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<pre>Independent Submission M. Saito |
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Request for Comments: 6193 NTT Communications |
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Category: Informational D. Wing |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Cisco Systems |
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M. Toyama |
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NTT Corporation |
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April 2011 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Media Description for the Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE)</span> |
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<span class="h1">in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)</span> |
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Abstract |
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This document specifies how to establish a media session that |
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represents a virtual private network using the Session Initiation |
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Protocol for the purpose of on-demand media/application sharing |
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between peers. It extends the protocol identifier of the Session |
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Description Protocol (SDP) so that it can negotiate use of the |
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Internet Key Exchange Protocol (IKE) for media sessions in the SDP |
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offer/answer model. It also specifies a method to boot up IKE and |
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generate IPsec security associations using a self-signed certificate. |
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Status of This Memo |
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other |
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RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at |
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its discretion and makes no statement about its value for |
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implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by |
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the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6193">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6193</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Applicability Statement .........................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Problem Statement ..........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Approach to Solution .......................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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2.3. Alternative Solution under Prior Relationship |
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between Two Nodes ..........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Authorization Model ........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Overview ...............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers ............................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Normative Behavior ..............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. SDP Offer and Answer Exchange ..............................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Maintenance and Termination of VPN Session ................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Forking ...................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Port Usage ................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Multiplexing UDP Messages When Using ICE ..................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Examples .......................................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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6.1. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange without |
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IPsec NAT-Traversal .......................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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6.2. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange with |
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IPsec NAT-Traversal .......................................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Application to IKE .............................................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Specifications Assuming Prior Relationship between Two Nodes ...<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Certificates Signed by Trusted Third Party ................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Configured Pre-Shared Key .................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations ...........................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgments ...............................................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-12">12</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Applicability Statement</span> |
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This document provides information about a deployed use of the |
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Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [<a href="./rfc3261" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">RFC3261</a>] for the Internet |
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community. It is not currently an IETF standards track proposal. |
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The mechanisms in this document use SIP as a name resolution and |
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authentication mechanism to initiate an Internet Key Exchange |
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Protocol (IKE) [<a href="./rfc5996" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC5996</a>] session. The purpose of this document is to |
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establish an on-demand virtual private network (VPN) to a home router |
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that does not have a fixed IP address using self-signed certificates. |
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It is only applicable under the condition that the integrity of the |
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Session Description Protocol (SDP) [<a href="./rfc4566" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">RFC4566</a>] is assured. The method |
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to ensure this integrity of SDP is outside the scope of this |
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document. This document specifies the process in which a pair of SIP |
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user agents resolve each other's names, exchange the fingerprints of |
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their self-signed certificates securely, and agree to establish an |
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IPsec-based VPN [<a href="./rfc4301" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">RFC4301</a>]. However, this document does not make any |
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modifications to the specifications of IPsec/IKE. Despite the |
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limitations of the conditions under which this document can be |
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applied, there are sufficient use cases in which this specification |
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is helpful, such as the following: |
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o Sharing media using a framework developed by Digital Living |
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Network Alliance (DLNA) or similar protocols over VPN between two |
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user devices. |
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o Accessing remote desktop applications over VPN initiated by SIP |
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call. As an additional function of click-to-call, a customer |
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service agent can access a customer's PC remotely to troubleshoot |
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the problem while talking with the customer over the phone. |
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o Accessing and controlling medical equipment (medical robotics) |
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remotely to monitor the elderly in a rural area (remote care |
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services). |
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o Using a LAN-based gaming protocol based on peer-to-peer rather |
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than via a gaming server. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Introduction</span> |
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This section describes the problem in accessing home networks and |
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provides an overview of the proposed solution. |
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<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Problem Statement</span> |
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Home servers and network-capable consumer electronic devices have |
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been widely deployed. People using such devices are willing to share |
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content and applications and are therefore seeking ways to establish |
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multiple communication channels with each other. However, there are |
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several obstacles to be overcome in the case of remote home access. |
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It is often not possible for a device outside the home network to |
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connect to another device inside the home network because the home |
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device is behind a network address translation (NAT) or firewall that |
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allows outgoing connections but blocks incoming connections. One |
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effective solution for this problem is VPN remote access to the NAT |
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device, which is usually a home router. With this approach, once the |
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external device joins the home network securely, establishing |
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connections with all the devices inside the home will become easy |
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because popular LAN-based communication methods such as DLNA can be |
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used transparently. However, there are more difficult cases in which |
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a home router itself is located behind the NAT. In such cases, it is |
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also necessary to consider NAT traversal of the remote access to the |
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home router. In many cases, because the global IP address of the |
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home router is not always fixed, it is necessary to make use of an |
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effective name resolution mechanism. |
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In addition, there is the problem of how a remote client and a home |
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router authenticate each other over IKE to establish IPsec for remote |
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access. It is not always possible for the two devices to securely |
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exchange a pre-shared key in advance. Administrative costs can make |
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it impractical to distribute authentication certificates signed by a |
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well-known root certification authority (CA) to all the devices. In |
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addition, it is inefficient to publish a temporary certificate to a |
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device that does not have a fixed IP address or hostname. To resolve |
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these authentication issues, this document proposes a mechanism that |
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enables the devices to authenticate each other using self-signed |
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certificates. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Approach to Solution</span> |
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This document proposes the use of SIP as a name resolution and |
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authentication mechanism because of three main advantages: |
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o Delegation of Authentication to Third Party |
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Devices can be free from managing their signed certificates and |
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whitelists by taking advantage of authentication and authorization |
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mechanisms supported by SIP. |
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<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
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o UDP Hole Punching for IKE/IPsec |
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SIP has a cross-NAT rendezvous mechanism, and Interactive |
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Connectivity Establishment (ICE) [<a href="./rfc5245" title=""Interactive Connectivity Establishment (ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols"">RFC5245</a>] has a function to open |
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ports through the NAT. The combination of these effective |
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functions can be used for general applications as well as real- |
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time media. It is difficult to set up a session between devices |
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without SIP if the devices are behind various types of NAT. |
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o Reuse of Existing SIP Infrastructure |
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SIP servers are widely distributed as a scalable infrastructure, |
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and it is quite practical to reuse them without any modifications. |
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Today, SIP is applied to not only Voice over IP (VoIP) but also |
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various applications and is recognized as a general protocol for |
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session initiation. Therefore, it can also be used to initiate |
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IKE/IPsec sessions. |
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However, there is also a specification that uses a self-signed |
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certificate for authentication in the SIP/SDP framework. |
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"Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer |
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Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)" |
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[<a href="./rfc4572" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4572</a>] (hereafter referred to as comedia-tls) specifies a method |
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to exchange the fingerprint of a self-signed certificate to establish |
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a Transport Layer Security (TLS) [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>] connection. This |
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specification defines a mechanism by which self-signed certificates |
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can be used securely, provided that the integrity of the SDP |
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description is assured. Because a certificate itself is used for |
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authentication not only in TLS but also in IKE, this mechanism will |
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be applied to the establishment of an IPsec security association (SA) |
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by extending the protocol identifier of SDP so that it can specify |
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IKE. |
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One easy method to protect the integrity of the SDP description, |
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which is the premise of this specification, is to use the SIP |
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identity [<a href="./rfc4474" title=""Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC4474</a>] mechanism. This approach is also referred to in |
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[<a href="./rfc5763" title=""Framework for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"">RFC5763</a>]. Because the SIP identity mechanism can protect the |
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integrity of a body part as well as the value of the From header in a |
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SIP request by using a valid Identity header, the receiver of the |
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request can establish secure IPsec connections with the sender by |
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confirming that the hash value of the certificate sent during IKE |
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negotiation matches the fingerprint in the SDP. Although SIP |
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identity does not protect the identity of the receiver of the SIP |
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request, SIP-connected identity [<a href="./rfc4916" title=""Connected Identity in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC4916</a>] does. Note that the |
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possible deficiencies discussed in [<a href="#ref-RFC4474-Concerns">RFC4474-Concerns</a>] could affect |
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this specification if SIP identity is used for the security |
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mechanism. |
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<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
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Considering the above background, this document defines new media |
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formats "ike-esp" and "ike-esp-udpencap", which can be used when the |
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protocol identifier is "udp", to enable the negotiation of using IKE |
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for media sessions over SDP exchange on the condition that the |
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integrity of the SDP description is assured. It also specifies the |
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method to set up an IPsec SA by exchanging fingerprints of self- |
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signed certificates based on comedia-tls, and it notes the example of |
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SDP offer/answer [<a href="./rfc3264" title=""An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC3264</a>] and the points that should be taken care |
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of by implementation. Because there is a chance that devices are |
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behind NAT, this document also covers the method to combine IKE/IPsec |
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NAT-Traversal [<a href="./rfc3947" title=""Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE"">RFC3947</a>][RFC3948] with ICE. In addition, it defines |
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the attribute "ike-setup" for IKE media sessions, similar to the |
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"setup" attribute for TCP-based media transport defined in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> |
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[<a href="./rfc4145" title=""TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4145</a>]. This attribute is used to negotiate the role of each |
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endpoint in the IKE session. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Alternative Solution under Prior Relationship between Two Nodes</span> |
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Under quite limited conditions, certificates signed by trusted third |
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parties or pre-shared keys between endpoints could be used for |
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authentication in IKE, using SIP servers only for name resolution and |
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authorization of session initiation. Such limited cases are |
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addressed in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Authorization Model</span> |
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In this document, SIP servers are used for authorization of each SIP |
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call. The actual media sessions of IPsec/IKE are not authorized by |
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SIP servers but by the remote client and the home router based on the |
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information in SIP/SDP. For example, the home router recognizes the |
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remote client with its SIP-URI and IP address in the SDP. If it |
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decides to accept the remote client as a peer of a VPN session, it |
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will accept the following IKE session. Then, during the IKE |
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negotiation, the certificate fingerprint in the SDP is compared with |
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the certificate exchanged in the IKE session. If they match, IKE |
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negotiation continues. Only a successful IKE negotiation establishes |
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an IPsec session with the remote peer. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Protocol Overview</span> |
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Figure 1 shows a case of VPN remote access from a device outside the |
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home to a home router whose IP address is not fixed. In this case, |
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the external device, a remote client, recognizes the Address of |
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Record of the home router but does not have any information about its |
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contact address and certificate. Generally, establishing an IPsec SA |
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dynamically and securely in this situation is difficult. However, as |
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specified in comedia-tls [<a href="./rfc4572" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4572</a>], if the integrity of SDP session |
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descriptions is assured, it is possible for the home router and the |
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remote client to have a prior relationship with each other by |
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exchanging certificate fingerprints, i.e., secure one-way hashes of |
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the distinguished encoding rules (DER) form of the certificates. |
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REGISTRATION REGISTRATION |
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(1) +----------+ (1) |
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+------------->| |<---------+ |
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| INVITE(2) | | | |
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| +----------->| SIP |--------+ | |
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| | 200 OK(2) | Proxy | | | |
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| | +----------| |<-----+ | | |
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| | | | | | | | _________ |
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| | V +----------+ | V | / \ |
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+----------+ IKE (Media Session) +---------+ \ |
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| Remote |<---------(3)------->| Home | Home \ |
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| Client | | Router | Network | |
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| ============(4)==================== | |
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|(SIP UAC) | VPN (IPsec SA) |(SIP UAS)| / |
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+----------+ +---------+ / |
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\_________/ |
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Figure 1: Remote Access to Home Network |
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(1) Both Remote Client and Home Router generate secure signaling |
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channels. They may REGISTER to SIP Proxy using TLS. |
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(2) Remote Client sends an offer SDP with an INVITE request to Home |
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Router, and Home Router returns an answer SDP with a reliable |
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response (e.g., 200 OK). Both exchange the fingerprints of |
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their self-signed certificates in SDP during this transaction. |
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Remote Client does not accept an answer SDP with an unreliable |
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response as the final response. |
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(3) After the SDP exchange, Remote Client, which has the active |
| 381 |
role, initiates IKE with Home Router, which has the passive |
| 382 |
role, to establish an IPsec SA. Both validate that the |
| 383 |
certificate presented in the IKE exchange has a fingerprint that |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
matches the fingerprint from SDP. If they match, IKE |
| 394 |
negotiation proceeds as normal. |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
(4) Remote Client joins the Home Network. |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
By this method, the self-signed certificates of both parties are used |
| 399 |
for authentication in IKE, but SDP itself is not concerned with all |
| 400 |
the negotiations related to key-exchange, such as those of encryption |
| 401 |
and authentication algorithms. These negotiations are up to IKE. In |
| 402 |
many cases where IPsec is used for remote access, a remote client |
| 403 |
needs to dynamically obtain a private address inside the home network |
| 404 |
while initiating the remote access. Therefore, the IPsec security |
| 405 |
policy also needs to be set dynamically at the same time. However, |
| 406 |
such a management function of the security policy is the |
| 407 |
responsibility of the high-level application. SDP is not concerned |
| 408 |
with it. The roles of SDP here are to determine the IP addresses of |
| 409 |
both parties used for IKE connection with c-line in SDP and to |
| 410 |
exchange the fingerprints of the certificates used for authentication |
| 411 |
in IKE with the fingerprint attribute in SDP. |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers</span> |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
This document defines two SDP media formats for the "udp" protocol |
| 416 |
under the "application" media type: "ike-esp" and "ike-esp-udpencap". |
| 417 |
The format "ike-esp" indicates that the media described is IKE for |
| 418 |
the establishment of an IPsec security association as described in |
| 419 |
IPsec Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="./rfc4303" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">RFC4303</a>]. In contrast, |
| 420 |
"ike-esp-udpencap" indicates that the media described is IKE, which |
| 421 |
is capable of NAT traversal for the establishment of UDP |
| 422 |
encapsulation of IPsec packets through NAT boxes as specified in |
| 423 |
[<a href="./rfc3947" title=""Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE"">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title=""UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets"">RFC3948</a>]. Even if the offerer and answerer exchange |
| 424 |
"ike-esp-udpencap", IKE conforming to [<a href="./rfc3947" title=""Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE"">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title=""UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets"">RFC3948</a>] can end |
| 425 |
up establishing a normal IPsec tunnel when there is no need to use |
| 426 |
UDP encapsulation of IPsec. Both the offerer and answerer can |
| 427 |
negotiate IKE by specifying "udp" in the "proto" field and "ike-esp" |
| 428 |
or "ike-esp-udpencap" in the "fmt" field in SDP. |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
In addition, this document defines a new attribute "ike-setup", which |
| 431 |
can be used when the protocol identifier is "udp" and the "fmt" field |
| 432 |
is "ike-esp" or "ike-esp-udpencap", in order to describe how |
| 433 |
endpoints should perform the IKE session setup procedure. The "ike- |
| 434 |
setup" attribute indicates which of the end points should initiate |
| 435 |
the establishment of an IKE session. The "ike-setup" attribute is |
| 436 |
charset-independent and can be a session- or media-level attribute. |
| 437 |
The following is the ABNF of the "ike-setup" attribute. |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
ike-setup-attr = "a=ike-setup:" role |
| 450 |
role = "active" / "passive" / "actpass" |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
'active': The endpoint will initiate an outgoing session. |
| 453 |
'passive': The endpoint will accept an incoming session. |
| 454 |
'actpass': The endpoint is willing to accept an incoming |
| 455 |
session or to initiate an outgoing session. |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
Both endpoints use the SDP offer/answer model to negotiate the value |
| 458 |
of "ike-setup", following the procedures determined for the "setup" |
| 459 |
attribute defined in <a href="./rfc4145#section-4.1">Section 4.1 of [RFC4145]</a>. However, "holdconn", |
| 460 |
as defined in [<a href="./rfc4145" title=""TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4145</a>], is not defined for the "ike-setup" |
| 461 |
attribute. |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
Offer Answer |
| 464 |
---------------------------- |
| 465 |
active passive |
| 466 |
passive active |
| 467 |
actpass active / passive |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
The semantics for the "ike-setup" attribute values of "active", |
| 470 |
"passive", and "actpass" in the offer/answer exchange are the same as |
| 471 |
those described for the "setup" attribute in <a href="./rfc4145#section-4.1">Section 4.1 of |
| 472 |
[RFC4145]</a>, except that "ike-setup" applies to an IKE session instead |
| 473 |
of a TCP connection. The default value of the "ike-setup" attribute |
| 474 |
is "active" in the offer and "passive" in the answer. |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Normative Behavior</span> |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
In this section, a method to negotiate the use of IKE for media |
| 479 |
sessions in the SDP offer/answer model is described. |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. SDP Offer and Answer Exchange</span> |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
An offerer and an answerer negotiate the use of IKE following the |
| 484 |
usage of the protocol identifiers defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. If IPsec |
| 485 |
NAT-Traversal is not necessary, the offerer MAY use the media format |
| 486 |
"ike-esp" to indicate an IKE session. |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
If either of the endpoints that negotiate IKE is behind the NAT, the |
| 489 |
endpoints need to transmit both IKE and IPsec packets over the NAT. |
| 490 |
That mechanism is specified in [<a href="./rfc3947" title=""Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE"">RFC3947</a>] and [<a href="./rfc3948" title=""UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets"">RFC3948</a>]: both |
| 491 |
endpoints encapsulate IPsec-ESP packets with a UDP header and |
| 492 |
multiplex them into the UDP path that IKE generates. |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
To indicate this type of IKE session, the offerer uses "ike-esp- |
| 495 |
udpencap" media lines. In this case, the offerer MAY decide their |
| 496 |
transport addresses (combination of IP address and port) before |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
starting IKE, making use of the ICE framework. Because UDP- |
| 506 |
encapsulated ESP packets and IKE packets go through the same UDP hole |
| 507 |
of a NAT, IPsec NAT-Traversal works if ICE reserves simply one UDP |
| 508 |
path through the NAT. However, those UDP packets need to be |
| 509 |
multiplexed with Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN) [<a href="./rfc5389" title=""Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)"">RFC5389</a>] |
| 510 |
packets if ICE is required to use STUN. A method to coordinate IPsec |
| 511 |
NAT-Traversal and ICE is described in Sections <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a> and <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
The offer MAY contain media lines for media other than "ike-esp" or |
| 514 |
"ike-esp-udpencap". For example, audio stream may be included in the |
| 515 |
same SDP to have a voice session when establishing the VPN. This may |
| 516 |
be useful to verify that the connected device is indeed operated by |
| 517 |
somebody who is authorized to access it, as described in <a href="#section-9">Section 9</a>. |
| 518 |
If that occurs, the negotiation described in this specification |
| 519 |
occurs only for the "ike-esp" or "ike-esp-udpencap" media lines; |
| 520 |
other media lines are negotiated and set up normally. If the |
| 521 |
answerer determines it will refuse the IKE session without beginning |
| 522 |
the IKE negotiation (e.g., the From address is not on the permitted |
| 523 |
list), it SHOULD reject the "ike-esp" or "ike-esp-udpencap" media |
| 524 |
line in the normal manner by setting the port number in the SDP |
| 525 |
answer to 0 and SHOULD process the other media lines normally (only |
| 526 |
if it is still reasonable to establish that media without VPN). |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
If the offerer and the answerer agree to start an IKE session by the |
| 529 |
offer/answer exchange, they will start the IKE setup. Following the |
| 530 |
comedia-tls specification [<a href="./rfc4572" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4572</a>], the fingerprint attribute, which |
| 531 |
may be either a session- or a media-level SDP attribute, is used to |
| 532 |
exchange fingerprints of self-signed certificates. If the |
| 533 |
fingerprint attribute is a session-level attribute, it applies to all |
| 534 |
IKE sessions and TLS sessions for which no media-level fingerprint |
| 535 |
attribute is defined. |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
Note that it is possible for an offerer to become the IKE responder |
| 538 |
and an answerer to become the IKE initiator. For example, when a |
| 539 |
Remote Access Server (RAS) sends an INVITE to an RAS client, the |
| 540 |
server may expect the client to become an IKE initiator. In this |
| 541 |
case, the server sends an offer SDP with ike-setup:passive and the |
| 542 |
client returns an answer SDP with ike-setup:active. |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Maintenance and Termination of VPN Session</span> |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
If the high-level application recognizes a VPN session as the media |
| 547 |
session, it MAY discard the IPsec SA and terminate IKE when that |
| 548 |
media session is terminated by a BYE request. Therefore, the |
| 549 |
application aware of the VPN session MUST NOT send a BYE request as |
| 550 |
long as it needs the IPsec SA. On the other hand, if the high-level |
| 551 |
application detects that a VPN session is terminated, it MAY |
| 552 |
terminate the media associated with the VPN or the entire SIP |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
session. Session timers in SIP [<a href="./rfc4028" title=""Session Timers in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">RFC4028</a>] MAY be used for the session |
| 562 |
maintenance of the SIP call, but this does not necessarily ensure |
| 563 |
that the VPN session is alive. If the VPN session needs session |
| 564 |
maintenance such as keep-alive and rekeying, it MUST be done |
| 565 |
utilizing its own maintenance mechanisms. SIP re-INVITE MUST NOT be |
| 566 |
used for this purpose. Note that each party can cache the |
| 567 |
certificate of the other party as described in the Security |
| 568 |
Considerations section of comedia-tls [<a href="./rfc4572" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4572</a>]. |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Forking</span> |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
Forking to multiple registered instances is outside the scope of this |
| 573 |
document. At least, it is assumed that a User Agent Client (UAC) |
| 574 |
establishes a session with only one User Agent Server (UAS). |
| 575 |
Encountering forked answers should be treated as an illegal process, |
| 576 |
and the UAC should cancel the session. |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Port Usage</span> |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
IKE generally uses local UDP port 500, but the IPsec NAT-Traversal |
| 581 |
specification requires a port transition to local UDP port 4500 |
| 582 |
during IKE negotiation because IPsec-aware NAT may multiplex IKE |
| 583 |
sessions using port 500 without changing the port number. If using |
| 584 |
ICE for IPsec Nat-Traversal, this port transition of IKE means ICE |
| 585 |
has to generate an additional UDP path for port 4500, and this would |
| 586 |
be unnecessary overhead. However, IPsec NAT-Traversal allows an IKE |
| 587 |
session to use local UDP port 4500 from the beginning without using |
| 588 |
port 500. Therefore, the endpoints SHOULD use their local UDP port |
| 589 |
4500 for an IKE session from the beginning, and ICE will only need to |
| 590 |
generate a UDP path of port 4500. |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
When using ICE, a responder's IKE port observed by an initiator is |
| 593 |
not necessarily 500 or 4500. Therefore, an IKE initiator MUST allow |
| 594 |
any destination ports in addition to 500 and 4500 for the IKE packets |
| 595 |
that it sends. An IKE initiator just initiates an IKE session to the |
| 596 |
port number decided by an SDP offer/answer or ICE. |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Multiplexing UDP Messages When Using ICE</span> |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
Conforming to ICE, an offerer and an answerer start a STUN |
| 601 |
connectivity check after SDP exchange. Then the offerer initiates |
| 602 |
the IKE session making use of the UDP path generated by STUN packets. |
| 603 |
In addition, UDP-encapsulated ESP packets are multiplexed into the |
| 604 |
same UDP path as IKE. Thus, it is necessary to multiplex the three |
| 605 |
different packets, STUN, IKE, and UDP-encapsulated ESP, into the same |
| 606 |
UDP path. This section describes how to demultiplex these three |
| 607 |
packets. |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
At the first step, the endpoint that received a UDP packet at the |
| 618 |
multiplexed port MUST check the first 32 bits (bits 0-31) of the UDP |
| 619 |
payload. If they are all 0, which is defined as a non-ESP marker, |
| 620 |
that packet MUST be treated as an IKE packet. |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
Otherwise, it is judged as an ESP packet in the IPsec NAT-Traversal |
| 623 |
specification. It is furthermore necessary to distinguish STUN from |
| 624 |
ESP. Therefore, the bits 32-63 from the beginning of the UDP payload |
| 625 |
MUST be checked. If the bits do not match the magic cookie of STUN |
| 626 |
0x2112A442 (most packets do not match), the packet is treated as an |
| 627 |
ESP packet because it is no longer a STUN packet. |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
However, if the bits do match the magic cookie, an additional test is |
| 630 |
necessary to determine if the packet is STUN or ESP. The magic |
| 631 |
cookie field of STUN overlaps the sequence number field of ESP, so a |
| 632 |
possibility still remains that the sequence number of ESP coincides |
| 633 |
with 0x2112A442. In this additional test, the validity of the |
| 634 |
fingerprint attribute of the STUN message MUST be checked. If there |
| 635 |
is a valid fingerprint in the message, it is judged as a STUN packet; |
| 636 |
otherwise, it is an ESP packet. |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
The above logic is expressed as follows. |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
if SPI-field-is-all-zeros |
| 641 |
{ packet is IKE } |
| 642 |
else |
| 643 |
{ |
| 644 |
if bits-32-through-63 == stun-magic-cookie-value and |
| 645 |
bits-0-through-1 == 0 and |
| 646 |
bits-2-through-15 == a STUN message type and |
| 647 |
bits-16-through-31 == length of this UDP packet |
| 648 |
{ |
| 649 |
fingerprint_found == parse_for_stun_fingerprint(); |
| 650 |
if fingerprint_found == 1 |
| 651 |
{ packet is STUN } |
| 652 |
else |
| 653 |
{ packet is ESP } |
| 654 |
} |
| 655 |
else |
| 656 |
{ packet is ESP } |
| 657 |
} |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Examples</span> |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange without IPsec NAT-</span> |
| 676 |
<span class="h3"> Traversal</span> |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
If IPsec NAT-Traversal is not necessary, SDP negotiation to set up |
| 679 |
IKE is quite simple. Examples of SDP exchange are as follows. |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
(Note: Due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP |
| 682 |
across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters. A backslash |
| 683 |
character marks where this line folding has taken place. This |
| 684 |
backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in |
| 685 |
actual SDP content.) |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
offer SDP |
| 688 |
... |
| 689 |
m=application 500 udp ike-esp |
| 690 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10 |
| 691 |
a=ike-setup:active |
| 692 |
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 693 |
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB |
| 694 |
... |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
answer SDP |
| 697 |
... |
| 698 |
m=application 500 udp ike-esp |
| 699 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20 |
| 700 |
a=ike-setup:passive |
| 701 |
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 702 |
D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E |
| 703 |
... |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
Figure 2: SDP Example When Offerer Is an IKE Initiator |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
offer SDP |
| 730 |
... |
| 731 |
m=application 500 udp ike-esp |
| 732 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10 |
| 733 |
a=ike-setup:passive |
| 734 |
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 735 |
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB |
| 736 |
... |
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
answer SDP |
| 739 |
... |
| 740 |
m=application 500 udp ike-esp |
| 741 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20 |
| 742 |
a=ike-setup:active |
| 743 |
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 744 |
D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E |
| 745 |
... |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
Figure 3: SDP Example When Offerer Is an IKE Responder |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Example of SDP Offer and Answer Exchange with IPsec NAT-Traversal</span> |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
We consider the following scenario here. |
| 752 |
|
| 753 |
+---------------------+ |
| 754 |
| | |
| 755 |
| Internet | |
| 756 |
| | |
| 757 |
+---------------------+ |
| 758 |
| | |
| 759 |
| |(192.0.2.20:45664) |
| 760 |
| +---------+ |
| 761 |
| | NAT | |
| 762 |
| +---------+ |
| 763 |
| | |
| 764 |
(192.0.2.10:4500)| |(192.0.2.100:4500) |
| 765 |
+---------+ +----------+ |
| 766 |
| offerer | | answerer | |
| 767 |
+---------+ +----------+ |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
Figure 4: NAT-Traversal Scenario |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
As shown above, an offerer is on the Internet, but an answerer is |
| 772 |
behind the NAT. The offerer cannot initiate an IKE session unless |
| 773 |
the answerer prepares a global routable transport address that |
| 774 |
accepts IKE packets. In this case, the following offer/answer |
| 775 |
exchange will take place. |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
offer SDP |
| 786 |
... |
| 787 |
a=ice-pwd:YH75Fviy6338Vbrhrlp8Yh |
| 788 |
a=ice-ufrag:9uB6 |
| 789 |
m=application 4500 udp ike-esp-udpencap |
| 790 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10 |
| 791 |
a=ike-setup:active |
| 792 |
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 793 |
4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB |
| 794 |
a=candidate:1 1 udp 2130706431 192.0.2.10 4500 typ host |
| 795 |
... |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
answer SDP |
| 798 |
... |
| 799 |
a=ice-pwd:asd88fgpdd777uzjYhagZg |
| 800 |
a=ice-ufrag:8hhY |
| 801 |
m=application 45664 udp ike-esp-udpencap |
| 802 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20 |
| 803 |
a=ike-setup:passive |
| 804 |
a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 805 |
D2:9F:6F:1E:CD:D3:09:E8:70:65:1A:51:7C:9D:30:4F:21:E4:4A:8E |
| 806 |
a=candidate:1 1 udp 2130706431 192.0.2.100 4500 typ host |
| 807 |
a=candidate:2 1 udp 1694498815 192.0.2.20 45664 typ srflx \ |
| 808 |
raddr 192.0.2.100 rport 4500 |
| 809 |
... |
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
Figure 5: SDP Example with IPsec NAT-Traversal |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Application to IKE</span> |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
After the fingerprints of both parties are securely shared over the |
| 816 |
SDP exchange, the IKE initiator MAY start the IKE session with the |
| 817 |
other party. To follow this specification, a digital signature MUST |
| 818 |
be chosen as an authentication method in IKE phase 1. In this |
| 819 |
process, a certificate whose hash value matches the fingerprint |
| 820 |
exchanged over SDP MUST be used. If the certificate used in IKE does |
| 821 |
not match the original fingerprint, the endpoint MUST terminate the |
| 822 |
IKE session by detecting an authentication failure. |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
In addition, each party MUST present a certificate and be |
| 825 |
authenticated by each other. |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
The example described in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> is for tunnel mode IPsec used for |
| 828 |
remote access, but the mode of negotiated IPsec is not limited to |
| 829 |
tunnel mode. For example, IKE can negotiate transport mode IPsec to |
| 830 |
encrypt multiple media sessions between two parties with only a pair |
| 831 |
of IPsec security associations. The only thing for which the SDP |
| 832 |
offer/answer model is responsible is to exchange the fingerprints of |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
certificates used for IKE; therefore, the SDP offer/answer is not |
| 842 |
responsible for setting the security policy. |
| 843 |
|
| 844 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Specifications Assuming Prior Relationship between Two Nodes</span> |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
This section describes the specification for the limited cases in |
| 847 |
which certificates signed by trusted third parties or pre-shared keys |
| 848 |
between endpoints can be used for authentication in IKE. Because the |
| 849 |
endpoints already have a prior relationship in this case, they use |
| 850 |
SIP servers for only name resolution and authorization. However, |
| 851 |
even in this case, the integrity of the SDP description MUST be |
| 852 |
assured. |
| 853 |
|
| 854 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Certificates Signed by Trusted Third Party</span> |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
The protocol overview in this case is the same as in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. The |
| 857 |
SDP offer/answer procedure is also the same as in Sections <a href="#section-5">5</a> and <a href="#section-6">6</a>. |
| 858 |
Both endpoints have a prior relationship through the trusted third |
| 859 |
parties, and SIP servers are used for name resolution and |
| 860 |
authorization of session initiation. Even so, they MAY exchange |
| 861 |
fingerprints in the SDP because one device can have several |
| 862 |
certificates and it would be necessary to specify in advance which |
| 863 |
certificate will be used for the following IKE authentication. This |
| 864 |
process also ensures that the certificate offered in the IKE process |
| 865 |
is the same as that owned by the peer that has been authorized at the |
| 866 |
SIP/SDP layer. By this process, authorization in SIP and |
| 867 |
authentication in IKE become consistent with each other. |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Configured Pre-Shared Key</span> |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
If a pre-shared key for IKE authentication is installed in both |
| 872 |
endpoints in advance, they need not exchange the fingerprints of |
| 873 |
their certificates. However, they may still need to specify which |
| 874 |
pre-shared key they will use in the following IKE authentication in |
| 875 |
SDP because they may have several pre-shared keys. Therefore, a new |
| 876 |
attribute, "psk-fingerprint", is defined to exchange the fingerprint |
| 877 |
of a pre-shared key over SDP. This attribute also has the role of |
| 878 |
making authorization in SIP consistent with authentication in IKE. |
| 879 |
Attribute "psk-fingerprint" is applied to pre-shared keys as the |
| 880 |
"fingerprint" defined in [<a href="./rfc4572" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4572</a>] is applied to certificates. The |
| 881 |
following is the ABNF of the "psk-fingerprint" attribute. The use of |
| 882 |
"psk-fingerprint" is OPTIONAL. |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
attribute =/ psk-fingerprint-attribute |
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
psk-fingerprint-attribute = "psk-fingerprint" ":" hash-func SP |
| 887 |
psk-fingerprint |
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
hash-func = "sha-1" / "sha-224" / "sha-256" / |
| 898 |
"sha-384" / "sha-512" / token |
| 899 |
; Additional hash functions can only come |
| 900 |
; from updates to <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
psk-fingerprint = 2UHEX *(":" 2UHEX) |
| 903 |
; Each byte in upper-case hex, separated |
| 904 |
; by colons. |
| 905 |
|
| 906 |
UHEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 ; A-F uppercase |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
An example of SDP negotiation for IKE with pre-shared key |
| 909 |
authentication without IPsec NAT-Traversal is as follows. |
| 910 |
|
| 911 |
offer SDP |
| 912 |
... |
| 913 |
m=application 500 udp ike-esp |
| 914 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.10 |
| 915 |
a=ike-setup:active |
| 916 |
a=psk-fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 917 |
12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02 |
| 918 |
... |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
answer SDP |
| 921 |
... |
| 922 |
m=application 500 udp ike-esp |
| 923 |
c=IN IP4 192.0.2.20 |
| 924 |
a=ike-setup:passive |
| 925 |
a=psk-fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
| 926 |
12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02 |
| 927 |
... |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
Figure 6: SDP Example of IKE with Pre-Shared Key Authentication |
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
This entire document concerns security, but the security |
| 934 |
considerations applicable to SDP in general are described in the SDP |
| 935 |
specification [<a href="./rfc4566" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">RFC4566</a>]. The security issues that should be |
| 936 |
considered in using comedia-tls are described in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> in its |
| 937 |
specification [<a href="./rfc4572" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">RFC4572</a>]. This section mainly describes the security |
| 938 |
considerations specific to the negotiation of IKE using comedia-tls. |
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
Offering IKE in SDP (or agreeing to one in the SDP offer/answer |
| 941 |
model) does not create an obligation for an endpoint to accept any |
| 942 |
IKE session with the given fingerprint. However, the endpoint must |
| 943 |
engage in the standard IKE negotiation procedure to ensure that the |
| 944 |
chosen IPsec security associations (including encryption and |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
authentication algorithms) meet the security requirements of the |
| 954 |
higher-level application. When IKE has finished negotiating, the |
| 955 |
decision to conclude IKE and establish an IPsec security association |
| 956 |
with the remote peer is entirely the decision of each endpoint. This |
| 957 |
procedure is similar to how VPNs are typically established in the |
| 958 |
absence of SIP. |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
In the general authentication process in IKE, subject DN or |
| 961 |
subjectAltName is recognized as the identity of the remote party. |
| 962 |
However, by using SIP identity and SIP-connected identity mechanisms |
| 963 |
in this spec, certificates are used simply as carriers for the public |
| 964 |
keys of the peers and there is no need for the information about who |
| 965 |
is the signer of the certificate and who is indicated by subject DN. |
| 966 |
|
| 967 |
In this document, the purpose of using IKE is to launch the IPsec SA; |
| 968 |
it is not for the security mechanism of RTP and RTCP [<a href="./rfc3550" title=""RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time Applications"">RFC3550</a>] |
| 969 |
packets. In fact, this mechanism cannot provide end-to-end security |
| 970 |
inside the VPN as long as the VPN uses tunnel mode IPsec. Therefore, |
| 971 |
other security methods such as the Secure Real-time Transport |
| 972 |
Protocol (SRTP) [<a href="./rfc3711" title=""The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)"">RFC3711</a>] must be used to secure the packets. |
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
When using the specification defined in this document, it needs to be |
| 975 |
considered that under the following circumstances, security based on |
| 976 |
SIP authentication provided by SIP proxy may be breached. |
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
o If a legitimate user's terminal is used by another person, it may |
| 979 |
be able to establish a VPN with the legitimate identity |
| 980 |
information. This issue also applies to the general VPN cases |
| 981 |
based on the shared secret key. Furthermore, in SIP we have a |
| 982 |
similar problem when file transfer, IM, or comedia-tls where non- |
| 983 |
voice/video is used as a means of communication. |
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
o If a malicious user hijacks the proxy, he or she can use whatever |
| 986 |
credential is on the Access Control List (ACL) to gain access to |
| 987 |
the home network. |
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
For countermeasures to these issues, it is recommended to use unique |
| 990 |
information such as a password that only a legitimate user knows for |
| 991 |
VPN establishment. Validating the originating user by voice or video |
| 992 |
before establishing VPN would be another method. |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
|
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
IANA has registered the following new SDP attributes and media |
| 1012 |
formats. |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
Attribute name: ike-setup |
| 1015 |
Long form name: IKE setup extensions |
| 1016 |
Type of attribute: Session-level and media-level |
| 1017 |
Subject to charset: No |
| 1018 |
Purpose: Attribute to indicate initiator and responder |
| 1019 |
of IKE-based media session |
| 1020 |
Appropriate values: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-4">Section 4 of RFC 6193</a> |
| 1021 |
Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected] |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
Media format name: ike-esp |
| 1024 |
Long form name: IKE followed by IPsec ESP |
| 1025 |
Associated media: application |
| 1026 |
Associated proto: udp |
| 1027 |
Subject to charset: No |
| 1028 |
Purpose: Media format that indicates IKE and IPsec ESP |
| 1029 |
as a VPN session |
| 1030 |
Reference to the spec: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-5">Section 5 of RFC 6193</a> |
| 1031 |
Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected] |
| 1032 |
|
| 1033 |
|
| 1034 |
Media format name: ike-esp-udpencap |
| 1035 |
Long form name: IKE followed by IPsec ESP or UDP encapsulated |
| 1036 |
IPsec ESP |
| 1037 |
Associated media: application |
| 1038 |
Associated proto: udp |
| 1039 |
Subject to charset: No |
| 1040 |
Purpose: Media format that indicates IKE that |
| 1041 |
supports NAT-Traversal and IPsec ESP or UDP |
| 1042 |
encapsulation of IPsec ESP packets as a VPN |
| 1043 |
session |
| 1044 |
Reference to the spec: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-5">Section 5 of RFC 6193</a> |
| 1045 |
Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected] |
| 1046 |
|
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
Attribute name: psk-fingerprint |
| 1049 |
Long form name: Fingerprint of pre-shared key extensions |
| 1050 |
Type of attribute: Session-level and media-level |
| 1051 |
Subject to charset: No |
| 1052 |
Purpose: Attribute to indicate a pre-shared key that |
| 1053 |
will be used in the following media session |
| 1054 |
Appropriate values: See <a href="./rfc6193#section-8.2">Section 8.2. of RFC 6193</a> |
| 1055 |
Contact name: Makoto Saito, [email protected] |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
We would like to thank Remi Denis-Courmont, Dale Worley, Richard |
| 1068 |
Barnes, David Hancock, Stuart Hoggan, Jean-Francois Mule, Gonzalo |
| 1069 |
Camarillo, and Robert Sparks for providing comments and suggestions |
| 1070 |
contributing to this document. Eric Rescorla especially gave |
| 1071 |
insightful comments from a security point of view. Shintaro Mizuno |
| 1072 |
and Shida Schubert also contributed a lot of effort to improving this |
| 1073 |
document. |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. References</span> |
| 1076 |
|
| 1077 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 1078 |
|
| 1079 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1080 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 1081 |
|
| 1082 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3261">RFC3261</a>] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, |
| 1083 |
A., Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. |
| 1084 |
Schooler, "SIP: Session Initiation Protocol", <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>, |
| 1085 |
June 2002. |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3264">RFC3264</a>] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model |
| 1088 |
with Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc3264">RFC 3264</a>, June |
| 1089 |
2002. |
| 1090 |
|
| 1091 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3947">RFC3947</a>] Kivinen, T., Swander, B., Huttunen, A., and V. Volpe, |
| 1092 |
"Negotiation of NAT-Traversal in the IKE", <a href="./rfc3947">RFC 3947</a>, |
| 1093 |
January 2005. |
| 1094 |
|
| 1095 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3948">RFC3948</a>] Huttunen, A., Swander, B., Volpe, V., DiBurro, L., and M. |
| 1096 |
Stenberg, "UDP Encapsulation of IPsec ESP Packets", <a href="./rfc3948">RFC</a> |
| 1097 |
<a href="./rfc3948">3948</a>, January 2005. |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4301">RFC4301</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the |
| 1100 |
Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005. |
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4303">RFC4303</a>] Kent, S., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc4303">RFC</a> |
| 1103 |
<a href="./rfc4303">4303</a>, December 2005. |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4566">RFC4566</a>] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session |
| 1106 |
Description Protocol", <a href="./rfc4566">RFC 4566</a>, July 2006. |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4572">RFC4572</a>] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the |
| 1109 |
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session |
| 1110 |
Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a>, July 2006. |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5245">RFC5245</a>] Rosenberg, J., "Interactive Connectivity Establishment |
| 1122 |
(ICE): A Protocol for Network Address Translator (NAT) |
| 1123 |
Traversal for Offer/Answer Protocols", <a href="./rfc5245">RFC 5245</a>, April |
| 1124 |
2010. |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5389">RFC5389</a>] Rosenberg, J., Mahy, R., Matthews, P., and D. Wing, |
| 1127 |
"Session Traversal Utilities for NAT (STUN)", <a href="./rfc5389">RFC 5389</a>, |
| 1128 |
October 2008. |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, |
| 1131 |
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", <a href="./rfc5996">RFC</a> |
| 1132 |
<a href="./rfc5996">5996</a>, September 2010. |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4474-Concerns">RFC4474-Concerns</a>] |
| 1137 |
Rosenberg, J., "Concerns around the Applicability of <a href="./rfc4474">RFC</a> |
| 1138 |
<a href="./rfc4474">4474</a>", Work in Progress, February 2008. |
| 1139 |
|
| 1140 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3550">RFC3550</a>] Schulzrinne, H., Casner, S., Frederick, R., and V. |
| 1141 |
Jacobson, "RTP: A Transport Protocol for Real-Time |
| 1142 |
Applications", STD 64, <a href="./rfc3550">RFC 3550</a>, July 2003. |
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3711">RFC3711</a>] Baugher, M., McGrew, D., Naslund, M., Carrara, E., and K. |
| 1145 |
Norrman, "The Secure Real-time Transport Protocol (SRTP)", |
| 1146 |
<a href="./rfc3711">RFC 3711</a>, March 2004. |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4028">RFC4028</a>] Donovan, S. and J. Rosenberg, "Session Timers in the |
| 1149 |
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4028">RFC 4028</a>, April 2005. |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4145">RFC4145</a>] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in |
| 1152 |
the Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>, |
| 1153 |
September 2005. |
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4474">RFC4474</a>] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for |
| 1156 |
Authenticated Identity Management in the Session |
| 1157 |
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4474">RFC 4474</a>, August 2006. |
| 1158 |
|
| 1159 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4916">RFC4916</a>] Elwell, J., "Connected Identity in the Session Initiation |
| 1160 |
Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc4916">RFC 4916</a>, June 2007. |
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
| 1163 |
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008. |
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5763">RFC5763</a>] Fischl, J., Tschofenig, H., and E. Rescorla, "Framework |
| 1166 |
for Establishing a Secure Real-time Transport Protocol |
| 1167 |
(SRTP) Security Context Using Datagram Transport Layer |
| 1168 |
Security (DTLS)", <a href="./rfc5763">RFC 5763</a>, May 2010. |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Saito, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6193">RFC 6193</a> Media Description for IKE in SDP April 2011</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
Makoto Saito |
| 1180 |
NTT Communications |
| 1181 |
1-1-6 Uchisaiwai-Cho, Chiyoda-ku |
| 1182 |
Tokyo 100-8019 |
| 1183 |
Japan |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
|
| 1188 |
Dan Wing |
| 1189 |
Cisco Systems |
| 1190 |
170 West Tasman Drive |
| 1191 |
San Jose, CA 95134 |
| 1192 |
United States |
| 1193 |
|
| 1194 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
Masashi Toyama |
| 1198 |
NTT Corporation |
| 1199 |
9-11 Midori-Cho 3-Chome, Musashino-Shi |
| 1200 |
Tokyo 180-8585 |
| 1201 |
Japan |
| 1202 |
|
| 1203 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 |
|
| 1206 |
|
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
|
| 1210 |
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|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
Saito, et al. Informational [Page 22] |
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</pre> |