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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) L. Velvindron
2 Request for Comments: 8270 Hackers.mu
3 Updates: <a href="./rfc4419">4419</a> M. Baushke
4 Category: Standards Track Juniper Networks, Inc.
5 ISSN: 2070-1721 December 2017
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Increase the Secure Shell Minimum Recommended</span>
9 <span class="h1">Diffie-Hellman Modulus Size to 2048 Bits</span>
10
11 Abstract
12
13 The Diffie-Hellman (DH) Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH)
14 transport-layer protocol specifies that servers and clients should
15 support groups with a minimum modulus group size of 1024 bits.
16 Recent security research has shown that the minimum value of 1024
17 bits is insufficient to protect against state-sponsored actors and
18 any organization with enough computing resources. This RFC updates
19 <a href="./rfc4419">RFC 4419</a>, which allowed for DH moduli less than 2048 bits; now, 2048
20 bits is the minimum acceptable group size.
21
22 Status of This Memo
23
24 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
25
26 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
27 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
28 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
29 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
30 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
31
32 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
33 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
34 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8270">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8270</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Velvindron &amp; Baushke Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8270">RFC 8270</a> Recommended Minimum Modulus Size December 2017</span>
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57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
75 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
76 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. 2048-Bit DH Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
77 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Interoperability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
78 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
79 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
80 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
81 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
82 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
83 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
84
85 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
86
87 [<a id="ref-RFC4419">RFC4419</a>] specifies a recommended minimum DH modulus group size of
88 1024 bits. It also suggests that in all cases, the size of the group
89 needs to be at least 1024 bits. This document updates [<a href="./rfc4419" title="&quot;Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol&quot;">RFC4419</a>] so
90 that the minimum recommended size is 2048 bits. This recommendation
91 is based on recent research [<a href="#ref-LOGJAM" title="&quot;Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice&quot;">LOGJAM</a>] on DH group weaknesses. This
92 minimum DH group size may need to be increased to 3072 for forward-
93 looking users.
94
95 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements Language</span>
96
97 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
98 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
99 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in
100 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
101 capitals, as shown here.
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108 <span class="grey">Velvindron &amp; Baushke Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8270">RFC 8270</a> Recommended Minimum Modulus Size December 2017</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. 2048-Bit DH Group</span>
114
115 Recent research [<a href="#ref-LOGJAM" title="&quot;Imperfect Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice&quot;">LOGJAM</a>] strongly suggests that DH groups that are
116 1024 bits can be broken by state-sponsored actors and any
117 organization with enough computing resources. The authors show how
118 they are able to break 768-bit DH groups and extrapolate the attack
119 to 1024-bit DH groups. In their analysis, they show that breaking
120 1024 bits can be done with sufficient computing resources. This
121 document provides the following recommendation: SSH servers and SSH
122 clients SHOULD support groups with a minimum acceptable group size of
123 2048 bits for the "min" value of the SSH_MSG_KEY_DH_GEX_REQUEST
124 client message given in [<a href="./rfc4419" title="&quot;Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol&quot;">RFC4419</a>]. Further, SSH clients SHOULD be
125 able to send a value of 3072 bits for the preferred acceptable group
126 size "n" in the SSH_MSG_KEY_DH_GEX_REQUEST message.
127
128 [<a id="ref-RFC4419">RFC4419</a>] specifies a recommended minimum size of 1024 bits for k,
129 which is the modulus length of the DH group. It also suggests that,
130 in all cases, the size of the group needs be at least 1024 bits.
131 This document updates [<a href="./rfc4419" title="&quot;Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol&quot;">RFC4419</a>] as described below:
132
133 o <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>, paragraph 9:
134 Servers and clients SHOULD support groups with a modulus length of
135 k bits where 2048 &lt;= k &lt;= 8192. The recommended minimum values
136 for min and max are 2048 and 8192, respectively. Setting k to
137 3072 SHOULD be possible, as the need may arise in the coming
138 years.
139
140 o <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>, paragraph 11:
141 In all cases, the size of the group SHOULD be at least 2048 bits.
142 Setting the group size to 3072 SHOULD be possible, as the need may
143 arise in the coming years.
144
145 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Interoperability</span>
146
147 This document keeps the following requirement from [<a href="./rfc4419" title="&quot;Diffie-Hellman Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer Protocol&quot;">RFC4419</a>]:
148
149 The server should return the smallest group it knows that is
150 larger than the size the client requested. If the server does not
151 know a group that is larger than the client request, then it
152 SHOULD return the largest group it knows.
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154 Also, it updates the subsequent sentence as follows:
155
156 In all cases, the size of the returned group SHOULD be at least
157 2048 bits. Setting the group size to 3072 SHOULD be possible, as
158 the need may arise in the coming years.
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164 <span class="grey">Velvindron &amp; Baushke Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8270">RFC 8270</a> Recommended Minimum Modulus Size December 2017</span>
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168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
170
171 This document discusses security issues of DH groups that are 1024
172 bits in size, and formally updates the minimum size of DH groups to
173 be 2048 bits. A hostile or "owned" SSH server implementation could
174 potentially use backdoored DH primes using the methods described in
175 [<a href="#ref-Backdoor-DH">Backdoor-DH</a>] to provide the g and p values to be used. Or, it could
176 just send the calculated secret through a covert channel of some sort
177 to a passive listener.
178
179 A malicious client could cause a Denial of Service by intentionally
180 making multiple connections that are less than 2048 bits in size.
181 Therefore, operating systems SHOULD NOT log DH groups that are less
182 than 2048 bits in size, as it would create an additional attack
183 surface.
184
185 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
186
187 This document does not require any IANA actions.
188
189 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. References</span>
190
191 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Normative References</span>
192
193 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
194 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
195 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
196 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
197
198 [<a id="ref-RFC4419">RFC4419</a>] Friedl, M., Provos, N., and W. Simpson, "Diffie-Hellman
199 Group Exchange for the Secure Shell (SSH) Transport Layer
200 Protocol", <a href="./rfc4419">RFC 4419</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4419, March 2006,
201 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4419">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4419</a>&gt;.
202
203 [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
204 <a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
205 May 2017, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.
206
207 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Informative References</span>
208
209 [<a id="ref-Backdoor-DH">Backdoor-DH</a>]
210 Wong, D., "How to Backdoor Diffie-Hellman", Cryptology
211 ePrint Archive Report 2016/644, June 2016,
212 &lt;<a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2016/644.pdf</a>&gt;.
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220 <span class="grey">Velvindron &amp; Baushke Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8270">RFC 8270</a> Recommended Minimum Modulus Size December 2017</span>
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224
225 [<a id="ref-LOGJAM">LOGJAM</a>] Adrian, D., Bhargavan, K., Durumeric, Z., Gaudry, P.,
226 Green, M., Halderman, J., Heninger, N., Springall, D.,
227 Thome, E., Valenta, L., VanderSloot, B., Wustrow, E.,
228 Zanella-Beguelin, S., and P. Zimmermann, "Imperfect
229 Forward Secrecy: How Diffie-Hellman Fails in Practice",
230 ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
231 (CCS) 2015, DOI 10.1145/2810103.2813707, 2015,
232 &lt;<a href="https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf">https://weakdh.org/imperfect-forward-secrecy-ccs15.pdf</a>&gt;.
233
234 Authors' Addresses
235
236 Loganaden Velvindron
237 Hackers.mu
238 88, Avenue De Plevitz
239 Roches Brunes
240 Mauritius
241
242 Phone: +230 59762817
243 Email: [email protected]
244
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246 Mark D. Baushke
247 Juniper Networks, Inc.
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249 Email: [email protected]
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