Debian Codegraph @

rfc6353.html

raw
1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) W. Hardaker
2 Request for Comments: 6353 SPARTA, Inc.
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc5953">5953</a> July 2011
4 Category: Standards Track
5 ISSN: 2070-1721
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for</span>
9 <span class="h1">the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)</span>
10
11 Abstract
12
13 This document describes a Transport Model for the Simple Network
14 Management Protocol (SNMP), that uses either the Transport Layer
15 Security protocol or the Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)
16 protocol. The TLS and DTLS protocols provide authentication and
17 privacy services for SNMP applications. This document describes how
18 the TLS Transport Model (TLSTM) implements the needed features of an
19 SNMP Transport Subsystem to make this protection possible in an
20 interoperable way.
21
22 This Transport Model is designed to meet the security and operational
23 needs of network administrators. It supports the sending of SNMP
24 messages over TLS/TCP and DTLS/UDP. The TLS mode can make use of
25 TCP's improved support for larger packet sizes and the DTLS mode
26 provides potentially superior operation in environments where a
27 connectionless (e.g., UDP) transport is preferred. Both TLS and DTLS
28 integrate well into existing public keying infrastructures.
29
30 This document also defines a portion of the Management Information
31 Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols. In particular,
32 it defines objects for managing the TLS Transport Model for SNMP.
33
34 Status of This Memo
35
36 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
37
38 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
39 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
40 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
41 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
42 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
43
44 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
45 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
46 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6353</a>.
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
73 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
74 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
75 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
76 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
77 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
78 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
79 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
80 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
81 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
82 than English.
83
84 Table of Contents
85
86 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
87 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
88 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Changes Since <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
89 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. The Transport Layer Security Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
90 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. How the TLSTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
91 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Security Capabilities of This Model . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
92 <a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Threats . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
93 <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Message Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
94 <a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. (D)TLS Connections . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
95 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Security Parameter Passing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
96 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Notifications and Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
97 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Elements of the Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
98 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. X.509 Certificates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
99 <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Provisioning for the Certificate . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
100 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. (D)TLS Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
101 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. SNMP Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
102 <a href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. SNMP Services for an Outgoing Message . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
103 <a href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. SNMP Services for an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
111
112
113 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Cached Information and References . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
114 <a href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. TLS Transport Model Cached Information . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
115 <a href="#section-4.4.1.1">4.4.1.1</a>. tmSecurityName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
116 <a href="#section-4.4.1.2">4.4.1.2</a>. tmSessionID . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
117 <a href="#section-4.4.1.3">4.4.1.3</a>. Session State . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
118 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Elements of Procedure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
119 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Procedures for an Incoming Message . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
120 <a href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a>. DTLS over UDP Processing for Incoming Messages . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a>
121 <a href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a>. Transport Processing for Incoming SNMP Messages . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
122 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Procedures for an Outgoing SNMP Message . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
123 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Establishing or Accepting a Session . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
124 <a href="#section-5.3.1">5.3.1</a>. Establishing a Session as a Client . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
125 <a href="#section-5.3.2">5.3.2</a>. Accepting a Session as a Server . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
126 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Closing a Session . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-29">29</a>
127 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. MIB Module Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
128 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Structure of the MIB Module . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
129 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Textual Conventions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
130 <a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Statistical Counters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
131 <a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Configuration Tables . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
132 <a href="#section-6.4.1">6.4.1</a>. Notifications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
133 <a href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. Relationship to Other MIB Modules . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
134 <a href="#section-6.5.1">6.5.1</a>. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
135 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. MIB Module Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
136 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Operational Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-54">54</a>
137 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Sessions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-54">54</a>
138 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Notification Receiver Credential Selection . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-54">54</a>
139 <a href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>. contextEngineID Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a>
140 <a href="#section-8.4">8.4</a>. Transport Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a>
141 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a>
142 <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Certificates, Authentication, and Authorization . . . . . <a href="#page-55">55</a>
143 <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. (D)TLS Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-56">56</a>
144 <a href="#section-9.2.1">9.2.1</a>. TLS Version Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-56">56</a>
145 <a href="#section-9.2.2">9.2.2</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-57">57</a>
146 <a href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Use with SNMPv1/SNMPv2c Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-57">57</a>
147 <a href="#section-9.4">9.4</a>. MIB Module Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-57">57</a>
148 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-59">59</a>
149 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-59">59</a>
150 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-60">60</a>
151 <a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-60">60</a>
152 <a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-61">61</a>
153 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Target and Notification Configuration Example . . . . <a href="#page-63">63</a>
154 <a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Configuring a Notification Originator . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-63">63</a>
155 A.2. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize a Simple Derivation of
156 tmSecurityName . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-64">64</a>
157 A.3. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize Table-Driven Certificate
158 Mapping . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-64">64</a>
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
170
171 It is important to understand the modular SNMPv3 architecture as
172 defined by [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>] and enhanced by the Transport Subsystem
173 [<a href="./rfc5590" title="&quot;Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5590</a>]. It is also important to understand the terminology of the
174 SNMPv3 architecture in order to understand where the Transport Model
175 described in this document fits into the architecture and how it
176 interacts with the other architecture subsystems. For a detailed
177 overview of the documents that describe the current Internet-Standard
178 Management Framework, please refer to <a href="./rfc3410#section-7">Section&nbsp;7 of [RFC3410]</a>.
179
180 This document describes a Transport Model that makes use of the
181 Transport Layer Security (TLS) [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] and the Datagram Transport
182 Layer Security (DTLS) Protocol [<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>], within a Transport
183 Subsystem [<a href="./rfc5590" title="&quot;Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5590</a>]. DTLS is the datagram variant of the Transport
184 Layer Security (TLS) protocol [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>]. The Transport Model in this
185 document is referred to as the Transport Layer Security Transport
186 Model (TLSTM). TLS and DTLS take advantage of the X.509 public
187 keying infrastructure [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]. While (D)TLS supports multiple
188 authentication mechanisms, this document only discusses X.509
189 certificate-based authentication. Although other forms of
190 authentication are possible, they are outside the scope of this
191 specification. This transport model is designed to meet the security
192 and operational needs of network administrators, operating in both
193 environments where a connectionless (e.g., UDP) transport is
194 preferred and in environments where large quantities of data need to
195 be sent (e.g., over a TCP-based stream). Both TLS and DTLS integrate
196 well into existing public keying infrastructures. This document
197 supports sending of SNMP messages over TLS/TCP and DTLS/UDP.
198
199 This document also defines a portion of the Management Information
200 Base (MIB) for use with network management protocols. In particular,
201 it defines objects for managing the TLS Transport Model for SNMP.
202
203 Managed objects are accessed via a virtual information store, termed
204 the Management Information Base or MIB. MIB objects are generally
205 accessed through the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP).
206 Objects in the MIB are defined using the mechanisms defined in the
207 Structure of Management Information (SMI). This memo specifies a MIB
208 module that is compliant to the SMIv2, which is described in STD 58:
209 [<a href="./rfc2578" title="&quot;Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)&quot;">RFC2578</a>], [<a href="./rfc2579" title="&quot;Textual Conventions for SMIv2&quot;">RFC2579</a>], and [<a href="./rfc2580" title="&quot;Conformance Statements for SMIv2&quot;">RFC2580</a>].
210
211
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
223
224
225 The diagram shown below gives a conceptual overview of two SNMP
226 entities communicating using the TLS Transport Model (shown as
227 "TLSTM"). One entity contains a command responder and notification
228 originator application, and the other a command generator and
229 notification receiver application. It should be understood that this
230 particular mix of application types is an example only and other
231 combinations are equally valid.
232
233 Note: this diagram shows the Transport Security Model (TSM) being
234 used as the security model that is defined in [<a href="./rfc5591" title="&quot;Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5591</a>].
235
236
237
238
239
240
241
242
243
244
245
246
247
248
249
250
251
252
253
254
255
256
257
258
259
260
261
262
263
264
265
266
267
268
269
270
271
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
279
280
281 +---------------------------------------------------------------------+
282 | Network |
283 +---------------------------------------------------------------------+
284 ^ | ^ |
285 |Notifications |Commands |Commands |Notifications
286 +---|---------------------|-------+ +--|---------------|--------------+
287 | | V | | | V |
288 | +------------+ +------------+ | | +-----------+ +----------+ |
289 | | (D)TLS | | (D)TLS | | | | (D)TLS | | (D)TLS | |
290 | | (Client) | | (Server) | | | | (Client) | | (Server) | |
291 | +------------+ +------------+ | | +-----------+ +----------+ |
292 | ^ ^ | | ^ ^ |
293 | | | | | | | |
294 | +-------------+ | | +--------------+ |
295 | +-----|------------+ | | +-----|------------+ |
296 | | V | | | | V | |
297 | | +--------+ | +-----+ | | | +--------+ | +-----+ |
298 | | | TLS TM |&lt;---------&gt;|Cache| | | | | TLS TM |&lt;---------&gt;|Cache| |
299 | | +--------+ | +-----+ | | | +--------+ | +-----+ |
300 | |Transport Subsys. | ^ | | |Transport Subsys. | ^ |
301 | +------------------+ | | | +------------------+ | |
302 | ^ | | | ^ | |
303 | | +--+ | | | +--+ |
304 | v | | | V | |
305 | +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | | | +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | |
306 | | | |Message | |Securi.| | | | | | |Message | |Securi.| | |
307 | |Disp.| |Proc. | |Subsys.| | | | |Disp.| |Proc. | |Subsys.| | |
308 | | | |Subsys. | | | | | | | | |Subsys. | | | | |
309 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
310 | | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | | | | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | |
311 | | &lt;---&gt;|v3MP|&lt;--&gt; |TSM|&lt;--+ | | | &lt;---&gt;|v3MP|&lt;---&gt;|TSM|&lt;--+ |
312 | | | | +----+ | | +---+ | | | | | | +----+ | | +---+ | |
313 | | | | | | | | | | | | | | | |
314 | +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ | | +-----+ +--------+ +-------+ |
315 | ^ | | ^ |
316 | | | | | |
317 | +-+------------+ | | +-+----------+ |
318 | | | | | | | |
319 | v v | | v V |
320 | +-------------+ +-------------+ | | +-------------+ +-------------+ |
321 | | COMMAND | | NOTIFICAT. | | | | COMMAND | | NOTIFICAT. | |
322 | | RESPONDER | | ORIGINATOR | | | | GENERATOR | | RECEIVER | |
323 | | application | | application | | | | application | | application | |
324 | +-------------+ +-------------+ | | +-------------+ +-------------+ |
325 | SNMP entity | | SNMP entity |
326 +---------------------------------+ +---------------------------------+
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
335
336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions</span>
338
339 For consistency with SNMP-related specifications, this document
340 favors terminology as defined in STD 62, rather than favoring
341 terminology that is consistent with non-SNMP specifications. This is
342 consistent with the IESG decision to not require the SNMPv3
343 terminology be modified to match the usage of other non-SNMP
344 specifications when SNMPv3 was advanced to a Full Standard.
345
346 "Authentication" in this document typically refers to the English
347 meaning of "serving to prove the authenticity of" the message, not
348 data source authentication or peer identity authentication.
349
350 The terms "manager" and "agent" are not used in this document
351 because, in the [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>] architecture, all SNMP entities have the
352 capability of acting as manager, agent, or both depending on the SNMP
353 application types supported in the implementation. Where distinction
354 is required, the application names of command generator, command
355 responder, notification originator, notification receiver, and proxy
356 forwarder are used. See "SNMP Applications" [<a href="./rfc3413" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications&quot;">RFC3413</a>] for further
357 information.
358
359 Large portions of this document simultaneously refer to both TLS and
360 DTLS when discussing TLSTM components that function equally with
361 either protocol. "(D)TLS" is used in these places to indicate that
362 the statement applies to either or both protocols as appropriate.
363 When a distinction between the protocols is needed, they are referred
364 to independently through the use of "TLS" or "DTLS". The Transport
365 Model, however, is named "TLS Transport Model" and refers not to the
366 TLS or DTLS protocol but to the specification in this document, which
367 includes support for both TLS and DTLS.
368
369 Throughout this document, the terms "client" and "server" are used to
370 refer to the two ends of the (D)TLS transport connection. The client
371 actively opens the (D)TLS connection, and the server passively
372 listens for the incoming (D)TLS connection. An SNMP entity may act
373 as a (D)TLS client or server or both, depending on the SNMP
374 applications supported.
375
376 The User-Based Security Model (USM) [<a href="./rfc3414" title="&quot;User-based Security Model (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMPv3)&quot;">RFC3414</a>] is a mandatory-to-
377 implement Security Model in STD 62. While (D)TLS and USM frequently
378 refer to a user, the terminology preferred in <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> and in this
379 memo is "principal". A principal is the "who" on whose behalf
380 services are provided or processing takes place. A principal can be,
381 among other things, an individual acting in a particular role; a set
382 of individuals, with each acting in a particular role; an application
383 or a set of applications, or a combination of these within an
384 administrative domain.
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
391
392
393 Throughout this document, the term "session" is used to refer to a
394 secure association between two TLS Transport Models that permits the
395 transmission of one or more SNMP messages within the lifetime of the
396 session. The (D)TLS protocols also have an internal notion of a
397 session and although these two concepts of a session are related,
398 when the term "session" is used this document is referring to the
399 TLSTM's specific session and not directly to the (D)TLS protocol's
400 session.
401
402 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
403 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
404 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
405
406 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Changes Since <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a></span>
407
408 This document obsoletes [<a href="./rfc5953" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5953</a>].
409
410 Since the publication of <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a>, a few editorial errata have been
411 noted. These errata are posted on the RFC Editor web site. These
412 errors have been corrected in this document.
413
414 This document updates the references to <a href="./rfc3490">RFC 3490</a> (IDNA 2003) to
415 [<a href="./rfc5890" title="&quot;Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document Framework&quot;">RFC5890</a>] (IDNA 2008), because <a href="./rfc3490">RFC 3490</a> was obsoleted by <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>.
416
417 References to <a href="./rfc1033">RFC 1033</a> were replaced with references to [<a href="./rfc1123" title="&quot;Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and Support&quot;">RFC1123</a>].
418
419 Added informative reference to 5953.
420
421 Updated MIB dates and revision date.
422
423 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The Transport Layer Security Protocol</span>
424
425 (D)TLS provides authentication, data message integrity, and privacy
426 at the transport layer (see [<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>]).
427
428 The primary goals of the TLS Transport Model are to provide privacy,
429 peer identity authentication, and data integrity between two
430 communicating SNMP entities. The TLS and DTLS protocols provide a
431 secure transport upon which the TLSTM is based. Please refer to
432 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] and [<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>] for complete descriptions of the protocols.
433
434 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. How the TLSTM Fits into the Transport Subsystem</span>
435
436 A transport model is a component of the Transport Subsystem. The TLS
437 Transport Model thus fits between the underlying (D)TLS transport
438 layer and the Message Dispatcher [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>] component of the SNMP
439 engine.
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
447
448
449 The TLS Transport Model will establish a session between itself and
450 the TLS Transport Model of another SNMP engine. The sending
451 transport model passes unencrypted and unauthenticated messages from
452 the Dispatcher to (D)TLS to be encrypted and authenticated, and the
453 receiving transport model accepts decrypted and authenticated/
454 integrity-checked incoming messages from (D)TLS and passes them to
455 the Dispatcher.
456
457 After a TLS Transport Model session is established, SNMP messages can
458 conceptually be sent through the session from one SNMP message
459 Dispatcher to another SNMP Message Dispatcher. If multiple SNMP
460 messages are needed to be passed between two SNMP applications they
461 MAY be passed through the same session. A TLSTM implementation
462 engine MAY choose to close the session to conserve resources.
463
464 The TLS Transport Model of an SNMP engine will perform the
465 translation between (D)TLS-specific security parameters and SNMP-
466 specific, model-independent parameters.
467
468
469
470
471
472
473
474
475
476
477
478
479
480
481
482
483
484
485
486
487
488
489
490
491
492
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
503
504
505 The diagram below depicts where the TLS Transport Model (shown as
506 "(D)TLS TM") fits into the architecture described in <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> and the
507 Transport Subsystem:
508
509 +------------------------------+
510 | Network |
511 +------------------------------+
512 ^ ^ ^
513 | | |
514 v v v
515 +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
516 | +--------------------------------------------------+ |
517 | | Transport Subsystem | +--------+ |
518 | | +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ +-------+ | | | |
519 | | | UDP | | SSH | |(D)TLS | . . . | other |&lt;---&gt;| Cache | |
520 | | | | | TM | | TM | | | | | | |
521 | | +-----+ +-----+ +-------+ +-------+ | +--------+ |
522 | +--------------------------------------------------+ ^ |
523 | ^ | |
524 | | | |
525 | Dispatcher v | |
526 | +--------------+ +---------------------+ +----------------+ | |
527 | | Transport | | Message Processing | | Security | | |
528 | | Dispatch | | Subsystem | | Subsystem | | |
529 | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | |
530 | | | | +-&gt;| v1MP |&lt;---&gt;| | USM | | | |
531 | | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | |
532 | | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | | |
533 | | | | +-&gt;| v2cMP |&lt;---&gt;| | Transport | | | |
534 | | Message | | | +------------+ | | | Security |&lt;--+ |
535 | | Dispatch &lt;----&gt;| +------------+ | | | Model | | |
536 | | | | +-&gt;| v3MP |&lt;---&gt;| +------------+ | |
537 | | | | | +------------+ | | +------------+ | |
538 | | PDU Dispatch | | | +------------+ | | | Other | | |
539 | +--------------+ | +-&gt;| otherMP |&lt;---&gt;| | Model(s) | | |
540 | ^ | +------------+ | | +------------+ | |
541 | | +---------------------+ +----------------+ |
542 | v |
543 | +-------+-------------------------+---------------+ |
544 | ^ ^ ^ |
545 | | | | |
546 | v v v |
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
559
560
561 | +-------------+ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ |
562 | | COMMAND | | ACCESS | | NOTIFICATION | | PROXY | |
563 | | RESPONDER |&lt;-&gt;| CONTROL |&lt;-&gt;| ORIGINATOR | | FORWARDER | |
564 | | application | | | | applications | | application | |
565 | +-------------+ +---------+ +--------------+ +-------------+ |
566 | ^ ^ |
567 | | | |
568 | v v |
569 | +----------------------------------------------+ |
570 | | MIB instrumentation | SNMP entity |
571 +-------------------------------------------------------------------+
572
573 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Security Capabilities of This Model</span>
574
575 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Threats</span>
576
577 The TLS Transport Model provides protection against the threats
578 identified by the <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> architecture [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>]:
579
580 1. Modification of Information - The modification threat is the
581 danger that an unauthorized entity may alter in-transit SNMP
582 messages generated on behalf of an authorized principal in such a
583 way as to effect unauthorized management operations, including
584 falsifying the value of an object.
585
586 (D)TLS provides verification that the content of each received
587 message has not been modified during its transmission through the
588 network, data has not been altered or destroyed in an
589 unauthorized manner, and data sequences have not been altered to
590 an extent greater than can occur non-maliciously.
591
592 2. Masquerade - The masquerade threat is the danger that management
593 operations unauthorized for a given principal may be attempted by
594 assuming the identity of another principal that has the
595 appropriate authorizations.
596
597 The TLSTM verifies the identity of the (D)TLS server through the
598 use of the (D)TLS protocol and X.509 certificates. A TLS
599 Transport Model implementation MUST support the authentication of
600 both the server and the client.
601
602 3. Message stream modification - The re-ordering, delay, or replay
603 of messages can and does occur through the natural operation of
604 many connectionless transport services. The message stream
605 modification threat is the danger that messages may be
606 maliciously re-ordered, delayed, or replayed to an extent that is
607 greater than can occur through the natural operation of
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
615
616
617 connectionless transport services, in order to effect
618 unauthorized management operations.
619
620 (D)TLS provides replay protection with a Message Authentication
621 Code (MAC) that includes a sequence number. Since UDP provides
622 no sequencing ability, DTLS uses a sliding window protocol with
623 the sequence number used for replay protection (see [<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>]).
624
625 4. Disclosure - The disclosure threat is the danger of eavesdropping
626 on the exchanges between SNMP engines.
627
628 (D)TLS provides protection against the disclosure of information
629 to unauthorized recipients or eavesdroppers by allowing for
630 encryption of all traffic between SNMP engines. A TLS Transport
631 Model implementation MUST support message encryption to protect
632 sensitive data from eavesdropping attacks.
633
634 5. Denial of Service - The <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> architecture [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>] states
635 that denial-of-service (DoS) attacks need not be addressed by an
636 SNMP security protocol. However, connectionless transports (like
637 DTLS over UDP) are susceptible to a variety of DoS attacks
638 because they are more vulnerable to spoofed IP addresses. See
639 <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a> for details on how the cookie mechanism is used.
640 Note, however, that this mechanism does not provide any defense
641 against DoS attacks mounted from valid IP addresses.
642
643 See <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a> for more detail on the security considerations
644 associated with the TLSTM and these security threats.
645
646 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Message Protection</span>
647
648 The <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> architecture recognizes three levels of security:
649
650 o without authentication and without privacy (noAuthNoPriv)
651
652 o with authentication but without privacy (authNoPriv)
653
654 o with authentication and with privacy (authPriv)
655
656 The TLS Transport Model determines from (D)TLS the identity of the
657 authenticated principal, the transport type, and the transport
658 address associated with an incoming message. The TLS Transport Model
659 provides the identity and destination type and address to (D)TLS for
660 outgoing messages.
661
662 When an application requests a session for a message, it also
663 requests a security level for that session. The TLS Transport Model
664 MUST ensure that the (D)TLS connection provides security at least as
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
671
672
673 high as the requested level of security. How the security level is
674 translated into the algorithms used to provide data integrity and
675 privacy is implementation dependent. However, the NULL integrity and
676 encryption algorithms MUST NOT be used to fulfill security level
677 requests for authentication or privacy. Implementations MAY choose
678 to force (D)TLS to only allow cipher_suites that provide both
679 authentication and privacy to guarantee this assertion.
680
681 If a suitable interface between the TLS Transport Model and the
682 (D)TLS Handshake Protocol is implemented to allow the selection of
683 security-level-dependent algorithms (for example, a security level to
684 cipher_suites mapping table), then different security levels may be
685 utilized by the application.
686
687 The authentication, integrity, and privacy algorithms used by the
688 (D)TLS Protocols may vary over time as the science of cryptography
689 continues to evolve and the development of (D)TLS continues over
690 time. Implementers are encouraged to plan for changes in operator
691 trust of particular algorithms. Implementations SHOULD offer
692 configuration settings for mapping algorithms to SNMPv3 security
693 levels.
694
695 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. (D)TLS Connections</span>
696
697 (D)TLS connections are opened by the TLS Transport Model during the
698 elements of procedure for an outgoing SNMP message. Since the sender
699 of a message initiates the creation of a (D)TLS connection if needed,
700 the (D)TLS connection will already exist for an incoming message.
701
702 Implementations MAY choose to instantiate (D)TLS connections in
703 anticipation of outgoing messages. This approach might be useful to
704 ensure that a (D)TLS connection to a given target can be established
705 before it becomes important to send a message over the (D)TLS
706 connection. Of course, there is no guarantee that a pre-established
707 session will still be valid when needed.
708
709 DTLS connections, when used over UDP, are uniquely identified within
710 the TLS Transport Model by the combination of transportDomain,
711 transportAddress, tmSecurityName, and requestedSecurityLevel
712 associated with each session. Each unique combination of these
713 parameters MUST have a locally chosen unique tlstmSessionID for each
714 active session. For further information, see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. TLS over
715 TCP sessions, on the other hand, do not require a unique pairing of
716 address and port attributes since their lower-layer protocols (TCP)
717 already provide adequate session framing. But they must still
718 provide a unique tlstmSessionID for referencing the session.
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
727
728
729 The tlstmSessionID MUST NOT change during the entire duration of the
730 session from the TLSTM's perspective, and MUST uniquely identify a
731 single session. As an implementation hint: note that the (D)TLS
732 internal SessionID does not meet these requirements, since it can
733 change over the life of the connection as seen by the TLSTM (for
734 example, during renegotiation), and does not necessarily uniquely
735 identify a TLSTM session (there can be multiple TLSTM sessions
736 sharing the same D(TLS) internal SessionID).
737
738 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Security Parameter Passing</span>
739
740 For the (D)TLS server-side, (D)TLS-specific security parameters
741 (i.e., cipher_suites, X.509 certificate fields, IP addresses, and
742 ports) are translated by the TLS Transport Model into security
743 parameters for the TLS Transport Model and security model (e.g.,
744 tmSecurityLevel, tmSecurityName, transportDomain, transportAddress).
745 The transport-related and (D)TLS-security-related information,
746 including the authenticated identity, are stored in a cache
747 referenced by tmStateReference.
748
749 For the (D)TLS client side, the TLS Transport Model takes input
750 provided by the Dispatcher in the sendMessage() Abstract Service
751 Interface (ASI) and input from the tmStateReference cache. The
752 (D)TLS Transport Model converts that information into suitable
753 security parameters for (D)TLS and establishes sessions as needed.
754
755 The elements of procedure in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> discuss these concepts in much
756 greater detail.
757
758 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Notifications and Proxy</span>
759
760 (D)TLS connections may be initiated by (D)TLS clients on behalf of
761 SNMP applications that initiate communications, such as command
762 generators, notification originators, proxy forwarders. Command
763 generators are frequently operated by a human, but notification
764 originators and proxy forwarders are usually unmanned automated
765 processes. The targets to whom notifications and proxied requests
766 should be sent are typically determined and configured by a network
767 administrator.
768
769 The SNMP-TARGET-MIB module [<a href="./rfc3413" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications&quot;">RFC3413</a>] contains objects for defining
770 management targets, including transportDomain, transportAddress,
771 securityName, securityModel, and securityLevel parameters, for
772 notification originator, proxy forwarder, and SNMP-controllable
773 command generator applications. Transport domains and transport
774 addresses are configured in the snmpTargetAddrTable, and the
775 securityModel, securityName, and securityLevel parameters are
776 configured in the snmpTargetParamsTable. This document defines a MIB
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
783
784
785 module that extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's snmpTargetParamsTable to
786 specify a (D)TLS client-side certificate to use for the connection.
787
788 When configuring a (D)TLS target, the snmpTargetAddrTDomain and
789 snmpTargetAddrTAddress parameters in snmpTargetAddrTable SHOULD be
790 set to the snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain object and an
791 appropriate snmpTLSAddress value. When used with the SNMPv3 message
792 processing model, the snmpTargetParamsMPModel column of the
793 snmpTargetParamsTable SHOULD be set to a value of 3. The
794 snmpTargetParamsSecurityName SHOULD be set to an appropriate
795 securityName value, and the snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint
796 parameter of the snmpTlstmParamsTable SHOULD be set to a value that
797 refers to a locally held certificate (and the corresponding private
798 key) to be used. Other parameters, for example, cryptographic
799 configuration such as which cipher_suites to use, must come from
800 configuration mechanisms not defined in this document.
801
802 The securityName defined in the snmpTargetParamsSecurityName column
803 will be used by the access control model to authorize any
804 notifications that need to be sent.
805
806 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Elements of the Model</span>
807
808 This section contains definitions required to realize the (D)TLS
809 Transport Model defined by this document.
810
811 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. X.509 Certificates</span>
812
813 (D)TLS can make use of X.509 certificates for authentication of both
814 sides of the transport. This section discusses the use of X.509
815 certificates in the TLSTM.
816
817 While (D)TLS supports multiple authentication mechanisms, this
818 document only discusses X.509-certificate-based authentication; other
819 forms of authentication are outside the scope of this specification.
820 TLSTM implementations are REQUIRED to support X.509 certificates.
821
822 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Provisioning for the Certificate</span>
823
824 Authentication using (D)TLS will require that SNMP entities have
825 certificates, either signed by trusted Certification Authorities
826 (CAs), or self signed. Furthermore, SNMP entities will most commonly
827 need to be provisioned with root certificates that represent the list
828 of trusted CAs that an SNMP entity can use for certificate
829 verification. SNMP entities SHOULD also be provisioned with an X.509
830 certificate revocation mechanism which can be used to verify that a
831 certificate has not been revoked. Trusted public keys from either CA
832 certificates and/or self-signed certificates MUST be installed into
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
839
840
841 the server through a trusted out-of-band mechanism and their
842 authenticity MUST be verified before access is granted.
843
844 Having received a certificate from a connecting TLSTM client, the
845 authenticated tmSecurityName of the principal is derived using the
846 snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable. This table allows mapping of incoming
847 connections to tmSecurityNames through defined transformations. The
848 transformations defined in the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB include:
849
850 o Mapping a certificate's subjectAltName or CommonName components to
851 a tmSecurityName, or
852
853 o Mapping a certificate's fingerprint value to a directly specified
854 tmSecurityName
855
856 As an implementation hint: implementations may choose to discard any
857 connections for which no potential snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable mapping
858 exists before performing certificate verification to avoid expending
859 computational resources associated with certificate verification.
860
861 Deployments SHOULD map the "subjectAltName" component of X.509
862 certificates to the TLSTM specific tmSecurityNames. The
863 authenticated identity can be obtained by the TLS Transport Model by
864 extracting the subjectAltName(s) from the peer's certificate. The
865 receiving application will then have an appropriate tmSecurityName
866 for use by other SNMPv3 components like an access control model.
867
868 An example of this type of mapping setup can be found in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.
869
870 This tmSecurityName may be later translated from a TLSTM specific
871 tmSecurityName to an SNMP engine securityName by the security model.
872 A security model, like the TSM security model [<a href="./rfc5591" title="&quot;Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5591</a>], may perform
873 an identity mapping or a more complex mapping to derive the
874 securityName from the tmSecurityName offered by the TLS Transport
875 Model.
876
877 The standard View-Based Access Control Model (VACM) access control
878 model constrains securityNames to be 32 octets or less in length. A
879 TLSTM generated tmSecurityName, possibly in combination with a
880 messaging or security model that increases the length of the
881 securityName, might cause the securityName length to exceed 32
882 octets. For example, a 32-octet tmSecurityName derived from an IPv6
883 address, paired with a TSM prefix, will generate a 36-octet
884 securityName. Such a securityName will not be able to be used with
885 standard VACM or TARGET MIB modules. Operators should be careful to
886 select algorithms and subjectAltNames to avoid this situation.
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
895
896
897 A pictorial view of the complete transformation process (using the
898 TSM security model for the example) is shown below:
899
900 +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+
901 | Certificate | | | | |
902 | Path | | TLSTM | tmSecurityName | TSM |
903 | Validation | --&gt; | | -----------------&gt;| |
904 +-------------+ +-------+ +-----+
905 |
906 | securityName
907 V
908 +-------------+
909 | application |
910 +-------------+
911
912 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. (D)TLS Usage</span>
913
914 (D)TLS MUST negotiate a cipher_suite that uses X.509 certificates for
915 authentication, and MUST authenticate both the client and the server.
916 The mandatory-to-implement cipher_suite is specified in the TLS
917 specification [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>].
918
919 TLSTM verifies the certificates when the connection is opened (see
920 <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>). For this reason, TLS renegotiation with different
921 certificates MUST NOT be done. That is, implementations MUST either
922 disable renegotiation completely (RECOMMENDED), or they MUST present
923 the same certificate during renegotiation (and MUST verify that the
924 other end presented the same certificate).
925
926 For DTLS over UDP, each SNMP message MUST be placed in a single UDP
927 datagram; it MAY be split to multiple DTLS records. In other words,
928 if a single datagram contains multiple DTLS application_data records,
929 they are concatenated when received. The TLSTM implementation SHOULD
930 return an error if the SNMP message does not fit in the UDP datagram,
931 and thus cannot be sent.
932
933 For DTLS over UDP, the DTLS server implementation MUST support DTLS
934 cookies ([<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>] already requires that clients support DTLS
935 cookies). Implementations are not required to perform the cookie
936 exchange for every DTLS handshake; however, enabling it by default is
937 RECOMMENDED.
938
939 For DTLS, replay protection MUST be used.
940
941
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
951
952
953 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. SNMP Services</span>
954
955 This section describes the services provided by the TLS Transport
956 Model with their inputs and outputs. The services are between the
957 Transport Model and the Dispatcher.
958
959 The services are described as primitives of an abstract service
960 interface (ASI) and the inputs and outputs are described as abstract
961 data elements as they are passed in these abstract service
962 primitives.
963
964 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.1" href="#section-4.3.1">4.3.1</a>. SNMP Services for an Outgoing Message</span>
965
966 The Dispatcher passes the information to the TLS Transport Model
967 using the ASI defined in the Transport Subsystem:
968
969 statusInformation =
970 sendMessage(
971 IN destTransportDomain -- transport domain to be used
972 IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used
973 IN outgoingMessage -- the message to send
974 IN outgoingMessageLength -- its length
975 IN tmStateReference -- reference to transport state
976 )
977
978 The abstract data elements returned from or passed as parameters into
979 the abstract service primitives are as follows:
980
981 statusInformation: An indication of whether the sending of the
982 message was successful. If not, it is an indication of the
983 problem.
984
985 destTransportDomain: The transport domain for the associated
986 destTransportAddress. The Transport Model uses this parameter to
987 determine the transport type of the associated
988 destTransportAddress. This document specifies the
989 snmpTLSTCPDomain and the snmpDTLSUDPDomain transport domains.
990
991 destTransportAddress: The transport address of the destination TLS
992 Transport Model in a format specified by the SnmpTLSAddress
993 TEXTUAL-CONVENTION.
994
995 outgoingMessage: The outgoing message to send to (D)TLS for
996 encapsulation and transmission.
997
998 outgoingMessageLength: The length of the outgoingMessage.
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1007
1008
1009 tmStateReference: A reference used to pass model-specific and
1010 mechanism-specific parameters between the Transport Subsystem and
1011 transport-aware Security Models.
1012
1013 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3.2" href="#section-4.3.2">4.3.2</a>. SNMP Services for an Incoming Message</span>
1014
1015 The TLS Transport Model processes the received message from the
1016 network using the (D)TLS service and then passes it to the Dispatcher
1017 using the following ASI:
1018
1019 statusInformation =
1020 receiveMessage(
1021 IN transportDomain -- origin transport domain
1022 IN transportAddress -- origin transport address
1023 IN incomingMessage -- the message received
1024 IN incomingMessageLength -- its length
1025 IN tmStateReference -- reference to transport state
1026 )
1027
1028 The abstract data elements returned from or passed as parameters into
1029 the abstract service primitives are as follows:
1030
1031 statusInformation: An indication of whether the passing of the
1032 message was successful. If not, it is an indication of the
1033 problem.
1034
1035 transportDomain: The transport domain for the associated
1036 transportAddress. This document specifies the snmpTLSTCPDomain
1037 and the snmpDTLSUDPDomain transport domains.
1038
1039 transportAddress: The transport address of the source of the
1040 received message in a format specified by the SnmpTLSAddress
1041 TEXTUAL-CONVENTION.
1042
1043 incomingMessage: The whole SNMP message after being processed by
1044 (D)TLS.
1045
1046 incomingMessageLength: The length of the incomingMessage.
1047
1048 tmStateReference: A reference used to pass model-specific and
1049 mechanism-specific parameters between the Transport Subsystem and
1050 transport-aware Security Models.
1051
1052
1053
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1063
1064
1065 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Cached Information and References</span>
1066
1067 When performing SNMP processing, there are two levels of state
1068 information that may need to be retained: the immediate state linking
1069 a request-response pair, and potentially longer-term state relating
1070 to transport and security. "Transport Subsystem for the Simple
1071 Network Management Protocol (SNMP)" [<a href="./rfc5590" title="&quot;Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5590</a>] defines general
1072 requirements for caches and references.
1073
1074 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1" href="#section-4.4.1">4.4.1</a>. TLS Transport Model Cached Information</span>
1075
1076 The TLS Transport Model has specific responsibilities regarding the
1077 cached information. See the Elements of Procedure in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for
1078 detailed processing instructions on the use of the tmStateReference
1079 fields by the TLS Transport Model.
1080
1081 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1.1" href="#section-4.4.1.1">4.4.1.1</a>. tmSecurityName</span>
1082
1083 The tmSecurityName MUST be a human-readable name (in snmpAdminString
1084 format) representing the identity that has been set according to the
1085 procedures in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. The tmSecurityName MUST be constant for all
1086 traffic passing through a single TLSTM session. Messages MUST NOT be
1087 sent through an existing (D)TLS connection that was established using
1088 a different tmSecurityName.
1089
1090 On the (D)TLS server side of a connection, the tmSecurityName is
1091 derived using the procedures described in <a href="#section-5.3.2">Section 5.3.2</a> and the SNMP-
1092 TLS-TM-MIB's snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable DESCRIPTION clause.
1093
1094 On the (D)TLS client side of a connection, the tmSecurityName is
1095 presented to the TLS Transport Model by the security model through
1096 the tmStateReference. This tmSecurityName is typically a copy of or
1097 is derived from the securityName that was passed by application
1098 (possibly because of configuration specified in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB).
1099 The Security Model likely derived the tmSecurityName from the
1100 securityName presented to the Security Model by the application
1101 (possibly because of configuration specified in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB).
1102
1103 Transport-Model-aware security models derive tmSecurityName from a
1104 securityName, possibly configured in MIB modules for notifications
1105 and access controls. Transport Models SHOULD use predictable
1106 tmSecurityNames so operators will know what to use when configuring
1107 MIB modules that use securityNames derived from tmSecurityNames. The
1108 TLSTM generates predictable tmSecurityNames based on the
1109 configuration found in the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB's snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
1110 and relies on the network operators to have configured this table
1111 appropriately.
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1119
1120
1121 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1.2" href="#section-4.4.1.2">4.4.1.2</a>. tmSessionID</span>
1122
1123 The tmSessionID MUST be recorded per message at the time of receipt.
1124 When tmSameSecurity is set, the recorded tmSessionID can be used to
1125 determine whether the (D)TLS connection available for sending a
1126 corresponding outgoing message is the same (D)TLS connection as was
1127 used when receiving the incoming message (e.g., a response to a
1128 request).
1129
1130 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4.1.3" href="#section-4.4.1.3">4.4.1.3</a>. Session State</span>
1131
1132 The per-session state that is referenced by tmStateReference may be
1133 saved across multiple messages in a Local Configuration Datastore.
1134 Additional session/connection state information might also be stored
1135 in a Local Configuration Datastore.
1136
1137 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Elements of Procedure</span>
1138
1139 Abstract service interfaces have been defined by [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>] and
1140 further augmented by [<a href="./rfc5590" title="&quot;Transport Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5590</a>] to describe the conceptual data flows
1141 between the various subsystems within an SNMP entity. The TLSTM uses
1142 some of these conceptual data flows when communicating between
1143 subsystems.
1144
1145 To simplify the elements of procedure, the release of state
1146 information is not always explicitly specified. As a general rule,
1147 if state information is available when a message gets discarded, the
1148 message-state information should also be released. If state
1149 information is available when a session is closed, the session state
1150 information should also be released. Sensitive information, like
1151 cryptographic keys, should be overwritten appropriately prior to
1152 being released.
1153
1154 An error indication in statusInformation will typically include the
1155 Object Identifier (OID) and value for an incremented error counter.
1156 This may be accompanied by the requested securityLevel and the
1157 tmStateReference. Per-message context information is not accessible
1158 to Transport Models, so for the returned counter OID and value,
1159 contextEngine would be set to the local value of snmpEngineID and
1160 contextName to the default context for error counters.
1161
1162 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Procedures for an Incoming Message</span>
1163
1164 This section describes the procedures followed by the (D)TLS
1165 Transport Model when it receives a (D)TLS protected packet. The
1166 required functionality is broken into two different sections.
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1175
1176
1177 <a href="#section-5.1.1">Section 5.1.1</a> describes the processing required for de-multiplexing
1178 multiple DTLS connections, which is specifically needed for DTLS over
1179 UDP sessions. It is assumed that TLS protocol implementations
1180 already provide appropriate message demultiplexing.
1181
1182 <a href="#section-5.1.2">Section 5.1.2</a> describes the transport processing required once the
1183 (D)TLS processing has been completed. This will be needed for all
1184 (D)TLS-based connections.
1185
1186 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.1" href="#section-5.1.1">5.1.1</a>. DTLS over UDP Processing for Incoming Messages</span>
1187
1188 Demultiplexing of incoming packets into separate DTLS sessions MUST
1189 be implemented. For connection-oriented transport protocols, such as
1190 TCP, the transport protocol takes care of demultiplexing incoming
1191 packets to the right connection. For DTLS over UDP, this
1192 demultiplexing will either need to be done within the DTLS
1193 implementation, if supported, or by the TLSTM implementation.
1194
1195 Like TCP, DTLS over UDP uses the four-tuple &lt;source IP, destination
1196 IP, source port, destination port&gt; for identifying the connection
1197 (and relevant DTLS connection state). This means that when
1198 establishing a new session, implementations MUST use a different UDP
1199 source port number for each active connection to a remote destination
1200 IP-address/port-number combination to ensure the remote entity can
1201 disambiguate between multiple connections.
1202
1203 If demultiplexing received UDP datagrams to DTLS connection state is
1204 done by the TLSTM implementation (instead of the DTLS
1205 implementation), the steps below describe one possible method to
1206 accomplish this.
1207
1208 The important output results from the steps in this process are the
1209 remote transport address, incomingMessage, incomingMessageLength, and
1210 the tlstmSessionID.
1211
1212 1) The TLS Transport Model examines the raw UDP message, in an
1213 implementation-dependent manner.
1214
1215 2) The TLS Transport Model queries the Local Configuration Datastore
1216 (LCD) (see <a href="./rfc3411#section-3.4.2">[RFC3411], Section&nbsp;3.4.2</a>) using the transport
1217 parameters (source and destination IP addresses and ports) to
1218 determine if a session already exists.
1219
1220 2a) If a matching entry in the LCD does not exist, then the UDP
1221 packet is passed to the DTLS implementation for processing.
1222 If the DTLS implementation decides to continue with the
1223 connection and allocate state for it, it returns a new DTLS
1224 connection handle (an implementation dependent detail). In
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1231
1232
1233 this case, TLSTM selects a new tlstmSessionId, and caches
1234 this and the DTLS connection handle as a new entry in the
1235 LCD (indexed by the transport parameters). If the DTLS
1236 implementation returns an error or does not allocate
1237 connection state (which can happen with the stateless cookie
1238 exchange), processing stops.
1239
1240 2b) If a session does exist in the LCD, then its DTLS connection
1241 handle (an implementation dependent detail) and its
1242 tlstmSessionId is extracted from the LCD. The UDP packet
1243 and the connection handle are passed to the DTLS
1244 implementation. If the DTLS implementation returns success
1245 but does not return an incomingMessage and an
1246 incomingMessageLength, then processing stops (this is the
1247 case when the UDP datagram contained DTLS handshake
1248 messages, for example). If the DTLS implementation returns
1249 an error, then processing stops.
1250
1251 3) Retrieve the incomingMessage and an incomingMessageLength from
1252 DTLS. These results and the tlstmSessionID are used below in
1253 <a href="#section-5.1.2">Section 5.1.2</a> to complete the processing of the incoming message.
1254
1255 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1.2" href="#section-5.1.2">5.1.2</a>. Transport Processing for Incoming SNMP Messages</span>
1256
1257 The procedures in this section describe how the TLS Transport Model
1258 should process messages that have already been properly extracted
1259 from the (D)TLS stream. Note that care must be taken when processing
1260 messages originating from either TLS or DTLS to ensure they're
1261 complete and single. For example, multiple SNMP messages can be
1262 passed through a single DTLS message and partial SNMP messages may be
1263 received from a TLS stream. These steps describe the processing of a
1264 singular SNMP message after it has been delivered from the (D)TLS
1265 stream.
1266
1267 1) Determine the tlstmSessionID for the incoming message. The
1268 tlstmSessionID MUST be a unique session identifier for this
1269 (D)TLS connection. The contents and format of this identifier
1270 are implementation dependent as long as it is unique to the
1271 session. A session identifier MUST NOT be reused until all
1272 references to it are no longer in use. The tmSessionID is equal
1273 to the tlstmSessionID discussed in <a href="#section-5.1.1">Section 5.1.1</a>. tmSessionID
1274 refers to the session identifier when stored in the
1275 tmStateReference and tlstmSessionID refers to the session
1276 identifier when stored in the LCD. They MUST always be equal
1277 when processing a given session's traffic.
1278
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1287
1288
1289 If this is the first message received through this session, and
1290 the session does not have an assigned tlstmSessionID yet, then
1291 the snmpTlstmSessionAccepts counter is incremented and a
1292 tlstmSessionID for the session is created. This will only happen
1293 on the server side of a connection because a client would have
1294 already assigned a tlstmSessionID during the openSession()
1295 invocation. Implementations may have performed the procedures
1296 described in <a href="#section-5.3.2">Section 5.3.2</a> prior to this point or they may
1297 perform them now, but the procedures described in <a href="#section-5.3.2">Section 5.3.2</a>
1298 MUST be performed before continuing beyond this point.
1299
1300 2) Create a tmStateReference cache for the subsequent reference and
1301 assign the following values within it:
1302
1303 tmTransportDomain = snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain as
1304 appropriate.
1305
1306 tmTransportAddress = The address from which the message
1307 originated.
1308
1309 tmSecurityLevel = The derived tmSecurityLevel for the session,
1310 as discussed in Sections <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a> and <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>.
1311
1312 tmSecurityName = The derived tmSecurityName for the session as
1313 discussed in <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>. This value MUST be constant during
1314 the lifetime of the session.
1315
1316 tmSessionID = The tlstmSessionID described in step 1 above.
1317
1318 3) The incomingMessage and incomingMessageLength are assigned values
1319 from the (D)TLS processing.
1320
1321 4) The TLS Transport Model passes the transportDomain,
1322 transportAddress, incomingMessage, and incomingMessageLength to
1323 the Dispatcher using the receiveMessage ASI:
1324
1325 statusInformation =
1326 receiveMessage(
1327 IN transportDomain -- snmpTLSTCPDomain or snmpDTLSUDPDomain,
1328 IN transportAddress -- address for the received message
1329 IN incomingMessage -- the whole SNMP message from (D)TLS
1330 IN incomingMessageLength -- the length of the SNMP message
1331 IN tmStateReference -- transport info
1332 )
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1343
1344
1345 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Procedures for an Outgoing SNMP Message</span>
1346
1347 The Dispatcher sends a message to the TLS Transport Model using the
1348 following ASI:
1349
1350 statusInformation =
1351 sendMessage(
1352 IN destTransportDomain -- transport domain to be used
1353 IN destTransportAddress -- transport address to be used
1354 IN outgoingMessage -- the message to send
1355 IN outgoingMessageLength -- its length
1356 IN tmStateReference -- transport info
1357 )
1358
1359 This section describes the procedure followed by the TLS Transport
1360 Model whenever it is requested through this ASI to send a message.
1361
1362 1) If tmStateReference does not refer to a cache containing values
1363 for tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName,
1364 tmRequestedSecurityLevel, and tmSameSecurity, then increment the
1365 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches counter, discard the message, and
1366 return the error indication in the statusInformation. Processing
1367 of this message stops.
1368
1369 2) Extract the tmSessionID, tmTransportDomain, tmTransportAddress,
1370 tmSecurityName, tmRequestedSecurityLevel, and tmSameSecurity
1371 values from the tmStateReference. Note: the tmSessionID value
1372 may be undefined if no session exists yet over which the message
1373 can be sent.
1374
1375 3) If tmSameSecurity is true and tmSessionID is either undefined or
1376 refers to a session that is no longer open, then increment the
1377 snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions counter, discard the message, and
1378 return the error indication in the statusInformation. Processing
1379 of this message stops.
1380
1381 4) If tmSameSecurity is false and tmSessionID refers to a session
1382 that is no longer available, then an implementation SHOULD open a
1383 new session, using the openSession() ASI (described in greater
1384 detail in step 5b). Instead of opening a new session an
1385 implementation MAY return an snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions error to
1386 the calling module and stop the processing of the message.
1387
1388 5) If tmSessionID is undefined, then use tmTransportDomain,
1389 tmTransportAddress, tmSecurityName, and tmRequestedSecurityLevel
1390 to see if there is a corresponding entry in the LCD suitable to
1391 send the message over.
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1399
1400
1401 5a) If there is a corresponding LCD entry, then this session
1402 will be used to send the message.
1403
1404 5b) If there is no corresponding LCD entry, then open a session
1405 using the openSession() ASI (discussed further in
1406 <a href="#section-5.3.1">Section 5.3.1</a>). Implementations MAY wish to offer message
1407 buffering to prevent redundant openSession() calls for the
1408 same cache entry. If an error is returned from
1409 openSession(), then discard the message, discard the
1410 tmStateReference, increment the snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors,
1411 return an error indication to the calling module, and stop
1412 the processing of the message.
1413
1414 6) Using either the session indicated by the tmSessionID (if there
1415 was one) or the session resulting from a previous step (4 or 5),
1416 pass the outgoingMessage to (D)TLS for encapsulation and
1417 transmission.
1418
1419 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Establishing or Accepting a Session</span>
1420
1421 Establishing a (D)TLS connection as either a client or a server
1422 requires slightly different processing. The following two sections
1423 describe the necessary processing steps.
1424
1425 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.1" href="#section-5.3.1">5.3.1</a>. Establishing a Session as a Client</span>
1426
1427 The TLS Transport Model provides the following primitive for use by a
1428 client to establish a new (D)TLS connection:
1429
1430 statusInformation = -- errorIndication or success
1431 openSession(
1432 IN tmStateReference -- transport information to be used
1433 OUT tmStateReference -- transport information to be used
1434 IN maxMessageSize -- of the sending SNMP entity
1435 )
1436
1437 The following describes the procedure to follow when establishing an
1438 SNMP over a (D)TLS connection between SNMP engines for exchanging
1439 SNMP messages. This process is followed by any SNMP client's engine
1440 when establishing a session for subsequent use.
1441
1442 This procedure MAY be done automatically for an SNMP application that
1443 initiates a transaction, such as a command generator, a notification
1444 originator, or a proxy forwarder.
1445
1446 1) The snmpTlstmSessionOpens counter is incremented.
1447
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1455
1456
1457 2) The client selects the appropriate certificate and cipher_suites
1458 for the key agreement based on the tmSecurityName and the
1459 tmRequestedSecurityLevel for the session. For sessions being
1460 established as a result of an SNMP-TARGET-MIB based operation,
1461 the certificate will potentially have been identified via the
1462 snmpTlstmParamsTable mapping and the cipher_suites will have to
1463 be taken from a system-wide or implementation-specific
1464 configuration. If no row in the snmpTlstmParamsTable exists,
1465 then implementations MAY choose to establish the connection using
1466 a default client certificate available to the application.
1467 Otherwise, the certificate and appropriate cipher_suites will
1468 need to be passed to the openSession() ASI as supplemental
1469 information or configured through an implementation-dependent
1470 mechanism. It is also implementation-dependent and possibly
1471 policy-dependent how tmRequestedSecurityLevel will be used to
1472 influence the security capabilities provided by the (D)TLS
1473 connection. However this is done, the security capabilities
1474 provided by (D)TLS MUST be at least as high as the level of
1475 security indicated by the tmRequestedSecurityLevel parameter.
1476 The actual security level of the session is reported in the
1477 tmStateReference cache as tmSecurityLevel. For (D)TLS to provide
1478 strong authentication, each principal acting as a command
1479 generator SHOULD have its own certificate.
1480
1481 3) Using the destTransportDomain and destTransportAddress values,
1482 the client will initiate the (D)TLS handshake protocol to
1483 establish session keys for message integrity and encryption.
1484
1485 If the attempt to establish a session is unsuccessful, then
1486 snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors is incremented, an error indication is
1487 returned, and processing stops. If the session failed to open
1488 because the presented server certificate was unknown or invalid,
1489 then the snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate or
1490 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates MUST be incremented and
1491 an snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown or
1492 snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate notification SHOULD be sent as
1493 appropriate. Reasons for server certificate invalidation
1494 include, but are not limited to, cryptographic validation
1495 failures and an unexpected presented certificate identity.
1496
1497 4) The (D)TLS client MUST then verify that the (D)TLS server's
1498 presented certificate is the expected certificate. The (D)TLS
1499 client MUST NOT transmit SNMP messages until the server
1500 certificate has been authenticated, the client certificate has
1501 been transmitted, and the TLS connection has been fully
1502 established.
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1511
1512
1513 If the connection is being established from a configuration based
1514 on SNMP-TARGET-MIB configuration, then the snmpTlstmAddrTable
1515 DESCRIPTION clause describes how the verification is done (using
1516 either a certificate fingerprint, or an identity authenticated
1517 via certification path validation).
1518
1519 If the connection is being established for reasons other than
1520 configuration found in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB, then configuration
1521 and procedures outside the scope of this document should be
1522 followed. Configuration mechanisms SHOULD be similar in nature
1523 to those defined in the snmpTlstmAddrTable to ensure consistency
1524 across management configuration systems. For example, a command-
1525 line tool for generating SNMP GETs might support specifying
1526 either the server's certificate fingerprint or the expected host
1527 name as a command-line argument.
1528
1529 5) (D)TLS provides assurance that the authenticated identity has
1530 been signed by a trusted configured Certification Authority. If
1531 verification of the server's certificate fails in any way (for
1532 example, because of failures in cryptographic verification or the
1533 presented identity did not match the expected named entity), then
1534 the session establishment MUST fail, and the
1535 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates object is incremented.
1536 If the session cannot be opened for any reason at all, including
1537 cryptographic verification failures and snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
1538 lookup failures, then the snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors counter is
1539 incremented and processing stops.
1540
1541 6) The TLSTM-specific session identifier (tlstmSessionID) is set in
1542 the tmSessionID of the tmStateReference passed to the TLS
1543 Transport Model to indicate that the session has been established
1544 successfully and to point to a specific (D)TLS connection for
1545 future use. The tlstmSessionID is also stored in the LCD for
1546 later lookup during processing of incoming messages
1547 (<a href="#section-5.1.2">Section 5.1.2</a>).
1548
1549 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.2" href="#section-5.3.2">5.3.2</a>. Accepting a Session as a Server</span>
1550
1551 A (D)TLS server should accept new session connections from any client
1552 for which it is able to verify the client's credentials. This is
1553 done by authenticating the client's presented certificate through a
1554 certificate path validation process (e.g., [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>]) or through
1555 certificate fingerprint verification using fingerprints configured in
1556 the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable. Afterward, the server will determine
1557 the identity of the remote entity using the following procedures.
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1567
1568
1569 The (D)TLS server identifies the authenticated identity from the
1570 (D)TLS client's principal certificate using configuration information
1571 from the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable mapping table. The (D)TLS server
1572 MUST request and expect a certificate from the client and MUST NOT
1573 accept SNMP messages over the (D)TLS connection until the client has
1574 sent a certificate and it has been authenticated. The resulting
1575 derived tmSecurityName is recorded in the tmStateReference cache as
1576 tmSecurityName. The details of the lookup process are fully
1577 described in the DESCRIPTION clause of the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
1578 MIB object. If any verification fails in any way (for example,
1579 because of failures in cryptographic verification or because of the
1580 lack of an appropriate row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable), then the
1581 session establishment MUST fail, and the
1582 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates object is incremented. If
1583 the session cannot be opened for any reason at all, including
1584 cryptographic verification failures, then the
1585 snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors counter is incremented and processing
1586 stops.
1587
1588 Servers that wish to support multiple principals at a particular port
1589 SHOULD make use of a (D)TLS extension that allows server-side
1590 principal selection like the Server Name Indication extension defined
1591 in <a href="./rfc4366#section-3.1">Section&nbsp;3.1 of [RFC4366]</a>. Supporting this will allow, for
1592 example, sending notifications to a specific principal at a given TCP
1593 or UDP port.
1594
1595 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Closing a Session</span>
1596
1597 The TLS Transport Model provides the following primitive to close a
1598 session:
1599
1600 statusInformation =
1601 closeSession(
1602 IN tmSessionID -- session ID of the session to be closed
1603 )
1604
1605 The following describes the procedure to follow to close a session
1606 between a client and server. This process is followed by any SNMP
1607 engine closing the corresponding SNMP session.
1608
1609 1) Increment either the snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses or the
1610 snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses counter as appropriate.
1611
1612 2) Look up the session using the tmSessionID.
1613
1614 3) If there is no open session associated with the tmSessionID, then
1615 closeSession processing is completed.
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1623
1624
1625 4) Have (D)TLS close the specified connection. This MUST include
1626 sending a close_notify TLS Alert to inform the other side that
1627 session cleanup may be performed.
1628
1629 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. MIB Module Overview</span>
1630
1631 This MIB module provides management of the TLS Transport Model. It
1632 defines needed textual conventions, statistical counters,
1633 notifications, and configuration infrastructure necessary for session
1634 establishment. Example usage of the configuration tables can be
1635 found in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.
1636
1637 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Structure of the MIB Module</span>
1638
1639 Objects in this MIB module are arranged into subtrees. Each subtree
1640 is organized as a set of related objects. The overall structure and
1641 assignment of objects to their subtrees, and the intended purpose of
1642 each subtree, is shown below.
1643
1644 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Textual Conventions</span>
1645
1646 Generic and Common Textual Conventions used in this module can be
1647 found summarized at <a href="http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-common-tcs.html">http://www.ops.ietf.org/mib-common-tcs.html</a>.
1648
1649 This module defines the following new Textual Conventions:
1650
1651 o A new TransportAddress format for describing (D)TLS connection
1652 addressing requirements.
1653
1654 o A certificate fingerprint allowing MIB module objects to
1655 generically refer to a stored X.509 certificate using a
1656 cryptographic hash as a reference pointer.
1657
1658 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. Statistical Counters</span>
1659
1660 The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defines counters that provide network management
1661 stations with information about session usage and potential errors
1662 that a device may be experiencing.
1663
1664 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. Configuration Tables</span>
1665
1666 The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defines configuration tables that an
1667 administrator can use for configuring a device for sending and
1668 receiving SNMP messages over (D)TLS. In particular, there are MIB
1669 tables that extend the SNMP-TARGET-MIB for configuring (D)TLS
1670 certificate usage and a MIB table for mapping incoming (D)TLS client
1671 certificates to SNMPv3 tmSecurityNames.
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1679
1680
1681 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4.1" href="#section-6.4.1">6.4.1</a>. Notifications</span>
1682
1683 The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB defines notifications to alert management
1684 stations when a (D)TLS connection fails because a server's presented
1685 certificate did not meet an expected value
1686 (snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown) or because cryptographic
1687 validation failed (snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate).
1688
1689 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5" href="#section-6.5">6.5</a>. Relationship to Other MIB Modules</span>
1690
1691 Some management objects defined in other MIB modules are applicable
1692 to an entity implementing the TLS Transport Model. In particular, it
1693 is assumed that an entity implementing the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB will
1694 implement the SNMPv2-MIB [<a href="./rfc3418" title="&quot;Management Information Base (MIB) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3418</a>], the SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>],
1695 the SNMP-TARGET-MIB [<a href="./rfc3413" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications&quot;">RFC3413</a>], the SNMP-NOTIFICATION-MIB [<a href="./rfc3413" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications&quot;">RFC3413</a>],
1696 and the SNMP-VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB [<a href="./rfc3415" title="&quot;View-based Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC3415</a>].
1697
1698 The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB module contained in this document is for managing
1699 TLS Transport Model information.
1700
1701 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.5.1" href="#section-6.5.1">6.5.1</a>. MIB Modules Required for IMPORTS</span>
1702
1703 The SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB module imports items from SNMPv2-SMI [<a href="./rfc2578" title="&quot;Structure of Management Information Version 2 (SMIv2)&quot;">RFC2578</a>],
1704 SNMPv2-TC [<a href="./rfc2579" title="&quot;Textual Conventions for SMIv2&quot;">RFC2579</a>], SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB [<a href="./rfc3411" title="&quot;An Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks&quot;">RFC3411</a>], SNMP-TARGET-MIB
1705 [<a href="./rfc3413" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications&quot;">RFC3413</a>], and SNMPv2-CONF [<a href="./rfc2580" title="&quot;Conformance Statements for SMIv2&quot;">RFC2580</a>].
1706
1707 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. MIB Module Definition</span>
1708
1709 SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB DEFINITIONS ::= BEGIN
1710
1711 IMPORTS
1712 MODULE-IDENTITY, OBJECT-TYPE,
1713 OBJECT-IDENTITY, mib-2, snmpDomains,
1714 Counter32, Unsigned32, Gauge32, NOTIFICATION-TYPE
1715 FROM SNMPv2-SMI -- <a href="./rfc2578">RFC 2578</a> or any update thereof
1716 TEXTUAL-CONVENTION, TimeStamp, RowStatus, StorageType,
1717 AutonomousType
1718 FROM SNMPv2-TC -- <a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a> or any update thereof
1719 MODULE-COMPLIANCE, OBJECT-GROUP, NOTIFICATION-GROUP
1720 FROM SNMPv2-CONF -- <a href="./rfc2580">RFC 2580</a> or any update thereof
1721 SnmpAdminString
1722 FROM SNMP-FRAMEWORK-MIB -- <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a> or any update thereof
1723 snmpTargetParamsName, snmpTargetAddrName
1724 FROM SNMP-TARGET-MIB -- <a href="./rfc3413">RFC 3413</a> or any update thereof
1725 ;
1726
1727 snmpTlstmMIB MODULE-IDENTITY
1728 LAST-UPDATED "201107190000Z"
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1735
1736
1737 ORGANIZATION "ISMS Working Group"
1738 CONTACT-INFO "WG-EMail: [email protected]
1739 Subscribe: [email protected]
1740
1741 Chairs:
1742 Juergen Schoenwaelder
1743 Jacobs University Bremen
1744 Campus Ring 1
1745 28725 Bremen
1746 Germany
1747 +49 421 200-3587
1748 [email protected]
1749
1750 Russ Mundy
1751 SPARTA, Inc.
1752 7110 Samuel Morse Drive
1753 Columbia, MD 21046
1754 USA
1755
1756 Editor:
1757 Wes Hardaker
1758 SPARTA, Inc.
1759 P.O. Box 382
1760 Davis, CA 95617
1761 USA
1762 [email protected]
1763 "
1764
1765 DESCRIPTION "
1766 The TLS Transport Model MIB
1767
1768 Copyright (c) 2010-2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified
1769 as authors of the code. All rights reserved.
1770
1771 Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or
1772 without modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject
1773 to the license terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License
1774 set forth in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions
1775 Relating to IETF Documents
1776 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>)."
1777
1778 REVISION "201107190000Z"
1779 DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of
1780 <a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a>; see the RFC itself for full legal
1781 notices. The only change was to introduce
1782 new wording to reflect require changes for
1783 IDNA addresses in the SnmpTLSAddress TC."
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1791
1792
1793 REVISION "201005070000Z"
1794 DESCRIPTION "This version of this MIB module is part of
1795 <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a>; see the RFC itself for full legal
1796 notices."
1797
1798 ::= { mib-2 198 }
1799
1800 -- ************************************************
1801 -- subtrees of the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB
1802 -- ************************************************
1803
1804 snmpTlstmNotifications OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 0 }
1805 snmpTlstmIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 1 }
1806 snmpTlstmObjects OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 2 }
1807 snmpTlstmConformance OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmMIB 3 }
1808
1809 -- ************************************************
1810 -- snmpTlstmObjects - Objects
1811 -- ************************************************
1812
1813 snmpTLSTCPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
1814 STATUS current
1815 DESCRIPTION
1816 "The SNMP over TLS via TCP transport domain. The
1817 corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.
1818
1819 The securityName prefix to be associated with the
1820 snmpTLSTCPDomain is 'tls'. This prefix may be used by
1821 security models or other components to identify which secure
1822 transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
1823 REFERENCE
1824 "<a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a>: Textual Conventions for SMIv2"
1825 ::= { snmpDomains 8 }
1826
1827 snmpDTLSUDPDomain OBJECT-IDENTITY
1828 STATUS current
1829 DESCRIPTION
1830 "The SNMP over DTLS via UDP transport domain. The
1831 corresponding transport address is of type SnmpTLSAddress.
1832
1833 The securityName prefix to be associated with the
1834 snmpDTLSUDPDomain is 'dtls'. This prefix may be used by
1835 security models or other components to identify which secure
1836 transport infrastructure authenticated a securityName."
1837 REFERENCE
1838 "<a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a>: Textual Conventions for SMIv2"
1839 ::= { snmpDomains 9 }
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1847
1848
1849 SnmpTLSAddress ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
1850 DISPLAY-HINT "1a"
1851 STATUS current
1852 DESCRIPTION
1853 "Represents an IPv4 address, an IPv6 address, or a
1854 US-ASCII-encoded hostname and port number.
1855
1856 An IPv4 address must be in dotted decimal format followed by a
1857 colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number
1858 in US-ASCII.
1859
1860 An IPv6 address must be a colon-separated format (as described
1861 in <a href="./rfc5952">RFC 5952</a>), surrounded by square brackets ('[', US-ASCII
1862 character 0x5B, and ']', US-ASCII character 0x5D), followed by
1863 a colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number
1864 in US-ASCII.
1865
1866 A hostname is always in US-ASCII (as per <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>);
1867 internationalized hostnames are encoded as A-labels as specified
1868 in <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>. The hostname is followed by a
1869 colon ':' (US-ASCII character 0x3A) and a decimal port number
1870 in US-ASCII. The name SHOULD be fully qualified whenever
1871 possible.
1872
1873 Values of this textual convention may not be directly usable
1874 as transport-layer addressing information, and may require
1875 run-time resolution. As such, applications that write them
1876 must be prepared for handling errors if such values are not
1877 supported, or cannot be resolved (if resolution occurs at the
1878 time of the management operation).
1879
1880 The DESCRIPTION clause of TransportAddress objects that may
1881 have SnmpTLSAddress values must fully describe how (and
1882 when) such names are to be resolved to IP addresses and vice
1883 versa.
1884
1885 This textual convention SHOULD NOT be used directly in object
1886 definitions since it restricts addresses to a specific
1887 format. However, if it is used, it MAY be used either on its
1888 own or in conjunction with TransportAddressType or
1889 TransportDomain as a pair.
1890
1891 When this textual convention is used as a syntax of an index
1892 object, there may be issues with the limit of 128
1893 sub-identifiers specified in SMIv2 (STD 58). It is RECOMMENDED
1894 that all MIB documents using this textual convention make
1895 explicit any limitations on index component lengths that
1896 management software must observe. This may be done either by
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1903
1904
1905 including SIZE constraints on the index components or by
1906 specifying applicable constraints in the conceptual row
1907 DESCRIPTION clause or in the surrounding documentation."
1908 REFERENCE
1909 "<a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>: Requirements for Internet Hosts - Application and
1910 Support
1911 <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>: Internationalized Domain Names for Applications (IDNA):
1912 Definitions and Document Framework
1913 <a href="./rfc5952">RFC 5952</a>: A Recommendation for IPv6 Address Text Representation
1914 "
1915 SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (1..255))
1916
1917 SnmpTLSFingerprint ::= TEXTUAL-CONVENTION
1918 DISPLAY-HINT "1x:1x"
1919 STATUS current
1920 DESCRIPTION
1921 "A fingerprint value that can be used to uniquely reference
1922 other data of potentially arbitrary length.
1923
1924 An SnmpTLSFingerprint value is composed of a 1-octet hashing
1925 algorithm identifier followed by the fingerprint value. The
1926 octet value encoded is taken from the IANA TLS HashAlgorithm
1927 Registry (<a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>). The remaining octets are filled using the
1928 results of the hashing algorithm.
1929
1930 This TEXTUAL-CONVENTION allows for a zero-length (blank)
1931 SnmpTLSFingerprint value for use in tables where the
1932 fingerprint value may be optional. MIB definitions or
1933 implementations may refuse to accept a zero-length value as
1934 appropriate."
1935 REFERENCE "<a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>: The Transport Layer
1936 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2
1937 <a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/">http://www.iana.org/assignments/tls-parameters/</a>
1938 "
1939 SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE (0..255))
1940
1941 -- Identities for use in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable
1942
1943 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities OBJECT IDENTIFIER
1944 ::= { snmpTlstmIdentities 1 }
1945
1946 snmpTlstmCertSpecified OBJECT-IDENTITY
1947 STATUS current
1948 DESCRIPTION "Directly specifies the tmSecurityName to be used for
1949 this certificate. The value of the tmSecurityName
1950 to use is specified in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
1951 column. The snmpTlstmCertToTSNData column must
1952 contain a non-zero length SnmpAdminString compliant
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
1959
1960
1961 value or the mapping described in this row must be
1962 considered a failure."
1963 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 1 }
1964
1965 snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name OBJECT-IDENTITY
1966 STATUS current
1967 DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's rfc822Name to a
1968 tmSecurityName. The local part of the rfc822Name is
1969 passed unaltered but the host-part of the name must
1970 be passed in lowercase. This mapping results in a
1971 1:1 correspondence between equivalent subjectAltName
1972 rfc822Name values and tmSecurityName values except
1973 that the host-part of the name MUST be passed in
1974 lowercase.
1975
1976 Example rfc822Name Field: [email protected]
1977 is mapped to tmSecurityName: [email protected]."
1978 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 2 }
1979
1980 snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName OBJECT-IDENTITY
1981 STATUS current
1982 DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's dNSName to a
1983 tmSecurityName after first converting it to all
1984 lowercase (<a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a> does not specify converting to
1985 lowercase so this involves an extra step). This
1986 mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
1987 subjectAltName dNSName values and the tmSecurityName
1988 values."
1989 REFERENCE "<a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a> - Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
1990 Certificate and Certificate Revocation
1991 List (CRL) Profile."
1992 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 3 }
1993
1994 snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress OBJECT-IDENTITY
1995 STATUS current
1996 DESCRIPTION "Maps a subjectAltName's iPAddress to a
1997 tmSecurityName by transforming the binary encoded
1998 address as follows:
1999
2000 1) for IPv4, the value is converted into a
2001 decimal-dotted quad address (e.g., '192.0.2.1').
2002
2003 2) for IPv6 addresses, the value is converted into a
2004 32-character all lowercase hexadecimal string
2005 without any colon separators.
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2015
2016
2017 This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
2018 subjectAltName iPAddress values and the
2019 tmSecurityName values.
2020
2021 The resulting length of an encoded IPv6 address is
2022 the maximum length supported by the View-Based
2023 Access Control Model (VACM). Using both the
2024 Transport Security Model's support for transport
2025 prefixes (see the SNMP-TSM-MIB's
2026 snmpTsmConfigurationUsePrefix object for details)
2027 will result in securityName lengths that exceed what
2028 VACM can handle."
2029 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 4 }
2030
2031 snmpTlstmCertSANAny OBJECT-IDENTITY
2032 STATUS current
2033 DESCRIPTION "Maps any of the following fields using the
2034 corresponding mapping algorithms:
2035
2036 |------------+----------------------------|
2037 | Type | Algorithm |
2038 |------------+----------------------------|
2039 | rfc822Name | snmpTlstmCertSANRFC822Name |
2040 | dNSName | snmpTlstmCertSANDNSName |
2041 | iPAddress | snmpTlstmCertSANIpAddress |
2042 |------------+----------------------------|
2043
2044 The first matching subjectAltName value found in the
2045 certificate of the above types MUST be used when
2046 deriving the tmSecurityName. The mapping algorithm
2047 specified in the 'Algorithm' column MUST be used to
2048 derive the tmSecurityName.
2049
2050 This mapping results in a 1:1 correspondence between
2051 subjectAltName values and tmSecurityName values. The
2052 three sub-mapping algorithms produced by this
2053 combined algorithm cannot produce conflicting
2054 results between themselves."
2055 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 5 }
2056
2057 snmpTlstmCertCommonName OBJECT-IDENTITY
2058 STATUS current
2059
2060 DESCRIPTION "Maps a certificate's CommonName to a tmSecurityName
2061 after converting it to a UTF-8 encoding. The usage
2062 of CommonNames is deprecated and users are
2063 encouraged to use subjectAltName mapping methods
2064 instead. This mapping results in a 1:1
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2071
2072
2073 correspondence between certificate CommonName values
2074 and tmSecurityName values."
2075 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities 6 }
2076
2077 -- The snmpTlstmSession Group
2078
2079 snmpTlstmSession OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 1 }
2080
2081 snmpTlstmSessionOpens OBJECT-TYPE
2082 SYNTAX Counter32
2083 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2084 STATUS current
2085 DESCRIPTION
2086 "The number of times an openSession() request has been executed
2087 as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it succeeded or
2088 failed."
2089 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 1 }
2090
2091 snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses OBJECT-TYPE
2092 SYNTAX Counter32
2093 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2094 STATUS current
2095 DESCRIPTION
2096 "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
2097 executed as a (D)TLS client, regardless of whether it
2098 succeeded or failed."
2099 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 2 }
2100
2101 snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors OBJECT-TYPE
2102 SYNTAX Counter32
2103 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2104 STATUS current
2105 DESCRIPTION
2106 "The number of times an openSession() request failed to open a
2107 session as a (D)TLS client, for any reason."
2108 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 3 }
2109
2110 snmpTlstmSessionAccepts OBJECT-TYPE
2111 SYNTAX Counter32
2112 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2113 STATUS current
2114 DESCRIPTION
2115 "The number of times a (D)TLS server has accepted a new
2116 connection from a client and has received at least one SNMP
2117 message through it."
2118 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 4 }
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2127
2128
2129 snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses OBJECT-TYPE
2130 SYNTAX Counter32
2131 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2132 STATUS current
2133 DESCRIPTION
2134 "The number of times a closeSession() request has been
2135 executed as a (D)TLS server, regardless of whether it
2136 succeeded or failed."
2137 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 5 }
2138
2139 snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions OBJECT-TYPE
2140 SYNTAX Counter32
2141 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2142 STATUS current
2143 DESCRIPTION
2144 "The number of times an outgoing message was dropped because
2145 the session associated with the passed tmStateReference was no
2146 longer (or was never) available."
2147 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 6 }
2148
2149 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
2150 SYNTAX Counter32
2151 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2152 STATUS current
2153 DESCRIPTION
2154 "The number of times an incoming session was not established
2155 on a (D)TLS server because the presented client certificate
2156 was invalid. Reasons for invalidation include, but are not
2157 limited to, cryptographic validation failures or lack of a
2158 suitable mapping row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
2159 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 7 }
2160
2161 snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate OBJECT-TYPE
2162 SYNTAX Counter32
2163 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2164 STATUS current
2165 DESCRIPTION
2166 "The number of times an outgoing session was not established
2167 on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented
2168 by an SNMP over (D)TLS server was invalid because no
2169 configured fingerprint or Certification Authority (CA) was
2170 acceptable to validate it.
2171 This may result because there was no entry in the
2172 snmpTlstmAddrTable or because no path could be found to a
2173 known CA."
2174 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 8 }
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2183
2184
2185 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates OBJECT-TYPE
2186 SYNTAX Counter32
2187 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2188 STATUS current
2189 DESCRIPTION
2190 "The number of times an outgoing session was not established
2191 on a (D)TLS client because the server certificate presented
2192 by an SNMP over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if
2193 the fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That
2194 is, a cryptographic validation error occurred during
2195 certificate validation processing.
2196
2197 Reasons for invalidation include, but are not
2198 limited to, cryptographic validation failures."
2199 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 9 }
2200
2201 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches OBJECT-TYPE
2202 SYNTAX Counter32
2203 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2204 STATUS current
2205 DESCRIPTION
2206 "The number of outgoing messages dropped because the
2207 tmStateReference referred to an invalid cache."
2208 ::= { snmpTlstmSession 10 }
2209
2210 -- Configuration Objects
2211
2212 snmpTlstmConfig OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmObjects 2 }
2213
2214 -- Certificate mapping
2215
2216 snmpTlstmCertificateMapping OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConfig 1 }
2217
2218 snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount OBJECT-TYPE
2219 SYNTAX Gauge32
2220 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2221 STATUS current
2222 DESCRIPTION
2223 "A count of the number of entries in the
2224 snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable."
2225 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 1 }
2226
2227 snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
2228 SYNTAX TimeStamp
2229 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2230 STATUS current
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2239
2240
2241 DESCRIPTION
2242 "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable was
2243 last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
2244 modified since the command responder was started."
2245 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 2 }
2246
2247 snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable OBJECT-TYPE
2248 SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
2249 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2250 STATUS current
2251 DESCRIPTION
2252 "This table is used by a (D)TLS server to map the (D)TLS
2253 client's presented X.509 certificate to a tmSecurityName.
2254
2255 On an incoming (D)TLS/SNMP connection, the client's presented
2256 certificate must either be validated based on an established
2257 trust anchor, or it must directly match a fingerprint in this
2258 table. This table does not provide any mechanisms for
2259 configuring the trust anchors; the transfer of any needed
2260 trusted certificates for path validation is expected to occur
2261 through an out-of-band transfer.
2262
2263 Once the certificate has been found acceptable (either by path
2264 validation or directly matching a fingerprint in this table),
2265 this table is consulted to determine the appropriate
2266 tmSecurityName to identify with the remote connection. This
2267 is done by considering each active row from this table in
2268 prioritized order according to its snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value.
2269 Each row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value determines
2270 whether the row is a match for the incoming connection:
2271
2272 1) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
2273 identifies the presented certificate, then consider the
2274 row as a successful match.
2275
2276 2) If the row's snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint value
2277 identifies a locally held copy of a trusted CA
2278 certificate and that CA certificate was used to
2279 validate the path to the presented certificate, then
2280 consider the row as a successful match.
2281
2282 Once a matching row has been found, the
2283 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType value can be used to determine how
2284 the tmSecurityName to associate with the session should be
2285 determined. See the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column's
2286 DESCRIPTION for details on determining the tmSecurityName
2287 value. If it is impossible to determine a tmSecurityName from
2288 the row's data combined with the data presented in the
2289
2290
2291
2292 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 41]</span></pre>
2293 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span>
2294 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2295
2296
2297 certificate, then additional rows MUST be searched looking for
2298 another potential match. If a resulting tmSecurityName mapped
2299 from a given row is not compatible with the needed
2300 requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a
2301 32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived
2302 securityName could be longer), then it must be considered an
2303 invalid match and additional rows MUST be searched looking for
2304 another potential match.
2305
2306 If no matching and valid row can be found, the connection MUST
2307 be closed and SNMP messages MUST NOT be accepted over it.
2308
2309 Missing values of snmpTlstmCertToTSNID are acceptable and
2310 implementations should continue to the next highest numbered
2311 row. It is recommended that administrators skip index values
2312 to leave room for the insertion of future rows (for example,
2313 use values of 10 and 20 when creating initial rows).
2314
2315 Users are encouraged to make use of certificates with
2316 subjectAltName fields that can be used as tmSecurityNames so
2317 that a single root CA certificate can allow all child
2318 certificate's subjectAltName to map directly to a
2319 tmSecurityName via a 1:1 transformation. However, this table
2320 is flexible to allow for situations where existing deployed
2321 certificate infrastructures do not provide adequate
2322 subjectAltName values for use as tmSecurityNames.
2323 Certificates may also be mapped to tmSecurityNames using the
2324 CommonName portion of the Subject field. However, the usage
2325 of the CommonName field is deprecated and thus this usage is
2326 NOT RECOMMENDED. Direct mapping from each individual
2327 certificate fingerprint to a tmSecurityName is also possible
2328 but requires one entry in the table per tmSecurityName and
2329 requires more management operations to completely configure a
2330 device."
2331 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 3 }
2332
2333 snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry OBJECT-TYPE
2334 SYNTAX SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry
2335 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2336 STATUS current
2337 DESCRIPTION
2338 "A row in the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable that specifies a mapping
2339 for an incoming (D)TLS certificate to a tmSecurityName to use
2340 for a connection."
2341 INDEX { snmpTlstmCertToTSNID }
2342 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable 1 }
2343
2344
2345
2346
2347
2348 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 42]</span></pre>
2349 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-43" ></span>
2350 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2351
2352
2353 SnmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
2354 snmpTlstmCertToTSNID Unsigned32,
2355 snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
2356 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType AutonomousType,
2357 snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OCTET STRING,
2358 snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType StorageType,
2359 snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus RowStatus
2360 }
2361
2362 snmpTlstmCertToTSNID OBJECT-TYPE
2363 SYNTAX Unsigned32 (1..4294967295)
2364 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2365 STATUS current
2366 DESCRIPTION
2367 "A unique, prioritized index for the given entry. Lower
2368 numbers indicate a higher priority."
2369 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 1 }
2370
2371 snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
2372 SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint (SIZE(1..255))
2373 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2374 STATUS current
2375 DESCRIPTION
2376 "A cryptographic hash of an X.509 certificate. The results of
2377 a successful matching fingerprint to either the trusted CA in
2378 the certificate validation path or to the certificate itself
2379 is dictated by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType column."
2380 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 2 }
2381
2382 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType OBJECT-TYPE
2383 SYNTAX AutonomousType
2384 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2385 STATUS current
2386 DESCRIPTION
2387 "Specifies the mapping type for deriving a tmSecurityName from
2388 a certificate. Details for mapping of a particular type SHALL
2389 be specified in the DESCRIPTION clause of the OBJECT-IDENTITY
2390 that describes the mapping. If a mapping succeeds it will
2391 return a tmSecurityName for use by the TLSTM model and
2392 processing stops.
2393
2394 If the resulting mapped value is not compatible with the
2395 needed requirements of a tmSecurityName (e.g., VACM imposes a
2396 32-octet-maximum length and the certificate derived
2397 securityName could be longer), then future rows MUST be
2398 searched for additional snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint matches
2399 to look for a mapping that succeeds.
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 43]</span></pre>
2405 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-44" ></span>
2406 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2407
2408
2409 Suitable values for assigning to this object that are defined
2410 within the SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB can be found in the
2411 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMIdentities portion of the MIB tree."
2412 DEFVAL { snmpTlstmCertSpecified }
2413 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 3 }
2414
2415 snmpTlstmCertToTSNData OBJECT-TYPE
2416 SYNTAX OCTET STRING (SIZE(0..1024))
2417 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2418 STATUS current
2419 DESCRIPTION
2420 "Auxiliary data used as optional configuration information for
2421 a given mapping specified by the snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
2422 column. Only some mapping systems will make use of this
2423 column. The value in this column MUST be ignored for any
2424 mapping type that does not require data present in this
2425 column."
2426 DEFVAL { "" }
2427 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 4 }
2428
2429 snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
2430 SYNTAX StorageType
2431 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2432 STATUS current
2433 DESCRIPTION
2434 "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
2435 having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
2436 any columnar objects in the row."
2437 DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
2438 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 5 }
2439
2440 snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
2441 SYNTAX RowStatus
2442 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2443 STATUS current
2444 DESCRIPTION
2445 "The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used
2446 to create or remove rows from this table.
2447
2448 To create a row in this table, an administrator must set this
2449 object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
2450
2451 Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately
2452 configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the
2453 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is notReady(3).
2454
2455 In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until
2456 the corresponding snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
2457
2458
2459
2460 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 44]</span></pre>
2461 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-45" ></span>
2462 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2463
2464
2465 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType, and snmpTlstmCertToTSNData columns
2466 have been set.
2467
2468 The following objects may not be modified while the
2469 value of this object is active(1):
2470 - snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint
2471 - snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType
2472 - snmpTlstmCertToTSNData
2473 An attempt to set these objects while the value of
2474 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
2475 an inconsistentValue error."
2476 ::= { snmpTlstmCertToTSNEntry 6 }
2477
2478 -- Maps tmSecurityNames to certificates for use by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
2479
2480 snmpTlstmParamsCount OBJECT-TYPE
2481 SYNTAX Gauge32
2482 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2483 STATUS current
2484 DESCRIPTION
2485 "A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmParamsTable."
2486 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 4 }
2487
2488 snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
2489 SYNTAX TimeStamp
2490 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2491 STATUS current
2492 DESCRIPTION
2493 "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmParamsTable
2494 was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
2495 modified since the command responder was started."
2496 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 5 }
2497
2498 snmpTlstmParamsTable OBJECT-TYPE
2499 SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
2500 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2501 STATUS current
2502 DESCRIPTION
2503 "This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
2504 connection is being set up using an entry in the
2505 SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
2506 snmpTargetParamsTable with a fingerprint of a certificate to
2507 use when establishing such a (D)TLS connection."
2508 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 6 }
2509
2510 snmpTlstmParamsEntry OBJECT-TYPE
2511 SYNTAX SnmpTlstmParamsEntry
2512 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2513
2514
2515
2516 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 45]</span></pre>
2517 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-46" ></span>
2518 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2519
2520
2521 STATUS current
2522 DESCRIPTION
2523 "A conceptual row containing a fingerprint hash of a locally
2524 held certificate for a given snmpTargetParamsEntry. The
2525 values in this row should be ignored if the connection that
2526 needs to be established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
2527 infrastructure, is not a certificate and (D)TLS based
2528 connection. The connection SHOULD NOT be established if the
2529 certificate fingerprint stored in this entry does not point to
2530 a valid locally held certificate or if it points to an
2531 unusable certificate (such as might happen when the
2532 certificate's expiration date has been reached)."
2533 INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetParamsName }
2534 ::= { snmpTlstmParamsTable 1 }
2535
2536 SnmpTlstmParamsEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
2537 snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
2538 snmpTlstmParamsStorageType StorageType,
2539 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus RowStatus
2540 }
2541
2542 snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
2543 SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint
2544 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2545 STATUS current
2546 DESCRIPTION
2547 "This object stores the hash of the public portion of a
2548 locally held X.509 certificate. The X.509 certificate, its
2549 public key, and the corresponding private key will be used
2550 when initiating a (D)TLS connection as a (D)TLS client."
2551 ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 1 }
2552
2553 snmpTlstmParamsStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
2554 SYNTAX StorageType
2555 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2556 STATUS current
2557 DESCRIPTION
2558 "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
2559 having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
2560 any columnar objects in the row."
2561 DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
2562 ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 2 }
2563
2564 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
2565 SYNTAX RowStatus
2566 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2567 STATUS current
2568 DESCRIPTION
2569
2570
2571
2572 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 46]</span></pre>
2573 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-47" ></span>
2574 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2575
2576
2577 "The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used
2578 to create or remove rows from this table.
2579
2580 To create a row in this table, an administrator must set this
2581 object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
2582
2583 Until instances of all corresponding columns are appropriately
2584 configured, the value of the corresponding instance of the
2585 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus column is notReady(3).
2586
2587 In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until
2588 the corresponding snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint column has
2589 been set.
2590
2591 The snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint object may not be modified
2592 while the value of this object is active(1).
2593
2594 An attempt to set these objects while the value of
2595 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus is active(1) will result in
2596 an inconsistentValue error."
2597 ::= { snmpTlstmParamsEntry 3 }
2598
2599 snmpTlstmAddrCount OBJECT-TYPE
2600 SYNTAX Gauge32
2601 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2602 STATUS current
2603 DESCRIPTION
2604 "A count of the number of entries in the snmpTlstmAddrTable."
2605 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 7 }
2606
2607 snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged OBJECT-TYPE
2608 SYNTAX TimeStamp
2609 MAX-ACCESS read-only
2610 STATUS current
2611 DESCRIPTION
2612 "The value of sysUpTime.0 when the snmpTlstmAddrTable
2613 was last modified through any means, or 0 if it has not been
2614 modified since the command responder was started."
2615 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 8 }
2616
2617 snmpTlstmAddrTable OBJECT-TYPE
2618 SYNTAX SEQUENCE OF SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
2619 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2620 STATUS current
2621 DESCRIPTION
2622 "This table is used by a (D)TLS client when a (D)TLS
2623 connection is being set up using an entry in the
2624 SNMP-TARGET-MIB. It extends the SNMP-TARGET-MIB's
2625
2626
2627
2628 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 47]</span></pre>
2629 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-48" ></span>
2630 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2631
2632
2633 snmpTargetAddrTable so that the client can verify that the
2634 correct server has been reached. This verification can use
2635 either a certificate fingerprint, or an identity
2636 authenticated via certification path validation.
2637
2638 If there is an active row in this table corresponding to the
2639 entry in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB that was used to establish the
2640 connection, and the row's snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
2641 column has non-empty value, then the server's presented
2642 certificate is compared with the
2643 snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value (and the
2644 snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column is ignored). If the
2645 fingerprint matches, the verification has succeeded. If the
2646 fingerprint does not match, then the connection MUST be
2647 closed.
2648
2649 If the server's presented certificate has passed
2650 certification path validation [<a href="./rfc5280" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">RFC5280</a>] to a configured
2651 trust anchor, and an active row exists with a zero-length
2652 snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint value, then the
2653 snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity column contains the expected
2654 host name. This expected host name is then compared against
2655 the server's certificate as follows:
2656
2657 - Implementations MUST support matching the expected host
2658 name against a dNSName in the subjectAltName extension
2659 field and MAY support checking the name against the
2660 CommonName portion of the subject distinguished name.
2661
2662 - The '*' (ASCII 0x2a) wildcard character is allowed in the
2663 dNSName of the subjectAltName extension (and in common
2664 name, if used to store the host name), but only as the
2665 left-most (least significant) DNS label in that value.
2666 This wildcard matches any left-most DNS label in the
2667 server name. That is, the subject *.example.com matches
2668 the server names a.example.com and b.example.com, but does
2669 not match example.com or a.b.example.com. Implementations
2670 MUST support wildcards in certificates as specified above,
2671 but MAY provide a configuration option to disable them.
2672
2673 - If the locally configured name is an internationalized
2674 domain name, conforming implementations MUST convert it to
2675 the ASCII Compatible Encoding (ACE) format for performing
2676 comparisons, as specified in <a href="./rfc5280#section-7">Section&nbsp;7 of [RFC5280]</a>.
2677
2678 If the expected host name fails these conditions then the
2679 connection MUST be closed.
2680
2681
2682
2683
2684 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 48]</span></pre>
2685 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-49" ></span>
2686 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2687
2688
2689 If there is no row in this table corresponding to the entry
2690 in the SNMP-TARGET-MIB and the server can be authorized by
2691 another, implementation-dependent means, then the connection
2692 MAY still proceed."
2693
2694 ::= { snmpTlstmCertificateMapping 9 }
2695
2696 snmpTlstmAddrEntry OBJECT-TYPE
2697 SYNTAX SnmpTlstmAddrEntry
2698 MAX-ACCESS not-accessible
2699 STATUS current
2700 DESCRIPTION
2701 "A conceptual row containing a copy of a certificate's
2702 fingerprint for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry. The values in
2703 this row should be ignored if the connection that needs to be
2704 established, as indicated by the SNMP-TARGET-MIB
2705 infrastructure, is not a (D)TLS based connection. If an
2706 snmpTlstmAddrEntry exists for a given snmpTargetAddrEntry, then
2707 the presented server certificate MUST match or the connection
2708 MUST NOT be established. If a row in this table does not
2709 exist to match an snmpTargetAddrEntry row, then the connection
2710 SHOULD still proceed if some other certificate validation path
2711 algorithm (e.g., <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>) can be used."
2712 INDEX { IMPLIED snmpTargetAddrName }
2713 ::= { snmpTlstmAddrTable 1 }
2714
2715 SnmpTlstmAddrEntry ::= SEQUENCE {
2716 snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint SnmpTLSFingerprint,
2717 snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity SnmpAdminString,
2718 snmpTlstmAddrStorageType StorageType,
2719 snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus RowStatus
2720 }
2721
2722 snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint OBJECT-TYPE
2723 SYNTAX SnmpTLSFingerprint
2724 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2725 STATUS current
2726 DESCRIPTION
2727 "A cryptographic hash of a public X.509 certificate. This
2728 object should store the hash of the public X.509 certificate
2729 that the remote server should present during the (D)TLS
2730 connection setup. The fingerprint of the presented
2731 certificate and this hash value MUST match exactly or the
2732 connection MUST NOT be established."
2733 DEFVAL { "" }
2734 ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 1 }
2735
2736
2737
2738
2739
2740 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 49]</span></pre>
2741 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-50" ></span>
2742 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2743
2744
2745 snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity OBJECT-TYPE
2746 SYNTAX SnmpAdminString
2747 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2748 STATUS current
2749 DESCRIPTION
2750 "The reference identity to check against the identity
2751 presented by the remote system."
2752 DEFVAL { "" }
2753 ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 2 }
2754
2755 snmpTlstmAddrStorageType OBJECT-TYPE
2756 SYNTAX StorageType
2757 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2758 STATUS current
2759 DESCRIPTION
2760 "The storage type for this conceptual row. Conceptual rows
2761 having the value 'permanent' need not allow write-access to
2762 any columnar objects in the row."
2763 DEFVAL { nonVolatile }
2764 ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 3 }
2765
2766
2767 snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus OBJECT-TYPE
2768 SYNTAX RowStatus
2769 MAX-ACCESS read-create
2770 STATUS current
2771 DESCRIPTION
2772 "The status of this conceptual row. This object may be used
2773 to create or remove rows from this table.
2774
2775 To create a row in this table, an administrator must set this
2776 object to either createAndGo(4) or createAndWait(5).
2777
2778 Until instances of all corresponding columns are
2779 appropriately configured, the value of the
2780 corresponding instance of the snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
2781 column is notReady(3).
2782
2783 In particular, a newly created row cannot be made active until
2784 the corresponding snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint column has been
2785 set.
2786
2787 Rows MUST NOT be active if the snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint
2788 column is blank and the snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity is set to
2789 '*' since this would insecurely accept any presented
2790 certificate.
2791
2792
2793
2794
2795
2796 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 50]</span></pre>
2797 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-51" ></span>
2798 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2799
2800
2801 The snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint object may not be modified
2802 while the value of this object is active(1).
2803
2804 An attempt to set these objects while the value of
2805 snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus is active(1) will result in
2806 an inconsistentValue error."
2807 ::= { snmpTlstmAddrEntry 4 }
2808
2809 -- ************************************************
2810 -- snmpTlstmNotifications - Notifications Information
2811 -- ************************************************
2812
2813 snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown NOTIFICATION-TYPE
2814 OBJECTS { snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate }
2815 STATUS current
2816 DESCRIPTION
2817 "Notification that the server certificate presented by an SNMP
2818 over (D)TLS server was invalid because no configured
2819 fingerprint or CA was acceptable to validate it. This may be
2820 because there was no entry in the snmpTlstmAddrTable or
2821 because no path could be found to known Certification
2822 Authority.
2823
2824 To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
2825 sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
2826 notification."
2827 ::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 1 }
2828
2829 snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate NOTIFICATION-TYPE
2830 OBJECTS { snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
2831 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates}
2832 STATUS current
2833 DESCRIPTION
2834 "Notification that the server certificate presented by an SNMP
2835 over (D)TLS server could not be validated even if the
2836 fingerprint or expected validation path was known. That is, a
2837 cryptographic validation error occurred during certificate
2838 validation processing.
2839
2840 To avoid notification loops, this notification MUST NOT be
2841 sent to servers that themselves have triggered the
2842 notification."
2843 ::= { snmpTlstmNotifications 2 }
2844
2845 -- ************************************************
2846 -- snmpTlstmCompliances - Conformance Information
2847 -- ************************************************
2848
2849
2850
2851
2852 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 51]</span></pre>
2853 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-52" ></span>
2854 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2855
2856
2857 snmpTlstmCompliances OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 1 }
2858
2859 snmpTlstmGroups OBJECT IDENTIFIER ::= { snmpTlstmConformance 2 }
2860
2861 -- ************************************************
2862 -- Compliance statements
2863 -- ************************************************
2864
2865 snmpTlstmCompliance MODULE-COMPLIANCE
2866 STATUS current
2867 DESCRIPTION
2868 "The compliance statement for SNMP engines that support the
2869 SNMP-TLS-TM-MIB"
2870 MODULE
2871 MANDATORY-GROUPS { snmpTlstmStatsGroup,
2872 snmpTlstmIncomingGroup,
2873 snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup,
2874 snmpTlstmNotificationGroup }
2875 ::= { snmpTlstmCompliances 1 }
2876
2877 -- ************************************************
2878 -- Units of conformance
2879 -- ************************************************
2880 snmpTlstmStatsGroup OBJECT-GROUP
2881 OBJECTS {
2882 snmpTlstmSessionOpens,
2883 snmpTlstmSessionClientCloses,
2884 snmpTlstmSessionOpenErrors,
2885 snmpTlstmSessionAccepts,
2886 snmpTlstmSessionServerCloses,
2887 snmpTlstmSessionNoSessions,
2888 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidClientCertificates,
2889 snmpTlstmSessionUnknownServerCertificate,
2890 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidServerCertificates,
2891 snmpTlstmSessionInvalidCaches
2892 }
2893 STATUS current
2894 DESCRIPTION
2895 "A collection of objects for maintaining
2896 statistical information of an SNMP engine that
2897 implements the SNMP TLS Transport Model."
2898 ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 1 }
2899
2900 snmpTlstmIncomingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
2901 OBJECTS {
2902 snmpTlstmCertToTSNCount,
2903 snmpTlstmCertToTSNTableLastChanged,
2904 snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint,
2905
2906
2907
2908 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 52]</span></pre>
2909 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-53" ></span>
2910 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2911
2912
2913 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType,
2914 snmpTlstmCertToTSNData,
2915 snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType,
2916 snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus
2917 }
2918 STATUS current
2919 DESCRIPTION
2920 "A collection of objects for maintaining
2921 incoming connection certificate mappings to
2922 tmSecurityNames of an SNMP engine that implements the
2923 SNMP TLS Transport Model."
2924 ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 2 }
2925
2926 snmpTlstmOutgoingGroup OBJECT-GROUP
2927 OBJECTS {
2928 snmpTlstmParamsCount,
2929 snmpTlstmParamsTableLastChanged,
2930 snmpTlstmParamsClientFingerprint,
2931 snmpTlstmParamsStorageType,
2932 snmpTlstmParamsRowStatus,
2933 snmpTlstmAddrCount,
2934 snmpTlstmAddrTableLastChanged,
2935 snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint,
2936 snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity,
2937 snmpTlstmAddrStorageType,
2938 snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus
2939 }
2940 STATUS current
2941 DESCRIPTION
2942 "A collection of objects for maintaining
2943 outgoing connection certificates to use when opening
2944 connections as a result of SNMP-TARGET-MIB settings."
2945 ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 3 }
2946
2947 snmpTlstmNotificationGroup NOTIFICATION-GROUP
2948 NOTIFICATIONS {
2949 snmpTlstmServerCertificateUnknown,
2950 snmpTlstmServerInvalidCertificate
2951 }
2952 STATUS current
2953 DESCRIPTION
2954 "Notifications"
2955 ::= { snmpTlstmGroups 4 }
2956
2957 END
2958
2959
2960
2961
2962
2963
2964 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 53]</span></pre>
2965 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-54" ></span>
2966 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
2967
2968
2969 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Operational Considerations</span>
2970
2971 This section discusses various operational aspects of deploying
2972 TLSTM.
2973
2974 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Sessions</span>
2975
2976 A session is discussed throughout this document as meaning a security
2977 association between two TLSTM instances. State information for the
2978 sessions are maintained in each TLSTM implementation and this
2979 information is created and destroyed as sessions are opened and
2980 closed. A "broken" session (one side up and one side down) can
2981 result if one side of a session is brought down abruptly (i.e.,
2982 reboot, power outage, etc.). Whenever possible, implementations
2983 SHOULD provide graceful session termination through the use of TLS
2984 disconnect messages. Implementations SHOULD also have a system in
2985 place for detecting "broken" sessions through the use of heartbeats
2986 [<a href="#ref-HEARTBEAT" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension&quot;">HEARTBEAT</a>] or other detection mechanisms.
2987
2988 Implementations SHOULD limit the lifetime of established sessions
2989 depending on the algorithms used for generation of the master session
2990 secret, the privacy and integrity algorithms used to protect
2991 messages, the environment of the session, the amount of data
2992 transferred, and the sensitivity of the data.
2993
2994 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Notification Receiver Credential Selection</span>
2995
2996 When an SNMP engine needs to establish an outgoing session for
2997 notifications, the snmpTargetParamsTable includes an entry for the
2998 snmpTargetParamsSecurityName of the target. Servers that wish to
2999 support multiple principals at a particular port SHOULD make use of
3000 the Server Name Indication extension defined in <a href="./rfc4366#section-3.1">Section&nbsp;3.1 of
3001 [RFC4366]</a>. Without the Server Name Indication the receiving SNMP
3002 engine (server) will not know which (D)TLS certificate to offer to
3003 the client so that the tmSecurityName identity-authentication will be
3004 successful.
3005
3006 Another solution is to maintain a one-to-one mapping between
3007 certificates and incoming ports for notification receivers. This can
3008 be handled at the notification originator by configuring the
3009 snmpTargetAddrTable (snmpTargetAddrTDomain and
3010 snmpTargetAddrTAddress) and requiring the receiving SNMP engine to
3011 monitor multiple incoming static ports based on which principals are
3012 capable of receiving notifications.
3013
3014 Implementations MAY also choose to designate a single Notification
3015 Receiver Principal to receive all incoming notifications or select an
3016
3017
3018
3019
3020 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 54]</span></pre>
3021 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-55" ></span>
3022 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3023
3024
3025 implementation specific method of selecting a server certificate to
3026 present to clients.
3027
3028 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.3" href="#section-8.3">8.3</a>. contextEngineID Discovery</span>
3029
3030 SNMPv3 requires that an application know the identifier
3031 (snmpEngineID) of the remote SNMP protocol engine in order to
3032 retrieve or manipulate objects maintained on the remote SNMP entity.
3033
3034 [<a id="ref-RFC5343">RFC5343</a>] introduces a well-known localEngineID and a discovery
3035 mechanism that can be used to learn the snmpEngineID of a remote SNMP
3036 protocol engine. Implementations are RECOMMENDED to support and use
3037 the contextEngineID discovery mechanism defined in [<a href="./rfc5343" title="&quot;Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP) Context EngineID Discovery&quot;">RFC5343</a>].
3038
3039 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.4" href="#section-8.4">8.4</a>. Transport Considerations</span>
3040
3041 This document defines how SNMP messages can be transmitted over the
3042 TLS- and DTLS-based protocols. Each of these protocols is
3043 additionally based on other transports (TCP and UDP). These two base
3044 protocols also have operational considerations that must be taken
3045 into consideration when selecting a (D)TLS-based protocol to use such
3046 as its performance in degraded or limited networks. It is beyond the
3047 scope of this document to summarize the characteristics of these
3048 transport mechanisms. Please refer to the base protocol documents
3049 for details on messaging considerations with respect to MTU size,
3050 fragmentation, performance in lossy networks, etc.
3051
3052 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span>
3053
3054 This document describes a transport model that permits SNMP to
3055 utilize (D)TLS security services. The security threats and how the
3056 (D)TLS transport model mitigates these threats are covered in detail
3057 throughout this document. Security considerations for DTLS are
3058 covered in [<a href="./rfc4347" title="&quot;Datagram Transport Layer Security&quot;">RFC4347</a>] and security considerations for TLS are
3059 described in <a href="#section-11">Section 11</a> and Appendices D, E, and F of TLS 1.2
3060 [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>]. When run over a connectionless transport such as UDP,
3061 DTLS is more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks from spoofed IP
3062 addresses; see <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a> for details how the cookie exchange is
3063 used to address this issue.
3064
3065 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Certificates, Authentication, and Authorization</span>
3066
3067 Implementations are responsible for providing a security certificate
3068 installation and configuration mechanism. Implementations SHOULD
3069 support certificate revocation lists.
3070
3071 (D)TLS provides for authentication of the identity of both the (D)TLS
3072 server and the (D)TLS client. Access to MIB objects for the
3073
3074
3075
3076 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 55]</span></pre>
3077 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-56" ></span>
3078 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3079
3080
3081 authenticated principal MUST be enforced by an access control
3082 subsystem (e.g., the VACM).
3083
3084 Authentication of the command generator principal's identity is
3085 important for use with the SNMP access control subsystem to ensure
3086 that only authorized principals have access to potentially sensitive
3087 data. The authenticated identity of the command generator
3088 principal's certificate is mapped to an SNMP model-independent
3089 securityName for use with SNMP access control.
3090
3091 The (D)TLS handshake only provides assurance that the certificate of
3092 the authenticated identity has been signed by a configured accepted
3093 Certification Authority. (D)TLS has no way to further authorize or
3094 reject access based on the authenticated identity. An Access Control
3095 Model (such as the VACM) provides access control and authorization of
3096 a command generator's requests to a command responder and a
3097 notification receiver's authorization to receive Notifications from a
3098 notification originator. However, to avoid man-in-the-middle
3099 attacks, both ends of the (D)TLS-based connection MUST check the
3100 certificate presented by the other side against what was expected.
3101 For example, command generators must check that the command responder
3102 presented and authenticated itself with an X.509 certificate that was
3103 expected. Not doing so would allow an impostor, at a minimum, to
3104 present false data, receive sensitive information, and/or provide a
3105 false belief that configuration was actually received and acted upon.
3106 Authenticating and verifying the identity of the (D)TLS server and
3107 the (D)TLS client for all operations ensures the authenticity of the
3108 SNMP engine that provides MIB data.
3109
3110 The instructions found in the DESCRIPTION clause of the
3111 snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable object must be followed exactly. It is also
3112 important that the rows of the table be searched in prioritized order
3113 starting with the row containing the lowest numbered
3114 snmpTlstmCertToTSNID value.
3115
3116 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. (D)TLS Security Considerations</span>
3117
3118 This section discusses security considerations specific to the usage
3119 of (D)TLS.
3120
3121 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2.1" href="#section-9.2.1">9.2.1</a>. TLS Version Requirements</span>
3122
3123 Implementations of TLS typically support multiple versions of the
3124 Transport Layer Security protocol as well as the older Secure Sockets
3125 Layer (SSL) protocol. Because of known security vulnerabilities,
3126 TLSTM clients and servers MUST NOT request, offer, or use SSL 2.0.
3127 See <a href="./rfc5246#appendix-E.2">Appendix&nbsp;E.2 of [RFC5246]</a> for further details.
3128
3129
3130
3131
3132 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 56]</span></pre>
3133 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-57" ></span>
3134 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3135
3136
3137 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2.2" href="#section-9.2.2">9.2.2</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy</span>
3138
3139 The use of Perfect Forward Secrecy is RECOMMENDED and can be provided
3140 by (D)TLS with appropriately selected cipher_suites, as discussed in
3141 <a href="./rfc5246#appendix-F">Appendix&nbsp;F of [RFC5246]</a>.
3142
3143 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.3" href="#section-9.3">9.3</a>. Use with SNMPv1/SNMPv2c Messages</span>
3144
3145 The SNMPv1 and SNMPv2c message processing described in [<a href="./rfc3584" title="&quot;Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework&quot;">RFC3584</a>] (<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp74">BCP</a>
3146 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp74">74</a>) always selects the SNMPv1 or SNMPv2c Security Models,
3147 respectively. Both of these and the User-based Security Model
3148 typically used with SNMPv3 derive the securityName and securityLevel
3149 from the SNMP message received, even when the message was received
3150 over a secure transport. Access control decisions are therefore made
3151 based on the contents of the SNMP message, rather than using the
3152 authenticated identity and securityLevel provided by the TLS
3153 Transport Model. It is RECOMMENDED that only SNMPv3 messages using
3154 the Transport Security Model (TSM) or another secure-transport aware
3155 security model be sent over the TLSTM transport.
3156
3157 Using a non-transport-aware Security Model with a secure Transport
3158 Model is NOT RECOMMENDED. See <a href="./rfc5590#section-7.1">[RFC5590], Section&nbsp;7.1</a> for additional
3159 details on the coexistence of security-aware transports and non-
3160 transport-aware security models.
3161
3162 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.4" href="#section-9.4">9.4</a>. MIB Module Security</span>
3163
3164 There are a number of management objects defined in this MIB module
3165 with a MAX-ACCESS clause of read-write and/or read-create. Such
3166 objects may be considered sensitive or vulnerable in some network
3167 environments. The support for SET operations in a non-secure
3168 environment without proper protection can have a negative effect on
3169 network operations. These are the tables and objects and their
3170 sensitivity/vulnerability:
3171
3172 o The snmpTlstmParamsTable can be used to change the outgoing X.509
3173 certificate used to establish a (D)TLS connection. Modifications
3174 to objects in this table need to be adequately authenticated since
3175 modifying the values in this table will have profound impacts to
3176 the security of outbound connections from the device. Since
3177 knowledge of authorization rules and certificate usage mechanisms
3178 may be considered sensitive, protection from disclosure of the
3179 SNMP traffic via encryption is also highly recommended.
3180
3181 o The snmpTlstmAddrTable can be used to change the expectations of
3182 the certificates presented by a remote (D)TLS server.
3183 Modifications to objects in this table need to be adequately
3184 authenticated since modifying the values in this table will have
3185
3186
3187
3188 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 57]</span></pre>
3189 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-58" ></span>
3190 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3191
3192
3193 profound impacts to the security of outbound connections from the
3194 device. Since knowledge of authorization rules and certificate
3195 usage mechanisms may be considered sensitive, protection from
3196 disclosure of the SNMP traffic via encryption is also highly
3197 recommended.
3198
3199 o The snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable is used to specify the mapping of
3200 incoming X.509 certificates to tmSecurityNames, which eventually
3201 get mapped to an SNMPv3 securityName. Modifications to objects in
3202 this table need to be adequately authenticated since modifying the
3203 values in this table will have profound impacts to the security of
3204 incoming connections to the device. Since knowledge of
3205 authorization rules and certificate usage mechanisms may be
3206 considered sensitive, protection from disclosure of the SNMP
3207 traffic via encryption is also highly recommended. When this
3208 table contains a significant number of rows it may affect the
3209 system performance when accepting new (D)TLS connections.
3210
3211 Some of the readable objects in this MIB module (i.e., objects with a
3212 MAX-ACCESS other than not-accessible) may be considered sensitive or
3213 vulnerable in some network environments. It is thus important to
3214 control even GET and/or NOTIFY access to these objects and possibly
3215 to even encrypt the values of these objects when sending them over
3216 the network via SNMP. These are the tables and objects and their
3217 sensitivity/vulnerability:
3218
3219 o This MIB contains a collection of counters that monitor the (D)TLS
3220 connections being established with a device. Since knowledge of
3221 connection and certificate usage mechanisms may be considered
3222 sensitive, protection from disclosure of the SNMP traffic via
3223 encryption is highly recommended.
3224
3225 SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 did not include adequate security.
3226 Even if the network itself is secure (for example, by using IPsec),
3227 even then, there is no control as to who on the secure network is
3228 allowed to access and GET/SET (read/change/create/delete) the objects
3229 in this MIB module.
3230
3231 It is RECOMMENDED that implementers consider the security features as
3232 provided by the SNMPv3 framework (see <a href="./rfc3410#section-8">[RFC3410], Section&nbsp;8</a>),
3233 including full support for the SNMPv3 cryptographic mechanisms (for
3234 authentication and privacy).
3235
3236 Further, deployment of SNMP versions prior to SNMPv3 is NOT
3237 RECOMMENDED. Instead, it is RECOMMENDED to deploy SNMPv3 and to
3238 enable cryptographic security. It is then a customer/operator
3239 responsibility to ensure that the SNMP entity giving access to an
3240 instance of this MIB module is properly configured to give access to
3241
3242
3243
3244 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 58]</span></pre>
3245 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-59" ></span>
3246 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3247
3248
3249 the objects only to those principals (users) that have legitimate
3250 rights to indeed GET or SET (change/create/delete) them.
3251
3252 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
3253
3254 IANA has assigned:
3255
3256 1. Two TCP/UDP port numbers from the "Registered Ports" range of the
3257 Port Numbers registry, with the following keywords:
3258
3259 Keyword Decimal Description References
3260 ------- ------- ----------- ----------
3261 snmptls 10161/tcp SNMP-TLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>]
3262 snmpdtls 10161/udp SNMP-DTLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>]
3263 snmptls-trap 10162/tcp SNMP-Trap-TLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>]
3264 snmpdtls-trap 10162/udp SNMP-Trap-DTLS [<a href="./rfc6353">RFC6353</a>]
3265
3266 These are the default ports for receipt of SNMP command messages
3267 (snmptls and snmpdtls) and SNMP notification messages (snmptls-trap
3268 and snmpdtls-trap) over a TLS Transport Model as defined in this
3269 document.
3270
3271 2. An SMI number (8) under snmpDomains for the snmpTLSTCPDomain
3272 object identifier
3273
3274 3. An SMI number (9) under snmpDomains for the snmpDTLSUDPDomain
3275 object identifier
3276
3277 4. An SMI number (198) under mib-2, for the MIB module in this
3278 document
3279
3280 5. "tls" as the corresponding prefix for the snmpTLSTCPDomain in the
3281 SNMP Transport Domains registry
3282
3283 6. "dtls" as the corresponding prefix for the snmpDTLSUDPDomain in
3284 the SNMP Transport Domains registry
3285
3286 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
3287
3288 This document closely follows and copies the Secure Shell Transport
3289 Model for SNMP documented by David Harrington and Joseph Salowey in
3290 [<a href="./rfc5592" title="&quot;Secure Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5592</a>].
3291
3292 This document was reviewed by the following people who helped provide
3293 useful comments (in alphabetical order): Andy Donati, Pasi Eronen,
3294 David Harrington, Jeffrey Hutzelman, Alan Luchuk, Michael Peck, Tom
3295 Petch, Randy Presuhn, Ray Purvis, Peter Saint-Andre, Joseph Salowey,
3296 Juergen Schoenwaelder, Dave Shield, and Robert Story.
3297
3298
3299
3300 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 59]</span></pre>
3301 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-60" ></span>
3302 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3303
3304
3305 This work was supported in part by the United States Department of
3306 Defense. Large portions of this document are based on work by
3307 General Dynamics C4 Systems and the following individuals: Brian
3308 Baril, Kim Bryant, Dana Deluca, Dan Hanson, Tim Huemiller, John
3309 Holzhauer, Colin Hoogeboom, Dave Kornbau, Chris Knaian, Dan Knaul,
3310 Charles Limoges, Steve Moccaldi, Gerardo Orlando, and Brandon Yip.
3311
3312 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. References</span>
3313
3314 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References</span>
3315
3316 [<a id="ref-RFC1123">RFC1123</a>] Braden, R., "Requirements for Internet Hosts -
3317 Application and Support", STD 3, <a href="./rfc1123">RFC 1123</a>, October 1989.
3318
3319 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
3320 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
3321
3322 [<a id="ref-RFC2578">RFC2578</a>] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
3323 Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Structure of Management Information
3324 Version 2 (SMIv2)", STD 58, <a href="./rfc2578">RFC 2578</a>, April 1999.
3325
3326 [<a id="ref-RFC2579">RFC2579</a>] McCloghrie, K., Ed., Perkins, D., Ed., and J.
3327 Schoenwaelder, Ed., "Textual Conventions for SMIv2",
3328 STD 58, <a href="./rfc2579">RFC 2579</a>, April 1999.
3329
3330 [<a id="ref-RFC2580">RFC2580</a>] McCloghrie, K., Perkins, D., and J. Schoenwaelder,
3331 "Conformance Statements for SMIv2", STD 58, <a href="./rfc2580">RFC 2580</a>,
3332 April 1999.
3333
3334 [<a id="ref-RFC3411">RFC3411</a>] Harrington, D., Presuhn, R., and B. Wijnen, "An
3335 Architecture for Describing Simple Network Management
3336 Protocol (SNMP) Management Frameworks", STD 62,
3337 <a href="./rfc3411">RFC 3411</a>, December 2002.
3338
3339 [<a id="ref-RFC3413">RFC3413</a>] Levi, D., Meyer, P., and B. Stewart, "Simple Network
3340 Management Protocol (SNMP) Applications", STD 62,
3341 <a href="./rfc3413">RFC 3413</a>, December 2002.
3342
3343 [<a id="ref-RFC3414">RFC3414</a>] Blumenthal, U. and B. Wijnen, "User-based Security Model
3344 (USM) for version 3 of the Simple Network Management
3345 Protocol (SNMPv3)", STD 62, <a href="./rfc3414">RFC 3414</a>, December 2002.
3346
3347 [<a id="ref-RFC3415">RFC3415</a>] Wijnen, B., Presuhn, R., and K. McCloghrie, "View-based
3348 Access Control Model (VACM) for the Simple Network
3349 Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62, <a href="./rfc3415">RFC 3415</a>,
3350 December 2002.
3351
3352
3353
3354
3355
3356 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 60]</span></pre>
3357 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-61" ></span>
3358 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3359
3360
3361 [<a id="ref-RFC3418">RFC3418</a>] Presuhn, R., "Management Information Base (MIB) for the
3362 Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)", STD 62,
3363 <a href="./rfc3418">RFC 3418</a>, December 2002.
3364
3365 [<a id="ref-RFC3584">RFC3584</a>] Frye, R., Levi, D., Routhier, S., and B. Wijnen,
3366 "Coexistence between Version 1, Version 2, and Version 3
3367 of the Internet-standard Network Management Framework",
3368 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp74">BCP 74</a>, <a href="./rfc3584">RFC 3584</a>, August 2003.
3369
3370 [<a id="ref-RFC4347">RFC4347</a>] Rescorla, E. and N. Modadugu, "Datagram Transport Layer
3371 Security", <a href="./rfc4347">RFC 4347</a>, April 2006.
3372
3373 [<a id="ref-RFC4366">RFC4366</a>] Blake-Wilson, S., Nystrom, M., Hopwood, D., Mikkelsen,
3374 J., and T. Wright, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
3375 Extensions", <a href="./rfc4366">RFC 4366</a>, April 2006.
3376
3377 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer
3378 Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>,
3379 August 2008.
3380
3381 [<a id="ref-RFC5280">RFC5280</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S.,
3382 Housley, R., and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key
3383 Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation
3384 List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, May 2008.
3385
3386 [<a id="ref-RFC5590">RFC5590</a>] Harrington, D. and J. Schoenwaelder, "Transport
3387 Subsystem for the Simple Network Management Protocol
3388 (SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5590">RFC 5590</a>, June 2009.
3389
3390 [<a id="ref-RFC5591">RFC5591</a>] Harrington, D. and W. Hardaker, "Transport Security
3391 Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol
3392 (SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5591">RFC 5591</a>, June 2009.
3393
3394 [<a id="ref-RFC5952">RFC5952</a>] Kawamura, S. and M. Kawashima, "A Recommendation for
3395 IPv6 Address Text Representation", <a href="./rfc5952">RFC 5952</a>,
3396 August 2010.
3397
3398 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References</span>
3399
3400 [<a id="ref-HEARTBEAT">HEARTBEAT</a>] Seggelmann, R., Tuexen, M., and M. Williams, "Transport
3401 Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer
3402 Security (DTLS) Heartbeat Extension", Work in Progress,
3403 July 2011.
3404
3405 [<a id="ref-RFC3410">RFC3410</a>] Case, J., Mundy, R., Partain, D., and B. Stewart,
3406 "Introduction and Applicability Statements for Internet-
3407 Standard Management Framework", <a href="./rfc3410">RFC 3410</a>, December 2002.
3408
3409
3410
3411
3412 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 61]</span></pre>
3413 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-62" ></span>
3414 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3415
3416
3417 [<a id="ref-RFC5343">RFC5343</a>] Schoenwaelder, J., "Simple Network Management Protocol
3418 (SNMP) Context EngineID Discovery", <a href="./rfc5343">RFC 5343</a>,
3419 September 2008.
3420
3421 [<a id="ref-RFC5592">RFC5592</a>] Harrington, D., Salowey, J., and W. Hardaker, "Secure
3422 Shell Transport Model for the Simple Network Management
3423 Protocol (SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5592">RFC 5592</a>, June 2009.
3424
3425 [<a id="ref-RFC5890">RFC5890</a>] Klensin, J., "Internationalized Domain Names for
3426 Applications (IDNA): Definitions and Document
3427 Framework", <a href="./rfc5890">RFC 5890</a>, August 2010.
3428
3429 [<a id="ref-RFC5953">RFC5953</a>] Hardaker, W., "Transport Layer Security (TLS) Transport
3430 Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol
3431 (SNMP)", <a href="./rfc5953">RFC 5953</a>, August 2010.
3432
3433
3434
3435
3436
3437
3438
3439
3440
3441
3442
3443
3444
3445
3446
3447
3448
3449
3450
3451
3452
3453
3454
3455
3456
3457
3458
3459
3460
3461
3462
3463
3464
3465
3466
3467
3468 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 62]</span></pre>
3469 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-63" ></span>
3470 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3471
3472
3473 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Target and Notification Configuration Example</span>
3474
3475 The following sections describe example configuration for the SNMP-
3476 TLS-TM-MIB, the SNMP-TARGET-MIB, the NOTIFICATION-MIB, and the SNMP-
3477 VIEW-BASED-ACM-MIB.
3478
3479 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. Configuring a Notification Originator</span>
3480
3481 The following row adds the "Joe Cool" user to the "administrators"
3482 group:
3483
3484 vacmSecurityModel = 4 (TSM)
3485 vacmSecurityName = "Joe Cool"
3486 vacmGroupName = "administrators"
3487 vacmSecurityToGroupStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
3488 vacmSecurityToGroupStatus = 4 (createAndGo)
3489
3490 The following row configures the snmpTlstmAddrTable to use
3491 certificate path validation and to require the remote notification
3492 receiver to present a certificate for the "server.example.org"
3493 identity.
3494
3495 snmpTargetAddrName = "toNRAddr"
3496 snmpTlstmAddrServerFingerprint = ""
3497 snmpTlstmAddrServerIdentity = "server.example.org"
3498 snmpTlstmAddrStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
3499 snmpTlstmAddrRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo)
3500
3501 The following row configures the snmpTargetAddrTable to send
3502 notifications using TLS/TCP to the snmptls-trap port at 192.0.2.1:
3503
3504 snmpTargetAddrName = "toNRAddr"
3505 snmpTargetAddrTDomain = snmpTLSTCPDomain
3506 snmpTargetAddrTAddress = "192.0.2.1:10162"
3507 snmpTargetAddrTimeout = 1500
3508 snmpTargetAddrRetryCount = 3
3509 snmpTargetAddrTagList = "toNRTag"
3510 snmpTargetAddrParams = "toNR" (MUST match below)
3511 snmpTargetAddrStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
3512 snmpTargetAddrRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo)
3513
3514
3515
3516
3517
3518
3519
3520
3521
3522
3523
3524 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 63]</span></pre>
3525 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-64" ></span>
3526 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3527
3528
3529 The following row configures the snmpTargetParamsTable to send the
3530 notifications to "Joe Cool", using authPriv SNMPv3 notifications
3531 through the TransportSecurityModel [<a href="./rfc5591" title="&quot;Transport Security Model for the Simple Network Management Protocol (SNMP)&quot;">RFC5591</a>]:
3532
3533 snmpTargetParamsName = "toNR" (must match above)
3534 snmpTargetParamsMPModel = 3 (SNMPv3)
3535 snmpTargetParamsSecurityModel = 4 (TransportSecurityModel)
3536 snmpTargetParamsSecurityName = "Joe Cool"
3537 snmpTargetParamsSecurityLevel = 3 (authPriv)
3538 snmpTargetParamsStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
3539 snmpTargetParamsRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo)
3540
3541 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize a Simple Derivation of tmSecurityName</span>
3542
3543 The following row configures the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable to map a
3544 validated client certificate, referenced by the client's public X.509
3545 hash fingerprint, to a tmSecurityName using the subjectAltName
3546 component of the certificate.
3547
3548 snmpTlstmCertToTSNID = 1
3549 (chosen by ordering preference)
3550 snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint = HASH (appropriate fingerprint)
3551 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType = snmpTlstmCertSANAny
3552 snmpTlstmCertToTSNData = "" (not used)
3553 snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
3554 snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo)
3555
3556 This type of configuration should only be used when the naming
3557 conventions of the (possibly multiple) Certification Authorities are
3558 well understood, so two different principals cannot inadvertently be
3559 identified by the same derived tmSecurityName.
3560
3561 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Configuring TLSTM to Utilize Table-Driven Certificate Mapping</span>
3562
3563 The following row configures the snmpTlstmCertToTSNTable to map a
3564 validated client certificate, referenced by the client's public X.509
3565 hash fingerprint, to the directly specified tmSecurityName of "Joe
3566 Cool".
3567
3568 snmpTlstmCertToTSNID = 2
3569 (chosen by ordering preference)
3570 snmpTlstmCertToTSNFingerprint = HASH (appropriate fingerprint)
3571 snmpTlstmCertToTSNMapType = snmpTlstmCertSpecified
3572 snmpTlstmCertToTSNSecurityName = "Joe Cool"
3573 snmpTlstmCertToTSNStorageType = 3 (nonVolatile)
3574 snmpTlstmCertToTSNRowStatus = 4 (createAndGo)
3575
3576
3577
3578
3579
3580 <span class="grey">Hardaker Standards Track [Page 64]</span></pre>
3581 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-65" ></span>
3582 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6353">RFC 6353</a> TLS Transport Model for SNMP July 2011</span>
3583
3584
3585 Author's Address
3586
3587 Wes Hardaker
3588 SPARTA, Inc.
3589 P.O. Box 382
3590 Davis, CA 95617
3591 USA
3592
3593 Phone: +1 530 792 1913
3594 EMail: [email protected]
3595
3596
3597
3598
3599
3600
3601
3602
3603
3604
3605
3606
3607
3608
3609
3610
3611
3612
3613
3614
3615
3616
3617
3618
3619
3620
3621
3622
3623
3624
3625
3626
3627
3628
3629
3630
3631
3632
3633
3634
3635
3636 Hardaker Standards Track [Page 65]
3637 </pre>