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1 <pre>Network Working Group S. Dorner
2 Request for Comments: 1339 P. Resnick
3 U. of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
4 June 1992
5
6
7 <span class="h1">Remote Mail Checking Protocol</span>
8
9 Status of this Memo
10
11 This memo defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet
12 community. Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested.
13 Please refer to the current edition of the "IAB Official Protocol
14 Standards" for the standardization state and status of this protocol.
15 Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
16
17 Abstract
18
19 This RFC defines a protocol to provide a mail checking service to be
20 used between a client and server pair. Typically, a small program on
21 a client workstation would use the protocol to query a server in
22 order to find out whether new mail has arrived for a specified user.
23
24 Intent
25
26 This RFC defines a simple, low-overhead protocol for checking the
27 status of a maildrop on a host. It is primarily intended for use in
28 adjunct with "remote mail" servers such as those implementing the
29 Post Office Protocol (<a href="./rfc1225">RFC 1225</a>). Remote mail clients must poll their
30 servers to discover the arrival of mail. Using one of the remote mail
31 protocols for periodic checking can be quite impractical and
32 expensive for the server since either a constant connection between
33 client and server must be maintained or repeated and expensive user
34 validations must be done. Furthermore, users on less capable
35 computers may not wish to devote the memory required to have a full
36 implementation of the client polling for mail. Thus, we feel that an
37 easy to implement and inexpensive to use polling scheme would be of
38 benefit both to mail servers and their clients.
39
40 Protocol Overview
41
42 To avoid connection overhead, the Remote Mail Checking Protocol is
43 based on the User Datagram Protocol (UDP), using UDP port 50 decimal
44 (62 octal) for the server. The protocol provides for both non-
45 authenticated and authenticated polling. Non-authenticated polling is
46 simplest for both client and server. Authenticated polling provides a
47 small increment of privacy, at the cost of more complexity in both
48 client and server (but still far less than polling with one of the
49
50
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52 <span class="grey">Dorner &amp; Resnick [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1339">RFC 1339</a> Remote Mail Checking Protocol June 1992</span>
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57 remote mail protocols).
58
59 Non-Authenticated Protocol
60
61 In the non-authenticated version of the protocol, the server will
62 listen on port 50 for maildrop check requests for users with
63 maildrops on the machine. A client will send a single UDP datagram
64 from a randomly chosen unreserved UDP port to UDP port 50 on the
65 server. The datagram will contain a 32-bit (four-octet) number which
66 is set to all zeros (0), followed by a case-sensitive ASCII string of
67 a username on the server system. The server will find the maildrop on
68 the system for that user and determine the amount of time that has
69 passed since the last message in the maildrop was appended, as well
70 as the amount of time that has passed since the maildrop was last
71 accessed for reading. The server will then send back a single UDP
72 datagram containing three 32-bit numbers in network byte order to the
73 originating port on the client. Again, the first will be zero (0),
74 the second will contain the number of seconds plus one since the last
75 addition to the specified user's maildrop and the third will contain
76 the number of seconds plus one since the last read on the user's
77 maildrop. If the username provided does not exist, if the maildrop is
78 not on the system or if the maildrop is empty, the server will send
79 back zero (0) in the last two numbers for its reply. The client will
80 consider the maildrop to contain new mail if the number of seconds
81 since the last read access is greater than or equal to the number of
82 seconds since the last addition access of the maildrop and either
83 number is non-zero, old mail if the number of seconds since the last
84 read access is less than or equal to the number of seconds since the
85 last addition access of the maildrop and either number is non-zero,
86 and empty if both numbers are zero.
87
88 Authenticated Protocol
89
90 The authenticated protocol operates identically to the non-
91 authenticated protocol with the exception of the first interaction
92 between the server and the client. After the client has sent its
93 initial request containing the requested username, the server will
94 send back a single UDP packet containing three 32-bit numbers. The
95 first number will be a bit-mask instead of the normal 32-bits of
96 zero. The bit-mask will indicate a request for authentication. Each
97 bit in the mask represents a type of authentication that the server
98 accepts. The bits (with the least significant bit numbered 0, and the
99 most significant bit 31) are defined as follows:
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112
113 0 Cleartext password The password for the maildrop, not
114 NULL-terminated.
115
116 1-23 Reserved for future use
117
118 24-31 Implementation-dependent. Implementors wishing to
119 experiment may use these.
120
121 For each type of authentication that the server accepts, the
122 corresponding bit will be set to one. All other bits will be set to
123 zero. The last two 32-bit numbers in the reply will be set to zero.
124 If the client supports authentication, it will send back a 32-bit
125 mask with the bit representing the kind of authentication it is using
126 set to one, followed by the data used for authentication. The client
127 is free to use any of the types of authentication indicated by the
128 authentication request from the server. If the client does not
129 support authentication and it receives an authentication request, it
130 SHOULD stop sending requests (though this behavior is not required).
131
132 Once a valid authentication is received by the server for a
133 particular maildrop, the server considers the IP address and UDP port
134 of the client along with that maildrop to be an authenticated
135 address/port/maildrop triple. From then on, normal non-authenticated
136 transactions take place between the server and the client as
137 described above. Should a datagram come from an authenticated
138 address/port pair with a different username, or if some amount of
139 time has elapsed since the last request (which is implementation
140 dependent), the server should remove the address/port/maildrop triple
141 from its list of authenticated triples and send another
142 authentication request. Since the time required for an authenticated
143 triple to become unauthenticated is implementation dependent, clients
144 should be prepared to send an authentication reply to containing the
145 server whenever it is requested.
146
147 Server Implementation Notes
148
149 Servers which implement either the authenticated or non-authenticated
150 protocol may decide that they do not wish to reveal the actual amount
151 of time that has passed since the last update or read from a
152 maildrop. (See the "Security Considerations" section below for
153 reasons some feel this is problematic.) In this case, a server may
154 instead reply with the following:
155
156 First 32 bits Second 32 bits Third 32 bits
157 New mail 0 0 1
158 Old mail 0 1 0
159 No mail 0 0 0
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169 These values will appear to the client as correctly representing new,
170 old or no mail respectively but will give no indication of the actual
171 times that the changes took place.
172
173 Servers implementing the non-authenticated protocol MUST provide some
174 mechanism by which users on the system can give permission for their
175 maildrops to accessed by the protocol. See the "Security
176 Considerations" section below for specifics.
177
178 Client Implementation Notes
179
180 Clients MUST not send more than one poll (and one authentication) per
181 minute. In particular, lack of server response should not result in
182 retransmission.
183
184 Since the last two numbers in an authentication request from a server
185 are always 0 as are the last two numbers in a response for an empty
186 or non-existent maildrop, clients that do not support authentication
187 need not examine the first number in the server datagram at all
188 (though they are encouraged to do so for the sake of proper reporting
189 to the user).
190
191 Clients can turn the modification interval into absolute time, and
192 track the changing of this absolute time in order to discern the
193 arrival of new mail (as opposed to the mere existence of unread
194 mail). However, such clients should bear three things in mind.
195 First, network delays and clock vagaries may result in small
196 inconsistencies in times. A "slop factor" of several seconds is
197 encouraged. Second, the reading of mail often entails modification of
198 the maildrop; the relationship of the access and modification
199 intervals should always be consulted. Third, the special results of
200 (1,0) and (0,1) are most properly handled as special cases.
201
202 Clients need not recall whether or not they are authenticated (though
203 they must use a consistent port if they receive any authentication
204 requests for a given maildrop). It is sufficient to issue requests
205 when desired, and to respond to any authentication requests that
206 appear.
207
208 Security Considerations
209
210 The are two security considerations for the protocol. The first is
211 one mainly of privacy. Some sites and individual users consider it
212 problematic to have information about mail arrival available freely.
213 This can be a simple privacy issue for individuals or a security
214 issue for highly secure sites. The authenticated version of the
215 protocol allows sites to have a reasonable amount of security in that
216 only people with passwords can access this information. The protocol
217
218
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222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1339">RFC 1339</a> Remote Mail Checking Protocol June 1992</span>
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224
225 currently only uses cleartext passwords, but can be simply modified
226 to use other authentication formats. The scheme mentioned in "Server
227 Implementation Notes" of using only (0,1) and (1,0) in the responses
228 also may limit access to some types of information. Implementations
229 that do not use the authenticated scheme MUST have a mechanism by
230 which a user can give consent to have this information made
231 available; the default for the unauthenticated implementation should
232 be that a user's maildrop cannot be accessed until consent of the
233 user is given. (For example, UNIX server implementations may wish to
234 make use of the "owner execute" bit to indicate whether a particular
235 maildrop allows use of the unauthenticated protocol. If this is done,
236 a single "stat" call can be used to gather all information required
237 to respond to a poll.) Servers which do not implement authentication
238 should simply return a zero-filled datagram for maildrops which don't
239 have permission.
240
241 The other security consideration involves unknown maildrops and
242 usernames. Some site administrators consider it a security risk give
243 out any information which would reveal the existence or non-existence
244 of a certain username or maildrop on the system. For this reason, we
245 have chosen to have the server send back a zero-filled datagram as
246 the response to either a request for an unknown username or a
247 maildrop that does not exist or is empty. In this way, potential
248 security violations are limited, since there is no way to tell the
249 difference between an empty maildrop and non-existent maildrop, and
250 also no way to tell if the user exists on the system or not. If
251 greater security is desired, the protocol should probably not be run
252 in the first place.
253
254 Authors' Addresses
255
256 Steve Dorner
257 Digital Computer Laboratory
258 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
259 1304 West Springfield Avenue
260 Urbana, Illinois 61801
261
262 Phone: (217) 244-1765
263 EMail: [email protected]
264
265 Pete Resnick
266 The Beckman Institute
267 University of Illinois at Urbana-Champaign
268 405 North Mathews Avenue
269 Urbana, Illinois 61801
270
271 Phone: (217) 244-1265
272 EMail: [email protected]
273
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