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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Hardaker |
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Request for Comments: 6353 SPARTA, Inc. |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc5953">5953</a> July 2011 |
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Category: Standards Track |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for</span> |
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<span class="h1">the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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This document describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network |
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Management Protocol (SNMP), that uses either the Transport Layer |
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Security protocol or the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) |
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protocol. The TLS and DTLS protocols provide authentication and |
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privacy services for SNMP applications. This document describes how |
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the TLS Transport Model (TLSTM) implements the needed features of an |
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SNMP Transport Subsystem to make this protection possible in an |
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interoperable way. |
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|
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This Transport Model is designed to meet the security and operational |
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needs of network administrators. It supports the sending of SNMP |
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messages over TLS/TCP and DTLS/UDP. The TLS mode can make use of |
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TCP's improved support for larger packet sizes and the DTLS mode |
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provides potentially superior operation in environments where a |
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connectionless (e.g., UDP) transport is preferred. Both TLS and DTLS |
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integrate well into existing public keying infrastructures. |
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|
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This document also defines a portion of the Management Information |
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Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols. In particular, |
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it defines objects for managing the TLS Transport Model for SNMP. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
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Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
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10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
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material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
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modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
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Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling |
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the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified |
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outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may |
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not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format |
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it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other |
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than English. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Changes Since <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. The Transport Layer Security Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. How the TLSTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Security Capabilities of This Model . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Message Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. (D)TLS Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Security Parameter Passing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Notifications and Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Elements of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. X.509 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Provisioning for the Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. (D)TLS Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. SNMP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. SNMP Services for an Outgoing Message . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. SNMP Services for an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
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<a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Cached Information and References . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. TLS Transport Model Cached Information . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.1.1">4.4.1.1</a>. tmSecurityName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.1.2">4.4.1.2</a>. tmSessionID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4.1.3">4.4.1.3</a>. Session State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Elements of Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Procedures for an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a>. DTLS over UDP Processing for Incoming Messages . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a>. Transport Processing for Incoming SNMP Messages . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Procedures for an Outgoing SNMP Message . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Establishing or Accepting a Session . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3.1">5.3.1</a>. Establishing a Session as a Client . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3.2">5.3.2</a>. Accepting a Session as a Server . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Closing a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. MIB Module Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Textual Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Statistical Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Configuration Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.4.1">6.4.1</a>. Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. Relationship to Other MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.5.1">6.5.1</a>. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. MIB Module Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-54">54</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-54">54</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Notification Receiver Credential Selection . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-54">54</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>. contextEngineID Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.4">8.4</a>. Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Certificates, Authentication, and Authorization . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. (D)TLS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-56">56</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2.1">9.2.1</a>. TLS Version Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-56">56</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2.2">9.2.2</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-57">57</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Use with SNMPv1/SNMPv2c Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-57">57</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.4">9.4</a>. MIB Module Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-57">57</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-59">59</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-59">59</a> |
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<a href="#section-12">12</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-60">60</a> |
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<a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-60">60</a> |
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<a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-61">61</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Target and Notification Configuration Example . . . . <a href="#page-63">63</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Configuring a Notification Originator . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-63">63</a> |
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A.2. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize a Simple Derivation of |
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tmSecurityName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-64">64</a> |
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A.3. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize Table-Driven Certificate |
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Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-64">64</a> |
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<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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It is important to understand the modular SNMPv3 architecture as |
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defined by [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>] and enhanced by the Transport Subsystem |
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[<a href="./rfc5590" title=""Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5590</a>]. It is also important to understand the terminology of the |
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SNMPv3 architecture in order to understand where the Transport Model |
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described in this document fits into the architecture and how it |
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interacts with the other architecture subsystems. For a detailed |
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overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard |
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Management Framework, please refer to <a href="./rfc3410#section-7">Section 7 of [RFC3410]</a>. |
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This document describes a Transport Model that makes use of the |
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] and the Datagram Transport |
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Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol [<a href="./rfc4347" title=""Datagram Transport Layer Security"">RFC4347</a>], within a Transport |
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Subsystem [<a href="./rfc5590" title=""Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5590</a>]. DTLS is the datagram variant of the Transport |
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Layer Security (TLS) protocol [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>]. The Transport Model in this |
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document is referred to as the Transport Layer Security Transport |
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Model (TLSTM). TLS and DTLS take advantage of the X.509 public |
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keying infrastructure [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]. While (D)TLS supports multiple |
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authentication mechanisms, this document only discusses X.509 |
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certificate-based authentication. Although other forms of |
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authentication are possible, they are outside the scope of this |
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specification. This transport model is designed to meet the security |
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and operational needs of network administrators, operating in both |
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environments where a connectionless (e.g., UDP) transport is |
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preferred and in environments where large quantities of data need to |
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be sent (e.g., over a TCP-based stream). Both TLS and DTLS integrate |
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well into existing public keying infrastructures. This document |
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supports sending of SNMP messages over TLS/TCP and DTLS/UDP. |
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This document also defines a portion of the Management Information |
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Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols. In particular, |
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it defines objects for managing the TLS Transport Model for SNMP. |
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Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed |
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the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally |
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accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP). |
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Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the |
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Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB |
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module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58: |
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[<a href="./rfc2578" title=""Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)"">RFC2578</a>], [<a href="./rfc2579" title=""Textual Conventions for SMIv2"">RFC2579</a>], and [<a href="./rfc2580" title=""Conformance Statements for SMIv2"">RFC2580</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
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The diagram shown below gives a conceptual overview of two SNMP |
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entities communicating using the TLS Transport Model (shown as |
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"TLSTM"). One entity contains a command responder and notification |
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originator application, and the other a command generator and |
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notification receiver application. It should be understood that this |
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particular mix of application types is an example only and other |
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combinations are equally valid. |
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Note: this diagram shows the Transport Security Model (TSM) being |
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used as the security model that is defined in [<a href="./rfc5591" title=""Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5591</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
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+---------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
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| Network | |
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+---------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
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^ | ^ | |
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|Notifications |Commands |Commands |Notifications |
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+---|---------------------|-------+ +--|---------------|--------------+ |
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| | V | | | V | |
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| +------------+ +------------+ | | +-----------+ +----------+ | |
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| | (D)TLS | | (D)TLS | | | | (D)TLS | | (D)TLS | | |
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| | (Client) | | (Server) | | | | (Client) | | (Server) | | |
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| +------------+ +------------+ | | +-----------+ +----------+ | |
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| ^ ^ | | ^ ^ | |
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| | | | | | | | |
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| +-------------+ | | +--------------+ | |
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| +-----|------------+ | | +-----|------------+ | |
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| | V | | | | V | | |
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| | +--------+ | +-----+ | | | +--------+ | +-----+ | |
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| | | TLS TM |<--------->|Cache| | | | | TLS TM |<--------->|Cache| | |
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| | +--------+ | +-----+ | | | +--------+ | +-----+ | |
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| |Transport Subsys. | ^ | | |Transport Subsys. | ^ | |
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| +------------------+ | | | +------------------+ | | |
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| ^ | | | ^ | | |
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| | +--+ | | | +--+ | |
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| v | | | V | | |
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| +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | | | +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | | |
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| | | |Message | |Securi.| | | | | | |Message | |Securi.| | | |
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| |Disp.| |Proc. | |Subsys.| | | | |Disp.| |Proc. | |Subsys.| | | |
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| | | |Subsys. | | | | | | | | |Subsys. | | | | | |
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| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
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| | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | | | | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | | |
| 311 |
| | <--->|v3MP|<--> |TSM|<--+ | | | <--->|v3MP|<--->|TSM|<--+ | |
| 312 |
| | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | | | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | |
| 313 |
| | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
| 314 |
| +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | | +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | |
| 315 |
| ^ | | ^ | |
| 316 |
| | | | | | |
| 317 |
| +-+------------+ | | +-+----------+ | |
| 318 |
| | | | | | | | |
| 319 |
| v v | | v V | |
| 320 |
| +-------------+ +-------------+ | | +-------------+ +-------------+ | |
| 321 |
| | COMMAND | | NOTIFICAT. | | | | COMMAND | | NOTIFICAT. | | |
| 322 |
| | RESPONDER | | ORIGINATOR | | | | GENERATOR | | RECEIVER | | |
| 323 |
| | application | | application | | | | application | | application | | |
| 324 |
| +-------------+ +-------------+ | | +-------------+ +-------------+ | |
| 325 |
| SNMP entity | | SNMP entity | |
| 326 |
+---------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+ |
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions</span> |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document |
| 340 |
favors terminology as defined in STD 62, rather than favoring |
| 341 |
terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is |
| 342 |
consistent with the IESG decision to not require the SNMPv3 |
| 343 |
terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP |
| 344 |
specifications when SNMPv3 was advanced to a Full Standard. |
| 345 |
|
| 346 |
"Authentication" in this document typically refers to the English |
| 347 |
meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not |
| 348 |
data source authentication or peer identity authentication. |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
The terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document |
| 351 |
because, in the [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>] architecture, all SNMP entities have the |
| 352 |
capability of acting as manager, agent, or both depending on the SNMP |
| 353 |
application types supported in the implementation. Where distinction |
| 354 |
is required, the application names of command generator, command |
| 355 |
responder, notification originator, notification receiver, and proxy |
| 356 |
forwarder are used. See "SNMP Applications" [<a href="./rfc3413" title=""Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications"">RFC3413</a>] for further |
| 357 |
information. |
| 358 |
|
| 359 |
Large portions of this document simultaneously refer to both TLS and |
| 360 |
DTLS when discussing TLSTM components that function equally with |
| 361 |
either protocol. "(D)TLS" is used in these places to indicate that |
| 362 |
the statement applies to either or both protocols as appropriate. |
| 363 |
When a distinction between the protocols is needed, they are referred |
| 364 |
to independently through the use of "TLS" or "DTLS". The Transport |
| 365 |
Model, however, is named "TLS Transport Model" and refers not to the |
| 366 |
TLS or DTLS protocol but to the specification in this document, which |
| 367 |
includes support for both TLS and DTLS. |
| 368 |
|
| 369 |
Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to |
| 370 |
refer to the two ends of the (D)TLS transport connection. The client |
| 371 |
actively opens the (D)TLS connection, and the server passively |
| 372 |
listens for the incoming (D)TLS connection. An SNMP entity may act |
| 373 |
as a (D)TLS client or server or both, depending on the SNMP |
| 374 |
applications supported. |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
The User-Based Security Model (USM) [<a href="./rfc3414" title=""User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)"">RFC3414</a>] is a mandatory-to- |
| 377 |
implement Security Model in STD 62. While (D)TLS and USM frequently |
| 378 |
refer to a user, the terminology preferred in <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> and in this |
| 379 |
memo is "principal". A principal is the "who" on whose behalf |
| 380 |
services are provided or processing takes place. A principal can be, |
| 381 |
among other things, an individual acting in a particular role; a set |
| 382 |
of individuals, with each acting in a particular role; an application |
| 383 |
or a set of applications, or a combination of these within an |
| 384 |
administrative domain. |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Throughout this document, the term "session" is used to refer to a |
| 394 |
secure association between two TLS Transport Models that permits the |
| 395 |
transmission of one or more SNMP messages within the lifetime of the |
| 396 |
session. The (D)TLS protocols also have an internal notion of a |
| 397 |
session and although these two concepts of a session are related, |
| 398 |
when the term "session" is used this document is referring to the |
| 399 |
TLSTM's specific session and not directly to the (D)TLS protocol's |
| 400 |
session. |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
| 403 |
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
| 404 |
document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Changes Since <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a></span> |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
This document obsoletes [<a href="./rfc5953" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5953</a>]. |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
Since the publication of <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a>, a few editorial errata have been |
| 411 |
noted. These errata are posted on the RFC Editor web site. These |
| 412 |
errors have been corrected in this document. |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
This document updates the references to <a href="./rfc3490">RFC 3490</a> (IDNA 2003) to |
| 415 |
[<a href="./rfc5890" title=""Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework"">RFC5890</a>] (IDNA 2008), because <a href="./rfc3490">RFC 3490</a> was obsoleted by <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>. |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
References to <a href="./rfc1033">RFC 1033</a> were replaced with references to [<a href="./rfc1123" title=""Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support"">RFC1123</a>]. |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
Added informative reference to 5953. |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
Updated MIB dates and revision date. |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The Transport Layer Security Protocol</span> |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
(D)TLS provides authentication, data message integrity, and privacy |
| 426 |
at the transport layer (see [<a href="./rfc4347" title=""Datagram Transport Layer Security"">RFC4347</a>]). |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
The primary goals of the TLS Transport Model are to provide privacy, |
| 429 |
peer identity authentication, and data integrity between two |
| 430 |
communicating SNMP entities. The TLS and DTLS protocols provide a |
| 431 |
secure transport upon which the TLSTM is based. Please refer to |
| 432 |
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4347" title=""Datagram Transport Layer Security"">RFC4347</a>] for complete descriptions of the protocols. |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. How the TLSTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem</span> |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
A transport model is a component of the Transport Subsystem. The TLS |
| 437 |
Transport Model thus fits between the underlying (D)TLS transport |
| 438 |
layer and the Message Dispatcher [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>] component of the SNMP |
| 439 |
engine. |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
The TLS Transport Model will establish a session between itself and |
| 450 |
the TLS Transport Model of another SNMP engine. The sending |
| 451 |
transport model passes unencrypted and unauthenticated messages from |
| 452 |
the Dispatcher to (D)TLS to be encrypted and authenticated, and the |
| 453 |
receiving transport model accepts decrypted and authenticated/ |
| 454 |
integrity-checked incoming messages from (D)TLS and passes them to |
| 455 |
the Dispatcher. |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
After a TLS Transport Model session is established, SNMP messages can |
| 458 |
conceptually be sent through the session from one SNMP message |
| 459 |
Dispatcher to another SNMP Message Dispatcher. If multiple SNMP |
| 460 |
messages are needed to be passed between two SNMP applications they |
| 461 |
MAY be passed through the same session. A TLSTM implementation |
| 462 |
engine MAY choose to close the session to conserve resources. |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
The TLS Transport Model of an SNMP engine will perform the |
| 465 |
translation between (D)TLS-specific security parameters and SNMP- |
| 466 |
specific, model-independent parameters. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
The diagram below depicts where the TLS Transport Model (shown as |
| 506 |
"(D)TLS TM") fits into the architecture described in <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> and the |
| 507 |
Transport Subsystem: |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
+------------------------------+ |
| 510 |
| Network | |
| 511 |
+------------------------------+ |
| 512 |
^ ^ ^ |
| 513 |
| | | |
| 514 |
v v v |
| 515 |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 516 |
| +--------------------------------------------------+ | |
| 517 |
| | Transport Subsystem | +--------+ | |
| 518 |
| | +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ +-------+ | | | | |
| 519 |
| | | UDP | | SSH | |(D)TLS | . . . | other |<--->| Cache | | |
| 520 |
| | | | | TM | | TM | | | | | | | |
| 521 |
| | +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ +-------+ | +--------+ | |
| 522 |
| +--------------------------------------------------+ ^ | |
| 523 |
| ^ | | |
| 524 |
| | | | |
| 525 |
| Dispatcher v | | |
| 526 |
| +--------------+ +---------------------+ +----------------+ | | |
| 527 |
| | Transport | | Message Processing | | Security | | | |
| 528 |
| | Dispatch | | Subsystem | | Subsystem | | | |
| 529 |
| | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | |
| 530 |
| | | | +->| v1MP |<--->| | USM | | | | |
| 531 |
| | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | |
| 532 |
| | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | | |
| 533 |
| | | | +->| v2cMP |<--->| | Transport | | | | |
| 534 |
| | Message | | | +------------+ | | | Security |<--+ | |
| 535 |
| | Dispatch <---->| +------------+ | | | Model | | | |
| 536 |
| | | | +->| v3MP |<--->| +------------+ | | |
| 537 |
| | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | |
| 538 |
| | PDU Dispatch | | | +------------+ | | | Other | | | |
| 539 |
| +--------------+ | +->| otherMP |<--->| | Model(s) | | | |
| 540 |
| ^ | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | |
| 541 |
| | +---------------------+ +----------------+ | |
| 542 |
| v | |
| 543 |
| +-------+-------------------------+---------------+ | |
| 544 |
| ^ ^ ^ | |
| 545 |
| | | | | |
| 546 |
| v v v | |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
| +-------------+ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ | |
| 562 |
| | COMMAND | | ACCESS | | NOTIFICATION | | PROXY | | |
| 563 |
| | RESPONDER |<->| CONTROL |<->| ORIGINATOR | | FORWARDER | | |
| 564 |
| | application | | | | applications | | application | | |
| 565 |
| +-------------+ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ | |
| 566 |
| ^ ^ | |
| 567 |
| | | | |
| 568 |
| v v | |
| 569 |
| +----------------------------------------------+ | |
| 570 |
| | MIB instrumentation | SNMP entity | |
| 571 |
+-------------------------------------------------------------------+ |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Security Capabilities of This Model</span> |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Threats</span> |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
The TLS Transport Model provides protection against the threats |
| 578 |
identified by the <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> architecture [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>]: |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
1. Modification of Information - The modification threat is the |
| 581 |
danger that an unauthorized entity may alter in-transit SNMP |
| 582 |
messages generated on behalf of an authorized principal in such a |
| 583 |
way as to effect unauthorized management operations, including |
| 584 |
falsifying the value of an object. |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
(D)TLS provides verification that the content of each received |
| 587 |
message has not been modified during its transmission through the |
| 588 |
network, data has not been altered or destroyed in an |
| 589 |
unauthorized manner, and data sequences have not been altered to |
| 590 |
an extent greater than can occur non-maliciously. |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
2. Masquerade - The masquerade threat is the danger that management |
| 593 |
operations unauthorized for a given principal may be attempted by |
| 594 |
assuming the identity of another principal that has the |
| 595 |
appropriate authorizations. |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
The TLSTM verifies the identity of the (D)TLS server through the |
| 598 |
use of the (D)TLS protocol and X.509 certificates. A TLS |
| 599 |
Transport Model implementation MUST support the authentication of |
| 600 |
both the server and the client. |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
3. Message stream modification - The re-ordering, delay, or replay |
| 603 |
of messages can and does occur through the natural operation of |
| 604 |
many connectionless transport services. The message stream |
| 605 |
modification threat is the danger that messages may be |
| 606 |
maliciously re-ordered, delayed, or replayed to an extent that is |
| 607 |
greater than can occur through the natural operation of |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
connectionless transport services, in order to effect |
| 618 |
unauthorized management operations. |
| 619 |
|
| 620 |
(D)TLS provides replay protection with a Message Authentication |
| 621 |
Code (MAC) that includes a sequence number. Since UDP provides |
| 622 |
no sequencing ability, DTLS uses a sliding window protocol with |
| 623 |
the sequence number used for replay protection (see [<a href="./rfc4347" title=""Datagram Transport Layer Security"">RFC4347</a>]). |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
4. Disclosure - The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping |
| 626 |
on the exchanges between SNMP engines. |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
(D)TLS provides protection against the disclosure of information |
| 629 |
to unauthorized recipients or eavesdroppers by allowing for |
| 630 |
encryption of all traffic between SNMP engines. A TLS Transport |
| 631 |
Model implementation MUST support message encryption to protect |
| 632 |
sensitive data from eavesdropping attacks. |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
5. Denial of Service - The <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> architecture [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>] states |
| 635 |
that denial-of-service (DoS) attacks need not be addressed by an |
| 636 |
SNMP security protocol. However, connectionless transports (like |
| 637 |
DTLS over UDP) are susceptible to a variety of DoS attacks |
| 638 |
because they are more vulnerable to spoofed IP addresses. See |
| 639 |
<a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a> for details on how the cookie mechanism is used. |
| 640 |
Note, however, that this mechanism does not provide any defense |
| 641 |
against DoS attacks mounted from valid IP addresses. |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
See <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> for more detail on the security considerations |
| 644 |
associated with the TLSTM and these security threats. |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Message Protection</span> |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
The <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> architecture recognizes three levels of security: |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
o without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv) |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
o with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv) |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
o with authentication and with privacy (authPriv) |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
The TLS Transport Model determines from (D)TLS the identity of the |
| 657 |
authenticated principal, the transport type, and the transport |
| 658 |
address associated with an incoming message. The TLS Transport Model |
| 659 |
provides the identity and destination type and address to (D)TLS for |
| 660 |
outgoing messages. |
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
When an application requests a session for a message, it also |
| 663 |
requests a security level for that session. The TLS Transport Model |
| 664 |
MUST ensure that the (D)TLS connection provides security at least as |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
high as the requested level of security. How the security level is |
| 674 |
translated into the algorithms used to provide data integrity and |
| 675 |
privacy is implementation dependent. However, the NULL integrity and |
| 676 |
encryption algorithms MUST NOT be used to fulfill security level |
| 677 |
requests for authentication or privacy. Implementations MAY choose |
| 678 |
to force (D)TLS to only allow cipher_suites that provide both |
| 679 |
authentication and privacy to guarantee this assertion. |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
If a suitable interface between the TLS Transport Model and the |
| 682 |
(D)TLS Handshake Protocol is implemented to allow the selection of |
| 683 |
security-level-dependent algorithms (for example, a security level to |
| 684 |
cipher_suites mapping table), then different security levels may be |
| 685 |
utilized by the application. |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
The authentication, integrity, and privacy algorithms used by the |
| 688 |
(D)TLS Protocols may vary over time as the science of cryptography |
| 689 |
continues to evolve and the development of (D)TLS continues over |
| 690 |
time. Implementers are encouraged to plan for changes in operator |
| 691 |
trust of particular algorithms. Implementations SHOULD offer |
| 692 |
configuration settings for mapping algorithms to SNMPv3 security |
| 693 |
levels. |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. (D)TLS Connections</span> |
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
(D)TLS connections are opened by the TLS Transport Model during the |
| 698 |
elements of procedure for an outgoing SNMP message. Since the sender |
| 699 |
of a message initiates the creation of a (D)TLS connection if needed, |
| 700 |
the (D)TLS connection will already exist for an incoming message. |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
Implementations MAY choose to instantiate (D)TLS connections in |
| 703 |
anticipation of outgoing messages. This approach might be useful to |
| 704 |
ensure that a (D)TLS connection to a given target can be established |
| 705 |
before it becomes important to send a message over the (D)TLS |
| 706 |
connection. Of course, there is no guarantee that a pre-established |
| 707 |
session will still be valid when needed. |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
DTLS connections, when used over UDP, are uniquely identified within |
| 710 |
the TLS Transport Model by the combination of transportDomain, |
| 711 |
transportAddress, tmSecurityName, and requestedSecurityLevel |
| 712 |
associated with each session. Each unique combination of these |
| 713 |
parameters MUST have a locally chosen unique tlstmSessionID for each |
| 714 |
active session. For further information, see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. TLS over |
| 715 |
TCP sessions, on the other hand, do not require a unique pairing of |
| 716 |
address and port attributes since their lower-layer protocols (TCP) |
| 717 |
already provide adequate session framing. But they must still |
| 718 |
provide a unique tlstmSessionID for referencing the session. |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
The tlstmSessionID MUST NOT change during the entire duration of the |
| 730 |
session from the TLSTM's perspective, and MUST uniquely identify a |
| 731 |
single session. As an implementation hint: note that the (D)TLS |
| 732 |
internal SessionID does not meet these requirements, since it can |
| 733 |
change over the life of the connection as seen by the TLSTM (for |
| 734 |
example, during renegotiation), and does not necessarily uniquely |
| 735 |
identify a TLSTM session (there can be multiple TLSTM sessions |
| 736 |
sharing the same D(TLS) internal SessionID). |
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Security Parameter Passing</span> |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
For the (D)TLS server-side, (D)TLS-specific security parameters |
| 741 |
(i.e., cipher_suites, X.509 certificate fields, IP addresses, and |
| 742 |
ports) are translated by the TLS Transport Model into security |
| 743 |
parameters for the TLS Transport Model and security model (e.g., |
| 744 |
tmSecurityLevel, tmSecurityName, transportDomain, transportAddress). |
| 745 |
The transport-related and (D)TLS-security-related information, |
| 746 |
including the authenticated identity, are stored in a cache |
| 747 |
referenced by tmStateReference. |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
For the (D)TLS client side, the TLS Transport Model takes input |
| 750 |
provided by the Dispatcher in the sendMessage() Abstract Service |
| 751 |
Interface (ASI) and input from the tmStateReference cache. The |
| 752 |
(D)TLS Transport Model converts that information into suitable |
| 753 |
security parameters for (D)TLS and establishes sessions as needed. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
The elements of procedure in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> discuss these concepts in much |
| 756 |
greater detail. |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Notifications and Proxy</span> |
| 759 |
|
| 760 |
(D)TLS connections may be initiated by (D)TLS clients on behalf of |
| 761 |
SNMP applications that initiate communications, such as command |
| 762 |
generators, notification originators, proxy forwarders. Command |
| 763 |
generators are frequently operated by a human, but notification |
| 764 |
originators and proxy forwarders are usually unmanned automated |
| 765 |
processes. The targets to whom notifications and proxied requests |
| 766 |
should be sent are typically determined and configured by a network |
| 767 |
administrator. |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
The SNMP-TARGET-MIB module [<a href="./rfc3413" title=""Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications"">RFC3413</a>] contains objects for defining |
| 770 |
management targets, including transportDomain, transportAddress, |
| 771 |
securityName, securityModel, and securityLevel parameters, for |
| 772 |
notification originator, proxy forwarder, and SNMP-controllable |
| 773 |
command generator applications. Transport domains and transport |
| 774 |
addresses are configured in the snmpTargetAddrTable, and the |
| 775 |
securityModel, securityName, and securityLevel parameters are |
| 776 |
configured in the snmpTargetParamsTable. This document defines a MIB |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
module that extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's snmpTargetParamsTable to |
| 786 |
specify a (D)TLS client-side certificate to use for the connection. |
| 787 |
|
| 788 |
When configuring a (D)TLS target, the snmpTargetAddrTDomain and |
| 789 |
snmpTargetAddrTAddress parameters in snmpTargetAddrTable SHOULD be |
| 790 |
set to the snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain object and an |
| 791 |
appropriate snmpTLSAddress value. When used with the SNMPv3 message |
| 792 |
processing model, the snmpTargetParamsMPModel column of the |
| 793 |
snmpTargetParamsTable SHOULD be set to a value of 3. The |
| 794 |
snmpTargetParamsSecurityName SHOULD be set to an appropriate |
| 795 |
securityName value, and the snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint |
| 796 |
parameter of the snmpTlstmParamsTable SHOULD be set to a value that |
| 797 |
refers to a locally held certificate (and the corresponding private |
| 798 |
key) to be used. Other parameters, for example, cryptographic |
| 799 |
configuration such as which cipher_suites to use, must come from |
| 800 |
configuration mechanisms not defined in this document. |
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
The securityName defined in the snmpTargetParamsSecurityName column |
| 803 |
will be used by the access control model to authorize any |
| 804 |
notifications that need to be sent. |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Elements of the Model</span> |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
This section contains definitions required to realize the (D)TLS |
| 809 |
Transport Model defined by this document. |
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. X.509 Certificates</span> |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
(D)TLS can make use of X.509 certificates for authentication of both |
| 814 |
sides of the transport. This section discusses the use of X.509 |
| 815 |
certificates in the TLSTM. |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
While (D)TLS supports multiple authentication mechanisms, this |
| 818 |
document only discusses X.509-certificate-based authentication; other |
| 819 |
forms of authentication are outside the scope of this specification. |
| 820 |
TLSTM implementations are REQUIRED to support X.509 certificates. |
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Provisioning for the Certificate</span> |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
Authentication using (D)TLS will require that SNMP entities have |
| 825 |
certificates, either signed by trusted Certification Authorities |
| 826 |
(CAs), or self signed. Furthermore, SNMP entities will most commonly |
| 827 |
need to be provisioned with root certificates that represent the list |
| 828 |
of trusted CAs that an SNMP entity can use for certificate |
| 829 |
verification. SNMP entities SHOULD also be provisioned with an X.509 |
| 830 |
certificate revocation mechanism which can be used to verify that a |
| 831 |
certificate has not been revoked. Trusted public keys from either CA |
| 832 |
certificates and/or self-signed certificates MUST be installed into |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
the server through a trusted out-of-band mechanism and their |
| 842 |
authenticity MUST be verified before access is granted. |
| 843 |
|
| 844 |
Having received a certificate from a connecting TLSTM client, the |
| 845 |
authenticated tmSecurityName of the principal is derived using the |
| 846 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable. This table allows mapping of incoming |
| 847 |
connections to tmSecurityNames through defined transformations. The |
| 848 |
transformations defined in the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB include: |
| 849 |
|
| 850 |
o Mapping a certificate's subjectAltName or CommonName components to |
| 851 |
a tmSecurityName, or |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
o Mapping a certificate's fingerprint value to a directly specified |
| 854 |
tmSecurityName |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
As an implementation hint: implementations may choose to discard any |
| 857 |
connections for which no potential snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable mapping |
| 858 |
exists before performing certificate verification to avoid expending |
| 859 |
computational resources associated with certificate verification. |
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
Deployments SHOULD map the "subjectAltName" component of X.509 |
| 862 |
certificates to the TLSTM specific tmSecurityNames. The |
| 863 |
authenticated identity can be obtained by the TLS Transport Model by |
| 864 |
extracting the subjectAltName(s) from the peer's certificate. The |
| 865 |
receiving application will then have an appropriate tmSecurityName |
| 866 |
for use by other SNMPv3 components like an access control model. |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
An example of this type of mapping setup can be found in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
This tmSecurityName may be later translated from a TLSTM specific |
| 871 |
tmSecurityName to an SNMP engine securityName by the security model. |
| 872 |
A security model, like the TSM security model [<a href="./rfc5591" title=""Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5591</a>], may perform |
| 873 |
an identity mapping or a more complex mapping to derive the |
| 874 |
securityName from the tmSecurityName offered by the TLS Transport |
| 875 |
Model. |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
The standard View-Based Access Control Model (VACM) access control |
| 878 |
model constrains securityNames to be 32 octets or less in length. A |
| 879 |
TLSTM generated tmSecurityName, possibly in combination with a |
| 880 |
messaging or security model that increases the length of the |
| 881 |
securityName, might cause the securityName length to exceed 32 |
| 882 |
octets. For example, a 32-octet tmSecurityName derived from an IPv6 |
| 883 |
address, paired with a TSM prefix, will generate a 36-octet |
| 884 |
securityName. Such a securityName will not be able to be used with |
| 885 |
standard VACM or TARGET MIB modules. Operators should be careful to |
| 886 |
select algorithms and subjectAltNames to avoid this situation. |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
A pictorial view of the complete transformation process (using the |
| 898 |
TSM security model for the example) is shown below: |
| 899 |
|
| 900 |
+-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ |
| 901 |
| Certificate | | | | | |
| 902 |
| Path | | TLSTM | tmSecurityName | TSM | |
| 903 |
| Validation | --> | | ----------------->| | |
| 904 |
+-------------+ +-------+ +-----+ |
| 905 |
| |
| 906 |
| securityName |
| 907 |
V |
| 908 |
+-------------+ |
| 909 |
| application | |
| 910 |
+-------------+ |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. (D)TLS Usage</span> |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
(D)TLS MUST negotiate a cipher_suite that uses X.509 certificates for |
| 915 |
authentication, and MUST authenticate both the client and the server. |
| 916 |
The mandatory-to-implement cipher_suite is specified in the TLS |
| 917 |
specification [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>]. |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
TLSTM verifies the certificates when the connection is opened (see |
| 920 |
<a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>). For this reason, TLS renegotiation with different |
| 921 |
certificates MUST NOT be done. That is, implementations MUST either |
| 922 |
disable renegotiation completely (RECOMMENDED), or they MUST present |
| 923 |
the same certificate during renegotiation (and MUST verify that the |
| 924 |
other end presented the same certificate). |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
For DTLS over UDP, each SNMP message MUST be placed in a single UDP |
| 927 |
datagram; it MAY be split to multiple DTLS records. In other words, |
| 928 |
if a single datagram contains multiple DTLS application_data records, |
| 929 |
they are concatenated when received. The TLSTM implementation SHOULD |
| 930 |
return an error if the SNMP message does not fit in the UDP datagram, |
| 931 |
and thus cannot be sent. |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
For DTLS over UDP, the DTLS server implementation MUST support DTLS |
| 934 |
cookies ([<a href="./rfc4347" title=""Datagram Transport Layer Security"">RFC4347</a>] already requires that clients support DTLS |
| 935 |
cookies). Implementations are not required to perform the cookie |
| 936 |
exchange for every DTLS handshake; however, enabling it by default is |
| 937 |
RECOMMENDED. |
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
For DTLS, replay protection MUST be used. |
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. SNMP Services</span> |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
This section describes the services provided by the TLS Transport |
| 956 |
Model with their inputs and outputs. The services are between the |
| 957 |
Transport Model and the Dispatcher. |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
The services are described as primitives of an abstract service |
| 960 |
interface (ASI) and the inputs and outputs are described as abstract |
| 961 |
data elements as they are passed in these abstract service |
| 962 |
primitives. |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.1" href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. SNMP Services for an Outgoing Message</span> |
| 965 |
|
| 966 |
The Dispatcher passes the information to the TLS Transport Model |
| 967 |
using the ASI defined in the Transport Subsystem: |
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
statusInformation = |
| 970 |
sendMessage( |
| 971 |
IN destTransportDomain -- transport domain to be used |
| 972 |
IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used |
| 973 |
IN outgoingMessage -- the message to send |
| 974 |
IN outgoingMessageLength -- its length |
| 975 |
IN tmStateReference -- reference to transport state |
| 976 |
) |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
The abstract data elements returned from or passed as parameters into |
| 979 |
the abstract service primitives are as follows: |
| 980 |
|
| 981 |
statusInformation: An indication of whether the sending of the |
| 982 |
message was successful. If not, it is an indication of the |
| 983 |
problem. |
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
destTransportDomain: The transport domain for the associated |
| 986 |
destTransportAddress. The Transport Model uses this parameter to |
| 987 |
determine the transport type of the associated |
| 988 |
destTransportAddress. This document specifies the |
| 989 |
snmpTLSTCPDomain and the snmpDTLSUDPDomain transport domains. |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
destTransportAddress: The transport address of the destination TLS |
| 992 |
Transport Model in a format specified by the SnmpTLSAddress |
| 993 |
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION. |
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
outgoingMessage: The outgoing message to send to (D)TLS for |
| 996 |
encapsulation and transmission. |
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
outgoingMessageLength: The length of the outgoingMessage. |
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
tmStateReference: A reference used to pass model-specific and |
| 1010 |
mechanism-specific parameters between the Transport Subsystem and |
| 1011 |
transport-aware Security Models. |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.2" href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. SNMP Services for an Incoming Message</span> |
| 1014 |
|
| 1015 |
The TLS Transport Model processes the received message from the |
| 1016 |
network using the (D)TLS service and then passes it to the Dispatcher |
| 1017 |
using the following ASI: |
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
statusInformation = |
| 1020 |
receiveMessage( |
| 1021 |
IN transportDomain -- origin transport domain |
| 1022 |
IN transportAddress -- origin transport address |
| 1023 |
IN incomingMessage -- the message received |
| 1024 |
IN incomingMessageLength -- its length |
| 1025 |
IN tmStateReference -- reference to transport state |
| 1026 |
) |
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 |
The abstract data elements returned from or passed as parameters into |
| 1029 |
the abstract service primitives are as follows: |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
statusInformation: An indication of whether the passing of the |
| 1032 |
message was successful. If not, it is an indication of the |
| 1033 |
problem. |
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 |
transportDomain: The transport domain for the associated |
| 1036 |
transportAddress. This document specifies the snmpTLSTCPDomain |
| 1037 |
and the snmpDTLSUDPDomain transport domains. |
| 1038 |
|
| 1039 |
transportAddress: The transport address of the source of the |
| 1040 |
received message in a format specified by the SnmpTLSAddress |
| 1041 |
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION. |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
incomingMessage: The whole SNMP message after being processed by |
| 1044 |
(D)TLS. |
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
incomingMessageLength: The length of the incomingMessage. |
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
tmStateReference: A reference used to pass model-specific and |
| 1049 |
mechanism-specific parameters between the Transport Subsystem and |
| 1050 |
transport-aware Security Models. |
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Cached Information and References</span> |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
When performing SNMP processing, there are two levels of state |
| 1068 |
information that may need to be retained: the immediate state linking |
| 1069 |
a request-response pair, and potentially longer-term state relating |
| 1070 |
to transport and security. "Transport Subsystem for the Simple |
| 1071 |
Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [<a href="./rfc5590" title=""Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5590</a>] defines general |
| 1072 |
requirements for caches and references. |
| 1073 |
|
| 1074 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. TLS Transport Model Cached Information</span> |
| 1075 |
|
| 1076 |
The TLS Transport Model has specific responsibilities regarding the |
| 1077 |
cached information. See the Elements of Procedure in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for |
| 1078 |
detailed processing instructions on the use of the tmStateReference |
| 1079 |
fields by the TLS Transport Model. |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1.1" href="#section-4.4.1.1">4.4.1.1</a>. tmSecurityName</span> |
| 1082 |
|
| 1083 |
The tmSecurityName MUST be a human-readable name (in snmpAdminString |
| 1084 |
format) representing the identity that has been set according to the |
| 1085 |
procedures in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. The tmSecurityName MUST be constant for all |
| 1086 |
traffic passing through a single TLSTM session. Messages MUST NOT be |
| 1087 |
sent through an existing (D)TLS connection that was established using |
| 1088 |
a different tmSecurityName. |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
On the (D)TLS server side of a connection, the tmSecurityName is |
| 1091 |
derived using the procedures described in <a href="#section-5.3.2">Section 5.3.2</a> and the SNMP- |
| 1092 |
TLS-TM-MIB's snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable DESCRIPTION clause. |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
On the (D)TLS client side of a connection, the tmSecurityName is |
| 1095 |
presented to the TLS Transport Model by the security model through |
| 1096 |
the tmStateReference. This tmSecurityName is typically a copy of or |
| 1097 |
is derived from the securityName that was passed by application |
| 1098 |
(possibly because of configuration specified in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB). |
| 1099 |
The Security Model likely derived the tmSecurityName from the |
| 1100 |
securityName presented to the Security Model by the application |
| 1101 |
(possibly because of configuration specified in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB). |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
Transport-Model-aware security models derive tmSecurityName from a |
| 1104 |
securityName, possibly configured in MIB modules for notifications |
| 1105 |
and access controls. Transport Models SHOULD use predictable |
| 1106 |
tmSecurityNames so operators will know what to use when configuring |
| 1107 |
MIB modules that use securityNames derived from tmSecurityNames. The |
| 1108 |
TLSTM generates predictable tmSecurityNames based on the |
| 1109 |
configuration found in the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB's snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable |
| 1110 |
and relies on the network operators to have configured this table |
| 1111 |
appropriately. |
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1.2" href="#section-4.4.1.2">4.4.1.2</a>. tmSessionID</span> |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
The tmSessionID MUST be recorded per message at the time of receipt. |
| 1124 |
When tmSameSecurity is set, the recorded tmSessionID can be used to |
| 1125 |
determine whether the (D)TLS connection available for sending a |
| 1126 |
corresponding outgoing message is the same (D)TLS connection as was |
| 1127 |
used when receiving the incoming message (e.g., a response to a |
| 1128 |
request). |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1.3" href="#section-4.4.1.3">4.4.1.3</a>. Session State</span> |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
The per-session state that is referenced by tmStateReference may be |
| 1133 |
saved across multiple messages in a Local Configuration Datastore. |
| 1134 |
Additional session/connection state information might also be stored |
| 1135 |
in a Local Configuration Datastore. |
| 1136 |
|
| 1137 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Elements of Procedure</span> |
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 |
Abstract service interfaces have been defined by [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>] and |
| 1140 |
further augmented by [<a href="./rfc5590" title=""Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5590</a>] to describe the conceptual data flows |
| 1141 |
between the various subsystems within an SNMP entity. The TLSTM uses |
| 1142 |
some of these conceptual data flows when communicating between |
| 1143 |
subsystems. |
| 1144 |
|
| 1145 |
To simplify the elements of procedure, the release of state |
| 1146 |
information is not always explicitly specified. As a general rule, |
| 1147 |
if state information is available when a message gets discarded, the |
| 1148 |
message-state information should also be released. If state |
| 1149 |
information is available when a session is closed, the session state |
| 1150 |
information should also be released. Sensitive information, like |
| 1151 |
cryptographic keys, should be overwritten appropriately prior to |
| 1152 |
being released. |
| 1153 |
|
| 1154 |
An error indication in statusInformation will typically include the |
| 1155 |
Object Identifier (OID) and value for an incremented error counter. |
| 1156 |
This may be accompanied by the requested securityLevel and the |
| 1157 |
tmStateReference. Per-message context information is not accessible |
| 1158 |
to Transport Models, so for the returned counter OID and value, |
| 1159 |
contextEngine would be set to the local value of snmpEngineID and |
| 1160 |
contextName to the default context for error counters. |
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Procedures for an Incoming Message</span> |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
This section describes the procedures followed by the (D)TLS |
| 1165 |
Transport Model when it receives a (D)TLS protected packet. The |
| 1166 |
required functionality is broken into two different sections. |
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
<a href="#section-5.1.1">Section 5.1.1</a> describes the processing required for de-multiplexing |
| 1178 |
multiple DTLS connections, which is specifically needed for DTLS over |
| 1179 |
UDP sessions. It is assumed that TLS protocol implementations |
| 1180 |
already provide appropriate message demultiplexing. |
| 1181 |
|
| 1182 |
<a href="#section-5.1.2">Section 5.1.2</a> describes the transport processing required once the |
| 1183 |
(D)TLS processing has been completed. This will be needed for all |
| 1184 |
(D)TLS-based connections. |
| 1185 |
|
| 1186 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.1" href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a>. DTLS over UDP Processing for Incoming Messages</span> |
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
Demultiplexing of incoming packets into separate DTLS sessions MUST |
| 1189 |
be implemented. For connection-oriented transport protocols, such as |
| 1190 |
TCP, the transport protocol takes care of demultiplexing incoming |
| 1191 |
packets to the right connection. For DTLS over UDP, this |
| 1192 |
demultiplexing will either need to be done within the DTLS |
| 1193 |
implementation, if supported, or by the TLSTM implementation. |
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 |
Like TCP, DTLS over UDP uses the four-tuple <source IP, destination |
| 1196 |
IP, source port, destination port> for identifying the connection |
| 1197 |
(and relevant DTLS connection state). This means that when |
| 1198 |
establishing a new session, implementations MUST use a different UDP |
| 1199 |
source port number for each active connection to a remote destination |
| 1200 |
IP-address/port-number combination to ensure the remote entity can |
| 1201 |
disambiguate between multiple connections. |
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
If demultiplexing received UDP datagrams to DTLS connection state is |
| 1204 |
done by the TLSTM implementation (instead of the DTLS |
| 1205 |
implementation), the steps below describe one possible method to |
| 1206 |
accomplish this. |
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
The important output results from the steps in this process are the |
| 1209 |
remote transport address, incomingMessage, incomingMessageLength, and |
| 1210 |
the tlstmSessionID. |
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
1) The TLS Transport Model examines the raw UDP message, in an |
| 1213 |
implementation-dependent manner. |
| 1214 |
|
| 1215 |
2) The TLS Transport Model queries the Local Configuration Datastore |
| 1216 |
(LCD) (see <a href="./rfc3411#section-3.4.2">[RFC3411], Section 3.4.2</a>) using the transport |
| 1217 |
parameters (source and destination IP addresses and ports) to |
| 1218 |
determine if a session already exists. |
| 1219 |
|
| 1220 |
2a) If a matching entry in the LCD does not exist, then the UDP |
| 1221 |
packet is passed to the DTLS implementation for processing. |
| 1222 |
If the DTLS implementation decides to continue with the |
| 1223 |
connection and allocate state for it, it returns a new DTLS |
| 1224 |
connection handle (an implementation dependent detail). In |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
this case, TLSTM selects a new tlstmSessionId, and caches |
| 1234 |
this and the DTLS connection handle as a new entry in the |
| 1235 |
LCD (indexed by the transport parameters). If the DTLS |
| 1236 |
implementation returns an error or does not allocate |
| 1237 |
connection state (which can happen with the stateless cookie |
| 1238 |
exchange), processing stops. |
| 1239 |
|
| 1240 |
2b) If a session does exist in the LCD, then its DTLS connection |
| 1241 |
handle (an implementation dependent detail) and its |
| 1242 |
tlstmSessionId is extracted from the LCD. The UDP packet |
| 1243 |
and the connection handle are passed to the DTLS |
| 1244 |
implementation. If the DTLS implementation returns success |
| 1245 |
but does not return an incomingMessage and an |
| 1246 |
incomingMessageLength, then processing stops (this is the |
| 1247 |
case when the UDP datagram contained DTLS handshake |
| 1248 |
messages, for example). If the DTLS implementation returns |
| 1249 |
an error, then processing stops. |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
3) Retrieve the incomingMessage and an incomingMessageLength from |
| 1252 |
DTLS. These results and the tlstmSessionID are used below in |
| 1253 |
<a href="#section-5.1.2">Section 5.1.2</a> to complete the processing of the incoming message. |
| 1254 |
|
| 1255 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2" href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a>. Transport Processing for Incoming SNMP Messages</span> |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
The procedures in this section describe how the TLS Transport Model |
| 1258 |
should process messages that have already been properly extracted |
| 1259 |
from the (D)TLS stream. Note that care must be taken when processing |
| 1260 |
messages originating from either TLS or DTLS to ensure they're |
| 1261 |
complete and single. For example, multiple SNMP messages can be |
| 1262 |
passed through a single DTLS message and partial SNMP messages may be |
| 1263 |
received from a TLS stream. These steps describe the processing of a |
| 1264 |
singular SNMP message after it has been delivered from the (D)TLS |
| 1265 |
stream. |
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 |
1) Determine the tlstmSessionID for the incoming message. The |
| 1268 |
tlstmSessionID MUST be a unique session identifier for this |
| 1269 |
(D)TLS connection. The contents and format of this identifier |
| 1270 |
are implementation dependent as long as it is unique to the |
| 1271 |
session. A session identifier MUST NOT be reused until all |
| 1272 |
references to it are no longer in use. The tmSessionID is equal |
| 1273 |
to the tlstmSessionID discussed in <a href="#section-5.1.1">Section 5.1.1</a>. tmSessionID |
| 1274 |
refers to the session identifier when stored in the |
| 1275 |
tmStateReference and tlstmSessionID refers to the session |
| 1276 |
identifier when stored in the LCD. They MUST always be equal |
| 1277 |
when processing a given session's traffic. |
| 1278 |
|
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
If this is the first message received through this session, and |
| 1290 |
the session does not have an assigned tlstmSessionID yet, then |
| 1291 |
the snmpTlstmSessionAccepts counter is incremented and a |
| 1292 |
tlstmSessionID for the session is created. This will only happen |
| 1293 |
on the server side of a connection because a client would have |
| 1294 |
already assigned a tlstmSessionID during the openSession() |
| 1295 |
invocation. Implementations may have performed the procedures |
| 1296 |
described in <a href="#section-5.3.2">Section 5.3.2</a> prior to this point or they may |
| 1297 |
perform them now, but the procedures described in <a href="#section-5.3.2">Section 5.3.2</a> |
| 1298 |
MUST be performed before continuing beyond this point. |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
2) Create a tmStateReference cache for the subsequent reference and |
| 1301 |
assign the following values within it: |
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 |
tmTransportDomain = snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain as |
| 1304 |
appropriate. |
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
tmTransportAddress = The address from which the message |
| 1307 |
originated. |
| 1308 |
|
| 1309 |
tmSecurityLevel = The derived tmSecurityLevel for the session, |
| 1310 |
as discussed in Sections <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a> and <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. |
| 1311 |
|
| 1312 |
tmSecurityName = The derived tmSecurityName for the session as |
| 1313 |
discussed in <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>. This value MUST be constant during |
| 1314 |
the lifetime of the session. |
| 1315 |
|
| 1316 |
tmSessionID = The tlstmSessionID described in step 1 above. |
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 |
3) The incomingMessage and incomingMessageLength are assigned values |
| 1319 |
from the (D)TLS processing. |
| 1320 |
|
| 1321 |
4) The TLS Transport Model passes the transportDomain, |
| 1322 |
transportAddress, incomingMessage, and incomingMessageLength to |
| 1323 |
the Dispatcher using the receiveMessage ASI: |
| 1324 |
|
| 1325 |
statusInformation = |
| 1326 |
receiveMessage( |
| 1327 |
IN transportDomain -- snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain, |
| 1328 |
IN transportAddress -- address for the received message |
| 1329 |
IN incomingMessage -- the whole SNMP message from (D)TLS |
| 1330 |
IN incomingMessageLength -- the length of the SNMP message |
| 1331 |
IN tmStateReference -- transport info |
| 1332 |
) |
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Procedures for an Outgoing SNMP Message</span> |
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 |
The Dispatcher sends a message to the TLS Transport Model using the |
| 1348 |
following ASI: |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
statusInformation = |
| 1351 |
sendMessage( |
| 1352 |
IN destTransportDomain -- transport domain to be used |
| 1353 |
IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used |
| 1354 |
IN outgoingMessage -- the message to send |
| 1355 |
IN outgoingMessageLength -- its length |
| 1356 |
IN tmStateReference -- transport info |
| 1357 |
) |
| 1358 |
|
| 1359 |
This section describes the procedure followed by the TLS Transport |
| 1360 |
Model whenever it is requested through this ASI to send a message. |
| 1361 |
|
| 1362 |
1) If tmStateReference does not refer to a cache containing values |
| 1363 |
for tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName, |
| 1364 |
tmRequestedSecurityLevel, and tmSameSecurity, then increment the |
| 1365 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches counter, discard the message, and |
| 1366 |
return the error indication in the statusInformation. Processing |
| 1367 |
of this message stops. |
| 1368 |
|
| 1369 |
2) Extract the tmSessionID, tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress, |
| 1370 |
tmSecurityName, tmRequestedSecurityLevel, and tmSameSecurity |
| 1371 |
values from the tmStateReference. Note: the tmSessionID value |
| 1372 |
may be undefined if no session exists yet over which the message |
| 1373 |
can be sent. |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
3) If tmSameSecurity is true and tmSessionID is either undefined or |
| 1376 |
refers to a session that is no longer open, then increment the |
| 1377 |
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions counter, discard the message, and |
| 1378 |
return the error indication in the statusInformation. Processing |
| 1379 |
of this message stops. |
| 1380 |
|
| 1381 |
4) If tmSameSecurity is false and tmSessionID refers to a session |
| 1382 |
that is no longer available, then an implementation SHOULD open a |
| 1383 |
new session, using the openSession() ASI (described in greater |
| 1384 |
detail in step 5b). Instead of opening a new session an |
| 1385 |
implementation MAY return an snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions error to |
| 1386 |
the calling module and stop the processing of the message. |
| 1387 |
|
| 1388 |
5) If tmSessionID is undefined, then use tmTransportDomain, |
| 1389 |
tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName, and tmRequestedSecurityLevel |
| 1390 |
to see if there is a corresponding entry in the LCD suitable to |
| 1391 |
send the message over. |
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
5a) If there is a corresponding LCD entry, then this session |
| 1402 |
will be used to send the message. |
| 1403 |
|
| 1404 |
5b) If there is no corresponding LCD entry, then open a session |
| 1405 |
using the openSession() ASI (discussed further in |
| 1406 |
<a href="#section-5.3.1">Section 5.3.1</a>). Implementations MAY wish to offer message |
| 1407 |
buffering to prevent redundant openSession() calls for the |
| 1408 |
same cache entry. If an error is returned from |
| 1409 |
openSession(), then discard the message, discard the |
| 1410 |
tmStateReference, increment the snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors, |
| 1411 |
return an error indication to the calling module, and stop |
| 1412 |
the processing of the message. |
| 1413 |
|
| 1414 |
6) Using either the session indicated by the tmSessionID (if there |
| 1415 |
was one) or the session resulting from a previous step (4 or 5), |
| 1416 |
pass the outgoingMessage to (D)TLS for encapsulation and |
| 1417 |
transmission. |
| 1418 |
|
| 1419 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Establishing or Accepting a Session</span> |
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
Establishing a (D)TLS connection as either a client or a server |
| 1422 |
requires slightly different processing. The following two sections |
| 1423 |
describe the necessary processing steps. |
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.1" href="#section-5.3.1">5.3.1</a>. Establishing a Session as a Client</span> |
| 1426 |
|
| 1427 |
The TLS Transport Model provides the following primitive for use by a |
| 1428 |
client to establish a new (D)TLS connection: |
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
statusInformation = -- errorIndication or success |
| 1431 |
openSession( |
| 1432 |
IN tmStateReference -- transport information to be used |
| 1433 |
OUT tmStateReference -- transport information to be used |
| 1434 |
IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity |
| 1435 |
) |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
The following describes the procedure to follow when establishing an |
| 1438 |
SNMP over a (D)TLS connection between SNMP engines for exchanging |
| 1439 |
SNMP messages. This process is followed by any SNMP client's engine |
| 1440 |
when establishing a session for subsequent use. |
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
This procedure MAY be done automatically for an SNMP application that |
| 1443 |
initiates a transaction, such as a command generator, a notification |
| 1444 |
originator, or a proxy forwarder. |
| 1445 |
|
| 1446 |
1) The snmpTlstmSessionOpens counter is incremented. |
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
2) The client selects the appropriate certificate and cipher_suites |
| 1458 |
for the key agreement based on the tmSecurityName and the |
| 1459 |
tmRequestedSecurityLevel for the session. For sessions being |
| 1460 |
established as a result of an SNMP-TARGET-MIB based operation, |
| 1461 |
the certificate will potentially have been identified via the |
| 1462 |
snmpTlstmParamsTable mapping and the cipher_suites will have to |
| 1463 |
be taken from a system-wide or implementation-specific |
| 1464 |
configuration. If no row in the snmpTlstmParamsTable exists, |
| 1465 |
then implementations MAY choose to establish the connection using |
| 1466 |
a default client certificate available to the application. |
| 1467 |
Otherwise, the certificate and appropriate cipher_suites will |
| 1468 |
need to be passed to the openSession() ASI as supplemental |
| 1469 |
information or configured through an implementation-dependent |
| 1470 |
mechanism. It is also implementation-dependent and possibly |
| 1471 |
policy-dependent how tmRequestedSecurityLevel will be used to |
| 1472 |
influence the security capabilities provided by the (D)TLS |
| 1473 |
connection. However this is done, the security capabilities |
| 1474 |
provided by (D)TLS MUST be at least as high as the level of |
| 1475 |
security indicated by the tmRequestedSecurityLevel parameter. |
| 1476 |
The actual security level of the session is reported in the |
| 1477 |
tmStateReference cache as tmSecurityLevel. For (D)TLS to provide |
| 1478 |
strong authentication, each principal acting as a command |
| 1479 |
generator SHOULD have its own certificate. |
| 1480 |
|
| 1481 |
3) Using the destTransportDomain and destTransportAddress values, |
| 1482 |
the client will initiate the (D)TLS handshake protocol to |
| 1483 |
establish session keys for message integrity and encryption. |
| 1484 |
|
| 1485 |
If the attempt to establish a session is unsuccessful, then |
| 1486 |
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors is incremented, an error indication is |
| 1487 |
returned, and processing stops. If the session failed to open |
| 1488 |
because the presented server certificate was unknown or invalid, |
| 1489 |
then the snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate or |
| 1490 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates MUST be incremented and |
| 1491 |
an snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown or |
| 1492 |
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate notification SHOULD be sent as |
| 1493 |
appropriate. Reasons for server certificate invalidation |
| 1494 |
include, but are not limited to, cryptographic validation |
| 1495 |
failures and an unexpected presented certificate identity. |
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 |
4) The (D)TLS client MUST then verify that the (D)TLS server's |
| 1498 |
presented certificate is the expected certificate. The (D)TLS |
| 1499 |
client MUST NOT transmit SNMP messages until the server |
| 1500 |
certificate has been authenticated, the client certificate has |
| 1501 |
been transmitted, and the TLS connection has been fully |
| 1502 |
established. |
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
If the connection is being established from a configuration based |
| 1514 |
on SNMP-TARGET-MIB configuration, then the snmpTlstmAddrTable |
| 1515 |
DESCRIPTION clause describes how the verification is done (using |
| 1516 |
either a certificate fingerprint, or an identity authenticated |
| 1517 |
via certification path validation). |
| 1518 |
|
| 1519 |
If the connection is being established for reasons other than |
| 1520 |
configuration found in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB, then configuration |
| 1521 |
and procedures outside the scope of this document should be |
| 1522 |
followed. Configuration mechanisms SHOULD be similar in nature |
| 1523 |
to those defined in the snmpTlstmAddrTable to ensure consistency |
| 1524 |
across management configuration systems. For example, a command- |
| 1525 |
line tool for generating SNMP GETs might support specifying |
| 1526 |
either the server's certificate fingerprint or the expected host |
| 1527 |
name as a command-line argument. |
| 1528 |
|
| 1529 |
5) (D)TLS provides assurance that the authenticated identity has |
| 1530 |
been signed by a trusted configured Certification Authority. If |
| 1531 |
verification of the server's certificate fails in any way (for |
| 1532 |
example, because of failures in cryptographic verification or the |
| 1533 |
presented identity did not match the expected named entity), then |
| 1534 |
the session establishment MUST fail, and the |
| 1535 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates object is incremented. |
| 1536 |
If the session cannot be opened for any reason at all, including |
| 1537 |
cryptographic verification failures and snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable |
| 1538 |
lookup failures, then the snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors counter is |
| 1539 |
incremented and processing stops. |
| 1540 |
|
| 1541 |
6) The TLSTM-specific session identifier (tlstmSessionID) is set in |
| 1542 |
the tmSessionID of the tmStateReference passed to the TLS |
| 1543 |
Transport Model to indicate that the session has been established |
| 1544 |
successfully and to point to a specific (D)TLS connection for |
| 1545 |
future use. The tlstmSessionID is also stored in the LCD for |
| 1546 |
later lookup during processing of incoming messages |
| 1547 |
(<a href="#section-5.1.2">Section 5.1.2</a>). |
| 1548 |
|
| 1549 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.2" href="#section-5.3.2">5.3.2</a>. Accepting a Session as a Server</span> |
| 1550 |
|
| 1551 |
A (D)TLS server should accept new session connections from any client |
| 1552 |
for which it is able to verify the client's credentials. This is |
| 1553 |
done by authenticating the client's presented certificate through a |
| 1554 |
certificate path validation process (e.g., [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>]) or through |
| 1555 |
certificate fingerprint verification using fingerprints configured in |
| 1556 |
the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable. Afterward, the server will determine |
| 1557 |
the identity of the remote entity using the following procedures. |
| 1558 |
|
| 1559 |
|
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 28]</span></pre> |
| 1565 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span> |
| 1566 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
The (D)TLS server identifies the authenticated identity from the |
| 1570 |
(D)TLS client's principal certificate using configuration information |
| 1571 |
from the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable mapping table. The (D)TLS server |
| 1572 |
MUST request and expect a certificate from the client and MUST NOT |
| 1573 |
accept SNMP messages over the (D)TLS connection until the client has |
| 1574 |
sent a certificate and it has been authenticated. The resulting |
| 1575 |
derived tmSecurityName is recorded in the tmStateReference cache as |
| 1576 |
tmSecurityName. The details of the lookup process are fully |
| 1577 |
described in the DESCRIPTION clause of the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable |
| 1578 |
MIB object. If any verification fails in any way (for example, |
| 1579 |
because of failures in cryptographic verification or because of the |
| 1580 |
lack of an appropriate row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable), then the |
| 1581 |
session establishment MUST fail, and the |
| 1582 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates object is incremented. If |
| 1583 |
the session cannot be opened for any reason at all, including |
| 1584 |
cryptographic verification failures, then the |
| 1585 |
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors counter is incremented and processing |
| 1586 |
stops. |
| 1587 |
|
| 1588 |
Servers that wish to support multiple principals at a particular port |
| 1589 |
SHOULD make use of a (D)TLS extension that allows server-side |
| 1590 |
principal selection like the Server Name Indication extension defined |
| 1591 |
in <a href="./rfc4366#section-3.1">Section 3.1 of [RFC4366]</a>. Supporting this will allow, for |
| 1592 |
example, sending notifications to a specific principal at a given TCP |
| 1593 |
or UDP port. |
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Closing a Session</span> |
| 1596 |
|
| 1597 |
The TLS Transport Model provides the following primitive to close a |
| 1598 |
session: |
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
statusInformation = |
| 1601 |
closeSession( |
| 1602 |
IN tmSessionID -- session ID of the session to be closed |
| 1603 |
) |
| 1604 |
|
| 1605 |
The following describes the procedure to follow to close a session |
| 1606 |
between a client and server. This process is followed by any SNMP |
| 1607 |
engine closing the corresponding SNMP session. |
| 1608 |
|
| 1609 |
1) Increment either the snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses or the |
| 1610 |
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses counter as appropriate. |
| 1611 |
|
| 1612 |
2) Look up the session using the tmSessionID. |
| 1613 |
|
| 1614 |
3) If there is no open session associated with the tmSessionID, then |
| 1615 |
closeSession processing is completed. |
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 29]</span></pre> |
| 1621 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span> |
| 1622 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1623 |
|
| 1624 |
|
| 1625 |
4) Have (D)TLS close the specified connection. This MUST include |
| 1626 |
sending a close_notify TLS Alert to inform the other side that |
| 1627 |
session cleanup may be performed. |
| 1628 |
|
| 1629 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. MIB Module Overview</span> |
| 1630 |
|
| 1631 |
This MIB module provides management of the TLS Transport Model. It |
| 1632 |
defines needed textual conventions, statistical counters, |
| 1633 |
notifications, and configuration infrastructure necessary for session |
| 1634 |
establishment. Example usage of the configuration tables can be |
| 1635 |
found in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. |
| 1636 |
|
| 1637 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Structure of the MIB Module</span> |
| 1638 |
|
| 1639 |
Objects in this MIB module are arranged into subtrees. Each subtree |
| 1640 |
is organized as a set of related objects. The overall structure and |
| 1641 |
assignment of objects to their subtrees, and the intended purpose of |
| 1642 |
each subtree, is shown below. |
| 1643 |
|
| 1644 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Textual Conventions</span> |
| 1645 |
|
| 1646 |
Generic and Common Textual Conventions used in this module can be |
| 1647 |
found summarized at <a href="http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-common-tcs.html">http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-common-tcs.html</a>. |
| 1648 |
|
| 1649 |
This module defines the following new Textual Conventions: |
| 1650 |
|
| 1651 |
o A new TransportAddress format for describing (D)TLS connection |
| 1652 |
addressing requirements. |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
o A certificate fingerprint allowing MIB module objects to |
| 1655 |
generically refer to a stored X.509 certificate using a |
| 1656 |
cryptographic hash as a reference pointer. |
| 1657 |
|
| 1658 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Statistical Counters</span> |
| 1659 |
|
| 1660 |
The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defines counters that provide network management |
| 1661 |
stations with information about session usage and potential errors |
| 1662 |
that a device may be experiencing. |
| 1663 |
|
| 1664 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Configuration Tables</span> |
| 1665 |
|
| 1666 |
The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defines configuration tables that an |
| 1667 |
administrator can use for configuring a device for sending and |
| 1668 |
receiving SNMP messages over (D)TLS. In particular, there are MIB |
| 1669 |
tables that extend the SNMP-TARGET-MIB for configuring (D)TLS |
| 1670 |
certificate usage and a MIB table for mapping incoming (D)TLS client |
| 1671 |
certificates to SNMPv3 tmSecurityNames. |
| 1672 |
|
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 30]</span></pre> |
| 1677 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span> |
| 1678 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1679 |
|
| 1680 |
|
| 1681 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4.1" href="#section-6.4.1">6.4.1</a>. Notifications</span> |
| 1682 |
|
| 1683 |
The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defines notifications to alert management |
| 1684 |
stations when a (D)TLS connection fails because a server's presented |
| 1685 |
certificate did not meet an expected value |
| 1686 |
(snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown) or because cryptographic |
| 1687 |
validation failed (snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate). |
| 1688 |
|
| 1689 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. Relationship to Other MIB Modules</span> |
| 1690 |
|
| 1691 |
Some management objects defined in other MIB modules are applicable |
| 1692 |
to an entity implementing the TLS Transport Model. In particular, it |
| 1693 |
is assumed that an entity implementing the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB will |
| 1694 |
implement the SNMPv2-MIB [<a href="./rfc3418" title=""Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC3418</a>], the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>], |
| 1695 |
the SNMP-TARGET-MIB [<a href="./rfc3413" title=""Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications"">RFC3413</a>], the SNMP-NOTIFICATION-MIB [<a href="./rfc3413" title=""Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications"">RFC3413</a>], |
| 1696 |
and the SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB [<a href="./rfc3415" title=""View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC3415</a>]. |
| 1697 |
|
| 1698 |
The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB module contained in this document is for managing |
| 1699 |
TLS Transport Model information. |
| 1700 |
|
| 1701 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5.1" href="#section-6.5.1">6.5.1</a>. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS</span> |
| 1702 |
|
| 1703 |
The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB module imports items from SNMPv2-SMI [<a href="./rfc2578" title=""Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)"">RFC2578</a>], |
| 1704 |
SNMPv2-TC [<a href="./rfc2579" title=""Textual Conventions for SMIv2"">RFC2579</a>], SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [<a href="./rfc3411" title=""An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks"">RFC3411</a>], SNMP-TARGET-MIB |
| 1705 |
[<a href="./rfc3413" title=""Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications"">RFC3413</a>], and SNMPv2-CONF [<a href="./rfc2580" title=""Conformance Statements for SMIv2"">RFC2580</a>]. |
| 1706 |
|
| 1707 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. MIB Module Definition</span> |
| 1708 |
|
| 1709 |
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN |
| 1710 |
|
| 1711 |
IMPORTS |
| 1712 |
MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE, |
| 1713 |
OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains, |
| 1714 |
Counter32, Unsigned32, Gauge32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE |
| 1715 |
FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- <a href="./rfc2578">RFC 2578</a> or any update thereof |
| 1716 |
TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TimeStamp, RowStatus, StorageType, |
| 1717 |
AutonomousType |
| 1718 |
FROM SNMPv2-TC -- <a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a> or any update thereof |
| 1719 |
MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP |
| 1720 |
FROM SNMPv2-CONF -- <a href="./rfc2580">RFC 2580</a> or any update thereof |
| 1721 |
SnmpAdminString |
| 1722 |
FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB -- <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> or any update thereof |
| 1723 |
snmpTargetParamsName, snmpTargetAddrName |
| 1724 |
FROM SNMP-TARGET-MIB -- <a href="./rfc3413">RFC 3413</a> or any update thereof |
| 1725 |
; |
| 1726 |
|
| 1727 |
snmpTlstmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY |
| 1728 |
LAST-UPDATED "201107190000Z" |
| 1729 |
|
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 31]</span></pre> |
| 1733 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span> |
| 1734 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
ORGANIZATION "ISMS Working Group" |
| 1738 |
CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: [email protected] |
| 1739 |
Subscribe: [email protected] |
| 1740 |
|
| 1741 |
Chairs: |
| 1742 |
Juergen Schoenwaelder |
| 1743 |
Jacobs University Bremen |
| 1744 |
Campus Ring 1 |
| 1745 |
28725 Bremen |
| 1746 |
Germany |
| 1747 |
+49 421 200-3587 |
| 1748 |
[email protected] |
| 1749 |
|
| 1750 |
Russ Mundy |
| 1751 |
SPARTA, Inc. |
| 1752 |
7110 Samuel Morse Drive |
| 1753 |
Columbia, MD 21046 |
| 1754 |
USA |
| 1755 |
|
| 1756 |
Editor: |
| 1757 |
Wes Hardaker |
| 1758 |
SPARTA, Inc. |
| 1759 |
P.O. Box 382 |
| 1760 |
Davis, CA 95617 |
| 1761 |
USA |
| 1762 |
[email protected] |
| 1763 |
" |
| 1764 |
|
| 1765 |
DESCRIPTION " |
| 1766 |
The TLS Transport Model MIB |
| 1767 |
|
| 1768 |
Copyright (c) 2010-2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified |
| 1769 |
as authors of the code. All rights reserved. |
| 1770 |
|
| 1771 |
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or |
| 1772 |
without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject |
| 1773 |
to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License |
| 1774 |
set forth in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions |
| 1775 |
Relating to IETF Documents |
| 1776 |
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>)." |
| 1777 |
|
| 1778 |
REVISION "201107190000Z" |
| 1779 |
DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of |
| 1780 |
<a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a>; see the RFC itself for full legal |
| 1781 |
notices. The only change was to introduce |
| 1782 |
new wording to reflect require changes for |
| 1783 |
IDNA addresses in the SnmpTLSAddress TC." |
| 1784 |
|
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 32]</span></pre> |
| 1789 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span> |
| 1790 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 |
REVISION "201005070000Z" |
| 1794 |
DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of |
| 1795 |
<a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a>; see the RFC itself for full legal |
| 1796 |
notices." |
| 1797 |
|
| 1798 |
::= { mib-2 198 } |
| 1799 |
|
| 1800 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 1801 |
-- subtrees of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB |
| 1802 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 1803 |
|
| 1804 |
snmpTlstmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 0 } |
| 1805 |
snmpTlstmIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 1 } |
| 1806 |
snmpTlstmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 2 } |
| 1807 |
snmpTlstmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 3 } |
| 1808 |
|
| 1809 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 1810 |
-- snmpTlstmObjects - Objects |
| 1811 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 1812 |
|
| 1813 |
snmpTLSTCPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 1814 |
STATUS current |
| 1815 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 1816 |
"The SNMP over TLS via TCP transport domain. The |
| 1817 |
corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress. |
| 1818 |
|
| 1819 |
The securityName prefix to be associated with the |
| 1820 |
snmpTLSTCPDomain is 'tls'. This prefix may be used by |
| 1821 |
security models or other components to identify which secure |
| 1822 |
transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName." |
| 1823 |
REFERENCE |
| 1824 |
"<a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a>: Textual Conventions for SMIv2" |
| 1825 |
::= { snmpDomains 8 } |
| 1826 |
|
| 1827 |
snmpDTLSUDPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 1828 |
STATUS current |
| 1829 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 1830 |
"The SNMP over DTLS via UDP transport domain. The |
| 1831 |
corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress. |
| 1832 |
|
| 1833 |
The securityName prefix to be associated with the |
| 1834 |
snmpDTLSUDPDomain is 'dtls'. This prefix may be used by |
| 1835 |
security models or other components to identify which secure |
| 1836 |
transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName." |
| 1837 |
REFERENCE |
| 1838 |
"<a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a>: Textual Conventions for SMIv2" |
| 1839 |
::= { snmpDomains 9 } |
| 1840 |
|
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 33]</span></pre> |
| 1845 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span> |
| 1846 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
SnmpTLSAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION |
| 1850 |
DISPLAY-HINT "1a" |
| 1851 |
STATUS current |
| 1852 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 1853 |
"Represents an IPv4 address, an IPv6 address, or a |
| 1854 |
US-ASCII-encoded hostname and port number. |
| 1855 |
|
| 1856 |
An IPv4 address must be in dotted decimal format followed by a |
| 1857 |
colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number |
| 1858 |
in US-ASCII. |
| 1859 |
|
| 1860 |
An IPv6 address must be a colon-separated format (as described |
| 1861 |
in <a href="./rfc5952">RFC 5952</a>), surrounded by square brackets ('[', US-ASCII |
| 1862 |
character 0x5B, and ']', US-ASCII character 0x5D), followed by |
| 1863 |
a colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number |
| 1864 |
in US-ASCII. |
| 1865 |
|
| 1866 |
A hostname is always in US-ASCII (as per <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>); |
| 1867 |
internationalized hostnames are encoded as A-labels as specified |
| 1868 |
in <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>. The hostname is followed by a |
| 1869 |
colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number |
| 1870 |
in US-ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully qualified whenever |
| 1871 |
possible. |
| 1872 |
|
| 1873 |
Values of this textual convention may not be directly usable |
| 1874 |
as transport-layer addressing information, and may require |
| 1875 |
run-time resolution. As such, applications that write them |
| 1876 |
must be prepared for handling errors if such values are not |
| 1877 |
supported, or cannot be resolved (if resolution occurs at the |
| 1878 |
time of the management operation). |
| 1879 |
|
| 1880 |
The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that may |
| 1881 |
have SnmpTLSAddress values must fully describe how (and |
| 1882 |
when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses and vice |
| 1883 |
versa. |
| 1884 |
|
| 1885 |
This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in object |
| 1886 |
definitions since it restricts addresses to a specific |
| 1887 |
format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used either on its |
| 1888 |
own or in conjunction with TransportAddressType or |
| 1889 |
TransportDomain as a pair. |
| 1890 |
|
| 1891 |
When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an index |
| 1892 |
object, there may be issues with the limit of 128 |
| 1893 |
sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2 (STD 58). It is RECOMMENDED |
| 1894 |
that all MIB documents using this textual convention make |
| 1895 |
explicit any limitations on index component lengths that |
| 1896 |
management software must observe. This may be done either by |
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 34]</span></pre> |
| 1901 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span> |
| 1902 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
including SIZE constraints on the index components or by |
| 1906 |
specifying applicable constraints in the conceptual row |
| 1907 |
DESCRIPTION clause or in the surrounding documentation." |
| 1908 |
REFERENCE |
| 1909 |
"<a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and |
| 1910 |
Support |
| 1911 |
<a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): |
| 1912 |
Definitions and Document Framework |
| 1913 |
<a href="./rfc5952">RFC 5952</a>: A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text Representation |
| 1914 |
" |
| 1915 |
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255)) |
| 1916 |
|
| 1917 |
SnmpTLSFingerprint ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION |
| 1918 |
DISPLAY-HINT "1x:1x" |
| 1919 |
STATUS current |
| 1920 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 1921 |
"A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference |
| 1922 |
other data of potentially arbitrary length. |
| 1923 |
|
| 1924 |
An SnmpTLSFingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet hashing |
| 1925 |
algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint value. The |
| 1926 |
octet value encoded is taken from the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm |
| 1927 |
Registry (<a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>). The remaining octets are filled using the |
| 1928 |
results of the hashing algorithm. |
| 1929 |
|
| 1930 |
This TEXTUAL-CONVENTION allows for a zero-length (blank) |
| 1931 |
SnmpTLSFingerprint value for use in tables where the |
| 1932 |
fingerprint value may be optional. MIB definitions or |
| 1933 |
implementations may refuse to accept a zero-length value as |
| 1934 |
appropriate." |
| 1935 |
REFERENCE "<a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>: The Transport Layer |
| 1936 |
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2 |
| 1937 |
<a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/">http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/</a> |
| 1938 |
" |
| 1939 |
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255)) |
| 1940 |
|
| 1941 |
-- Identities for use in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable |
| 1942 |
|
| 1943 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER |
| 1944 |
::= { snmpTlstmIdentities 1 } |
| 1945 |
|
| 1946 |
snmpTlstmCertSpecified OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 1947 |
STATUS current |
| 1948 |
DESCRIPTION "Directly specifies the tmSecurityName to be used for |
| 1949 |
this certificate. The value of the tmSecurityName |
| 1950 |
to use is specified in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData |
| 1951 |
column. The snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column must |
| 1952 |
contain a non-zero length SnmpAdminString compliant |
| 1953 |
|
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
|
| 1956 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 35]</span></pre> |
| 1957 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span> |
| 1958 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
value or the mapping described in this row must be |
| 1962 |
considered a failure." |
| 1963 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 1 } |
| 1964 |
|
| 1965 |
snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 1966 |
STATUS current |
| 1967 |
DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a |
| 1968 |
tmSecurityName. The local part of the rfc822Name is |
| 1969 |
passed unaltered but the host-part of the name must |
| 1970 |
be passed in lowercase. This mapping results in a |
| 1971 |
1:1 correspondence between equivalent subjectAltName |
| 1972 |
rfc822Name values and tmSecurityName values except |
| 1973 |
that the host-part of the name MUST be passed in |
| 1974 |
lowercase. |
| 1975 |
|
| 1976 |
Example rfc822Name Field: [email protected] |
| 1977 |
is mapped to tmSecurityName: [email protected]." |
| 1978 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 2 } |
| 1979 |
|
| 1980 |
snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 1981 |
STATUS current |
| 1982 |
DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a |
| 1983 |
tmSecurityName after first converting it to all |
| 1984 |
lowercase (<a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a> does not specify converting to |
| 1985 |
lowercase so this involves an extra step). This |
| 1986 |
mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between |
| 1987 |
subjectAltName dNSName values and the tmSecurityName |
| 1988 |
values." |
| 1989 |
REFERENCE "<a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a> - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure |
| 1990 |
Certificate and Certificate Revocation |
| 1991 |
List (CRL) Profile." |
| 1992 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 3 } |
| 1993 |
|
| 1994 |
snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 1995 |
STATUS current |
| 1996 |
DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a |
| 1997 |
tmSecurityName by transforming the binary encoded |
| 1998 |
address as follows: |
| 1999 |
|
| 2000 |
1) for IPv4, the value is converted into a |
| 2001 |
decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1'). |
| 2002 |
|
| 2003 |
2) for IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a |
| 2004 |
32-character all lowercase hexadecimal string |
| 2005 |
without any colon separators. |
| 2006 |
|
| 2007 |
|
| 2008 |
|
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
|
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 36]</span></pre> |
| 2013 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span> |
| 2014 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
|
| 2017 |
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between |
| 2018 |
subjectAltName iPAddress values and the |
| 2019 |
tmSecurityName values. |
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 |
The resulting length of an encoded IPv6 address is |
| 2022 |
the maximum length supported by the View-Based |
| 2023 |
Access Control Model (VACM). Using both the |
| 2024 |
Transport Security Model's support for transport |
| 2025 |
prefixes (see the SNMP-TSM-MIB's |
| 2026 |
snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object for details) |
| 2027 |
will result in securityName lengths that exceed what |
| 2028 |
VACM can handle." |
| 2029 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 4 } |
| 2030 |
|
| 2031 |
snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 2032 |
STATUS current |
| 2033 |
DESCRIPTION "Maps any of the following fields using the |
| 2034 |
corresponding mapping algorithms: |
| 2035 |
|
| 2036 |
|------------+----------------------------| |
| 2037 |
| Type | Algorithm | |
| 2038 |
|------------+----------------------------| |
| 2039 |
| rfc822Name | snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name | |
| 2040 |
| dNSName | snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName | |
| 2041 |
| iPAddress | snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress | |
| 2042 |
|------------+----------------------------| |
| 2043 |
|
| 2044 |
The first matching subjectAltName value found in the |
| 2045 |
certificate of the above types MUST be used when |
| 2046 |
deriving the tmSecurityName. The mapping algorithm |
| 2047 |
specified in the 'Algorithm' column MUST be used to |
| 2048 |
derive the tmSecurityName. |
| 2049 |
|
| 2050 |
This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between |
| 2051 |
subjectAltName values and tmSecurityName values. The |
| 2052 |
three sub-mapping algorithms produced by this |
| 2053 |
combined algorithm cannot produce conflicting |
| 2054 |
results between themselves." |
| 2055 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 } |
| 2056 |
|
| 2057 |
snmpTlstmCertCommonName OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 2058 |
STATUS current |
| 2059 |
|
| 2060 |
DESCRIPTION "Maps a certificate's CommonName to a tmSecurityName |
| 2061 |
after converting it to a UTF-8 encoding. The usage |
| 2062 |
of CommonNames is deprecated and users are |
| 2063 |
encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods |
| 2064 |
instead. This mapping results in a 1:1 |
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 37]</span></pre> |
| 2069 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span> |
| 2070 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 |
correspondence between certificate CommonName values |
| 2074 |
and tmSecurityName values." |
| 2075 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 6 } |
| 2076 |
|
| 2077 |
-- The snmpTlstmSession Group |
| 2078 |
|
| 2079 |
snmpTlstmSession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 1 } |
| 2080 |
|
| 2081 |
snmpTlstmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2082 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2083 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2084 |
STATUS current |
| 2085 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2086 |
"The number of times an openSession() request has been executed |
| 2087 |
as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it succeeded or |
| 2088 |
failed." |
| 2089 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 1 } |
| 2090 |
|
| 2091 |
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2092 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2093 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2094 |
STATUS current |
| 2095 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2096 |
"The number of times a closeSession() request has been |
| 2097 |
executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it |
| 2098 |
succeeded or failed." |
| 2099 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 2 } |
| 2100 |
|
| 2101 |
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2102 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2103 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2104 |
STATUS current |
| 2105 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2106 |
"The number of times an openSession() request failed to open a |
| 2107 |
session as a (D)TLS client, for any reason." |
| 2108 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 3 } |
| 2109 |
|
| 2110 |
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2111 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2112 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2113 |
STATUS current |
| 2114 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2115 |
"The number of times a (D)TLS server has accepted a new |
| 2116 |
connection from a client and has received at least one SNMP |
| 2117 |
message through it." |
| 2118 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 4 } |
| 2119 |
|
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 |
|
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 38]</span></pre> |
| 2125 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span> |
| 2126 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2127 |
|
| 2128 |
|
| 2129 |
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2130 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2131 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2132 |
STATUS current |
| 2133 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2134 |
"The number of times a closeSession() request has been |
| 2135 |
executed as a (D)TLS server, regardless of whether it |
| 2136 |
succeeded or failed." |
| 2137 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 5 } |
| 2138 |
|
| 2139 |
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2140 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2141 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2142 |
STATUS current |
| 2143 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2144 |
"The number of times an outgoing message was dropped because |
| 2145 |
the session associated with the passed tmStateReference was no |
| 2146 |
longer (or was never) available." |
| 2147 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 6 } |
| 2148 |
|
| 2149 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2150 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2151 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2152 |
STATUS current |
| 2153 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2154 |
"The number of times an incoming session was not established |
| 2155 |
on a (D)TLS server because the presented client certificate |
| 2156 |
was invalid. Reasons for invalidation include, but are not |
| 2157 |
limited to, cryptographic validation failures or lack of a |
| 2158 |
suitable mapping row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable." |
| 2159 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 7 } |
| 2160 |
|
| 2161 |
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2162 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2163 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2164 |
STATUS current |
| 2165 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2166 |
"The number of times an outgoing session was not established |
| 2167 |
on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented |
| 2168 |
by an SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no |
| 2169 |
configured fingerprint or Certification Authority (CA) was |
| 2170 |
acceptable to validate it. |
| 2171 |
This may result because there was no entry in the |
| 2172 |
snmpTlstmAddrTable or because no path could be found to a |
| 2173 |
known CA." |
| 2174 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 8 } |
| 2175 |
|
| 2176 |
|
| 2177 |
|
| 2178 |
|
| 2179 |
|
| 2180 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 39]</span></pre> |
| 2181 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span> |
| 2182 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2183 |
|
| 2184 |
|
| 2185 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2186 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2187 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2188 |
STATUS current |
| 2189 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2190 |
"The number of times an outgoing session was not established |
| 2191 |
on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented |
| 2192 |
by an SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if |
| 2193 |
the fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That |
| 2194 |
is, a cryptographic validation error occurred during |
| 2195 |
certificate validation processing. |
| 2196 |
|
| 2197 |
Reasons for invalidation include, but are not |
| 2198 |
limited to, cryptographic validation failures." |
| 2199 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 9 } |
| 2200 |
|
| 2201 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2202 |
SYNTAX Counter32 |
| 2203 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2204 |
STATUS current |
| 2205 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2206 |
"The number of outgoing messages dropped because the |
| 2207 |
tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache." |
| 2208 |
::= { snmpTlstmSession 10 } |
| 2209 |
|
| 2210 |
-- Configuration Objects |
| 2211 |
|
| 2212 |
snmpTlstmConfig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 2 } |
| 2213 |
|
| 2214 |
-- Certificate mapping |
| 2215 |
|
| 2216 |
snmpTlstmCertificateMapping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConfig 1 } |
| 2217 |
|
| 2218 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2219 |
SYNTAX Gauge32 |
| 2220 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2221 |
STATUS current |
| 2222 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2223 |
"A count of the number of entries in the |
| 2224 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable." |
| 2225 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 1 } |
| 2226 |
|
| 2227 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2228 |
SYNTAX TimeStamp |
| 2229 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2230 |
STATUS current |
| 2231 |
|
| 2232 |
|
| 2233 |
|
| 2234 |
|
| 2235 |
|
| 2236 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 40]</span></pre> |
| 2237 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span> |
| 2238 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2239 |
|
| 2240 |
|
| 2241 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2242 |
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable was |
| 2243 |
last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been |
| 2244 |
modified since the command responder was started." |
| 2245 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 2 } |
| 2246 |
|
| 2247 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2248 |
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry |
| 2249 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2250 |
STATUS current |
| 2251 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2252 |
"This table is used by a (D)TLS server to map the (D)TLS |
| 2253 |
client's presented X.509 certificate to a tmSecurityName. |
| 2254 |
|
| 2255 |
On an incoming (D)TLS/SNMP connection, the client's presented |
| 2256 |
certificate must either be validated based on an established |
| 2257 |
trust anchor, or it must directly match a fingerprint in this |
| 2258 |
table. This table does not provide any mechanisms for |
| 2259 |
configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed |
| 2260 |
trusted certificates for path validation is expected to occur |
| 2261 |
through an out-of-band transfer. |
| 2262 |
|
| 2263 |
Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by path |
| 2264 |
validation or directly matching a fingerprint in this table), |
| 2265 |
this table is consulted to determine the appropriate |
| 2266 |
tmSecurityName to identify with the remote connection. This |
| 2267 |
is done by considering each active row from this table in |
| 2268 |
prioritized order according to its snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value. |
| 2269 |
Each row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value determines |
| 2270 |
whether the row is a match for the incoming connection: |
| 2271 |
|
| 2272 |
1) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value |
| 2273 |
identifies the presented certificate, then consider the |
| 2274 |
row as a successful match. |
| 2275 |
|
| 2276 |
2) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value |
| 2277 |
identifies a locally held copy of a trusted CA |
| 2278 |
certificate and that CA certificate was used to |
| 2279 |
validate the path to the presented certificate, then |
| 2280 |
consider the row as a successful match. |
| 2281 |
|
| 2282 |
Once a matching row has been found, the |
| 2283 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType value can be used to determine how |
| 2284 |
the tmSecurityName to associate with the session should be |
| 2285 |
determined. See the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column's |
| 2286 |
DESCRIPTION for details on determining the tmSecurityName |
| 2287 |
value. If it is impossible to determine a tmSecurityName from |
| 2288 |
the row's data combined with the data presented in the |
| 2289 |
|
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 |
|
| 2292 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 41]</span></pre> |
| 2293 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span> |
| 2294 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2295 |
|
| 2296 |
|
| 2297 |
certificate, then additional rows MUST be searched looking for |
| 2298 |
another potential match. If a resulting tmSecurityName mapped |
| 2299 |
from a given row is not compatible with the needed |
| 2300 |
requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a |
| 2301 |
32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived |
| 2302 |
securityName could be longer), then it must be considered an |
| 2303 |
invalid match and additional rows MUST be searched looking for |
| 2304 |
another potential match. |
| 2305 |
|
| 2306 |
If no matching and valid row can be found, the connection MUST |
| 2307 |
be closed and SNMP messages MUST NOT be accepted over it. |
| 2308 |
|
| 2309 |
Missing values of snmpTlstmCertToTSNID are acceptable and |
| 2310 |
implementations should continue to the next highest numbered |
| 2311 |
row. It is recommended that administrators skip index values |
| 2312 |
to leave room for the insertion of future rows (for example, |
| 2313 |
use values of 10 and 20 when creating initial rows). |
| 2314 |
|
| 2315 |
Users are encouraged to make use of certificates with |
| 2316 |
subjectAltName fields that can be used as tmSecurityNames so |
| 2317 |
that a single root CA certificate can allow all child |
| 2318 |
certificate's subjectAltName to map directly to a |
| 2319 |
tmSecurityName via a 1:1 transformation. However, this table |
| 2320 |
is flexible to allow for situations where existing deployed |
| 2321 |
certificate infrastructures do not provide adequate |
| 2322 |
subjectAltName values for use as tmSecurityNames. |
| 2323 |
Certificates may also be mapped to tmSecurityNames using the |
| 2324 |
CommonName portion of the Subject field. However, the usage |
| 2325 |
of the CommonName field is deprecated and thus this usage is |
| 2326 |
NOT RECOMMENDED. Direct mapping from each individual |
| 2327 |
certificate fingerprint to a tmSecurityName is also possible |
| 2328 |
but requires one entry in the table per tmSecurityName and |
| 2329 |
requires more management operations to completely configure a |
| 2330 |
device." |
| 2331 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 3 } |
| 2332 |
|
| 2333 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2334 |
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry |
| 2335 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2336 |
STATUS current |
| 2337 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2338 |
"A row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable that specifies a mapping |
| 2339 |
for an incoming (D)TLS certificate to a tmSecurityName to use |
| 2340 |
for a connection." |
| 2341 |
INDEX { snmpTlstmCertToTSNID } |
| 2342 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable 1 } |
| 2343 |
|
| 2344 |
|
| 2345 |
|
| 2346 |
|
| 2347 |
|
| 2348 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 42]</span></pre> |
| 2349 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-43" ></span> |
| 2350 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2351 |
|
| 2352 |
|
| 2353 |
SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 2354 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID Unsigned32, |
| 2355 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint, |
| 2356 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType AutonomousType, |
| 2357 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OCTET STRING, |
| 2358 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType StorageType, |
| 2359 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus RowStatus |
| 2360 |
} |
| 2361 |
|
| 2362 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2363 |
SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295) |
| 2364 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2365 |
STATUS current |
| 2366 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2367 |
"A unique, prioritized index for the given entry. Lower |
| 2368 |
numbers indicate a higher priority." |
| 2369 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 1 } |
| 2370 |
|
| 2371 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2372 |
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint (SIZE(1..255)) |
| 2373 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2374 |
STATUS current |
| 2375 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2376 |
"A cryptographic hash of an X.509 certificate. The results of |
| 2377 |
a successful matching fingerprint to either the trusted CA in |
| 2378 |
the certificate validation path or to the certificate itself |
| 2379 |
is dictated by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column." |
| 2380 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 2 } |
| 2381 |
|
| 2382 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2383 |
SYNTAX AutonomousType |
| 2384 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2385 |
STATUS current |
| 2386 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2387 |
"Specifies the mapping type for deriving a tmSecurityName from |
| 2388 |
a certificate. Details for mapping of a particular type SHALL |
| 2389 |
be specified in the DESCRIPTION clause of the OBJECT-IDENTITY |
| 2390 |
that describes the mapping. If a mapping succeeds it will |
| 2391 |
return a tmSecurityName for use by the TLSTM model and |
| 2392 |
processing stops. |
| 2393 |
|
| 2394 |
If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the |
| 2395 |
needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a |
| 2396 |
32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived |
| 2397 |
securityName could be longer), then future rows MUST be |
| 2398 |
searched for additional snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint matches |
| 2399 |
to look for a mapping that succeeds. |
| 2400 |
|
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
|
| 2403 |
|
| 2404 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 43]</span></pre> |
| 2405 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-44" ></span> |
| 2406 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2407 |
|
| 2408 |
|
| 2409 |
Suitable values for assigning to this object that are defined |
| 2410 |
within the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB can be found in the |
| 2411 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities portion of the MIB tree." |
| 2412 |
DEFVAL { snmpTlstmCertSpecified } |
| 2413 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 3 } |
| 2414 |
|
| 2415 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2416 |
SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024)) |
| 2417 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2418 |
STATUS current |
| 2419 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2420 |
"Auxiliary data used as optional configuration information for |
| 2421 |
a given mapping specified by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType |
| 2422 |
column. Only some mapping systems will make use of this |
| 2423 |
column. The value in this column MUST be ignored for any |
| 2424 |
mapping type that does not require data present in this |
| 2425 |
column." |
| 2426 |
DEFVAL { "" } |
| 2427 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 4 } |
| 2428 |
|
| 2429 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2430 |
SYNTAX StorageType |
| 2431 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2432 |
STATUS current |
| 2433 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2434 |
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows |
| 2435 |
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to |
| 2436 |
any columnar objects in the row." |
| 2437 |
DEFVAL { nonVolatile } |
| 2438 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 5 } |
| 2439 |
|
| 2440 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2441 |
SYNTAX RowStatus |
| 2442 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2443 |
STATUS current |
| 2444 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2445 |
"The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used |
| 2446 |
to create or remove rows from this table. |
| 2447 |
|
| 2448 |
To create a row in this table, an administrator must set this |
| 2449 |
object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5). |
| 2450 |
|
| 2451 |
Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately |
| 2452 |
configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the |
| 2453 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is notReady(3). |
| 2454 |
|
| 2455 |
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until |
| 2456 |
the corresponding snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint, |
| 2457 |
|
| 2458 |
|
| 2459 |
|
| 2460 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 44]</span></pre> |
| 2461 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-45" ></span> |
| 2462 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2463 |
|
| 2464 |
|
| 2465 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType, and snmpTlstmCertToTSNData columns |
| 2466 |
have been set. |
| 2467 |
|
| 2468 |
The following objects may not be modified while the |
| 2469 |
value of this object is active(1): |
| 2470 |
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint |
| 2471 |
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType |
| 2472 |
- snmpTlstmCertToTSNData |
| 2473 |
An attempt to set these objects while the value of |
| 2474 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in |
| 2475 |
an inconsistentValue error." |
| 2476 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 6 } |
| 2477 |
|
| 2478 |
-- Maps tmSecurityNames to certificates for use by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB |
| 2479 |
|
| 2480 |
snmpTlstmParamsCount OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2481 |
SYNTAX Gauge32 |
| 2482 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2483 |
STATUS current |
| 2484 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2485 |
"A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmParamsTable." |
| 2486 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 4 } |
| 2487 |
|
| 2488 |
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2489 |
SYNTAX TimeStamp |
| 2490 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2491 |
STATUS current |
| 2492 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2493 |
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmParamsTable |
| 2494 |
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been |
| 2495 |
modified since the command responder was started." |
| 2496 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 5 } |
| 2497 |
|
| 2498 |
snmpTlstmParamsTable OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2499 |
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmParamsEntry |
| 2500 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2501 |
STATUS current |
| 2502 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2503 |
"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS |
| 2504 |
connection is being set up using an entry in the |
| 2505 |
SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's |
| 2506 |
snmpTargetParamsTable with a fingerprint of a certificate to |
| 2507 |
use when establishing such a (D)TLS connection." |
| 2508 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 6 } |
| 2509 |
|
| 2510 |
snmpTlstmParamsEntry OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2511 |
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmParamsEntry |
| 2512 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2513 |
|
| 2514 |
|
| 2515 |
|
| 2516 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 45]</span></pre> |
| 2517 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-46" ></span> |
| 2518 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2519 |
|
| 2520 |
|
| 2521 |
STATUS current |
| 2522 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2523 |
"A conceptual row containing a fingerprint hash of a locally |
| 2524 |
held certificate for a given snmpTargetParamsEntry. The |
| 2525 |
values in this row should be ignored if the connection that |
| 2526 |
needs to be established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB |
| 2527 |
infrastructure, is not a certificate and (D)TLS based |
| 2528 |
connection. The connection SHOULD NOT be established if the |
| 2529 |
certificate fingerprint stored in this entry does not point to |
| 2530 |
a valid locally held certificate or if it points to an |
| 2531 |
unusable certificate (such as might happen when the |
| 2532 |
certificate's expiration date has been reached)." |
| 2533 |
INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetParamsName } |
| 2534 |
::= { snmpTlstmParamsTable 1 } |
| 2535 |
|
| 2536 |
SnmpTlstmParamsEntry ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 2537 |
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint, |
| 2538 |
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType StorageType, |
| 2539 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus RowStatus |
| 2540 |
} |
| 2541 |
|
| 2542 |
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2543 |
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint |
| 2544 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2545 |
STATUS current |
| 2546 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2547 |
"This object stores the hash of the public portion of a |
| 2548 |
locally held X.509 certificate. The X.509 certificate, its |
| 2549 |
public key, and the corresponding private key will be used |
| 2550 |
when initiating a (D)TLS connection as a (D)TLS client." |
| 2551 |
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 1 } |
| 2552 |
|
| 2553 |
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2554 |
SYNTAX StorageType |
| 2555 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2556 |
STATUS current |
| 2557 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2558 |
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows |
| 2559 |
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to |
| 2560 |
any columnar objects in the row." |
| 2561 |
DEFVAL { nonVolatile } |
| 2562 |
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 2 } |
| 2563 |
|
| 2564 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2565 |
SYNTAX RowStatus |
| 2566 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2567 |
STATUS current |
| 2568 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2569 |
|
| 2570 |
|
| 2571 |
|
| 2572 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 46]</span></pre> |
| 2573 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-47" ></span> |
| 2574 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2575 |
|
| 2576 |
|
| 2577 |
"The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used |
| 2578 |
to create or remove rows from this table. |
| 2579 |
|
| 2580 |
To create a row in this table, an administrator must set this |
| 2581 |
object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5). |
| 2582 |
|
| 2583 |
Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately |
| 2584 |
configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the |
| 2585 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is notReady(3). |
| 2586 |
|
| 2587 |
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until |
| 2588 |
the corresponding snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint column has |
| 2589 |
been set. |
| 2590 |
|
| 2591 |
The snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint object may not be modified |
| 2592 |
while the value of this object is active(1). |
| 2593 |
|
| 2594 |
An attempt to set these objects while the value of |
| 2595 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in |
| 2596 |
an inconsistentValue error." |
| 2597 |
::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 3 } |
| 2598 |
|
| 2599 |
snmpTlstmAddrCount OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2600 |
SYNTAX Gauge32 |
| 2601 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2602 |
STATUS current |
| 2603 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2604 |
"A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmAddrTable." |
| 2605 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 7 } |
| 2606 |
|
| 2607 |
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2608 |
SYNTAX TimeStamp |
| 2609 |
MAX-ACCESS read-only |
| 2610 |
STATUS current |
| 2611 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2612 |
"The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmAddrTable |
| 2613 |
was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been |
| 2614 |
modified since the command responder was started." |
| 2615 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 8 } |
| 2616 |
|
| 2617 |
snmpTlstmAddrTable OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2618 |
SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmAddrEntry |
| 2619 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2620 |
STATUS current |
| 2621 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2622 |
"This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS |
| 2623 |
connection is being set up using an entry in the |
| 2624 |
SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's |
| 2625 |
|
| 2626 |
|
| 2627 |
|
| 2628 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 47]</span></pre> |
| 2629 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-48" ></span> |
| 2630 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2631 |
|
| 2632 |
|
| 2633 |
snmpTargetAddrTable so that the client can verify that the |
| 2634 |
correct server has been reached. This verification can use |
| 2635 |
either a certificate fingerprint, or an identity |
| 2636 |
authenticated via certification path validation. |
| 2637 |
|
| 2638 |
If there is an active row in this table corresponding to the |
| 2639 |
entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB that was used to establish the |
| 2640 |
connection, and the row's snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint |
| 2641 |
column has non-empty value, then the server's presented |
| 2642 |
certificate is compared with the |
| 2643 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value (and the |
| 2644 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column is ignored). If the |
| 2645 |
fingerprint matches, the verification has succeeded. If the |
| 2646 |
fingerprint does not match, then the connection MUST be |
| 2647 |
closed. |
| 2648 |
|
| 2649 |
If the server's presented certificate has passed |
| 2650 |
certification path validation [<a href="./rfc5280" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">RFC5280</a>] to a configured |
| 2651 |
trust anchor, and an active row exists with a zero-length |
| 2652 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value, then the |
| 2653 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column contains the expected |
| 2654 |
host name. This expected host name is then compared against |
| 2655 |
the server's certificate as follows: |
| 2656 |
|
| 2657 |
- Implementations MUST support matching the expected host |
| 2658 |
name against a dNSName in the subjectAltName extension |
| 2659 |
field and MAY support checking the name against the |
| 2660 |
CommonName portion of the subject distinguished name. |
| 2661 |
|
| 2662 |
- The '*' (ASCII 0x2a) wildcard character is allowed in the |
| 2663 |
dNSName of the subjectAltName extension (and in common |
| 2664 |
name, if used to store the host name), but only as the |
| 2665 |
left-most (least significant) DNS label in that value. |
| 2666 |
This wildcard matches any left-most DNS label in the |
| 2667 |
server name. That is, the subject *.example.com matches |
| 2668 |
the server names a.example.com and b.example.com, but does |
| 2669 |
not match example.com or a.b.example.com. Implementations |
| 2670 |
MUST support wildcards in certificates as specified above, |
| 2671 |
but MAY provide a configuration option to disable them. |
| 2672 |
|
| 2673 |
- If the locally configured name is an internationalized |
| 2674 |
domain name, conforming implementations MUST convert it to |
| 2675 |
the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format for performing |
| 2676 |
comparisons, as specified in <a href="./rfc5280#section-7">Section 7 of [RFC5280]</a>. |
| 2677 |
|
| 2678 |
If the expected host name fails these conditions then the |
| 2679 |
connection MUST be closed. |
| 2680 |
|
| 2681 |
|
| 2682 |
|
| 2683 |
|
| 2684 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 48]</span></pre> |
| 2685 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-49" ></span> |
| 2686 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2687 |
|
| 2688 |
|
| 2689 |
If there is no row in this table corresponding to the entry |
| 2690 |
in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB and the server can be authorized by |
| 2691 |
another, implementation-dependent means, then the connection |
| 2692 |
MAY still proceed." |
| 2693 |
|
| 2694 |
::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 9 } |
| 2695 |
|
| 2696 |
snmpTlstmAddrEntry OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2697 |
SYNTAX SnmpTlstmAddrEntry |
| 2698 |
MAX-ACCESS not-accessible |
| 2699 |
STATUS current |
| 2700 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2701 |
"A conceptual row containing a copy of a certificate's |
| 2702 |
fingerprint for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry. The values in |
| 2703 |
this row should be ignored if the connection that needs to be |
| 2704 |
established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB |
| 2705 |
infrastructure, is not a (D)TLS based connection. If an |
| 2706 |
snmpTlstmAddrEntry exists for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry, then |
| 2707 |
the presented server certificate MUST match or the connection |
| 2708 |
MUST NOT be established. If a row in this table does not |
| 2709 |
exist to match an snmpTargetAddrEntry row, then the connection |
| 2710 |
SHOULD still proceed if some other certificate validation path |
| 2711 |
algorithm (e.g., <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>) can be used." |
| 2712 |
INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetAddrName } |
| 2713 |
::= { snmpTlstmAddrTable 1 } |
| 2714 |
|
| 2715 |
SnmpTlstmAddrEntry ::= SEQUENCE { |
| 2716 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint, |
| 2717 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity SnmpAdminString, |
| 2718 |
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType StorageType, |
| 2719 |
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus RowStatus |
| 2720 |
} |
| 2721 |
|
| 2722 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2723 |
SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint |
| 2724 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2725 |
STATUS current |
| 2726 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2727 |
"A cryptographic hash of a public X.509 certificate. This |
| 2728 |
object should store the hash of the public X.509 certificate |
| 2729 |
that the remote server should present during the (D)TLS |
| 2730 |
connection setup. The fingerprint of the presented |
| 2731 |
certificate and this hash value MUST match exactly or the |
| 2732 |
connection MUST NOT be established." |
| 2733 |
DEFVAL { "" } |
| 2734 |
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 1 } |
| 2735 |
|
| 2736 |
|
| 2737 |
|
| 2738 |
|
| 2739 |
|
| 2740 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 49]</span></pre> |
| 2741 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-50" ></span> |
| 2742 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2743 |
|
| 2744 |
|
| 2745 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2746 |
SYNTAX SnmpAdminString |
| 2747 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2748 |
STATUS current |
| 2749 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2750 |
"The reference identity to check against the identity |
| 2751 |
presented by the remote system." |
| 2752 |
DEFVAL { "" } |
| 2753 |
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 2 } |
| 2754 |
|
| 2755 |
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2756 |
SYNTAX StorageType |
| 2757 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2758 |
STATUS current |
| 2759 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2760 |
"The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows |
| 2761 |
having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to |
| 2762 |
any columnar objects in the row." |
| 2763 |
DEFVAL { nonVolatile } |
| 2764 |
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 3 } |
| 2765 |
|
| 2766 |
|
| 2767 |
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE |
| 2768 |
SYNTAX RowStatus |
| 2769 |
MAX-ACCESS read-create |
| 2770 |
STATUS current |
| 2771 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2772 |
"The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used |
| 2773 |
to create or remove rows from this table. |
| 2774 |
|
| 2775 |
To create a row in this table, an administrator must set this |
| 2776 |
object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5). |
| 2777 |
|
| 2778 |
Until instances of all corresponding columns are |
| 2779 |
appropriately configured, the value of the |
| 2780 |
corresponding instance of the snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus |
| 2781 |
column is notReady(3). |
| 2782 |
|
| 2783 |
In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until |
| 2784 |
the corresponding snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint column has been |
| 2785 |
set. |
| 2786 |
|
| 2787 |
Rows MUST NOT be active if the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint |
| 2788 |
column is blank and the snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity is set to |
| 2789 |
'*' since this would insecurely accept any presented |
| 2790 |
certificate. |
| 2791 |
|
| 2792 |
|
| 2793 |
|
| 2794 |
|
| 2795 |
|
| 2796 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 50]</span></pre> |
| 2797 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-51" ></span> |
| 2798 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2799 |
|
| 2800 |
|
| 2801 |
The snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint object may not be modified |
| 2802 |
while the value of this object is active(1). |
| 2803 |
|
| 2804 |
An attempt to set these objects while the value of |
| 2805 |
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus is active(1) will result in |
| 2806 |
an inconsistentValue error." |
| 2807 |
::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 4 } |
| 2808 |
|
| 2809 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2810 |
-- snmpTlstmNotifications - Notifications Information |
| 2811 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2812 |
|
| 2813 |
snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown NOTIFICATION-TYPE |
| 2814 |
OBJECTS { snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate } |
| 2815 |
STATUS current |
| 2816 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2817 |
"Notification that the server certificate presented by an SNMP |
| 2818 |
over (D)TLS server was invalid because no configured |
| 2819 |
fingerprint or CA was acceptable to validate it. This may be |
| 2820 |
because there was no entry in the snmpTlstmAddrTable or |
| 2821 |
because no path could be found to known Certification |
| 2822 |
Authority. |
| 2823 |
|
| 2824 |
To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be |
| 2825 |
sent to servers that themselves have triggered the |
| 2826 |
notification." |
| 2827 |
::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 1 } |
| 2828 |
|
| 2829 |
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate NOTIFICATION-TYPE |
| 2830 |
OBJECTS { snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint, |
| 2831 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates} |
| 2832 |
STATUS current |
| 2833 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2834 |
"Notification that the server certificate presented by an SNMP |
| 2835 |
over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if the |
| 2836 |
fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That is, a |
| 2837 |
cryptographic validation error occurred during certificate |
| 2838 |
validation processing. |
| 2839 |
|
| 2840 |
To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be |
| 2841 |
sent to servers that themselves have triggered the |
| 2842 |
notification." |
| 2843 |
::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 2 } |
| 2844 |
|
| 2845 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2846 |
-- snmpTlstmCompliances - Conformance Information |
| 2847 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2848 |
|
| 2849 |
|
| 2850 |
|
| 2851 |
|
| 2852 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 51]</span></pre> |
| 2853 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-52" ></span> |
| 2854 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2855 |
|
| 2856 |
|
| 2857 |
snmpTlstmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 1 } |
| 2858 |
|
| 2859 |
snmpTlstmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 2 } |
| 2860 |
|
| 2861 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2862 |
-- Compliance statements |
| 2863 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2864 |
|
| 2865 |
snmpTlstmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE |
| 2866 |
STATUS current |
| 2867 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2868 |
"The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the |
| 2869 |
SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB" |
| 2870 |
MODULE |
| 2871 |
MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTlstmStatsGroup, |
| 2872 |
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup, |
| 2873 |
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup, |
| 2874 |
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup } |
| 2875 |
::= { snmpTlstmCompliances 1 } |
| 2876 |
|
| 2877 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2878 |
-- Units of conformance |
| 2879 |
-- ************************************************ |
| 2880 |
snmpTlstmStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP |
| 2881 |
OBJECTS { |
| 2882 |
snmpTlstmSessionOpens, |
| 2883 |
snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses, |
| 2884 |
snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors, |
| 2885 |
snmpTlstmSessionAccepts, |
| 2886 |
snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses, |
| 2887 |
snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions, |
| 2888 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates, |
| 2889 |
snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate, |
| 2890 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates, |
| 2891 |
snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches |
| 2892 |
} |
| 2893 |
STATUS current |
| 2894 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2895 |
"A collection of objects for maintaining |
| 2896 |
statistical information of an SNMP engine that |
| 2897 |
implements the SNMP TLS Transport Model." |
| 2898 |
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 1 } |
| 2899 |
|
| 2900 |
snmpTlstmIncomingGroup OBJECT-GROUP |
| 2901 |
OBJECTS { |
| 2902 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount, |
| 2903 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged, |
| 2904 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint, |
| 2905 |
|
| 2906 |
|
| 2907 |
|
| 2908 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 52]</span></pre> |
| 2909 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-53" ></span> |
| 2910 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2911 |
|
| 2912 |
|
| 2913 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType, |
| 2914 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData, |
| 2915 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType, |
| 2916 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus |
| 2917 |
} |
| 2918 |
STATUS current |
| 2919 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2920 |
"A collection of objects for maintaining |
| 2921 |
incoming connection certificate mappings to |
| 2922 |
tmSecurityNames of an SNMP engine that implements the |
| 2923 |
SNMP TLS Transport Model." |
| 2924 |
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 2 } |
| 2925 |
|
| 2926 |
snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup OBJECT-GROUP |
| 2927 |
OBJECTS { |
| 2928 |
snmpTlstmParamsCount, |
| 2929 |
snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged, |
| 2930 |
snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint, |
| 2931 |
snmpTlstmParamsStorageType, |
| 2932 |
snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus, |
| 2933 |
snmpTlstmAddrCount, |
| 2934 |
snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged, |
| 2935 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint, |
| 2936 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity, |
| 2937 |
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType, |
| 2938 |
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus |
| 2939 |
} |
| 2940 |
STATUS current |
| 2941 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2942 |
"A collection of objects for maintaining |
| 2943 |
outgoing connection certificates to use when opening |
| 2944 |
connections as a result of SNMP-TARGET-MIB settings." |
| 2945 |
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 3 } |
| 2946 |
|
| 2947 |
snmpTlstmNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP |
| 2948 |
NOTIFICATIONS { |
| 2949 |
snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown, |
| 2950 |
snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate |
| 2951 |
} |
| 2952 |
STATUS current |
| 2953 |
DESCRIPTION |
| 2954 |
"Notifications" |
| 2955 |
::= { snmpTlstmGroups 4 } |
| 2956 |
|
| 2957 |
END |
| 2958 |
|
| 2959 |
|
| 2960 |
|
| 2961 |
|
| 2962 |
|
| 2963 |
|
| 2964 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 53]</span></pre> |
| 2965 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-54" ></span> |
| 2966 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 2967 |
|
| 2968 |
|
| 2969 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Operational Considerations</span> |
| 2970 |
|
| 2971 |
This section discusses various operational aspects of deploying |
| 2972 |
TLSTM. |
| 2973 |
|
| 2974 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Sessions</span> |
| 2975 |
|
| 2976 |
A session is discussed throughout this document as meaning a security |
| 2977 |
association between two TLSTM instances. State information for the |
| 2978 |
sessions are maintained in each TLSTM implementation and this |
| 2979 |
information is created and destroyed as sessions are opened and |
| 2980 |
closed. A "broken" session (one side up and one side down) can |
| 2981 |
result if one side of a session is brought down abruptly (i.e., |
| 2982 |
reboot, power outage, etc.). Whenever possible, implementations |
| 2983 |
SHOULD provide graceful session termination through the use of TLS |
| 2984 |
disconnect messages. Implementations SHOULD also have a system in |
| 2985 |
place for detecting "broken" sessions through the use of heartbeats |
| 2986 |
[<a href="#ref-HEARTBEAT" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension"">HEARTBEAT</a>] or other detection mechanisms. |
| 2987 |
|
| 2988 |
Implementations SHOULD limit the lifetime of established sessions |
| 2989 |
depending on the algorithms used for generation of the master session |
| 2990 |
secret, the privacy and integrity algorithms used to protect |
| 2991 |
messages, the environment of the session, the amount of data |
| 2992 |
transferred, and the sensitivity of the data. |
| 2993 |
|
| 2994 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Notification Receiver Credential Selection</span> |
| 2995 |
|
| 2996 |
When an SNMP engine needs to establish an outgoing session for |
| 2997 |
notifications, the snmpTargetParamsTable includes an entry for the |
| 2998 |
snmpTargetParamsSecurityName of the target. Servers that wish to |
| 2999 |
support multiple principals at a particular port SHOULD make use of |
| 3000 |
the Server Name Indication extension defined in <a href="./rfc4366#section-3.1">Section 3.1 of |
| 3001 |
[RFC4366]</a>. Without the Server Name Indication the receiving SNMP |
| 3002 |
engine (server) will not know which (D)TLS certificate to offer to |
| 3003 |
the client so that the tmSecurityName identity-authentication will be |
| 3004 |
successful. |
| 3005 |
|
| 3006 |
Another solution is to maintain a one-to-one mapping between |
| 3007 |
certificates and incoming ports for notification receivers. This can |
| 3008 |
be handled at the notification originator by configuring the |
| 3009 |
snmpTargetAddrTable (snmpTargetAddrTDomain and |
| 3010 |
snmpTargetAddrTAddress) and requiring the receiving SNMP engine to |
| 3011 |
monitor multiple incoming static ports based on which principals are |
| 3012 |
capable of receiving notifications. |
| 3013 |
|
| 3014 |
Implementations MAY also choose to designate a single Notification |
| 3015 |
Receiver Principal to receive all incoming notifications or select an |
| 3016 |
|
| 3017 |
|
| 3018 |
|
| 3019 |
|
| 3020 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 54]</span></pre> |
| 3021 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-55" ></span> |
| 3022 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3023 |
|
| 3024 |
|
| 3025 |
implementation specific method of selecting a server certificate to |
| 3026 |
present to clients. |
| 3027 |
|
| 3028 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.3" href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>. contextEngineID Discovery</span> |
| 3029 |
|
| 3030 |
SNMPv3 requires that an application know the identifier |
| 3031 |
(snmpEngineID) of the remote SNMP protocol engine in order to |
| 3032 |
retrieve or manipulate objects maintained on the remote SNMP entity. |
| 3033 |
|
| 3034 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5343">RFC5343</a>] introduces a well-known localEngineID and a discovery |
| 3035 |
mechanism that can be used to learn the snmpEngineID of a remote SNMP |
| 3036 |
protocol engine. Implementations are RECOMMENDED to support and use |
| 3037 |
the contextEngineID discovery mechanism defined in [<a href="./rfc5343" title=""Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Context EngineID Discovery"">RFC5343</a>]. |
| 3038 |
|
| 3039 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.4" href="#section-8.4">8.4</a>. Transport Considerations</span> |
| 3040 |
|
| 3041 |
This document defines how SNMP messages can be transmitted over the |
| 3042 |
TLS- and DTLS-based protocols. Each of these protocols is |
| 3043 |
additionally based on other transports (TCP and UDP). These two base |
| 3044 |
protocols also have operational considerations that must be taken |
| 3045 |
into consideration when selecting a (D)TLS-based protocol to use such |
| 3046 |
as its performance in degraded or limited networks. It is beyond the |
| 3047 |
scope of this document to summarize the characteristics of these |
| 3048 |
transport mechanisms. Please refer to the base protocol documents |
| 3049 |
for details on messaging considerations with respect to MTU size, |
| 3050 |
fragmentation, performance in lossy networks, etc. |
| 3051 |
|
| 3052 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 3053 |
|
| 3054 |
This document describes a transport model that permits SNMP to |
| 3055 |
utilize (D)TLS security services. The security threats and how the |
| 3056 |
(D)TLS transport model mitigates these threats are covered in detail |
| 3057 |
throughout this document. Security considerations for DTLS are |
| 3058 |
covered in [<a href="./rfc4347" title=""Datagram Transport Layer Security"">RFC4347</a>] and security considerations for TLS are |
| 3059 |
described in <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a> and Appendices D, E, and F of TLS 1.2 |
| 3060 |
[<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>]. When run over a connectionless transport such as UDP, |
| 3061 |
DTLS is more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks from spoofed IP |
| 3062 |
addresses; see <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a> for details how the cookie exchange is |
| 3063 |
used to address this issue. |
| 3064 |
|
| 3065 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Certificates, Authentication, and Authorization</span> |
| 3066 |
|
| 3067 |
Implementations are responsible for providing a security certificate |
| 3068 |
installation and configuration mechanism. Implementations SHOULD |
| 3069 |
support certificate revocation lists. |
| 3070 |
|
| 3071 |
(D)TLS provides for authentication of the identity of both the (D)TLS |
| 3072 |
server and the (D)TLS client. Access to MIB objects for the |
| 3073 |
|
| 3074 |
|
| 3075 |
|
| 3076 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 55]</span></pre> |
| 3077 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-56" ></span> |
| 3078 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3079 |
|
| 3080 |
|
| 3081 |
authenticated principal MUST be enforced by an access control |
| 3082 |
subsystem (e.g., the VACM). |
| 3083 |
|
| 3084 |
Authentication of the command generator principal's identity is |
| 3085 |
important for use with the SNMP access control subsystem to ensure |
| 3086 |
that only authorized principals have access to potentially sensitive |
| 3087 |
data. The authenticated identity of the command generator |
| 3088 |
principal's certificate is mapped to an SNMP model-independent |
| 3089 |
securityName for use with SNMP access control. |
| 3090 |
|
| 3091 |
The (D)TLS handshake only provides assurance that the certificate of |
| 3092 |
the authenticated identity has been signed by a configured accepted |
| 3093 |
Certification Authority. (D)TLS has no way to further authorize or |
| 3094 |
reject access based on the authenticated identity. An Access Control |
| 3095 |
Model (such as the VACM) provides access control and authorization of |
| 3096 |
a command generator's requests to a command responder and a |
| 3097 |
notification receiver's authorization to receive Notifications from a |
| 3098 |
notification originator. However, to avoid man-in-the-middle |
| 3099 |
attacks, both ends of the (D)TLS-based connection MUST check the |
| 3100 |
certificate presented by the other side against what was expected. |
| 3101 |
For example, command generators must check that the command responder |
| 3102 |
presented and authenticated itself with an X.509 certificate that was |
| 3103 |
expected. Not doing so would allow an impostor, at a minimum, to |
| 3104 |
present false data, receive sensitive information, and/or provide a |
| 3105 |
false belief that configuration was actually received and acted upon. |
| 3106 |
Authenticating and verifying the identity of the (D)TLS server and |
| 3107 |
the (D)TLS client for all operations ensures the authenticity of the |
| 3108 |
SNMP engine that provides MIB data. |
| 3109 |
|
| 3110 |
The instructions found in the DESCRIPTION clause of the |
| 3111 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable object must be followed exactly. It is also |
| 3112 |
important that the rows of the table be searched in prioritized order |
| 3113 |
starting with the row containing the lowest numbered |
| 3114 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value. |
| 3115 |
|
| 3116 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. (D)TLS Security Considerations</span> |
| 3117 |
|
| 3118 |
This section discusses security considerations specific to the usage |
| 3119 |
of (D)TLS. |
| 3120 |
|
| 3121 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2.1" href="#section-9.2.1">9.2.1</a>. TLS Version Requirements</span> |
| 3122 |
|
| 3123 |
Implementations of TLS typically support multiple versions of the |
| 3124 |
Transport Layer Security protocol as well as the older Secure Sockets |
| 3125 |
Layer (SSL) protocol. Because of known security vulnerabilities, |
| 3126 |
TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer, or use SSL 2.0. |
| 3127 |
See <a href="./rfc5246#appendix-E.2">Appendix E.2 of [RFC5246]</a> for further details. |
| 3128 |
|
| 3129 |
|
| 3130 |
|
| 3131 |
|
| 3132 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 56]</span></pre> |
| 3133 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-57" ></span> |
| 3134 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3135 |
|
| 3136 |
|
| 3137 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2.2" href="#section-9.2.2">9.2.2</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy</span> |
| 3138 |
|
| 3139 |
The use of Perfect Forward Secrecy is RECOMMENDED and can be provided |
| 3140 |
by (D)TLS with appropriately selected cipher_suites, as discussed in |
| 3141 |
<a href="./rfc5246#appendix-F">Appendix F of [RFC5246]</a>. |
| 3142 |
|
| 3143 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.3" href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Use with SNMPv1/SNMPv2c Messages</span> |
| 3144 |
|
| 3145 |
The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c message processing described in [<a href="./rfc3584" title=""Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework"">RFC3584</a>] (<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp74">BCP</a> |
| 3146 |
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp74">74</a>) always selects the SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c Security Models, |
| 3147 |
respectively. Both of these and the User-based Security Model |
| 3148 |
typically used with SNMPv3 derive the securityName and securityLevel |
| 3149 |
from the SNMP message received, even when the message was received |
| 3150 |
over a secure transport. Access control decisions are therefore made |
| 3151 |
based on the contents of the SNMP message, rather than using the |
| 3152 |
authenticated identity and securityLevel provided by the TLS |
| 3153 |
Transport Model. It is RECOMMENDED that only SNMPv3 messages using |
| 3154 |
the Transport Security Model (TSM) or another secure-transport aware |
| 3155 |
security model be sent over the TLSTM transport. |
| 3156 |
|
| 3157 |
Using a non-transport-aware Security Model with a secure Transport |
| 3158 |
Model is NOT RECOMMENDED. See <a href="./rfc5590#section-7.1">[RFC5590], Section 7.1</a> for additional |
| 3159 |
details on the coexistence of security-aware transports and non- |
| 3160 |
transport-aware security models. |
| 3161 |
|
| 3162 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.4" href="#section-9.4">9.4</a>. MIB Module Security</span> |
| 3163 |
|
| 3164 |
There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module |
| 3165 |
with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such |
| 3166 |
objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network |
| 3167 |
environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure |
| 3168 |
environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on |
| 3169 |
network operations. These are the tables and objects and their |
| 3170 |
sensitivity/vulnerability: |
| 3171 |
|
| 3172 |
o The snmpTlstmParamsTable can be used to change the outgoing X.509 |
| 3173 |
certificate used to establish a (D)TLS connection. Modifications |
| 3174 |
to objects in this table need to be adequately authenticated since |
| 3175 |
modifying the values in this table will have profound impacts to |
| 3176 |
the security of outbound connections from the device. Since |
| 3177 |
knowledge of authorization rules and certificate usage mechanisms |
| 3178 |
may be considered sensitive, protection from disclosure of the |
| 3179 |
SNMP traffic via encryption is also highly recommended. |
| 3180 |
|
| 3181 |
o The snmpTlstmAddrTable can be used to change the expectations of |
| 3182 |
the certificates presented by a remote (D)TLS server. |
| 3183 |
Modifications to objects in this table need to be adequately |
| 3184 |
authenticated since modifying the values in this table will have |
| 3185 |
|
| 3186 |
|
| 3187 |
|
| 3188 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 57]</span></pre> |
| 3189 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-58" ></span> |
| 3190 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3191 |
|
| 3192 |
|
| 3193 |
profound impacts to the security of outbound connections from the |
| 3194 |
device. Since knowledge of authorization rules and certificate |
| 3195 |
usage mechanisms may be considered sensitive, protection from |
| 3196 |
disclosure of the SNMP traffic via encryption is also highly |
| 3197 |
recommended. |
| 3198 |
|
| 3199 |
o The snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable is used to specify the mapping of |
| 3200 |
incoming X.509 certificates to tmSecurityNames, which eventually |
| 3201 |
get mapped to an SNMPv3 securityName. Modifications to objects in |
| 3202 |
this table need to be adequately authenticated since modifying the |
| 3203 |
values in this table will have profound impacts to the security of |
| 3204 |
incoming connections to the device. Since knowledge of |
| 3205 |
authorization rules and certificate usage mechanisms may be |
| 3206 |
considered sensitive, protection from disclosure of the SNMP |
| 3207 |
traffic via encryption is also highly recommended. When this |
| 3208 |
table contains a significant number of rows it may affect the |
| 3209 |
system performance when accepting new (D)TLS connections. |
| 3210 |
|
| 3211 |
Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a |
| 3212 |
MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or |
| 3213 |
vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to |
| 3214 |
control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly |
| 3215 |
to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over |
| 3216 |
the network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their |
| 3217 |
sensitivity/vulnerability: |
| 3218 |
|
| 3219 |
o This MIB contains a collection of counters that monitor the (D)TLS |
| 3220 |
connections being established with a device. Since knowledge of |
| 3221 |
connection and certificate usage mechanisms may be considered |
| 3222 |
sensitive, protection from disclosure of the SNMP traffic via |
| 3223 |
encryption is highly recommended. |
| 3224 |
|
| 3225 |
SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security. |
| 3226 |
Even if the network itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec), |
| 3227 |
even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is |
| 3228 |
allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects |
| 3229 |
in this MIB module. |
| 3230 |
|
| 3231 |
It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as |
| 3232 |
provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see <a href="./rfc3410#section-8">[RFC3410], Section 8</a>), |
| 3233 |
including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms (for |
| 3234 |
authentication and privacy). |
| 3235 |
|
| 3236 |
Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT |
| 3237 |
RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to |
| 3238 |
enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator |
| 3239 |
responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an |
| 3240 |
instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to |
| 3241 |
|
| 3242 |
|
| 3243 |
|
| 3244 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 58]</span></pre> |
| 3245 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-59" ></span> |
| 3246 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3247 |
|
| 3248 |
|
| 3249 |
the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate |
| 3250 |
rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them. |
| 3251 |
|
| 3252 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 3253 |
|
| 3254 |
IANA has assigned: |
| 3255 |
|
| 3256 |
1. Two TCP/UDP port numbers from the "Registered Ports" range of the |
| 3257 |
Port Numbers registry, with the following keywords: |
| 3258 |
|
| 3259 |
Keyword Decimal Description References |
| 3260 |
------- ------- ----------- ---------- |
| 3261 |
snmptls 10161/tcp SNMP-TLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>] |
| 3262 |
snmpdtls 10161/udp SNMP-DTLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>] |
| 3263 |
snmptls-trap 10162/tcp SNMP-Trap-TLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>] |
| 3264 |
snmpdtls-trap 10162/udp SNMP-Trap-DTLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>] |
| 3265 |
|
| 3266 |
These are the default ports for receipt of SNMP command messages |
| 3267 |
(snmptls and snmpdtls) and SNMP notification messages (snmptls-trap |
| 3268 |
and snmpdtls-trap) over a TLS Transport Model as defined in this |
| 3269 |
document. |
| 3270 |
|
| 3271 |
2. An SMI number (8) under snmpDomains for the snmpTLSTCPDomain |
| 3272 |
object identifier |
| 3273 |
|
| 3274 |
3. An SMI number (9) under snmpDomains for the snmpDTLSUDPDomain |
| 3275 |
object identifier |
| 3276 |
|
| 3277 |
4. An SMI number (198) under mib-2, for the MIB module in this |
| 3278 |
document |
| 3279 |
|
| 3280 |
5. "tls" as the corresponding prefix for the snmpTLSTCPDomain in the |
| 3281 |
SNMP Transport Domains registry |
| 3282 |
|
| 3283 |
6. "dtls" as the corresponding prefix for the snmpDTLSUDPDomain in |
| 3284 |
the SNMP Transport Domains registry |
| 3285 |
|
| 3286 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 3287 |
|
| 3288 |
This document closely follows and copies the Secure Shell Transport |
| 3289 |
Model for SNMP documented by David Harrington and Joseph Salowey in |
| 3290 |
[<a href="./rfc5592" title=""Secure Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5592</a>]. |
| 3291 |
|
| 3292 |
This document was reviewed by the following people who helped provide |
| 3293 |
useful comments (in alphabetical order): Andy Donati, Pasi Eronen, |
| 3294 |
David Harrington, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Alan Luchuk, Michael Peck, Tom |
| 3295 |
Petch, Randy Presuhn, Ray Purvis, Peter Saint-Andre, Joseph Salowey, |
| 3296 |
Juergen Schoenwaelder, Dave Shield, and Robert Story. |
| 3297 |
|
| 3298 |
|
| 3299 |
|
| 3300 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 59]</span></pre> |
| 3301 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-60" ></span> |
| 3302 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3303 |
|
| 3304 |
|
| 3305 |
This work was supported in part by the United States Department of |
| 3306 |
Defense. Large portions of this document are based on work by |
| 3307 |
General Dynamics C4 Systems and the following individuals: Brian |
| 3308 |
Baril, Kim Bryant, Dana Deluca, Dan Hanson, Tim Huemiller, John |
| 3309 |
Holzhauer, Colin Hoogeboom, Dave Kornbau, Chris Knaian, Dan Knaul, |
| 3310 |
Charles Limoges, Steve Moccaldi, Gerardo Orlando, and Brandon Yip. |
| 3311 |
|
| 3312 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. References</span> |
| 3313 |
|
| 3314 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 3315 |
|
| 3316 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1123">RFC1123</a>] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts - |
| 3317 |
Application and Support", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>, October 1989. |
| 3318 |
|
| 3319 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 3320 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 3321 |
|
| 3322 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2578">RFC2578</a>] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J. |
| 3323 |
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information |
| 3324 |
Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, <a href="./rfc2578">RFC 2578</a>, April 1999. |
| 3325 |
|
| 3326 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2579">RFC2579</a>] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J. |
| 3327 |
Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2", |
| 3328 |
STD 58, <a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a>, April 1999. |
| 3329 |
|
| 3330 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2580">RFC2580</a>] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder, |
| 3331 |
"Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, <a href="./rfc2580">RFC 2580</a>, |
| 3332 |
April 1999. |
| 3333 |
|
| 3334 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3411">RFC3411</a>] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An |
| 3335 |
Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management |
| 3336 |
Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62, |
| 3337 |
<a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a>, December 2002. |
| 3338 |
|
| 3339 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3413">RFC3413</a>] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network |
| 3340 |
Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62, |
| 3341 |
<a href="./rfc3413">RFC 3413</a>, December 2002. |
| 3342 |
|
| 3343 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3414">RFC3414</a>] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model |
| 3344 |
(USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management |
| 3345 |
Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, <a href="./rfc3414">RFC 3414</a>, December 2002. |
| 3346 |
|
| 3347 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3415">RFC3415</a>] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based |
| 3348 |
Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network |
| 3349 |
Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, <a href="./rfc3415">RFC 3415</a>, |
| 3350 |
December 2002. |
| 3351 |
|
| 3352 |
|
| 3353 |
|
| 3354 |
|
| 3355 |
|
| 3356 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 60]</span></pre> |
| 3357 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-61" ></span> |
| 3358 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3359 |
|
| 3360 |
|
| 3361 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3418">RFC3418</a>] Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for the |
| 3362 |
Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, |
| 3363 |
<a href="./rfc3418">RFC 3418</a>, December 2002. |
| 3364 |
|
| 3365 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3584">RFC3584</a>] Frye, R., Levi, D., Routhier, S., and B. Wijnen, |
| 3366 |
"Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 |
| 3367 |
of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework", |
| 3368 |
<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp74">BCP 74</a>, <a href="./rfc3584">RFC 3584</a>, August 2003. |
| 3369 |
|
| 3370 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4347">RFC4347</a>] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer |
| 3371 |
Security", <a href="./rfc4347">RFC 4347</a>, April 2006. |
| 3372 |
|
| 3373 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4366">RFC4366</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen, |
| 3374 |
J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 3375 |
Extensions", <a href="./rfc4366">RFC 4366</a>, April 2006. |
| 3376 |
|
| 3377 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer |
| 3378 |
Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, |
| 3379 |
August 2008. |
| 3380 |
|
| 3381 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., |
| 3382 |
Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key |
| 3383 |
Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation |
| 3384 |
List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, May 2008. |
| 3385 |
|
| 3386 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5590">RFC5590</a>] Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Transport |
| 3387 |
Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol |
| 3388 |
(SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5590">RFC 5590</a>, June 2009. |
| 3389 |
|
| 3390 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5591">RFC5591</a>] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security |
| 3391 |
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol |
| 3392 |
(SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5591">RFC 5591</a>, June 2009. |
| 3393 |
|
| 3394 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5952">RFC5952</a>] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for |
| 3395 |
IPv6 Address Text Representation", <a href="./rfc5952">RFC 5952</a>, |
| 3396 |
August 2010. |
| 3397 |
|
| 3398 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 3399 |
|
| 3400 |
[<a id="ref-HEARTBEAT">HEARTBEAT</a>] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport |
| 3401 |
Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer |
| 3402 |
Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", Work in Progress, |
| 3403 |
July 2011. |
| 3404 |
|
| 3405 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3410">RFC3410</a>] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart, |
| 3406 |
"Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet- |
| 3407 |
Standard Management Framework", <a href="./rfc3410">RFC 3410</a>, December 2002. |
| 3408 |
|
| 3409 |
|
| 3410 |
|
| 3411 |
|
| 3412 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 61]</span></pre> |
| 3413 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-62" ></span> |
| 3414 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3415 |
|
| 3416 |
|
| 3417 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5343">RFC5343</a>] Schoenwaelder, J., "Simple Network Management Protocol |
| 3418 |
(SNMP) Context EngineID Discovery", <a href="./rfc5343">RFC 5343</a>, |
| 3419 |
September 2008. |
| 3420 |
|
| 3421 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5592">RFC5592</a>] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure |
| 3422 |
Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management |
| 3423 |
Protocol (SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5592">RFC 5592</a>, June 2009. |
| 3424 |
|
| 3425 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5890">RFC5890</a>] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for |
| 3426 |
Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document |
| 3427 |
Framework", <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>, August 2010. |
| 3428 |
|
| 3429 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5953">RFC5953</a>] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport |
| 3430 |
Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol |
| 3431 |
(SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a>, August 2010. |
| 3432 |
|
| 3433 |
|
| 3434 |
|
| 3435 |
|
| 3436 |
|
| 3437 |
|
| 3438 |
|
| 3439 |
|
| 3440 |
|
| 3441 |
|
| 3442 |
|
| 3443 |
|
| 3444 |
|
| 3445 |
|
| 3446 |
|
| 3447 |
|
| 3448 |
|
| 3449 |
|
| 3450 |
|
| 3451 |
|
| 3452 |
|
| 3453 |
|
| 3454 |
|
| 3455 |
|
| 3456 |
|
| 3457 |
|
| 3458 |
|
| 3459 |
|
| 3460 |
|
| 3461 |
|
| 3462 |
|
| 3463 |
|
| 3464 |
|
| 3465 |
|
| 3466 |
|
| 3467 |
|
| 3468 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 62]</span></pre> |
| 3469 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-63" ></span> |
| 3470 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3471 |
|
| 3472 |
|
| 3473 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Target and Notification Configuration Example</span> |
| 3474 |
|
| 3475 |
The following sections describe example configuration for the SNMP- |
| 3476 |
TLS-TM-MIB, the SNMP-TARGET-MIB, the NOTIFICATION-MIB, and the SNMP- |
| 3477 |
VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB. |
| 3478 |
|
| 3479 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Configuring a Notification Originator</span> |
| 3480 |
|
| 3481 |
The following row adds the "Joe Cool" user to the "administrators" |
| 3482 |
group: |
| 3483 |
|
| 3484 |
vacmSecurityModel = 4 (TSM) |
| 3485 |
vacmSecurityName = "Joe Cool" |
| 3486 |
vacmGroupName = "administrators" |
| 3487 |
vacmSecurityToGroupStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile) |
| 3488 |
vacmSecurityToGroupStatus = 4 (createAndGo) |
| 3489 |
|
| 3490 |
The following row configures the snmpTlstmAddrTable to use |
| 3491 |
certificate path validation and to require the remote notification |
| 3492 |
receiver to present a certificate for the "server.example.org" |
| 3493 |
identity. |
| 3494 |
|
| 3495 |
snmpTargetAddrName = "toNRAddr" |
| 3496 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint = "" |
| 3497 |
snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity = "server.example.org" |
| 3498 |
snmpTlstmAddrStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile) |
| 3499 |
snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo) |
| 3500 |
|
| 3501 |
The following row configures the snmpTargetAddrTable to send |
| 3502 |
notifications using TLS/TCP to the snmptls-trap port at 192.0.2.1: |
| 3503 |
|
| 3504 |
snmpTargetAddrName = "toNRAddr" |
| 3505 |
snmpTargetAddrTDomain = snmpTLSTCPDomain |
| 3506 |
snmpTargetAddrTAddress = "192.0.2.1:10162" |
| 3507 |
snmpTargetAddrTimeout = 1500 |
| 3508 |
snmpTargetAddrRetryCount = 3 |
| 3509 |
snmpTargetAddrTagList = "toNRTag" |
| 3510 |
snmpTargetAddrParams = "toNR" (MUST match below) |
| 3511 |
snmpTargetAddrStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile) |
| 3512 |
snmpTargetAddrRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo) |
| 3513 |
|
| 3514 |
|
| 3515 |
|
| 3516 |
|
| 3517 |
|
| 3518 |
|
| 3519 |
|
| 3520 |
|
| 3521 |
|
| 3522 |
|
| 3523 |
|
| 3524 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 63]</span></pre> |
| 3525 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-64" ></span> |
| 3526 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3527 |
|
| 3528 |
|
| 3529 |
The following row configures the snmpTargetParamsTable to send the |
| 3530 |
notifications to "Joe Cool", using authPriv SNMPv3 notifications |
| 3531 |
through the TransportSecurityModel [<a href="./rfc5591" title=""Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)"">RFC5591</a>]: |
| 3532 |
|
| 3533 |
snmpTargetParamsName = "toNR" (must match above) |
| 3534 |
snmpTargetParamsMPModel = 3 (SNMPv3) |
| 3535 |
snmpTargetParamsSecurityModel = 4 (TransportSecurityModel) |
| 3536 |
snmpTargetParamsSecurityName = "Joe Cool" |
| 3537 |
snmpTargetParamsSecurityLevel = 3 (authPriv) |
| 3538 |
snmpTargetParamsStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile) |
| 3539 |
snmpTargetParamsRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo) |
| 3540 |
|
| 3541 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize a Simple Derivation of tmSecurityName</span> |
| 3542 |
|
| 3543 |
The following row configures the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable to map a |
| 3544 |
validated client certificate, referenced by the client's public X.509 |
| 3545 |
hash fingerprint, to a tmSecurityName using the subjectAltName |
| 3546 |
component of the certificate. |
| 3547 |
|
| 3548 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID = 1 |
| 3549 |
(chosen by ordering preference) |
| 3550 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint = HASH (appropriate fingerprint) |
| 3551 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType = snmpTlstmCertSANAny |
| 3552 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNData = "" (not used) |
| 3553 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile) |
| 3554 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo) |
| 3555 |
|
| 3556 |
This type of configuration should only be used when the naming |
| 3557 |
conventions of the (possibly multiple) Certification Authorities are |
| 3558 |
well understood, so two different principals cannot inadvertently be |
| 3559 |
identified by the same derived tmSecurityName. |
| 3560 |
|
| 3561 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize Table-Driven Certificate Mapping</span> |
| 3562 |
|
| 3563 |
The following row configures the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable to map a |
| 3564 |
validated client certificate, referenced by the client's public X.509 |
| 3565 |
hash fingerprint, to the directly specified tmSecurityName of "Joe |
| 3566 |
Cool". |
| 3567 |
|
| 3568 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNID = 2 |
| 3569 |
(chosen by ordering preference) |
| 3570 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint = HASH (appropriate fingerprint) |
| 3571 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType = snmpTlstmCertSpecified |
| 3572 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNSecurityName = "Joe Cool" |
| 3573 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile) |
| 3574 |
snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo) |
| 3575 |
|
| 3576 |
|
| 3577 |
|
| 3578 |
|
| 3579 |
|
| 3580 |
<span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 64]</span></pre> |
| 3581 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-65" ></span> |
| 3582 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span> |
| 3583 |
|
| 3584 |
|
| 3585 |
Author's Address |
| 3586 |
|
| 3587 |
Wes Hardaker |
| 3588 |
SPARTA, Inc. |
| 3589 |
P.O. Box 382 |
| 3590 |
Davis, CA 95617 |
| 3591 |
USA |
| 3592 |
|
| 3593 |
Phone: +1 530 792 1913 |
| 3594 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 3595 |
|
| 3596 |
|
| 3597 |
|
| 3598 |
|
| 3599 |
|
| 3600 |
|
| 3601 |
|
| 3602 |
|
| 3603 |
|
| 3604 |
|
| 3605 |
|
| 3606 |
|
| 3607 |
|
| 3608 |
|
| 3609 |
|
| 3610 |
|
| 3611 |
|
| 3612 |
|
| 3613 |
|
| 3614 |
|
| 3615 |
|
| 3616 |
|
| 3617 |
|
| 3618 |
|
| 3619 |
|
| 3620 |
|
| 3621 |
|
| 3622 |
|
| 3623 |
|
| 3624 |
|
| 3625 |
|
| 3626 |
|
| 3627 |
|
| 3628 |
|
| 3629 |
|
| 3630 |
|
| 3631 |
|
| 3632 |
|
| 3633 |
|
| 3634 |
|
| 3635 |
|
| 3636 |
Hardaker Standards Track [Page 65] |
| 3637 |
</pre> |