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1 <pre>Independent Submission V. Cakulev
2 Request for Comments: 6539 G. Sundaram
3 Category: Informational I. Broustis
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Alcatel Lucent
5 March 2012
6
7
8 <span class="h1">IBAKE: Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange</span>
9
10 Abstract
11
12 Cryptographic protocols based on public-key methods have been
13 traditionally based on certificates and Public Key Infrastructure
14 (PKI) to support certificate management. The emerging field of
15 Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) protocols allows simplification of
16 infrastructure requirements via a Private-Key Generator (PKG) while
17 providing the same flexibility. However, one significant limitation
18 of IBE methods is that the PKG can end up being a de facto key escrow
19 server, with undesirable consequences. Another observed deficiency
20 is a lack of mutual authentication of communicating parties. This
21 document specifies the Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
22 (IBAKE) protocol. IBAKE does not suffer from the key escrow problem
23 and in addition provides mutual authentication as well as perfect
24 forward and backward secrecy.
25
26 Status of This Memo
27
28 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
29 published for informational purposes.
30
31 This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
32 RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
33 its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
34 implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
35 the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet
36 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
37
38 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
39 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
40 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6539">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6539</a>.
41
42 Independent Submissions Editor Note
43
44 This document specifies the Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
45 (IBAKE) protocol. Due to its specialized nature, this document
46 experienced limited review within the Internet Community. Readers of
47 this RFC should carefully evaluate its value for implementation and
48 deployment.
49
50
51
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54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span>
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56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2012 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document.
68
69 Table of Contents
70
71 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a>
72 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Notation ...........................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
73 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. IBE: Definition ............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
74 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Abbreviations ..............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Conventions ................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
76 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange .......................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
77 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Overview ...................................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. IBAKE Message Exchange .....................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Discussion .................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
80 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations .........................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
81 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General ....................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
82 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. IBAKE Protocol ............................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
83 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
84 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
85 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
86
87 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
88
89 Authenticated key agreements are cryptographic protocols where two or
90 more participants authenticate each other and agree on key material
91 used for securing future communication. These protocols could be
92 symmetric key or asymmetric public-key protocols. Symmetric-key
93 protocols require an out-of-band security mechanism to bootstrap a
94 secret key. On the other hand, public-key protocols traditionally
95 require certificates and a large-scale Public Key Infrastructure
96 (PKI). Clearly, public-key methods are more flexible; however, the
97 requirement for certificates and a large-scale PKI have proved to be
98 challenging. In particular, efficient methods to support large-scale
99 certificate revocation and management have proved to be elusive.
100
101 Recently, Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) protocols have been
102 proposed as a viable alternative to public-key methods by replacing
103 the PKI with a Private-Key Generator (PKG). However, one significant
104 limitation of IBE methods is that the PKG can end up being a de facto
105
106
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112
113 key escrow entity (i.e., an entity that has sufficient information to
114 decrypt communicated data), with undesirable consequences. Another
115 limitation is a lack of mutual authentication between communicating
116 parties. This document specifies an Identity-Based Authenticated Key
117 Encryption (IBAKE) protocol that does not suffer from the key escrow
118 problem and that provides mutual authentication. In addition, the
119 scheme described in this document allows the use of time-bound public
120 identities and corresponding public and private keys, resulting in
121 automatic expiration of private keys at the end of a time span
122 indicated in the identity itself. With the self-expiration of the
123 public identities, the traditional real-time validity verification
124 and revocation procedures used with certificates are not required.
125 For example, if the public identity is bound to one day, then, at the
126 end of the day, the public/private key pair issued to this peer will
127 simply not be valid anymore. Nevertheless, just as with public-key-
128 based certificate systems, if there is a need to revoke keys before
129 the designated expiry time, communication with a third party will be
130 needed. Finally, the protocol also provides forward and backward
131 secrecy of session keys; i.e., a session key produced using IBAKE is
132 always fresh and unrelated to any past or future sessions between the
133 protocol participants.
134
135 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Notation</span>
136
137 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
138 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
139 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
140
141 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. IBE: Definition</span>
142
143 Identity-Based Encryption (IBE) is a public-key encryption technology
144 that allows a public key to be calculated from an identity and a set
145 of public parameters, and the corresponding private key to be
146 calculated from the public key. The public key can then be used by
147 an Initiator to encrypt messages that the recipient can decrypt using
148 the corresponding private key. The IBE framework is defined in
149 [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>], [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5409" title="&quot;Using the Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5409</a>].
150
151 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Abbreviations</span>
152
153 EC Elliptic Curve
154
155 IBE Identity-Based Encryption
156
157 IBAKE Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange
158
159 IDi Initiator's Identity
160
161
162
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168
169 IDr Responder's Identity
170
171 K_PUB Public Key
172
173 PKG Private-Key Generator
174
175 PKI Public Key Infrastructure
176
177 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Conventions</span>
178
179 o E is an elliptic curve over a finite field F.
180
181 o P is a point on E of large prime order.
182
183 o s is a non-zero positive integer. s is a secret stored in a PKG.
184 This is a system-wide secret and not revealed outside the PKG.
185
186 o sP is the public key of the system that is known to all
187 participants. sP denotes a point on E, and denotes the point P
188 added to itself s times where addition refers to the group
189 operation on E.
190
191 o H1 is a known hash function that takes a string and assigns it to
192 a point on the elliptic curve, i.e., H1(A) = QA on E, where A is
193 usually based on the identity.
194
195 o E(k, A) denotes that A is IBE-encrypted with the key k.
196
197 o s||t denotes concatenation of the strings s and t.
198
199 o K_PUBx denotes a public key of x.
200
201
202
203
204
205
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209
210
211
212
213
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222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span>
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224
225 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange</span>
226
227 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Overview</span>
228
229 IBAKE consists of a three-way exchange between an Initiator and a
230 Responder. In the figure below, a conceptual signaling diagram of
231 IBAKE is depicted.
232
233 +---+ +---+
234 | I | | R |
235 +---+ +---+
236
237 MESSAGE_1
238 ----------------------------------&gt;
239 MESSAGE_2
240 &lt;----------------------------------
241 MESSAGE_3
242 ----------------------------------&gt;
243
244 Figure 1: Example IBAKE Message Exchange
245
246 The Initiator (I) and Responder (R) are attempting to mutually
247 authenticate each other and agree on a key using IBAKE. This
248 specification assumes that the Initiator and the Responder trust a
249 third party -- the PKG. Rather than a single PKG, different PKGs may
250 be involved, e.g., one for the Initiator and one for the Responder.
251 The Initiator and the Responder do not share any credentials;
252 however, they know or can obtain each other's public identity (key)
253 as well as the public parameters of each other's PKG. This
254 specification does not make any assumption on when and how the
255 private keys are obtained. However, to complete the protocol
256 described (i.e., to decrypt encrypted messages in the IBAKE protocol
257 exchange), the Initiator and the Responder need to have their
258 respective private keys. The procedures needed to obtain the private
259 keys and public parameters are outside the scope of this
260 specification. The details of these procedures can be found in
261 [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>]. Finally, the protocol described in this
262 document relies on the use of elliptic curves. <a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a> discusses
263 the choice of elliptic curves. However, how the Initiator and the
264 Responder agree on a specific elliptic curve is left to the
265 application that is leveraging the IBAKE protocol (see [<a href="#ref-EAP-IBAKE" title="&quot;An EAP Authentication Method Based on Identity-Based Authenticated Key Exchange&quot;">EAP-IBAKE</a>],
266 for example).
267
268 The Initiator chooses a random x. In the first step, the Initiator
269 computes xP (i.e., P, as a point on E, added to itself x times using
270 the addition law on E); encrypts xP, the IDi, and the IDr using the
271 Responder's public key (e.g., K_PUBr=H1(IDr||date)); and includes
272
273
274
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280
281 this encrypted information in MESSAGE_1 sent to the Responder. In
282 this step, encryption refers to IBE as described in [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>] and
283 [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>].
284
285 The Responder, upon receiving the message, IBE-decrypts it using its
286 private key (e.g., a private key for that date), and obtains xP. The
287 Responder further chooses a random y and computes yP. The Responder
288 then IBE-encrypts the Initiator's identity (IDi), its own identity
289 (IDr), xP, and yP using the Initiator's public key (e.g.,
290 K_PUBi=H1(IDi||date)). The Responder includes this encrypted
291 information in MESSAGE_2 sent to the Initiator.
292
293 The Initiator, upon receiving and IBE-decrypting MESSAGE_2, obtains
294 yP. Subsequently, the Initiator sends MESSAGE_3, which includes the
295 IBE-encrypted IDi, IDr, and yP, to the Responder. At this point,
296 both the Initiator and the Responder are able to compute the same
297 session key as xyP.
298
299 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. IBAKE Message Exchange</span>
300
301 Initially, the Initiator selects a random x and computes xP; the
302 Initiator MUST use a fresh, random value for x on each run of the
303 protocol. The Initiator then encrypts xP, the IDi, and the IDr using
304 the Responder's public key (e.g., K_PUBr=H1(IDr||date)). The
305 Initiator includes this encrypted information in MESSAGE_1 and sends
306 it to the Responder, as shown below.
307
308 Initiator ----&gt; Responder
309
310 MESSAGE_1 = E(K_PUBr, IDi || IDr || xP)
311
312 Upon receiving MESSAGE_1, the Responder SHALL perform the following:
313
314 o Decrypt the message as specified in [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>].
315
316 o Obtain xP.
317
318 o Select a random y and compute yP. The Responder MUST use a fresh,
319 random value for x on each run of the protocol.
320
321 o Encrypt the Initiator's identity (IDi), its own identity (IDr),
322 xP, and yP using the Initiator's public key (K_PUBi).
323
324 Responder ----&gt; Initiator
325
326 MESSAGE_2 = E(K_PUBi, IDi || IDr || xP || yP)
327
328
329
330
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336
337 Upon receiving MESSAGE_2, the Initiator SHALL perform the following:
338
339 o Decrypt the message as specified in [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>].
340
341 o Verify that the received xP is the same as that sent in MESSAGE_1.
342
343 o Obtain yP.
344
345 o Encrypt its own identity (IDi), the Responder's identity (IDr),
346 and yP using the Responder's public key (K_PUBi).
347
348 Initiator ----&gt; Responder
349
350 MESSAGE_3 = E(K_PUBr, IDi || IDr || yP)
351
352 Upon receiving MESSAGE_3, the Responder SHALL perform the following:
353
354 o Decrypt the message as specified in [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>] and [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>].
355
356 o Verify that the received yP is the same as that sent in MESSAGE_2.
357
358 If any of the above verifications fail, the protocol halts;
359 otherwise, following this exchange, both the Initiator and the
360 Responder have authenticated each other and are able to compute xyP
361 as the session key. At this point, both protocol participants MUST
362 discard all intermediate cryptographic values, including x and y.
363 Similarly, both parties MUST immediately discard these values
364 whenever the protocol terminates as a result of a verification
365 failure or timeout.
366
367 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Discussion</span>
368
369 Properties of the protocol are as follows:
370
371 o Immunity from key escrow: Observe that all of the steps in the
372 protocol exchange are encrypted using IBE. So, clearly, the PKG
373 can decrypt all of the exchanges. However, given the assumption
374 that PKGs are trusted and well behaved (e.g., PKGs will not mount
375 an active man-in-the-middle (MitM) attack), they cannot compute
376 the session key. This is because of the hardness of the Elliptic
377 Curve Diffie-Hellman problem. In other words, given xP and yP, it
378 is computationally hard to compute xyP.
379
380 o Mutually authenticated key agreement: Observe that all of the
381 steps in the protocol exchange are encrypted using IBE. In
382 particular, only the Responder and its corresponding PKG can
383 decrypt the contents of MESSAGE_1 and MESSAGE_3 sent by the
384 Initiator, and similarly only the Initiator and its corresponding
385
386
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392
393 PKG can decrypt the contents of MESSAGE_2 sent by the Responder.
394 Again, given the assumption made above -- that PKGs are trusted
395 and well behaved (e.g., a PKG will not impersonate a user to which
396 it issued a private key) -- upon receiving MESSAGE_2, the
397 Initiator can verify the Responder's authenticity, since xP could
398 have been sent in MESSAGE_2 only after decryption of the contents
399 of MESSAGE_1 by the Responder. Similarly, upon receiving
400 MESSAGE_3, the Responder can verify the Initiator's authenticity,
401 since yP could have been sent back in MESSAGE_3 only after correct
402 decryption of the contents of MESSAGE_2 by the Initiator.
403 Finally, both the Initiator and the Responder can agree on the
404 same session key. In other words, IBAKE is a mutually
405 authenticated key agreement protocol based on IBE. The hardness
406 of the key agreement protocol relies on the hardness of the
407 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman problem. Thus, in any practical
408 implementation, care should be devoted to the choice of elliptic
409 curve.
410
411 o Perfect forward and backward secrecy: Since x and y are random,
412 xyP is always fresh and unrelated to any past or future sessions
413 between the Initiator and the Responder.
414
415 o No passwords: Clearly, the IBAKE protocol does not require any
416 offline exchange of passwords or secret keys between the Initiator
417 and the Responder. In fact, the method is applicable to any two
418 parties communicating for the first time through any communication
419 network. The only requirement is to ensure that both the
420 Initiator and the Responder are aware of each other's public keys
421 and the public parameters of the PKG that generated the
422 corresponding private keys.
423
424 o PKG availability: Observe that PKGs need not be contacted during
425 an IBAKE protocol exchange, which dramatically reduces the
426 availability requirements on PKGs.
427
428 o Choice of elliptic curves: This specification relies on the use of
429 elliptic curves for both IBE and Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman
430 exchange. When making a decision on the choice of elliptic
431 curves, it is beneficial to choose two different elliptic curves
432 -- a non-supersingular curve for the internal calculations of
433 Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman values xP and yP, and a
434 supersingular curve for the IBE encryption/decryption. For the
435 calculations of Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman values, it is
436 beneficial to use the curves recommended by NIST [<a href="#ref-FIPS-186" title="&quot;Digital Signature Standard (DSS)&quot;">FIPS-186</a>].
437 These curves make the calculations simpler while keeping the
438 security high. On the other hand, IBE systems are based on
439 bilinear pairings. Therefore, the choice of an elliptic curve for
440
441
442
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448
449 IBE is restricted to a family of supersingular elliptic curves
450 over finite fields of large prime characteristic. The appropriate
451 elliptic curves for IBE are described in [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>].
452
453 o Implementation considerations: An implementation of IBAKE would
454 consist of two primary modules, i.e., point addition operations
455 over a NIST curve, and IBE operations over a supersingular curve.
456 The implementation of both modules only needs to be aware of the
457 following parameters: (a) the full description of the curves that
458 are in use (fixed or negotiated), (b) the public parameters of the
459 PKG used for the derivation of IBE private keys, and (c) the exact
460 public identity of each IBAKE participant. The knowledge of these
461 parameters is sufficient to perform Elliptic Curve Cryptography
462 (ECC) operations in different terminals and produce the same
463 results, independently of the implementation.
464
465 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span>
466
467 This document is based on the basic IBE protocol, as specified in
468 [<a href="#ref-BF" title="&quot;Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing&quot;">BF</a>], [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>]), [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5409" title="&quot;Using the Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5409</a>], and as such inherits some
469 properties of that protocol. For instance, by concatenating the
470 "date" with the identity (to derive the public key), the need for any
471 key revocation mechanisms is virtually eliminated. Moreover, by
472 allowing the participants to acquire multiple private keys (e.g., for
473 duration of contract) the availability requirements on the PKG are
474 also reduced without any reduction in security. The granularity
475 associated with the date is a matter of security policy and as such
476 is a decision made by the PKG administrator. However, the
477 granularity applicable to any given participant should be publicly
478 available and known to other participants. For example, this
479 information can be made available in the same venue that provides
480 "public information" on a PKG server (i.e., P, sP) needed to
481 execute IBE.
482
483 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. General</span>
484
485 Attacks on the cryptographic algorithms used in IBE are outside the
486 scope of this document. It is assumed that any administrator will
487 pay attention to the desired strengths of the relevant cryptographic
488 algorithms based on an up-to-date understanding of the strength of
489 these algorithms from published literature, as well as to known
490 attacks.
491
492 It is assumed that the PKGs are secure, not compromised, trusted, and
493 will not engage in launching active attacks independently or in a
494 collaborative environment. Nevertheless, if an active adversary can
495 fool the parties into believing that it is a legitimate PKG, then it
496 can mount a successful MitM attack. Therefore, care should be taken
497
498
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504
505 when choosing a PKG. In addition, any malicious insider could
506 potentially launch passive attacks (by decryption of one or more
507 message exchanges offline). While it is in the best interest of
508 administrators to prevent such an issue, it is hard to eliminate this
509 problem. Hence, it is assumed that such problems will persist, and
510 hence the session key agreement protocols are designed to protect
511 participants from passive adversaries.
512
513 It is also assumed that the communication between participants and
514 their respective PKGs is secure. Therefore, in any implementation of
515 the protocols described in this document, administrators of any PKG
516 have to ensure that communication with participants is secure and not
517 compromised.
518
519 Finally, concatenating the date to the identity ensures that the
520 corresponding private key is applicable only to that date. This
521 serves to limit the damage related to a leakage or compromise of
522 private keys to just that date. This, in particular, eliminates the
523 revocation mechanisms that are typical to various certificate-based
524 public key protocols.
525
526 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. IBAKE Protocol</span>
527
528 For the basic IBAKE protocol, from a cryptographic perspective, the
529 following security considerations apply.
530
531 In every step, IBE is used, with the recipient's public key. This
532 guarantees that only the intended recipient of the message and its
533 corresponding PKG can decrypt the message [<a href="#ref-BF" title="&quot;Identity-Based Encryption from the Weil Pairing&quot;">BF</a>].
534
535 Next, the use of identities within the encrypted payload is intended
536 to eliminate some basic reflection attacks. For instance, suppose we
537 did not use identities as part of the encrypted payload, in the first
538 step of the IBAKE protocol exchange (i.e., MESSAGE_1 of Figure 1 in
539 <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>). Furthermore, assume that an adversary has access to
540 the conversation between the Initiator and the Responder and can
541 actively snoop packets and drop/modify them before routing them to
542 the destination. For instance, assume that the IP source address and
543 destination address can be modified by the adversary. After the
544 first message is sent by the Initiator (to the Responder), the
545 adversary can take over and trap the packet. Next, the adversary can
546 modify the IP source address to include the adversary's IP address,
547 before routing it on to the Responder. The Responder will assume
548 that the request for an IBAKE session came from the adversary, and
549 will execute step 2 of the IBAKE protocol exchange (i.e., MESSAGE_2
550 of Figure 1 in <a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>) but encrypt it using the adversary's
551 public key. The above message can be decrypted by the adversary (and
552 only by the adversary). In particular, since the second message
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span>
559
560
561 includes the challenge sent by the Initiator to the Responder, the
562 adversary will now learn the challenge sent by the Initiator.
563 Following this, the adversary can carry on a conversation with the
564 Initiator, "pretending" to be the Responder. This attack will be
565 eliminated if identities are used as part of the encrypted payload.
566 In summary, at the end of the exchange, both the Initiator and the
567 Responder can mutually authenticate each other and agree on a
568 session key.
569
570 Recall that IBE guarantees that only the recipient of the message can
571 decrypt the message using the private key, with the caveat that the
572 PKG that generated the private key of the recipient of the message
573 can decrypt the message as well. However, the PKG cannot learn the
574 public key xyP given xP and yP, based on the hardness of the Elliptic
575 Curve Diffie-Hellman problem. This property of resistance to passive
576 key escrow from the PKG is not applicable to the basic IBE protocols
577 proposed in [<a href="./rfc5091" title="&quot;Identity-Based Cryptography Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems&quot;">RFC5091</a>]), [<a href="./rfc5408" title="&quot;Identity- Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data Structures&quot;">RFC5408</a>], and [<a href="./rfc5409" title="&quot;Using the Boneh-Franklin and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)&quot;">RFC5409</a>].
578
579 Observe that the protocol works even if the Initiator and Responder
580 belong to two different PKGs. In particular, the parameters used for
581 encryption to the Responder and parameters used for encryption to the
582 Initiator can be completely different and independent of each other.
583 Moreover, the elliptic curve used to generate the session key xyP can
584 be completely different and can be chosen during the key exchange.
585 If such flexibility is desired, then it would be required to add
586 optional extra data to the protocol to exchange the algebraic
587 primitives used in deriving the session key.
588
589 In addition to mutual authentication and resistance to passive
590 escrow, the Diffie-Hellman property of the session key exchange
591 guarantees perfect secrecy of keys. In other words, accidental
592 leakage of one session key does not compromise past or future session
593 keys between the same Initiator and Responder.
594
595
596
597
598
599
600
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. References</span>
618
619 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Normative References</span>
620
621 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
622 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
623
624 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Informative References</span>
625
626 [<a id="ref-BF">BF</a>] Boneh, D. and M. Franklin, "Identity-Based Encryption
627 from the Weil Pairing", in SIAM Journal on Computing,
628 Vol. 32, No. 3, pp. 586-615, 2003.
629
630 [<a id="ref-EAP-IBAKE">EAP-IBAKE</a>] Cakulev, V. and I. Broustis, "An EAP Authentication
631 Method Based on Identity-Based Authenticated Key
632 Exchange", Work in Progress, February 2012.
633
634 [<a id="ref-FIPS-186">FIPS-186</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Digital
635 Signature Standard (DSS)", FIPS Pub 186-3, June 2009.
636
637 [<a id="ref-RFC5091">RFC5091</a>] Boyen, X. and L. Martin, "Identity-Based Cryptography
638 Standard (IBCS) #1: Supersingular Curve Implementations
639 of the BF and BB1 Cryptosystems", <a href="./rfc5091">RFC 5091</a>,
640 December 2007.
641
642 [<a id="ref-RFC5408">RFC5408</a>] Appenzeller, G., Martin, L., and M. Schertler, "Identity-
643 Based Encryption Architecture and Supporting Data
644 Structures", <a href="./rfc5408">RFC 5408</a>, January 2009.
645
646 [<a id="ref-RFC5409">RFC5409</a>] Martin, L. and M. Schertler, "Using the Boneh-Franklin
647 and Boneh-Boyen Identity-Based Encryption Algorithms with
648 the Cryptographic Message Syntax (CMS)", <a href="./rfc5409">RFC 5409</a>,
649 January 2009.
650
651
652
653
654
655
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6539">RFC 6539</a> IBAKE March 2012</span>
671
672
673 Authors' Addresses
674
675 Violeta Cakulev
676 Alcatel Lucent
677 600 Mountain Ave.
678 3D-517
679 Murray Hill, NJ 07974
680 US
681
682 Phone: +1 908 582 3207
683 EMail: [email protected]
684
685
686 Ganapathy S. Sundaram
687 Alcatel Lucent
688 600 Mountain Ave.
689 3D-517
690 Murray Hill, NJ 07974
691 US
692
693 Phone: +1 908 582 3209
694 EMail: [email protected]
695
696
697 Ioannis Broustis
698 Alcatel Lucent
699 600 Mountain Ave.
700 3D-526
701 Murray Hill, NJ 07974
702 US
703
704 Phone: +1 908 582 3744
705 EMail: [email protected]
706
707
708
709
710
711
712
713
714
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 Cakulev, et al. Informational [Page 13]
725 </pre>