5.1.1
4427 ------------------------------------------------------
4428 5.1.2 Physical Access 5.1.2
4429 ------------------------------------------------------
4430 5.1.3 Power and Air Conditioning 5.1.3
4431 ------------------------------------------------------
4432 5.1.4 Water Exposures 5.1.4
4433 ------------------------------------------------------
4434 5.1.5 Fire Prevention and Protection 5.1.5
4435 ------------------------------------------------------
4436 5.1.6 Media Storage 5.1.6
4437 ------------------------------------------------------
4438 5.1.7 Waste Disposal 5.1.7
4439 ------------------------------------------------------
4440 5.1.8 Off-Site Backup 5.1.8
4441 ------------------------------------------------------
4442 5.2 Procedural Controls 5.2
4443 ------------------------------------------------------
4444 5.2.1 Trusted Roles 5.2.1
4445 ------------------------------------------------------
4446 5.2.2 Number of Persons Required
4447 per Task 5.2.2
4448 ------------------------------------------------------
4449 5.2.3 Identification and
4450 Authentication for Each Role 5.2.3
4451 ------------------------------------------------------
4452 5.2.4 Roles Requiring Separation
4453 of Duties 5.2.1, 5.2.2
4454 ------------------------------------------------------
4455 5.3 Personnel Controls 5.3
4456 ------------------------------------------------------
4457 5.3.1 Qualifications, Experience,
4458 and Clearance Requirements 5.3.1
4459 ------------------------------------------------------
4460 5.3.2 Background Check Procedures 5.3.2
4461 ------------------------------------------------------
4462 5.3.3 Training Requirements 5.3.3
4463 ------------------------------------------------------
4464 5.3.4 Retraining Frequency
4465 and Requirements 5.3.4
4466 ------------------------------------------------------
4467 5.3.5 Job Rotation Frequency
4468 and Sequence 5.3.5
4469 ------------------------------------------------------
4470 5.3.6 Sanctions for Unauthorized
4471 Actions 5.3.6
4472
4473
4474
4475
4476 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 80]</span></pre>
4477 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-81" ></span>
4478 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4479
4480
4481 ------------------------------------------------------
4482 5.3.7 Independent Contractor
4483 Requirements 5.3.7
4484 ------------------------------------------------------
4485 5.3.8 Documentation Supplied to
4486 Personnel 5.3.8
4487 ------------------------------------------------------
4488 5.4 Audit Logging Procedures 4.5
4489 ------------------------------------------------------
4490 5.4.1 Types of Events Recorded 4.5.1
4491 ------------------------------------------------------
4492 5.4.2 Frequency of Processing Log 4.5.2
4493 ------------------------------------------------------
4494 5.4.3 Retention Period for Audit
4495 Log 4.5.3
4496 ------------------------------------------------------
4497 5.4.4 Protection of Audit Log 4.5.4
4498 ------------------------------------------------------
4499 5.4.5 Audit Log Backup Procedures 4.5.5
4500 ------------------------------------------------------
4501 5.4.6 Audit Collection System
4502 (Internal vs. External) 4.5.6
4503 ------------------------------------------------------
4504 5.4.7 Notification to Event-Causing
4505 Subject 4.5.7
4506 ------------------------------------------------------
4507 5.4.8 Vulnerability Assessments 4.5.8
4508 ------------------------------------------------------
4509 5.5 Records Archival 4.6
4510 ------------------------------------------------------
4511 5.5.1 Types of Records Archived 4.6.1
4512 ------------------------------------------------------
4513 5.5.2 Retention Period for Archive 4.6.2
4514 ------------------------------------------------------
4515 5.5.3 Protection of Archive 4.6.3
4516 ------------------------------------------------------
4517 5.5.4 Archive Backup Procedures 4.6.4
4518 ------------------------------------------------------
4519 5.5.5 Requirements for Time-Stamping
4520 of Records 4.6.5
4521 ------------------------------------------------------
4522 5.5.6 Archive Collection System
4523 (Internal or External) 4.6.6
4524 ------------------------------------------------------
4525 5.5.7 Procedures to Obtain and
4526 Verify Archive
4527 Information 4.6.7
4528
4529
4530
4531
4532 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 81]</span></pre>
4533 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-82" ></span>
4534 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4535
4536
4537 ------------------------------------------------------
4538 5.6 Key Changeover 4.7
4539 ------------------------------------------------------
4540 5.7 Compromise and Disaster Recovery 4.8
4541 ------------------------------------------------------
4542 5.7.1 Incident and Compromise
4543 Handling Procedures 4.8
4544 ------------------------------------------------------
4545 5.7.2 Computing Resources, Software,
4546 and/or Data Are Corrupted 4.8.1
4547 ------------------------------------------------------
4548 5.7.3 Entity Private Key
4549 Compromise Procedures 4.8.3
4550 ------------------------------------------------------
4551 5.7.4 Business Continuity
4552 Capabilities After a
4553 Disaster 4.8.4
4554 ------------------------------------------------------
4555 5.8 CA or RA Termination 4.9
4556 ------------------------------------------------------
4557 6. Technical Security Controls 2.1.3, 2.1.4,
4558 6.
4559 ------------------------------------------------------
4560 6.1 Key Pair Generation and
4561 Installation 6.1
4562 ------------------------------------------------------
4563 6.1.1 Key Pair Generation 6.1.1, 6.1.8
4564 ------------------------------------------------------
4565 6.1.2 Private Key Delivery to
4566 Subscriber 6.1.2
4567 ------------------------------------------------------
4568 6.1.3 Public Key Delivery to
4569 Certificate Issuer 6.1.3
4570 ------------------------------------------------------
4571 6.1.4 CA Public Key Delivery to
4572 Relying Parties 6.1.4
4573 ------------------------------------------------------
4574 6.1.5 Key Sizes 6.1.5
4575 ------------------------------------------------------
4576 6.1.6 Public Key Parameters Generation
4577 and Quality Checking 6.1.6, 6.1.7
4578 ------------------------------------------------------
4579 6.1.7 Key Usage Purposes
4580 (as per X.509 v3
4581 Key Usage Field) 6.1.9
4582
4583
4584
4585
4586
4587
4588 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 82]</span></pre>
4589 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-83" ></span>
4590 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4591
4592
4593 ------------------------------------------------------
4594 6.2 Private Key Protection and
4595 Cryptographic Module
4596 Engineering Controls 6.2, 6.8
4597 ------------------------------------------------------
4598 6.2.1 Cryptographic Module Standards
4599 and Controls 6.2.1, 6.8
4600 ------------------------------------------------------
4601 6.2.2 Private Key (n out of m)
4602 Multi-Person Control 6.2.2
4603 ------------------------------------------------------
4604 6.2.3 Private Key Escrow 6.2.3
4605 ------------------------------------------------------
4606 6.2.4 Private Key Backup 6.2.4
4607 ------------------------------------------------------
4608 6.2.5 Private Key Archival 6.2.5
4609 ------------------------------------------------------
4610 6.2.6 Private Key Transfer Into
4611 or From a Cryptographic
4612 Module 6.2.6
4613 ------------------------------------------------------
4614 6.2.7 Private Key Storage on
4615 Cryptographic Module 6.2.6
4616 ------------------------------------------------------
4617 6.2.8 Method of Activating Private
4618 Key 6.2.7
4619 ------------------------------------------------------
4620 6.2.9 Method of Deactivating
4621 Private Key 6.2.8
4622 ------------------------------------------------------
4623 6.2.10 Method of Destroying
4624 Private Key 6.2.9
4625 ------------------------------------------------------
4626 6.2.11 Cryptographic Module Rating 6.2.1, 6.8
4627 ------------------------------------------------------
4628 6.3 Other Aspects of Key Pair
4629 Management 6.3
4630 ------------------------------------------------------
4631 6.3.1 Public Key Archival 6.3.1
4632 ------------------------------------------------------
4633 6.3.2 Certificate Operational
4634 Periods and Key Pair Usage
4635 Periods 6.3.2
4636 ------------------------------------------------------
4637 6.4 Activation Data 6.4
4638
4639
4640
4641
4642
4643
4644 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 83]</span></pre>
4645 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-84" ></span>
4646 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4647
4648
4649 ------------------------------------------------------
4650 6.4.1 Activation Data Generation
4651 and Installation 6.4.1
4652 ------------------------------------------------------
4653 6.4.2 Activation Data Protection 6.4.2
4654 ------------------------------------------------------
4655 6.4.3 Other Aspects of Activation
4656 Data 6.4.3
4657 ------------------------------------------------------
4658 6.5 Computer Security Controls 6.5
4659 ------------------------------------------------------
4660 6.5.1 Specific Computer Security
4661 Technical Requirements 6.5.1
4662 ------------------------------------------------------
4663 6.5.2 Computer Security Rating 6.5.2
4664 ------------------------------------------------------
4665 6.6 Life Cycle Technical Controls 6.6
4666 ------------------------------------------------------
4667 6.6.1 System Development Controls 6.6.1
4668 ------------------------------------------------------
4669 6.6.2 Security Management Controls 6.6.2
4670 ------------------------------------------------------
4671 6.6.3 Life Cycle Security Controls 6.6.3
4672 ------------------------------------------------------
4673 6.7 Network Security Controls 6.7
4674 ------------------------------------------------------
4675 6.8 Time-Stamping N/A
4676 ------------------------------------------------------
4677 7. Certificate, CRL, and
4678 OCSP Profiles 7.
4679 ------------------------------------------------------
4680 7.1 Certificate Profile 7.1
4681 ------------------------------------------------------
4682 7.1.1 Version Number(s) 7.1.1
4683 ------------------------------------------------------
4684 7.1.2 Certificate Extensions 7.1.2
4685 ------------------------------------------------------
4686 7.1.3 Algorithm Object Identifiers 7.1.3
4687 ------------------------------------------------------
4688 7.1.4 Name Forms 7.1.4
4689 ------------------------------------------------------
4690 7.1.5 Name Constraints 7.1.5
4691 ------------------------------------------------------
4692 7.1.6 Certificate Policy
4693 Object Identifier 7.1.6
4694 ------------------------------------------------------
4695 7.1.7 Usage of Policy Constraints
4696 Extension 7.1.7
4697
4698
4699
4700 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 84]</span></pre>
4701 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-85" ></span>
4702 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4703
4704
4705 ------------------------------------------------------
4706 7.1.8 Policy Qualifiers Syntax
4707 and Semantics 7.1.8
4708 ------------------------------------------------------
4709 7.1.9 Processing Semantics for the
4710 Critical Certificate Policies
4711 Extension 7.1.9
4712 ------------------------------------------------------
4713 7.2 CRL Profile 7.2
4714 ------------------------------------------------------
4715 7.2.1 Version Number(s) 7.2.1
4716 ------------------------------------------------------
4717 7.2.2 CRL and CRL Entry Extensions 7.2.1
4718 ------------------------------------------------------
4719 7.3 OCSP Profile N/A
4720 ------------------------------------------------------
4721 7.3.1 Version Number(s) N/A
4722 ------------------------------------------------------
4723 7.3.2 OCSP Extensions N/A
4724 ------------------------------------------------------
4725 8. Compliance Audit and Other
4726 Assessments 2.7
4727 ------------------------------------------------------
4728 8.1 Frequency and Circumstances
4729 of Assessment 2.7.1
4730 ------------------------------------------------------
4731 8.2 Identity/Qualifications of
4732 Assessor 2.7.2
4733 ------------------------------------------------------
4734 8.3 Assessor's Relationship to
4735 Assessed Entity 2.7.3
4736 ------------------------------------------------------
4737 8.4 Topics Covered by Assessment 2.7.4
4738 ------------------------------------------------------
4739 8.5 Actions Taken as a Result
4740 of Deficiency 2.7.5
4741 ------------------------------------------------------
4742 8.6 Communications of Results 2.7.6
4743 ------------------------------------------------------
4744 9. Other Business and Legal
4745 Matters 2.
4746
4747 ------------------------------------------------------
4748 9.1 Fees 2.5
4749 ------------------------------------------------------
4750 9.1.1 Certificate Issuance or
4751 Renewal Fees 2.5.1
4752
4753
4754
4755
4756 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 85]</span></pre>
4757 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-86" ></span>
4758 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4759
4760
4761 ------------------------------------------------------
4762 9.1.2 Certificate Access Fees 2.5.2
4763 ------------------------------------------------------
4764 9.1.3 Revocation or Status
4765 Information Access Fees 2.5.3
4766 ------------------------------------------------------
4767 9.1.4 Fees for Other Services 2.5.4
4768 ------------------------------------------------------
4769 9.1.5 Refund Policy 2.5.5
4770 ------------------------------------------------------
4771 9.2 Financial Responsibility 2.3
4772 ------------------------------------------------------
4773 9.2.1 Insurance Coverage 2.3
4774 ------------------------------------------------------
4775 9.2.2 Other Assets 2.3
4776 ------------------------------------------------------
4777 9.2.3 Insurance or Warranty Coverage
4778 for End-Entities 2.3
4779 ------------------------------------------------------
4780 9.3 Confidentiality of Business
4781 Information 2.8
4782 ------------------------------------------------------
4783 9.3.1 Scope of Confidential
4784 Information 2.8.1, 2.8.3
4785 ------------------------------------------------------
4786 9.3.2 Information Not Within the
4787 Scope of Confidential
4788 Information 2.8.2, 2.8.3
4789 ------------------------------------------------------
4790 9.3.3 Responsibility to Protect
4791 Confidential Information 2.8,
4792
4793 2.8.3-2.8.7
4794 ------------------------------------------------------
4795 9.4 Privacy of Personal Information 2.8
4796 ------------------------------------------------------
4797 9.4.1 Privacy Plan N/A
4798 ------------------------------------------------------
4799 9.4.2 Information Treated as Private 2.8.1, 2.8.3
4800 ------------------------------------------------------
4801 9.4.3 Information Not Deemed Private 2.8.2, 2.8.3
4802 ------------------------------------------------------
4803 9.4.4 Responsibility to Protect
4804 Private Information 2.8, 2.8.1,
4805 2.8.3
4806 ------------------------------------------------------
4807 9.4.5 Notice and Consent to Use
4808 Private Information N/A
4809
4810
4811
4812 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 86]</span></pre>
4813 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-87" ></span>
4814 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4815
4816
4817 ------------------------------------------------------
4818 9.4.6 Disclosure Pursuant to
4819 Judicial or Administrative
4820 Process 2.8.4-2.8.5
4821 ------------------------------------------------------
4822 9.4.7 Other Information Disclosure
4823 Circumstances 2.8.6-2.8.7
4824 ------------------------------------------------------
4825 9.5 Intellectual Property rights 2.9
4826 ------------------------------------------------------
4827 9.6 Representations and Warranties 2.2
4828 ------------------------------------------------------
4829 9.6.1 CA Representations and
4830 Warranties 2.2.1
4831 ------------------------------------------------------
4832 9.6.2 RA Representations and
4833 Warranties 2.2.2
4834 ------------------------------------------------------
4835 9.6.3 Subscriber Representations
4836 and Warranties 2.1.3
4837 ------------------------------------------------------
4838
4839 9.6.4 Relying Party Representations
4840 and Warranties 2.1.4
4841 ------------------------------------------------------
4842 9.6.5 Representations and Warranties
4843 of Other Participants N/A
4844 ------------------------------------------------------
4845 9.7 Disclaimers of Warranties 2.2, 2.3.2
4846 ------------------------------------------------------
4847 9.8 Limitations of Liability 2.2
4848 ------------------------------------------------------
4849 9.9 Indemnities 2.1.3, 2.1.4,
4850 2.2, 2.3.1
4851 ------------------------------------------------------
4852 9.10 Term and Termination N/A
4853 ------------------------------------------------------
4854 9.10.1 Term N/A
4855 ------------------------------------------------------
4856 9.10.2 Termination N/A
4857 ------------------------------------------------------
4858 9.10.3 Effect of Termination and
4859 Survival N/A
4860 ------------------------------------------------------
4861 9.11 Individual Notices and
4862 Communications with Participants 2.4.2
4863 ------------------------------------------------------
4864 9.12 Amendments 8.1
4865
4866
4867
4868 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 87]</span></pre>
4869 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-88" ></span>
4870 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4871
4872
4873 ------------------------------------------------------
4874 9.12.1 Procedure for Amendment 8.1
4875 ------------------------------------------------------
4876 9.12.2 Notification Mechanism
4877 and Period 8.1
4878 ------------------------------------------------------
4879 9.12.3 Circumstances Under Which OID
4880 Must be Changed 8.1
4881 ------------------------------------------------------
4882 9.13 Dispute Resolution Provisions 2.4.3
4883 ------------------------------------------------------
4884 9.14 Governing Law 2.4.1
4885 ------------------------------------------------------
4886 9.15 Compliance with Applicable Law 2.4.1
4887 ------------------------------------------------------
4888 9.16 Miscellaneous Provisions 2.4
4889 ------------------------------------------------------
4890 9.16.1 Entire Agreement 2.4.2
4891 ------------------------------------------------------
4892 9.16.2 Assignment N/A
4893 ------------------------------------------------------
4894 9.16.3 Severability 2.4.2
4895 ------------------------------------------------------
4896 9.16.4 Enforcement (Attorney's Fees
4897 and Waiver of Rights) 2.4.3
4898 ------------------------------------------------------
4899 9.17 Other Provisions N/A
4900 ------------------------------------------------------
4901
4902 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
4903
4904 The development of the predecessor document (<a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>) was supported
4905 by the Government of Canada's Policy Management Authority (PMA)
4906 Committee, the National Security Agency, the National Institute of
4907 Standards and Technology (NIST), and the American Bar Association
4908 Information Security Committee Accreditation Working Group.
4909
4910 This revision effort is largely a result of constant inspiration from
4911 Michael Baum. Michael Power, Mike Jenkins, and Alice Sturgeon have
4912 also made several contributions.
4913
4914 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
4915
4916 [<a id="ref-ABA1">ABA1</a>] American Bar Association, Digital Signature Guidelines: Legal
4917 Infrastructure for Certification Authorities and Secure
4918 Electronic Commerce, 1996.
4919
4920
4921
4922
4923
4924 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 88]</span></pre>
4925 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-89" ></span>
4926 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4927
4928
4929 [<a id="ref-ABA2">ABA2</a>] American Bar Association, PKI Assessment Guidelines, v0.30,
4930 Public Draft For Comment, June 2001.
4931
4932 [<a id="ref-BAU1">BAU1</a>] Michael. S. Baum, Federal Certification Authority Liability
4933 and Policy, NIST-GCR-94-654, June 1994, available at
4934 <a href="http://www.verisign.com/repository/pubs/index.html">http://www.verisign.com/repository/pubs/index.html</a>.
4935
4936 [<a id="ref-ETS">ETS</a>] European Telecommunications Standards Institute, "Policy
4937 Requirements for Certification Authorities Issuing Qualified
4938 Certificates," ETSI TS 101 456, Version 1.1.1, December 2000.
4939
4940 [<a id="ref-GOC">GOC</a>] Government of Canada PKI Policy Management Authority, "Digital
4941 Signature and Confidentiality Certificate Policies for the
4942 Government of Canada Public Key Infrastructure," v.3.02, April
4943 1999.
4944
4945 [<a id="ref-IDT">IDT</a>] Identrus, LLC, "Identrus Identity Certificate Policy" IP-IPC
4946 Version 1.7, March 2001.
4947
4948 [<a id="ref-ISO1">ISO1</a>] ISO/IEC 9594-8/ITU-T Recommendation X.509, "Information
4949 Technology - Open Systems Interconnection: The Directory:
4950 Authentication Framework," 1997 edition. (Pending publication
4951 of 2000 edition, use 1997 edition.)
4952
4953 [<a id="ref-PEM1">PEM1</a>] Kent, S., "Privacy Enhancement for Internet Electronic Mail:
4954 Part II: Certificate-Based Key Management", <a href="./rfc1422">RFC 1422</a>, February
4955 1993.
4956
4957 [<a id="ref-PKI1">PKI1</a>] Housley, R., Polk, W. Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
4958 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
4959 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc3280">RFC 3280</a>, April 2002.
4960
4961 [<a id="ref-CPF">CPF</a>] Chokhani, S. and W. Ford, "Internet X.509 Public Key
4962 Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices
4963 Statement Framework", <a href="./rfc2527">RFC 2527</a>, March 1999.
4964
4965 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Notes</span>
4966
4967 1. A paper copy of the ABA Digital Signature Guidelines can be
4968 purchased from the ABA. See <a href="http://www.abanet.com">http://www.abanet.com</a> for ordering
4969 details. The DSG may also be downloaded without charge from the
4970 ABA website at
4971 <a href="http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/digital_signature.html">http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/digital_signature.html</a>.
4972
4973 2. A draft of the PKI Assessment Guidelines may be downloaded
4974 without charge from the ABA website at
4975 <a href="http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/pag/pag.html">http://www.abanet.org/scitech/ec/isc/pag/pag.html</a>.
4976
4977
4978
4979
4980 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 89]</span></pre>
4981 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-90" ></span>
4982 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
4983
4984
4985 3. The term "meaningful" means that the name form has commonly
4986 understood semantics to determine the identity of a person and/or
4987 organization. Directory names and <a href="./rfc822">RFC 822</a> names may be more or
4988 less meaningful.
4989
4990 4. The subject may not need to prove to the CA that the subject has
4991 possession of the private key corresponding to the public key
4992 being registered if the CA generates the subject's key pair on
4993 the subject's behalf.
4994
4995 5. Examples of means to identify and authenticate individuals
4996 include biometric means (such as thumb print, ten finger print,
4997 and scan of the face, palm, or retina), a driver's license, a
4998 credit card, a company badge, and a government badge.
4999
5000 6. Certificate "modification" does not refer to making a change to
5001 an existing certificate, since this would prevent the
5002 verification of any digital signatures on the certificate and
5003 cause the certificate to be invalid. Rather, the concept of
5004 "modification" refers to a situation where the information
5005 referred to in the certificate has changed or should be changed,
5006 and the CA issues a new certificate containing the modified
5007 information. One example is a subscriber that changes his or her
5008 name, which would necessitate the issuance of a new certificate
5009 containing the new name.
5010
5011 7. The n out of m rule allows a private key to be split in m parts.
5012 The m parts may be given to m different individuals. Any n parts
5013 out of the m parts may be used to fully reconstitute the private
5014 key, but having any n-1 parts provides one with no information
5015 about the private key.
5016
5017 8. A private key may be escrowed, backed up, or archived. Each of
5018 these functions has a different purpose. Thus, a private key may
5019 go through any subset of these functions depending on the
5020 requirements. The purpose of escrow is to allow a third party
5021 (such as an organization or government) to obtain the private key
5022 without the cooperation of the subscriber. The purpose of back
5023 up is to allow the subscriber to reconstitute the key in case of
5024 the destruction or corruption of the key for business continuity
5025 purposes. The purpose of archives is to provide for reuse of the
5026 private key in the future, e.g., use to decrypt a document.
5027
5028 9. WebTrust refers to the "WebTrust Program for Certification
5029 Authorities," from the American Institute of Certified Public
5030 Accountants, Inc., and the Canadian Institute of Chartered
5031 Accountants.
5032
5033
5034
5035
5036 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 90]</span></pre>
5037 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-91" ></span>
5038 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
5039
5040
5041 10. See &lt;<a href="http://www.aicpa.org">http://www.aicpa.org</a>&gt;.
5042
5043 11. All or some of the following items may be different for the
5044 various types of entities, i.e., CA, RA, and end entities.
5045
5046 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. List of Acronyms</span>
5047
5048 ABA - American Bar Association
5049 CA - Certification Authority
5050 CP - Certificate Policy
5051 CPS - Certification Practice Statement
5052 CRL - Certificate Revocation List
5053 DAM - Draft Amendment
5054 FIPS - Federal Information Processing Standard
5055 I&amp;A - Identification and Authentication
5056 IEC - International Electrotechnical Commission
5057 IETF - Internet Engineering Task Force
5058 IP - Internet Protocol
5059 ISO - International Organization for Standardization
5060 ITU - International Telecommunications Union
5061 NIST - National Institute of Standards and Technology
5062 OID - Object Identifier
5063 PIN - Personal Identification Number
5064 PKI - Public Key Infrastructure
5065 PKIX - Public Key Infrastructure (X.509) (IETF Working Group)
5066 RA - Registration Authority
5067 RFC - Request For Comment
5068 URL - Uniform Resource Locator
5069 US - United States
5070
5071
5072
5073
5074
5075
5076
5077
5078
5079
5080
5081
5082
5083
5084
5085
5086
5087
5088
5089
5090
5091
5092 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 91]</span></pre>
5093 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-92" ></span>
5094 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
5095
5096
5097 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Authors' Addresses</span>
5098
5099 Santosh Chokhani
5100 Orion Security Solutions, Inc.
5101 3410 N. Buchanan Street
5102 Arlington, VA 22207
5103
5104 Phone: (703) 237-4621
5105 Fax: (703) 237-4920
5106 EMail: [email protected]
5107
5108
5109 Warwick Ford
5110 VeriSign, Inc.
5111 6 Ellery Square
5112 Cambridge, MA 02138
5113
5114 Phone: (617) 642-0139
5115 EMail: [email protected]
5116
5117
5118 Randy V. Sabett, J.D., CISSP
5119 Cooley Godward LLP
5120 One Freedom Square, Reston Town Center
5121 11951 Freedom Drive
5122 Reston, VA 20190-5656
5123
5124 Phone: (703) 456-8137
5125 Fax: (703) 456-8100
5126 EMail: [email protected]
5127
5128
5129 Charles (Chas) R. Merrill
5130 McCarter &amp; English, LLP
5131 Four Gateway Center
5132 100 Mulberry Street
5133 Newark, New Jersey 07101-0652
5134
5135 Phone: (973) 622-4444
5136 Fax: (973) 624-7070
5137 EMail: [email protected]
5138
5139
5140
5141
5142
5143
5144
5145
5146
5147
5148 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 92]</span></pre>
5149 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-93" ></span>
5150 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
5151
5152
5153 Stephen S. Wu
5154 Infoliance, Inc.
5155 800 West El Camino Real
5156 Suite 180
5157 Mountain View, CA 94040
5158
5159 Phone: (650) 917-8045
5160 Fax: (650) 618-1454
5161 EMail: [email protected]
5162
5163
5164
5165
5166
5167
5168
5169
5170
5171
5172
5173
5174
5175
5176
5177
5178
5179
5180
5181
5182
5183
5184
5185
5186
5187
5188
5189
5190
5191
5192
5193
5194
5195
5196
5197
5198
5199
5200
5201
5202
5203
5204 <span class="grey">Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 93]</span></pre>
5205 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-94" ></span>
5206 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3647">RFC 3647</a> Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure November 2003</span>
5207
5208
5209 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. Full Copyright Statement</span>
5210
5211 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2003). All Rights Reserved.
5212
5213 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
5214 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
5215 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
5216 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
5217 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
5218 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
5219 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
5220 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
5221 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
5222 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
5223 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
5224 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
5225 English.
5226
5227 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
5228 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assignees.
5229
5230 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
5231 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
5232 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
5233 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
5234 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
5235 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
5236
5237 Acknowledgement
5238
5239 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
5240 Internet Society.
5241
5242
5243
5244
5245
5246
5247
5248
5249
5250
5251
5252
5253
5254
5255
5256
5257
5258
5259
5260 Chokhani, et al. Informational [Page 94]
5261 </pre>