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<pre>Independent Submission A. Keromytis |
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Request for Comments: 6042 Columbia University |
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Category: Informational October 2010 |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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This document specifies the use of the KeyNote trust-management |
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system as an authorization extension in the Transport Layer Security |
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(TLS) Handshake Protocol, according to guidelines in <a href="./rfc5878">RFC 5878</a>. |
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Extensions carried in the client and server hello messages confirm |
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that both parties support the desired authorization data types. |
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Then, if supported by both the client and the server, KeyNote |
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credentials are exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other |
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RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at |
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its discretion and makes no statement about its value for |
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implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by |
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the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6042">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6042</a>. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. |
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<span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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This document describes the identifiers necessary to exchange KeyNote |
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[<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title=""The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2"">KEYNOTE</a>] credential assertions inside a TLS [<a href="#ref-TLS1.0" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"">TLS1.0</a>] [<a href="#ref-TLS1.1" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1"">TLS1.1</a>] |
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[<a href="#ref-TLS1.2" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">TLS1.2</a>] exchange. Such credential assertions can authorize the |
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client and/or the server to perform certain actions. In most usage |
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scenarios, the KeyNote credential assertions will be signed by a |
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cryptographic public key [<a href="./rfc2792" title=""DSA and RSA Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust Management System"">RFC2792</a>]. By using the X.509 key and |
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signature encoding [<a href="#ref-X509KEY" title=""X.509 Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust Management System"">X509KEY</a>], it is possible to add KeyNote-based |
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authorization and policy compliance support to the existing, |
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unmodified X.509 authentication exchange in TLS. |
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A list of KeyNote credentials (e.g., forming a delegation chain) may |
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be sent as part of the same payload. Alternatively, a URL [<a href="./rfc3986" title=""Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax"">RFC3986</a>] |
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pointing to the location of such a list of KeyNote credentials may be |
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provided. |
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In most scenarios, at least one of these credentials will be issued |
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to the public key of the transmitter of the credentials, i.e., said |
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public key will appear in the "Licensees" field of at least one |
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KeyNote credential assertion. The same public key will generally be |
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used by the transmitter of the same credentials to authenticate as |
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part of the TLS exchange. The authentication material (e.g., |
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cryptographic public key) that was used by the transmitter to |
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authenticate in the TLS exchange will be provided to the KeyNote |
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evaluation engine as an "Action Authorizer". |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. KeyNote Credential Assertion Lists</span> |
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|
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The KeyNote Assertion List type definition in the TLS Authorization |
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Data Formats registry is: |
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|
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keynote_assertion_list(64) |
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When the keynote_assertion_list value is present, the authorization |
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data is a list of KeyNote credential assertions that conforms to the |
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profile in <a href="./rfc2704">RFC 2704</a> [<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title=""The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2"">KEYNOTE</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span> |
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A KeyNote assertion list is transmitted inside an |
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AuthorizationDataEntry structure as an opaque sequence of |
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1 - 2^16-1 bytes: |
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opaque KeyNoteAssertionList<1..2^16-1>; |
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When KeyNoteAssertionList is used, the field contains an ASCII- |
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encoded list of signed KeyNote assertions, as described in <a href="./rfc2704">RFC 2704</a> |
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[<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title=""The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2"">KEYNOTE</a>]. The assertions are separated by two "\n" (newline) |
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characters. A KeyNote assertion is a structure similar to a public |
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key certificate; the main difference is that instead of a binding |
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between a name and a public key, KeyNote assertions bind public keys |
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to authorization rules that are evaluated by the peer when the sender |
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later issues specific requests. |
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When making an authorization decision based on a list of KeyNote |
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assertions, proper linkage between the KeyNote assertions and the |
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public key certificate that is transferred in the TLS Certificate |
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message is needed. Receivers of a KeyNote assertion list should |
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initialize the ACTION_AUTHORIZER variable to be the sender's public |
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key, which was used to authenticate the TLS exchange. If a different |
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authentication mechanism is used, it is the responsibility of the |
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credential issuer to issue the appropriate credentials. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. KeyNote Credential Assertion List URL</span> |
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The KeyNote Assertion List URL type definition in the TLS |
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Authorization Data Formats registry is: |
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keynote_assertion_list_url(65) |
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A KeyNote Assertion List URL is transmitted inside an |
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AuthorizationDataEntry structure as a URLandHash structure [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions"">AUTHZ</a>]. |
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When the keynote_assertion_list_url value is present, the |
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authorization data is a list of KeyNote assertions as described in |
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<a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>; however, the KeyNote assertion list is fetched with the |
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supplied URL. A one-way hash value is provided to ensure that the |
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intended KeyNote credential assertion is obtained. |
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Implementations that support keynote_assertion_list_url MUST support |
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URLs that employ the HTTP scheme [<a href="#ref-HTTP" title=""Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1"">HTTP</a>]. These implementations MUST |
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confirm that the hash value computed on the fetched authorization |
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matches the one received in the handshake. Mismatch of the hash |
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values SHOULD be treated as though the authorization was not |
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provided, which will result in a bad_certificate alert [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions"">AUTHZ</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span> |
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Other schemes may also be supported. When dereferencing these URLs, |
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circular dependencies MUST be avoided. Avoiding TLS when |
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dereferencing these URLs is one way to avoid circular dependencies. |
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Therefore, clients using the HTTP scheme MUST NOT use these TLS |
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extensions if the Upgrade mechanism in HTTP [<a href="#ref-UPGRADE" title=""Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1"">UPGRADE</a>] is used. For |
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other schemes, similar care must be taken to avoid using these TLS |
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extensions. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
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With this document, IANA has registered two new entries in the TLS |
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Authorization Data Formats registry: keynote_assertion_list(64) and |
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keynote_assertion_list_url(65). This registry is defined in [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions"">AUTHZ</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
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There are no security considerations beyond those discussed in |
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[<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title=""The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2"">KEYNOTE</a>], [<a href="./rfc2792" title=""DSA and RSA Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust Management System"">RFC2792</a>], and [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions"">AUTHZ</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
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|
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[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
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Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
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[<a id="ref-TLS1.0">TLS1.0</a>] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", |
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<a href="./rfc2246">RFC 2246</a>, January 1999. |
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[<a id="ref-TLS1.1">TLS1.1</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
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(TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006. |
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[<a id="ref-TLS1.2">TLS1.2</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
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(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008. |
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[<a id="ref-HTTP">HTTP</a>] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H., |
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Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext |
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Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", <a href="./rfc2616">RFC 2616</a>, June 1999. |
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[<a id="ref-UPGRADE">UPGRADE</a>] Khare, R. and S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within |
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HTTP/1.1", <a href="./rfc2817">RFC 2817</a>, May 2000. |
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[<a id="ref-KEYNOTE">KEYNOTE</a>] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., Ioannidis, J., and A. |
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Keromytis, "The KeyNote Trust-Management System |
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Version 2", <a href="./rfc2704">RFC 2704</a>, September 1999. |
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[<a id="ref-AUTHZ">AUTHZ</a>] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
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Authorization Extensions", <a href="./rfc5878">RFC 5878</a>, May 2010. |
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<span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
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[<a id="ref-RFC2792">RFC2792</a>] Blaze, M., Ioannidis, J., and A. Keromytis, "DSA and RSA |
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Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust |
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Management System", <a href="./rfc2792">RFC 2792</a>, March 2000. |
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[<a id="ref-X509KEY">X509KEY</a>] Keromytis, A., "X.509 Key and Signature Encoding for the |
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KeyNote Trust Management System", <a href="./rfc5708">RFC 5708</a>, January 2010. |
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[<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform |
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Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66, |
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<a href="./rfc3986">RFC 3986</a>, January 2005. |
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<span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Updated TLS Authorization Data Structures</span> |
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For clarity, this Appendix shows an updated version of the relevant |
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data structures from Section 3.3 in [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title=""Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions"">AUTHZ</a>] with the new entries |
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described in this document. The added elements are denoted with two |
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asterisks ("**") at the end of the respective lines. |
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struct { |
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AuthorizationDataEntry authz_data_list<1..2^16-1>; |
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} AuthorizationData; |
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struct { |
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AuthzDataFormat authz_format; |
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select (AuthzDataFormat) { |
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case x509_attr_cert: X509AttrCert; |
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case saml_assertion: SAMLAssertion; |
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case x509_attr_cert_url: URLandHash; |
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case saml_assertion_url: URLandHash; |
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case keynote_assertion_list: KeyNoteAssertionList; ** |
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case keynote_assertion_list_url: URLandHash; ** |
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} |
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} AuthorizationDataEntry; |
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enum { |
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x509_attr_cert(0), saml_assertion(1), x509_attr_cert_url(2), |
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saml_assertion_url(3), |
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keynote_assertion_list(64), keynote_assertion_list_url(65), ** |
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(255) |
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} AuthzDataFormat; |
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opaque X509AttrCert<1..2^16-1>; |
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opaque SAMLAssertion<1..2^16-1>; |
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opaque KeyNoteAssertionList<1..2^16-1>; ** |
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struct { |
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opaque url<1..2^16-1>; |
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HashAlgorithm hash_alg; |
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select (hash_alg) { |
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case md5: MD5Hash; |
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case sha1: SHA1Hash; |
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case sha224: SHA224Hash; |
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case sha256: SHA256Hash; |
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case sha384: SHA384Hash; |
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case sha512: SHA512Hash; |
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} hash; |
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} URLandHash; |
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<span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span> |
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enum { |
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none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5), |
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sha512(6), (255) |
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} HashAlgorithm; |
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opaque MD5Hash[16]; |
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opaque SHA1Hash[20]; |
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opaque SHA224Hash[28]; |
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opaque SHA256Hash[32]; |
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opaque SHA384Hash[48]; |
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opaque SHA512Hash[64]; |
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Author's Address |
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Angelos D. Keromytis |
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Department of Computer Science |
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Columbia University |
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Mail Code 0401 |
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1214 Amsterdam Avenue |
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New York, NY 10027 |
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USA |
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EMail: [email protected] |
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Keromytis Informational [Page 7] |
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</pre> |