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<pre>Network Working Group J. Rosenberg |
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Request for Comments: 5039 C. Jennings |
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Category: Informational Cisco |
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January 2008 |
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<span class="h1">The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) and Spam</span> |
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Status of This Memo |
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does |
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not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this |
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memo is unlimited. |
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Abstract |
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Spam, defined as the transmission of bulk unsolicited messages, has |
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plagued Internet email. Unfortunately, spam is not limited to email. |
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It can affect any system that enables user-to-user communications. |
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The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) defines a system for user-to- |
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user multimedia communications. Therefore, it is susceptible to |
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spam, just as email is. In this document, we analyze the problem of |
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spam in SIP. We first identify the ways in which the problem is the |
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same and the ways in which it is different from email. We then |
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examine the various possible solutions that have been discussed for |
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email and consider their applicability to SIP. |
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<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Problem Definition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Call Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. IM Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Presence Spam . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Solution Space . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Content Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Black Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. White Lists . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Consent-Based Communications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Reputation Systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Address Obfuscation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Limited-Use Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Turing Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>. Computational Puzzles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.10">3.10</a>. Payments at Risk . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.11">3.11</a>. Legal Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.12">3.12</a>. Circles of Trust . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.13">3.13</a>. Centralized SIP Providers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Authenticated Identity in Email . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Sender Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Signature-Based Techniques . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Authenticated Identity in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Framework for Anti-Spam in SIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Additional Work . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a> |
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<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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Spam, defined as the transmission of bulk unsolicited email, has been |
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a plague on the Internet email system. Many solutions have been |
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documented and deployed to counter the problem. None of these |
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solutions is ideal. However, one thing is clear: the spam problem |
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would be much less significant had solutions been deployed |
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ubiquitously before the problem became widespread. |
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The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) [<a href="#ref-2" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">2</a>] is used for multimedia |
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communications between users, including voice, video, instant |
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messaging, and presence. Consequently, it can be just as much of a |
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target for spam as email. To deal with this, solutions need to be |
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defined and recommendations put into place for dealing with spam as |
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soon as possible. |
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This document serves to meet those goals by defining the problem |
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space more concretely, analyzing the applicability of solutions used |
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in the email space, identifying protocol mechanisms that have been |
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defined for SIP that can help the problem, and making recommendations |
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for implementors. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Problem Definition</span> |
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The spam problem in email is well understood, and we make no attempt |
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to further elaborate on it here. The question, however, is what is |
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the meaning of spam when applied to SIP? Since SIP covers a broad |
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range of functionality, there appear to be three related but |
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different manifestations: |
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Call Spam: This type of spam is defined as a bulk unsolicited set of |
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session initiation attempts (i.e., INVITE requests), attempting to |
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establish a voice, video, instant messaging [<a href="#ref-1" title=""The Message Session Relay Protocol (MSRP)"">1</a>], or other type of |
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communications session. If the user should answer, the spammer |
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proceeds to relay their message over the real-time media. This is |
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the classic telemarketer spam, applied to SIP. This is often |
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called SPam over Ip Telephony, or SPIT. |
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IM Spam: This type of spam is similar to email. It is defined as a |
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bulk unsolicited set of instant messages, whose content contains |
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the message that the spammer is seeking to convey. IM spam is |
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most naturally sent using the SIP MESSAGE [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for Instant Messaging"">3</a>] request. However, |
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any other request that causes content to automatically appear on |
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the user's display will also suffice. That might include INVITE |
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requests with large Subject headers (since the Subject is |
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sometimes rendered to the user), or INVITE requests with text or |
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HTML bodies. This is often called SPam over Instant Messaging, or |
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SPIM. |
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<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
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Presence Spam: This type of spam is similar to IM spam. It is |
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defined as a bulk unsolicited set of presence requests (i.e., |
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SUBSCRIBE requests [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event Notification"">4</a>] for the presence event package [<a href="#ref-6" title=""A Presence Event Package for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">6</a>]), in an |
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attempt to get on the "buddy list" or "white list" of a user in |
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order to send them IM or initiate other forms of communications. |
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This is occasionally called SPam over Presence Protocol, or SPPP. |
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There are many other SIP messages that a spammer might send. |
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However, most of the other ones do not result in content being |
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delivered to a user, nor do they seek input from a user. Rather, |
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they are answered by automata. OPTIONS is a good example of this. |
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There is little value for a spammer in sending an OPTIONS request, |
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since it is answered automatically by the User Agent Server (UAS). |
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No content is delivered to the user, and they are not consulted. |
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In the sections below, we consider the likelihood of these various |
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forms of SIP spam. This is done in some cases by a rough cost |
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analysis. It should be noted that all of these analyses are |
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approximate, and serve only to give a rough sense of the order of |
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magnitude of the problem. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Call Spam</span> |
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Will call spam occur? That is an important question to answer. |
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Clearly, it does occur in the existing telephone network, in the form |
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of telemarketer calls. Although these calls are annoying, they do |
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not arrive in the same kind of volume as email spam. The difference |
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is cost; it costs more for the spammer to make a phone call than it |
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does to send email. This cost manifests itself in terms of the cost |
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for systems that can perform telemarketer call, and in cost per call. |
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Both of these costs are substantially reduced by SIP. A SIP call |
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spam application is easy to write. It is just a SIP User Agent that |
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initiates, in parallel, a large number of calls. If a call connects, |
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the spam application generates an ACK and proceeds to play out a |
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recorded announcement, and then it terminates the call. This kind of |
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application can be built entirely in software, using readily |
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available (and indeed, free) off-the-shelf software components. It |
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can run on a low-end PC and requires no special expertise to execute. |
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The cost per call is also substantially reduced. A normal |
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residential phone line allows only one call to be placed at a time. |
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If additional lines are required, a user must purchase more expensive |
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connectivity. Typically, a T1 or T3 would be required for a large- |
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volume telemarketing service. That kind of access is very expensive |
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and well beyond the reach of an average user. A T1 line is |
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approximately US $250 per month, and about 1.5 cents per minute for |
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calls. T1 lines used only for outbound calls (such as in this case) |
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<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
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are even more expensive than inbound trunks due to the reciprocal |
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termination charges that a provider pays and receives. |
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There are two aspects to the capacity: the call attempt rate, and the |
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number of simultaneous successful calls that can be in progress. A |
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T1 would allow a spammer, at most, 24 simultaneous calls, and |
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assuming about 10 seconds for each call attempt, about 2.4 call |
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attempts per second. At high-volume calling, the per-minute rates |
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far exceed the flat monthly fee for the T1. The result is a cost of |
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250,000 microcents for each successful spam delivery, assuming 10 |
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seconds of content. |
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With SIP, this cost is much reduced. Consider a spammer using a |
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typical broadband Internet connection that provides 500 Kbps of |
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upstream bandwidth. Initiating a call requires just a single INVITE |
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message. Assuming, for simplicity's sake, that this is 1 KB, a 500 |
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Kbps upstream DSL or cable modem connection will allow about 62 call |
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attempts per second. A successful call requires enough bandwidth to |
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transmit a message to the receiver. Assuming a low compression codec |
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(say, G.723.1 at 5.3 Kbps), this requires approximately 16 Kbps after |
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RTP, UDP, and IP overheads. With 500 Kbps upstream bandwidth, this |
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means as many as 31 simultaneous calls can be in progress. With 10 |
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seconds of content per call, that allows for 3.1 successful call |
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attempts per second. If broadband access is around $50/month, the |
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cost per successful voice spam is about 6.22 microcents each. This |
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assumes that calls can be made 24 hours a day, 30 days a month, which |
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may or may not be the case. |
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These figures indicate that SIP call spam is roughly four orders of |
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magnitude cheaper to send than traditional circuit-based telemarketer |
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calls. This low cost is certainly going to be very attractive to |
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spammers. Indeed, many spammers utilize computational and bandwidth |
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resources provided by others, by infecting their machines with |
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viruses that turn them into "zombies" that can be used to generate |
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spam. This can reduce the cost of call spam to nearly zero. |
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Even ignoring the zombie issue, this reduction in cost is even more |
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amplified for international calls. Currently, there are few |
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telemarketing calls across international borders, largely due to the |
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large cost of making international calls. This is one of the reasons |
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why the "do not call list", a United States national list of numbers |
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that telemarketers cannot call -- has been effective. The law only |
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affects U.S. companies, but since most telemarketing calls are |
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domestic, it has been effective. Unfortunately (and fortunately), |
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the IP network provides no boundaries of these sorts, and calls to |
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any SIP URI are possible from anywhere in the world. This will allow |
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for international spam at a significantly reduced cost. |
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<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
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International spam is likely to be even more annoying than national |
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spam, since it may arrive in languages that the recipient doesn't |
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even speak. |
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These figures assume that the primary limitation is the access |
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bandwidth and not CPU, disk, or termination costs. Termination costs |
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merit further discussion. Currently, most Voice over IP (VoIP) calls |
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terminate on the Public Switched Telephone Network (PSTN), and this |
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termination costs the originator of the call money. These costs are |
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similar to the per-minute rates of a T1. It ranges anywhere from |
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half a cent to three cents per minute, depending on volume and other |
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factors. However, equipment costs, training, and other factors are |
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much lower for SIP-based termination than a T1, making the cost still |
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lower than circuit connectivity. Furthermore, the current trend in |
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VoIP systems is to make termination free for calls that never touch |
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the PSTN, that is, calls to actual SIP endpoints. Thus, as more and |
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more SIP endpoints come online, termination costs will probably drop. |
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Until then, SIP spam can be used in concert with termination services |
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for a lower-cost form of traditional telemarketer calls, made to |
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normal PSTN endpoints. |
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It is useful to compare these figures with email. VoIP can deliver |
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approximately 3.1 successful call attempts per second. Email spam |
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can, of course, deliver more. Assuming 1 KB per email, and an |
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upstream link of 500 Kbps, a spammer can generate 62.5 messages per |
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second. This number goes down with larger messages of course. |
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Interestingly, spam filters delete large numbers of these mails, so |
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the cost per viewed message is likely to be much higher. In that |
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sense, call spam is much more attractive, since its content is much |
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more likely to be examined by a user if a call attempt is successful. |
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Another part of the cost of spamming is collecting addresses. |
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Spammers have, over time, built up immense lists of email addresses, |
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each of the form user@domain, to which spam is directed. SIP uses |
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the same form of addressing, making it likely that email addresses |
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can easily be turned into valid SIP addresses. Telephone numbers |
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also represent valid SIP addresses; in concert with a termination |
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provider, a spammer can direct SIP calls at traditional PSTN devices. |
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It is not clear whether email spammers have also been collecting |
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phone numbers as they perform their Web sweeps, but it is probably |
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not hard to do so. Furthermore, unlike email addresses, phone |
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numbers are a finite address space and one that is fairly densely |
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packed. As a result, going sequentially through phone numbers is |
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likely to produce a fairly high hit rate. Thus, it seems like the |
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cost is relatively low for a spammer to obtain large numbers of SIP |
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addresses to which spam can be directed. |
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<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. IM Spam</span> |
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IM spam is very much like email, in terms of the costs for deploying |
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and generating spam. Assuming, for the sake of argument, a 1KB |
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message to be sent and 500 Kbps of upstream bandwidth, that is 62.5 |
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messages per second. At $50/month, the result is .31 microcents per |
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message. This is less than voice spam, but not substantially less. |
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The cost is probably on par with email spam. However, IM is much |
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more intrusive than email. In today's systems, IMs automatically pop |
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up and present themselves to the user. Email, of course, must be |
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deliberately selected and displayed. However, most popular IM |
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systems employ white lists, which only allow IM to be delivered if |
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the sender is on the white list. Thus, whether or not IM spam will |
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be useful seems to depend a lot on the nature of the systems as the |
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network is opened up. If they are ubiquitously deployed with white- |
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list access, the value of IM spam is likely to be low. |
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It is important to point out that there are two different types of IM |
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systems: page mode and session mode. Page mode IM systems work much |
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like email, with each IM being sent as a separate message. In |
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session mode IM, there is signaling in advance of communication to |
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establish a session, and then IMs are exchanged, perhaps point-to- |
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point, as part of the session. The modality impacts the types of |
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spam techniques that can be applied. Techniques for email can be |
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applied identically to page mode IM, but session mode IM is more like |
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telephony, and many techniques (such as content filtering) are harder |
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to apply. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Presence Spam</span> |
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As defined above, presence spam is the generation of bulk unsolicited |
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SUBSCRIBE messages. The cost of this is within a small constant |
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factor of IM spam so the same cost estimates can be used here. What |
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would be the effect of such spam? Most presence systems provide some |
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kind of consent framework. A watcher that has not been granted |
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permission to see the user's presence will not gain access to their |
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presence. However, the presence request is usually noted and |
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conveyed to the user, allowing them to approve or deny the request. |
| 375 |
In SIP, this is done using the watcherinfo event package [<a href="#ref-7" title=""A Watcher Information Event Template-Package for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">7</a>]. This |
| 376 |
package allows a user to learn the identity of the watcher, in order |
| 377 |
to make an authorization decision. |
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
Interestingly, this provides a vehicle for conveying information to a |
| 380 |
user. By generating SUBSCRIBE requests from identities such as |
| 381 |
sip:[email protected], brief messages can be |
| 382 |
conveyed to the user, even though the sender does not have, and never |
| 383 |
will receive, permission to access presence. As such, presence spam |
| 384 |
can be viewed as a form of IM spam, where the amount of content to be |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
conveyed is limited. The limit is equal to the amount of information |
| 394 |
generated by the watcher that gets conveyed to the user through the |
| 395 |
permission system. |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
This type of spam also shows up in consent frameworks used to prevent |
| 398 |
call spam, as discussed in <a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>. |
| 399 |
|
| 400 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Solution Space</span> |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
In this section, we consider the various solutions that might be |
| 403 |
possible to deal with SIP spam. We primarily consider techniques |
| 404 |
that have been employed to deal with email spam. It is important to |
| 405 |
note that the solutions documented below are not meant to be an |
| 406 |
exhaustive study of the spam solutions used for email but rather just |
| 407 |
a representative set. We also consider some solutions that appear to |
| 408 |
be SIP-specific. |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Content Filtering</span> |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
The most common form of spam protection used in email is based on |
| 413 |
content filtering. Spam filters analyze the content of the email, |
| 414 |
and look for clues that the email is spam. Bayesian spam filters are |
| 415 |
in this category. |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
Unfortunately, this type of spam filtering, while successful for |
| 418 |
email spam, is completely useless for call spam. There are two |
| 419 |
reasons. First, in the case where the user answers the call, the |
| 420 |
call is already established and the user is paying attention before |
| 421 |
the content is delivered. The spam cannot be analyzed before the |
| 422 |
user sees it. Second, if the content is stored before the user |
| 423 |
accesses it (e.g., with voicemail), the content will be in the form |
| 424 |
of recorded audio or video. Speech and video recognition technology |
| 425 |
is not likely to be good enough to analyze the content and determine |
| 426 |
whether or not it is spam. Indeed, if a system tried to perform |
| 427 |
speech recognition on a recording in order to perform such an |
| 428 |
analysis, it would be easy for the spammers to make calls with |
| 429 |
background noises, poor grammar, and varied accents, all of which |
| 430 |
will throw off recognition systems. Video recognition is even harder |
| 431 |
to do and remains primarily an area of research. |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
IM spam, due to its similarity to email, can be countered with |
| 434 |
content analysis tools. Indeed, the same tools and techniques used |
| 435 |
for email will directly work for IM spam. |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Black Lists</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
Black listing is an approach whereby the spam filter maintains a list |
| 452 |
of addresses that identify spammers. These addresses include both |
| 453 |
usernames ([email protected]) and entire domains (example.com). |
| 454 |
Pure blacklists are not very effective in email for two reasons. |
| 455 |
First, email addresses are easy to spoof, making it easy for the |
| 456 |
sender to pretend to be someone else. If the sender varies the |
| 457 |
addresses they send from, the black list becomes almost completely |
| 458 |
useless. The second problem is that, even if the sender doesn't |
| 459 |
forge the From address, email addresses are in almost limitless |
| 460 |
supply. Each domain contains an infinite supply of email addresses, |
| 461 |
and new domains can be obtained for very low cost. Furthermore, |
| 462 |
there will always be public providers that will allow users to obtain |
| 463 |
identities for almost no cost (for example, Yahoo or AOL mail |
| 464 |
accounts). The entire domain cannot be blacklisted because it |
| 465 |
contains so many valid users. Blacklisting needs to be for |
| 466 |
individual users. Those identities are easily changed. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
As a result, as long as identities are easy to manufacture, or |
| 469 |
zombies are used, black lists will have limited effectiveness for |
| 470 |
email. |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
Blacklists are also likely to be ineffective for SIP spam. |
| 473 |
Mechanisms for inter-domain authenticated identity for email and SIP |
| 474 |
are discussed in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> and <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. Assuming these mechanisms |
| 475 |
are used and enabled in inter-domain communications, it becomes |
| 476 |
difficult to forge sender addresses. However, it still remains cheap |
| 477 |
to obtain a nearly infinite supply of addresses. |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. White Lists</span> |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
White lists are the opposite of black lists. It is a list of valid |
| 482 |
senders that a user is willing to accept email from. Unlike black |
| 483 |
lists, a spammer cannot change identities to get around the white |
| 484 |
list. White lists are susceptible to address spoofing, but a strong |
| 485 |
identity authentication mechanism can prevent that problem. As a |
| 486 |
result, the combination of white lists and strong identity, as |
| 487 |
described in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a> and <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>, are a good form of defense |
| 488 |
against spam. |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
However, they are not a complete solution, since they would prohibit |
| 491 |
a user from ever being able to receive email from someone who was not |
| 492 |
explicitly put on the white list. As a result, white lists require a |
| 493 |
solution to the "introduction problem" - how to meet someone for the |
| 494 |
first time, and decide whether they should be placed in the white |
| 495 |
list. In addition to the introduction problem, white lists demand |
| 496 |
time from the user to manage. |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
In IM systems, white lists have proven exceptionally useful at |
| 506 |
preventing spam. This is due, in no small part, to the fact that the |
| 507 |
white list exists naturally in the form of the buddy list. Users |
| 508 |
don't have to manage this list just for the purposes of spam |
| 509 |
prevention; it provides general utility, and assists in spam |
| 510 |
prevention for free. Many popular IM systems also have strong |
| 511 |
identity mechanisms since they do not allow communications with IM |
| 512 |
systems in other administrative domains. The introduction problem in |
| 513 |
these systems is solved with a consent framework, described below. |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
The success of white lists in IM systems has applicability to SIP as |
| 516 |
well. This is because SIP also provides a buddy list concept and has |
| 517 |
an advanced presence system as part of its specifications. The |
| 518 |
introduction problem remains. In email, techniques like Turing tests |
| 519 |
have been employed to address the introduction problem. Turing tests |
| 520 |
are considered further in the sections below. As with email, a |
| 521 |
technique for solving the introduction problem would need to be |
| 522 |
applied in conjunction with a white list. |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
If a user's computer is compromised and used a zombie, that computer |
| 525 |
can usually be used to send spam to anyone that has put the user on |
| 526 |
their white list. |
| 527 |
|
| 528 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Consent-Based Communications</span> |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
A consent-based solution is used in conjunction with white or black |
| 531 |
lists. That is, if user A is not on user B's white or black list, |
| 532 |
and user A attempts to communicate with user B, user A's attempt is |
| 533 |
initially rejected, and they are told that consent is being |
| 534 |
requested. Next time user B connects, user B is informed that user A |
| 535 |
had attempted communications. User B can then authorize or reject |
| 536 |
user A. |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
These kinds of consent-based systems are used widely in presence and |
| 539 |
IM. Since most of today's popular IM systems only allow |
| 540 |
communications within a single administrative domain, sender |
| 541 |
identities can be authenticated. Email often uses similar consent- |
| 542 |
based systems for mailing lists. They use a form of authentication |
| 543 |
based on sending cookies to an email address to verify that a user |
| 544 |
can receive mail at that address. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
This kind of consent-based communications has been standardized in |
| 547 |
SIP for presence, using the watcher information event package [<a href="#ref-7" title=""A Watcher Information Event Template-Package for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">7</a>] and |
| 548 |
data format [<a href="#ref-8" title=""An Extensible Markup Language (XML) Based Format for Watcher Information"">8</a>], which allow a user to find out that someone has |
| 549 |
subscribed. Then, the XML Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP) [<a href="#ref-10" title=""The Extensible Markup Language (XML) Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)"">10</a>] |
| 550 |
is used, along with the XML format for presence authorization [<a href="#ref-11" title=""Presence Authorization Rules"">11</a>] to |
| 551 |
provide permission for the user to communicate. |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
A consent framework has also been developed that is applicable to |
| 562 |
other forms of SIP communications [<a href="#ref-12" title=""A Framework for Consent-Based Communications in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">12</a>]. However, this framework |
| 563 |
focuses on authorizing the addition of users to "mailing lists", |
| 564 |
known as exploders in SIP terminology. Though spammers typically use |
| 565 |
such exploder functions, presumably one run by a spammer would not |
| 566 |
use this technique. Consequently, this consent framework is not |
| 567 |
directly applicable to the spam problem. It is, however, useful as a |
| 568 |
tool for managing a white list. Through the PUBLISH mechanism, it |
| 569 |
allows a user to upload a permission document [<a href="#ref-13" title=""A Document Format for Requesting Consent"">13</a>] that indicates |
| 570 |
that they will only accept incoming calls from a particular sender. |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
Can a consent framework, like the ones used for presence, help solve |
| 573 |
call spam? At first glance, it would seem to help a lot. However, |
| 574 |
it might just change the nature of the spam. Instead of being |
| 575 |
bothered with content, in the form of call spam or IM spam, users are |
| 576 |
bothered with consent requests. A user's "communications inbox" |
| 577 |
might instead be filled with requests for communications from a |
| 578 |
multiplicity of users. Those requests for communications don't |
| 579 |
convey much useful content to the user, but they can convey some. At |
| 580 |
the very least, they will convey the identity of the requester. The |
| 581 |
user part of the SIP URI allows for limited free form text, and thus |
| 582 |
could be used to convey brief messages. One can imagine receiving |
| 583 |
consent requests with identities like |
| 584 |
"sip:[email protected]", for |
| 585 |
example. Fortunately, it is possible to apply traditional content |
| 586 |
filtering systems to the header fields in the SIP messages, thus |
| 587 |
reducing these kinds of consent request attacks. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
In order for the spammer to convey more extensive content to the |
| 590 |
user, the user must explicitly accept the request, and only then can |
| 591 |
the spammer convey the full content. This is unlike email spam, |
| 592 |
where, even though much spam is automatically deleted, some |
| 593 |
percentage of the content does get through, and is seen by users, |
| 594 |
without their explicit consent that they want to see it. Thus, if |
| 595 |
consent is required first, the value in sending spam is reduced, and |
| 596 |
perhaps it will cease for those spam cases where consent is not given |
| 597 |
to spammers. |
| 598 |
|
| 599 |
As such, the real question is whether or not the consent system would |
| 600 |
make it possible for a user to give consent to non-spammers and |
| 601 |
reject spammers. Authenticated identity can help. A user in an |
| 602 |
enterprise would know to give consent to senders in other enterprises |
| 603 |
in the same industry, for example. However, in the consumer space, |
| 604 |
if sip:[email protected] tries to communicate with a user, how does |
| 605 |
that user determine whether Bob is a spammer or a long-lost friend |
| 606 |
from high school? There is no way based on the identity alone. In |
| 607 |
such a case, a useful technique is to grant permission for Bob to |
| 608 |
communicate but to ensure that the permission is extremely limited. |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
In particular, Bob may be granted permission to send no more than 200 |
| 618 |
words of text in a single IM, which he can use to identify himself, |
| 619 |
so that the user can determine whether or not more permissions are |
| 620 |
appropriate. It may even be possible that an automated system could |
| 621 |
do some form of content analysis on this initial short message. |
| 622 |
However, this 200 words of text may be enough for a spammer to convey |
| 623 |
their message, in much the same way they might convey it in the user |
| 624 |
part of the SIP URI. |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
Thus, it seems that a consent-based framework, along with white lists |
| 627 |
and black lists, cannot fully solve the problem for SIP, although it |
| 628 |
does appear to help. |
| 629 |
|
| 630 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Reputation Systems</span> |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
A reputation system is also used in conjunction with white or black |
| 633 |
lists. Assume that user A is not on user B's white list, and A |
| 634 |
attempts to contact user B. If a consent-based system is used, B is |
| 635 |
prompted to consent to communications from A, and along with the |
| 636 |
consent, a reputation score might be displayed in order to help B |
| 637 |
decide whether or not they should accept communications from A. |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
Traditionally, reputation systems are implemented in highly |
| 640 |
centralized messaging architectures; the most widespread reputation |
| 641 |
systems in messaging today have been deployed by monolithic instant |
| 642 |
messaging providers (though many Web sites with a high degree of |
| 643 |
interactivity employ very similar concepts of reputation). |
| 644 |
Reputation is calculated based on user feedback. For example, a |
| 645 |
button on the user interface of the messaging client might empower |
| 646 |
users to inform the system that a particular user is abusive. Of |
| 647 |
course, the input of any single user has to be insufficient to ruin |
| 648 |
one's reputation, but consistent negative feedback would give the |
| 649 |
abusive user a negative reputation score. |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
Reputation systems have been successful in systems where |
| 652 |
centralization of resources (user identities, authentication, etc.) |
| 653 |
and monolithic control dominate. Examples of these include the large |
| 654 |
instant messaging providers that run IM systems that do not exchange |
| 655 |
messages with other administrative domains. That control, first of |
| 656 |
all, provides a relatively strong identity assertion for users (since |
| 657 |
all users trust a common provider, and the common provider is the |
| 658 |
arbiter of authentication and identity). Secondly, it provides a |
| 659 |
single place where reputation can be managed. |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
Reputation systems based on negative reputation scores suffer from |
| 662 |
many of the same problems as black lists, since effectively the |
| 663 |
consequence of having a negative reputation is that you are |
| 664 |
blacklisted. If identities are very easy to acquire, a user with a |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
negative reputation will simply acquire a new identity. Moreover, |
| 674 |
negative reputation is generated by tattling, which requires users to |
| 675 |
be annoyed enough to click the warning button -- a process that can |
| 676 |
be abused. In some reputation systems, "reputation mafias" |
| 677 |
consisting of large numbers of users routinely bully or extort |
| 678 |
victims by threatening collectively to give victims a negative |
| 679 |
reputation. |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
Reputation systems based on positive reputation, where users praise |
| 682 |
each other for being good, rather than tattling on each other for |
| 683 |
being bad, have some similar drawbacks. Collectives of spammers, or |
| 684 |
just one spammer who acquires a large number identities, could praise |
| 685 |
one another in order to create an artificial positive reputation. |
| 686 |
Users similarly have to overcome the inertia required to press the |
| 687 |
"praise" button. Unlike negative reputation systems, however, |
| 688 |
positive reputation is not circumvented when users acquire a new |
| 689 |
identity, since basing authorization decisions on positive reputation |
| 690 |
is essentially a form of white listing. |
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
So, while positive reputation systems are superior to negative |
| 693 |
reputation systems, they are far from perfect. Intriguingly, though, |
| 694 |
combining presence-based systems with reputation systems leads to an |
| 695 |
interesting fusion. The "buddy-list" concept of presence is, in |
| 696 |
effect, a white list - and one can infer that the users on one's |
| 697 |
buddy list are people whom you are "praising". This eliminates the |
| 698 |
problem of user inertia in the use of the "praise" button, and |
| 699 |
automates the initial establishment of reputation. |
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
And of course, your buddies in turn have buddies. Collectively, you |
| 702 |
and your buddies (and their buddies, and so on) constitute a social |
| 703 |
network of reputation. If there were a way to leverage this social |
| 704 |
network, it would eliminate the need for centralization of the |
| 705 |
reputation system. Your perception of a particular user's reputation |
| 706 |
might be dependent on your relationship to them in the social |
| 707 |
network: are they one buddy removed (strong reputation), four buddies |
| 708 |
removed (weaker reputation), three buddies removed but connected to |
| 709 |
you through several of your buddies, etc. This web of trust |
| 710 |
furthermore would have the very desirable property that circles of |
| 711 |
spammers adding one another to their own buddy lists would not affect |
| 712 |
your perception of their reputation unless their circle linked to |
| 713 |
your own social network. |
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
If a users machine is compromised and turned into a zombie, this |
| 716 |
allows SPAM to be sent and may impact their reputation in a negative |
| 717 |
way. Once their reputation decreases, it becomes extremely difficult |
| 718 |
to reestablish a positive reputation. |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. Address Obfuscation</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
Spammers build up their spam lists by gathering email addresses from |
| 732 |
Web sites and other public sources of information. One way to |
| 733 |
minimize spam is to make your address difficult or impossible to |
| 734 |
gather. Spam bots typically look for text in pages of the form |
| 735 |
"user@domain", and assume that anything of that form is an email |
| 736 |
address. To hide from such spam bots, many Web sites have recently |
| 737 |
begun placing email addresses in an obfuscated form, usable to humans |
| 738 |
but difficult for an automata to read as an email address. Examples |
| 739 |
include forms such as, "user at example dot com" or "j d r o s e n a |
| 740 |
t e x a m p l e d o t c o m". |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
These techniques are equally applicable to prevention of SIP spam, |
| 743 |
and are likely to be as equally effective or ineffective in its |
| 744 |
prevention. |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
It is worth mentioning that the source of addresses need not be a Web |
| 747 |
site - any publicly accessible service containing addresses will |
| 748 |
suffice. As a result, ENUM [<a href="#ref-9" title=""The E.164 to Uniform Resource Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) Application (ENUM)"">9</a>] has been cited as a potential gold |
| 749 |
mine for spammers. It would allow a spammer to collect SIP and other |
| 750 |
URIs by traversing the tree in e164.arpa and mining it for data. |
| 751 |
This problem is mitigated in part if only number prefixes, as opposed |
| 752 |
to actual numbers, appear in the DNS. Even in that case, however, it |
| 753 |
provides a technique for a spammer to learn which phone numbers are |
| 754 |
reachable through cheaper direct SIP connectivity. |
| 755 |
|
| 756 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.7" href="#section-3.7">3.7</a>. Limited-Use Addresses</span> |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
A related technique to address obfuscation is limited-use addresses. |
| 759 |
In this technique, a user has a large number of email addresses at |
| 760 |
their disposal, each of which has constraints on its applicability. |
| 761 |
A limited-use address can be time-bound, so that it expires after a |
| 762 |
fixed period. Or, a different email address can be given to each |
| 763 |
correspondent. When spam arrives from that correspondent, the |
| 764 |
limited-use address they were given is terminated. In another |
| 765 |
variation, the same limited-use address is given to multiple users |
| 766 |
that share some property; for example, all work colleagues, all |
| 767 |
coworkers from different companies, all retailers, and so on. Should |
| 768 |
spam begin arriving on one of the addresses, it is invalidated, |
| 769 |
preventing communications from anyone else that received the limited |
| 770 |
use address. |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
This technique is equally applicable to SIP. One of the drawbacks of |
| 773 |
the approach is that it can make it hard for people to reach you; if |
| 774 |
an email address you hand out to a friend becomes spammed, changing |
| 775 |
it requires you to inform your friend of the new address. SIP can |
| 776 |
help solve this problem in part, by making use of presence [<a href="#ref-6" title=""A Presence Event Package for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">6</a>]. |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
Instead of handing out your email address to your friends, you would |
| 786 |
hand out your presence URI. When a friend wants to send you an |
| 787 |
email, they subscribe to your presence (indeed, they are likely to be |
| 788 |
continuously subscribed from a buddy list application). The presence |
| 789 |
data can include an email address where you can be reached. This |
| 790 |
email address can be obfuscated and be of single use, different for |
| 791 |
each buddy who requests your presence. They can also be constantly |
| 792 |
changed, as these changes are pushed directly to your buddies. In a |
| 793 |
sense, the buddy list represents an automatically updated address |
| 794 |
book, and would therefore eliminate the problem. |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
Another approach is to give a different address to each and every |
| 797 |
correspondent, so that it is never necessary to tell a "good" user |
| 798 |
that an address needs to be changed. This is an extreme form of |
| 799 |
limited-use addresses, which can be called a single-use address. |
| 800 |
Mechanisms are available in SIP for the generation of [<a href="#ref-16" title=""Applying Loose Routing to Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) User Agents (UA)"">16</a>] an |
| 801 |
infinite supply of single use addresses. However, the hard part |
| 802 |
remains a useful mechanism for distribution and management of those |
| 803 |
addresses. |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.8" href="#section-3.8">3.8</a>. Turing Tests</span> |
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
In email, Turing tests are mechanisms whereby the sender of the |
| 808 |
message is given some kind of puzzle or challenge, which only a human |
| 809 |
can answer (since Turing tests rely on video or audio puzzles, they |
| 810 |
sometimes cannot be solved by individuals with handicaps). These |
| 811 |
tests are also known as captchas (Completely Automated Public Turing |
| 812 |
test to tell Computers and Humans Apart). If the puzzle is answered |
| 813 |
correctly, the sender is placed on the user's white list. These |
| 814 |
puzzles frequently take the form of recognizing a word or sequence of |
| 815 |
numbers in an image with a lot of background noise. The tests need |
| 816 |
to be designed such that automata cannot easily perform the image |
| 817 |
recognition needed to extract the word or number sequence, but a |
| 818 |
human user usually can. Designing such tests is not easy, since |
| 819 |
ongoing advances in image processing and artificial intelligence |
| 820 |
continually raise the bar. Consequently, the effectiveness of |
| 821 |
captchas are tied to whether spammers can come up with or obtain |
| 822 |
algorithms for automatically solving them. |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
Like many of the other email techniques, Turing tests are dependent |
| 825 |
on sender identity, which cannot easily be authenticated in email. |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
Turing tests can be used to prevent IM spam in much the same way they |
| 828 |
can be used to prevent email spam. |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
Turing tests can be applied to call spam as well, although not |
| 831 |
directly, because call spam does not usually involve the transfer of |
| 832 |
images and other content that can be used to verify that a human is |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
on the other end. If most of the calls are voice, the technique |
| 842 |
needs to be adapted to voice. This is not that difficult to do. |
| 843 |
Here is how it could be done. User A calls user B and is not on user |
| 844 |
B's white or black list. User A is transferred to an Interactive |
| 845 |
Voice Response (IVR) system. The IVR system tells the user that they |
| 846 |
are going to hear a series of numbers (say 5 of them), and that they |
| 847 |
have to enter those numbers on the keypad. The IVR system reads out |
| 848 |
the numbers while background music is playing, making it difficult |
| 849 |
for an automated speech recognition system to be applied to the |
| 850 |
media. The user then enters the numbers on their keypad. If they |
| 851 |
are entered correctly, the user is added to the white list. |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
This kind of voice-based Turing test is easily extended to a variety |
| 854 |
of media, such as video and text, and user interfaces by making use |
| 855 |
of the SIP application interaction framework [<a href="#ref-14" title=""A Framework for Application Interaction in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">14</a>]. This framework |
| 856 |
allows client devices to interact with applications in the network, |
| 857 |
where such interaction is done with stimulus signaling, including |
| 858 |
keypads (supported with the Keypad Markup Language [<a href="#ref-15" title=""A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Event Package for Key Press Stimulus (KPML)"">15</a>]), but also |
| 859 |
including Web browsers, voice recognition, and so on. The framework |
| 860 |
allows the application to determine the media capabilities of the |
| 861 |
device (or user, in cases where they are handicapped) and interact |
| 862 |
with them appropriately. |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
In the case of voice, the Turing test would need to be made to run in |
| 865 |
the language of the caller. This is possible in SIP, using the |
| 866 |
Accept-Language header field, though this is not widely used at the |
| 867 |
moment, and meant for languages of SIP message components, not the |
| 868 |
media streams. |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
The primary problem with the voice Turing test is the same one that |
| 871 |
email tests have: instead of having an automata process the test, a |
| 872 |
spammer can pay cheap workers to take the tests. Assuming cheap |
| 873 |
labor in a poor country can be obtained for about 60 cents per hour, |
| 874 |
and assuming a Turing test of a 30-second duration, this is about |
| 875 |
0.50 cents per test and thus 0.50 cents per message to send an IM |
| 876 |
spam. Lower labor rates would reduce this further; the number quoted |
| 877 |
here is based on real online bids in September of 2006 made for |
| 878 |
actual work of this type. |
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
As an alternative to paying cheap workers to take the tests, the |
| 881 |
tests can be taken by human users that are tricked into completing |
| 882 |
the tests in order to gain access to what they believe is a |
| 883 |
legitimate resource. This was done by a spambot that posted the |
| 884 |
tests on a pornography site, and required users to complete the tests |
| 885 |
in order to gain access to content. |
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
Due to these limitations, Turing tests may never completely solve the |
| 888 |
problem. |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.9" href="#section-3.9">3.9</a>. Computational Puzzles</span> |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
This technique is similar to Turing tests. When user A tries to |
| 900 |
communicate with user B, user B asks user A to perform a computation |
| 901 |
and pass the result back. This computation has to be something a |
| 902 |
human user cannot perform and something expensive enough to increase |
| 903 |
user A's cost to communicate. This cost increase has to be high |
| 904 |
enough to make it prohibitively expensive for spammers but |
| 905 |
inconsequential for legitimate users. |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
One of the problems with the technique is that there is wide |
| 908 |
variation in the computational power of the various clients that |
| 909 |
might legitimately communicate. The CPU speed on a low-end cell |
| 910 |
phone is around 50 MHz, while a high-end PC approaches 5 GHz. This |
| 911 |
represents almost two orders of magnitude difference. Thus, if the |
| 912 |
test is designed to be reasonable for a cell phone to perform, it is |
| 913 |
two orders of magnitude cheaper to perform for a spammer on a high- |
| 914 |
end machine. Recent research has focused on defining computational |
| 915 |
puzzles that challenge the CPU/memory bandwidth, as opposed to just |
| 916 |
the CPU [<a href="#ref-26" title=""Moderately Hard, Memory Bound Functions, NDSS 2003"">26</a>]. It seems that there is less variety in the CPU/memory |
| 917 |
bandwidth across devices, roughly a single order of magnitude. |
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
Recent work [<a href="#ref-28" title=""Proof of Work Proves not to Work, Third Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security"">28</a>] suggests that, due to the ability of spammers to use |
| 920 |
virus-infected machines (also known as zombies) to generate the spam, |
| 921 |
the amount of computational power available to the spammers is |
| 922 |
substantial, and it may be impossible to have them compute a puzzle |
| 923 |
that is sufficiently hard that will not also block normal emails. If |
| 924 |
combined with white listing, computational puzzles would only be |
| 925 |
utilized for new communications partners. Of course, if the partner |
| 926 |
on the white list is a zombie, spam will come from that source. The |
| 927 |
frequency of communications with new partners is arguably higher for |
| 928 |
email than for multimedia, and thus the computational puzzle |
| 929 |
techniques may be more effective for SIP than for email in dealing |
| 930 |
with the introduction problem. |
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
These techniques are an active area of research right now, and any |
| 933 |
results for email are likely to be usable for SIP. |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.10" href="#section-3.10">3.10</a>. Payments at Risk</span> |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
This approach has been proposed for email [<a href="#ref-27" title=""Bankable Postage for Network Services, Proceedings of the 8th Asian Computing Science Conference, Mumbai, India"">27</a>]. When user A sends |
| 938 |
email to user B, user A deposits a small amount of money (say, one |
| 939 |
dollar) into user B's account. If user B decides that the message is |
| 940 |
not spam, user B refunds this money back to user A. If the message |
| 941 |
is spam, user B keeps the money. This technique requires two |
| 942 |
transactions to complete: a transfer from A to B, and a transfer from |
| 943 |
B back to A. The first transfer has to occur before the message can |
| 944 |
be received in order to avoid reuse of "pending payments" across |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
several messages, which would eliminate the utility of the solution. |
| 954 |
The second one then needs to occur when the message is found not to |
| 955 |
be spam. |
| 956 |
|
| 957 |
This technique appears just as applicable to call spam and IM spam as |
| 958 |
it is to email spam. Like many of the other techniques, this |
| 959 |
exchange would only happen the first time you talk to people. Its |
| 960 |
proper operation therefore requires a good authenticated identity |
| 961 |
infrastructure. |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
This technique has the potential to make it arbitrarily expensive to |
| 964 |
send spam of any sort. However, it relies on cheap micro-payment |
| 965 |
techniques on the Internet. Traditional costs for Internet payments |
| 966 |
are around 25 cents per transaction, which would probably be |
| 967 |
prohibitive. However, recent providers have been willing to charge |
| 968 |
15% of the transaction for small transactions, as small as one cent. |
| 969 |
This cost would have to be shouldered by users of the system. The |
| 970 |
cost that would need to be shouldered per user is equal to the number |
| 971 |
of messages from unknown senders (that is, senders not on the white |
| 972 |
list) that are received. For a busy user, assume about 10 new |
| 973 |
senders per day. If the deposit is 5 cents, the transaction provider |
| 974 |
would take 0.75 cents and deliver 4.25 cents. If the sender is |
| 975 |
allowed, the recipient returns 4.25 cents, the provider takes 0.64 |
| 976 |
cents, and returns 3.6 cents. This costs the sender 0.65 cents on |
| 977 |
each transaction, if it was legitimate. If there are ten new |
| 978 |
recipients per day, that is US $1.95 per month, which is relatively |
| 979 |
inexpensive. |
| 980 |
|
| 981 |
Assuming a micro-payment infrastructure exists, another problem with |
| 982 |
payment-at-risk is that it loses effectiveness when there are strong |
| 983 |
inequities in the value of currency between sender and recipient. |
| 984 |
For example, a poor person in a Third World country might keep the |
| 985 |
money in each mail message, regardless of whether it is spam. |
| 986 |
Similarly, a poor person might not be willing to include money in an |
| 987 |
email, even if legitimate, for fear that the recipient might keep it. |
| 988 |
If the amount of money is lowered to help handle these problems, it |
| 989 |
might become sufficiently small that spammers can just afford to |
| 990 |
spend it. |
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.11" href="#section-3.11">3.11</a>. Legal Action</span> |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
In this solution, countries pass laws that prohibit spam. These laws |
| 995 |
could apply to IM or call spam just as easily as they could apply to |
| 996 |
email spam. There is a lot of debate about whether these laws would |
| 997 |
really be effective in preventing spam. |
| 998 |
|
| 999 |
As a recent example in the US, "do not call" lists seem to be |
| 1000 |
effective. However, due to the current cost of long-distance phone |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
calls, the telemarketing is coming from companies within the US. As |
| 1010 |
such, calls from such telemarketers can be traced. If a telemarketer |
| 1011 |
violates the "do not call" list, the trace allows legal action to be |
| 1012 |
taken against them. A similar "do not irritate" list for VoIP or for |
| 1013 |
email would be less likely to work because the spam is likely to come |
| 1014 |
from international sources. This problem could be obviated if there |
| 1015 |
was a strong way to identify the sender's legal entity, and then |
| 1016 |
determine whether it was in a jurisdiction where it was practical to |
| 1017 |
take legal action against them. If the spammer is not in such a |
| 1018 |
jurisdiction, the SIP spam could be rejected. |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
There are also schemes that cause laws other than anti-spam laws to |
| 1021 |
be broken if spam is sent. This does not inherently reduce SPAM, but |
| 1022 |
it allows more legal options to be brought to bear against the |
| 1023 |
spammer. For example, Habeas <<a href="http://www.habeas.com">http://www.habeas.com</a>> inserts |
| 1024 |
material in the header that, if it was inserted by a spammer without |
| 1025 |
an appropriate license, would allegedly causes the spammer to violate |
| 1026 |
US copyright and trademark laws, possibly reciprocal laws, and |
| 1027 |
similar laws in many countries. |
| 1028 |
|
| 1029 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.12" href="#section-3.12">3.12</a>. Circles of Trust</span> |
| 1030 |
|
| 1031 |
In this model, a group of domains (e.g., a set of enterprises) all |
| 1032 |
get together. They agree to exchange SIP calls amongst each other, |
| 1033 |
and they also agree to introduce a fine should any one of them be |
| 1034 |
caught spamming. Each company would then enact measures to terminate |
| 1035 |
employees who spam from their accounts. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
This technique relies on secure inter-domain authentication - that |
| 1038 |
is, domain B can know that messages are received from domain A. In |
| 1039 |
SIP, this is readily provided by usage of the mutually authenticated |
| 1040 |
Transport Level Security (TLS)[<a href="#ref-22" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1"">22</a>] between providers or SIP Identity |
| 1041 |
[<a href="#ref-17" title=""Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">17</a>]. |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
This kind of technique works well for small domains or small sets of |
| 1044 |
providers, where these policies can be easily enforced. However, it |
| 1045 |
is unclear how well it scales up. Could a very large domain truly |
| 1046 |
prevent its users from spamming? At what point would the network be |
| 1047 |
large enough that it would be worthwhile to send spam and just pay |
| 1048 |
the fine? How would the pricing be structured to allow both small |
| 1049 |
and large domains alike to participate? |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.13" href="#section-3.13">3.13</a>. Centralized SIP Providers</span> |
| 1052 |
|
| 1053 |
This technique is a variation on the circles of trust described in |
| 1054 |
<a href="#section-3.12">Section 3.12</a>. A small number of providers get established as "inter- |
| 1055 |
domain SIP providers". These providers act as a SIP-equivalent to |
| 1056 |
the interexchange carriers in the PSTN. Every enterprise, consumer |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
SIP provider, or other SIP network (call these the local SIP |
| 1066 |
providers) connects to one of these inter-domain providers. The |
| 1067 |
local SIP providers only accept SIP messages from their chosen inter- |
| 1068 |
domain provider. The inter-domain provider charges the local |
| 1069 |
provider, per SIP message, for the delivery of SIP messages to other |
| 1070 |
local providers. The local provider can choose to pass on this cost |
| 1071 |
to its own customers if it so chooses. |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
The inter-domain SIP providers then form bi-lateral agreements with |
| 1074 |
each other, exchanging SIP messages according to strict contracts. |
| 1075 |
These contracts require that each of the inter-domain providers be |
| 1076 |
responsible for charging a minimum per-message fee to their own |
| 1077 |
customers. Extensive auditing procedures can be put into place to |
| 1078 |
verify this. Besides such contracts, there may or may not be a flow |
| 1079 |
of funds between the inter-domain providers. |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
The result of such a system is that a fixed cost can be associated |
| 1082 |
with sending a SIP message, and that this cost does not require |
| 1083 |
micro-payments to be exchanged between local providers, as it does in |
| 1084 |
<a href="#section-3.10">Section 3.10</a>. Since all of the relationships are pre-established and |
| 1085 |
negotiated, cheaper techniques for monetary transactions (such as |
| 1086 |
monthly post-paid transactions) can be used. |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
This technique can be made to work in SIP, whereas it cannot in |
| 1089 |
email, because inter-domain SIP connectivity has not yet been broadly |
| 1090 |
established. In email, there already exists a no-cost form of inter- |
| 1091 |
domain connectivity that cannot be eliminated without destroying the |
| 1092 |
utility of email. If, however, SIP inter-domain communications get |
| 1093 |
established from the start using this structure, there is a path to |
| 1094 |
deployment. |
| 1095 |
|
| 1096 |
This structure is more or less the same as the one in place for the |
| 1097 |
PSTN today, and since there is relatively little spam on the PSTN |
| 1098 |
(compared to email!), there is some proof that this kind of |
| 1099 |
arrangement can work. However, centralized architectures as these |
| 1100 |
are deliberately eschewed because they put back into SIP much of the |
| 1101 |
complexity and monopolistic structures that the protocol aims to |
| 1102 |
eliminate. |
| 1103 |
|
| 1104 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Authenticated Identity in Email</span> |
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
Though not a form of anti-spam in and of itself, authenticated or |
| 1107 |
verifiable identities are a key part of making other anti-spam |
| 1108 |
mechanisms work. Many of the techniques described above are most |
| 1109 |
effective when combined with a white or black list, which itself |
| 1110 |
requires a strong form of identity. |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
In email, two types of authenticated identity have been developed - |
| 1122 |
sender checks and signature-based solutions. |
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Sender Checks</span> |
| 1125 |
|
| 1126 |
In email, DNS resource records have been defined that will allow a |
| 1127 |
domain that receives a message to verify that the sender is a valid |
| 1128 |
Message Transfer Agent (MTA) for the sending domain [<a href="#ref-18" title=""SMTP Service Extension for Indicating the Responsible Submitter of an E-Mail Message"">18</a>] [<a href="#ref-19" title=""Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail"">19</a>] [<a href="#ref-20" title=""Purported Responsible Address in E-Mail Messages"">20</a>] |
| 1129 |
[<a href="#ref-21" title=""Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1"">21</a>]. They don't prevent spam by themselves, but may help in |
| 1130 |
preventing spoofed emails. As has been mentioned several times, a |
| 1131 |
form of strong authenticated identity is key in making many other |
| 1132 |
anti-spam techniques work. |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
Are these techniques useful for SIP? They can be used for SIP but |
| 1135 |
are not necessary. In SIP, TLS with mutual authentication can be |
| 1136 |
used inter-domain. A provider receiving a message can then reject |
| 1137 |
any message coming from a domain that does not match the asserted |
| 1138 |
identity of the sender of the message. Such a policy only works in |
| 1139 |
the "trapezoid" model of SIP, whereby there are only two domains in |
| 1140 |
any call - the sending domain, which is where the originator resides, |
| 1141 |
and the receiving domain. These techniques are discussed in <a href="./rfc3261#section-26.3.2.2">Section</a> |
| 1142 |
<a href="./rfc3261#section-26.3.2.2">26.3.2.2 of RFC 3261</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">2</a>]. In forwarding situations, the assumption |
| 1143 |
no longer holds and these techniques no longer work. However, the |
| 1144 |
authenticated identity mechanism for SIP, discussed in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>, |
| 1145 |
does work in more complex network configurations and provides fairly |
| 1146 |
strong assertion of identity. |
| 1147 |
|
| 1148 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Signature-Based Techniques</span> |
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 |
Domain Keys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures [<a href="#ref-23" title=""DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures"">23</a>] (and several non- |
| 1151 |
standard techniques that preceded it) provide strong identity |
| 1152 |
assertions by allowing the sending domain to sign an email, and then |
| 1153 |
providing mechanisms by which the receiving MTA or Mail User Agent |
| 1154 |
(MUA) can validate the signature. |
| 1155 |
|
| 1156 |
Unfortunately, when used with blacklists, this kind of authenticated |
| 1157 |
identity is only as useful as the fraction of the emails that utilize |
| 1158 |
it. This is partly true for white lists as well; if any |
| 1159 |
unauthenticated email is accepted for an address on a white list, a |
| 1160 |
spammer can spoof that address. However, a white list can be |
| 1161 |
effective with limited deployment of DKIM if all the people on the |
| 1162 |
white list are those whose domains are utilizing the mechanism, and |
| 1163 |
the users on that white list aren't zombies. |
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
This kind of identity mechanism is also applicable to SIP, and is in |
| 1166 |
fact, exactly what is defined by SIP's authenticated identity |
| 1167 |
mechanism [<a href="#ref-17" title=""Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">17</a>]. |
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
Other signature-based approaches for email include S/MIME[24] and |
| 1178 |
OpenPGP[25]. |
| 1179 |
|
| 1180 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Authenticated Identity in SIP</span> |
| 1181 |
|
| 1182 |
One of the key parts of many of the solutions described above is the |
| 1183 |
ability to securely identify the sender of a SIP message. SIP |
| 1184 |
provides a secure solution for this problem, called SIP Identity |
| 1185 |
[<a href="#ref-17" title=""Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">17</a>], and it is important to discuss it here. |
| 1186 |
|
| 1187 |
The solution starts by having each domain authenticate its own users. |
| 1188 |
SIP provides HTTP digest authentication as part of the core SIP |
| 1189 |
specification, and all clients and servers are required to support |
| 1190 |
it. Indeed, digest is widely deployed for SIP. However, digest |
| 1191 |
alone has many known vulnerabilities, most notably offline dictionary |
| 1192 |
attacks. These vulnerabilities are all resolved by having each |
| 1193 |
client maintain a persistent TLS connection to the server. The |
| 1194 |
client verifies the server identity using TLS, and then authenticates |
| 1195 |
itself to the server using a digest exchange over TLS. This |
| 1196 |
technique, which is also documented in <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>, is very secure but |
| 1197 |
not widely deployed yet. In the long term, this approach will be |
| 1198 |
necessary for the security properties needed to prevent SIP spam. |
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 |
Once a domain has authenticated the identity of a user, when it |
| 1201 |
relays a message from that user to another domain, the sending domain |
| 1202 |
can assert the identity of the sender, and include a signature to |
| 1203 |
validate that assertion. This is done using the SIP identity |
| 1204 |
mechanism [<a href="#ref-17" title=""Enhancements for Authenticated Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)"">17</a>]. |
| 1205 |
|
| 1206 |
A weaker form of identity assertion is possible using the P-Asserted- |
| 1207 |
Identity header field [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Private Extensions to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity within Trusted Networks"">5</a>], but this technique requires mutual trust |
| 1208 |
among all domains. Unfortunately, this becomes exponentially harder |
| 1209 |
to provide as the number of interconnected domains grows. As that |
| 1210 |
happens, the value of the identity assertion becomes equal to the |
| 1211 |
trustworthiness of the least trustworthy domain. Since spam is a |
| 1212 |
consequence of the receiving domain not being able to trust the |
| 1213 |
sending domains to disallow the hosts in the sending to send spam, |
| 1214 |
the P-Asserted-Identity technique becomes ineffective at exactly the |
| 1215 |
same levels of interconnectedness that introduce spam. |
| 1216 |
|
| 1217 |
Consider the following example to help illustrate this fact. A |
| 1218 |
malicious domain -- let us call them spam.example.com, would like to |
| 1219 |
send SIP INVITE requests with false P-Asserted-Identity, indicating |
| 1220 |
users outside of its own domain. spam.example.com finds a regional |
| 1221 |
SIP provider in a small country who, due to its small size and |
| 1222 |
disinterest in spam, accepts any P-Asserted-Identity from its |
| 1223 |
customers without verification. This provider, in turn, connects to |
| 1224 |
a larger, interconnect provider. They do ask each of their customers |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
to verify P-Asserted-Identity but have no easy way of enforcing it. |
| 1234 |
This provider, in turn, connects to everyone else. As a consequence, |
| 1235 |
the spam.example.com domain is able to inject calls with a spoofed |
| 1236 |
caller ID. This request can be directed to any recipient reachable |
| 1237 |
through the network (presumably everyone due to the large size of the |
| 1238 |
root provider). There is no way for a recipient to know that this |
| 1239 |
particular P-Asserted-Identity came from this bad spam.example.com |
| 1240 |
domain. As the example shows, even though the central provider's |
| 1241 |
policy is good, the overall effectiveness of P-Asserted-Identity is |
| 1242 |
still only as good as the policies of the weakest link in the chain. |
| 1243 |
|
| 1244 |
SIP also defines the usage of TLS between domains, using mutual |
| 1245 |
authentication, as part of the base specification. This technique |
| 1246 |
provides a way for one domain to securely determine that it is |
| 1247 |
talking to a server that is a valid representative of another domain. |
| 1248 |
|
| 1249 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Framework for Anti-Spam in SIP</span> |
| 1250 |
|
| 1251 |
Unfortunately, there is no magic bullet for preventing SIP spam, just |
| 1252 |
as there is none for email spam. However, the combination of several |
| 1253 |
techniques can provide a framework for dealing with spam in SIP. |
| 1254 |
This section provides recommendations for network designers in order |
| 1255 |
to help mitigate the risk of spam. |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
There are four core recommendations that can be made: |
| 1258 |
|
| 1259 |
Strong Identity: Firstly, in almost all of the solutions discussed |
| 1260 |
above, there is a dependency on the ability to authenticate the |
| 1261 |
sender of a SIP message inter-domain. Consent, reputation |
| 1262 |
systems, computational puzzles, and payments at risk, amongst |
| 1263 |
others, all work best when applied only to new requests, and |
| 1264 |
successful completion of an introduction results in the placement |
| 1265 |
of a user on a white list. However, usage of white lists depends |
| 1266 |
on strong identity assertions. Consequently, any network that |
| 1267 |
interconnects with others should make use of strong SIP identity |
| 1268 |
as described in <a href="./rfc4474">RFC 4474</a>. P-Asserted-Identity is not strong |
| 1269 |
enough. |
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
White Lists: Secondly, with a strong identity system in place, |
| 1272 |
networks are recommended to make use of white lists. These are |
| 1273 |
ideally built off existing buddy lists, if present. If not, |
| 1274 |
separate white lists can be managed for spam. Placement on these |
| 1275 |
lists can be manual or based on the successful completion of one |
| 1276 |
or more introduction mechanisms. |
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
Solve the Introduction Problem: This in turn leads to the final |
| 1279 |
recommendation to be made. Network designers should make use of |
| 1280 |
one or more mechanisms meant to solve the introduction problem. |
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
Indeed, it is possible to use more than one and combine the |
| 1290 |
results through some kind of weight. A user that successfully |
| 1291 |
completes the introduction mechanism can be automatically added to |
| 1292 |
the white list. Of course, that can only be done usefully if |
| 1293 |
their identity is verified by SIP Identity. The set of mechanisms |
| 1294 |
for solving the introduction problem, as described in this |
| 1295 |
document, are based on some (but not all) of the techniques known |
| 1296 |
and used at the time of writing. Providers of SIP services should |
| 1297 |
keep tabs on solutions in email as they evolve, and utilize the |
| 1298 |
best of what those techniques have to offer. |
| 1299 |
|
| 1300 |
Don't Wait Until It's Too Late: But perhaps most importantly, |
| 1301 |
providers should not ignore the spam problem until it happens! As |
| 1302 |
soon as a provider inter-connects with other providers, or allows |
| 1303 |
SIP messages from the open Internet, that provider must consider |
| 1304 |
how they will deal with spam. |
| 1305 |
|
| 1306 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Additional Work</span> |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
Though the above framework serves as a good foundation on which to |
| 1309 |
deal with spam in SIP, there are gaps, some of which can be addressed |
| 1310 |
by additional work that has yet to be undertaken. |
| 1311 |
|
| 1312 |
One of the difficulties with the strong identity techniques is that a |
| 1313 |
receiver of a SIP request without an authenticated identity cannot |
| 1314 |
know whether the request lacked such an identity because the |
| 1315 |
originating domain didn't support it, or because a man-in-the-middle |
| 1316 |
removed it. As a result, transition mechanisms should be put in |
| 1317 |
place to allow these to be differentiated. Without it, the value of |
| 1318 |
the identity mechanism is much reduced. |
| 1319 |
|
| 1320 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 1321 |
|
| 1322 |
This document is entirely devoted to issues relating to spam in SIP |
| 1323 |
and references a variety of security mechanisms in support of that |
| 1324 |
goal. |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
The authors would like to thank Rohan Mahy for providing information |
| 1329 |
on Habeas, Baruch Sterman for providing costs on VoIP termination |
| 1330 |
services, and Gonzalo Camarillo and Vijay Gurbani for their reviews. |
| 1331 |
Useful comments and feedback were provided by Nils Ohlmeir, Tony |
| 1332 |
Finch, Randy Gellens, Lisa Dusseault, Sam Hartman, Chris Newman, Tim |
| 1333 |
Polk, Donald Eastlake, and Yakov Shafranovich. Jon Peterson wrote |
| 1334 |
some of the text in this document and has contributed to the work as |
| 1335 |
it has moved along. |
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1346 |
|
| 1347 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Campbell, B., Mahy, R., and C. Jennings, "The Message Session |
| 1348 |
Relay Protocol (MSRP)", <a href="./rfc4975">RFC 4975</a>, September 2007. |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., |
| 1351 |
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: |
| 1352 |
Session Initiation Protocol", <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>, June 2002. |
| 1353 |
|
| 1354 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Campbell, B., Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Huitema, C., and |
| 1355 |
D. Gurle, "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) Extension for |
| 1356 |
Instant Messaging", <a href="./rfc3428">RFC 3428</a>, December 2002. |
| 1357 |
|
| 1358 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Roach, A., "Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)-Specific Event |
| 1359 |
Notification", <a href="./rfc3265">RFC 3265</a>, June 2002. |
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Jennings, C., Peterson, J., and M. Watson, "Private Extensions |
| 1362 |
to the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) for Asserted Identity |
| 1363 |
within Trusted Networks", <a href="./rfc3325">RFC 3325</a>, November 2002. |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Rosenberg, J., "A Presence Event Package for the Session |
| 1366 |
Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc3856">RFC 3856</a>, August 2004. |
| 1367 |
|
| 1368 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Rosenberg, J., "A Watcher Information Event Template-Package |
| 1369 |
for the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", <a href="./rfc3857">RFC 3857</a>, |
| 1370 |
August 2004. |
| 1371 |
|
| 1372 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Rosenberg, J., "An Extensible Markup Language (XML) Based |
| 1373 |
Format for Watcher Information", <a href="./rfc3858">RFC 3858</a>, August 2004. |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Faltstrom, P. and M. Mealling, "The E.164 to Uniform Resource |
| 1376 |
Identifiers (URI) Dynamic Delegation Discovery System (DDDS) |
| 1377 |
Application (ENUM)", <a href="./rfc3761">RFC 3761</a>, April 2004. |
| 1378 |
|
| 1379 |
[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Rosenberg, J., "The Extensible Markup Language (XML) |
| 1380 |
Configuration Access Protocol (XCAP)", <a href="./rfc4825">RFC 4825</a>, May 2007. |
| 1381 |
|
| 1382 |
[<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Rosenberg, J., "Presence Authorization Rules", <a href="./rfc5025">RFC 5025</a>, |
| 1383 |
October 2007. |
| 1384 |
|
| 1385 |
[<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Rosenberg, J., "A Framework for Consent-Based Communications in |
| 1386 |
the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", Work in Progress, |
| 1387 |
October 2007. |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
[<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Camarillo, G., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22A+Document+Format+for+Requesting+Consent%22'>"A Document Format for Requesting Consent"</a>, Work |
| 1390 |
in Progress, October 2007. |
| 1391 |
|
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Rosenberg, J., "A Framework for Application Interaction in the |
| 1402 |
Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", Work in Progress, |
| 1403 |
October 2005. |
| 1404 |
|
| 1405 |
[<a id="ref-15">15</a>] Burger, E. and M. Dolly, "A Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) |
| 1406 |
Event Package for Key Press Stimulus (KPML)", <a href="./rfc4730">RFC 4730</a>, |
| 1407 |
November 2006. |
| 1408 |
|
| 1409 |
[<a id="ref-16">16</a>] Rosenberg, J., "Applying Loose Routing to Session Initiation |
| 1410 |
Protocol (SIP) User Agents (UA)", Work in Progress, June 2007. |
| 1411 |
|
| 1412 |
[<a id="ref-17">17</a>] Peterson, J. and C. Jennings, "Enhancements for Authenticated |
| 1413 |
Identity Management in the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)", |
| 1414 |
<a href="./rfc4474">RFC 4474</a>, August 2006. |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
[<a id="ref-18">18</a>] Allman, E. and H. Katz, "SMTP Service Extension for Indicating |
| 1417 |
the Responsible Submitter of an E-Mail Message", <a href="./rfc4405">RFC 4405</a>, |
| 1418 |
April 2006. |
| 1419 |
|
| 1420 |
[<a id="ref-19">19</a>] Lyon, J. and M. Wong, "Sender ID: Authenticating E-Mail", |
| 1421 |
<a href="./rfc4406">RFC 4406</a>, April 2006. |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
[<a id="ref-20">20</a>] Lyon, J., "Purported Responsible Address in E-Mail Messages", |
| 1424 |
<a href="./rfc4407">RFC 4407</a>, April 2006. |
| 1425 |
|
| 1426 |
[<a id="ref-21">21</a>] Wong, M. and W. Schlitt, "Sender Policy Framework (SPF) for |
| 1427 |
Authorizing Use of Domains in E-Mail, Version 1", <a href="./rfc4408">RFC 4408</a>, |
| 1428 |
April 2006. |
| 1429 |
|
| 1430 |
[<a id="ref-22">22</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 1431 |
Protocol Version 1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006. |
| 1432 |
|
| 1433 |
[<a id="ref-23">23</a>] Allman, E., Callas, J., Delany, M., Libbey, M., Fenton, J., and |
| 1434 |
M. Thomas, "DomainKeys Identified Mail (DKIM) Signatures", |
| 1435 |
<a href="./rfc4871">RFC 4871</a>, May 2007. |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
[<a id="ref-24">24</a>] Ramsdell, B., "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions |
| 1438 |
(S/MIME) Version 3.1 Message Specification", <a href="./rfc3851">RFC 3851</a>, |
| 1439 |
July 2004. |
| 1440 |
|
| 1441 |
[<a id="ref-25">25</a>] Elkins, M., Del Torto, D., Levien, R., and T. Roessler, "MIME |
| 1442 |
Security with OpenPGP", <a href="./rfc3156">RFC 3156</a>, August 2001. |
| 1443 |
|
| 1444 |
[<a id="ref-26">26</a>] Abadi, M., Burrows, M., Manasse, M., and T. Wobber, "Moderately |
| 1445 |
Hard, Memory Bound Functions, NDSS 2003", February 2003. |
| 1446 |
|
| 1447 |
|
| 1448 |
|
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
[<a id="ref-27">27</a>] Abadi, M., Burrows, M., Birrell, A., Dabek, F., and T. Wobber, |
| 1458 |
"Bankable Postage for Network Services, Proceedings of the 8th |
| 1459 |
Asian Computing Science Conference, Mumbai, India", |
| 1460 |
December 2003. |
| 1461 |
|
| 1462 |
[<a id="ref-28">28</a>] Clayton, R. and B. Laurie, "Proof of Work Proves not to Work, |
| 1463 |
Third Annual Workshop on Economics and Information Security", |
| 1464 |
May 2004. |
| 1465 |
|
| 1466 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1467 |
|
| 1468 |
Jonathan Rosenberg |
| 1469 |
Cisco |
| 1470 |
Edison, NJ |
| 1471 |
US |
| 1472 |
|
| 1473 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1474 |
URI: <a href="http://www.jdrosen.net">http://www.jdrosen.net</a> |
| 1475 |
|
| 1476 |
|
| 1477 |
Cullen Jennings |
| 1478 |
Cisco |
| 1479 |
170 West Tasman Dr. |
| 1480 |
San Jose, CA 95134 |
| 1481 |
US |
| 1482 |
|
| 1483 |
Phone: +1 408 421-9990 |
| 1484 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1485 |
|
| 1486 |
|
| 1487 |
|
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
|
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
|
| 1492 |
|
| 1493 |
|
| 1494 |
|
| 1495 |
|
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 |
|
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
|
| 1500 |
|
| 1501 |
|
| 1502 |
|
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5039">RFC 5039</a> SIP Spam January 2008</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 1514 |
|
| 1515 |
Copyright (C) The IETF Trust (2008). |
| 1516 |
|
| 1517 |
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions |
| 1518 |
contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors |
| 1519 |
retain all their rights. |
| 1520 |
|
| 1521 |
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an |
| 1522 |
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS |
| 1523 |
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY, THE IETF TRUST AND |
| 1524 |
THE INTERNET ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS |
| 1525 |
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF |
| 1526 |
THE INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED |
| 1527 |
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 1528 |
|
| 1529 |
Intellectual Property |
| 1530 |
|
| 1531 |
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any |
| 1532 |
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to |
| 1533 |
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in |
| 1534 |
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights |
| 1535 |
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has |
| 1536 |
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information |
| 1537 |
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be |
| 1538 |
found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>. |
| 1539 |
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| 1540 |
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any |
| 1541 |
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an |
| 1542 |
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of |
| 1543 |
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this |
| 1544 |
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at |
| 1545 |
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>. |
| 1546 |
|
| 1547 |
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any |
| 1548 |
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary |
| 1549 |
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement |
| 1550 |
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at |
| 1551 |
[email protected]. |
| 1552 |
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| 1553 |
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| 1554 |
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| 1555 |
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| 1556 |
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| 1557 |
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| 1558 |
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| 1560 |
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Rosenberg & Jennings Informational [Page 28] |
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</pre> |