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1 <pre>Network Working Group J. Klensin
2 Request for Comments: 2195 R. Catoe
3 Category: Standards Track P. Krumviede
4 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc2095">2095</a> MCI
5 September 1997
6
7
8 <span class="h1">IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension for Simple Challenge/Response</span>
9
10 Status of this Memo
11
12 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
13 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
14 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
15 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
16 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
17
18 Abstract
19
20 While IMAP4 supports a number of strong authentication mechanisms as
21 described in <a href="./rfc1731">RFC 1731</a>, it lacks any mechanism that neither passes
22 cleartext, reusable passwords across the network nor requires either
23 a significant security infrastructure or that the mail server update
24 a mail-system-wide user authentication file on each mail access.
25 This specification provides a simple challenge-response
26 authentication protocol that is suitable for use with IMAP4. Since
27 it utilizes Keyed-MD5 digests and does not require that the secret be
28 stored in the clear on the server, it may also constitute an
29 improvement on APOP for POP3 use as specified in <a href="./rfc1734">RFC 1734</a>.
30
31 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
32
33 Existing Proposed Standards specify an AUTHENTICATE mechanism for the
34 IMAP4 protocol [<a href="#ref-IMAP" title="&quot;Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1&quot;">IMAP</a>, <a href="#ref-IMAP-AUTH" title="&quot;IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms&quot;">IMAP-AUTH</a>] and a parallel AUTH mechanism for
35 the POP3 protocol [<a href="#ref-POP3-AUTH" title="&quot;POP3 AUTHentication command&quot;">POP3-AUTH</a>]. The AUTHENTICATE mechanism is
36 intended to be extensible; the four methods specified in [<a href="#ref-IMAP-AUTH" title="&quot;IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms&quot;">IMAP-AUTH</a>]
37 are all fairly powerful and require some security infrastructure to
38 support. The base POP3 specification [<a href="#ref-POP3" title="&quot;Post Office Protocol - Version 3&quot;">POP3</a>] also contains a
39 lightweight challenge-response mechanism called APOP. APOP is
40 associated with most of the risks associated with such protocols: in
41 particular, it requires that both the client and server machines have
42 access to the shared secret in cleartext form. CRAM offers a method
43 for avoiding such cleartext storage while retaining the algorithmic
44 simplicity of APOP in using only MD5, though in a "keyed" method.
45
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52 <span class="grey">Klensin, Catoe &amp; Krumviede Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2195">RFC 2195</a> IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension September 1997</span>
55
56
57 At present, IMAP [<a href="#ref-IMAP" title="&quot;Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1&quot;">IMAP</a>] lacks any facility corresponding to APOP.
58 The only alternative to the strong mechanisms identified in [IMAP-
59 AUTH] is a presumably cleartext username and password, supported
60 through the LOGIN command in [<a href="#ref-IMAP" title="&quot;Internet Message Access Protocol - Version 4rev1&quot;">IMAP</a>]. This document describes a
61 simple challenge-response mechanism, similar to APOP and PPP CHAP
62 [PPP], that can be used with IMAP (and, in principle, with POP3).
63
64 This mechanism also has the advantage over some possible alternatives
65 of not requiring that the server maintain information about email
66 "logins" on a per-login basis. While mechanisms that do require such
67 per-login history records may offer enhanced security, protocols such
68 as IMAP, which may have several connections between a given client
69 and server open more or less simultaneous, may make their
70 implementation particularly challenging.
71
72 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Challenge-Response Authentication Mechanism (CRAM)</span>
73
74 The authentication type associated with CRAM is "CRAM-MD5".
75
76 The data encoded in the first ready response contains an
77 presumptively arbitrary string of random digits, a timestamp, and the
78 fully-qualified primary host name of the server. The syntax of the
79 unencoded form must correspond to that of an <a href="./rfc822">RFC 822</a> 'msg-id'
80 [<a href="./rfc822">RFC822</a>] as described in [<a href="#ref-POP3" title="&quot;Post Office Protocol - Version 3&quot;">POP3</a>].
81
82 The client makes note of the data and then responds with a string
83 consisting of the user name, a space, and a 'digest'. The latter is
84 computed by applying the keyed MD5 algorithm from [<a href="#ref-KEYED-MD5" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">KEYED-MD5</a>] where
85 the key is a shared secret and the digested text is the timestamp
86 (including angle-brackets).
87
88 This shared secret is a string known only to the client and server.
89 The `digest' parameter itself is a 16-octet value which is sent in
90 hexadecimal format, using lower-case ASCII characters.
91
92 When the server receives this client response, it verifies the digest
93 provided. If the digest is correct, the server should consider the
94 client authenticated and respond appropriately.
95
96 Keyed MD5 is chosen for this application because of the greater
97 security imparted to authentication of short messages. In addition,
98 the use of the techniques described in [<a href="#ref-KEYED-MD5" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">KEYED-MD5</a>] for precomputation
99 of intermediate results make it possible to avoid explicit cleartext
100 storage of the shared secret on the server system by instead storing
101 the intermediate results which are known as "contexts".
102
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108 <span class="grey">Klensin, Catoe &amp; Krumviede Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2195">RFC 2195</a> IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension September 1997</span>
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112
113 CRAM does not support a protection mechanism.
114
115 Example:
116
117 The examples in this document show the use of the CRAM mechanism with
118 the IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE command [<a href="#ref-IMAP-AUTH" title="&quot;IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms&quot;">IMAP-AUTH</a>]. The base64 encoding of
119 the challenges and responses is part of the IMAP4 AUTHENTICATE
120 command, not part of the CRAM specification itself.
121
122 S: * OK IMAP4 Server
123 C: A0001 AUTHENTICATE CRAM-MD5
124 S: + PDE4OTYuNjk3MTcwOTUyQHBvc3RvZmZpY2UucmVzdG9uLm1jaS5uZXQ+
125 C: dGltIGI5MTNhNjAyYzdlZGE3YTQ5NWI0ZTZlNzMzNGQzODkw
126 S: A0001 OK CRAM authentication successful
127
128 In this example, the shared secret is the string
129 'tanstaaftanstaaf'. Hence, the Keyed MD5 digest is produced by
130 calculating
131
132 MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR opad),
133 MD5((tanstaaftanstaaf XOR ipad),
134 &lt;[email protected]&gt;))
135
136 where ipad and opad are as defined in the keyed-MD5 Work in
137 Progress [<a href="#ref-KEYED-MD5" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">KEYED-MD5</a>] and the string shown in the challenge is the
138 base64 encoding of &lt;[email protected]&gt;. The
139 shared secret is null-padded to a length of 64 bytes. If the
140 shared secret is longer than 64 bytes, the MD5 digest of the
141 shared secret is used as a 16 byte input to the keyed MD5
142 calculation.
143
144 This produces a digest value (in hexadecimal) of
145
146 b913a602c7eda7a495b4e6e7334d3890
147
148 The user name is then prepended to it, forming
149
150 tim b913a602c7eda7a495b4e6e7334d3890
151
152 Which is then base64 encoded to meet the requirements of the IMAP4
153 AUTHENTICATE command (or the similar POP3 AUTH command), yielding
154
155 dGltIGI5MTNhNjAyYzdlZGE3YTQ5NWI0ZTZlNzMzNGQzODkw
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164 <span class="grey">Klensin, Catoe &amp; Krumviede Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2195">RFC 2195</a> IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension September 1997</span>
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168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. References</span>
170
171 [<a id="ref-CHAP">CHAP</a>] Lloyd, B., and W. Simpson, "PPP Authentication Protocols",
172 <a href="./rfc1334">RFC 1334</a>, October 1992.
173
174 [<a id="ref-IMAP">IMAP</a>] Crispin, M., "Internet Message Access Protocol - Version
175 4rev1", <a href="./rfc2060">RFC 2060</a>, University of Washington, December 1996.
176
177 [<a id="ref-IMAP-AUTH">IMAP-AUTH</a>] Myers, J., "IMAP4 Authentication Mechanisms",
178 <a href="./rfc1731">RFC 1731</a>, Carnegie Mellon, December 1994.
179
180 [<a id="ref-KEYED-MD5">KEYED-MD5</a>] Krawczyk, Bellare, Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-Hashing for
181 Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, February 1997.
182
183 [<a id="ref-MD5">MD5</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm",
184 <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, MIT Laboratory for Computer Science, April 1992.
185
186 [<a id="ref-POP3">POP3</a>] Myers, J., and M. Rose, "Post Office Protocol - Version 3",
187 STD 53, <a href="./rfc1939">RFC 1939</a>, Carnegie Mellon, May 1996.
188
189 [<a id="ref-POP3-AUTH">POP3-AUTH</a>] Myers, J., "POP3 AUTHentication command", <a href="./rfc1734">RFC 1734</a>,
190 Carnegie Mellon, December, 1994.
191
192 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span>
193
194 It is conjectured that use of the CRAM authentication mechanism
195 provides origin identification and replay protection for a session.
196 Accordingly, a server that implements both a cleartext password
197 command and this authentication type should not allow both methods of
198 access for a given user.
199
200 While the saving, on the server, of "contexts" (see <a href="#section-2">section 2</a>) is
201 marginally better than saving the shared secrets in cleartext as is
202 required by CHAP [<a href="#ref-CHAP" title="&quot;PPP Authentication Protocols&quot;">CHAP</a>] and APOP [<a href="#ref-POP3" title="&quot;Post Office Protocol - Version 3&quot;">POP3</a>], it is not sufficient to
203 protect the secrets if the server itself is compromised.
204 Consequently, servers that store the secrets or contexts must both be
205 protected to a level appropriate to the potential information value
206 in user mailboxes and identities.
207
208 As the length of the shared secret increases, so does the difficulty
209 of deriving it.
210
211 While there are now suggestions in the literature that the use of MD5
212 and keyed MD5 in authentication procedures probably has a limited
213 effective lifetime, the technique is now widely deployed and widely
214 understood. It is believed that this general understanding may
215 assist with the rapid replacement, by CRAM-MD5, of the current uses
216 of permanent cleartext passwords in IMAP. This document has been
217
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220 <span class="grey">Klensin, Catoe &amp; Krumviede Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2195">RFC 2195</a> IMAP/POP AUTHorize Extension September 1997</span>
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224
225 deliberately written to permit easy upgrading to use SHA (or whatever
226 alternatives emerge) when they are considered to be widely available
227 and adequately safe.
228
229 Even with the use of CRAM, users are still vulnerable to active
230 attacks. An example of an increasingly common active attack is 'TCP
231 Session Hijacking' as described in CERT Advisory CA-95:01 [CERT95].
232
233 See <a href="#section-1">section 1</a> above for additional discussion.
234
235 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
236
237 This memo borrows ideas and some text liberally from [<a href="#ref-POP3" title="&quot;Post Office Protocol - Version 3&quot;">POP3</a>] and
238 [<a href="./rfc1731">RFC-1731</a>] and thanks are due the authors of those documents. Ran
239 Atkinson made a number of valuable technical and editorial
240 contributions to the document.
241
242 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Authors' Addresses</span>
243
244 John C. Klensin
245 MCI Telecommunications
246 800 Boylston St, 7th floor
247 Boston, MA 02199
248 USA
249
250 EMail: [email protected]
251 Phone: +1 617 960 1011
252
253 Randy Catoe
254 MCI Telecommunications
255 2100 Reston Parkway
256 Reston, VA 22091
257 USA
258
259 EMail: [email protected]
260 Phone: +1 703 715 7366
261
262 Paul Krumviede
263 MCI Telecommunications
264 2100 Reston Parkway
265 Reston, VA 22091
266 USA
267
268 EMail: [email protected]
269 Phone: +1 703 715 7251
270
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276 Klensin, Catoe &amp; Krumviede Standards Track [Page 5]
277 </pre>