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<pre>Network Working Group D. Estrin |
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Request for Comments: 1125 USC Computer Science Department |
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November 1989 |
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<span class="h1">POLICY REQUIREMENTS FOR INTER ADMINISTRATIVE DOMAIN ROUTING</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a> STATUS OF THIS MEMO</span> |
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The purpose of this memo is to focus discussion on particular |
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problems in the Internet and possible methods of solution. No |
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proposed solutions in this document are intended as standards for the |
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Internet. Rather, it is hoped that a general consensus will emerge |
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as to the appropriate solution to such problems, leading eventually |
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to the development and adoption of standards. Distribution of this |
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memo is unlimited. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a> ABSTRACT</span> |
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Efforts are now underway to develop a new generation of routing |
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protocol that will allow each Administrative Domain (AD) in the |
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growing Internet (and internets in general) to independently express |
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and enforce policies regarding the flow of packets to, from, and |
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through its resources. (FOOTNOTE 1: The material presented here |
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incorporates discussions held with members of the IAB Autonomous |
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Networks Research Group and the Open Routing Working Group.) This |
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document articulates the requirements for policy based routing and |
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should be used as input to the functional specification and |
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evaluation of proposed protocols. |
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Two critical assumptions will shape the type of routing mechanism |
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that is devised: (1) the topological organization of ADs, and (2) the |
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type and variability of policies expressed by ADs. After justifying |
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our assumptions regarding AD topology we present a taxonomy, and |
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specific examples, of policies that must be supported by a PR |
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protocol. We conclude with a brief discussion of policy routing |
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mechanisms proposed in previous RFCs (827, 1102, 1104, 1105). Future |
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RFCs will elaborate on the architecture and protocols needed to |
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support the requirements presented here. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a> BACKGROUND</span> |
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The Research Internet has evolved from a single backbone wide area |
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network with many connected campus networks, to an internet with |
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multiple cross-country backbones, regional access networks, and a |
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profusion of campus networks. (FOOTNOTE 2: The term Research Internet |
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refers to a collection of government, university, and some private |
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company, networks that are used by researchers to access shared |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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computing resources (e.g., supercomputers), and for research related |
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information exchange (e.g., distribution of software, technical |
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documents, and email). The networks that make up the Research |
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Internet run the DOD Internet Protocol [<a href="#ref-1" title="Network Information Center">1</a>].) At times during its |
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development the Research Internet topology appeared somewhat chaotic. |
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Overlapping facilities and lateral (as opposed to hierarchical) |
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connections seemed to be the rule rather than the exception. Today |
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the Research Internet topology is becoming more regular through |
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coordination of agency investment and adoption of a hierarchy similar |
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to that of the telephone networks'. The result is several |
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overlapping wide area backbones connected to regional networks, which |
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in turn connect to campus networks at universities, research |
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laboratories, and private companies. However, the telephone network |
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has lateral connections only at the highest level, i.e., between long |
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haul carriers. In the Research Internet there exist lateral |
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connections at each level of the hierarchy, i.e., between campus (and |
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regional) networks as well. |
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Additional complexity is introduced in the Research Internet by |
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virtue of connections to private networks. Many private companies are |
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connected to the Research Internet for purposes of research or |
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support activities. These private companies connect in the same |
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manner as campuses, via a regional network or via lateral links to |
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other campuses. However, many companies have their own private wide |
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area networks which physically overlap with backbone and/or regional |
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networks in the research internet, i.e., private vertical bypass |
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links. |
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Implicit in this complex topology are organizational boundaries. |
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These boundaries define Administrative Domains (ADs) which preclude |
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the imposition of a single, centralized set of policies on all |
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resources. The subject of this paper is the policy requirements for |
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resource usage control in the Research Internet. |
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In the remainder of this section we describe the policy routing |
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problem in very general terms. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> examines the constraints and |
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requirements that makes the problem challenging, and leads us to |
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conclude that a new generation of routing and resource control |
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protocols are needed. <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> provides more detail on our |
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assumptions as to the future topology and configuration of |
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interconnected ADs. We return to the subject of policy requirements |
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in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> and categorize the different types of policies that ADs |
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in the research internet may want to enforce. Included in this |
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section are examples of FRICC policy statements. (FOOTNOTE 3: The |
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Federal Research Internet Coordinating Committee (FRICC) is made up |
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of representatives of each of the major agencies that are involved in |
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networking. They have been very effective in coordinating their |
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efforts to eliminate inefficient redundancy and have proposed a plan |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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for the next 10 years of internetworking for the government, |
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scientific, and education community [<a href="#ref-2" title="The Federal Research Internet Coordinating Committee and National Research Network">2</a>].) <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> identifies types |
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of policy statements that are problematic to enforce due to their |
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dynamics, granularity, or performance implications. Several proposed |
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mechanisms for supporting PR (including RFCs 827, 1102, 1104, 1105) |
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are discussed briefly in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>. Future RFCs will elaborate on the |
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architecture and protocols needed to support the requirements |
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presented here. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> POLICY ROUTING</span> |
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Previous protocols such as the Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP)[<a href="#ref-3" title="Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP)">3</a>] |
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embodied a limited notion of policy and ADs. In particular, |
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autonomous system boundaries constrained the flow of routing database |
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information, and only indirectly affected the flow of packets |
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themselves. We consider an Administrative Domain (AD) to be a set of |
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hosts and network resources (gateways, links, etc.) that is governed |
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by common policies. In large internets that cross organization |
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boundaries, e.g., the Research Internet, inter-AD routes must be |
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selected according to policy-related parameters such as cost and |
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access rights, in addition to the traditional parameters of |
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connectivity and congestion. In other words, Policy Routing (PR) is |
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needed to navigate through the complex web of policy boundaries |
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created by numerous interconnected ADs. Moreover, each AD has its own |
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privileges and perspective and therefore must make its own evaluation |
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of legal and preferred routes. Efforts are now underway to develop a |
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new generation of routing protocol that will allow each AD to |
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independently express and enforce policies regarding the flow of |
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packets to, from, and through its resources [<a href="#ref-4" title="Policy Routing in Internet Protocols">4</a>]. (FOOTNOTE 4: These |
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issues are under investigation by the IAB Autonomous Networks |
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Research Group and the IAB Open Routing Working Group. For further |
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information contact the author.) |
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The purpose of this paper is to articulate the requirements for such |
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policy based routing. Two critical assumptions will shape the type of |
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routing mechanism that is devised: |
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* The topological organization of ADs, and |
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* The type and variability of policies expressed by ADs. |
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We make use of the policies expressed by owners of current Research |
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Internet resources and private networks connected to the Research |
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Internet to generalize types of policies that must be supported. This |
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top down effort must be done with attention to the technical |
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implications of the policy statements if the result is to be useful |
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in guiding technical development. For example, some ADs express the |
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desire to enforce local constraints over how packets travel to their |
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destination. Other ADs are only concerned with preventing use of |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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their own network resources by restricting transit. Still other ADs |
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are concerned primarily with recovering the expense of carrying |
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traffic and providing feedback to users so that users will limit |
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their own data flows; in other words they are concerned with |
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charging. We refer to ADs whose primary concern is communication to |
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and from hosts within their AD as stub and to ADs whose primary |
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concern is carrying packets to and from other ADs as transit}. If we |
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address control of transit alone, for example, the resulting |
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mechanisms will not necessarily allow an AD to control the flow of |
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its packets from source to destination, or to implement flexible |
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charging schemes. (FOOTNOTE 5: Gene Tsudik uses the analogy of |
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international travel to express the need for source and transit |
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controls. Each country expresses its own policies about travel to and |
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through its land. Travel through one country enroute to another is |
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analogous to transit traffic in the network world. A traveler |
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collects policy information from each of the countries of interest |
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and plans an itinerary that conforms to those policies as well as the |
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preferences of the traveler and his/her home nation. Thus there is |
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both source and transit region control of routing.) Our purpose is |
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to articulate a comprehensive set of requirements for PR as input to |
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the functional specification, and evaluation, of proposed protocols. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a> WHY THE PROBLEM IS DIFFICULT</span> |
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Before proceeding with our description of topology and policy |
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requirements this section outlines several assumptions and |
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constraints, namely: the lack of global authority, the need to |
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support network resource sharing as well as network interconnection, |
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the complex and dynamic mapping of users to ADs and privileges, and |
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the need for accountability across ADs. These assumptions limit the |
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solution space and raise challenging technical issues. |
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The purpose of policy based routing is to allow ADs to interconnect |
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and share computer and network resources in a controlled manner. |
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Unlike many other problems of resource control, there is no global |
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authority. Each AD defines its own policies with respect to its own |
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traffic and resources. However, while we assume no global authority, |
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and no global policies, we recognize that complete autonomy implies |
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no dependence and therefore no communication. The multi-organization |
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internets addressed here have inherent regions of autonomy, as well |
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as requirements for interdependence. Our mechanisms should allow ADs |
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to design their boundaries, instead of requiring that the boundaries |
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be either impenetrable or eliminated. |
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One of the most problematic aspects of the policy routing |
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requirements identified here is the need to support both network |
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resource sharing and interconnection across ADs. An example of |
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resource sharing is two ADs (e.g., agencies, divisions, companies) |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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sharing network resources (e.g., links, or gateways and links) to |
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take advantage of economies of scale. Providing transit services to |
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external ADs is another example of network resource sharing. |
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Interconnection is the more common example of ADs interconnecting |
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their independently used network resources to achieve connectivity |
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across the ADs, i.e., to allow a user in one AD to communicate with |
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users in another AD. In some respects, network resource control is |
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simpler than network interconnection control since the potential |
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dangers are fewer (i.e., denial of service and loss of revenue as |
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compared with a wide range of attacks on end systems through network |
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interconnection). However, controlled network resource sharing is |
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more difficult to support. In an internet a packet may travel |
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through a number of transit ADs on its way to the destination. |
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Consequently, policies from all transit ADs must be considered when a |
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packet is being sent, whereas for stub-AD control only the policies |
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of the two end point ADs have to be considered. In other words, |
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controlled network resource sharing and transit require that policy |
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enforcement be integrated into the routing protocols themselves and |
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can not be left to network control mechanisms at the end points. |
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(FOOTNOTE 6&7: Another difference is that in the interconnect case, |
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traffic traveling over AD A's network resources always has a member |
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of AD A as its source or destination (or both). Under resource |
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sharing arrangements members of both AD A and B are connected to the |
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same resources and consequently intra-AD traffic (i.e., packets |
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sourced and destined for members of the same AD) travels over the |
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resources. This distinction is relevant to the writing of policies in |
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terms of principal affiliation. Economies of scale is one motivation |
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for resource sharing. For example, instead of interconnecting |
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separately to several independent agency networks, a campus network |
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may interconnect to a shared backbone facility. Today, |
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interconnection is achieved through a combination of AD specific and |
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shared arrangements. We expect this mixed situation to persist for |
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"well-connected" campuses for reasons of politics, economics, and |
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functionality (e.g., different characteristics of the different |
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agency-networks). See <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for more discussion.) |
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Complications also result from the fact that legitimate users of an |
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AD's resources are not all located in that AD. Many users (and their |
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computers) who are funded by, or are affiliated with, a particular |
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agency's program reside within the AD of the user's university or |
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research laboratory. They reside in a campus AD along with users who |
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are legitimate users of other AD resources. Moreover, any one person |
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may be a legitimate user of multiple AR resources under varying |
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conditions and constraints (see examples in <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>). In addition, |
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users can move from one AD to another. In other words, a user's |
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rights can not be determined solely based on the AD from which the |
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user's communications originate. Consequently, PR must not only |
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identify resources, it must identify principals and associate |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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different capabilities and rights with different principals. (The |
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term principal is taken from the computer security community[7].) |
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One way of reducing the compromise of autonomy associated with |
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interconnection is to implement mechanisms that assure |
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accountability} for resources used. Accountability may be enforced a |
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priori, e.g., access control mechanisms applied before resource usage |
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is permitted. Alternatively, accountability may be enforced after |
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the fact, e.g., record keeping or metering that supports detection |
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and provides evidence to third parties (i.e., non-repudiation). |
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Accountability mechanisms can also be used to provide feedback to |
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users as to consumption of resources. Internally an AD often decides |
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to do away with such feedback under the premise that communication is |
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a global good and should not be inhibited. There is not necessarily a |
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"global good" across AD boundaries. Therefore, it becomes more |
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appropriate to have resource usage visible to users, whether or not |
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actual charging for usage takes place. Another motivation that |
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drives the need for accountability across AD boundaries is the |
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greater variability in implementations. Different implementations of |
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a single network protocol can vary greatly as to their efficiency |
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[<a href="#ref-8" title="Palo Alto">8</a>]. We can not assume control over implementation across AD |
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boundaries. Feedback mechanisms such as metering (and charging in |
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some cases) would introduce a concrete incentive for ADs to employ |
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efficient and correct implementations. PR should allow an AD to |
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advertise and apply such accounting measures to inter-AD traffic. |
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In summary, the lack of global authority, the need to support network |
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resource sharing as well as network interconnection, the complex and |
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dynamic mapping of users to ADs and rights, and the need for |
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accountability across ADs, are characteristics of inter-AD |
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communications which must be taken into account in the design of both |
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policies and supporting technical mechanisms. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a> TOPOLOGY MODEL OF INTERNET</span> |
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Before discussing policies per se, we outline our model of inter-AD |
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topology and how it influences the type of policy support required. |
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Most members of the Internet community agree that the future Internet |
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will connect on the order of 150,000,000 termination points and |
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100,000 ADs. However, there are conflicting opinions as to the AD |
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topology for which we must design PR mechanisms. The informal |
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argument is described here. |
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SIMPLE AD TOPOLOGY AND POLICY MODEL Some members of the Internet |
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community believe that the current complex topology of interconnected |
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ADs is a transient artifact resulting from the evolutionary nature of |
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the Research Internet's history. (FOOTNOTE 9: David Cheriton of |
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Stanford University articulated this side of the argument at an |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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|
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|
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Internet workshop in Santa Clara, January, 1989). The critical points |
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of this argument relate to topology and policy. They contend that in |
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the long term the following three conditions will prevail: |
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* The public carriers will provide pervasive, competitively |
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priced, high speed data services. |
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* The resulting topology of ADs will be |
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stub (not transit) ADs connected to regional |
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backbones, which in turn interconnect via multiple, |
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overlapping long haul backbones, i.e., a hierarchy with |
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no lateral connections between stub-ADs or regionals, |
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and no vertical bypass links. |
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* The policy requirements of the backbone and stub-ADs |
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will be based only on charging for resource usage at the |
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stub-AD to backbone-AD boundary, and to settling accounts |
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between neighboring backbone providers (regional to long haul, |
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and long haul to long haul). |
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Under these assumptions, the primary requirement for general AD |
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interconnect is a metering and charging protocol. The routing |
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decision can be modeled as a simple least cost path with the metric |
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in dollars and cents. In other words, restrictions on access to |
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transit services will be minimal and the functionality provided by |
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the routing protocol need not be changed significantly from current |
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day approaches. |
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COMPLEX AD TOPOLOGY AND POLICY MODEL The counter argument is that a |
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more complex AD topology will persist. (FOOTNOTE 10: Much of the |
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remainder of this paper attempts to justify and provide evidence for |
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this statement.) The different assumptions about AD topology lead to |
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the significantly different assumptions about AD policies. |
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This model assumes that the topology of ADs will in many respects |
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agree with the previous model of increased commercial carrier |
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participation and resulting hierarchical structure. However, we |
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anticipate unavoidable and persistent exceptions to the hierarchy. |
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We assume that there will be a relatively small number of long haul |
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transit ADs (on the order of 100), but that there may be tens of |
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thousands of regional ADs and hundreds of thousands of stub ADs |
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(e.g., campuses, laboratories, and private companies). The competing |
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long haul offerings will differ, both in the services provided and in |
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their packaging and pricing. Regional networks will overlap less and |
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will connect campus and private company networks. However, many |
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stub-ADs will retain some private lateral links for political, |
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technical, and reliability reasons. For example, political |
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incentives cause organizations to invest in bypass links that are not |
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<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
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|
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always justifiable on a strict cost comparison basis; specialized |
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technical requirements cause organizations to invest in links that |
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have characteristics (e.g., data rate, delay, error, security) not |
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available from public carriers at a competitive rate; and critical |
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requirements cause organizations to invest in redundant back up links |
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for reliability reasons. These exceptions to the otherwise regular |
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topology are not dispensible. They will persist and must be |
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accommodated, perhaps at the expense of optimality; see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for |
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more detail. In addition, many private companies will retain their |
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own private long haul network facilities. (FOOTNOTE 11: While |
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private voice networks also exist, private data networks are more |
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common. Voice requirements are more standardized because voice |
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applications are more uniform than are data applications, and |
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therefore the commercial services more often have what the voice |
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customer wants at a price that is competitive with the private |
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network option. Data communication requirements are still more |
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specialized and dynamic. Thus, there is less opportunity for economy |
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of scale in service offerings and it is harder to keep up to date |
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with customer demand. For this reason we expect private data networks |
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to persist for the near future. As the telephone companies begin to |
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introduce the next generation of high speed packet switched services, |
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the scenario should change. However, we maintain that the result will |
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be a predominance, but not complete dominance, of public carrier use |
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for long haul communication. Therefore, private data networks will |
| 417 |
persist and the routing architecture must accommodate controlled |
| 418 |
interconnection.) Critical differences between the two models follow |
| 419 |
from the difference in assumptions regarding AD topology. In the |
| 420 |
complex case, lateral connections must be supported, along with the |
| 421 |
means to control the use of such connections in the routing |
| 422 |
protocols. |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
The different topologies imply different policy requirements. The |
| 425 |
first model assumes that all policies can be expressed and enforced |
| 426 |
in terms of dollars and cents and distributed charging schemes. The |
| 427 |
second model assumes that ADs want more varied control over their |
| 428 |
resources, control that can not be captured in a dollars and cents |
| 429 |
metric alone. We describe the types of policies to be supported and |
| 430 |
provide examples in the following section, <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a>. In brief, given |
| 431 |
private lateral links, ADs must be able to express access and |
| 432 |
charging related restrictions and privileges that discriminate on an |
| 433 |
AD basis. These policies will be diverse, dynamic, and new |
| 434 |
requirements will emerge over time, consequently support must be |
| 435 |
extensible. For example, the packaging and charging schemes of any |
| 436 |
single long haul service will vary over time and may be relatively |
| 437 |
elaborate (e.g., many tiers of service, special package deals, to |
| 438 |
achieve price discrimination). |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
Note that these assumptions about complexity do not preclude some |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
collection of ADs from "negotiating away" their policy differences, |
| 450 |
i.e., forming a federation, and coordinating a simplified inter-AD |
| 451 |
configuration in order to reduce the requirements for inter-AD |
| 452 |
mechanisms. However, we maintain that there will persist collections |
| 453 |
of ADs that will not and can not behave as a single federation; both |
| 454 |
in the research community and, even more predominantly, in the |
| 455 |
broader commercial arena. Moreover, when it comes to interconnecting |
| 456 |
across these federations, non-negotiable differences will arise |
| 457 |
eventually. It is our goal to develop mechanisms that are applicable |
| 458 |
in the broader arena. |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
The Internet community developed its original protocol suite with |
| 461 |
only minimal provision for resource control [<a href="#ref-9" title="Palo Alto">9</a>]. This was |
| 462 |
appropriate at the time of development based on the assumed community |
| 463 |
(i.e., researchers) and the ground breaking nature of the technology. |
| 464 |
The next generation of network technology is now being designed to |
| 465 |
take advantage of high speed media and to support high demand traffic |
| 466 |
generated by more powerful computers and their applications [<a href="#ref-10" title="B. Leiner">10</a>]. As |
| 467 |
with TCP/IP we hope that the technology being developed will find |
| 468 |
itself applied outside of the research community. This time it would |
| 469 |
be inexcusable to ignore resource control requirements and not to pay |
| 470 |
careful attention to their specification. |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
Finally, we look forward to the Internet structure taking advantage |
| 473 |
of economies of scale offered by enhanced commercial services. |
| 474 |
However, in many respects the problem that stub-ADs may thus avoid, |
| 475 |
will be faced by the multiple regional and long haul carriers |
| 476 |
providing the services. The carriers' charging and resource control |
| 477 |
policies will be complex enough to require routing mechanisms similar |
| 478 |
to ones being proposed for the complex AD topology case described |
| 479 |
here. Whether the network structure is based on private or |
| 480 |
commercial services, the goal is to construct policy sensitive |
| 481 |
mechanisms that will be transparent to end users (i.e., the |
| 482 |
mechanisms are part of the routing infrastructure at the network |
| 483 |
level, and not an end to end concern). |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a> POLICY TYPES</span> |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
This section outlines a taxonomy of internet policies for inter-AD |
| 488 |
topologies that allow lateral and bypass links. The taxonomy is |
| 489 |
intended to cover a wide range of ADs and internets. Any particular |
| 490 |
PR architecture we design should support a significant subset of |
| 491 |
these policy types but may not support all of them due to technical |
| 492 |
complexity and performance considerations. The general taxonomy is |
| 493 |
important input to a functional specification for PR. Moreover, it |
| 494 |
can be used to evaluate and compare the suitability and completeness |
| 495 |
of existing routing architectures and protocols for PR; see <a href="#section-8">Section</a> |
| 496 |
<a href="#section-8">8</a>. |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
We provide examples from the Research Internet of the different |
| 506 |
policy types in the form of resource usage policy statements. These |
| 507 |
statements were collected through interviews with agency |
| 508 |
representatives, but they do not represent official policy. These |
| 509 |
sample policy statements should not} be interpreted as agency policy, |
| 510 |
they are provided here only as examples. |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
Internet policies fall into two classes, access and charging. Access |
| 513 |
policies specify who can use resources and under what conditions. |
| 514 |
Charging policies specify the metering, accounting, and billing |
| 515 |
implemented by a particular AD. |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> TAXONOMY OF ACCESS POLICIES</span> |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
We have identified the following types of access policies that ADs |
| 520 |
may wish to enforce. Charging policies are described in the |
| 521 |
subsequent section. <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a> provides more specific examples of |
| 522 |
both access and charging policies using FRICC policy statements. |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
Access policies typically are expressed in the form: principals of |
| 525 |
type x can have access to resources of type y under the following |
| 526 |
conditions, z. The policies are categorized below according to the |
| 527 |
definition of y and z. In any particular instance, each of the |
| 528 |
policy types would be further qualified by definition of legitimate |
| 529 |
principals, , x, i.e., what characteristics x must have in order to |
| 530 |
access the resource in question. |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
We refer to access policies described by stub and transit ADs. The |
| 533 |
two roles imply different motivations for resource control, however |
| 534 |
the types of policies expressed are similar; we expect the supporting |
| 535 |
mechanisms to be common as well. |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
Stub and transit access policies may specify any of the following |
| 538 |
parameters: |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
* SOURCE/DESTINATION |
| 541 |
Source/Destination policies prevent or restrict communication |
| 542 |
originated by or destined for particular ADs (or hosts or user |
| 543 |
classes within an AD). |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
* PATH |
| 546 |
Path sensitive policies specify which ADs may or may not be passed |
| 547 |
through en route to a destination. The most general path sensitive |
| 548 |
policies allow stub and transit ADs to express policies that depend |
| 549 |
on any component in the AD path. In other words, a stub AD could |
| 550 |
reject a route based on any AD (or combination of ADs) in the route. |
| 551 |
Similarly, a transit AD could express a packet forwarding policy that |
| 552 |
behaves differently depending upon which ADs a packet has passed |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
through, and is going to pass through, en route to the destination. |
| 562 |
Less ambitious (and perhaps more reasonable) path sensitive policies |
| 563 |
might only discriminate according to the immediate neighbor ADs |
| 564 |
through which the packet is traveling (i.e., a stub network could |
| 565 |
reject a route based on the first transit AD in the route, and a |
| 566 |
transit AD could express a packet forwarding policy that depends upon |
| 567 |
the previous, and the subsequent, transit ADs in the route.) |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
* QUALITY/TYPE OF SERVICE(QOS OR TOS) |
| 570 |
This type of policy restricts access to special resources or |
| 571 |
services. For example, a special high throughput, low delay link may |
| 572 |
be made available on a selective basis. |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
* RESOURCE GUARANTEE |
| 575 |
These policies provide a guaranteed percentage of a resource on a |
| 576 |
selective, as needed basis. In other words, the resource can be used |
| 577 |
by others if the preferred-AD's offered load is below the guaranteed |
| 578 |
level of service. The guarantee may be to always carry intra-AD |
| 579 |
traffic or to always carry inter-AD traffic for a specific AD. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
* TEMPORAL |
| 582 |
Temporal policies restrict usage based on the time of day or other |
| 583 |
time related parameters. |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
* HIGH LEVEL PROTOCOL |
| 586 |
Usage may be restricted to a specific high level protocol such as |
| 587 |
mail or file transfer. (Alternatively, such policies can be |
| 588 |
implemented as source/destination policies by configuring a host(s) |
| 589 |
within an AD as an application relay and composing policy terms that |
| 590 |
allow inter-AD access to only that host.) |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
* RESOURCE LIMIT |
| 593 |
There may be a limit on the amount of traffic load a source may |
| 594 |
generate during a particular time interval, e.g., so many packets in |
| 595 |
a day, hour, or minute. |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
* AUTHENTICATION REQUIREMENTS |
| 598 |
Conditions may be specified regarding the authenticability of |
| 599 |
principal identifying information. Some ADs might require some form |
| 600 |
of cryptographic proof as to the identity and affiliations of the |
| 601 |
principal before providing access to critical resources. |
| 602 |
|
| 603 |
The above policy types usually exist in combination for a particular |
| 604 |
AD, i.e., an AD's policies might express a combination of transit, |
| 605 |
source/destination, and QOS restrictions. This taxonomy will evolve |
| 606 |
as PR is applied to other domains. |
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
As will be seen in <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a> an AD can express its charging and |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
access policies in a single syntax. Moreover, both stub and transit |
| 618 |
policies can co-exist. This is important since some ADs operate as |
| 619 |
both stub and transit facilities and require such hybrid control. |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a> TAXONOMY OF CHARGING POLICIES</span> |
| 622 |
|
| 623 |
Stub and transit charging policies may specify the following |
| 624 |
parameters: |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
* UNIT OF ACCOUNTING (e.g., dollars or credits). |
| 627 |
* BASIS FOR CHARGING (e.g., per Kbyte or per Kpkt). |
| 628 |
* ACTUAL CHARGES (e.g., actual numbers such as $.50/Mbyte). |
| 629 |
* WHO IS CHARGED OR PAID (e.g., originator of packet, |
| 630 |
immediate neighbor from whom packet was received, destination |
| 631 |
of packet, a third party collection agent). |
| 632 |
* WHOSE PACKET COUNT is used (e.g., source, destination, the |
| 633 |
transit AD's own count, the count of some upstream or |
| 634 |
downstream AD). |
| 635 |
* BOUND ON CHARGES (e.g., to limit the amount that a stub |
| 636 |
AD is willing to spend, or the amount that a transit AD is |
| 637 |
willing to carry.) |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
The enforcement of these policies may be carried out during route |
| 640 |
synthesis or route selection [<a href="#ref-4" title="Policy Routing in Internet Protocols">4</a>]. |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a> EXAMPLE POLICY STATEMENTS</span> |
| 643 |
|
| 644 |
The following policy statements were collected in the fall of 1988 |
| 645 |
through interviews with representatives of the federal agencies most |
| 646 |
involved in supporting internetworking. Once again we emphasize that |
| 647 |
these are not official policy statements. They are presented here to |
| 648 |
provide concrete examples of the sort of policies that agencies would |
| 649 |
like to enforce. |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
Expressing policies as Policy Terms (PTs) |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
Each policy is described in English and then expressed in a policy |
| 654 |
term (PT) notation suggested by Dave Clark in [<a href="#ref-4" title="Policy Routing in Internet Protocols">4</a>]. Each PT |
| 655 |
represents a distinct policy of the AD that synthesized it. The |
| 656 |
format of a PT is: |
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
[(H{src},AD{src},AD{ent}),(H{dst},AD{dst},AD{exit}),UCI, Cg,Cb] |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
Hsrc stands for source host, ADsrc for source AD, ADent for entering |
| 661 |
AD (i.e., neighboring AD from which traffic is arriving directly), |
| 662 |
Hdst for destination host, ADdst for destination AD, ADexit for exit |
| 663 |
AD (i.e.,neighboring AD to which traffic is going directly), UCI for |
| 664 |
user class identifier, and Cg and Cb for global and bilateral |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
conditions, respectively. The purpose of a PT is to specify that |
| 674 |
packets from some host, H{src}, (or a group of hosts) in a source AD, |
| 675 |
AD{src}, are allowed to enter the AD in question via some directly |
| 676 |
connected AD, AD{ent}, and exit through another directly connected |
| 677 |
AD, AD{exit}, on its way to a host, H{dst}, (or a group of hosts) in |
| 678 |
some destination AD, AD{dst}. User Class Identifier (UCI) allows for |
| 679 |
distinguishing between various user classes, e.g., Government, |
| 680 |
Research, Commercial, Contract, etc. Global Conditions (Cg) |
| 681 |
represent billing and other variables. Bilateral Conditions (Cb) |
| 682 |
relate to agreements between neighboring ADs, e.g., related to |
| 683 |
metering or charging. In the example policy terms provided below we |
| 684 |
make use of the following abbreviations: Fricc for |
| 685 |
{DOE,NASA,DCA,NSF}, F for Federal Agency, Re for Regional, U for |
| 686 |
University, Co for Commercial Corporation, and Cc for Commercial |
| 687 |
Carrier. A hyphen, -, means no applicable matches. |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
By examining a PT we can identify the type of policy represented, as |
| 690 |
per the taxonomy presented earlier. |
| 691 |
|
| 692 |
* If an AD specifies a policy term that has a null (-) entry for |
| 693 |
the ADexit, then it is disallowing transit for some group of users, |
| 694 |
and it is a transit policy. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
* If an AD specifies a policy term that lists itself |
| 697 |
explicitly as ADsrc or ADdst, it is expressing restrictions on who |
| 698 |
can access particular resources within its boundaries, or on who inside |
| 699 |
can obtain external access. In other words the AD is expressing a |
| 700 |
source/destination policy. |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
* If ADexit or ADentr is specified then the policy expressed is an |
| 703 |
exit/entrance path policy. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
* If the global conditions include charging, QOS, resource |
| 706 |
guarantee, time of day, higher level application, resource limit, or |
| 707 |
authentication related information it is obviously a charging, QOS, |
| 708 |
resource guarantee, temporal, higher level application, resource |
| 709 |
limit, or authentication policy, respectively. |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
As seen below, any one PT typically incorporates a combination of |
| 712 |
policy types. |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3.1" href="#section-6.3.1">6.3.1</a> THE FRICC</span> |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
In the following examples all policies (and PTs) are symmetrical |
| 717 |
under the assumption that communication is symmetrical. |
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
NATIONAL SCIENCE FOUNDATION (NSF) |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
1. NSF will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re network |
| 732 |
talking to any other host connected to a F/Re via any F/Re entry and |
| 733 |
exit network, so long as there is it is being used for research or |
| 734 |
support. There is no authentication of the UCI and no per packet |
| 735 |
charging. NSFnet is a backbone and so does not connect directly to |
| 736 |
universities or companies...thus the indication of {F/Re} instead of |
| 737 |
{F/Re/U/Co} as ADent and ADexit. |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
[NSF1: (*, {F/Re}, {F/Re})(*, {F/Re}, {F/Re}){research,support} |
| 740 |
{unauthenticated UCI,no-per-pkt charge}{}] |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
2. NSF will carry traffic to user and expert services hosts in NSF |
| 743 |
AD to/from any F/Re AD, via any F/Re AD. These are the only things |
| 744 |
that directly connect to NSFnet. |
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
[NSF2: ({User svcs, Expert Svcs},{NSF},{F/Re})(*,{F/Re},{-}){}{}{}] |
| 747 |
|
| 748 |
DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY (DOE) |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
1. DOE will carry traffic to and from any host directly connected to |
| 751 |
DOE so long as it is used for research or support. There is no |
| 752 |
authentication of the UCI and no per packet charging. |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
[DOE1: (*,DOE,-)(*,*,*){research,support} |
| 755 |
{unauthenticated UCI,no-per-packet charge}{}] |
| 756 |
|
| 757 |
2. DOE will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re network |
| 758 |
talking to any other host connected to a F/Re via any F/Re entry and |
| 759 |
exit network without regard to the UCI. There is no authentication of |
| 760 |
the UCI and no per packet charging. (in other words DOE is more |
| 761 |
restrictive with its own traffic than with traffic it is carrying as |
| 762 |
part of a resource sharing arrangement.) |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
[DOE2: (*,{F/Re},{F/Re})(*,{F/Re},{F/Re}){} |
| 765 |
{unauthenticated UCI, no-per-pkt charge}{}] |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
NATIONAL AERONAUTICS AND SPACE ADMINISTRATION (NASA) |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
1. Nasa will accept any traffic to/from members of the Nasa AD. But |
| 770 |
no transit. No UCI authentication and no per packet charge. |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
[NASA1: (*,*,*)(*,Nasa,-){Nasa-research, support} |
| 773 |
{unauthenticated UCI,no-per-packet-charge}{}] |
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
2. Nasa will carry transit traffic to/from other federal agency |
| 776 |
networks if it is in support of research, and if the total use of |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
available BW by non-nasa Federal agencies is below n%. NOTE THAT this |
| 786 |
non-interference policy type needs some more work in terms of |
| 787 |
integrating it into the routing algorithms. See <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
[NASA2: (*,{F},*)(*,{F},*){research,support} |
| 790 |
{per-packet accounting, limited to n% of available BW}{}] |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
3. NASA will carry commercial traffic to federal and regional and |
| 793 |
university ADs for nasa research or support. But it will not allow |
| 794 |
transit. The particular entry AD is not important. |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
[NASA3: (*,{Co},*} (*,{F/R/U},*) {NASA research,support} |
| 797 |
{unauthenticated UCI, no per packet charge}{}] |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
4. On a case by case basis NASA may provide access to its resources |
| 800 |
on a cost reimbursed basis. Transit traffic will not be carried on |
| 801 |
this basis. |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
[NASA4: (*,*,-)(*,*,-){} |
| 804 |
{per-packet-charge, limited to n% of available BW} {}] |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
DEFENSE ADVANCED RESEARCH PROJECTS AGENCY (DARPA) |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
1. DARPA will carry traffic to/from any host in DARPA AD from any |
| 809 |
external host that can get it there so long as UCI is research or |
| 810 |
support. No UCI authentication or per packet charge. |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
[DARPA1: (*,*,*)(*,DARPA,-){research,support} |
| 813 |
{unauthenticated-UCI, no per packet charge}{}] |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
2. DARPA will carry traffic for any host connected to a F/Re/U/Co |
| 816 |
network talking to any other host connected to a F/Re/U/Co via any |
| 817 |
F/Re/U/Co entry and exit network, so long as there is it is being |
| 818 |
used for research or support, and the network is not heavily |
| 819 |
congested!!. There is no authentication of the UCI and no per packet |
| 820 |
charging. NOTE: Darpa would like to say something about the need to |
| 821 |
enter the Darpa AD at the point closest to the destination...but i |
| 822 |
don't know how to express this... |
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
DARPA2: (*,{F/R/U/Co},{F/R/U/Co})(*,{F/R/U/Co},{F/R/U/Co}) |
| 825 |
{research,support}{unauthenticated-UCI,no per packet charge, |
| 826 |
non-interference basis}{}] |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
DEFENSE COMMUNICATIONS AGENCY (DCA) |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
1. DCA will not carry any transit traffic. It will only accept and |
| 831 |
send traffic to and from its mailbridge(s) and only from and to hosts |
| 832 |
on other F/Re nets. All packets are marked and charged for by the |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
kilopacket. |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
[DCA1:(mailbridge,DCA,-)(*,{F/Re},{F/Re}){research,support} |
| 844 |
{unauthenticated UCI, all incoming packets marked, per-kilopacket |
| 845 |
charge}{}] |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3.2" href="#section-6.3.2">6.3.2</a> THE REGIONALS</span> |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
Interviews with regional network administrations are now underway. In |
| 850 |
general their policies are still in formation due to the relatively |
| 851 |
recent formation of these regional networks. However, for the sake of |
| 852 |
illustration we provide an example of a hypothetical regional's |
| 853 |
network policies. |
| 854 |
|
| 855 |
REGIONAL A |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
1. Regional A will carry traffic from/to any directly connected |
| 858 |
F/Re/U network to any F/Re/U network via NSF if it is for a research |
| 859 |
or support UCI. (NSF requires that all Regional networks only pass it |
| 860 |
traffic that complies with its, NSF's, policies!) |
| 861 |
|
| 862 |
[Regional A:(*,{F/Re/U},{F/Re/U})(*,{F/Re/U},NSF){research,support} |
| 863 |
{unauthenticated UCI, no-per-packet charge}{}] |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
REGIONAL B |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
1. Regional B will carry traffic from/to any directly connected |
| 868 |
F/Re/U network to any F/Re/U network via a commercial carrier |
| 869 |
regardless of its UCI. In this case the packets are charged for since |
| 870 |
the commercial carrier charges per kilopacket. |
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
[Regional B:(*,{F/Re/U},{F/Re/U})(*,{F/Re/U},Cc){} |
| 873 |
{unauthenticated UCI, per-kilopacket charge}{}] |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3.3" href="#section-6.3.3">6.3.3</a> CAMPUS AND PRIVATE NETWORKS</span> |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
Similar interviews should be conducted with administrators of campus |
| 878 |
and private networks. However, many aspects of their policies are |
| 879 |
contingent on the still unresolved policies of the regionals and |
| 880 |
federal agencies. In any event, transit policies will be critical |
| 881 |
for campus and private networks to flexibly control access to lateral |
| 882 |
links and private wide area networks, respectively. For example, a |
| 883 |
small set of university and private laboratories may provide access |
| 884 |
to special gigabit links for particular classes of researchers. On |
| 885 |
the other hand, source/destination policies should not be used in |
| 886 |
place of network level access controls for these end ADs. |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3.4" href="#section-6.3.4">6.3.4</a> COMMERCIAL SERVICES</span> |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
Currently commercial communication services play a low level role in |
| 900 |
most parts of today's Research Internet; they provide the |
| 901 |
transmission media, i.e.,leased lines. In the future we expect |
| 902 |
commercial carriers to provide increasingly higher level and enhanced |
| 903 |
services such as high speed packet switched backbone services. |
| 904 |
Because such services are not yet part of the Research Internet |
| 905 |
infrastructure there exist no policy statements. |
| 906 |
|
| 907 |
Charging and accounting are certain to be an important policy type in |
| 908 |
this context. Moreover, we anticipate the long haul services market |
| 909 |
to be highly competitive. This implies that competing service |
| 910 |
providers will engage in significant gaming in terms of packaging and |
| 911 |
pricing of services. Consequently, the ability to express varied and |
| 912 |
dynamic charging policies will be critical for these ADs. |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a> PROBLEMATIC REQUIREMENTS</span> |
| 915 |
|
| 916 |
Most of this paper has lobbied for articulation of relatively |
| 917 |
detailed policy statements in order to help define the technical |
| 918 |
mechanisms needed for enforcement. We promoted a top down design |
| 919 |
process beginning with articulation of desired policies. Now we feel |
| 920 |
compelled to mention requirements that are clearly problematic from |
| 921 |
the bottom up perspective of technical feasibility. |
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
* Non-interference policies are of the form "I will provide |
| 924 |
access for principals x to resources y so long as it does not |
| 925 |
interfere with my internal usage." The problem with such policies |
| 926 |
is that access to an AD at any point in time is contingent upon a |
| 927 |
local, highly dynamic, parameter that is not globally available. |
| 928 |
Therefore such a policy term could well result in looping, |
| 929 |
oscillations, and excessive route (re)computation overhead, |
| 930 |
both unacceptable. Consequently, this is one type of policy that |
| 931 |
routing experts suggest would be difficult to support in a very |
| 932 |
large decentralized internetwork. |
| 933 |
|
| 934 |
* Granularity can also be problematic, but not as devistating as |
| 935 |
highly dynamic PR contingencies. Here the caution is less specific. |
| 936 |
Very fine grain policies, which restrict access to particular |
| 937 |
hosts, or are contingent upon very fine grain user class |
| 938 |
identification, may be achieved more efficiently with network |
| 939 |
level access control [<a href="#ref-11" title="J. Mogul and G. Tsudik">11</a>] or end system controls instead of |
| 940 |
burdening the inter-AD routing mechanism. |
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
* Security is expensive, as always. Routing protocols are subject |
| 943 |
to fraud through impersonation, data substitution, and denial of |
| 944 |
service. Some of the proposed mechanisms provide some means for |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
detection and non-repudiation. However, to achieve a priori |
| 954 |
prevention of resource misuse is expensive in terms of per |
| 955 |
connection or per packet cryptographic overhead. For some |
| 956 |
environments we firmly believe that this will be necessary and |
| 957 |
we would prefer an architecture that would accommodate such |
| 958 |
variability [<a href="#ref-12" title="Security Issues in Policy Routing">12</a>]. |
| 959 |
|
| 960 |
In general, it is difficult to predict the impact of any particular |
| 961 |
policy term. Tools will be needed to assist people in writing and |
| 962 |
validating policy terms. |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a> PROPOSED MECHANISMS</span> |
| 965 |
|
| 966 |
Previous routing protocols have addressed a narrower definition of |
| 967 |
PR, as appropriate for the internets of their day. In particular, EGP |
| 968 |
[<a href="#ref-3" title="Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP)">3</a>], DGP[13], and BGP[6] incorporate a notion of policy restrictions |
| 969 |
as to where routing database information travels. None are intended |
| 970 |
to support policy based routing of packets as described here. More |
| 971 |
recent routing proposals such as Landmark [<a href="#ref-14" title="Palo Alto">14</a>] and Cartesian [<a href="#ref-15" title="Technical Report">15</a>] |
| 972 |
could be used to restrict packet forwarding but are not suited to |
| 973 |
source/destination, and some of the condition-oriented, policies. We |
| 974 |
feel these policy types are critical to support. We note that for |
| 975 |
environments (e.g., within an AD substructure) in which the simple- |
| 976 |
AD-topology conjecture holds true, these alternatives may be |
| 977 |
suitable. |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
<a href="./rfc1104">RFC 1104</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title="Models of Policy Based Routing">5</a>] provides a good description of shorter term policy |
| 980 |
routing requirements. Braun classifies three types of mechanisms, |
| 981 |
policy based distribution of route information, policy based packet |
| 982 |
forwarding, and policy based dynamic allocation of network resources. |
| 983 |
The second class is characterized by Dave Clark's PR architecture, |
| 984 |
<a href="./rfc1102">RFC 1102</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title="Policy Routing in Internet Protocols">4</a>]. With respect to the longer term requirements laid out |
| 985 |
in this document, only this second class is expressive and flexible |
| 986 |
enough to support the multiplicity of stub and transit policies. In |
| 987 |
other words, the power of the PR approach (e.g., <a href="./rfc1102">RFC1102</a>) is not just |
| 988 |
in the added granularity of control pointed out by Braun, i.e., the |
| 989 |
ability to specify particular hosts and user classes. Its power is in |
| 990 |
the ability to express and enforce many types of stub and transit |
| 991 |
policies and apply them on a discriminatory basis to different ADs. |
| 992 |
In addition, this approach provides explicit support for stub ADs to |
| 993 |
control routes via the use of source routing. (FOOTNOTE 12: |
| 994 |
Moreover, the source routing approach loosens the requirements for |
| 995 |
every AD to share a complete view of the entire internet by allowing |
| 996 |
the source to detect routing loops.) (FOOTNOTE 13: The match |
| 997 |
between <a href="./rfc1102">RFC1102</a> and the requirements specified in this document is |
| 998 |
hardly a coincidence since Clark's paper and discussions with him |
| 999 |
contributed to the requirements formulation presented here. His work |
| 1000 |
is currently being evaluated and refined by the ANRG and ORWG.) |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a> SUMMARY</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
Along with the emergence of very high speed applications and media, |
| 1012 |
resource management has become a critical issue in the Research |
| 1013 |
Internet and internets in general. A fundamental characteristic of |
| 1014 |
the resource management problem is allowing administratively ADs to |
| 1015 |
interconnect while retaining control over resource usage. However, we |
| 1016 |
have lacked a careful articulation of the types of resource |
| 1017 |
management policies that need to be supported. This paper addresses |
| 1018 |
policy requirements for the Research Internet. After justifying our |
| 1019 |
assumptions regarding AD topology we presented a taxonomy and |
| 1020 |
examples of policies that must be supported by a PR protocol. |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a> ACKNOWLEDGMENTS</span> |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
Members of the Autonomous Networks Research Group and Open Routing |
| 1025 |
Working Group have contributed significantly to the ideas presented |
| 1026 |
here, in particular, Guy Almes, Lee Breslau, Scott Brim, Dave Clark, |
| 1027 |
Marianne Lepp, and Gene Tsudik. In addition, Lee Breslau and Gene |
| 1028 |
Tsudik provided detailed comments on a previous draft. David Cheriton |
| 1029 |
inadvertently caused me to write this document. Sharon Anderson's |
| 1030 |
contributions deserve special recognition. The author is supported |
| 1031 |
by research grants from National Science Foundation, AT&T, and GTE. |
| 1032 |
|
| 1033 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a> REFERENCES</span> |
| 1034 |
|
| 1035 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] J. Postel, Internet Protocol, Network Information Center, <a href="./rfc791">RFC</a> |
| 1036 |
<a href="./rfc791">791</a>, September 1981. |
| 1037 |
|
| 1038 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] G. Vaudreuil, The Federal Research Internet Coordinating |
| 1039 |
Committee and National Research Network, ACM SIG Computer |
| 1040 |
Communications Review,April 1988. |
| 1041 |
|
| 1042 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] E. Rosen, Exterior Gateway Protocol (EGP), Network Information |
| 1043 |
Center, <a href="./rfc827">RFC 827</a>, October 1982. |
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] D. Clark, Policy Routing in Internet Protocols, Network |
| 1046 |
Information Center, <a href="./rfc1102">RFC 1102</a>, May 1989. |
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] H.W.Braun, Models of Policy Based Routing, Network Information |
| 1049 |
Center, <a href="./rfc1104">RFC 1104</a>, June 1989. |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] K. Lougheed, Y. Rekhter, A Border Gateway Protocol, Network |
| 1052 |
Information Center, <a href="./rfc1105">RFC 1105</a>, June 1989. |
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] J. Saltzer, M. Schroeder, The Protection of Information in |
| 1055 |
Computer Systems, Proceedings of the IEEE, 63, 9 September 1975. |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] V. Jacobson, Congestion Avoidance and Control. Proceedings of |
| 1066 |
ACM Sigcomm, pp. 106-114, August 1988, Palo Alto, CA. |
| 1067 |
|
| 1068 |
[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] David Clark, Design Philosophy of the DARPA Internet Protocols, |
| 1069 |
Proceedings of ACM Sigcomm, pp. 106-114, August 1988, Palo Alto, |
| 1070 |
CA. |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Gigabit Networking Group, B. Leiner, Editor. Critical Issues in |
| 1073 |
High Bandwidth Networking, Network Information Center, <a href="./rfc1077">RFC 1077</a>, |
| 1074 |
November 1988. |
| 1075 |
|
| 1076 |
[<a id="ref-11">11</a>] D. Estrin, J. Mogul and G. Tsudik, Visa Protocols for Controlling |
| 1077 |
Inter-Organizational Datagram Flow, To appear in IEEE Journal on |
| 1078 |
Selected Areas in Communications, Spring 1989. |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
[<a id="ref-12">12</a>] D. Estrin and G. Tsudik, Security Issues in Policy Routing, IEEE |
| 1081 |
Symposium on Research in Security and Privacy, Oakland, CA. May |
| 1082 |
1-3 1989. |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
[<a id="ref-13">13</a>] M. Little, The Dissimilar Gateway Protocol, Technical report |
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 |
[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] P. Tsuchiya, The Landmark Hierarchy: A new hierarchy for routing |
| 1087 |
in very large networks, IEEE SIGCOMM 88, Palo Alto, CA. September |
| 1088 |
1988. |
| 1089 |
|
| 1090 |
[<a id="ref-15">15</a>] G. Finn, Reducing the Vulnerability of Dynamic Computer Networks |
| 1091 |
USC/Information Sciences Institute, Technical Report, ISI/RR-88- |
| 1092 |
201 July 1988. |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
[<a id="ref-16">16</a>] A. Nakassis Routing Algorithm for Open Routing, Unpublished |
| 1095 |
paper, Available from the author at the National Institute of |
| 1096 |
Standards and Technology (formerly NBS), Washington D.C. |
| 1097 |
|
| 1098 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a> SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS</span> |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
This memo does not address the security aspects of the issues |
| 1101 |
discussed. |
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
AUTHOR'S ADDRESS: |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
Deborah Estrin |
| 1106 |
University of Southern California |
| 1107 |
Computer Science Department |
| 1108 |
Los Angeles, CA 90089-0782 |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
Phone: (213) 743-7842 |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Estrin [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1125">RFC 1125</a> Policy Requirements November 1989</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
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| 1121 |
|
| 1122 |
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| 1123 |
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| 1124 |
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| 1125 |
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| 1126 |
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| 1127 |
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| 1128 |
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| 1129 |
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| 1130 |
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| 1131 |
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| 1132 |
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| 1133 |
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| 1134 |
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| 1135 |
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| 1136 |
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| 1137 |
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| 1138 |
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| 1139 |
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| 1140 |
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| 1141 |
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| 1142 |
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| 1143 |
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| 1144 |
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| 1145 |
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| 1146 |
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| 1147 |
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| 1148 |
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| 1149 |
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| 1150 |
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| 1151 |
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| 1152 |
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| 1153 |
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| 1154 |
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| 1155 |
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| 1156 |
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| 1157 |
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| 1158 |
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| 1159 |
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| 1161 |
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| 1162 |
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| 1163 |
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| 1164 |
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| 1165 |
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| 1166 |
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| 1167 |
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| 1168 |
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| 1169 |
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| 1170 |
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| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
Estrin [Page 21] |
| 1173 |
</pre> |