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1 <pre>Independent Submission A. Keromytis
2 Request for Comments: 6042 Columbia University
3 Category: Informational October 2010
4 ISSN: 2070-1721
5
6
7 <span class="h1">Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Using KeyNote</span>
8
9 Abstract
10
11 This document specifies the use of the KeyNote trust-management
12 system as an authorization extension in the Transport Layer Security
13 (TLS) Handshake Protocol, according to guidelines in <a href="./rfc5878">RFC 5878</a>.
14 Extensions carried in the client and server hello messages confirm
15 that both parties support the desired authorization data types.
16 Then, if supported by both the client and the server, KeyNote
17 credentials are exchanged in the supplemental data handshake message.
18
19 Status of This Memo
20
21 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
22 published for informational purposes.
23
24 This is a contribution to the RFC Series, independently of any other
25 RFC stream. The RFC Editor has chosen to publish this document at
26 its discretion and makes no statement about its value for
27 implementation or deployment. Documents approved for publication by
28 the RFC Editor are not a candidate for any level of Internet
29 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
30
31 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
32 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
33 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6042">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6042</a>.
34
35 Copyright Notice
36
37 Copyright (c) 2010 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
38 document authors. All rights reserved.
39
40 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
41 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
42 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
43 publication of this document. Please review these documents
44 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
45 to this document.
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52 <span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span>
55
56
57 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
58
59 This document describes the identifiers necessary to exchange KeyNote
60 [<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title="&quot;The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2&quot;">KEYNOTE</a>] credential assertions inside a TLS [<a href="#ref-TLS1.0" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">TLS1.0</a>] [<a href="#ref-TLS1.1" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1&quot;">TLS1.1</a>]
61 [<a href="#ref-TLS1.2" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">TLS1.2</a>] exchange. Such credential assertions can authorize the
62 client and/or the server to perform certain actions. In most usage
63 scenarios, the KeyNote credential assertions will be signed by a
64 cryptographic public key [<a href="./rfc2792" title="&quot;DSA and RSA Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust Management System&quot;">RFC2792</a>]. By using the X.509 key and
65 signature encoding [<a href="#ref-X509KEY" title="&quot;X.509 Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust Management System&quot;">X509KEY</a>], it is possible to add KeyNote-based
66 authorization and policy compliance support to the existing,
67 unmodified X.509 authentication exchange in TLS.
68
69 A list of KeyNote credentials (e.g., forming a delegation chain) may
70 be sent as part of the same payload. Alternatively, a URL [<a href="./rfc3986" title="&quot;Uniform Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax&quot;">RFC3986</a>]
71 pointing to the location of such a list of KeyNote credentials may be
72 provided.
73
74 In most scenarios, at least one of these credentials will be issued
75 to the public key of the transmitter of the credentials, i.e., said
76 public key will appear in the "Licensees" field of at least one
77 KeyNote credential assertion. The same public key will generally be
78 used by the transmitter of the same credentials to authenticate as
79 part of the TLS exchange. The authentication material (e.g.,
80 cryptographic public key) that was used by the transmitter to
81 authenticate in the TLS exchange will be provided to the KeyNote
82 evaluation engine as an "Action Authorizer".
83
84 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions</span>
85
86 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
87 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
88 document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
89
90 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. KeyNote Credential Assertion Lists</span>
91
92 The KeyNote Assertion List type definition in the TLS Authorization
93 Data Formats registry is:
94
95 keynote_assertion_list(64)
96
97 When the keynote_assertion_list value is present, the authorization
98 data is a list of KeyNote credential assertions that conforms to the
99 profile in <a href="./rfc2704">RFC 2704</a> [<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title="&quot;The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2&quot;">KEYNOTE</a>].
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108 <span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span>
111
112
113 A KeyNote assertion list is transmitted inside an
114 AuthorizationDataEntry structure as an opaque sequence of
115 1 - 2^16-1 bytes:
116
117 opaque KeyNoteAssertionList&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
118
119 When KeyNoteAssertionList is used, the field contains an ASCII-
120 encoded list of signed KeyNote assertions, as described in <a href="./rfc2704">RFC 2704</a>
121 [<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title="&quot;The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2&quot;">KEYNOTE</a>]. The assertions are separated by two "\n" (newline)
122 characters. A KeyNote assertion is a structure similar to a public
123 key certificate; the main difference is that instead of a binding
124 between a name and a public key, KeyNote assertions bind public keys
125 to authorization rules that are evaluated by the peer when the sender
126 later issues specific requests.
127
128 When making an authorization decision based on a list of KeyNote
129 assertions, proper linkage between the KeyNote assertions and the
130 public key certificate that is transferred in the TLS Certificate
131 message is needed. Receivers of a KeyNote assertion list should
132 initialize the ACTION_AUTHORIZER variable to be the sender's public
133 key, which was used to authenticate the TLS exchange. If a different
134 authentication mechanism is used, it is the responsibility of the
135 credential issuer to issue the appropriate credentials.
136
137 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. KeyNote Credential Assertion List URL</span>
138
139 The KeyNote Assertion List URL type definition in the TLS
140 Authorization Data Formats registry is:
141
142 keynote_assertion_list_url(65)
143
144 A KeyNote Assertion List URL is transmitted inside an
145 AuthorizationDataEntry structure as a URLandHash structure [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions&quot;">AUTHZ</a>].
146
147 When the keynote_assertion_list_url value is present, the
148 authorization data is a list of KeyNote assertions as described in
149 <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>; however, the KeyNote assertion list is fetched with the
150 supplied URL. A one-way hash value is provided to ensure that the
151 intended KeyNote credential assertion is obtained.
152
153 Implementations that support keynote_assertion_list_url MUST support
154 URLs that employ the HTTP scheme [<a href="#ref-HTTP" title="&quot;Hypertext Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1&quot;">HTTP</a>]. These implementations MUST
155 confirm that the hash value computed on the fetched authorization
156 matches the one received in the handshake. Mismatch of the hash
157 values SHOULD be treated as though the authorization was not
158 provided, which will result in a bad_certificate alert [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions&quot;">AUTHZ</a>].
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164 <span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span>
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168
169 Other schemes may also be supported. When dereferencing these URLs,
170 circular dependencies MUST be avoided. Avoiding TLS when
171 dereferencing these URLs is one way to avoid circular dependencies.
172 Therefore, clients using the HTTP scheme MUST NOT use these TLS
173 extensions if the Upgrade mechanism in HTTP [<a href="#ref-UPGRADE" title="&quot;Upgrading to TLS Within HTTP/1.1&quot;">UPGRADE</a>] is used. For
174 other schemes, similar care must be taken to avoid using these TLS
175 extensions.
176
177 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
178
179 With this document, IANA has registered two new entries in the TLS
180 Authorization Data Formats registry: keynote_assertion_list(64) and
181 keynote_assertion_list_url(65). This registry is defined in [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions&quot;">AUTHZ</a>].
182
183 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
184
185 There are no security considerations beyond those discussed in
186 [<a href="#ref-KEYNOTE" title="&quot;The KeyNote Trust-Management System Version 2&quot;">KEYNOTE</a>], [<a href="./rfc2792" title="&quot;DSA and RSA Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust Management System&quot;">RFC2792</a>], and [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions&quot;">AUTHZ</a>].
187
188 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span>
189
190 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span>
191
192 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
193 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
194
195 [<a id="ref-TLS1.0">TLS1.0</a>] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0",
196 <a href="./rfc2246">RFC 2246</a>, January 1999.
197
198 [<a id="ref-TLS1.1">TLS1.1</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
199 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.1", <a href="./rfc4346">RFC 4346</a>, April 2006.
200
201 [<a id="ref-TLS1.2">TLS1.2</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security
202 (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008.
203
204 [<a id="ref-HTTP">HTTP</a>] Fielding, R., Gettys, J., Mogul, J., Frystyk, H.,
205 Masinter, L., Leach, P., and T. Berners-Lee, "Hypertext
206 Transfer Protocol -- HTTP/1.1", <a href="./rfc2616">RFC 2616</a>, June 1999.
207
208 [<a id="ref-UPGRADE">UPGRADE</a>] Khare, R. and S. Lawrence, "Upgrading to TLS Within
209 HTTP/1.1", <a href="./rfc2817">RFC 2817</a>, May 2000.
210
211 [<a id="ref-KEYNOTE">KEYNOTE</a>] Blaze, M., Feigenbaum, J., Ioannidis, J., and A.
212 Keromytis, "The KeyNote Trust-Management System
213 Version 2", <a href="./rfc2704">RFC 2704</a>, September 1999.
214
215 [<a id="ref-AUTHZ">AUTHZ</a>] Brown, M. and R. Housley, "Transport Layer Security (TLS)
216 Authorization Extensions", <a href="./rfc5878">RFC 5878</a>, May 2010.
217
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220 <span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span>
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224
225 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span>
226
227 [<a id="ref-RFC2792">RFC2792</a>] Blaze, M., Ioannidis, J., and A. Keromytis, "DSA and RSA
228 Key and Signature Encoding for the KeyNote Trust
229 Management System", <a href="./rfc2792">RFC 2792</a>, March 2000.
230
231 [<a id="ref-X509KEY">X509KEY</a>] Keromytis, A., "X.509 Key and Signature Encoding for the
232 KeyNote Trust Management System", <a href="./rfc5708">RFC 5708</a>, January 2010.
233
234 [<a id="ref-RFC3986">RFC3986</a>] Berners-Lee, T., Fielding, R., and L. Masinter, "Uniform
235 Resource Identifier (URI): Generic Syntax", STD 66,
236 <a href="./rfc3986">RFC 3986</a>, January 2005.
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277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span>
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280
281 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Updated TLS Authorization Data Structures</span>
282
283 For clarity, this Appendix shows an updated version of the relevant
284 data structures from Section 3.3 in [<a href="#ref-AUTHZ" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security (TLS) Authorization Extensions&quot;">AUTHZ</a>] with the new entries
285 described in this document. The added elements are denoted with two
286 asterisks ("**") at the end of the respective lines.
287
288 struct {
289 AuthorizationDataEntry authz_data_list&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
290 } AuthorizationData;
291
292 struct {
293 AuthzDataFormat authz_format;
294 select (AuthzDataFormat) {
295 case x509_attr_cert: X509AttrCert;
296 case saml_assertion: SAMLAssertion;
297 case x509_attr_cert_url: URLandHash;
298 case saml_assertion_url: URLandHash;
299 case keynote_assertion_list: KeyNoteAssertionList; **
300 case keynote_assertion_list_url: URLandHash; **
301 }
302 } AuthorizationDataEntry;
303
304 enum {
305 x509_attr_cert(0), saml_assertion(1), x509_attr_cert_url(2),
306 saml_assertion_url(3),
307 keynote_assertion_list(64), keynote_assertion_list_url(65), **
308 (255)
309 } AuthzDataFormat;
310
311 opaque X509AttrCert&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
312
313 opaque SAMLAssertion&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
314
315 opaque KeyNoteAssertionList&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;; **
316
317 struct {
318 opaque url&lt;1..2^16-1&gt;;
319 HashAlgorithm hash_alg;
320 select (hash_alg) {
321 case md5: MD5Hash;
322 case sha1: SHA1Hash;
323 case sha224: SHA224Hash;
324 case sha256: SHA256Hash;
325 case sha384: SHA384Hash;
326 case sha512: SHA512Hash;
327 } hash;
328 } URLandHash;
329
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332 <span class="grey">Keromytis Informational [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6042">RFC 6042</a> TLS Authorization Using KeyNote October 2010</span>
335
336
337 enum {
338 none(0), md5(1), sha1(2), sha224(3), sha256(4), sha384(5),
339 sha512(6), (255)
340 } HashAlgorithm;
341
342 opaque MD5Hash[16];
343
344 opaque SHA1Hash[20];
345
346 opaque SHA224Hash[28];
347
348 opaque SHA256Hash[32];
349
350 opaque SHA384Hash[48];
351
352 opaque SHA512Hash[64];
353
354 Author's Address
355
356 Angelos D. Keromytis
357 Department of Computer Science
358 Columbia University
359 Mail Code 0401
360 1214 Amsterdam Avenue
361 New York, NY 10027
362 USA
363
364 EMail: [email protected]
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389 </pre>