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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Wu
2 Request for Comments: 7039 J. Bi
3 Category: Informational Tsinghua Univ.
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Bagnulo
5 UC3M
6 F. Baker
7 Cisco
8 C. Vogt, Ed.
9 October 2013
10
11
12 <span class="h1">Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework</span>
13
14 Abstract
15
16 Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) methods were developed
17 to prevent nodes attached to the same IP link from spoofing each
18 other's IP addresses, so as to complement ingress filtering with
19 finer-grained, standardized IP source address validation. This
20 document is a framework document that describes and motivates the
21 design of the SAVI methods. Particular SAVI methods are described in
22 other documents.
23
24 Status of This Memo
25
26 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
27 published for informational purposes.
28
29 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
30 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
31 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
32 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
33 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
34 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
35
36 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
37 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
38 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
73 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
74 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
75 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
76 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
77 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
78 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
79 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
80 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
81 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
82 than English.
83
84 Table of Contents
85
86 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
87 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
88 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Deployment Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
89 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. IP Address Assignment Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
90 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Binding Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
91 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Scalability Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
92 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Reliability Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
93 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Scenario with Multiple Assignment Methods . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
94 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Prefix Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
95 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
96 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
97 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
98 <a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
99 <a href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
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110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 Since IP source addresses are used by hosts and network entities to
116 determine the origin of a packet and as a destination for return
117 data, spoofing of IP source addresses can enable impersonation,
118 concealment, and malicious traffic redirection. Unfortunately, the
119 Internet architecture does not prevent IP source address spoofing
120 [<a href="./rfc6959" title="&quot;Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope&quot;">RFC6959</a>]. Since the IP source address of a packet generally takes
121 no role in forwarding the packet, it can be selected arbitrarily by
122 the sending host without jeopardizing packet delivery. Extra methods
123 are necessary for IP source address validation to augment packet
124 forwarding with an explicit check of whether a given packet's IP
125 source address is legitimate.
126
127 IP source address validation can happen at different granularity.
128 Ingress filtering [<a href="#ref-BCP38" title="&quot;Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing&quot;">BCP38</a>] [<a href="#ref-BCP84" title="&quot;Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks&quot;">BCP84</a>], a widely deployed standard for IP
129 source address validation, functions at the coarse granularity of
130 networks. It verifies that the prefix of an IP source address routes
131 to the network from which the packet was received. An advantage of
132 ingress filtering is simplicity: the decision of whether to accept or
133 to reject an IP source address can be made solely based on the
134 information available from routing protocols. However, the
135 simplicity comes at the cost of not being able to validate IP source
136 addresses at a finer granularity, due to the aggregated nature of the
137 information available from routing protocols. Finer-grained IP
138 source address validation would ensure that source address
139 information is accurate, reduce the ability to launch denial-of-
140 service attacks, and help with localizing hosts and identifying
141 misbehaving hosts. Partial solutions [<a href="#ref-BA2007" title="&quot;Cisco IP Version 4 Source Guard&quot;">BA2007</a>] exist for finer-
142 grained IP source address validation but are proprietary and hence
143 often unsuitable for corporate procurement.
144
145 The Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) method was developed
146 to complement ingress filtering with standardized IP source address
147 validation at the maximally fine granularity of individual IP
148 addresses. It prevents hosts attached to the same link from spoofing
149 each other's IP addresses. To facilitate deployment in networks of
150 various kinds, the SAVI method was designed to be modular and
151 extensible. This document describes and motivates the design of the
152 SAVI method.
153
154 Note that SAVI raises a number of important privacy considerations
155 that are discussed more fully in [<a href="./rfc6959" title="&quot;Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope&quot;">RFC6959</a>]. SAVI implementers must
156 take those privacy considerations into account when designing
157 solutions that match this framework and follow the recommendations
158 given in [<a href="./rfc6959" title="&quot;Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope&quot;">RFC6959</a>].
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168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Model</span>
170
171 To enable network operators to deploy fine-grained IP source address
172 validation without a dependency on supportive functionality on hosts,
173 the SAVI method was designed to be purely network based. A SAVI
174 instance enforces the hosts' use of legitimate IP source addresses
175 according to the following three-step model:
176
177 1. Identify which IP source addresses are legitimate for a host,
178 based on monitoring packets exchanged by the host.
179
180 2. Bind a legitimate IP address to a link-layer property of the
181 host's network attachment. This property, called a "binding
182 anchor", must be verifiable in every packet that the host sends
183 and harder to spoof than the host's IP source address itself.
184
185 3. Enforce that the IP source addresses in packets match the binding
186 anchors to which they were bound.
187
188 This model allows SAVI functionality (a SAVI instance) to be located
189 anywhere on the link to which the hosts attach, hence enabling
190 different locations for a SAVI instance. One way to locate a SAVI
191 instance is in the hosts' default router. IP source addresses are
192 then validated in packets traversing the default router, yet the IP
193 source addresses in packets exchanged locally on the link may bypass
194 validation. Another way to locate a SAVI instance is in a switch
195 between the hosts and their default router. Thus, packets may
196 undergo IP source address validation even if exchanged locally on the
197 link.
198
199 The closer a SAVI instance is located to the host, the more effective
200 the SAVI method is. This is because each of the three steps of the
201 SAVI model can best be accomplished in a position close to the host:
202
203 o Identifying a host's legitimate IP source addresses is most
204 efficient close to the host because the likelihood that the host's
205 packets bypass a SAVI instance, and hence cannot be monitored,
206 increases with the topological distance between the SAVI instance
207 and the host.
208
209 o Selecting a binding anchor for a host's IP source address is
210 easiest close to the host because many link-layer properties are
211 unique for a given host only on a link segment directly attached
212 to the host.
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224
225 o Enforcing a host's use of a legitimate IP source address is most
226 reliable when pursued close to the host because the likelihood
227 that the host's packets bypass a SAVI instance, and hence do not
228 undergo IP source address validation, increases with the
229 topological distance between the SAVI instance and the host.
230
231 The preferred location of SAVI instances is therefore close to hosts,
232 such as in switches that directly attach to the hosts whose IP source
233 addresses are being validated.
234
235 Nevertheless, it is useful for SAVI mechanisms to be able to handle
236 situations where hosts are not directly attached to the SAVI-capable
237 device. For instance, deployments with both SAVI-capable and legacy
238 switches could be supported. In general, a SAVI solution needs to
239 specify how it deals with a number of deployment scenarios and
240 exceptional situations, including interaction with legacy devices,
241 hosts moving between wireless attachment points, network partitions,
242 and so on.
243
244 Besides, in the case of legacy switches, the security level is lower,
245 as there is no full protection for the hosts connected to the legacy
246 server.
247
248 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Deployment Options</span>
249
250 The model of the SAVI method, as explained in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, is
251 deployment specific in two ways:
252
253 o The identification of legitimate IP source addresses is dependent
254 on the IP address assignment method in use on a link, since it is
255 through assignment that a host becomes the legitimate user of an
256 IP source address.
257
258 o Binding anchors are dependent on the technology used to build the
259 link on which they are used, as binding anchors are link-layer
260 properties of a host's network attachment.
261
262 To facilitate the deployment of the SAVI method in networks of
263 various kinds, the SAVI method is designed to support different IP
264 address assignment methods and to function with different binding
265 anchors. Naturally, both the IP address assignment methods in use on
266 a link and the available binding anchors have an impact on the
267 functioning and the strength of IP source address validation. The
268 following two subsections explain this impact and describe how the
269 SAVI method accommodates this.
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280
281 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. IP Address Assignment Methods</span>
282
283 Since the SAVI method traces IP address assignment packets, it
284 necessarily needs to incorporate logic that is specific to particular
285 IP address assignment methods. However, developing SAVI method
286 variants for each IP address assignment method is alone not
287 sufficient since multiple IP address assignment methods may coexist
288 on a given link. The SAVI method hence comes in multiple variants,
289 e.g., for links with DHCP [<a href="./rfc2131" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC2131</a>] [<a href="./rfc3315" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)&quot;">RFC3315</a>], Stateless Address
290 Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>] with or without Secure Neighbor
291 Discovery (SEND) [<a href="./rfc3971" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">RFC3971</a>], Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
292 (IKEv2) [<a href="./rfc5996" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC5996</a>] [<a href="./rfc5739" title="&quot;IPv6 Configuration in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC5739</a>] [<a href="./rfc5026" title="&quot;Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping in Split Scenario&quot;">RFC5026</a>], and combinations thereof.
293
294 The reason to develop SAVI method variants for each single IP address
295 configuration method, in addition to the variant that handles all IP
296 address assignment methods, is to minimize the complexity of the
297 common case. Many link deployments today either are constrained to a
298 single IP address assignment method or, equivalently from the
299 perspective of the SAVI method, use different IP address assignment
300 methods within different IP address prefixes. The SAVI method for
301 such links can be simpler than the SAVI method for links with
302 multiple IP address assignment methods per IP address prefix.
303
304 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Binding Anchors</span>
305
306 The SAVI method supports a range of binding anchors:
307
308 o The IEEE extended unique identifier, EUI-48 or EUI-64, of a host's
309 interface.
310
311 o The port on an Ethernet switch to which a host attaches.
312
313 o The security association between a host and the base station on
314 wireless links.
315
316 o The combination of a host interface's link-layer address and a
317 customer relationship in cable modem networks.
318
319 o An ATM virtual channel, a PPP session identifier, or a Layer 2
320 Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) session identifier in a DSL network.
321
322 o A tunnel that connects to a single host, such as an IP-in-IP
323 tunnel, a Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel, or an MPLS
324 label-switched path.
325
326
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336
337 The various binding anchors differ significantly in the security they
338 provide. IEEE extended unique identifiers, for example, fail to
339 render a secure binding anchor because they can be spoofed with
340 little effort. Switch ports alone may be insufficient because they
341 may connect to more than a single host, such as in the case of
342 concatenated switches.
343
344 Given this diversity in the security provided, one could define a set
345 of possible binding anchors and leave it up to the administrator to
346 choose one or more of them. Such a selection of binding anchors
347 would, of course, have to be accompanied by an explanation of the
348 pros and cons of the different binding anchors. In addition, SAVI
349 devices may have a default binding anchor depending on the lower
350 layers. Such a default could be to use switch ports when available
351 and MAC addresses otherwise or to use MAC addresses and switch ports
352 in addition if available.
353
354 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Scalability Optimizations</span>
355
356 The preference to locate a SAVI instance close to hosts implies that
357 multiple SAVI instances must be able to coexist in order to support
358 large links. Although the model of the SAVI method is independent of
359 the number of SAVI instances per link, coexistence of multiple SAVI
360 instances without further measures can lead to higher-than-necessary
361 memory requirements. Since a SAVI instance creates bindings for the
362 IP source addresses of all hosts on a link, bindings are replicated
363 if multiple SAVI instances coexist on the link. High memory
364 requirements, in turn, increase the cost of a SAVI instance. This is
365 problematic in particular for SAVI instances that are located on a
366 switch since it may significantly increase the cost of such a switch.
367
368 To reduce memory requirements for SAVI instances that are located on
369 a switch, the SAVI method enables the suppression of binding
370 replication on links with multiple SAVI instances. This requires
371 manual disabling of IP source address validation on switch ports that
372 connect to other switches running a SAVI instance. Each SAVI
373 instance is then responsible for validating IP source addresses only
374 on those ports to which hosts attach either directly or via switches
375 without a SAVI instance. On ports towards other switches running a
376 SAVI instance, IP source addresses are not validated. The switches
377 running SAVI instances thus form a "protection perimeter". The IP
378 source addresses in packets passing the protection perimeter are
379 validated by the ingress SAVI instance, but no further validation
380 takes place as long as the packets remain within or leave the
381 protection perimeter.
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392
393 ..............
394 protection perimeter --&gt; : +--------+ :
395 +---+ +---+ : | SAVI | :
396 | A | | B | &lt;-- hosts : | switch | :
397 +---+ +---+ : +--------+ :
398 ...|......|.............................: | :
399 : +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ :
400 : | SAVI |----------| legacy | | SAVI | :
401 : | switch | | switch |----------| switch | :
402 : +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ :
403 : | ...............................|........:
404 : +--------+ : +--------+
405 : | SAVI | : | legacy |
406 : | switch | : | switch |
407 : +--------+ : +--------+
408 :............: | |
409 +---+ +---+
410 hosts --&gt; | C | | D |
411 +---+ +---+
412
413 Figure 1: Protection Perimeter Concept
414
415 Figure 1 illustrates the concept of the protection perimeter. The
416 figure shows a link with six switches, of which four, denoted "SAVI
417 switch", run a SAVI instance. The protection perimeter created by
418 the four SAVI instances is shown as a dotted line in the figure. IP
419 source address validation is enabled on all switch ports on the
420 protection perimeter, and it is disabled on all other switch ports.
421 Four hosts, denoted A through D in the figure, attach to the
422 protection perimeter.
423
424 In the example in Figure 1, the protection perimeter encompasses one
425 of the legacy switches, located in the middle of the depicted link
426 topology. This enables a single, unpartitioned protection perimeter.
427 A single protection perimeter minimizes memory requirements for the
428 SAVI instances because every binding is kept only once, namely, by
429 the SAVI instance that attaches to the host being validated.
430 Excluding the legacy switch from the protection perimeter would
431 result in two smaller protection perimeters to the left and to the
432 right of the depicted link topology. The memory requirements for the
433 SAVI instances would then be higher: since IP source address
434 validation would be activated on the two ports connecting to the
435 legacy switch, the SAVI instances adjacent to the legacy switch would
436 replicate all bindings from the other protection perimeter,
437 respectively. The reason why it is possible to include the legacy
438 switch in the protection perimeter is because the depicted link
439 topology guarantees that packets cannot enter the protection
440 perimeter via this legacy switch. Without this guarantee, the legacy
441
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448
449 switch would have to be excluded from the protection perimeter in
450 order to ensure that packets entering the protection perimeter
451 undergo IP source address validation.
452
453 Note that if such configuration is used, care must be taken as any
454 hosts on subnets attached to non-enforcing ports will be able to use
455 spoofed source addresses.
456
457 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Reliability Optimizations</span>
458
459 The explicit storage of legitimate IP addresses in the form of
460 bindings implies that failure to create a binding, or the premature
461 removal of bindings, can lead to loss of legitimate packets. There
462 are three situations in which this can happen:
463
464 o Legitimate IP address configuration packets, which should trigger
465 the creation of a binding in a SAVI instance, are lost before
466 reaching the SAVI instance.
467
468 o A SAVI instance loses a binding, for example, due to a restart.
469
470 o The link topology changes, resulting in hosts to communicate
471 through SAVI instances that do not have a binding for those hosts'
472 IP addresses.
473
474 To limit the disruption that missing bindings for legitimate IP
475 addresses can have, the SAVI method includes a mechanism for reactive
476 binding creation based on regular packets. This mechanism
477 supplements the proactive binding creation based on IP address
478 configuration packets. Reactive binding creation occurs when a SAVI
479 instance recognizes excessive drops of regular packets originating
480 from the same IP address. The SAVI instance then verifies whether
481 said IP address is unique on the link. How the verification is
482 carried out depends on the IP address configuration method that the
483 SAVI instance supports. The SAVI method variant for Stateless
484 Address Autoconfiguration and for Secure Neighbor Discovery verifies
485 an IP address through the Duplicate Address Detection procedure. The
486 SAVI method variant for DHCP verifies an IP address through a DHCP
487 Lease Query message exchange with the DHCP server. If verification
488 indicates that the IP address is unique on the link, the SAVI
489 instance creates a binding for the IP address. Otherwise, no binding
490 is created, and packets sent from the IP address continue to be
491 dropped. These reliability issues should be addressed in all the
492 SAVI protocols describing particular SAVI methods.
493
494
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504
505 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Scenario with Multiple Assignment Methods</span>
506
507 While multiple assignment methods can be used on the same link, the
508 SAVI device may have to deal with a mix of binding discovery methods.
509 If the address prefix used for each assignment method is different,
510 the "mix scenario" behaves the same as with the scenario with only
511 one assignment method. If different address assignment methods are
512 used to assign addresses from the same prefix, additional
513 considerations are needed because one binding mechanism may create a
514 binding violating an existing binding from another binding mechanism,
515 e.g., binding from First-Come, First-Served (FCFS) SAVI [<a href="./rfc6620" title="&quot;FCFS SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses&quot;">RFC6620</a>] may
516 violate a binding from SAVI-DHCP [<a href="#ref-SAVI-DHCP" title="&quot;SAVI Solution for DHCP&quot;">SAVI-DHCP</a>]. Thus, the collision
517 between different SAVI mechanisms in the mix scenario must be handled
518 in case more than one address assignment method is used to assign
519 addresses from the same prefix.
520
521 The prioritization of relationships between different address
522 assignment methods is used as the basis to solve possible collisions.
523 Current standard documents of address assignment methods (DHCP
524 [<a href="./rfc2131" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol&quot;">RFC2131</a>], DHCPv6 [<a href="./rfc3315" title="&quot;Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)&quot;">RFC3315</a>], SLAAC [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>], and SEND [<a href="./rfc3971" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">RFC3971</a>])
525 have implied the prioritization relationship in general cases.
526 However, in some scenarios, the default prioritization level may not
527 be quite suitable. A configurable prioritization level should be
528 supported in the SAVI solution for the mix scenario [<a href="#ref-SAVI-MIX" title="&quot;SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario&quot;">SAVI-MIX</a>].
529
530 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Prefix Configuration</span>
531
532 Before setting up a host-level granularity binding, it is important
533 to configure correct prefixes on the SAVI device. This document
534 suggests a set of 3 prefix configuration mechanisms at a SAVI device:
535
536 o Manual Prefix Configuration: The allowed prefix scope of IPv4
537 addresses, IPv6 static addresses, IPv6 addresses assigned by
538 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), and IPv6 addresses
539 assigned by DHCPv6 can be set manually at the SAVI device.
540 FE80::/64 is always a feasible prefix in IPv6.
541
542 o Prefix Configuration by Router Advertisement (RA) Snooping: The
543 allowed prefix scope of IPv6 static addresses and IPv6 addresses
544 assigned by SLAAC can be set at the SAVI device through snooping
545 an RA message at the SAVI device.
546
547 o Prefix Configuration by DHCP Prefix Delegation (DHCP-PD) Snooping:
548 The allowed prefix scope of IPv6 static addresses, IPv6 addresses
549 assigned by SLAAC, and IPv6 addresses assigned by DHCPv6 can be
550 set through snooping a DHCP-PD message at the SAVI device.
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span>
559
560
561 If some of the prefix scopes are set to have no prefix, the
562 implication is that the corresponding address assignment method is
563 not allowed in the network.
564
565 There is no need to explicitly present these prefix scopes, but these
566 restrictions should be used as the premier check in binding setup.
567
568 When SAVI is partially deployed, binding may fail as RA messages and
569 DHCP-PD can be spoofed. So, it is recommended that Manual Prefix
570 Configuration be used unless SAVI gets fully deployed.
571
572 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
573
574 The authors would like to thank the SAVI working group for a thorough
575 technical discussion on the design and the framework of the SAVI
576 method as captured in this document, in particular Erik Nordmark,
577 Guang Yao, Eric Levy-Abegnoli, and Alberto Garcia. Thanks also to
578 Torben Melsen for reviewing this document.
579
580 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span>
581
582 This document only discusses the possible methods to mitigate the
583 usage of forged IP addresses. Some such methods may rely on
584 cryptographic methods, but not all do. As a result, it is generally
585 not possible to prove address ownership in any strong sense. If a
586 binding anchor is not exclusive for each IP address, or is without
587 strong security, addresses can still be forged. Besides, the binding
588 may not accord with the address management requirement, which can be
589 more specified for each client. However, given no new protocol is
590 introduced, the improvements are still acceptable. If strong
591 security is required when using IP addresses, then cryptographic-
592 based authentication must be used as it is the only way to provide
593 strong security.
594
595 <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> explains how the preferred location of SAVI instances is
596 close to hosts. However, in some cases, this makes the SAVI
597 instances themselves vulnerable and may defeat the purpose of
598 deploying a SAVI solution. For instance, deployments should not
599 place SAVI functionality in devices that are physically exposed.
600 Even if the device correctly monitors the source address usage of
601 hosts, an attacker could replace the device with one that does not
602 check or hook up to a trusted interface from the device to the rest
603 of the network. Similarly, deployments where SAVI instances are
604 distributed across administrative boundaries are not recommended.
605 For instance, in most cases, it would be undesirable to deploy a
606 distributed SAVI solution on both sides of a customer-provider
607 interface if the solution required trusting the correct operation of
608 the SAVI devices on the other side of the interface.
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. References</span>
618
619 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References</span>
620
621 [<a id="ref-RFC2131">RFC2131</a>] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", <a href="./rfc2131">RFC</a>
622 <a href="./rfc2131">2131</a>, March 1997.
623
624 [<a id="ref-RFC3315">RFC3315</a>] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C.,
625 and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for
626 IPv6 (DHCPv6)", <a href="./rfc3315">RFC 3315</a>, July 2003.
627
628 [<a id="ref-RFC3971">RFC3971</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
629 Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>, March 2005.
630
631 [<a id="ref-RFC4862">RFC4862</a>] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
632 Address Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc4862">RFC 4862</a>, September 2007.
633
634 [<a id="ref-RFC5026">RFC5026</a>] Giaretta, G., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, "Mobile IPv6
635 Bootstrapping in Split Scenario", <a href="./rfc5026">RFC 5026</a>, October 2007.
636
637 [<a id="ref-RFC5739">RFC5739</a>] Eronen, P., Laganier, J., and C. Madson, "IPv6
638 Configuration in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
639 (IKEv2)", <a href="./rfc5739">RFC 5739</a>, February 2010.
640
641 [<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen,
642 "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", <a href="./rfc5996">RFC</a>
643 <a href="./rfc5996">5996</a>, September 2010.
644
645 [<a id="ref-RFC6620">RFC6620</a>] Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS
646 SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation
647 Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", <a href="./rfc6620">RFC</a>
648 <a href="./rfc6620">6620</a>, May 2012.
649
650 [<a id="ref-RFC6959">RFC6959</a>] McPherson, D., Baker, F., and J. Halpern, "Source Address
651 Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope", <a href="./rfc6959">RFC 6959</a>,
652 May 2013.
653
654 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.2" href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References</span>
655
656 [<a id="ref-BA2007">BA2007</a>] Baker, F., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22Cisco+IP+Version+4+Source+Guard%22'>"Cisco IP Version 4 Source Guard"</a>, Work in
657 Progress, November 2007.
658
659 [<a id="ref-BCP38">BCP38</a>] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering:
660 Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP
661 Source Address Spoofing", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp38">BCP 38</a>, <a href="./rfc2827">RFC 2827</a>, May 2000.
662
663 [<a id="ref-BCP84">BCP84</a>] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for
664 Multihomed Networks", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp84">BCP 84</a>, <a href="./rfc3704">RFC 3704</a>, March 2004.
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span>
671
672
673 [<a id="ref-SAVI-DHCP">SAVI-DHCP</a>] Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for
674 DHCP", Work in Progress, June 2013.
675
676 [<a id="ref-SAVI-MIX">SAVI-MIX</a>] Bi, J., Yao, G., Halpern, J., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "SAVI
677 for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario", Work in Progress, May
678 2013.
679
680
681
682
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685
686
687
688
689
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
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724 <span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span>
727
728
729 Authors' Addresses
730
731 Jianping Wu
732 Tsinghua University
733 Computer Science, Tsinghua University
734 Beijing 100084
735 China
736
737 EMail: [email protected]
738
739
740 Jun Bi
741 Tsinghua University
742 Network Research Center, Tsinghua University
743 Beijing 100084
744 China
745
746 EMail: [email protected]
747
748
749 Marcelo Bagnulo
750 Universidad Carlos III de Madrid
751 Avenida de la Universidad 30
752 Leganes, Madrid 28911
753 Spain
754
755 EMail: [email protected]
756
757
758 Fred Baker
759 Cisco Systems
760 Santa Barbara, CA 93117
761 United States
762
763 EMail: [email protected]
764
765
766 Christian Vogt (editor)
767 3507 Palmilla Drive
768 San Jose, CA 95134
769 United States
770
771 EMail: [email protected]
772
773
774
775
776
777
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780 Wu, et al. Informational [Page 14]
781 </pre>