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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) F. Costa
2 Request for Comments: 6957 J-M. Combes, Ed.
3 Category: Standards Track X. Pougnard
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 France Telecom Orange
5 H. Li
6 Huawei Technologies
7 June 2013
8
9
10 <span class="h1">Duplicate Address Detection Proxy</span>
11
12 Abstract
13
14 The document describes a proxy-based mechanism allowing the use of
15 Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) by IPv6 nodes in a point-to-
16 multipoint architecture with a "split-horizon" forwarding scheme,
17 primarily deployed for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Fiber access
18 architectures. Based on the DAD signaling, the first-hop router
19 stores in a Binding Table all known IPv6 addresses used on a point-
20 to-multipoint domain (e.g., VLAN). When a node performs DAD for an
21 address already used by another node, the first-hop router defends
22 the address rather than the device using the address.
23
24 Status of This Memo
25
26 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
27
28 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
29 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
30 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
31 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
32 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
33
34 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
35 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
36 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6957">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6957</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
76 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
77 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Why Existing IETF Solutions Are Not Sufficient . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Duplicate Address Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Neighbor Discovery Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. IPv6 Mobility Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
82 4. Duplicate Address Detection Proxy (DAD-Proxy) Specifications 6
83 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. DAD-Proxy Data Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
84 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. DAD-Proxy Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
85 <a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. No Entry Exists for the Tentative Address . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
86 <a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. An Entry Already Exists for the Tentative Address . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
87 4.2.3. Confirmation of Reachability to Check the Validity of
88 the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
89 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
90 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
91 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Interoperability with SEND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
92 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Protection against IP Source Address Spoofing . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
93 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
94 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
95 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
96 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
97 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. DAD-Proxy State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
98
99
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 This document specifies a function called Duplicate Address Detection
116 (DAD) proxy allowing the use of DAD by the nodes on the same point-
117 to-multipoint domain with a "split-horizon" forwarding scheme,
118 primarily deployed for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Fiber access
119 architectures [<a href="#ref-TR-101" title="&quot;Migration to Ethernet-Based DSL Aggregation&quot;">TR-101</a>]. It only impacts the first-hop router and it
120 doesn't need modifications on the other IPv6 nodes. This mechanism
121 is fully effective if all the nodes of a point-to-multipoint domain
122 (except the DAD proxy itself) perform DAD.
123
124 This document explains also why the DAD mechanism [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>] without a
125 proxy cannot be used in a point-to-multipoint architecture with a
126 "split-horizon" forwarding scheme (IPv6 over PPP [<a href="./rfc5072" title="&quot;IP Version 6 over PPP&quot;">RFC5072</a>] is not
127 affected). One of the main reasons is that, because of this
128 forwarding scheme, IPv6 nodes on the same point-to-multipoint domain
129 cannot have direct communication: any communication between them must
130 go through the first-hop router of the same domain.
131
132 It is assumed in this document that link-layer addresses on a point-
133 to-multipoint domain are unique from the first-hop router's point of
134 view (e.g., in an untrusted Ethernet architecture, this assumption
135 can be guaranteed thanks to mechanisms such as Media Access Control
136 (MAC) address translation performed by an aggregation device between
137 IPv6 nodes and the first-hop router).
138
139 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
140
141 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
142 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
143 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
144
145 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Background</span>
146
147 Terminology in this document follows that in "Neighbor Discovery for
148 IP version 6 (IPv6)" [<a href="./rfc4861" title="&quot;Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">RFC4861</a>] and "IPv6 Stateless Address
149 Autoconfiguration" [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>]. In addition, this section defines
150 additional terms related to DSL and Fiber access architectures, which
151 are an important case where the solution described in this document
152 can be used:
153
154 Customer Premises Equipment (CPE)
155 The first IPv6 node in a customer's network.
156
157 Access Node (AN)
158 The first aggregation point in the public access network. It
159 is considered as an L2 bridge in this document.
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
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168
169 Broadband Network Gateway (BNG)
170 The first-hop router from the CPE's point of view.
171
172 VLAN N:1 architecture
173 A point-to-multipoint architecture where many CPEs are
174 connected to the same VLAN. The CPEs may be connected on the
175 same or different Access Nodes.
176
177 split-horizon model
178 A forwarding scheme where CPEs cannot have direct layer 2
179 communications between them (i.e., IP flows must be forwarded
180 through the BNG via routing).
181
182 The following figure shows where the different entities are, as
183 defined above.
184
185 +------+ +----+
186 | CPE3 |---------| AN |
187 +------+ +----+
188 |
189 |
190 +------+ +----+
191 | CPE2 |---------| AN |---+
192 +------+ +----+ |
193 +------+ | |
194 | CPE1 |------------+ |
195 +------+ +-----+
196 | BNG |--- Internet
197 +-----+
198
199 Figure 1: DSL and Fiber Access Architecture
200
201 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Why Existing IETF Solutions Are Not Sufficient</span>
202
203 In a DSL or Fiber access architecture depicted in Figure 1, CPE1,
204 CPE2, CPE3, and the BNG are IPv6 nodes, while AN is an L2 bridge
205 providing connectivity between the BNG and each CPE. The AN enforces
206 a split-horizon model so that CPEs can only send and receive frames
207 (e.g., Ethernet frames) to and from the BNG but not to each other.
208 That said, the BNG is on the same link with all CPEs, but a given CPE
209 is not on the same link with any other CPE.
210
211 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Duplicate Address Detection</span>
212
213 Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>] is performed when an IPv6
214 node verifies the uniqueness of a tentative IPv6 address. This node
215 sends a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message with the IP destination
216 set to the solicited-node multicast address of the tentative address.
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
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224
225 This NS message is multicasted to other nodes on the same link. When
226 the tentative address is already used on the link by another node,
227 this last one replies with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message to
228 inform the first node. So, when performing DAD, a node expects the
229 NS messages to be received by any node currently using the tentative
230 address.
231
232 However, in a point-to-multipoint network with a split-horizon
233 forwarding scheme implemented in the AN, the CPEs are prevented from
234 talking to each other directly. All packets sent out from a CPE are
235 forwarded by the AN only to the BNG but not to any other CPE. NS
236 messages sent by a certain CPE will be received only by the BNG and
237 will not reach other CPEs. So, other CPEs have no idea that a
238 certain IPv6 address is used by another CPE. That means, in a
239 network with split-horizon, DAD, as defined in [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>], can't work
240 properly without additional help.
241
242 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Neighbor Discovery Proxy</span>
243
244 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Proxy [<a href="./rfc4389" title="&quot;Neighbor Discovery Proxies (ND Proxy)&quot;">RFC4389</a>] is designed for forwarding ND
245 messages between different IP links where the subnet prefix is the
246 same. An ND Proxy function on a bridge ensures that packets between
247 nodes on different segments can be received by this function and have
248 the correct link-layer address type on each segment. When the ND
249 Proxy receives a multicast ND message, it forwards it to all other
250 interfaces on a same link.
251
252 In DSL or Fiber networks, when the AN, acting as an ND Proxy,
253 receives an ND message from a CPE, it will forward it to the BNG but
254 none of the other CPEs, as only the BNG is on the same link with the
255 CPE. Hence, implementing ND Proxy on the AN would not help a CPE
256 acknowledge link-local addresses used by other CPEs.
257
258 As the BNG must not forward link-local scoped messages sent from a
259 CPE to other CPEs, ND Proxy cannot be implemented in the BNG.
260
261 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery</span>
262
263 [<a id="ref-RFC6775">RFC6775</a>] defines an optional modification of DAD for IPv6 over Low-
264 Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN). When a 6LoWPAN node
265 wants to configure an IPv6 address, it registers that address with
266 one or more of its default routers using the Address Registration
267 Option (ARO). If this address is already owned by another node, the
268 router informs the 6LoWPAN node that this address cannot be
269 configured.
270
271 This mechanism requires modifications in all hosts in order to
272 support the ARO.
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
279
280
281 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. IPv6 Mobility Manager</span>
282
283 According to [<a href="./rfc6275" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">RFC6275</a>], a home agent acts as a proxy for mobile nodes
284 when they are away from the home network: the home agent defends a
285 mobile node's home address by replying to NS messages with NA
286 messages.
287
288 There is a problem for this mechanism if it is applied in a DSL or
289 Fiber public access network. Operators of such networks require that
290 an NA message is only received by the sender of the corresponding NS
291 message, for security and scalability reasons. However, the home
292 agent per [<a href="./rfc6275" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">RFC6275</a>] multicasts NA messages on the home link and all
293 nodes on this link will receive these NA messages. This shortcoming
294 prevents this mechanism from being deployed in DSL or Fiber access
295 networks directly.
296
297 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Duplicate Address Detection Proxy (DAD-Proxy) Specifications</span>
298
299 First, it is important to note that, as this mechanism is strongly
300 based on DAD [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>], it is not completely reliable, and the goal
301 of this document is not to fix DAD.
302
303 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. DAD-Proxy Data Structure</span>
304
305 A BNG needs to store in a Binding Table information related to the
306 IPv6 addresses generated by any CPE. This Binding Table can be
307 distinct from the Neighbor Cache. This must be done per point-to-
308 multipoint domain (e.g., per Ethernet VLAN). Each entry in this
309 Binding Table MUST contain the following fields:
310
311 o IPv6 Address
312
313 o Link-layer Address
314
315 For security or performances reasons, it must be possible to limit
316 the number of IPv6 addresses per link-layer address (possibly, but
317 not necessarily, to 1).
318
319 On the reception of an unsolicited NA (e.g., when a CPE wishes to
320 inform its neighbors of a new link-layer address) for an IPv6 address
321 already recorded in the Binding Table, each entry associated to this
322 IPv6 address MUST be updated consequently: the current link-layer
323 address is replaced by the one included in the unsolicited NA
324 message.
325
326 For security or performances reasons, the Binding Table MUST be large
327 enough for the deployment in which it is used: if the Binding Table
328 is distinct from the Neighbor Cache, it MUST be at least the same
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
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336
337 size as this last one. Implementations MUST either state the fixed
338 size of the Binding Table that they support or make the size
339 configurable. In the latter case, implementations MUST state the
340 largest Binding Table size that they support. Additionally,
341 implementations SHOULD allow an operator to inquire about the current
342 occupancy level of the Binding Table to determine if it is about to
343 become full. Implementations encountering a full Binding Table will
344 likely handle it in a way similar to NS message loss.
345
346 It is recommended to apply technical solutions to minimize the risk
347 that the Binding Table becomes full. These solutions are out of the
348 scope of this document.
349
350 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. DAD-Proxy Mechanism</span>
351
352 When a CPE performs DAD, as specified in [<a href="./rfc4862" title="&quot;IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration&quot;">RFC4862</a>], it sends a
353 Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message, with the unspecified address as
354 the source address, in order to check if a tentative address is
355 already in use on the link. The BNG receives this message and MUST
356 perform actions specified in the following sections based on the
357 information in the Binding Table.
358
359 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. No Entry Exists for the Tentative Address</span>
360
361 When there is no entry for the tentative address, the BNG MUST create
362 one with the following information:
363
364 o IPv6 Address field set to the tentative address in the NS message.
365
366 o Link-layer Address field set to the link-layer source address in
367 the link-layer header of the NS message.
368
369 The BNG MUST NOT reply to the CPE or forward the NS message.
370
371 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. An Entry Already Exists for the Tentative Address</span>
372
373 When there is an entry for the tentative address, the BNG MUST check
374 the following conditions:
375
376 o The address in the Target Address field in the NS message is equal
377 to the address in the IPv6 Address field in the entry.
378
379 o The source address of the IPv6 Header in the NS message is equal
380 to the unspecified address.
381
382 When these conditions are met and the source address of the link-
383 layer header in the NS message is equal to the address in the Link-
384 layer Address field in the entry, that means the CPE is still
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
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392
393 performing DAD for this address. The BNG MUST NOT reply to the CPE
394 or forward the NS message.
395
396 When these conditions are met and the source address of the link-
397 layer header in the NS message is not equal to the address in the
398 Link-layer Address field in the entry, that means possibly another
399 CPE is performing DAD for an already owned address. The BNG then has
400 to verify whether there is a real conflict by checking if the CPE
401 whose IPv6 address is in the entry is still connected. In the
402 following text, we will call IPv6-CPE1 the IPv6 address of the
403 existing entry in the Binding Table, Link-layer-CPE1 the link-layer
404 address of that entry, and Link-layer-CPE2 the link-layer address of
405 the CPE that is performing DAD, which is different from Link-layer-
406 CPE1.
407
408 The BNG MUST check if the potential address conflict is real. In
409 particular:
410
411 o If IPv6-CPE1 is in the Neighbor Cache and it is associated with
412 Link-layer-CPE1, the reachability of IPv6-CPE1 MUST be confirmed
413 as explained in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>.
414
415 o If IPv6-CPE1 is in the Neighbor Cache, but in this cache it is
416 associated with a link-layer address other than Link-layer-CPE1,
417 that means that there is possibly a conflict with another CPE, but
418 that CPE did not perform DAD. This situation is out of the scope
419 of this document, since one assumption made above is that all the
420 nodes of a point-to-multipoint domain (except the DAD proxy
421 itself) perform DAD.
422
423 o If IPv6-CPE1 is not in the Neighbor Cache, then the BNG MUST
424 create a new entry based on the information of the entry in the
425 Binding Table. This step is necessary in order to trigger the
426 reachability check as explained in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>. The entry in
427 the Neighbor Cache MUST be created based on the algorithm defined
428 in <a href="./rfc4861#section-7.3.3">Section&nbsp;7.3.3 of [RFC4861]</a>, in particular by treating this case
429 as though a packet other than a solicited Neighbor Advertisement
430 were received from IPv6-CPE1. Thus, the new entry of the Neighbor
431 Cache MUST contain the following information:
432
433 * IPv6 address: IPv6-CPE1
434
435 * Link-layer address: Link-layer-CPE1
436
437 * State: STALE
438
439 The reachability of IPv6-CPE1 MUST be confirmed as soon as
440 possible following the procedure explained in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>.
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Confirmation of Reachability to Check the Validity of the</span>
450 <span class="h4"> Conflict</span>
451
452 Given that the IPv6-CPE1 is in an entry of the Neighbor Cache, the
453 reachability of IPv6-CPE1 is checked by using the Neighbor
454 Unreachability Detection (NUD) mechanism described in <a href="./rfc4861#section-7.3.1">Section&nbsp;7.3.1
455 of [RFC4861]</a>. This mechanism MUST be triggered as though a packet
456 had to be sent to IPv6-CPE1. Note that in some cases this mechanism
457 does not do anything. For instance, if the state of the entry is
458 REACHABLE and a positive confirmation was received recently that the
459 forward path to the IPv6-CPE1 was functioning properly (see <a href="./rfc4861">RFC 4861</a>
460 for more details), this mechanism does not do anything.
461
462 Next, the behavior of the BNG depends on the result of the NUD
463 process, as explained in the following sections.
464
465 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3.1" href="#section-4.2.3.1">4.2.3.1</a>. The Result of the NUD Process is Negative</span>
466
467 If the result of the NUD process is negative (i.e., if this process
468 removes IPv6-CPE1 from the Neighbor Cache), that means that the
469 potential conflict is not real.
470
471 The conflicting entry in the Binding Table (Link-layer-CPE1) is
472 deleted and it is replaced by a new entry with the same IPv6 address,
473 but the link-layer address of the CPE is performing DAD (Link-layer-
474 CPE2), as explained in <a href="#section-4.2.1">Section 4.2.1</a>.
475
476 <span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3.2" href="#section-4.2.3.2">4.2.3.2</a>. The Result of the NUD Process is Positive</span>
477
478 If the result of the NUD process is positive (i.e., if after this
479 process the state of IPv6-CPE1 is REACHABLE), that means that the
480 potential conflict is real.
481
482 As shown in Figure 2, the BNG MUST reply to the CPE that is
483 performing DAD (CPE2 in Figure 1) with an NA message that has the
484 following format:
485
486 Layer 2 Header Fields:
487
488 Source Address
489 The link-layer address of the interface on which the BNG
490 received the NS message.
491
492 Destination Address
493 The source address in the Layer 2 Header of the NS
494 message received by the BNG (i.e., Link-layer-CPE2).
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
503
504
505 IPv6 Header Fields:
506
507 Source Address
508 An address assigned to the interface from which the
509 advertisement is sent.
510
511 Destination Address
512 The all-nodes multicast address.
513
514 ICMPv6 Fields:
515
516 Target Address
517 The tentative address already used (i.e., IPv6-CPE1).
518
519 Target Link-layer Address
520 The link-layer address of the interface on which the BNG
521 received the NS message.
522
523 CPE1 CPE2 BNG
524 | | |
525 (a)| | |
526 | | |
527 (b)|===================&gt;|
528 | | |(c)
529 | | |
530 | (d)| |
531 | | |
532 | (e)|=========&gt;|
533 | | |
534 | |&lt;=========|(f)
535 | | |
536
537 (a) CPE1 generates a tentative address
538 (b) CPE1 performs DAD for this one
539 (c) BNG updates its Binding Table
540 (d) CPE2 generates a same tentative address
541 (e) CPE2 performs DAD for this one
542 (f) BNG informs CPE2 that DAD fails
543
544 Figure 2: DAD Failure
545
546 The BNG and the CPE MUST support the unicast transmission on the link
547 layer of IPv6 multicast messages [<a href="./rfc6085" title="&quot;Address Mapping of IPv6 Multicast Packets on Ethernet&quot;">RFC6085</a>], to be able, respectively,
548 to generate and to process such a packet format.
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Manageability Considerations</span>
562
563 The BNG SHOULD support a mechanism to log and emit alarms whenever a
564 duplication of IPv6 addresses is detected by the DAD-Proxy function.
565 Moreover, the BNG SHOULD implement a function to allow an operator to
566 access logs and to see the current entries in the Binding Table. The
567 management of access rights to get this information is out of the
568 scope of this document.
569
570 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span>
571
572 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Interoperability with SEND</span>
573
574 The mechanism described in this document will not interoperate with
575 SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [<a href="./rfc3971" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">RFC3971</a>]. This is due to the BNG
576 not owning the private key associated with the Cryptographically
577 Generated Address (CGA) [<a href="./rfc3972" title="&quot;Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)&quot;">RFC3972</a>] needed to correctly sign the
578 proxied ND messages [<a href="./rfc5909" title="&quot;Securing Neighbor Discovery Proxy: Problem Statement&quot;">RFC5909</a>].
579
580 Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND [<a href="./rfc6496" title="&quot;Secure Proxy ND Support for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">RFC6496</a>] has been specified to
581 address this limitation, and it SHOULD be implemented and used on the
582 BNG and the CPEs.
583
584 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Protection against IP Source Address Spoofing</span>
585
586 To ensure protection against IP source address spoofing in data
587 packets, this proposal can be used in combination with Source Address
588 Validation Improvement (SAVI) mechanisms [<a href="./rfc6620" title="&quot;FCFS SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses&quot;">RFC6620</a>] [<a href="#ref-SAVI-SEND" title="&quot;SEND-based Source- Address Validation Implementation&quot;">SAVI-SEND</a>]
589 [<a href="#ref-SAVI-MIX" title="&quot;SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario&quot;">SAVI-MIX</a>].
590
591 If SAVI mechanisms are used, the SAVI device is the BNG, and the
592 Binding Anchor for a CPE is its MAC address, which is assumed to be
593 unique in this document (cf. <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>).
594
595 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
596
597 The authors would like to thank Alan Kavanagh, Wojciech Dec, Suresh
598 Krishnan, and Tassos Chatzithomaoglou for their comments. The
599 authors would like also to thank the IETF 6man WG members and the BBF
600 community for their support.
601
602
603
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span>
618
619 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span>
620
621 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
622 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
623
624 [<a id="ref-RFC4861">RFC4861</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman,
625 "Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc4861">RFC 4861</a>,
626 September 2007.
627
628 [<a id="ref-RFC4862">RFC4862</a>] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless
629 Address Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc4862">RFC 4862</a>, September 2007.
630
631 [<a id="ref-RFC6085">RFC6085</a>] Gundavelli, S., Townsley, M., Troan, O., and W. Dec,
632 "Address Mapping of IPv6 Multicast Packets on Ethernet",
633 <a href="./rfc6085">RFC 6085</a>, January 2011.
634
635 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span>
636
637 [<a id="ref-RFC3971">RFC3971</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
638 Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>, March 2005.
639
640 [<a id="ref-RFC3972">RFC3972</a>] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)",
641 <a href="./rfc3972">RFC 3972</a>, March 2005.
642
643 [<a id="ref-RFC4389">RFC4389</a>] Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery
644 Proxies (ND Proxy)", <a href="./rfc4389">RFC 4389</a>, April 2006.
645
646 [<a id="ref-RFC5072">RFC5072</a>] Varada, S., Ed., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6
647 over PPP", <a href="./rfc5072">RFC 5072</a>, September 2007.
648
649 [<a id="ref-RFC5909">RFC5909</a>] Combes, J-M., Krishnan, S., and G. Daley, "Securing
650 Neighbor Discovery Proxy: Problem Statement", <a href="./rfc5909">RFC 5909</a>,
651 July 2010.
652
653 [<a id="ref-RFC6275">RFC6275</a>] Perkins, C., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support
654 in IPv6", <a href="./rfc6275">RFC 6275</a>, July 2011.
655
656 [<a id="ref-RFC6496">RFC6496</a>] Krishnan, S., Laganier, J., Bonola, M., and A. Garcia-
657 Martinez, "Secure Proxy ND Support for SEcure Neighbor
658 Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc6496">RFC 6496</a>, February 2012.
659
660 [<a id="ref-RFC6620">RFC6620</a>] Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS
661 SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation
662 Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", <a href="./rfc6620">RFC</a>
663 <a href="./rfc6620">6620</a>, May 2012.
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
671
672
673 [<a id="ref-RFC6775">RFC6775</a>] Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C.
674 Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over
675 Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)",
676 <a href="./rfc6775">RFC 6775</a>, November 2012.
677
678 [<a id="ref-SAVI-MIX">SAVI-MIX</a>] Bi, J., Yao, G., Halpern, J., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed.,
679 "SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario",
680 Work in Progress, May 2013.
681
682 [<a id="ref-SAVI-SEND">SAVI-SEND</a>] Bagnulo, M. and A. Garcia-Martinez, "SEND-based Source-
683 Address Validation Implementation", Work in Progress,
684 April 2013.
685
686 [<a id="ref-TR-101">TR-101</a>] The Broadband Forum, "Migration to Ethernet-Based DSL
687 Aggregation", Issue 2, Technical Report TR-101, July
688 2011, &lt;<a href="http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/TR-101_Issue-2.pdf">http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/</a>
689 <a href="http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/TR-101_Issue-2.pdf">TR-101_Issue-2.pdf</a>&gt;.
690
691
692
693
694
695
696
697
698
699
700
701
702
703
704
705
706
707
708
709
710
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713
714
715
716
717
718
719
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721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. DAD-Proxy State Machine</span>
730
731 This appendix, which is informative, contains a summary (cf. Table 1)
732 of the actions done by the BNG when it receives a DAD-based NS
733 (DAD-NS) message. The tentative address in this message is IPv6-CPE1
734 and the associated link-layer address is Link-layer-CPE2. The
735 actions are precisely specified in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>.
736
737 +------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+
738 | Event | Check | Action | New event |
739 +------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+
740 | DAD-NS | * No entry for | Create an entry | - |
741 | message | IPv6-CPE1 in the | for IPv6-CPE1 | |
742 | reception. | Binding Table. | bound to Link- | |
743 | | | layer-CPE2 in the | |
744 | | | Binding Table. | |
745 | | * Entry for | - | Existing |
746 | | IPv6-CPE1 in the | | entry. |
747 | | Binding Table. | | |
748 | | | | |
749 | Existing | * Link-layer-CPE2 | - | - |
750 | entry. | bound to IPv6-CPE1 | | |
751 | | in the Binding | | |
752 | | Table. | | |
753 | | * Another link- | - | Conflict? |
754 | | layer address, | | |
755 | | Link-layer-CPE1, | | |
756 | | bound to IPv6-CPE1 | | |
757 | | in the Binding | | |
758 | | Table. | | |
759 | | | | |
760 | Conflict? | * IPv6-CPE1 | - | Reachable? |
761 | | associated to | | |
762 | | Link-layer-CPE1 in | | |
763 | | the Neighbor | | |
764 | | Cache. | | |
765 | | * IPv6-CPE1 | Out of scope. | - |
766 | | associated to | | |
767 | | another link-layer | | |
768 | | address than Link- | | |
769 | | layer-CPE1 in the | | |
770 | | Neighbor Cache. | | |
771 | | * IPv6-CPE1 is not | Create an entry | Reachable? |
772 | | in the Neighbor | for IPv6-CPE1 | |
773 | | Cache. | associated to | |
774 | | | Link-layer-CPE1 in | |
775 | | | the Neighbor | |
776 | | | Cache. | |
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
783
784
785 | Reachable? | * NUD process is | IPv6-CPE2 is bound | - |
786 | | negative. | to Link-layer- | |
787 | | | CPE2, instead to | |
788 | | | Link-layer-CPE1, | |
789 | | | in the Binding | |
790 | | | Table. | |
791 | | * NUD process is | A NA message is | - |
792 | | positive. | sent. | |
793 +------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+
794
795 Table 1: DAD-Proxy State Machine
796
797
798
799
800
801
802
803
804
805
806
807
808
809
810
811
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813
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815
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836 <span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span>
839
840
841 Authors' Addresses
842
843 Fabio Costa
844 France Telecom Orange
845 61 rue des Archives
846 75141 Paris Cedex 03
847 France
848
849 EMail: [email protected]
850
851
852 Jean-Michel Combes (editor)
853 France Telecom Orange
854 38 rue du General Leclerc
855 92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9
856 France
857
858 EMail: [email protected]
859
860
861 Xavier Pougnard
862 France Telecom Orange
863 2 avenue Pierre Marzin
864 22300 Lannion
865 France
866
867 EMail: [email protected]
868
869
870 Hongyu Li
871 Huawei Technologies
872 Huawei Industrial Base
873 Shenzhen
874 China
875
876 EMail: [email protected]
877
878
879
880
881
882
883
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 16]
893 </pre>