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1 <pre>Independent Submission M. Saito
2 Request for Comments: 6193 NTT Communications
3 Category: Informational D. Wing
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco Systems
5 M. Toyama
6 NTT Corporation
7 April 2011
8
9
10 <span class="h1">Media Description for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)</span>
11 <span class="h1">in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)</span>
12
13 Abstract
14
15 This document specifies how to establish a media session that
16 represents a virtual private network using the Session Initiation
17 Protocol for the purpose of on-demand media/application sharing
18 between peers. It extends the protocol identifier of the Session
19 Description Protocol (SDP) so that it can negotiate use of the
20 Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) for media sessions in the SDP
21 offer/answer model. It also specifies a method to boot up IKE and
22 generate IPsec security associations using a self-signed certificate.
23
24 Status of This Memo
25
26 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
27 published for informational purposes.
28
29 This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
30 RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
31 its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
32 implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
33 the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet
34 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
35
36 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
37 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
38 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6193">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6193</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
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56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document.
68
69 Table of Contents
70
71 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Applicability Statement .........................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
72 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
73 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Problem Statement ..........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
74 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Approach to Solution .......................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
75 2.3. Alternative Solution under Prior Relationship
76 between Two Nodes ..........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
77 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Authorization Model ........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
78 <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
79 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Overview ...............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
80 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers ............................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
81 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Normative Behavior ..............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
82 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. SDP Offer and Answer Exchange ..............................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
83 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Maintenance and Termination of VPN Session ................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
84 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Forking ...................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
85 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Port Usage ................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
86 <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Multiplexing UDP Messages When Using ICE ..................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
87 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Examples .......................................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
88 6.1. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange without
89 IPsec NAT-Traversal .......................................<a href="#page-13">13</a>
90 6.2. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange with
91 IPsec NAT-Traversal .......................................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
92 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Application to IKE .............................................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
93 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Specifications Assuming Prior Relationship between Two Nodes ...<a href="#page-16">16</a>
94 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Certificates Signed by Trusted Third Party ................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
95 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Configured Pre-Shared Key .................................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
96 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
97 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations ...........................................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
98 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgments ...............................................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
99 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
100 <a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
101 <a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
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110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Applicability Statement</span>
114
115 This document provides information about a deployed use of the
116 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [<a href="./rfc3261" title="&quot;SIP: Session Initiation Protocol&quot;">RFC3261</a>] for the Internet
117 community. It is not currently an IETF standards track proposal.
118 The mechanisms in this document use SIP as a name resolution and
119 authentication mechanism to initiate an Internet Key Exchange
120 Protocol (IKE) [<a href="./rfc5996" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC5996</a>] session. The purpose of this document is to
121 establish an on-demand virtual private network (VPN) to a home router
122 that does not have a fixed IP address using self-signed certificates.
123 It is only applicable under the condition that the integrity of the
124 Session Description Protocol (SDP) [<a href="./rfc4566" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">RFC4566</a>] is assured. The method
125 to ensure this integrity of SDP is outside the scope of this
126 document. This document specifies the process in which a pair of SIP
127 user agents resolve each other's names, exchange the fingerprints of
128 their self-signed certificates securely, and agree to establish an
129 IPsec-based VPN [<a href="./rfc4301" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">RFC4301</a>]. However, this document does not make any
130 modifications to the specifications of IPsec/IKE. Despite the
131 limitations of the conditions under which this document can be
132 applied, there are sufficient use cases in which this specification
133 is helpful, such as the following:
134
135 o Sharing media using a framework developed by Digital Living
136 Network Alliance (DLNA) or similar protocols over VPN between two
137 user devices.
138
139 o Accessing remote desktop applications over VPN initiated by SIP
140 call. As an additional function of click-to-call, a customer
141 service agent can access a customer's PC remotely to troubleshoot
142 the problem while talking with the customer over the phone.
143
144 o Accessing and controlling medical equipment (medical robotics)
145 remotely to monitor the elderly in a rural area (remote care
146 services).
147
148 o Using a LAN-based gaming protocol based on peer-to-peer rather
149 than via a gaming server.
150
151 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Introduction</span>
152
153 This section describes the problem in accessing home networks and
154 provides an overview of the proposed solution.
155
156
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164 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
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166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
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168
169 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Problem Statement</span>
170
171 Home servers and network-capable consumer electronic devices have
172 been widely deployed. People using such devices are willing to share
173 content and applications and are therefore seeking ways to establish
174 multiple communication channels with each other. However, there are
175 several obstacles to be overcome in the case of remote home access.
176
177 It is often not possible for a device outside the home network to
178 connect to another device inside the home network because the home
179 device is behind a network address translation (NAT) or firewall that
180 allows outgoing connections but blocks incoming connections. One
181 effective solution for this problem is VPN remote access to the NAT
182 device, which is usually a home router. With this approach, once the
183 external device joins the home network securely, establishing
184 connections with all the devices inside the home will become easy
185 because popular LAN-based communication methods such as DLNA can be
186 used transparently. However, there are more difficult cases in which
187 a home router itself is located behind the NAT. In such cases, it is
188 also necessary to consider NAT traversal of the remote access to the
189 home router. In many cases, because the global IP address of the
190 home router is not always fixed, it is necessary to make use of an
191 effective name resolution mechanism.
192
193 In addition, there is the problem of how a remote client and a home
194 router authenticate each other over IKE to establish IPsec for remote
195 access. It is not always possible for the two devices to securely
196 exchange a pre-shared key in advance. Administrative costs can make
197 it impractical to distribute authentication certificates signed by a
198 well-known root certification authority (CA) to all the devices. In
199 addition, it is inefficient to publish a temporary certificate to a
200 device that does not have a fixed IP address or hostname. To resolve
201 these authentication issues, this document proposes a mechanism that
202 enables the devices to authenticate each other using self-signed
203 certificates.
204
205 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Approach to Solution</span>
206
207 This document proposes the use of SIP as a name resolution and
208 authentication mechanism because of three main advantages:
209
210 o Delegation of Authentication to Third Party
211
212 Devices can be free from managing their signed certificates and
213 whitelists by taking advantage of authentication and authorization
214 mechanisms supported by SIP.
215
216
217
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222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
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224
225 o UDP Hole Punching for IKE/IPsec
226
227 SIP has a cross-NAT rendezvous mechanism, and Interactive
228 Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [<a href="./rfc5245" title="&quot;Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols&quot;">RFC5245</a>] has a function to open
229 ports through the NAT. The combination of these effective
230 functions can be used for general applications as well as real-
231 time media. It is difficult to set up a session between devices
232 without SIP if the devices are behind various types of NAT.
233
234 o Reuse of Existing SIP Infrastructure
235
236 SIP servers are widely distributed as a scalable infrastructure,
237 and it is quite practical to reuse them without any modifications.
238
239 Today, SIP is applied to not only Voice over IP (VoIP) but also
240 various applications and is recognized as a general protocol for
241 session initiation. Therefore, it can also be used to initiate
242 IKE/IPsec sessions.
243
244 However, there is also a specification that uses a self-signed
245 certificate for authentication in the SIP/SDP framework.
246 "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer
247 Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"
248 [<a href="./rfc4572" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4572</a>] (hereafter referred to as comedia-tls) specifies a method
249 to exchange the fingerprint of a self-signed certificate to establish
250 a Transport Layer Security (TLS) [<a href="./rfc5246" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">RFC5246</a>] connection. This
251 specification defines a mechanism by which self-signed certificates
252 can be used securely, provided that the integrity of the SDP
253 description is assured. Because a certificate itself is used for
254 authentication not only in TLS but also in IKE, this mechanism will
255 be applied to the establishment of an IPsec security association (SA)
256 by extending the protocol identifier of SDP so that it can specify
257 IKE.
258
259 One easy method to protect the integrity of the SDP description,
260 which is the premise of this specification, is to use the SIP
261 identity [<a href="./rfc4474" title="&quot;Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC4474</a>] mechanism. This approach is also referred to in
262 [<a href="./rfc5763" title="&quot;Framework for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)&quot;">RFC5763</a>]. Because the SIP identity mechanism can protect the
263 integrity of a body part as well as the value of the From header in a
264 SIP request by using a valid Identity header, the receiver of the
265 request can establish secure IPsec connections with the sender by
266 confirming that the hash value of the certificate sent during IKE
267 negotiation matches the fingerprint in the SDP. Although SIP
268 identity does not protect the identity of the receiver of the SIP
269 request, SIP-connected identity [<a href="./rfc4916" title="&quot;Connected Identity in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC4916</a>] does. Note that the
270 possible deficiencies discussed in [<a href="#ref-RFC4474-Concerns">RFC4474-Concerns</a>] could affect
271 this specification if SIP identity is used for the security
272 mechanism.
273
274
275
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278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
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280
281 Considering the above background, this document defines new media
282 formats "ike-esp" and "ike-esp-udpencap", which can be used when the
283 protocol identifier is "udp", to enable the negotiation of using IKE
284 for media sessions over SDP exchange on the condition that the
285 integrity of the SDP description is assured. It also specifies the
286 method to set up an IPsec SA by exchanging fingerprints of self-
287 signed certificates based on comedia-tls, and it notes the example of
288 SDP offer/answer [<a href="./rfc3264" title="&quot;An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC3264</a>] and the points that should be taken care
289 of by implementation. Because there is a chance that devices are
290 behind NAT, this document also covers the method to combine IKE/IPsec
291 NAT-Traversal [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>][RFC3948] with ICE. In addition, it defines
292 the attribute "ike-setup" for IKE media sessions, similar to the
293 "setup" attribute for TCP-based media transport defined in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>
294 [<a href="./rfc4145" title="&quot;TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4145</a>]. This attribute is used to negotiate the role of each
295 endpoint in the IKE session.
296
297 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Alternative Solution under Prior Relationship between Two Nodes</span>
298
299 Under quite limited conditions, certificates signed by trusted third
300 parties or pre-shared keys between endpoints could be used for
301 authentication in IKE, using SIP servers only for name resolution and
302 authorization of session initiation. Such limited cases are
303 addressed in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>.
304
305 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Authorization Model</span>
306
307 In this document, SIP servers are used for authorization of each SIP
308 call. The actual media sessions of IPsec/IKE are not authorized by
309 SIP servers but by the remote client and the home router based on the
310 information in SIP/SDP. For example, the home router recognizes the
311 remote client with its SIP-URI and IP address in the SDP. If it
312 decides to accept the remote client as a peer of a VPN session, it
313 will accept the following IKE session. Then, during the IKE
314 negotiation, the certificate fingerprint in the SDP is compared with
315 the certificate exchanged in the IKE session. If they match, IKE
316 negotiation continues. Only a successful IKE negotiation establishes
317 an IPsec session with the remote peer.
318
319 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span>
320
321 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
322 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
323 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
324
325
326
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328
329
330
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334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
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336
337 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Overview</span>
338
339 Figure 1 shows a case of VPN remote access from a device outside the
340 home to a home router whose IP address is not fixed. In this case,
341 the external device, a remote client, recognizes the Address of
342 Record of the home router but does not have any information about its
343 contact address and certificate. Generally, establishing an IPsec SA
344 dynamically and securely in this situation is difficult. However, as
345 specified in comedia-tls [<a href="./rfc4572" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4572</a>], if the integrity of SDP session
346 descriptions is assured, it is possible for the home router and the
347 remote client to have a prior relationship with each other by
348 exchanging certificate fingerprints, i.e., secure one-way hashes of
349 the distinguished encoding rules (DER) form of the certificates.
350
351 REGISTRATION REGISTRATION
352 (1) +----------+ (1)
353 +-------------&gt;| |&lt;---------+
354 | INVITE(2) | | |
355 | +-----------&gt;| SIP |--------+ |
356 | | 200 OK(2) | Proxy | | |
357 | | +----------| |&lt;-----+ | |
358 | | | | | | | | _________
359 | | V +----------+ | V | / \
360 +----------+ IKE (Media Session) +---------+ \
361 | Remote |&lt;---------(3)-------&gt;| Home | Home \
362 | Client | | Router | Network |
363 | ============(4)==================== |
364 |(SIP UAC) | VPN (IPsec SA) |(SIP UAS)| /
365 +----------+ +---------+ /
366 \_________/
367
368 Figure 1: Remote Access to Home Network
369
370 (1) Both Remote Client and Home Router generate secure signaling
371 channels. They may REGISTER to SIP Proxy using TLS.
372
373 (2) Remote Client sends an offer SDP with an INVITE request to Home
374 Router, and Home Router returns an answer SDP with a reliable
375 response (e.g., 200 OK). Both exchange the fingerprints of
376 their self-signed certificates in SDP during this transaction.
377 Remote Client does not accept an answer SDP with an unreliable
378 response as the final response.
379
380 (3) After the SDP exchange, Remote Client, which has the active
381 role, initiates IKE with Home Router, which has the passive
382 role, to establish an IPsec SA. Both validate that the
383 certificate presented in the IKE exchange has a fingerprint that
384
385
386
387
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392
393 matches the fingerprint from SDP. If they match, IKE
394 negotiation proceeds as normal.
395
396 (4) Remote Client joins the Home Network.
397
398 By this method, the self-signed certificates of both parties are used
399 for authentication in IKE, but SDP itself is not concerned with all
400 the negotiations related to key-exchange, such as those of encryption
401 and authentication algorithms. These negotiations are up to IKE. In
402 many cases where IPsec is used for remote access, a remote client
403 needs to dynamically obtain a private address inside the home network
404 while initiating the remote access. Therefore, the IPsec security
405 policy also needs to be set dynamically at the same time. However,
406 such a management function of the security policy is the
407 responsibility of the high-level application. SDP is not concerned
408 with it. The roles of SDP here are to determine the IP addresses of
409 both parties used for IKE connection with c-line in SDP and to
410 exchange the fingerprints of the certificates used for authentication
411 in IKE with the fingerprint attribute in SDP.
412
413 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers</span>
414
415 This document defines two SDP media formats for the "udp" protocol
416 under the "application" media type: "ike-esp" and "ike-esp-udpencap".
417 The format "ike-esp" indicates that the media described is IKE for
418 the establishment of an IPsec security association as described in
419 IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">RFC4303</a>]. In contrast,
420 "ike-esp-udpencap" indicates that the media described is IKE, which
421 is capable of NAT traversal for the establishment of UDP
422 encapsulation of IPsec packets through NAT boxes as specified in
423 [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>]. Even if the offerer and answerer exchange
424 "ike-esp-udpencap", IKE conforming to [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>] can end
425 up establishing a normal IPsec tunnel when there is no need to use
426 UDP encapsulation of IPsec. Both the offerer and answerer can
427 negotiate IKE by specifying "udp" in the "proto" field and "ike-esp"
428 or "ike-esp-udpencap" in the "fmt" field in SDP.
429
430 In addition, this document defines a new attribute "ike-setup", which
431 can be used when the protocol identifier is "udp" and the "fmt" field
432 is "ike-esp" or "ike-esp-udpencap", in order to describe how
433 endpoints should perform the IKE session setup procedure. The "ike-
434 setup" attribute indicates which of the end points should initiate
435 the establishment of an IKE session. The "ike-setup" attribute is
436 charset-independent and can be a session- or media-level attribute.
437 The following is the ABNF of the "ike-setup" attribute.
438
439
440
441
442
443
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448
449 ike-setup-attr = "a=ike-setup:" role
450 role = "active" / "passive" / "actpass"
451
452 'active': The endpoint will initiate an outgoing session.
453 'passive': The endpoint will accept an incoming session.
454 'actpass': The endpoint is willing to accept an incoming
455 session or to initiate an outgoing session.
456
457 Both endpoints use the SDP offer/answer model to negotiate the value
458 of "ike-setup", following the procedures determined for the "setup"
459 attribute defined in <a href="./rfc4145#section-4.1">Section&nbsp;4.1 of [RFC4145]</a>. However, "holdconn",
460 as defined in [<a href="./rfc4145" title="&quot;TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4145</a>], is not defined for the "ike-setup"
461 attribute.
462
463 Offer Answer
464 ----------------------------
465 active passive
466 passive active
467 actpass active / passive
468
469 The semantics for the "ike-setup" attribute values of "active",
470 "passive", and "actpass" in the offer/answer exchange are the same as
471 those described for the "setup" attribute in <a href="./rfc4145#section-4.1">Section&nbsp;4.1 of
472 [RFC4145]</a>, except that "ike-setup" applies to an IKE session instead
473 of a TCP connection. The default value of the "ike-setup" attribute
474 is "active" in the offer and "passive" in the answer.
475
476 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Normative Behavior</span>
477
478 In this section, a method to negotiate the use of IKE for media
479 sessions in the SDP offer/answer model is described.
480
481 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. SDP Offer and Answer Exchange</span>
482
483 An offerer and an answerer negotiate the use of IKE following the
484 usage of the protocol identifiers defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. If IPsec
485 NAT-Traversal is not necessary, the offerer MAY use the media format
486 "ike-esp" to indicate an IKE session.
487
488 If either of the endpoints that negotiate IKE is behind the NAT, the
489 endpoints need to transmit both IKE and IPsec packets over the NAT.
490 That mechanism is specified in [<a href="./rfc3947" title="&quot;Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE&quot;">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title="&quot;UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets&quot;">RFC3948</a>]: both
491 endpoints encapsulate IPsec-ESP packets with a UDP header and
492 multiplex them into the UDP path that IKE generates.
493
494 To indicate this type of IKE session, the offerer uses "ike-esp-
495 udpencap" media lines. In this case, the offerer MAY decide their
496 transport addresses (combination of IP address and port) before
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
503
504
505 starting IKE, making use of the ICE framework. Because UDP-
506 encapsulated ESP packets and IKE packets go through the same UDP hole
507 of a NAT, IPsec NAT-Traversal works if ICE reserves simply one UDP
508 path through the NAT. However, those UDP packets need to be
509 multiplexed with Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [<a href="./rfc5389" title="&quot;Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)&quot;">RFC5389</a>]
510 packets if ICE is required to use STUN. A method to coordinate IPsec
511 NAT-Traversal and ICE is described in Sections <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a> and <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>.
512
513 The offer MAY contain media lines for media other than "ike-esp" or
514 "ike-esp-udpencap". For example, audio stream may be included in the
515 same SDP to have a voice session when establishing the VPN. This may
516 be useful to verify that the connected device is indeed operated by
517 somebody who is authorized to access it, as described in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>.
518 If that occurs, the negotiation described in this specification
519 occurs only for the "ike-esp" or "ike-esp-udpencap" media lines;
520 other media lines are negotiated and set up normally. If the
521 answerer determines it will refuse the IKE session without beginning
522 the IKE negotiation (e.g., the From address is not on the permitted
523 list), it SHOULD reject the "ike-esp" or "ike-esp-udpencap" media
524 line in the normal manner by setting the port number in the SDP
525 answer to 0 and SHOULD process the other media lines normally (only
526 if it is still reasonable to establish that media without VPN).
527
528 If the offerer and the answerer agree to start an IKE session by the
529 offer/answer exchange, they will start the IKE setup. Following the
530 comedia-tls specification [<a href="./rfc4572" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4572</a>], the fingerprint attribute, which
531 may be either a session- or a media-level SDP attribute, is used to
532 exchange fingerprints of self-signed certificates. If the
533 fingerprint attribute is a session-level attribute, it applies to all
534 IKE sessions and TLS sessions for which no media-level fingerprint
535 attribute is defined.
536
537 Note that it is possible for an offerer to become the IKE responder
538 and an answerer to become the IKE initiator. For example, when a
539 Remote Access Server (RAS) sends an INVITE to an RAS client, the
540 server may expect the client to become an IKE initiator. In this
541 case, the server sends an offer SDP with ike-setup:passive and the
542 client returns an answer SDP with ike-setup:active.
543
544 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Maintenance and Termination of VPN Session</span>
545
546 If the high-level application recognizes a VPN session as the media
547 session, it MAY discard the IPsec SA and terminate IKE when that
548 media session is terminated by a BYE request. Therefore, the
549 application aware of the VPN session MUST NOT send a BYE request as
550 long as it needs the IPsec SA. On the other hand, if the high-level
551 application detects that a VPN session is terminated, it MAY
552 terminate the media associated with the VPN or the entire SIP
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
559
560
561 session. Session timers in SIP [<a href="./rfc4028" title="&quot;Session Timers in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)&quot;">RFC4028</a>] MAY be used for the session
562 maintenance of the SIP call, but this does not necessarily ensure
563 that the VPN session is alive. If the VPN session needs session
564 maintenance such as keep-alive and rekeying, it MUST be done
565 utilizing its own maintenance mechanisms. SIP re-INVITE MUST NOT be
566 used for this purpose. Note that each party can cache the
567 certificate of the other party as described in the Security
568 Considerations section of comedia-tls [<a href="./rfc4572" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4572</a>].
569
570 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Forking</span>
571
572 Forking to multiple registered instances is outside the scope of this
573 document. At least, it is assumed that a User Agent Client (UAC)
574 establishes a session with only one User Agent Server (UAS).
575 Encountering forked answers should be treated as an illegal process,
576 and the UAC should cancel the session.
577
578 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Port Usage</span>
579
580 IKE generally uses local UDP port 500, but the IPsec NAT-Traversal
581 specification requires a port transition to local UDP port 4500
582 during IKE negotiation because IPsec-aware NAT may multiplex IKE
583 sessions using port 500 without changing the port number. If using
584 ICE for IPsec Nat-Traversal, this port transition of IKE means ICE
585 has to generate an additional UDP path for port 4500, and this would
586 be unnecessary overhead. However, IPsec NAT-Traversal allows an IKE
587 session to use local UDP port 4500 from the beginning without using
588 port 500. Therefore, the endpoints SHOULD use their local UDP port
589 4500 for an IKE session from the beginning, and ICE will only need to
590 generate a UDP path of port 4500.
591
592 When using ICE, a responder's IKE port observed by an initiator is
593 not necessarily 500 or 4500. Therefore, an IKE initiator MUST allow
594 any destination ports in addition to 500 and 4500 for the IKE packets
595 that it sends. An IKE initiator just initiates an IKE session to the
596 port number decided by an SDP offer/answer or ICE.
597
598 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Multiplexing UDP Messages When Using ICE</span>
599
600 Conforming to ICE, an offerer and an answerer start a STUN
601 connectivity check after SDP exchange. Then the offerer initiates
602 the IKE session making use of the UDP path generated by STUN packets.
603 In addition, UDP-encapsulated ESP packets are multiplexed into the
604 same UDP path as IKE. Thus, it is necessary to multiplex the three
605 different packets, STUN, IKE, and UDP-encapsulated ESP, into the same
606 UDP path. This section describes how to demultiplex these three
607 packets.
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
615
616
617 At the first step, the endpoint that received a UDP packet at the
618 multiplexed port MUST check the first 32 bits (bits 0-31) of the UDP
619 payload. If they are all 0, which is defined as a non-ESP marker,
620 that packet MUST be treated as an IKE packet.
621
622 Otherwise, it is judged as an ESP packet in the IPsec NAT-Traversal
623 specification. It is furthermore necessary to distinguish STUN from
624 ESP. Therefore, the bits 32-63 from the beginning of the UDP payload
625 MUST be checked. If the bits do not match the magic cookie of STUN
626 0x2112A442 (most packets do not match), the packet is treated as an
627 ESP packet because it is no longer a STUN packet.
628
629 However, if the bits do match the magic cookie, an additional test is
630 necessary to determine if the packet is STUN or ESP. The magic
631 cookie field of STUN overlaps the sequence number field of ESP, so a
632 possibility still remains that the sequence number of ESP coincides
633 with 0x2112A442. In this additional test, the validity of the
634 fingerprint attribute of the STUN message MUST be checked. If there
635 is a valid fingerprint in the message, it is judged as a STUN packet;
636 otherwise, it is an ESP packet.
637
638 The above logic is expressed as follows.
639
640 if SPI-field-is-all-zeros
641 { packet is IKE }
642 else
643 {
644 if bits-32-through-63 == stun-magic-cookie-value and
645 bits-0-through-1 == 0 and
646 bits-2-through-15 == a STUN message type and
647 bits-16-through-31 == length of this UDP packet
648 {
649 fingerprint_found == parse_for_stun_fingerprint();
650 if fingerprint_found == 1
651 { packet is STUN }
652 else
653 { packet is ESP }
654 }
655 else
656 { packet is ESP }
657 }
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
671
672
673 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Examples</span>
674
675 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange without IPsec NAT-</span>
676 <span class="h3"> Traversal</span>
677
678 If IPsec NAT-Traversal is not necessary, SDP negotiation to set up
679 IKE is quite simple. Examples of SDP exchange are as follows.
680
681 (Note: Due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP
682 across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters. A backslash
683 character marks where this line folding has taken place. This
684 backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in
685 actual SDP content.)
686
687 offer SDP
688 ...
689 m=application 500 udp ike-esp
690 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10
691 a=ike-setup:active
692 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
693 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
694 ...
695
696 answer SDP
697 ...
698 m=application 500 udp ike-esp
699 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20
700 a=ike-setup:passive
701 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
702 D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E
703 ...
704
705 Figure 2: SDP Example When Offerer Is an IKE Initiator
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
727
728
729 offer SDP
730 ...
731 m=application 500 udp ike-esp
732 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10
733 a=ike-setup:passive
734 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
735 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
736 ...
737
738 answer SDP
739 ...
740 m=application 500 udp ike-esp
741 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20
742 a=ike-setup:active
743 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
744 D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E
745 ...
746
747 Figure 3: SDP Example When Offerer Is an IKE Responder
748
749 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange with IPsec NAT-Traversal</span>
750
751 We consider the following scenario here.
752
753 +---------------------+
754 | |
755 | Internet |
756 | |
757 +---------------------+
758 | |
759 | |(192.0.2.20:45664)
760 | +---------+
761 | | NAT |
762 | +---------+
763 | |
764 (192.0.2.10:4500)| |(192.0.2.100:4500)
765 +---------+ +----------+
766 | offerer | | answerer |
767 +---------+ +----------+
768
769 Figure 4: NAT-Traversal Scenario
770
771 As shown above, an offerer is on the Internet, but an answerer is
772 behind the NAT. The offerer cannot initiate an IKE session unless
773 the answerer prepares a global routable transport address that
774 accepts IKE packets. In this case, the following offer/answer
775 exchange will take place.
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
783
784
785 offer SDP
786 ...
787 a=ice-pwd:YH75Fviy6338Vbrhrlp8Yh
788 a=ice-ufrag:9uB6
789 m=application 4500 udp ike-esp-udpencap
790 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10
791 a=ike-setup:active
792 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
793 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
794 a=candidate:1 1 udp 2130706431 192.0.2.10 4500 typ host
795 ...
796
797 answer SDP
798 ...
799 a=ice-pwd:asd88fgpdd777uzjYhagZg
800 a=ice-ufrag:8hhY
801 m=application 45664 udp ike-esp-udpencap
802 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20
803 a=ike-setup:passive
804 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
805 D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E
806 a=candidate:1 1 udp 2130706431 192.0.2.100 4500 typ host
807 a=candidate:2 1 udp 1694498815 192.0.2.20 45664 typ srflx \
808 raddr 192.0.2.100 rport 4500
809 ...
810
811 Figure 5: SDP Example with IPsec NAT-Traversal
812
813 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Application to IKE</span>
814
815 After the fingerprints of both parties are securely shared over the
816 SDP exchange, the IKE initiator MAY start the IKE session with the
817 other party. To follow this specification, a digital signature MUST
818 be chosen as an authentication method in IKE phase 1. In this
819 process, a certificate whose hash value matches the fingerprint
820 exchanged over SDP MUST be used. If the certificate used in IKE does
821 not match the original fingerprint, the endpoint MUST terminate the
822 IKE session by detecting an authentication failure.
823
824 In addition, each party MUST present a certificate and be
825 authenticated by each other.
826
827 The example described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> is for tunnel mode IPsec used for
828 remote access, but the mode of negotiated IPsec is not limited to
829 tunnel mode. For example, IKE can negotiate transport mode IPsec to
830 encrypt multiple media sessions between two parties with only a pair
831 of IPsec security associations. The only thing for which the SDP
832 offer/answer model is responsible is to exchange the fingerprints of
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
839
840
841 certificates used for IKE; therefore, the SDP offer/answer is not
842 responsible for setting the security policy.
843
844 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Specifications Assuming Prior Relationship between Two Nodes</span>
845
846 This section describes the specification for the limited cases in
847 which certificates signed by trusted third parties or pre-shared keys
848 between endpoints can be used for authentication in IKE. Because the
849 endpoints already have a prior relationship in this case, they use
850 SIP servers for only name resolution and authorization. However,
851 even in this case, the integrity of the SDP description MUST be
852 assured.
853
854 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Certificates Signed by Trusted Third Party</span>
855
856 The protocol overview in this case is the same as in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. The
857 SDP offer/answer procedure is also the same as in Sections <a href="#section-5">5</a> and <a href="#section-6">6</a>.
858 Both endpoints have a prior relationship through the trusted third
859 parties, and SIP servers are used for name resolution and
860 authorization of session initiation. Even so, they MAY exchange
861 fingerprints in the SDP because one device can have several
862 certificates and it would be necessary to specify in advance which
863 certificate will be used for the following IKE authentication. This
864 process also ensures that the certificate offered in the IKE process
865 is the same as that owned by the peer that has been authorized at the
866 SIP/SDP layer. By this process, authorization in SIP and
867 authentication in IKE become consistent with each other.
868
869 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Configured Pre-Shared Key</span>
870
871 If a pre-shared key for IKE authentication is installed in both
872 endpoints in advance, they need not exchange the fingerprints of
873 their certificates. However, they may still need to specify which
874 pre-shared key they will use in the following IKE authentication in
875 SDP because they may have several pre-shared keys. Therefore, a new
876 attribute, "psk-fingerprint", is defined to exchange the fingerprint
877 of a pre-shared key over SDP. This attribute also has the role of
878 making authorization in SIP consistent with authentication in IKE.
879 Attribute "psk-fingerprint" is applied to pre-shared keys as the
880 "fingerprint" defined in [<a href="./rfc4572" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4572</a>] is applied to certificates. The
881 following is the ABNF of the "psk-fingerprint" attribute. The use of
882 "psk-fingerprint" is OPTIONAL.
883
884 attribute =/ psk-fingerprint-attribute
885
886 psk-fingerprint-attribute = "psk-fingerprint" ":" hash-func SP
887 psk-fingerprint
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
895
896
897 hash-func = "sha-1" / "sha-224" / "sha-256" /
898 "sha-384" / "sha-512" / token
899 ; Additional hash functions can only come
900 ; from updates to <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a>
901
902 psk-fingerprint = 2UHEX *(":" 2UHEX)
903 ; Each byte in upper-case hex, separated
904 ; by colons.
905
906 UHEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 ; A-F uppercase
907
908 An example of SDP negotiation for IKE with pre-shared key
909 authentication without IPsec NAT-Traversal is as follows.
910
911 offer SDP
912 ...
913 m=application 500 udp ike-esp
914 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10
915 a=ike-setup:active
916 a=psk-fingerprint:SHA-1 \
917 12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02
918 ...
919
920 answer SDP
921 ...
922 m=application 500 udp ike-esp
923 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20
924 a=ike-setup:passive
925 a=psk-fingerprint:SHA-1 \
926 12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02
927 ...
928
929 Figure 6: SDP Example of IKE with Pre-Shared Key Authentication
930
931 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span>
932
933 This entire document concerns security, but the security
934 considerations applicable to SDP in general are described in the SDP
935 specification [<a href="./rfc4566" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">RFC4566</a>]. The security issues that should be
936 considered in using comedia-tls are described in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> in its
937 specification [<a href="./rfc4572" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">RFC4572</a>]. This section mainly describes the security
938 considerations specific to the negotiation of IKE using comedia-tls.
939
940 Offering IKE in SDP (or agreeing to one in the SDP offer/answer
941 model) does not create an obligation for an endpoint to accept any
942 IKE session with the given fingerprint. However, the endpoint must
943 engage in the standard IKE negotiation procedure to ensure that the
944 chosen IPsec security associations (including encryption and
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
951
952
953 authentication algorithms) meet the security requirements of the
954 higher-level application. When IKE has finished negotiating, the
955 decision to conclude IKE and establish an IPsec security association
956 with the remote peer is entirely the decision of each endpoint. This
957 procedure is similar to how VPNs are typically established in the
958 absence of SIP.
959
960 In the general authentication process in IKE, subject DN or
961 subjectAltName is recognized as the identity of the remote party.
962 However, by using SIP identity and SIP-connected identity mechanisms
963 in this spec, certificates are used simply as carriers for the public
964 keys of the peers and there is no need for the information about who
965 is the signer of the certificate and who is indicated by subject DN.
966
967 In this document, the purpose of using IKE is to launch the IPsec SA;
968 it is not for the security mechanism of RTP and RTCP [<a href="./rfc3550" title="&quot;RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications&quot;">RFC3550</a>]
969 packets. In fact, this mechanism cannot provide end-to-end security
970 inside the VPN as long as the VPN uses tunnel mode IPsec. Therefore,
971 other security methods such as the Secure Real-time Transport
972 Protocol (SRTP) [<a href="./rfc3711" title="&quot;The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)&quot;">RFC3711</a>] must be used to secure the packets.
973
974 When using the specification defined in this document, it needs to be
975 considered that under the following circumstances, security based on
976 SIP authentication provided by SIP proxy may be breached.
977
978 o If a legitimate user's terminal is used by another person, it may
979 be able to establish a VPN with the legitimate identity
980 information. This issue also applies to the general VPN cases
981 based on the shared secret key. Furthermore, in SIP we have a
982 similar problem when file transfer, IM, or comedia-tls where non-
983 voice/video is used as a means of communication.
984
985 o If a malicious user hijacks the proxy, he or she can use whatever
986 credential is on the Access Control List (ACL) to gain access to
987 the home network.
988
989 For countermeasures to these issues, it is recommended to use unique
990 information such as a password that only a legitimate user knows for
991 VPN establishment. Validating the originating user by voice or video
992 before establishing VPN would be another method.
993
994
995
996
997
998
999
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
1007
1008
1009 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
1010
1011 IANA has registered the following new SDP attributes and media
1012 formats.
1013
1014 Attribute name: ike-setup
1015 Long form name: IKE setup extensions
1016 Type of attribute: Session-level and media-level
1017 Subject to charset: No
1018 Purpose: Attribute to indicate initiator and responder
1019 of IKE-based media session
1020 Appropriate values: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-4">Section&nbsp;4 of RFC 6193</a>
1021 Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected]
1022
1023 Media format name: ike-esp
1024 Long form name: IKE followed by IPsec ESP
1025 Associated media: application
1026 Associated proto: udp
1027 Subject to charset: No
1028 Purpose: Media format that indicates IKE and IPsec ESP
1029 as a VPN session
1030 Reference to the spec: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-5">Section&nbsp;5 of RFC 6193</a>
1031 Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected]
1032
1033
1034 Media format name: ike-esp-udpencap
1035 Long form name: IKE followed by IPsec ESP or UDP encapsulated
1036 IPsec ESP
1037 Associated media: application
1038 Associated proto: udp
1039 Subject to charset: No
1040 Purpose: Media format that indicates IKE that
1041 supports NAT-Traversal and IPsec ESP or UDP
1042 encapsulation of IPsec ESP packets as a VPN
1043 session
1044 Reference to the spec: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-5">Section&nbsp;5 of RFC 6193</a>
1045 Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected]
1046
1047
1048 Attribute name: psk-fingerprint
1049 Long form name: Fingerprint of pre-shared key extensions
1050 Type of attribute: Session-level and media-level
1051 Subject to charset: No
1052 Purpose: Attribute to indicate a pre-shared key that
1053 will be used in the following media session
1054 Appropriate values: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-8.2">Section&nbsp;8.2. of RFC 6193</a>
1055 Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected]
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
1063
1064
1065 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
1066
1067 We would like to thank Remi Denis-Courmont, Dale Worley, Richard
1068 Barnes, David Hancock, Stuart Hoggan, Jean-Francois Mule, Gonzalo
1069 Camarillo, and Robert Sparks for providing comments and suggestions
1070 contributing to this document. Eric Rescorla especially gave
1071 insightful comments from a security point of view. Shintaro Mizuno
1072 and Shida Schubert also contributed a lot of effort to improving this
1073 document.
1074
1075 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. References</span>
1076
1077 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References</span>
1078
1079 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1080 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
1081
1082 [<a id="ref-RFC3261">RFC3261</a>] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston,
1083 A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E.
1084 Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>,
1085 June 2002.
1086
1087 [<a id="ref-RFC3264">RFC3264</a>] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model
1088 with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc3264">RFC 3264</a>, June
1089 2002.
1090
1091 [<a id="ref-RFC3947">RFC3947</a>] Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe,
1092 "Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", <a href="./rfc3947">RFC 3947</a>,
1093 January 2005.
1094
1095 [<a id="ref-RFC3948">RFC3948</a>] Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M.
1096 Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets", <a href="./rfc3948">RFC</a>
1097 <a href="./rfc3948">3948</a>, January 2005.
1098
1099 [<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the
1100 Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.
1101
1102 [<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4303">RFC</a>
1103 <a href="./rfc4303">4303</a>, December 2005.
1104
1105 [<a id="ref-RFC4566">RFC4566</a>] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
1106 Description Protocol", <a href="./rfc4566">RFC 4566</a>, July 2006.
1107
1108 [<a id="ref-RFC4572">RFC4572</a>] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
1109 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
1110 Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a>, July 2006.
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
1119
1120
1121 [<a id="ref-RFC5245">RFC5245</a>] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment
1122 (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT)
1123 Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", <a href="./rfc5245">RFC 5245</a>, April
1124 2010.
1125
1126 [<a id="ref-RFC5389">RFC5389</a>] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing,
1127 "Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", <a href="./rfc5389">RFC 5389</a>,
1128 October 2008.
1129
1130 [<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
1131 "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", <a href="./rfc5996">RFC</a>
1132 <a href="./rfc5996">5996</a>, September 2010.
1133
1134 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1135
1136 [<a id="ref-RFC4474-Concerns">RFC4474-Concerns</a>]
1137 Rosenberg, J., "Concerns around the Applicability of <a href="./rfc4474">RFC</a>
1138 <a href="./rfc4474">4474</a>", Work in Progress, February 2008.
1139
1140 [<a id="ref-RFC3550">RFC3550</a>] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V.
1141 Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time
1142 Applications", STD 64, <a href="./rfc3550">RFC 3550</a>, July 2003.
1143
1144 [<a id="ref-RFC3711">RFC3711</a>] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K.
1145 Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)",
1146 <a href="./rfc3711">RFC 3711</a>, March 2004.
1147
1148 [<a id="ref-RFC4028">RFC4028</a>] Donovan, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Session Timers in the
1149 Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4028">RFC 4028</a>, April 2005.
1150
1151 [<a id="ref-RFC4145">RFC4145</a>] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in
1152 the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>,
1153 September 2005.
1154
1155 [<a id="ref-RFC4474">RFC4474</a>] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for
1156 Authenticated Identity Management in the Session
1157 Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4474">RFC 4474</a>, August 2006.
1158
1159 [<a id="ref-RFC4916">RFC4916</a>] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation
1160 Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4916">RFC 4916</a>, June 2007.
1161
1162 [<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
1163 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008.
1164
1165 [<a id="ref-RFC5763">RFC5763</a>] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework
1166 for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol
1167 (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer
1168 Security (DTLS)", <a href="./rfc5763">RFC 5763</a>, May 2010.
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span>
1175
1176
1177 Authors' Addresses
1178
1179 Makoto Saito
1180 NTT Communications
1181 1-1-6 Uchisaiwai-Cho, Chiyoda-ku
1182 Tokyo 100-8019
1183 Japan
1184
1185 EMail: [email protected]
1186
1187
1188 Dan Wing
1189 Cisco Systems
1190 170 West Tasman Drive
1191 San Jose, CA 95134
1192 United States
1193
1194 EMail: [email protected]
1195
1196
1197 Masashi Toyama
1198 NTT Corporation
1199 9-11 Midori-Cho 3-Chome, Musashino-Shi
1200 Tokyo 180-8585
1201 Japan
1202
1203 EMail: [email protected]
1204
1205
1206
1207
1208
1209
1210
1211
1212
1213
1214
1215
1216
1217
1218
1219
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 Saito, et al. Informational [Page 22]
1229 </pre>