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<pre>Independent Submission V. Cakulev |
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Request for Comments: 6539 G. Sundaram |
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Category: Informational I. Broustis |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Alcatel Lucent |
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March 2012 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">IBAKE: Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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Cryptographic protocols based on public-key methods have been |
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traditionally based on certificates and Public Key Infrastructure |
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(PKI) to support certificate management. The emerging field of |
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Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) protocols allows simplification of |
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infrastructure requirements via a Private-Key Generator (PKG) while |
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providing the same flexibility. However, one significant limitation |
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of IBE methods is that the PKG can end up being a de facto key escrow |
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server, with undesirable consequences. Another observed deficiency |
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is a lack of mutual authentication of communicating parties. This |
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document specifies the Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange |
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(IBAKE) protocol. IBAKE does not suffer from the key escrow problem |
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and in addition provides mutual authentication as well as perfect |
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forward and backward secrecy. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other |
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RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at |
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its discretion and makes no statement about its value for |
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implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by |
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the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6539">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6539</a>. |
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|
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Independent Submissions Editor Note |
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|
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This document specifies the Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange |
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(IBAKE) protocol. Due to its specialized nature, this document |
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experienced limited review within the Internet Community. Readers of |
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this RFC should carefully evaluate its value for implementation and |
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deployment. |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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|
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Notation ...........................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. IBE: Definition ............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Abbreviations ..............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Conventions ................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange .......................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Overview ...................................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. IBAKE Message Exchange .....................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Discussion .................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations .........................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General ....................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. IBAKE Protocol ............................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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|
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Authenticated key agreements are cryptographic protocols where two or |
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more participants authenticate each other and agree on key material |
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used for securing future communication. These protocols could be |
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symmetric key or asymmetric public-key protocols. Symmetric-key |
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protocols require an out-of-band security mechanism to bootstrap a |
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secret key. On the other hand, public-key protocols traditionally |
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require certificates and a large-scale Public Key Infrastructure |
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(PKI). Clearly, public-key methods are more flexible; however, the |
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requirement for certificates and a large-scale PKI have proved to be |
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challenging. In particular, efficient methods to support large-scale |
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certificate revocation and management have proved to be elusive. |
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|
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Recently, Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) protocols have been |
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proposed as a viable alternative to public-key methods by replacing |
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the PKI with a Private-Key Generator (PKG). However, one significant |
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limitation of IBE methods is that the PKG can end up being a de facto |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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|
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key escrow entity (i.e., an entity that has sufficient information to |
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decrypt communicated data), with undesirable consequences. Another |
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limitation is a lack of mutual authentication between communicating |
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parties. This document specifies an Identity-Based Authenticated Key |
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Encryption (IBAKE) protocol that does not suffer from the key escrow |
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problem and that provides mutual authentication. In addition, the |
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scheme described in this document allows the use of time-bound public |
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identities and corresponding public and private keys, resulting in |
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automatic expiration of private keys at the end of a time span |
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indicated in the identity itself. With the self-expiration of the |
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public identities, the traditional real-time validity verification |
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and revocation procedures used with certificates are not required. |
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For example, if the public identity is bound to one day, then, at the |
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end of the day, the public/private key pair issued to this peer will |
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simply not be valid anymore. Nevertheless, just as with public-key- |
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based certificate systems, if there is a need to revoke keys before |
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the designated expiry time, communication with a third party will be |
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needed. Finally, the protocol also provides forward and backward |
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secrecy of session keys; i.e., a session key produced using IBAKE is |
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always fresh and unrelated to any past or future sessions between the |
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protocol participants. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Notation</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. IBE: Definition</span> |
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|
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Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a public-key encryption technology |
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that allows a public key to be calculated from an identity and a set |
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of public parameters, and the corresponding private key to be |
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calculated from the public key. The public key can then be used by |
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an Initiator to encrypt messages that the recipient can decrypt using |
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the corresponding private key. The IBE framework is defined in |
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[<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>], [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5409" title=""Using the Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"">RFC5409</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Abbreviations</span> |
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|
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EC Elliptic Curve |
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IBE Identity-Based Encryption |
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IBAKE Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange |
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IDi Initiator's Identity |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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IDr Responder's Identity |
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K_PUB Public Key |
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PKG Private-Key Generator |
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PKI Public Key Infrastructure |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Conventions</span> |
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o E is an elliptic curve over a finite field F. |
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o P is a point on E of large prime order. |
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o s is a non-zero positive integer. s is a secret stored in a PKG. |
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This is a system-wide secret and not revealed outside the PKG. |
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o sP is the public key of the system that is known to all |
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participants. sP denotes a point on E, and denotes the point P |
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added to itself s times where addition refers to the group |
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operation on E. |
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o H1 is a known hash function that takes a string and assigns it to |
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a point on the elliptic curve, i.e., H1(A) = QA on E, where A is |
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usually based on the identity. |
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|
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o E(k, A) denotes that A is IBE-encrypted with the key k. |
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o s||t denotes concatenation of the strings s and t. |
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o K_PUBx denotes a public key of x. |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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|
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Overview</span> |
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IBAKE consists of a three-way exchange between an Initiator and a |
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Responder. In the figure below, a conceptual signaling diagram of |
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IBAKE is depicted. |
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|
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+---+ +---+ |
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| I | | R | |
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+---+ +---+ |
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|
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MESSAGE_1 |
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----------------------------------> |
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MESSAGE_2 |
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<---------------------------------- |
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MESSAGE_3 |
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----------------------------------> |
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|
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Figure 1: Example IBAKE Message Exchange |
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|
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The Initiator (I) and Responder (R) are attempting to mutually |
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authenticate each other and agree on a key using IBAKE. This |
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specification assumes that the Initiator and the Responder trust a |
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third party -- the PKG. Rather than a single PKG, different PKGs may |
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be involved, e.g., one for the Initiator and one for the Responder. |
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The Initiator and the Responder do not share any credentials; |
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however, they know or can obtain each other's public identity (key) |
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as well as the public parameters of each other's PKG. This |
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specification does not make any assumption on when and how the |
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private keys are obtained. However, to complete the protocol |
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described (i.e., to decrypt encrypted messages in the IBAKE protocol |
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exchange), the Initiator and the Responder need to have their |
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respective private keys. The procedures needed to obtain the private |
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keys and public parameters are outside the scope of this |
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specification. The details of these procedures can be found in |
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[<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>]. Finally, the protocol described in this |
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document relies on the use of elliptic curves. <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a> discusses |
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the choice of elliptic curves. However, how the Initiator and the |
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Responder agree on a specific elliptic curve is left to the |
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application that is leveraging the IBAKE protocol (see [<a href="#ref-EAP-IBAKE" title=""An EAP Authentication Method Based on Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange"">EAP-IBAKE</a>], |
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for example). |
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|
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The Initiator chooses a random x. In the first step, the Initiator |
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computes xP (i.e., P, as a point on E, added to itself x times using |
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the addition law on E); encrypts xP, the IDi, and the IDr using the |
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Responder's public key (e.g., K_PUBr=H1(IDr||date)); and includes |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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|
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|
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this encrypted information in MESSAGE_1 sent to the Responder. In |
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this step, encryption refers to IBE as described in [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>] and |
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[<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>]. |
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|
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The Responder, upon receiving the message, IBE-decrypts it using its |
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private key (e.g., a private key for that date), and obtains xP. The |
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Responder further chooses a random y and computes yP. The Responder |
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then IBE-encrypts the Initiator's identity (IDi), its own identity |
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(IDr), xP, and yP using the Initiator's public key (e.g., |
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K_PUBi=H1(IDi||date)). The Responder includes this encrypted |
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information in MESSAGE_2 sent to the Initiator. |
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The Initiator, upon receiving and IBE-decrypting MESSAGE_2, obtains |
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yP. Subsequently, the Initiator sends MESSAGE_3, which includes the |
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IBE-encrypted IDi, IDr, and yP, to the Responder. At this point, |
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both the Initiator and the Responder are able to compute the same |
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session key as xyP. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. IBAKE Message Exchange</span> |
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Initially, the Initiator selects a random x and computes xP; the |
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Initiator MUST use a fresh, random value for x on each run of the |
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protocol. The Initiator then encrypts xP, the IDi, and the IDr using |
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the Responder's public key (e.g., K_PUBr=H1(IDr||date)). The |
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Initiator includes this encrypted information in MESSAGE_1 and sends |
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it to the Responder, as shown below. |
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Initiator ----> Responder |
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MESSAGE_1 = E(K_PUBr, IDi || IDr || xP) |
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Upon receiving MESSAGE_1, the Responder SHALL perform the following: |
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o Decrypt the message as specified in [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>]. |
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o Obtain xP. |
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o Select a random y and compute yP. The Responder MUST use a fresh, |
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random value for x on each run of the protocol. |
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o Encrypt the Initiator's identity (IDi), its own identity (IDr), |
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xP, and yP using the Initiator's public key (K_PUBi). |
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Responder ----> Initiator |
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MESSAGE_2 = E(K_PUBi, IDi || IDr || xP || yP) |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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|
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Upon receiving MESSAGE_2, the Initiator SHALL perform the following: |
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o Decrypt the message as specified in [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>]. |
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o Verify that the received xP is the same as that sent in MESSAGE_1. |
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o Obtain yP. |
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o Encrypt its own identity (IDi), the Responder's identity (IDr), |
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and yP using the Responder's public key (K_PUBi). |
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Initiator ----> Responder |
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MESSAGE_3 = E(K_PUBr, IDi || IDr || yP) |
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Upon receiving MESSAGE_3, the Responder SHALL perform the following: |
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o Decrypt the message as specified in [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>]. |
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o Verify that the received yP is the same as that sent in MESSAGE_2. |
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If any of the above verifications fail, the protocol halts; |
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otherwise, following this exchange, both the Initiator and the |
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Responder have authenticated each other and are able to compute xyP |
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as the session key. At this point, both protocol participants MUST |
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discard all intermediate cryptographic values, including x and y. |
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Similarly, both parties MUST immediately discard these values |
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whenever the protocol terminates as a result of a verification |
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failure or timeout. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Discussion</span> |
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Properties of the protocol are as follows: |
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o Immunity from key escrow: Observe that all of the steps in the |
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protocol exchange are encrypted using IBE. So, clearly, the PKG |
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can decrypt all of the exchanges. However, given the assumption |
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that PKGs are trusted and well behaved (e.g., PKGs will not mount |
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an active man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack), they cannot compute |
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the session key. This is because of the hardness of the Elliptic |
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Curve Diffie-Hellman problem. In other words, given xP and yP, it |
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is computationally hard to compute xyP. |
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o Mutually authenticated key agreement: Observe that all of the |
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steps in the protocol exchange are encrypted using IBE. In |
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particular, only the Responder and its corresponding PKG can |
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decrypt the contents of MESSAGE_1 and MESSAGE_3 sent by the |
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Initiator, and similarly only the Initiator and its corresponding |
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<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
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|
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PKG can decrypt the contents of MESSAGE_2 sent by the Responder. |
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Again, given the assumption made above -- that PKGs are trusted |
| 395 |
and well behaved (e.g., a PKG will not impersonate a user to which |
| 396 |
it issued a private key) -- upon receiving MESSAGE_2, the |
| 397 |
Initiator can verify the Responder's authenticity, since xP could |
| 398 |
have been sent in MESSAGE_2 only after decryption of the contents |
| 399 |
of MESSAGE_1 by the Responder. Similarly, upon receiving |
| 400 |
MESSAGE_3, the Responder can verify the Initiator's authenticity, |
| 401 |
since yP could have been sent back in MESSAGE_3 only after correct |
| 402 |
decryption of the contents of MESSAGE_2 by the Initiator. |
| 403 |
Finally, both the Initiator and the Responder can agree on the |
| 404 |
same session key. In other words, IBAKE is a mutually |
| 405 |
authenticated key agreement protocol based on IBE. The hardness |
| 406 |
of the key agreement protocol relies on the hardness of the |
| 407 |
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman problem. Thus, in any practical |
| 408 |
implementation, care should be devoted to the choice of elliptic |
| 409 |
curve. |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
o Perfect forward and backward secrecy: Since x and y are random, |
| 412 |
xyP is always fresh and unrelated to any past or future sessions |
| 413 |
between the Initiator and the Responder. |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
o No passwords: Clearly, the IBAKE protocol does not require any |
| 416 |
offline exchange of passwords or secret keys between the Initiator |
| 417 |
and the Responder. In fact, the method is applicable to any two |
| 418 |
parties communicating for the first time through any communication |
| 419 |
network. The only requirement is to ensure that both the |
| 420 |
Initiator and the Responder are aware of each other's public keys |
| 421 |
and the public parameters of the PKG that generated the |
| 422 |
corresponding private keys. |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
o PKG availability: Observe that PKGs need not be contacted during |
| 425 |
an IBAKE protocol exchange, which dramatically reduces the |
| 426 |
availability requirements on PKGs. |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
o Choice of elliptic curves: This specification relies on the use of |
| 429 |
elliptic curves for both IBE and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman |
| 430 |
exchange. When making a decision on the choice of elliptic |
| 431 |
curves, it is beneficial to choose two different elliptic curves |
| 432 |
-- a non-supersingular curve for the internal calculations of |
| 433 |
Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman values xP and yP, and a |
| 434 |
supersingular curve for the IBE encryption/decryption. For the |
| 435 |
calculations of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman values, it is |
| 436 |
beneficial to use the curves recommended by NIST [<a href="#ref-FIPS-186" title=""Digital Signature Standard (DSS)"">FIPS-186</a>]. |
| 437 |
These curves make the calculations simpler while keeping the |
| 438 |
security high. On the other hand, IBE systems are based on |
| 439 |
bilinear pairings. Therefore, the choice of an elliptic curve for |
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
IBE is restricted to a family of supersingular elliptic curves |
| 450 |
over finite fields of large prime characteristic. The appropriate |
| 451 |
elliptic curves for IBE are described in [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>]. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
o Implementation considerations: An implementation of IBAKE would |
| 454 |
consist of two primary modules, i.e., point addition operations |
| 455 |
over a NIST curve, and IBE operations over a supersingular curve. |
| 456 |
The implementation of both modules only needs to be aware of the |
| 457 |
following parameters: (a) the full description of the curves that |
| 458 |
are in use (fixed or negotiated), (b) the public parameters of the |
| 459 |
PKG used for the derivation of IBE private keys, and (c) the exact |
| 460 |
public identity of each IBAKE participant. The knowledge of these |
| 461 |
parameters is sufficient to perform Elliptic Curve Cryptography |
| 462 |
(ECC) operations in different terminals and produce the same |
| 463 |
results, independently of the implementation. |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
This document is based on the basic IBE protocol, as specified in |
| 468 |
[<a href="#ref-BF" title=""Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing"">BF</a>], [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>]), [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5409" title=""Using the Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"">RFC5409</a>], and as such inherits some |
| 469 |
properties of that protocol. For instance, by concatenating the |
| 470 |
"date" with the identity (to derive the public key), the need for any |
| 471 |
key revocation mechanisms is virtually eliminated. Moreover, by |
| 472 |
allowing the participants to acquire multiple private keys (e.g., for |
| 473 |
duration of contract) the availability requirements on the PKG are |
| 474 |
also reduced without any reduction in security. The granularity |
| 475 |
associated with the date is a matter of security policy and as such |
| 476 |
is a decision made by the PKG administrator. However, the |
| 477 |
granularity applicable to any given participant should be publicly |
| 478 |
available and known to other participants. For example, this |
| 479 |
information can be made available in the same venue that provides |
| 480 |
"public information" on a PKG server (i.e., P, sP) needed to |
| 481 |
execute IBE. |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General</span> |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
Attacks on the cryptographic algorithms used in IBE are outside the |
| 486 |
scope of this document. It is assumed that any administrator will |
| 487 |
pay attention to the desired strengths of the relevant cryptographic |
| 488 |
algorithms based on an up-to-date understanding of the strength of |
| 489 |
these algorithms from published literature, as well as to known |
| 490 |
attacks. |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
It is assumed that the PKGs are secure, not compromised, trusted, and |
| 493 |
will not engage in launching active attacks independently or in a |
| 494 |
collaborative environment. Nevertheless, if an active adversary can |
| 495 |
fool the parties into believing that it is a legitimate PKG, then it |
| 496 |
can mount a successful MitM attack. Therefore, care should be taken |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
when choosing a PKG. In addition, any malicious insider could |
| 506 |
potentially launch passive attacks (by decryption of one or more |
| 507 |
message exchanges offline). While it is in the best interest of |
| 508 |
administrators to prevent such an issue, it is hard to eliminate this |
| 509 |
problem. Hence, it is assumed that such problems will persist, and |
| 510 |
hence the session key agreement protocols are designed to protect |
| 511 |
participants from passive adversaries. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
It is also assumed that the communication between participants and |
| 514 |
their respective PKGs is secure. Therefore, in any implementation of |
| 515 |
the protocols described in this document, administrators of any PKG |
| 516 |
have to ensure that communication with participants is secure and not |
| 517 |
compromised. |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
Finally, concatenating the date to the identity ensures that the |
| 520 |
corresponding private key is applicable only to that date. This |
| 521 |
serves to limit the damage related to a leakage or compromise of |
| 522 |
private keys to just that date. This, in particular, eliminates the |
| 523 |
revocation mechanisms that are typical to various certificate-based |
| 524 |
public key protocols. |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. IBAKE Protocol</span> |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
For the basic IBAKE protocol, from a cryptographic perspective, the |
| 529 |
following security considerations apply. |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
In every step, IBE is used, with the recipient's public key. This |
| 532 |
guarantees that only the intended recipient of the message and its |
| 533 |
corresponding PKG can decrypt the message [<a href="#ref-BF" title=""Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing"">BF</a>]. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
Next, the use of identities within the encrypted payload is intended |
| 536 |
to eliminate some basic reflection attacks. For instance, suppose we |
| 537 |
did not use identities as part of the encrypted payload, in the first |
| 538 |
step of the IBAKE protocol exchange (i.e., MESSAGE_1 of Figure 1 in |
| 539 |
<a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>). Furthermore, assume that an adversary has access to |
| 540 |
the conversation between the Initiator and the Responder and can |
| 541 |
actively snoop packets and drop/modify them before routing them to |
| 542 |
the destination. For instance, assume that the IP source address and |
| 543 |
destination address can be modified by the adversary. After the |
| 544 |
first message is sent by the Initiator (to the Responder), the |
| 545 |
adversary can take over and trap the packet. Next, the adversary can |
| 546 |
modify the IP source address to include the adversary's IP address, |
| 547 |
before routing it on to the Responder. The Responder will assume |
| 548 |
that the request for an IBAKE session came from the adversary, and |
| 549 |
will execute step 2 of the IBAKE protocol exchange (i.e., MESSAGE_2 |
| 550 |
of Figure 1 in <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>) but encrypt it using the adversary's |
| 551 |
public key. The above message can be decrypted by the adversary (and |
| 552 |
only by the adversary). In particular, since the second message |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
includes the challenge sent by the Initiator to the Responder, the |
| 562 |
adversary will now learn the challenge sent by the Initiator. |
| 563 |
Following this, the adversary can carry on a conversation with the |
| 564 |
Initiator, "pretending" to be the Responder. This attack will be |
| 565 |
eliminated if identities are used as part of the encrypted payload. |
| 566 |
In summary, at the end of the exchange, both the Initiator and the |
| 567 |
Responder can mutually authenticate each other and agree on a |
| 568 |
session key. |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
Recall that IBE guarantees that only the recipient of the message can |
| 571 |
decrypt the message using the private key, with the caveat that the |
| 572 |
PKG that generated the private key of the recipient of the message |
| 573 |
can decrypt the message as well. However, the PKG cannot learn the |
| 574 |
public key xyP given xP and yP, based on the hardness of the Elliptic |
| 575 |
Curve Diffie-Hellman problem. This property of resistance to passive |
| 576 |
key escrow from the PKG is not applicable to the basic IBE protocols |
| 577 |
proposed in [<a href="./rfc5091" title=""Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems"">RFC5091</a>]), [<a href="./rfc5408" title=""Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures"">RFC5408</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5409" title=""Using the Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)"">RFC5409</a>]. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
Observe that the protocol works even if the Initiator and Responder |
| 580 |
belong to two different PKGs. In particular, the parameters used for |
| 581 |
encryption to the Responder and parameters used for encryption to the |
| 582 |
Initiator can be completely different and independent of each other. |
| 583 |
Moreover, the elliptic curve used to generate the session key xyP can |
| 584 |
be completely different and can be chosen during the key exchange. |
| 585 |
If such flexibility is desired, then it would be required to add |
| 586 |
optional extra data to the protocol to exchange the algebraic |
| 587 |
primitives used in deriving the session key. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
In addition to mutual authentication and resistance to passive |
| 590 |
escrow, the Diffie-Hellman property of the session key exchange |
| 591 |
guarantees perfect secrecy of keys. In other words, accidental |
| 592 |
leakage of one session key does not compromise past or future session |
| 593 |
keys between the same Initiator and Responder. |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. References</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 622 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
[<a id="ref-BF">BF</a>] Boneh, D. and M. Franklin, "Identity-Based Encryption |
| 627 |
from the Weil Pairing", in SIAM Journal on Computing, |
| 628 |
Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 586-615, 2003. |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
[<a id="ref-EAP-IBAKE">EAP-IBAKE</a>] Cakulev, V. and I. Broustis, "An EAP Authentication |
| 631 |
Method Based on Identity-Based Authenticated Key |
| 632 |
Exchange", Work in Progress, February 2012. |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
[<a id="ref-FIPS-186">FIPS-186</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital |
| 635 |
Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS Pub 186-3, June 2009. |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5091">RFC5091</a>] Boyen, X. and L. Martin, "Identity-Based Cryptography |
| 638 |
Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations |
| 639 |
of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems", <a href="./rfc5091">RFC 5091</a>, |
| 640 |
December 2007. |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5408">RFC5408</a>] Appenzeller, G., Martin, L., and M. Schertler, "Identity- |
| 643 |
Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data |
| 644 |
Structures", <a href="./rfc5408">RFC 5408</a>, January 2009. |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5409">RFC5409</a>] Martin, L. and M. Schertler, "Using the Boneh-Franklin |
| 647 |
and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with |
| 648 |
the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", <a href="./rfc5409">RFC 5409</a>, |
| 649 |
January 2009. |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
Violeta Cakulev |
| 676 |
Alcatel Lucent |
| 677 |
600 Mountain Ave. |
| 678 |
3D-517 |
| 679 |
Murray Hill, NJ 07974 |
| 680 |
US |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
Phone: +1 908 582 3207 |
| 683 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
Ganapathy S. Sundaram |
| 687 |
Alcatel Lucent |
| 688 |
600 Mountain Ave. |
| 689 |
3D-517 |
| 690 |
Murray Hill, NJ 07974 |
| 691 |
US |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
Phone: +1 908 582 3209 |
| 694 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
Ioannis Broustis |
| 698 |
Alcatel Lucent |
| 699 |
600 Mountain Ave. |
| 700 |
3D-526 |
| 701 |
Murray Hill, NJ 07974 |
| 702 |
US |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
Phone: +1 908 582 3744 |
| 705 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 13] |
| 725 |
</pre> |