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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) F. Costa |
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Request for Comments: 6957 J-M. Combes, Ed. |
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Category: Standards Track X. Pougnard |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 France Telecom Orange |
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H. Li |
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Huawei Technologies |
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June 2013 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Duplicate Address Detection Proxy</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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The document describes a proxy-based mechanism allowing the use of |
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Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) by IPv6 nodes in a point-to- |
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multipoint architecture with a "split-horizon" forwarding scheme, |
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primarily deployed for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Fiber access |
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architectures. Based on the DAD signaling, the first-hop router |
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stores in a Binding Table all known IPv6 addresses used on a point- |
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to-multipoint domain (e.g., VLAN). When a node performs DAD for an |
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address already used by another node, the first-hop router defends |
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the address rather than the device using the address. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6957">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6957</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2013 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Why Existing IETF Solutions Are Not Sufficient . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Duplicate Address Detection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Neighbor Discovery Proxy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. IPv6 Mobility Manager . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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4. Duplicate Address Detection Proxy (DAD-Proxy) Specifications 6 |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. DAD-Proxy Data Structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. DAD-Proxy Mechanism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. No Entry Exists for the Tentative Address . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. An Entry Already Exists for the Tentative Address . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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4.2.3. Confirmation of Reachability to Check the Validity of |
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the Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Manageability Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Interoperability with SEND . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Protection against IP Source Address Spoofing . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. DAD-Proxy State Machine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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This document specifies a function called Duplicate Address Detection |
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(DAD) proxy allowing the use of DAD by the nodes on the same point- |
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to-multipoint domain with a "split-horizon" forwarding scheme, |
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primarily deployed for Digital Subscriber Line (DSL) and Fiber access |
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architectures [<a href="#ref-TR-101" title=""Migration to Ethernet-Based DSL Aggregation"">TR-101</a>]. It only impacts the first-hop router and it |
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doesn't need modifications on the other IPv6 nodes. This mechanism |
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is fully effective if all the nodes of a point-to-multipoint domain |
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(except the DAD proxy itself) perform DAD. |
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This document explains also why the DAD mechanism [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>] without a |
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proxy cannot be used in a point-to-multipoint architecture with a |
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"split-horizon" forwarding scheme (IPv6 over PPP [<a href="./rfc5072" title=""IP Version 6 over PPP"">RFC5072</a>] is not |
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affected). One of the main reasons is that, because of this |
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forwarding scheme, IPv6 nodes on the same point-to-multipoint domain |
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cannot have direct communication: any communication between them must |
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go through the first-hop router of the same domain. |
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It is assumed in this document that link-layer addresses on a point- |
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to-multipoint domain are unique from the first-hop router's point of |
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view (e.g., in an untrusted Ethernet architecture, this assumption |
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can be guaranteed thanks to mechanisms such as Media Access Control |
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(MAC) address translation performed by an aggregation device between |
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IPv6 nodes and the first-hop router). |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Background</span> |
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Terminology in this document follows that in "Neighbor Discovery for |
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IP version 6 (IPv6)" [<a href="./rfc4861" title=""Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)"">RFC4861</a>] and "IPv6 Stateless Address |
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Autoconfiguration" [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>]. In addition, this section defines |
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additional terms related to DSL and Fiber access architectures, which |
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are an important case where the solution described in this document |
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can be used: |
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Customer Premises Equipment (CPE) |
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The first IPv6 node in a customer's network. |
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Access Node (AN) |
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The first aggregation point in the public access network. It |
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is considered as an L2 bridge in this document. |
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<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
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Broadband Network Gateway (BNG) |
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The first-hop router from the CPE's point of view. |
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VLAN N:1 architecture |
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A point-to-multipoint architecture where many CPEs are |
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connected to the same VLAN. The CPEs may be connected on the |
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same or different Access Nodes. |
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split-horizon model |
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A forwarding scheme where CPEs cannot have direct layer 2 |
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communications between them (i.e., IP flows must be forwarded |
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through the BNG via routing). |
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The following figure shows where the different entities are, as |
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defined above. |
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+------+ +----+ |
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| CPE3 |---------| AN | |
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+------+ +----+ |
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| |
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| |
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+------+ +----+ |
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| CPE2 |---------| AN |---+ |
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+------+ +----+ | |
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+------+ | | |
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| CPE1 |------------+ | |
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+------+ +-----+ |
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| BNG |--- Internet |
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+-----+ |
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Figure 1: DSL and Fiber Access Architecture |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Why Existing IETF Solutions Are Not Sufficient</span> |
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In a DSL or Fiber access architecture depicted in Figure 1, CPE1, |
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CPE2, CPE3, and the BNG are IPv6 nodes, while AN is an L2 bridge |
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providing connectivity between the BNG and each CPE. The AN enforces |
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a split-horizon model so that CPEs can only send and receive frames |
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(e.g., Ethernet frames) to and from the BNG but not to each other. |
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That said, the BNG is on the same link with all CPEs, but a given CPE |
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is not on the same link with any other CPE. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Duplicate Address Detection</span> |
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Duplicate Address Detection (DAD) [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>] is performed when an IPv6 |
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node verifies the uniqueness of a tentative IPv6 address. This node |
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sends a Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message with the IP destination |
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set to the solicited-node multicast address of the tentative address. |
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<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
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This NS message is multicasted to other nodes on the same link. When |
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the tentative address is already used on the link by another node, |
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this last one replies with a Neighbor Advertisement (NA) message to |
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inform the first node. So, when performing DAD, a node expects the |
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NS messages to be received by any node currently using the tentative |
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address. |
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However, in a point-to-multipoint network with a split-horizon |
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forwarding scheme implemented in the AN, the CPEs are prevented from |
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talking to each other directly. All packets sent out from a CPE are |
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forwarded by the AN only to the BNG but not to any other CPE. NS |
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messages sent by a certain CPE will be received only by the BNG and |
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will not reach other CPEs. So, other CPEs have no idea that a |
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certain IPv6 address is used by another CPE. That means, in a |
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network with split-horizon, DAD, as defined in [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>], can't work |
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properly without additional help. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Neighbor Discovery Proxy</span> |
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Neighbor Discovery (ND) Proxy [<a href="./rfc4389" title=""Neighbor Discovery Proxies (ND Proxy)"">RFC4389</a>] is designed for forwarding ND |
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messages between different IP links where the subnet prefix is the |
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same. An ND Proxy function on a bridge ensures that packets between |
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nodes on different segments can be received by this function and have |
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the correct link-layer address type on each segment. When the ND |
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Proxy receives a multicast ND message, it forwards it to all other |
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interfaces on a same link. |
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In DSL or Fiber networks, when the AN, acting as an ND Proxy, |
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receives an ND message from a CPE, it will forward it to the BNG but |
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none of the other CPEs, as only the BNG is on the same link with the |
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CPE. Hence, implementing ND Proxy on the AN would not help a CPE |
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acknowledge link-local addresses used by other CPEs. |
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As the BNG must not forward link-local scoped messages sent from a |
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CPE to other CPEs, ND Proxy cannot be implemented in the BNG. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. 6LoWPAN Neighbor Discovery</span> |
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[<a id="ref-RFC6775">RFC6775</a>] defines an optional modification of DAD for IPv6 over Low- |
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Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPAN). When a 6LoWPAN node |
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wants to configure an IPv6 address, it registers that address with |
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one or more of its default routers using the Address Registration |
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Option (ARO). If this address is already owned by another node, the |
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router informs the 6LoWPAN node that this address cannot be |
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configured. |
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This mechanism requires modifications in all hosts in order to |
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support the ARO. |
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<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. IPv6 Mobility Manager</span> |
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According to [<a href="./rfc6275" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">RFC6275</a>], a home agent acts as a proxy for mobile nodes |
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when they are away from the home network: the home agent defends a |
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mobile node's home address by replying to NS messages with NA |
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messages. |
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There is a problem for this mechanism if it is applied in a DSL or |
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Fiber public access network. Operators of such networks require that |
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an NA message is only received by the sender of the corresponding NS |
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message, for security and scalability reasons. However, the home |
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agent per [<a href="./rfc6275" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">RFC6275</a>] multicasts NA messages on the home link and all |
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nodes on this link will receive these NA messages. This shortcoming |
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prevents this mechanism from being deployed in DSL or Fiber access |
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networks directly. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Duplicate Address Detection Proxy (DAD-Proxy) Specifications</span> |
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First, it is important to note that, as this mechanism is strongly |
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based on DAD [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>], it is not completely reliable, and the goal |
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of this document is not to fix DAD. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. DAD-Proxy Data Structure</span> |
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A BNG needs to store in a Binding Table information related to the |
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IPv6 addresses generated by any CPE. This Binding Table can be |
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distinct from the Neighbor Cache. This must be done per point-to- |
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multipoint domain (e.g., per Ethernet VLAN). Each entry in this |
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Binding Table MUST contain the following fields: |
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o IPv6 Address |
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o Link-layer Address |
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For security or performances reasons, it must be possible to limit |
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the number of IPv6 addresses per link-layer address (possibly, but |
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not necessarily, to 1). |
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On the reception of an unsolicited NA (e.g., when a CPE wishes to |
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inform its neighbors of a new link-layer address) for an IPv6 address |
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already recorded in the Binding Table, each entry associated to this |
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IPv6 address MUST be updated consequently: the current link-layer |
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address is replaced by the one included in the unsolicited NA |
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message. |
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For security or performances reasons, the Binding Table MUST be large |
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enough for the deployment in which it is used: if the Binding Table |
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is distinct from the Neighbor Cache, it MUST be at least the same |
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<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
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size as this last one. Implementations MUST either state the fixed |
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size of the Binding Table that they support or make the size |
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configurable. In the latter case, implementations MUST state the |
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largest Binding Table size that they support. Additionally, |
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implementations SHOULD allow an operator to inquire about the current |
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occupancy level of the Binding Table to determine if it is about to |
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become full. Implementations encountering a full Binding Table will |
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likely handle it in a way similar to NS message loss. |
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It is recommended to apply technical solutions to minimize the risk |
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that the Binding Table becomes full. These solutions are out of the |
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scope of this document. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. DAD-Proxy Mechanism</span> |
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When a CPE performs DAD, as specified in [<a href="./rfc4862" title=""IPv6 Stateless Address Autoconfiguration"">RFC4862</a>], it sends a |
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Neighbor Solicitation (NS) message, with the unspecified address as |
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the source address, in order to check if a tentative address is |
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already in use on the link. The BNG receives this message and MUST |
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perform actions specified in the following sections based on the |
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information in the Binding Table. |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. No Entry Exists for the Tentative Address</span> |
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When there is no entry for the tentative address, the BNG MUST create |
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one with the following information: |
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o IPv6 Address field set to the tentative address in the NS message. |
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o Link-layer Address field set to the link-layer source address in |
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the link-layer header of the NS message. |
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The BNG MUST NOT reply to the CPE or forward the NS message. |
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|
| 371 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. An Entry Already Exists for the Tentative Address</span> |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
When there is an entry for the tentative address, the BNG MUST check |
| 374 |
the following conditions: |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
o The address in the Target Address field in the NS message is equal |
| 377 |
to the address in the IPv6 Address field in the entry. |
| 378 |
|
| 379 |
o The source address of the IPv6 Header in the NS message is equal |
| 380 |
to the unspecified address. |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
When these conditions are met and the source address of the link- |
| 383 |
layer header in the NS message is equal to the address in the Link- |
| 384 |
layer Address field in the entry, that means the CPE is still |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
performing DAD for this address. The BNG MUST NOT reply to the CPE |
| 394 |
or forward the NS message. |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
When these conditions are met and the source address of the link- |
| 397 |
layer header in the NS message is not equal to the address in the |
| 398 |
Link-layer Address field in the entry, that means possibly another |
| 399 |
CPE is performing DAD for an already owned address. The BNG then has |
| 400 |
to verify whether there is a real conflict by checking if the CPE |
| 401 |
whose IPv6 address is in the entry is still connected. In the |
| 402 |
following text, we will call IPv6-CPE1 the IPv6 address of the |
| 403 |
existing entry in the Binding Table, Link-layer-CPE1 the link-layer |
| 404 |
address of that entry, and Link-layer-CPE2 the link-layer address of |
| 405 |
the CPE that is performing DAD, which is different from Link-layer- |
| 406 |
CPE1. |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
The BNG MUST check if the potential address conflict is real. In |
| 409 |
particular: |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
o If IPv6-CPE1 is in the Neighbor Cache and it is associated with |
| 412 |
Link-layer-CPE1, the reachability of IPv6-CPE1 MUST be confirmed |
| 413 |
as explained in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>. |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
o If IPv6-CPE1 is in the Neighbor Cache, but in this cache it is |
| 416 |
associated with a link-layer address other than Link-layer-CPE1, |
| 417 |
that means that there is possibly a conflict with another CPE, but |
| 418 |
that CPE did not perform DAD. This situation is out of the scope |
| 419 |
of this document, since one assumption made above is that all the |
| 420 |
nodes of a point-to-multipoint domain (except the DAD proxy |
| 421 |
itself) perform DAD. |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
o If IPv6-CPE1 is not in the Neighbor Cache, then the BNG MUST |
| 424 |
create a new entry based on the information of the entry in the |
| 425 |
Binding Table. This step is necessary in order to trigger the |
| 426 |
reachability check as explained in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>. The entry in |
| 427 |
the Neighbor Cache MUST be created based on the algorithm defined |
| 428 |
in <a href="./rfc4861#section-7.3.3">Section 7.3.3 of [RFC4861]</a>, in particular by treating this case |
| 429 |
as though a packet other than a solicited Neighbor Advertisement |
| 430 |
were received from IPv6-CPE1. Thus, the new entry of the Neighbor |
| 431 |
Cache MUST contain the following information: |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
* IPv6 address: IPv6-CPE1 |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
* Link-layer address: Link-layer-CPE1 |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
* State: STALE |
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
The reachability of IPv6-CPE1 MUST be confirmed as soon as |
| 440 |
possible following the procedure explained in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>. |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Confirmation of Reachability to Check the Validity of the</span> |
| 450 |
<span class="h4"> Conflict</span> |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
Given that the IPv6-CPE1 is in an entry of the Neighbor Cache, the |
| 453 |
reachability of IPv6-CPE1 is checked by using the Neighbor |
| 454 |
Unreachability Detection (NUD) mechanism described in <a href="./rfc4861#section-7.3.1">Section 7.3.1 |
| 455 |
of [RFC4861]</a>. This mechanism MUST be triggered as though a packet |
| 456 |
had to be sent to IPv6-CPE1. Note that in some cases this mechanism |
| 457 |
does not do anything. For instance, if the state of the entry is |
| 458 |
REACHABLE and a positive confirmation was received recently that the |
| 459 |
forward path to the IPv6-CPE1 was functioning properly (see <a href="./rfc4861">RFC 4861</a> |
| 460 |
for more details), this mechanism does not do anything. |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
Next, the behavior of the BNG depends on the result of the NUD |
| 463 |
process, as explained in the following sections. |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3.1" href="#section-4.2.3.1">4.2.3.1</a>. The Result of the NUD Process is Negative</span> |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
If the result of the NUD process is negative (i.e., if this process |
| 468 |
removes IPv6-CPE1 from the Neighbor Cache), that means that the |
| 469 |
potential conflict is not real. |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
The conflicting entry in the Binding Table (Link-layer-CPE1) is |
| 472 |
deleted and it is replaced by a new entry with the same IPv6 address, |
| 473 |
but the link-layer address of the CPE is performing DAD (Link-layer- |
| 474 |
CPE2), as explained in <a href="#section-4.2.1">Section 4.2.1</a>. |
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3.2" href="#section-4.2.3.2">4.2.3.2</a>. The Result of the NUD Process is Positive</span> |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
If the result of the NUD process is positive (i.e., if after this |
| 479 |
process the state of IPv6-CPE1 is REACHABLE), that means that the |
| 480 |
potential conflict is real. |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
As shown in Figure 2, the BNG MUST reply to the CPE that is |
| 483 |
performing DAD (CPE2 in Figure 1) with an NA message that has the |
| 484 |
following format: |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
Layer 2 Header Fields: |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
Source Address |
| 489 |
The link-layer address of the interface on which the BNG |
| 490 |
received the NS message. |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
Destination Address |
| 493 |
The source address in the Layer 2 Header of the NS |
| 494 |
message received by the BNG (i.e., Link-layer-CPE2). |
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
IPv6 Header Fields: |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
Source Address |
| 508 |
An address assigned to the interface from which the |
| 509 |
advertisement is sent. |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
Destination Address |
| 512 |
The all-nodes multicast address. |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
ICMPv6 Fields: |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
Target Address |
| 517 |
The tentative address already used (i.e., IPv6-CPE1). |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
Target Link-layer Address |
| 520 |
The link-layer address of the interface on which the BNG |
| 521 |
received the NS message. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
CPE1 CPE2 BNG |
| 524 |
| | | |
| 525 |
(a)| | | |
| 526 |
| | | |
| 527 |
(b)|===================>| |
| 528 |
| | |(c) |
| 529 |
| | | |
| 530 |
| (d)| | |
| 531 |
| | | |
| 532 |
| (e)|=========>| |
| 533 |
| | | |
| 534 |
| |<=========|(f) |
| 535 |
| | | |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
(a) CPE1 generates a tentative address |
| 538 |
(b) CPE1 performs DAD for this one |
| 539 |
(c) BNG updates its Binding Table |
| 540 |
(d) CPE2 generates a same tentative address |
| 541 |
(e) CPE2 performs DAD for this one |
| 542 |
(f) BNG informs CPE2 that DAD fails |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
Figure 2: DAD Failure |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
The BNG and the CPE MUST support the unicast transmission on the link |
| 547 |
layer of IPv6 multicast messages [<a href="./rfc6085" title=""Address Mapping of IPv6 Multicast Packets on Ethernet"">RFC6085</a>], to be able, respectively, |
| 548 |
to generate and to process such a packet format. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Manageability Considerations</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
The BNG SHOULD support a mechanism to log and emit alarms whenever a |
| 564 |
duplication of IPv6 addresses is detected by the DAD-Proxy function. |
| 565 |
Moreover, the BNG SHOULD implement a function to allow an operator to |
| 566 |
access logs and to see the current entries in the Binding Table. The |
| 567 |
management of access rights to get this information is out of the |
| 568 |
scope of this document. |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Interoperability with SEND</span> |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
The mechanism described in this document will not interoperate with |
| 575 |
SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND) [<a href="./rfc3971" title=""SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)"">RFC3971</a>]. This is due to the BNG |
| 576 |
not owning the private key associated with the Cryptographically |
| 577 |
Generated Address (CGA) [<a href="./rfc3972" title=""Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)"">RFC3972</a>] needed to correctly sign the |
| 578 |
proxied ND messages [<a href="./rfc5909" title=""Securing Neighbor Discovery Proxy: Problem Statement"">RFC5909</a>]. |
| 579 |
|
| 580 |
Secure Proxy ND Support for SEND [<a href="./rfc6496" title=""Secure Proxy ND Support for SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)"">RFC6496</a>] has been specified to |
| 581 |
address this limitation, and it SHOULD be implemented and used on the |
| 582 |
BNG and the CPEs. |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Protection against IP Source Address Spoofing</span> |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
To ensure protection against IP source address spoofing in data |
| 587 |
packets, this proposal can be used in combination with Source Address |
| 588 |
Validation Improvement (SAVI) mechanisms [<a href="./rfc6620" title=""FCFS SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses"">RFC6620</a>] [<a href="#ref-SAVI-SEND" title=""SEND-based Source- Address Validation Implementation"">SAVI-SEND</a>] |
| 589 |
[<a href="#ref-SAVI-MIX" title=""SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario"">SAVI-MIX</a>]. |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
If SAVI mechanisms are used, the SAVI device is the BNG, and the |
| 592 |
Binding Anchor for a CPE is its MAC address, which is assumed to be |
| 593 |
unique in this document (cf. <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>). |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
The authors would like to thank Alan Kavanagh, Wojciech Dec, Suresh |
| 598 |
Krishnan, and Tassos Chatzithomaoglou for their comments. The |
| 599 |
authors would like also to thank the IETF 6man WG members and the BBF |
| 600 |
community for their support. |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 622 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4861">RFC4861</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., Simpson, W., and H. Soliman, |
| 625 |
"Neighbor Discovery for IP version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc4861">RFC 4861</a>, |
| 626 |
September 2007. |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4862">RFC4862</a>] Thomson, S., Narten, T., and T. Jinmei, "IPv6 Stateless |
| 629 |
Address Autoconfiguration", <a href="./rfc4862">RFC 4862</a>, September 2007. |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6085">RFC6085</a>] Gundavelli, S., Townsley, M., Troan, O., and W. Dec, |
| 632 |
"Address Mapping of IPv6 Multicast Packets on Ethernet", |
| 633 |
<a href="./rfc6085">RFC 6085</a>, January 2011. |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3971">RFC3971</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure |
| 638 |
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>, March 2005. |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3972">RFC3972</a>] Aura, T., "Cryptographically Generated Addresses (CGA)", |
| 641 |
<a href="./rfc3972">RFC 3972</a>, March 2005. |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4389">RFC4389</a>] Thaler, D., Talwar, M., and C. Patel, "Neighbor Discovery |
| 644 |
Proxies (ND Proxy)", <a href="./rfc4389">RFC 4389</a>, April 2006. |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5072">RFC5072</a>] Varada, S., Ed., Haskins, D., and E. Allen, "IP Version 6 |
| 647 |
over PPP", <a href="./rfc5072">RFC 5072</a>, September 2007. |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5909">RFC5909</a>] Combes, J-M., Krishnan, S., and G. Daley, "Securing |
| 650 |
Neighbor Discovery Proxy: Problem Statement", <a href="./rfc5909">RFC 5909</a>, |
| 651 |
July 2010. |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6275">RFC6275</a>] Perkins, C., Johnson, D., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support |
| 654 |
in IPv6", <a href="./rfc6275">RFC 6275</a>, July 2011. |
| 655 |
|
| 656 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6496">RFC6496</a>] Krishnan, S., Laganier, J., Bonola, M., and A. Garcia- |
| 657 |
Martinez, "Secure Proxy ND Support for SEcure Neighbor |
| 658 |
Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc6496">RFC 6496</a>, February 2012. |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6620">RFC6620</a>] Nordmark, E., Bagnulo, M., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, "FCFS |
| 661 |
SAVI: First-Come, First-Served Source Address Validation |
| 662 |
Improvement for Locally Assigned IPv6 Addresses", <a href="./rfc6620">RFC</a> |
| 663 |
<a href="./rfc6620">6620</a>, May 2012. |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6775">RFC6775</a>] Shelby, Z., Chakrabarti, S., Nordmark, E., and C. |
| 674 |
Bormann, "Neighbor Discovery Optimization for IPv6 over |
| 675 |
Low-Power Wireless Personal Area Networks (6LoWPANs)", |
| 676 |
<a href="./rfc6775">RFC 6775</a>, November 2012. |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
[<a id="ref-SAVI-MIX">SAVI-MIX</a>] Bi, J., Yao, G., Halpern, J., and E. Levy-Abegnoli, Ed., |
| 679 |
"SAVI for Mixed Address Assignment Methods Scenario", |
| 680 |
Work in Progress, May 2013. |
| 681 |
|
| 682 |
[<a id="ref-SAVI-SEND">SAVI-SEND</a>] Bagnulo, M. and A. Garcia-Martinez, "SEND-based Source- |
| 683 |
Address Validation Implementation", Work in Progress, |
| 684 |
April 2013. |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
[<a id="ref-TR-101">TR-101</a>] The Broadband Forum, "Migration to Ethernet-Based DSL |
| 687 |
Aggregation", Issue 2, Technical Report TR-101, July |
| 688 |
2011, <<a href="http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/TR-101_Issue-2.pdf">http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/</a> |
| 689 |
<a href="http://www.broadband-forum.org/technical/download/TR-101_Issue-2.pdf">TR-101_Issue-2.pdf</a>>. |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
|
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
|
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. DAD-Proxy State Machine</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
This appendix, which is informative, contains a summary (cf. Table 1) |
| 732 |
of the actions done by the BNG when it receives a DAD-based NS |
| 733 |
(DAD-NS) message. The tentative address in this message is IPv6-CPE1 |
| 734 |
and the associated link-layer address is Link-layer-CPE2. The |
| 735 |
actions are precisely specified in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>. |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
+------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+ |
| 738 |
| Event | Check | Action | New event | |
| 739 |
+------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+ |
| 740 |
| DAD-NS | * No entry for | Create an entry | - | |
| 741 |
| message | IPv6-CPE1 in the | for IPv6-CPE1 | | |
| 742 |
| reception. | Binding Table. | bound to Link- | | |
| 743 |
| | | layer-CPE2 in the | | |
| 744 |
| | | Binding Table. | | |
| 745 |
| | * Entry for | - | Existing | |
| 746 |
| | IPv6-CPE1 in the | | entry. | |
| 747 |
| | Binding Table. | | | |
| 748 |
| | | | | |
| 749 |
| Existing | * Link-layer-CPE2 | - | - | |
| 750 |
| entry. | bound to IPv6-CPE1 | | | |
| 751 |
| | in the Binding | | | |
| 752 |
| | Table. | | | |
| 753 |
| | * Another link- | - | Conflict? | |
| 754 |
| | layer address, | | | |
| 755 |
| | Link-layer-CPE1, | | | |
| 756 |
| | bound to IPv6-CPE1 | | | |
| 757 |
| | in the Binding | | | |
| 758 |
| | Table. | | | |
| 759 |
| | | | | |
| 760 |
| Conflict? | * IPv6-CPE1 | - | Reachable? | |
| 761 |
| | associated to | | | |
| 762 |
| | Link-layer-CPE1 in | | | |
| 763 |
| | the Neighbor | | | |
| 764 |
| | Cache. | | | |
| 765 |
| | * IPv6-CPE1 | Out of scope. | - | |
| 766 |
| | associated to | | | |
| 767 |
| | another link-layer | | | |
| 768 |
| | address than Link- | | | |
| 769 |
| | layer-CPE1 in the | | | |
| 770 |
| | Neighbor Cache. | | | |
| 771 |
| | * IPv6-CPE1 is not | Create an entry | Reachable? | |
| 772 |
| | in the Neighbor | for IPv6-CPE1 | | |
| 773 |
| | Cache. | associated to | | |
| 774 |
| | | Link-layer-CPE1 in | | |
| 775 |
| | | the Neighbor | | |
| 776 |
| | | Cache. | | |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
| Reachable? | * NUD process is | IPv6-CPE2 is bound | - | |
| 786 |
| | negative. | to Link-layer- | | |
| 787 |
| | | CPE2, instead to | | |
| 788 |
| | | Link-layer-CPE1, | | |
| 789 |
| | | in the Binding | | |
| 790 |
| | | Table. | | |
| 791 |
| | * NUD process is | A NA message is | - | |
| 792 |
| | positive. | sent. | | |
| 793 |
+------------+--------------------+--------------------+------------+ |
| 794 |
|
| 795 |
Table 1: DAD-Proxy State Machine |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
|
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
|
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
|
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
|
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
|
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6957">RFC 6957</a> DAD-Proxy June 2013</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
Fabio Costa |
| 844 |
France Telecom Orange |
| 845 |
61 rue des Archives |
| 846 |
75141 Paris Cedex 03 |
| 847 |
France |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
Jean-Michel Combes (editor) |
| 853 |
France Telecom Orange |
| 854 |
38 rue du General Leclerc |
| 855 |
92794 Issy-les-Moulineaux Cedex 9 |
| 856 |
France |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
|
| 861 |
Xavier Pougnard |
| 862 |
France Telecom Orange |
| 863 |
2 avenue Pierre Marzin |
| 864 |
22300 Lannion |
| 865 |
France |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
Hongyu Li |
| 871 |
Huawei Technologies |
| 872 |
Huawei Industrial Base |
| 873 |
Shenzhen |
| 874 |
China |
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
|
| 879 |
|
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
|
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
Costa, et al. Standards Track [Page 16] |
| 893 |
</pre> |