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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) S. Kent
2 Request for Comments: 7132 BBN
3 Category: Informational A. Chi
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 UNC-CH
5 February 2014
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Threat Model for BGP Path Security</span>
9
10 Abstract
11
12 This document describes a threat model for the context in which
13 External Border Gateway Protocol (EBGP) path security mechanisms will
14 be developed. The threat model includes an analysis of the Resource
15 Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) and focuses on the ability of an
16 Autonomous System (AS) to verify the authenticity of the AS path info
17 received in a BGP update. We use the term "PATHSEC" to refer to any
18 BGP path security technology that makes use of the RPKI. PATHSEC
19 will secure BGP, consistent with the inter-AS security focus of the
20 RPKI.
21
22 The document characterizes classes of potential adversaries that are
23 considered to be threats and examines classes of attacks that might
24 be launched against PATHSEC. It does not revisit attacks against
25 unprotected BGP, as that topic has already been addressed in the
26 BGP-4 standard. It concludes with a brief discussion of residual
27 vulnerabilities.
28
29 Status of This Memo
30
31 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
32 published for informational purposes.
33
34 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
35 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
36 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
37 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
38 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
39 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
40
41 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
42 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
43 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7132">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7132</a>.
44
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56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2014 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
75 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
76 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Threat Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
77 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Attack Characterization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
78 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Active Wiretapping of Sessions between Routers . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
79 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Attacks on a BGP Router . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
80 4.3. Attacks on Network Operator Management Computers (Non-CA
81 Computers) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
82 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Attacks on a Repository Publication Point . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
83 <a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Attacks on an RPKI CA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
84 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Residual Vulnerabilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
85 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
86 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
87 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
88
89 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
90
91 This document describes the security context in which PATHSEC is
92 intended to operate. The term "PATHSEC" (for path security) refers
93 to any design used to preserve the integrity and authenticity of the
94 AS_PATH attribute carried in a BGP update message [<a href="./rfc4271" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">RFC4271</a>]. The
95 security context used throughout this document is established by the
96 Secure Inter-Domain Routing (SIDR) working group charter [<a href="#ref-SIDR-CH" title="&quot;Secure Inter-Domain Routing: Charter for Working Group&quot;">SIDR-CH</a>].
97 The charter requires that solutions that afford PATHSEC make use of
98 the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) [<a href="./rfc6480" title="&quot;An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing&quot;">RFC6480</a>]. It also
99 calls for protecting only the information required to verify that a
100 received route traversed the Autonomous Systems (ASes) in question,
101 and that the Network Layer Reachability Information (NLRI) in the
102 route is what was advertised.
103
104
105
106
107
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112
113 Thus, the goal of PATHSEC is to enable a BGP speaker to verify that
114 the ASes enumerated in this path attribute represent the sequence of
115 ASes that the NLRI traversed. The term "PATHSEC" is thus consistent
116 with the goal described above. (Other SIDR documents use the term
117 "BGPSEC" to refer to a specific design; we avoid use of that term
118 here.)
119
120 This document discusses classes of potential adversaries that are
121 considered to be threats, and classes of attacks that might be
122 launched against PATHSEC. Because PATHSEC will rely on the RPKI,
123 threats and attacks against the RPKI are included. This model also
124 takes into consideration classes of attacks that are enabled by the
125 use of PATHSEC (e.g., based on use of the RPKI).
126
127 The motivation for developing PATHSEC, i.e., residual security
128 concerns for BGP, is well described in several documents, including
129 "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis" [<a href="./rfc4272" title="&quot;BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis&quot;">RFC4272</a>] and "Design and
130 Analysis of the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)" [<a href="#ref-Kent2000">Kent2000</a>].
131 All of these documents note that BGP does not include mechanisms that
132 allow an AS to verify the legitimacy and authenticity of BGP route
133 advertisements. (BGP now mandates support for mechanisms to secure
134 peer-to-peer communication, i.e., for the links that connect BGP
135 routers. There are several secure protocol options to address this
136 security concern, e.g., IPsec [<a href="./rfc4301" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC4301</a>] and TCP Authentication Option
137 (TCP-AO) [<a href="./rfc5925" title="&quot;The TCP Authentication Option&quot;">RFC5925</a>]. This document briefly notes the need to address
138 this aspect of BGP security, but focuses on application layer BGP
139 security issues that must be addressed by PATHSEC.)
140
141 <a href="./rfc4272">RFC 4272</a> [<a href="./rfc4272" title="&quot;BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis&quot;">RFC4272</a>] succinctly notes:
142
143 BGP speakers themselves can inject bogus routing information,
144 either by masquerading as any other legitimate BGP speaker, or by
145 distributing unauthorized routing information as themselves.
146 Historically, misconfigured and faulty routers have been
147 responsible for widespread disruptions in the Internet. The
148 legitimate BGP peers have the context and information to produce
149 believable, yet bogus, routing information, and therefore have the
150 opportunity to cause great damage. The cryptographic protections
151 of [TCPMD5] and operational protections cannot exclude the bogus
152 information arising from a legitimate peer. The risk of
153 disruptions caused by legitimate BGP speakers is real and cannot
154 be ignored.
155
156 PATHSEC is intended to address the concerns cited above, to provide
157 significantly improved path security, which builds upon the route
158 origination validation capability offered by use of the RPKI
159 [<a href="./rfc6810" title="&quot;The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol&quot;">RFC6810</a>]. Specifically, the RPKI enables relying parties (RPs) to
160 determine if the origin AS for a path was authorized to advertise the
161
162
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168
169 prefix contained in a BGP update message. This security feature is
170 enabled by the use of two types of digitally signed data: a PKI
171 [<a href="./rfc6487" title="&quot;A Profile for X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates&quot;">RFC6487</a>] that associates one or more prefixes with the public key(s)
172 of an address space holder, and Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)
173 [<a href="./rfc6482" title="&quot;A Profile for Route Origin Authorizations (ROAs)&quot;">RFC6482</a>] that allow a prefix holder to specify one or more ASes that
174 are authorized to originate routes for a prefix.
175
176 The security model adopted for PATHSEC does not assume an "oracle"
177 that can see all of the BGP inputs and outputs associated with every
178 AS or every BGP router. Instead, the model is based on a local
179 notion of what constitutes legitimate, authorized behavior by the BGP
180 routers associated with an AS. This is an AS-centric model of secure
181 operation, consistent with the AS-centric model that BGP employs for
182 routing. This model forms the basis for the discussion that follows.
183
184 This document begins with a brief set of definitions relevant to the
185 subsequent sections. It then discusses classes of adversaries that
186 are perceived as viable threats against routing in the public
187 Internet. It continues to explore a range of attacks that might be
188 effected by these adversaries against both path security and the
189 infrastructure upon which PATHSEC relies. It concludes with a brief
190 review of residual vulnerabilities, i.e., vulnerabilities that are
191 not addressed by use of the RPKI and that appear likely to be outside
192 the scope of PATHSEC mechanisms.
193
194 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology</span>
195
196 The following security and routing terminology definitions are
197 employed in this document.
198
199 Adversary: An adversary is an entity (e.g., a person or an
200 organization) that is perceived as malicious, relative to the
201 security policy of a system. The decision to characterize an
202 entity as an adversary is made by those responsible for the
203 security of a system. Often, one describes classes of adversaries
204 with similar capabilities or motivations rather than specific
205 individuals or organizations.
206
207 Attack: An attack is an action that attempts to violate the security
208 policy of a system, e.g., by exploiting a vulnerability. There is
209 often a many-to-one mapping of attacks to vulnerabilities because
210 many different attacks may be used to exploit a vulnerability.
211
212 Autonomous System (AS): An AS is a set of one or more IP networks
213 operated by a single administrative entity.
214
215 AS Number (ASN): An ASN is a 2- or 4-byte number issued by a
216 registry to identify an AS in BGP.
217
218
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224
225 Certification Authority (CA): An entity that issues digital
226 certificates (e.g., X.509 certificates) and vouches for the
227 binding between the data items in a certificate.
228
229 Countermeasure: A countermeasure is a procedure or technique that
230 thwarts an attack, preventing it from being successful. Often,
231 countermeasures are specific to attacks or classes of attacks.
232
233 Border Gateway Protocol (BGP): A path vector protocol used to convey
234 "reachability" information among ASes in support of inter-domain
235 routing.
236
237 False (Route) Origination: If a network operator originates a route
238 for a prefix that the operator does not hold (and that has not
239 been authorized to originate by the prefix holder), this is termed
240 false route origination.
241
242 Internet Service Provider (ISP): An organization managing (and
243 typically selling) Internet services to other organizations or
244 individuals.
245
246 Internet Number Resources (INRs): IPv4 or IPv6 address space and
247 ASNs.
248
249 Internet Registry: An organization that manages the allocation or
250 distribution of INRs. This encompasses the Internet Assigned
251 Number Authority (IANA), Regional Internet Registries (RIRs),
252 National Internet Registries (NIRs), and Local Internet Registries
253 (LIRs) (network operators).
254
255 Man in the Middle (MITM): A MITM is an entity that is able to
256 examine and modify traffic between two (or more) parties on a
257 communication path.
258
259 Network Operator: An entity that manages an AS and thus emits (E)BGP
260 updates, e.g., an ISP.
261
262 Network Operations Center (NOC): A network operator employs a set of
263 equipment and a staff to manage a network, typically on a 24/7
264 basis. The equipment and staff are often referred to as the NOC
265 for the network.
266
267 Prefix: A prefix is an IP address and a mask used to specify a set
268 of addresses that are grouped together for purposes of routing.
269
270 Public Key Infrastructure (PKI): A PKI is a collection of hardware,
271 software, people, policies, and procedures used to create, manage,
272 distribute, store, and revoke digital certificates.
273
274
275
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280
281 Relying Parties (RPs): An RP is an entity that makes use of signed
282 products from a PKI, i.e., it relies on signed data that is
283 verified using certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists
284 (CRLs) from a PKI.
285
286 RPKI Repository System: The RPKI repository system consists of a
287 distributed set of loosely synchronized databases.
288
289 Resource PKI (RPKI): A PKI operated by the entities that manage INRs
290 and that issue X.509 certificates (and CRLs) that attest to the
291 holdings of INRs.
292
293 RPKI Signed Object: An RPKI signed object is a data object
294 encapsulated with Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS) that complies
295 with the format and semantics defined in [<a href="./rfc6488" title="&quot;Signed Object Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)&quot;">RFC6488</a>].
296
297 Route: In the Internet, a route is a prefix and an associated
298 sequence of ASNs that indicates a path via which traffic destined
299 for the prefix can be directed. (The route includes the origin
300 AS.)
301
302 Route Leak: A route leak is said to occur when AS-A advertises
303 routes that it has received from AS-B to the neighbors of AS-A,
304 but AS-A is not viewed as a transit provider for the prefixes in
305 the route.
306
307 Threat: A threat is a motivated, capable adversary. An adversary
308 that is not motivated to launch an attack is not a threat. An
309 adversary that is motivated but not capable of launching an attack
310 also is not a threat.
311
312 Vulnerability: A vulnerability is a flaw or weakness in a system's
313 design, implementation, or operation and management that could be
314 exploited to violate the security policy of a system.
315
316 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Threat Characterization</span>
317
318 As noted in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> above, a threat is defined as a motivated,
319 capable adversary. The following classes of threats represent
320 classes of adversaries viewed as relevant to this environment.
321
322 Network Operators: A network operator may be a threat. An
323 operator may be motivated to cause BGP routers it controls to emit
324 update messages with inaccurate routing info, e.g., to cause
325 traffic to flow via paths that are economically advantageous for
326 the operator. Such updates might cause traffic to flow via paths
327 that would otherwise be rejected as less advantageous by other
328 network operators. Because an operator controls the BGP routers
329
330
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336
337 in its network, it is in a position to modify their operation in
338 arbitrary ways. Routers managed by a network operator are
339 vehicles for mounting MITM attacks on both control and data plane
340 traffic. If an operator participates in the RPKI, it will have at
341 least one CA resource certificate and may be able to generate an
342 arbitrary number of subordinate CA certificates and ROAs. It will
343 be authorized to populate (and may even host) its own repository
344 publication point. If it implements PATHSEC, and if PATHSEC makes
345 use of certificates associated with routers or ASes, it will have
346 the ability to issue such certificates for itself. If PATHSEC
347 digitally signs updates, it will be able to do so in a fashion
348 that will be accepted by PATHSEC-enabled neighbors.
349
350 Hackers: Hackers are considered a threat. A hacker might assume
351 control of network management computers and routers controlled by
352 operators, including operators that implement PATHSEC. In such
353 cases, hackers would be able to act as rogue network operators
354 (see above). It is assumed that hackers generally do not have the
355 capability to effect MITM attacks on most links between networks
356 (links used to transmit BGP and subscriber traffic). A hacker
357 might be recruited, without his/her knowledge, by criminals or by
358 nations, to act on their behalf. Hackers may be motivated by a
359 desire for "bragging rights", for profit, or to express support
360 for a cause ("hacktivists" [<a href="#ref-Sam04" title="&quot;Hacktivism and the Future of Political Participation&quot;">Sam04</a>]). We view hackers as possibly
361 distinct from criminals in that the former are presumed to effect
362 attacks only remotely (not via a physical presence associated with
363 a target) and not necessarily for monetary gain. Some hackers may
364 commit criminal acts (depending on the jurisdiction), and thus
365 there is a potential for overlap between this adversary group and
366 criminals.
367
368 Criminals: Criminals may be a threat. Criminals might persuade
369 (via threats or extortion) a network operator to act as a rogue
370 operator (see above) and thus be able to effect a wide range of
371 attacks. Criminals might persuade the staff of a
372 telecommunications provider to enable MITM attacks on links
373 between routers. Motivations for criminals may include the
374 ability to extort money from network operators or network operator
375 clients, e.g., by adversely affecting routing for these network
376 operators or their clients. Criminals also may wish to manipulate
377 routing to conceal the sources of spam, DoS attacks, or other
378 criminal activities.
379
380 Registries: Any registry in the RPKI could be a threat. Staff at
381 the registry are capable of manipulating repository content or
382 mismanaging the RPKI certificates that they issue. These actions
383 could adversely affect a network operator or a client of a network
384
385
386
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392
393 operator. The staff could be motivated to do this based on
394 political pressure from the nation in which the registry operates
395 (see below) or due to criminal influence (see above).
396
397 Nations: A nation may be a threat. A nation may control one or
398 more network operators that operate in the nation, and thus can
399 cause them to act as rogue network operators. A nation may have a
400 technical active wiretapping capability (e.g., within its
401 territory) that enables it to effect MITM attacks on inter-network
402 traffic. (This capability may be facilitated by control or
403 influence over a telecommunications provider operating within the
404 nation.) It may have an ability to attack and take control of
405 routers or management network computers of network operators in
406 other countries. A nation may control a registry (e.g., an RIR)
407 that operates within its territory and might force that registry
408 to act in a rogue capacity. National threat motivations include
409 the desire to control the flow of traffic to/from the nation or to
410 divert traffic destined for other nations (for passive or active
411 wiretapping, including DoS).
412
413 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Attack Characterization</span>
414
415 This section describes classes of attacks that may be effected
416 against Internet routing (relative to the context described in
417 <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>). Attacks are classified based on the target of the
418 attack, an element of the routing system, or the routing security
419 infrastructure on which PATHSEC relies. In general, attacks of
420 interest are ones that attempt to violate the integrity or
421 authenticity of BGP traffic or that violate the authorizations
422 associated with entities participating in the RPKI. Attacks that
423 violate the implied confidentiality of routing traffic, e.g., passive
424 wiretapping attacks, are not considered a requirement for BGP
425 security (see [<a href="./rfc4272" title="&quot;BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis&quot;">RFC4272</a>]).
426
427 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Active Wiretapping of Sessions between Routers</span>
428
429 An adversary may attack the BGP (TCP) session that connects a pair of
430 BGP speakers. An active attack against a BGP (TCP) session can be
431 effected by directing traffic to a BGP speaker from some remote
432 point, or by being positioned as a MITM on the link that carries BGP
433 session traffic. Remote attacks can be effected by any adversary. A
434 MITM attack requires access to the link. Modern transport networks
435 may be as complex as the packet networks that utilize them for inter-
436 AS links. Thus, these transport networks may present significant
437 attack surfaces. Nonetheless, only some classes of adversaries are
438 assumed to be capable of MITM attacks against a BGP session. MITM
439 attacks may be directed against BGP and PATHSEC-protected BGP, or
440 against TCP or IP. Such attacks include replay of selected BGP
441
442
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448
449 messages, selective modification of BGP messages, and DoS attacks
450 against BGP routers. [<a href="./rfc4272" title="&quot;BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis&quot;">RFC4272</a>] describes several countermeasures for
451 such attacks, and thus this document does not further address such
452 attacks.
453
454 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Attacks on a BGP Router</span>
455
456 An adversary may attack a BGP router, whether or not it implements
457 PATHSEC. Any adversary that controls routers legitimately, or that
458 can assume control of a router, is assumed to be able to effect the
459 types of attacks described below. Note that any router behavior that
460 can be ascribed to a local routing policy decision is not considered
461 to be an attack. This is because such behavior could be explained as
462 a result of local policy settings and thus is beyond the scope of
463 what PATHSEC can detect as unauthorized behavior. Thus, for example,
464 a router may fail to propagate some or all route withdrawals or
465 effect "route leaks". (These behaviors are not precluded by the
466 specification for BGP and might be the result of a local policy that
467 is not publicly disclosed. As a result, they are not considered
468 attacks. See <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for additional discussion.)
469
470 Attacks on a router are equivalent to active wiretapping attacks (in
471 the most general sense) that manipulate (forge, tamper with, or
472 suppress) data contained in BGP updates. The list below illustrates
473 attacks of this type.
474
475 AS Insertion: A router might insert one or more ASNs, other than
476 its own ASN, into an update message. This violates the BGP spec
477 and thus is considered an attack.
478
479 False (Route) Origination: A router might originate a route for a
480 prefix when the AS that the router represents is not authorized to
481 originate routes for that prefix. This is an attack, but it is
482 addressed by the use of the RPKI [<a href="./rfc6480" title="&quot;An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing&quot;">RFC6480</a>].
483
484 Secure Path Downgrade: A router might remove AS_PATH data from a
485 PATHSEC-protected update that it receives when forwarding this
486 update to a PATHSEC-enabled neighbor. This behavior violates the
487 PATHSEC security goals and thus is considered an attack.
488
489 Invalid AS_PATH Data Insertion: A router might emit a PATHSEC-
490 protected update with "bad" data (such as a signature), i.e.,
491 PATHSEC data that cannot be validated by other PATHSEC routers.
492 Such behavior is assumed to violate the PATHSEC goals and thus is
493 considered an attack.
494
495
496
497
498
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504
505 Stale Path Announcement: If PATHSEC-secured announcements can
506 expire, such an announcement may be propagated with PATHSEC data
507 that is "expired". This behavior would violate the PATHSEC goals
508 and is considered a type of replay attack.
509
510 Premature Path Announcement Expiration: If a PATHSEC-secured
511 announcement has an associated expiration time, a router might
512 emit a PATHSEC-secured announcement with an expiry time that is
513 very short. Unless the PATHSEC protocol specification mandates a
514 minimum expiry time, this is not an attack. However, if such a
515 time is mandated, this behavior becomes an attack. BGP speakers
516 along a path generally cannot determine if an expiry time is
517 "suspiciously short" since they cannot know how long a route may
518 have been held by an earlier AS, prior to being released.
519
520 MITM Attack: A cryptographic key used for point-to-point security
521 (e.g., TCP-AO, TLS, or IPsec) between two BGP routers might be
522 compromised (e.g., by extraction from a router). This would
523 enable an adversary to effect MITM attacks on the link(s) where
524 the key is used. Use of specific security mechanisms to protect
525 inter-router links between ASes is outside the scope of PATHSEC.
526
527 Compromised Router Private Key: If PATHSEC mechanisms employ
528 public key cryptography, e.g., to digitally sign data in an
529 update, then a private key associated with a router or an AS might
530 be compromised by an attack against the router. An adversary with
531 access to this key would be able to generate updates that appear
532 to have passed through the AS that this router represents. Such
533 updates might be injected on a link between the compromised router
534 and its neighbors if that link is accessible to the adversary. If
535 the adversary controls another network, it could use this key to
536 forge signatures that appear to come from the AS or router(s) in
537 question, with some constraints. So, for example, an adversary
538 that controls another AS could use a compromised router/AS key to
539 issue PATHSEC-signed data that includes the targeted router/AS.
540 (Neighbors of the adversary's AS ought not accept a route that
541 purports to emanate directly from the targeted AS. So, an
542 adversary could take a legitimate, protected route that passes
543 through the compromised AS, add itself as the next hop, and then
544 forward the resulting route to neighbors.)
545
546 Withdrawal Suppression Attack: A PATHSEC-protected update may be
547 signed and announced, and later withdrawn. An adversary
548 controlling intermediate routers could fail to propagate the
549 withdrawal. BGP is already vulnerable to behavior of this sort,
550 so withdrawal suppression is not characterized as an attack under
551 the assumptions upon which this mode is based (i.e., no oracle).
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
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559
560
561 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Attacks on Network Operator Management Computers (Non-CA</span>
562 <span class="h3"> Computers)</span>
563
564 An adversary may choose to attack computers used by a network
565 operator to manage its network, especially its routers. Such attacks
566 might be effected by an adversary who has compromised the security of
567 these computers. This might be effected via remote attacks,
568 extortion of network operations staff, etc. If an adversary
569 compromises NOC computers, he can execute any management function
570 that authorized network operations the staff would have performed.
571 Thus, the adversary could modify the local routing policy to change
572 preferences, to black-hole certain routes, etc. This type of
573 behavior cannot be externally detected as an attack. Externally,
574 this appears as a form of rogue operator behavior. (Such behavior
575 might be perceived as accidental or malicious by other operators.)
576
577 If a network operator participates in the RPKI, an adversary could
578 manipulate the RP tools that extract data from the RPKI, causing the
579 output of these tools to be corrupted in various ways. For example,
580 an attack of this sort could cause the operator to view valid routes
581 as not validated, which could alter its routing behavior.
582
583 If an adversary invoked the tool used to manage the repository
584 publication point for this operator, it could delete any objects
585 stored there (certificates, CRLs, manifests, ROAs, or subordinate CA
586 certificates). This could affect the routing status of entities that
587 have allocations/assignments from this network operator (e.g., by
588 deleting their CA certificates).
589
590 An adversary could invoke the tool used to request certificate
591 revocation, causing router certificates, ROAs, or subordinate CA
592 certificates to be revoked. An attack of this sort could affect not
593 only this operator but also any operators that receive allocations/
594 assignments from it, e.g., because their CA certificates were
595 revoked.
596
597 If an operator is PATHSEC-enabled, an attack of this sort could cause
598 the affected operator to be viewed as not PATHSEC-enabled, possibly
599 making routes it emits less preferable to other operators.
600
601 If an adversary invoked a tool used to request ROAs, it could
602 effectively reallocate some of the prefixes allocated/assigned to the
603 network operator (e.g., by modifying the origin AS in ROAs). This
604 might cause other PATHSEC-enabled networks to view the affected
605 network as no longer originating routes for these prefixes. Multi-
606 homed subscribers of this operator who received an allocation from
607 the operator might find that their traffic was routed via other
608 connections.
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
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615
616
617 If the network operator is PATHSEC-enabled, and makes use of
618 certificates associated with routers/ASes, an adversary could invoke
619 a tool used to request such certificates. The adversary could then
620 replace valid certificates for routers/ASes with ones that might be
621 rejected by PATHSEC-enabled neighbors.
622
623 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Attacks on a Repository Publication Point</span>
624
625 A critical element of the RPKI is the repository system. An
626 adversary might attack a repository, or a publication point within a
627 repository, to adversely affect routing.
628
629 This section considers only those attacks that can be launched by any
630 adversary who controls a computer hosting one or more repository
631 publication points, without access to the cryptographic keys needed
632 to generate valid RPKI-signed products. Such attacks might be
633 effected by an insider or an external threat. Because all repository
634 objects are digitally signed, attacks of this sort translate into DoS
635 attacks against the RPKI RPs. There are a few distinct forms of such
636 attacks, as described below.
637
638 Note first that the RPKI calls for RPs to cache the data they acquire
639 and verify from the repository system [<a href="./rfc6480" title="&quot;An Infrastructure to Support Secure Internet Routing&quot;">RFC6480</a>][RFC6481]. Attacks
640 that delete signed products, insert products with "bad" signatures,
641 tamper with object signatures, or replace newer objects with older
642 (valid) ones, can be detected by RPs (with a few exceptions). RPs
643 are expected to make use of local caches. If repository publication
644 points are unavailable or the retrieved data is corrupted, an RP can
645 revert to using the cached data. This behavior helps insulate RPs
646 from the immediate effects of DoS attacks on publication points.
647
648 Each RPKI data object has an associated date on which it expires or
649 is considered stale (certificates expire and CRLs become stale).
650 When an RP uses cached data, how to deal with stale or expired data
651 is a local decision. It is common in PKIs to make use of stale
652 certificate revocation status data when fresher data is not
653 available. Use of expired certificates is less common, although not
654 unknown. Each RP will decide, locally, whether to continue to make
655 use of or ignore cached RPKI objects that are stale or expired.
656
657 If an adversary inserts an object into a publication point, and the
658 object has a "bad" signature, the object will not be accepted and
659 used by RPs.
660
661 If an adversary modifies any signed product at a publication point,
662 the signature on the product will fail, causing RPs to not accept it.
663 This is equivalent to deleting the object, in many respects.
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
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671
672
673 If an adversary deletes one or more CA certificates, ROAs, or the CRL
674 for a publication point, the manifest for that publication point will
675 allow an RP to detect this attack. An RP can continue to use the
676 last valid instance of the deleted object (as a local policy option),
677 thus minimizing the impact of such an attack.
678
679 If an adversary deletes a manifest (and does not replace it with an
680 older instance), RPs are able to detect this action. Such behavior
681 should result in the CA (or publication point maintainer) being
682 notified of the problem. An RP can continue to use the last valid
683 instance of the deleted manifest (a local policy option), thus
684 minimizing the impact of such an attack.
685
686 If an adversary deletes newly added CA certificates or ROAs, and
687 replaces the current manifest with the previous manifest, the
688 manifest (and the CRL that it matches) will be "stale" (see
689 [<a href="./rfc6486" title="&quot;Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)&quot;">RFC6486</a>]). This alerts an RP that there may be a problem. The RP
690 should use the information from a Ghostbuster Record [<a href="./rfc6493" title="&quot;The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI) Ghostbusters Record&quot;">RFC6493</a>] to
691 contact the entity responsible for the publication point and request
692 a remedy to the problem (e.g., republish the missing CA certificates
693 and/or ROAs). An RP cannot know the content of the new certificates
694 or ROAs that are not present, but it can continue to use what it has
695 cached. An attack of this sort will, at least temporarily, cause RPs
696 to be unaware of the newly published objects. INRs associated with
697 these objects will be treated as unauthenticated.
698
699 If a CA revokes a CA certificate or a ROA (via deleting the
700 corresponding End Entity (EE) certificate), and the adversary tries
701 to reinstate that CA certificate or ROA, the adversary would have to
702 rollback the CRL and the manifest to undo this action by the CA. As
703 above, this would make the CRL and manifest stale, and this is
704 detectable by RPs. An RP cannot know which CA certificates or ROAs
705 were deleted. Depending on local policy, the RP might use the cached
706 instances of the affected objects and thus be tricked into making
707 decisions based on these revoked objects. Here too, the goal is that
708 the CA will be notified of the problem (by RPs) and will remedy the
709 error.
710
711 In the attack scenarios above, when a CRL or manifest is described as
712 stale, this means that the next issue date for the CRL or manifest
713 has passed. Until the next issue date, an RP will not detect the
714 attack. Thus, it behooves CAs to select CRL/manifest lifetimes (the
715 two are linked) that represent an acceptable trade-off between risk
716 and operational burdens.
717
718 Attacks effected by adversaries that are legitimate managers of
719 publication points can have much greater effects and are discussed
720 below under attacks on or by CAs.
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
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727
728
729 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. Attacks on an RPKI CA</span>
730
731 Every entity to which INRs have been allocated/assigned is a CA in
732 the RPKI. Each CA is nominally responsible for managing the
733 repository publication point for the set of signed products that it
734 generates. (An INR holder may choose to outsource the operation of
735 the RPKI CA function and the associated publication point. In such
736 cases, the organization operating on behalf of the INR holder becomes
737 the CA from an operational and security perspective. The following
738 discussion does not distinguish such outsourced CA operations.)
739
740 Note that attacks attributable to a CA may be the result of malice by
741 the CA (i.e., the CA is the adversary), or they may result from a
742 compromise of the CA.
743
744 All of the adversaries listed in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> are presumed to be capable
745 of launching attacks against the computers used to perform CA
746 functions. Some adversaries might effect an attack on a CA by
747 violating personnel or physical security controls as well. The
748 distinction between the CA as an adversary versus the CA as an attack
749 victim is important. Only in the latter case should one expect the
750 CA to remedy problems caused by an attack once the attack has been
751 detected. (If a CA does not take such action, the effects are the
752 same as if the CA is an adversary.)
753
754 Note that most of the attacks described below do not require
755 disclosure of a CA's private key to an adversary. If the adversary
756 can gain control of the computer used to issue certificates, it can
757 effect these attacks, even though the private key for the CA remains
758 "secure" (i.e., not disclosed to unauthorized parties). However, if
759 the CA is not the adversary, and if the CA's private key is not
760 compromised, then recovery from these attacks is much easier. This
761 motivates use of hardware security modules to protect CA keys, at
762 least for higher tiers in the RPKI.
763
764 An attack by a CA can result in revocation or replacement of any of
765 the certificates that the CA has issued. Revocation of a certificate
766 should cause RPs to delete the (formerly) valid certificate (and
767 associated signed object, in the case of a revoked EE certificate)
768 that they have cached. This would cause repository objects (e.g., CA
769 certificates and ROAs) that are verified under that certificate to be
770 considered invalid, transitively. As a result, RPs would not
771 consider any ROAs or PATHSEC-protected updates to be valid based on
772 these certificates, which would make routes dependent on them less
773 preferred. Because a CA that revokes a certificate is authorized to
774 do so, this sort of attack cannot be detected, intrinsically, by most
775 RPs. However, the entities affected by the revocation or replacement
776 of CA certificates can be expected to detect the attack and contact
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
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782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7132">RFC 7132</a> Threat Model for BGP Path Security February 2014</span>
783
784
785 the CA to effect remediation. If the CA was not the adversary, it
786 should be able to issue new certificates and restore the publication
787 point.
788
789 An adversary that controls the CA for a publication point can publish
790 signed products that create more subtle types of DoS attacks against
791 RPs. For example, such an attacker could create subordinate CA
792 certificates with Subject Information Access (SIA) pointers that lead
793 RPs on a "wild goose chase" looking for additional publication points
794 and signed products. An attacker could publish certificates with
795 very brief validity intervals or CRLs and manifests that become
796 "stale" very quickly. This sort of attack would cause RPs to access
797 repositories more frequently, and that might interfere with
798 legitimate accesses by other RPs.
799
800 An attacker with this capability could create very large numbers of
801 ROAs to be processed (with prefixes that are consistent with the
802 allocation for the CA) and correspondingly large manifests. An
803 attacker could create very deep subtrees with many ROAs per
804 publication point, etc. All of these types of DoS attacks against
805 RPs are feasible within the syntactic and semantic constraints
806 established for RPKI certificates, CRLs, and signed objects.
807
808 An attack that results in revocation and replacement (e.g., key
809 rollover or certificate renewal) of a CA certificate would cause RPs
810 to replace the old, valid certificate with the new one. This new
811 certificate might contain a public key that does not correspond to
812 the private key held by the certificate subject. That would cause
813 objects signed by that subject to be rejected as invalid, and prevent
814 the affected subject from being able to sign new objects. As above,
815 RPs would not consider any ROAs issued under the affected CA
816 certificate to be valid, and updates based on router certificates
817 issued by the affected CA would be rejected. This would make routes
818 dependent on these signed products less preferred. However, the
819 constraints imposed by the use of extensions detailed in [<a href="./rfc3779" title="&quot;X.509 Extensions for IP Addresses and AS Identifiers&quot;">RFC3779</a>]
820 prevent a compromised CA from issuing (valid) certificates with INRs
821 outside the scope of the CA, thus limiting the impact of the attack.
822
823 An adversary that controls a CA could issue CA certificates with
824 overlapping INRs to different entities when no transfer of INRs is
825 intended. This could cause confusion for RPs as conflicting ROAs
826 could be issued by the distinct (subordinate) CAs.
827
828 An adversary could replace a CA certificate, use the corresponding
829 private key to issue new signed products, and then publish them at a
830 publication point controlled by the attacker. This would effectively
831 transfer the affected INRs to the adversary or to a third party of
832 his choosing. The result would be to cause RPs to view the entity
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7132">RFC 7132</a> Threat Model for BGP Path Security February 2014</span>
839
840
841 that controls the private key in question as the legitimate INR
842 holder. Again, the constraints imposed by the use of the extensions
843 in <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a> prevent a compromised CA from issuing (valid)
844 certificates with INRs outside the scope of the CA, thus limiting the
845 impact of the attack.
846
847 Finally, an entity that manages a repository publication point can
848 inadvertently act as an attacker (an example of Walt Kelly's most
849 famous "Pogo" quote [<a href="#ref-Kelly70" title="&quot;We Have Met The Enemy and He Is Us: Pogo Earth Day Poster&quot;">Kelly70</a>]). For example, a CA might fail to
850 replace its own certificate in a timely fashion (well before it
851 expires). It might fail to issue its CRL and manifest prior to
852 expiration, creating stale instances of these products that cause
853 concern for RPs. A CA with many subordinate CAs (e.g., an RIR or
854 NIR) might fail to distribute the expiration times for the CA
855 certificates that it issues. A network with many ROAs might do the
856 same for the EE certificates associated with the ROAs it generates.
857 A CA could rollover its key but fail to reissue subordinate CA
858 certificates under its new key. Poor planning with regard to rekey
859 intervals for managed CAs could impose undue burdens for RPs, despite
860 a lack of malicious intent. All of these examples of mismanagement
861 could adversely affect RPs, despite the absence of malicious intent.
862
863 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Residual Vulnerabilities</span>
864
865 The RPKI, upon which PATHSEC relies, has several residual
866 vulnerabilities that were discussed in the preceding text (Sections
867 4.4 and 4.5). These vulnerabilities are of two principle forms:
868
869 o The RPKI repository system may be attacked in ways that make its
870 contents unavailable, not current, or inconsistent. The principle
871 defense against most forms of DoS attacks is the use of a local
872 cache by each RP. The local cache ensures availability of
873 previously acquired RPKI data in the event that a repository is
874 inaccessible or if the repository contents are deleted
875 (maliciously). Nonetheless, the system cannot ensure that every
876 RP will always have access to up-to-date RPKI data. An RP, when
877 it detects a problem with acquired repository data, has two
878 options:
879
880 1. The RP may choose to make use of its local cache, employing
881 local configuration settings that tolerate expired or stale
882 objects. (Such behavior is, nominally, always within the
883 purview of an RP in PKI.) Using cached, expired, or stale
884 data subjects the RP to attacks that take advantage of the
885 RP's ignorance of changes to this data.
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7132">RFC 7132</a> Threat Model for BGP Path Security February 2014</span>
895
896
897 2. The RP may chose to purge expired objects. Purging expired
898 objects removes the security information associated with the
899 real-world INRs to which the objects refer. This is
900 equivalent to the affected INRs not having been afforded
901 protection via the RPKI. Since use of the RPKI (and PATHSEC)
902 is voluntary, there may always be a set of INRs that are not
903 protected by these mechanisms. Thus, purging moves the
904 affected INRs to the set of non-participating INR holders.
905 This more conservative response enables an attacker to move
906 INRs from the protected set to the unprotected set.
907
908 o Any CA in the RPKI may misbehave within the bounds of the INRs
909 allocated to it, e.g., it may issue certificates with duplicate
910 resource allocations or revoke certificates inappropriately. This
911 vulnerability is intrinsic in any PKI, but its impact is limited
912 in the RPKI because of the use of extensions in <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a>. It is
913 anticipated that RPs will deal with such misbehavior through
914 administrative means once it is detected.
915
916 PATHSEC has a separate set of residual vulnerabilities:
917
918 o It has been stated that "route leaks" are viewed as a routing
919 security problem by many operators. However, BGP itself does not
920 include semantics that preclude what many perceive as route leaks,
921 and there is no definition of the term in any RFC. This makes it
922 inappropriate to address route leaks in this document.
923 Additionally, route leaks are outside the scope of PATHSEC,
924 consistent with the security context noted in <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a> of this
925 document. If, at a later time, the SIDR security context is
926 revised to include route leaks, and an appropriate definition
927 exists, this document should be revised.
928
929 o PATHSEC is not required to protect all attributes associated with
930 an AS_PATH, even though some of these attributes may be employed
931 as inputs to routing decisions. Thus, attacks that modify (or
932 strip) these other attributes are not prevented/detected by
933 PATHSEC. As noted in <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>, the SIDR security context calls
934 for protecting only the information needed to verify that a
935 received route traversed the ASes in question, and that the NLRI
936 in the route is what was advertised. (The AS_PATH data also may
937 have traversed ASes within a confederation that are not
938 represented. However, these ASes are not externally visible and
939 thus do not influence route selection, so their omission in this
940 context is not a security concern.) Thus, protection of other
941 attributes is outside the scope of this document, as described in
942 <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>. If, at a later time, the SIDR security context is
943 revised to include protection of additional BGP attributes, this
944 document should be revised.
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7132">RFC 7132</a> Threat Model for BGP Path Security February 2014</span>
951
952
953 o PATHSEC cannot ensure that an AS will withdraw a route when the AS
954 no longer has a route for a prefix, as noted in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>.
955 PATHSEC may incorporate features to limit the lifetime of an
956 advertisement. Such lifetime limits provide an upper bound on the
957 time that the failure to withdraw a route will remain effective.
958
959 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span>
960
961 A threat model is, by definition, a security-centric document.
962 Unlike a protocol description, a threat model does not create
963 security problems nor does it purport to address security problems.
964 This model postulates a set of threats (i.e., motivated, capable
965 adversaries) and examines classes of attacks that these threats are
966 capable of effecting, based on the motivations ascribed to the
967 threats. It describes the impact of these types of attacks on
968 PATHSEC, including the RPKI on which PATHSEC relies. It describes
969 how the design of the RPKI (and the PATHSEC design goals) address
970 classes of attacks, where applicable. It also notes residual
971 vulnerabilities.
972
973 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
974
975 The authors with to thank the members of the SIDR working group for
976 the extensive feedback provided during the development of this
977 document.
978
979 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Informative References</span>
980
981 [<a id="ref-Kelly70">Kelly70</a>] Kelly, W., "We Have Met The Enemy and He Is Us: Pogo Earth
982 Day Poster", April 1970.
983
984 [<a id="ref-Kent2000">Kent2000</a>]
985 Kent, S., Lynn, C., and K. Seo, "Design and Analysis of
986 the Secure Border Gateway Protocol (S-BGP)", IEEE DISCEX
987 Conference, June 2000.
988
989 [<a id="ref-RFC3779">RFC3779</a>] Lynn, C., Kent, S., and K. Seo, "X.509 Extensions for IP
990 Addresses and AS Identifiers", <a href="./rfc3779">RFC 3779</a>, June 2004.
991
992 [<a id="ref-RFC4271">RFC4271</a>] Rekhter, Y., Li, T., and S. Hares, "A Border Gateway
993 Protocol 4 (BGP-4)", <a href="./rfc4271">RFC 4271</a>, January 2006.
994
995 [<a id="ref-RFC4272">RFC4272</a>] Murphy, S., "BGP Security Vulnerabilities Analysis", <a href="./rfc4272">RFC</a>
996 <a href="./rfc4272">4272</a>, January 2006.
997
998 [<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
999 Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7132">RFC 7132</a> Threat Model for BGP Path Security February 2014</span>
1007
1008
1009 [<a id="ref-RFC5925">RFC5925</a>] Touch, J., Mankin, A., and R. Bonica, "The TCP
1010 Authentication Option", <a href="./rfc5925">RFC 5925</a>, June 2010.
1011
1012 [<a id="ref-RFC6480">RFC6480</a>] Lepinski, M. and S. Kent, "An Infrastructure to Support
1013 Secure Internet Routing", <a href="./rfc6480">RFC 6480</a>, February 2012.
1014
1015 [<a id="ref-RFC6481">RFC6481</a>] Huston, G., Loomans, R., and G. Michaelson, "A Profile for
1016 Resource Certificate Repository Structure", <a href="./rfc6481">RFC 6481</a>,
1017 February 2012.
1018
1019 [<a id="ref-RFC6482">RFC6482</a>] Lepinski, M., Kent, S., and D. Kong, "A Profile for Route
1020 Origin Authorizations (ROAs)", <a href="./rfc6482">RFC 6482</a>, February 2012.
1021
1022 [<a id="ref-RFC6486">RFC6486</a>] Austein, R., Huston, G., Kent, S., and M. Lepinski,
1023 "Manifests for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
1024 (RPKI)", <a href="./rfc6486">RFC 6486</a>, February 2012.
1025
1026 [<a id="ref-RFC6487">RFC6487</a>] Huston, G., Michaelson, G., and R. Loomans, "A Profile for
1027 X.509 PKIX Resource Certificates", <a href="./rfc6487">RFC 6487</a>, February
1028 2012.
1029
1030 [<a id="ref-RFC6488">RFC6488</a>] Lepinski, M., Chi, A., and S. Kent, "Signed Object
1031 Template for the Resource Public Key Infrastructure
1032 (RPKI)", <a href="./rfc6488">RFC 6488</a>, February 2012.
1033
1034 [<a id="ref-RFC6493">RFC6493</a>] Bush, R., "The Resource Public Key Infrastructure (RPKI)
1035 Ghostbusters Record", <a href="./rfc6493">RFC 6493</a>, February 2012.
1036
1037 [<a id="ref-RFC6810">RFC6810</a>] Bush, R. and R. Austein, "The Resource Public Key
1038 Infrastructure (RPKI) to Router Protocol", <a href="./rfc6810">RFC 6810</a>,
1039 January 2013.
1040
1041 [<a id="ref-SIDR-CH">SIDR-CH</a>] "Secure Inter-Domain Routing: Charter for Working Group",
1042 September 2013, &lt;<a href="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/charters?item=charter-sidr-2013-09-20.txt">http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/</a>
1043 <a href="http://tools.ietf.org/wg/sidr/charters?item=charter-sidr-2013-09-20.txt">charters?item=charter-sidr-2013-09-20.txt</a>&gt;.
1044
1045 [<a id="ref-Sam04">Sam04</a>] Samuel, A., "Hacktivism and the Future of Political
1046 Participation", Ph.D. dissertation, Harvard University,
1047 September 2004, &lt;<a href="http://www.alexandrasamuel.com/dissertation/pdfs/Samuel-Hacktivism-entire.pdf">http://www.alexandrasamuel.com/</a>
1048 <a href="http://www.alexandrasamuel.com/dissertation/pdfs/Samuel-Hacktivism-entire.pdf">dissertation/pdfs/Samuel-Hacktivism-entire.pdf</a>&gt;.
1049
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1060 <span class="grey">Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7132">RFC 7132</a> Threat Model for BGP Path Security February 2014</span>
1063
1064
1065 Authors' Addresses
1066
1067 Stephen Kent
1068 BBN Technologies
1069 10 Moulton St.
1070 Cambridge, MA 02138
1071 USA
1072
1073 EMail: [email protected]
1074
1075
1076 Andrew Chi
1077 University of North Carolina - Chapel Hill
1078 c/o Department of Computer Science
1079 CB 3175, Sitterson Hall
1080 Chapel Hill, NC 27599
1081 USA
1082
1083 EMail: [email protected]
1084
1085
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1116 Kent &amp; Chi Informational [Page 20]
1117 </pre>