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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Wu |
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Request for Comments: 7039 J. Bi |
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Category: Informational Tsinghua Univ. |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 M. Bagnulo |
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UC3M |
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F. Baker |
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Cisco |
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C. Vogt, Ed. |
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October 2013 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Framework</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) methods were developed |
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to prevent nodes attached to the same IP link from spoofing each |
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other's IP addresses, so as to complement ingress filtering with |
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finer-grained, standardized IP source address validation. This |
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document is a framework document that describes and motivates the |
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design of the SAVI methods. Particular SAVI methods are described in |
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other documents. |
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents |
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7039</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
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Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
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10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
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material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
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modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
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Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling |
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the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified |
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outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may |
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not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format |
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it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other |
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than English. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Deployment Options . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. IP Address Assignment Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Binding Anchors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Scalability Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Reliability Optimizations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Scenario with Multiple Assignment Methods . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Prefix Configuration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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|
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Since IP source addresses are used by hosts and network entities to |
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determine the origin of a packet and as a destination for return |
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data, spoofing of IP source addresses can enable impersonation, |
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concealment, and malicious traffic redirection. Unfortunately, the |
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Internet architecture does not prevent IP source address spoofing |
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[<a href="./rfc6959" title=""Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope"">RFC6959</a>]. Since the IP source address of a packet generally takes |
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no role in forwarding the packet, it can be selected arbitrarily by |
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the sending host without jeopardizing packet delivery. Extra methods |
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are necessary for IP source address validation to augment packet |
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forwarding with an explicit check of whether a given packet's IP |
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source address is legitimate. |
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IP source address validation can happen at different granularity. |
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Ingress filtering [<a href="#ref-BCP38" title=""Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing"">BCP38</a>] [<a href="#ref-BCP84" title=""Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks"">BCP84</a>], a widely deployed standard for IP |
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source address validation, functions at the coarse granularity of |
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networks. It verifies that the prefix of an IP source address routes |
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to the network from which the packet was received. An advantage of |
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ingress filtering is simplicity: the decision of whether to accept or |
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to reject an IP source address can be made solely based on the |
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information available from routing protocols. However, the |
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simplicity comes at the cost of not being able to validate IP source |
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addresses at a finer granularity, due to the aggregated nature of the |
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information available from routing protocols. Finer-grained IP |
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source address validation would ensure that source address |
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information is accurate, reduce the ability to launch denial-of- |
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service attacks, and help with localizing hosts and identifying |
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misbehaving hosts. Partial solutions [<a href="#ref-BA2007" title=""Cisco IP Version 4 Source Guard"">BA2007</a>] exist for finer- |
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grained IP source address validation but are proprietary and hence |
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often unsuitable for corporate procurement. |
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|
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The Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) method was developed |
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to complement ingress filtering with standardized IP source address |
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validation at the maximally fine granularity of individual IP |
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addresses. It prevents hosts attached to the same link from spoofing |
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each other's IP addresses. To facilitate deployment in networks of |
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various kinds, the SAVI method was designed to be modular and |
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extensible. This document describes and motivates the design of the |
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SAVI method. |
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|
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Note that SAVI raises a number of important privacy considerations |
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that are discussed more fully in [<a href="./rfc6959" title=""Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope"">RFC6959</a>]. SAVI implementers must |
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take those privacy considerations into account when designing |
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solutions that match this framework and follow the recommendations |
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given in [<a href="./rfc6959" title=""Source Address Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope"">RFC6959</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Model</span> |
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To enable network operators to deploy fine-grained IP source address |
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validation without a dependency on supportive functionality on hosts, |
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the SAVI method was designed to be purely network based. A SAVI |
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instance enforces the hosts' use of legitimate IP source addresses |
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according to the following three-step model: |
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1. Identify which IP source addresses are legitimate for a host, |
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based on monitoring packets exchanged by the host. |
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2. Bind a legitimate IP address to a link-layer property of the |
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host's network attachment. This property, called a "binding |
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anchor", must be verifiable in every packet that the host sends |
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and harder to spoof than the host's IP source address itself. |
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3. Enforce that the IP source addresses in packets match the binding |
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anchors to which they were bound. |
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This model allows SAVI functionality (a SAVI instance) to be located |
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anywhere on the link to which the hosts attach, hence enabling |
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different locations for a SAVI instance. One way to locate a SAVI |
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instance is in the hosts' default router. IP source addresses are |
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then validated in packets traversing the default router, yet the IP |
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source addresses in packets exchanged locally on the link may bypass |
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validation. Another way to locate a SAVI instance is in a switch |
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between the hosts and their default router. Thus, packets may |
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undergo IP source address validation even if exchanged locally on the |
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link. |
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The closer a SAVI instance is located to the host, the more effective |
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the SAVI method is. This is because each of the three steps of the |
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SAVI model can best be accomplished in a position close to the host: |
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o Identifying a host's legitimate IP source addresses is most |
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efficient close to the host because the likelihood that the host's |
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packets bypass a SAVI instance, and hence cannot be monitored, |
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increases with the topological distance between the SAVI instance |
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and the host. |
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o Selecting a binding anchor for a host's IP source address is |
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easiest close to the host because many link-layer properties are |
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unique for a given host only on a link segment directly attached |
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to the host. |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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|
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o Enforcing a host's use of a legitimate IP source address is most |
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reliable when pursued close to the host because the likelihood |
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that the host's packets bypass a SAVI instance, and hence do not |
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undergo IP source address validation, increases with the |
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topological distance between the SAVI instance and the host. |
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The preferred location of SAVI instances is therefore close to hosts, |
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such as in switches that directly attach to the hosts whose IP source |
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addresses are being validated. |
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Nevertheless, it is useful for SAVI mechanisms to be able to handle |
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situations where hosts are not directly attached to the SAVI-capable |
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device. For instance, deployments with both SAVI-capable and legacy |
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switches could be supported. In general, a SAVI solution needs to |
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specify how it deals with a number of deployment scenarios and |
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exceptional situations, including interaction with legacy devices, |
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hosts moving between wireless attachment points, network partitions, |
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and so on. |
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Besides, in the case of legacy switches, the security level is lower, |
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as there is no full protection for the hosts connected to the legacy |
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server. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Deployment Options</span> |
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The model of the SAVI method, as explained in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>, is |
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deployment specific in two ways: |
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o The identification of legitimate IP source addresses is dependent |
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on the IP address assignment method in use on a link, since it is |
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through assignment that a host becomes the legitimate user of an |
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IP source address. |
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o Binding anchors are dependent on the technology used to build the |
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link on which they are used, as binding anchors are link-layer |
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properties of a host's network attachment. |
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To facilitate the deployment of the SAVI method in networks of |
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various kinds, the SAVI method is designed to support different IP |
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address assignment methods and to function with different binding |
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anchors. Naturally, both the IP address assignment methods in use on |
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a link and the available binding anchors have an impact on the |
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functioning and the strength of IP source address validation. The |
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following two subsections explain this impact and describe how the |
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SAVI method accommodates this. |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. IP Address Assignment Methods</span> |
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Since the SAVI method traces IP address assignment packets, it |
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necessarily needs to incorporate logic that is specific to particular |
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IP address assignment methods. However, developing SAVI method |
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variants for each IP address assignment method is alone not |
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sufficient since multiple IP address assignment methods may coexist |
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on a given link. The SAVI method hence comes in multiple variants, |
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e.g., for links with DHCP [<a href="./rfc2131" title=""Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol"">RFC2131</a>] [<a href="./rfc3315" title=""Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)"">RFC3315</a>], Stateless Address |
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Autoconfiguration (SLAAC) [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>] with or without Secure Neighbor |
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Discovery (SEND) [<a href="./rfc3971" title=""SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)"">RFC3971</a>], Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 |
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(IKEv2) [<a href="./rfc5996" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC5996</a>] [<a href="./rfc5739" title=""IPv6 Configuration in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC5739</a>] [<a href="./rfc5026" title=""Mobile IPv6 Bootstrapping in Split Scenario"">RFC5026</a>], and combinations thereof. |
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The reason to develop SAVI method variants for each single IP address |
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configuration method, in addition to the variant that handles all IP |
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address assignment methods, is to minimize the complexity of the |
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common case. Many link deployments today either are constrained to a |
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single IP address assignment method or, equivalently from the |
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perspective of the SAVI method, use different IP address assignment |
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methods within different IP address prefixes. The SAVI method for |
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such links can be simpler than the SAVI method for links with |
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multiple IP address assignment methods per IP address prefix. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Binding Anchors</span> |
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The SAVI method supports a range of binding anchors: |
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o The IEEE extended unique identifier, EUI-48 or EUI-64, of a host's |
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interface. |
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o The port on an Ethernet switch to which a host attaches. |
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o The security association between a host and the base station on |
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wireless links. |
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o The combination of a host interface's link-layer address and a |
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customer relationship in cable modem networks. |
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o An ATM virtual channel, a PPP session identifier, or a Layer 2 |
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Tunneling Protocol (L2TP) session identifier in a DSL network. |
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o A tunnel that connects to a single host, such as an IP-in-IP |
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tunnel, a Generic Routing Encapsulation (GRE) tunnel, or an MPLS |
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label-switched path. |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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The various binding anchors differ significantly in the security they |
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provide. IEEE extended unique identifiers, for example, fail to |
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render a secure binding anchor because they can be spoofed with |
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little effort. Switch ports alone may be insufficient because they |
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may connect to more than a single host, such as in the case of |
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concatenated switches. |
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Given this diversity in the security provided, one could define a set |
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of possible binding anchors and leave it up to the administrator to |
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choose one or more of them. Such a selection of binding anchors |
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would, of course, have to be accompanied by an explanation of the |
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pros and cons of the different binding anchors. In addition, SAVI |
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devices may have a default binding anchor depending on the lower |
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layers. Such a default could be to use switch ports when available |
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and MAC addresses otherwise or to use MAC addresses and switch ports |
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in addition if available. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Scalability Optimizations</span> |
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The preference to locate a SAVI instance close to hosts implies that |
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multiple SAVI instances must be able to coexist in order to support |
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large links. Although the model of the SAVI method is independent of |
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the number of SAVI instances per link, coexistence of multiple SAVI |
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instances without further measures can lead to higher-than-necessary |
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memory requirements. Since a SAVI instance creates bindings for the |
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IP source addresses of all hosts on a link, bindings are replicated |
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if multiple SAVI instances coexist on the link. High memory |
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requirements, in turn, increase the cost of a SAVI instance. This is |
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problematic in particular for SAVI instances that are located on a |
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switch since it may significantly increase the cost of such a switch. |
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To reduce memory requirements for SAVI instances that are located on |
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a switch, the SAVI method enables the suppression of binding |
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replication on links with multiple SAVI instances. This requires |
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manual disabling of IP source address validation on switch ports that |
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connect to other switches running a SAVI instance. Each SAVI |
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instance is then responsible for validating IP source addresses only |
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on those ports to which hosts attach either directly or via switches |
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without a SAVI instance. On ports towards other switches running a |
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SAVI instance, IP source addresses are not validated. The switches |
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running SAVI instances thus form a "protection perimeter". The IP |
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source addresses in packets passing the protection perimeter are |
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validated by the ingress SAVI instance, but no further validation |
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takes place as long as the packets remain within or leave the |
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protection perimeter. |
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<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
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|
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|
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.............. |
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protection perimeter --> : +--------+ : |
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+---+ +---+ : | SAVI | : |
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| A | | B | <-- hosts : | switch | : |
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+---+ +---+ : +--------+ : |
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...|......|.............................: | : |
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: +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ : |
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: | SAVI |----------| legacy | | SAVI | : |
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: | switch | | switch |----------| switch | : |
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: +--------+ +--------+ +--------+ : |
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: | ...............................|........: |
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: +--------+ : +--------+ |
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: | SAVI | : | legacy | |
| 406 |
: | switch | : | switch | |
| 407 |
: +--------+ : +--------+ |
| 408 |
:............: | | |
| 409 |
+---+ +---+ |
| 410 |
hosts --> | C | | D | |
| 411 |
+---+ +---+ |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
Figure 1: Protection Perimeter Concept |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
Figure 1 illustrates the concept of the protection perimeter. The |
| 416 |
figure shows a link with six switches, of which four, denoted "SAVI |
| 417 |
switch", run a SAVI instance. The protection perimeter created by |
| 418 |
the four SAVI instances is shown as a dotted line in the figure. IP |
| 419 |
source address validation is enabled on all switch ports on the |
| 420 |
protection perimeter, and it is disabled on all other switch ports. |
| 421 |
Four hosts, denoted A through D in the figure, attach to the |
| 422 |
protection perimeter. |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
In the example in Figure 1, the protection perimeter encompasses one |
| 425 |
of the legacy switches, located in the middle of the depicted link |
| 426 |
topology. This enables a single, unpartitioned protection perimeter. |
| 427 |
A single protection perimeter minimizes memory requirements for the |
| 428 |
SAVI instances because every binding is kept only once, namely, by |
| 429 |
the SAVI instance that attaches to the host being validated. |
| 430 |
Excluding the legacy switch from the protection perimeter would |
| 431 |
result in two smaller protection perimeters to the left and to the |
| 432 |
right of the depicted link topology. The memory requirements for the |
| 433 |
SAVI instances would then be higher: since IP source address |
| 434 |
validation would be activated on the two ports connecting to the |
| 435 |
legacy switch, the SAVI instances adjacent to the legacy switch would |
| 436 |
replicate all bindings from the other protection perimeter, |
| 437 |
respectively. The reason why it is possible to include the legacy |
| 438 |
switch in the protection perimeter is because the depicted link |
| 439 |
topology guarantees that packets cannot enter the protection |
| 440 |
perimeter via this legacy switch. Without this guarantee, the legacy |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
switch would have to be excluded from the protection perimeter in |
| 450 |
order to ensure that packets entering the protection perimeter |
| 451 |
undergo IP source address validation. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
Note that if such configuration is used, care must be taken as any |
| 454 |
hosts on subnets attached to non-enforcing ports will be able to use |
| 455 |
spoofed source addresses. |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Reliability Optimizations</span> |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
The explicit storage of legitimate IP addresses in the form of |
| 460 |
bindings implies that failure to create a binding, or the premature |
| 461 |
removal of bindings, can lead to loss of legitimate packets. There |
| 462 |
are three situations in which this can happen: |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
o Legitimate IP address configuration packets, which should trigger |
| 465 |
the creation of a binding in a SAVI instance, are lost before |
| 466 |
reaching the SAVI instance. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
o A SAVI instance loses a binding, for example, due to a restart. |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
o The link topology changes, resulting in hosts to communicate |
| 471 |
through SAVI instances that do not have a binding for those hosts' |
| 472 |
IP addresses. |
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
To limit the disruption that missing bindings for legitimate IP |
| 475 |
addresses can have, the SAVI method includes a mechanism for reactive |
| 476 |
binding creation based on regular packets. This mechanism |
| 477 |
supplements the proactive binding creation based on IP address |
| 478 |
configuration packets. Reactive binding creation occurs when a SAVI |
| 479 |
instance recognizes excessive drops of regular packets originating |
| 480 |
from the same IP address. The SAVI instance then verifies whether |
| 481 |
said IP address is unique on the link. How the verification is |
| 482 |
carried out depends on the IP address configuration method that the |
| 483 |
SAVI instance supports. The SAVI method variant for Stateless |
| 484 |
Address Autoconfiguration and for Secure Neighbor Discovery verifies |
| 485 |
an IP address through the Duplicate Address Detection procedure. The |
| 486 |
SAVI method variant for DHCP verifies an IP address through a DHCP |
| 487 |
Lease Query message exchange with the DHCP server. If verification |
| 488 |
indicates that the IP address is unique on the link, the SAVI |
| 489 |
instance creates a binding for the IP address. Otherwise, no binding |
| 490 |
is created, and packets sent from the IP address continue to be |
| 491 |
dropped. These reliability issues should be addressed in all the |
| 492 |
SAVI protocols describing particular SAVI methods. |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Scenario with Multiple Assignment Methods</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
While multiple assignment methods can be used on the same link, the |
| 508 |
SAVI device may have to deal with a mix of binding discovery methods. |
| 509 |
If the address prefix used for each assignment method is different, |
| 510 |
the "mix scenario" behaves the same as with the scenario with only |
| 511 |
one assignment method. If different address assignment methods are |
| 512 |
used to assign addresses from the same prefix, additional |
| 513 |
considerations are needed because one binding mechanism may create a |
| 514 |
binding violating an existing binding from another binding mechanism, |
| 515 |
e.g., binding from First-Come, First-Served (FCFS) SAVI [<a href="./rfc6620" title=""FCFS SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses"">RFC6620</a>] may |
| 516 |
violate a binding from SAVI-DHCP [<a href="#ref-SAVI-DHCP" title=""SAVI Solution for DHCP"">SAVI-DHCP</a>]. Thus, the collision |
| 517 |
between different SAVI mechanisms in the mix scenario must be handled |
| 518 |
in case more than one address assignment method is used to assign |
| 519 |
addresses from the same prefix. |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
The prioritization of relationships between different address |
| 522 |
assignment methods is used as the basis to solve possible collisions. |
| 523 |
Current standard documents of address assignment methods (DHCP |
| 524 |
[<a href="./rfc2131" title=""Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol"">RFC2131</a>], DHCPv6 [<a href="./rfc3315" title=""Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for IPv6 (DHCPv6)"">RFC3315</a>], SLAAC [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>], and SEND [<a href="./rfc3971" title=""SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)"">RFC3971</a>]) |
| 525 |
have implied the prioritization relationship in general cases. |
| 526 |
However, in some scenarios, the default prioritization level may not |
| 527 |
be quite suitable. A configurable prioritization level should be |
| 528 |
supported in the SAVI solution for the mix scenario [<a href="#ref-SAVI-MIX" title=""SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario"">SAVI-MIX</a>]. |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Prefix Configuration</span> |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
Before setting up a host-level granularity binding, it is important |
| 533 |
to configure correct prefixes on the SAVI device. This document |
| 534 |
suggests a set of 3 prefix configuration mechanisms at a SAVI device: |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
o Manual Prefix Configuration: The allowed prefix scope of IPv4 |
| 537 |
addresses, IPv6 static addresses, IPv6 addresses assigned by |
| 538 |
Stateless Address Autoconfiguration (SLAAC), and IPv6 addresses |
| 539 |
assigned by DHCPv6 can be set manually at the SAVI device. |
| 540 |
FE80::/64 is always a feasible prefix in IPv6. |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
o Prefix Configuration by Router Advertisement (RA) Snooping: The |
| 543 |
allowed prefix scope of IPv6 static addresses and IPv6 addresses |
| 544 |
assigned by SLAAC can be set at the SAVI device through snooping |
| 545 |
an RA message at the SAVI device. |
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
o Prefix Configuration by DHCP Prefix Delegation (DHCP-PD) Snooping: |
| 548 |
The allowed prefix scope of IPv6 static addresses, IPv6 addresses |
| 549 |
assigned by SLAAC, and IPv6 addresses assigned by DHCPv6 can be |
| 550 |
set through snooping a DHCP-PD message at the SAVI device. |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
If some of the prefix scopes are set to have no prefix, the |
| 562 |
implication is that the corresponding address assignment method is |
| 563 |
not allowed in the network. |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
There is no need to explicitly present these prefix scopes, but these |
| 566 |
restrictions should be used as the premier check in binding setup. |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
When SAVI is partially deployed, binding may fail as RA messages and |
| 569 |
DHCP-PD can be spoofed. So, it is recommended that Manual Prefix |
| 570 |
Configuration be used unless SAVI gets fully deployed. |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
The authors would like to thank the SAVI working group for a thorough |
| 575 |
technical discussion on the design and the framework of the SAVI |
| 576 |
method as captured in this document, in particular Erik Nordmark, |
| 577 |
Guang Yao, Eric Levy-Abegnoli, and Alberto Garcia. Thanks also to |
| 578 |
Torben Melsen for reviewing this document. |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
This document only discusses the possible methods to mitigate the |
| 583 |
usage of forged IP addresses. Some such methods may rely on |
| 584 |
cryptographic methods, but not all do. As a result, it is generally |
| 585 |
not possible to prove address ownership in any strong sense. If a |
| 586 |
binding anchor is not exclusive for each IP address, or is without |
| 587 |
strong security, addresses can still be forged. Besides, the binding |
| 588 |
may not accord with the address management requirement, which can be |
| 589 |
more specified for each client. However, given no new protocol is |
| 590 |
introduced, the improvements are still acceptable. If strong |
| 591 |
security is required when using IP addresses, then cryptographic- |
| 592 |
based authentication must be used as it is the only way to provide |
| 593 |
strong security. |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
<a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> explains how the preferred location of SAVI instances is |
| 596 |
close to hosts. However, in some cases, this makes the SAVI |
| 597 |
instances themselves vulnerable and may defeat the purpose of |
| 598 |
deploying a SAVI solution. For instance, deployments should not |
| 599 |
place SAVI functionality in devices that are physically exposed. |
| 600 |
Even if the device correctly monitors the source address usage of |
| 601 |
hosts, an attacker could replace the device with one that does not |
| 602 |
check or hook up to a trusted interface from the device to the rest |
| 603 |
of the network. Similarly, deployments where SAVI instances are |
| 604 |
distributed across administrative boundaries are not recommended. |
| 605 |
For instance, in most cases, it would be undesirable to deploy a |
| 606 |
distributed SAVI solution on both sides of a customer-provider |
| 607 |
interface if the solution required trusting the correct operation of |
| 608 |
the SAVI devices on the other side of the interface. |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. References</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.1" href="#section-10.1">10.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2131">RFC2131</a>] Droms, R., "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol", <a href="./rfc2131">RFC</a> |
| 622 |
<a href="./rfc2131">2131</a>, March 1997. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3315">RFC3315</a>] Droms, R., Bound, J., Volz, B., Lemon, T., Perkins, C., |
| 625 |
and M. Carney, "Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol for |
| 626 |
IPv6 (DHCPv6)", <a href="./rfc3315">RFC 3315</a>, July 2003. |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3971">RFC3971</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure |
| 629 |
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>, March 2005. |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4862">RFC4862</a>] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless |
| 632 |
Address Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc4862">RFC 4862</a>, September 2007. |
| 633 |
|
| 634 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5026">RFC5026</a>] Giaretta, G., Kempf, J., and V. Devarapalli, "Mobile IPv6 |
| 635 |
Bootstrapping in Split Scenario", <a href="./rfc5026">RFC 5026</a>, October 2007. |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5739">RFC5739</a>] Eronen, P., Laganier, J., and C. Madson, "IPv6 |
| 638 |
Configuration in Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 |
| 639 |
(IKEv2)", <a href="./rfc5739">RFC 5739</a>, February 2010. |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5996">RFC5996</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., and P. Eronen, |
| 642 |
"Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)", <a href="./rfc5996">RFC</a> |
| 643 |
<a href="./rfc5996">5996</a>, September 2010. |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6620">RFC6620</a>] Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS |
| 646 |
SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation |
| 647 |
Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", <a href="./rfc6620">RFC</a> |
| 648 |
<a href="./rfc6620">6620</a>, May 2012. |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6959">RFC6959</a>] McPherson, D., Baker, F., and J. Halpern, "Source Address |
| 651 |
Validation Improvement (SAVI) Threat Scope", <a href="./rfc6959">RFC 6959</a>, |
| 652 |
May 2013. |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-10.2" href="#section-10.2">10.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
[<a id="ref-BA2007">BA2007</a>] Baker, F., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22Cisco+IP+Version+4+Source+Guard%22'>"Cisco IP Version 4 Source Guard"</a>, Work in |
| 657 |
Progress, November 2007. |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
[<a id="ref-BCP38">BCP38</a>] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: |
| 660 |
Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP |
| 661 |
Source Address Spoofing", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp38">BCP 38</a>, <a href="./rfc2827">RFC 2827</a>, May 2000. |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
[<a id="ref-BCP84">BCP84</a>] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for |
| 664 |
Multihomed Networks", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp84">BCP 84</a>, <a href="./rfc3704">RFC 3704</a>, March 2004. |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
[<a id="ref-SAVI-DHCP">SAVI-DHCP</a>] Bi, J., Wu, J., Yao, G., and F. Baker, "SAVI Solution for |
| 674 |
DHCP", Work in Progress, June 2013. |
| 675 |
|
| 676 |
[<a id="ref-SAVI-MIX">SAVI-MIX</a>] Bi, J., Yao, G., Halpern, J., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "SAVI |
| 677 |
for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario", Work in Progress, May |
| 678 |
2013. |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
|
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
|
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Wu, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7039">RFC 7039</a> SAVI Framework October 2013</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
Jianping Wu |
| 732 |
Tsinghua University |
| 733 |
Computer Science, Tsinghua University |
| 734 |
Beijing 100084 |
| 735 |
China |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
Jun Bi |
| 741 |
Tsinghua University |
| 742 |
Network Research Center, Tsinghua University |
| 743 |
Beijing 100084 |
| 744 |
China |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
Marcelo Bagnulo |
| 750 |
Universidad Carlos III de Madrid |
| 751 |
Avenida de la Universidad 30 |
| 752 |
Leganes, Madrid 28911 |
| 753 |
Spain |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
Fred Baker |
| 759 |
Cisco Systems |
| 760 |
Santa Barbara, CA 93117 |
| 761 |
United States |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
Christian Vogt (editor) |
| 767 |
3507 Palmilla Drive |
| 768 |
San Jose, CA 95134 |
| 769 |
United States |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
Wu, et al. Informational [Page 14] |
| 781 |
</pre> |