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1 <pre>Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Y. Nir
2 Request for Comments: 8439 Dell EMC
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc7539">7539</a> A. Langley
4 Category: Informational Google, Inc.
5 ISSN: 2070-1721 June 2018
6
7
8 <span class="h1">ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols</span>
9
10 Abstract
11
12 This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher as well as the use
13 of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms and as
14 a "combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data
15 (AEAD) algorithm.
16
17 <a href="./rfc7539">RFC 7539</a>, the predecessor of this document, was meant to serve as a
18 stable reference and an implementation guide. It was a product of
19 the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). This document merges the
20 errata filed against <a href="./rfc7539">RFC 7539</a> and adds a little text to the Security
21 Considerations section.
22
23 Status of This Memo
24
25 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
26 published for informational purposes.
27
28 This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force
29 (IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research
30 and development activities. These results might not be suitable for
31 deployment. This RFC represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum
32 Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents
33 approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for any level
34 of Internet Standard; see <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
35
36 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
37 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
38 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document.
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108 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
111
112
113 Table of Contents
114
115 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
116 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
117 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
118 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. The ChaCha Quarter Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
119 <a href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
120 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
121 2.2.1. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha State 7
122 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
123 <a href="#section-2.3.1">2.3.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
124 <a href="#section-2.3.2">2.3.2</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
125 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
126 <a href="#section-2.4.1">2.4.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm in Pseudocode . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
127 <a href="#section-2.4.2">2.4.2</a>. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
128 <a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
129 <a href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithms in Pseudocode . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
130 <a href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
131 <a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Generating the Poly1305 Key Using ChaCha20 . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
132 <a href="#section-2.6.1">2.6.1</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation in Pseudocode . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
133 <a href="#section-2.6.2">2.6.2</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Test Vector . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
134 2.7. A Pseudorandom Function for Crypto Suites Based on
135 ChaCha/Poly1305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
136 <a href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. AEAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
137 <a href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Pseudocode for the AEAD Construction . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
138 2.8.2. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 . 23
139 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Implementation Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
140 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
141 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
142 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
143 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a>
144 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
145 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Additional Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
146 <a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
147 <a href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. ChaCha20 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
148 <a href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Poly1305 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-36">36</a>
149 <a href="#appendix-A.4">A.4</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Using ChaCha20 . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-41">41</a>
150 <a href="#appendix-A.5">A.5</a>. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a>
151 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Performance Measurements of ChaCha20 . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-45">45</a>
152 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-46">46</a>
153 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-46">46</a>
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164 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
170
171 The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES -- [<a href="#ref-FIPS-197">FIPS-197</a>]) has become the
172 gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, widespread
173 implementation, and hardware support allow for high performance in
174 many areas. On most modern platforms, AES is anywhere from four to
175 ten times as fast as the previous most-used cipher, Triple Data
176 Encryption Standard (3DES -- [<a href="#ref-SP800-67">SP800-67</a>]), which makes it not only the
177 best choice, but the only practical choice.
178
179 There are several problems with this. If future advances in
180 cryptanalysis reveal a weakness in AES, users will be in an
181 unenviable position. With the only other widely supported cipher
182 being the much slower 3DES, it is not feasible to reconfigure
183 deployments to use 3DES. [<a href="#ref-Standby-Cipher">Standby-Cipher</a>] describes this issue and
184 the need for a standby cipher in greater detail. Another problem is
185 that while AES is very fast on dedicated hardware, its performance on
186 platforms that lack such hardware is considerably lower. Yet another
187 problem is that many AES implementations are vulnerable to cache-
188 collision timing attacks ([<a href="#ref-Cache-Collisions">Cache-Collisions</a>]).
189
190 This document provides a definition and implementation guide for
191 three algorithms:
192
193 1. The ChaCha20 cipher. This is a high-speed cipher first described
194 in [<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title="&quot;ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20&quot;">ChaCha</a>]. It is considerably faster than AES in software-only
195 implementations, making it around three times as fast on
196 platforms that lack specialized AES hardware. See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for
197 some hard numbers. ChaCha20 is also not sensitive to timing
198 attacks (see the security considerations in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). This
199 algorithm is described in <a href="#section-2.4">Section 2.4</a>
200
201 2. The Poly1305 authenticator. This is a high-speed message
202 authentication code. Implementation is also straightforward and
203 easy to get right. The algorithm is described in <a href="#section-2.5">Section 2.5</a>.
204
205 3. The CHACHA20-POLY1305 Authenticated Encryption with Associated
206 Data (AEAD) construction, described in <a href="#section-2.8">Section 2.8</a>.
207
208 This document and its predecessor do not introduce these new
209 algorithms for the first time. They have been defined in scientific
210 papers by D. J. Bernstein [<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title="&quot;ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20&quot;">ChaCha</a>][Poly1305]. The purpose of this
211 document is to serve as a stable reference for IETF documents making
212 use of these algorithms.
213
214 These algorithms have undergone rigorous analysis. Several papers
215 discuss the security of Salsa and ChaCha ([<a href="#ref-LatinDances">LatinDances</a>],
216 [<a href="#ref-LatinDances2">LatinDances2</a>], [<a href="#ref-Zhenqing2012">Zhenqing2012</a>]).
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
223
224
225 This document represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum Research
226 Group (CFRG). It replaces [<a href="./rfc7539" title="&quot;ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols&quot;">RFC7539</a>].
227
228 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span>
229
230 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
231 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and
232 "OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP</a>
233 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title="&quot;Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words&quot;">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all
234 capitals, as shown here.
235
236 The description of the ChaCha algorithm will at various time refer to
237 the ChaCha state as a "vector" or as a "matrix". This follows the
238 use of these terms in [<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title="&quot;ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20&quot;">ChaCha</a>]. The matrix notation is more visually
239 convenient and gives a better notion as to why some rounds are called
240 "column rounds" while others are called "diagonal rounds". Here's a
241 diagram of how the matrices relate to vectors (using the C language
242 convention of zero being the index origin).
243
244 0 1 2 3
245 4 5 6 7
246 8 9 10 11
247 12 13 14 15
248
249 The elements in this vector or matrix are 32-bit unsigned integers.
250
251 The algorithm name is "ChaCha". "ChaCha20" is a specific instance
252 where 20 "rounds" (or 80 quarter rounds -- see <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>) are used.
253 Other variations are defined, with 8 or 12 rounds, but in this
254 document we only describe the 20-round ChaCha, so the names "ChaCha"
255 and "ChaCha20" will be used interchangeably.
256
257 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The Algorithms</span>
258
259 The subsections below describe the algorithms used and the AEAD
260 construction.
261
262 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. The ChaCha Quarter Round</span>
263
264 The basic operation of the ChaCha algorithm is the quarter round. It
265 operates on four 32-bit unsigned integers, denoted a, b, c, and d.
266 The operation is as follows (in C-like notation):
267
268 a += b; d ^= a; d &lt;&lt;&lt;= 16;
269 c += d; b ^= c; b &lt;&lt;&lt;= 12;
270 a += b; d ^= a; d &lt;&lt;&lt;= 8;
271 c += d; b ^= c; b &lt;&lt;&lt;= 7;
272
273
274
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276 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
279
280
281 Where "+" denotes integer addition modulo 2^32, "^" denotes a bitwise
282 Exclusive OR (XOR), and "&lt;&lt;&lt; n" denotes an n-bit left roll (towards
283 the high bits).
284
285 For example, let's see the add, XOR, and roll operations from the
286 fourth line with sample numbers:
287
288 a = 0x11111111
289 b = 0x01020304
290 c = 0x77777777
291 d = 0x01234567
292 c = c + d = 0x77777777 + 0x01234567 = 0x789abcde
293 b = b ^ c = 0x01020304 ^ 0x789abcde = 0x7998bfda
294 b = b &lt;&lt;&lt; 7 = 0x7998bfda &lt;&lt;&lt; 7 = 0xcc5fed3c
295
296 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.1" href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round</span>
297
298 For a test vector, we will use the same numbers as in the example,
299 adding something random for c.
300
301 a = 0x11111111
302 b = 0x01020304
303 c = 0x9b8d6f43
304 d = 0x01234567
305
306 After running a Quarter Round on these four numbers, we get these:
307
308 a = 0xea2a92f4
309 b = 0xcb1cf8ce
310 c = 0x4581472e
311 d = 0x5881c4bb
312
313 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State</span>
314
315 The ChaCha state does not have four integer numbers: it has 16. So
316 the quarter-round operation works on only four of them -- hence the
317 name. Each quarter round operates on four predetermined numbers in
318 the ChaCha state. We will denote by QUARTERROUND(x, y, z, w) a
319 quarter-round operation on the numbers at indices x, y, z, and w of
320 the ChaCha state when viewed as a vector. For example, if we apply
321 QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13) to a state, this means running the quarter-
322 round operation on the elements marked with an asterisk, while
323 leaving the others alone:
324
325 0 *a 2 3
326 4 *b 6 7
327 8 *c 10 11
328 12 *d 14 15
329
330
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332 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
335
336
337 Note that this run of quarter round is part of what is called a
338 "column round".
339
340 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.1" href="#section-2.2.1">2.2.1</a>. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha State</span>
341
342 For a test vector, we will use a ChaCha state that was generated
343 randomly:
344
345 Sample ChaCha State
346
347 879531e0 c5ecf37d 516461b1 c9a62f8a
348 44c20ef3 3390af7f d9fc690b 2a5f714c
349 53372767 b00a5631 974c541a 359e9963
350 5c971061 3d631689 2098d9d6 91dbd320
351
352 We will apply the QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) operation to this state.
353 For obvious reasons, this one is part of what is called a "diagonal
354 round":
355
356 After applying QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13)
357
358 879531e0 c5ecf37d *bdb886dc c9a62f8a
359 44c20ef3 3390af7f d9fc690b *cfacafd2
360 *e46bea80 b00a5631 974c541a 359e9963
361 5c971061 *ccc07c79 2098d9d6 91dbd320
362
363 Note that only the numbers in positions 2, 7, 8, and 13 changed.
364
365 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function</span>
366
367 The ChaCha block function transforms a ChaCha state by running
368 multiple quarter rounds.
369
370 The inputs to ChaCha20 are:
371
372 o A 256-bit key, treated as a concatenation of eight 32-bit little-
373 endian integers.
374
375 o A 96-bit nonce, treated as a concatenation of three 32-bit little-
376 endian integers.
377
378 o A 32-bit block count parameter, treated as a 32-bit little-endian
379 integer.
380
381 The output is 64 random-looking bytes.
382
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386
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388 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
391
392
393 The ChaCha algorithm described here uses a 256-bit key. The original
394 algorithm also specified 128-bit keys and 8- and 12-round variants,
395 but these are out of scope for this document. In this section, we
396 describe the ChaCha block function.
397
398 Note also that the original ChaCha had a 64-bit nonce and 64-bit
399 block count. We have modified this here to be more consistent with
400 recommendations in <a href="./rfc5116#section-3.2">Section&nbsp;3.2 of [RFC5116]</a>. This limits the use of
401 a single (key,nonce) combination to 2^32 blocks, or 256 GB, but that
402 is enough for most uses. In cases where a single key is used by
403 multiple senders, it is important to make sure that they don't use
404 the same nonces. This can be assured by partitioning the nonce space
405 so that the first 32 bits are unique per sender, while the other 64
406 bits come from a counter.
407
408 The ChaCha20 state is initialized as follows:
409
410 o The first four words (0-3) are constants: 0x61707865, 0x3320646e,
411 0x79622d32, 0x6b206574.
412
413 o The next eight words (4-11) are taken from the 256-bit key by
414 reading the bytes in little-endian order, in 4-byte chunks.
415
416 o Word 12 is a block counter. Since each block is 64-byte, a 32-bit
417 word is enough for 256 gigabytes of data.
418
419 o Words 13-15 are a nonce, which MUST not be repeated for the same
420 key. The 13th word is the first 32 bits of the input nonce taken
421 as a little-endian integer, while the 15th word is the last 32
422 bits.
423
424 cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc
425 kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk
426 kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk
427 bbbbbbbb nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn
428
429 c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce
430
431
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437
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444 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
447
448
449 ChaCha20 runs 20 rounds, alternating between "column rounds" and
450 "diagonal rounds". Each round consists of four quarter-rounds, and
451 they are run as follows. Quarter rounds 1-4 are part of a "column"
452 round, while 5-8 are part of a "diagonal" round:
453
454 QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12)
455 QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13)
456 QUARTERROUND(2, 6, 10, 14)
457 QUARTERROUND(3, 7, 11, 15)
458 QUARTERROUND(0, 5, 10, 15)
459 QUARTERROUND(1, 6, 11, 12)
460 QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13)
461 QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14)
462
463 At the end of 20 rounds (or 10 iterations of the above list), we add
464 the original input words to the output words, and serialize the
465 result by sequencing the words one-by-one in little-endian order.
466
467 Note: "addition" in the above paragraph is done modulo 2^32. In some
468 machine languages, this is called carryless addition on a 32-bit
469 word.
470
471 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3.1" href="#section-2.3.1">2.3.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode</span>
472
473 Note: This section and a few others contain pseudocode for the
474 algorithm explained in a previous section. Every effort was made for
475 the pseudocode to accurately reflect the algorithm as described in
476 the preceding section. If a conflict is still present, the textual
477 explanation and the test vectors are normative.
478
479 inner_block (state):
480 Qround(state, 0, 4, 8, 12)
481 Qround(state, 1, 5, 9, 13)
482 Qround(state, 2, 6, 10, 14)
483 Qround(state, 3, 7, 11, 15)
484 Qround(state, 0, 5, 10, 15)
485 Qround(state, 1, 6, 11, 12)
486 Qround(state, 2, 7, 8, 13)
487 Qround(state, 3, 4, 9, 14)
488 end
489
490
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500 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
503
504
505 chacha20_block(key, counter, nonce):
506 state = constants | key | counter | nonce
507 initial_state = state
508 for i=1 upto 10
509 inner_block(state)
510 end
511 state += initial_state
512 return serialize(state)
513 end
514
515 Where the pipe character ("|") denotes concatenation.
516
517 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3.2" href="#section-2.3.2">2.3.2</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function</span>
518
519 For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20
520 block function:
521
522 o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13:
523 14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. The key is a sequence of
524 octets with no particular structure before we copy it into the
525 ChaCha state.
526
527 o Nonce = (00:00:00:09:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00)
528
529 o Block Count = 1.
530
531 After setting up the ChaCha state, it looks like this:
532
533 ChaCha state with the key setup.
534
535 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
536 03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c
537 13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c
538 00000001 09000000 4a000000 00000000
539
540 After running 20 rounds (10 column rounds interleaved with 10
541 "diagonal rounds"), the ChaCha state looks like this:
542
543 ChaCha state after 20 rounds
544
545 837778ab e238d763 a67ae21e 5950bb2f
546 c4f2d0c7 fc62bb2f 8fa018fc 3f5ec7b7
547 335271c2 f29489f3 eabda8fc 82e46ebd
548 d19c12b4 b04e16de 9e83d0cb 4e3c50a2
549
550 Finally, we add the original state to the result (simple vector or
551 matrix addition), giving this:
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
559
560
561 ChaCha state at the end of the ChaCha20 operation
562
563 e4e7f110 15593bd1 1fdd0f50 c47120a3
564 c7f4d1c7 0368c033 9aaa2204 4e6cd4c3
565 466482d2 09aa9f07 05d7c214 a2028bd9
566 d19c12b5 b94e16de e883d0cb 4e3c50a2
567
568 After we serialize the state, we get this:
569
570 Serialized Block:
571 000 10 f1 e7 e4 d1 3b 59 15 50 0f dd 1f a3 20 71 c4 .....;Y.P.... q.
572 016 c7 d1 f4 c7 33 c0 68 03 04 22 aa 9a c3 d4 6c 4e ....3.h.."....lN
573 032 d2 82 64 46 07 9f aa 09 14 c2 d7 05 d9 8b 02 a2 ..dF............
574 048 b5 12 9c d1 de 16 4e b9 cb d0 83 e8 a2 50 3c 4e ......N......P&lt;N
575
576 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm</span>
577
578 ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by D. J. Bernstein. It is a
579 refinement of the Salsa20 algorithm, and it uses a 256-bit key.
580
581 ChaCha20 successively calls the ChaCha20 block function, with the
582 same key and nonce, and with successively increasing block counter
583 parameters. ChaCha20 then serializes the resulting state by writing
584 the numbers in little-endian order, creating a keystream block.
585 Concatenating the keystream blocks from the successive blocks forms a
586 keystream. The ChaCha20 function then performs an XOR of this
587 keystream with the plaintext. Alternatively, each keystream block
588 can be XORed with a plaintext block before proceeding to create the
589 next block, saving some memory. There is no requirement for the
590 plaintext to be an integral multiple of 512 bits. If there is extra
591 keystream from the last block, it is discarded. Specific protocols
592 MAY require that the plaintext and ciphertext have certain length.
593 Such protocols need to specify how the plaintext is padded and how
594 much padding it receives.
595
596 The inputs to ChaCha20 are:
597
598 o A 256-bit key
599
600 o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will
601 usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the
602 zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time
603 authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm.
604
605 o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the
606 Initialization Vector.
607
608 o An arbitrary-length plaintext
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
615
616
617 The output is an encrypted message, or "ciphertext", of the same
618 length.
619
620 Decryption is done in the same way. The ChaCha20 block function is
621 used to expand the key into a keystream, which is XORed with the
622 ciphertext giving back the plaintext.
623
624 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.1" href="#section-2.4.1">2.4.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm in Pseudocode</span>
625
626 chacha20_encrypt(key, counter, nonce, plaintext):
627 for j = 0 upto floor(len(plaintext)/64)-1
628 key_stream = chacha20_block(key, counter+j, nonce)
629 block = plaintext[(j*64)..(j*64+63)]
630 encrypted_message += block ^ key_stream
631 end
632 if ((len(plaintext) % 64) != 0)
633 j = floor(len(plaintext)/64)
634 key_stream = chacha20_block(key, counter+j, nonce)
635 block = plaintext[(j*64)..len(plaintext)-1]
636 encrypted_message += (block^key_stream)[0..len(plaintext)%64]
637 end
638 return encrypted_message
639 end
640
641 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.2" href="#section-2.4.2">2.4.2</a>. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher</span>
642
643 For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20
644 block function:
645
646 o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13:
647 14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f.
648
649 o Nonce = (00:00:00:00:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00).
650
651 o Initial Counter = 1.
652
653 We use the following for the plaintext. It was chosen to be long
654 enough to require more than one block, but not so long that it would
655 make this example cumbersome (so, less than 3 blocks):
656
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
671
672
673 Plaintext Sunscreen:
674 000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c Ladies and Gentl
675 016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73 emen of the clas
676 032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63 s of '99: If I c
677 048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f ould offer you o
678 064 6e 6c 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20 nly one tip for
679 080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75 6e 73 the future, suns
680 096 63 72 65 65 6e 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 creen would be i
681 112 74 2e t.
682
683 The following figure shows four ChaCha state matrices:
684
685 1. First block as it is set up.
686
687 2. Second block as it is set up. Note that these blocks are only
688 two bits apart -- only the counter in position 12 is different.
689
690 3. Third block is the first block after the ChaCha20 block operation
691 was applied.
692
693 4. Final block is the second block after the ChaCha20 block
694 operation was applied.
695
696 After that, we show the keystream.
697
698 First block setup:
699 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
700 03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c
701 13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c
702 00000001 00000000 4a000000 00000000
703
704 Second block setup:
705 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
706 03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c
707 13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c
708 00000002 00000000 4a000000 00000000
709
710 First block after block operation:
711 f3514f22 e1d91b40 6f27de2f ed1d63b8
712 821f138c e2062c3d ecca4f7e 78cff39e
713 a30a3b8a 920a6072 cd7479b5 34932bed
714 40ba4c79 cd343ec6 4c2c21ea b7417df0
715
716 Second block after block operation:
717 9f74a669 410f633f 28feca22 7ec44dec
718 6d34d426 738cb970 3ac5e9f3 45590cc4
719 da6e8b39 892c831a cdea67c1 2b7e1d90
720 037463f3 a11a2073 e8bcfb88 edc49139
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
727
728
729 Keystream:
730 22:4f:51:f3:40:1b:d9:e1:2f:de:27:6f:b8:63:1d:ed:8c:13:1f:82:3d:2c:06
731 e2:7e:4f:ca:ec:9e:f3:cf:78:8a:3b:0a:a3:72:60:0a:92:b5:79:74:cd:ed:2b
732 93:34:79:4c:ba:40:c6:3e:34:cd:ea:21:2c:4c:f0:7d:41:b7:69:a6:74:9f:3f
733 63:0f:41:22:ca:fe:28:ec:4d:c4:7e:26:d4:34:6d:70:b9:8c:73:f3:e9:c5:3a
734 c4:0c:59:45:39:8b:6e:da:1a:83:2c:89:c1:67:ea:cd:90:1d:7e:2b:f3:63
735
736 Finally, we XOR the keystream with the plaintext, yielding the
737 ciphertext:
738
739 Ciphertext Sunscreen:
740 000 6e 2e 35 9a 25 68 f9 80 41 ba 07 28 dd 0d 69 81 n.5.%h..A..(..i.
741 016 e9 7e 7a ec 1d 43 60 c2 0a 27 af cc fd 9f ae 0b .~z..C`..'......
742 032 f9 1b 65 c5 52 47 33 ab 8f 59 3d ab cd 62 b3 57 ..e.RG3..Y=..b.W
743 048 16 39 d6 24 e6 51 52 ab 8f 53 0c 35 9f 08 61 d8 .9.$.QR..S.5..a.
744 064 07 ca 0d bf 50 0d 6a 61 56 a3 8e 08 8a 22 b6 5e ....P.jaV....".^
745 <a href="#section-080">080</a> 52 bc 51 4d 16 cc f8 06 81 8c e9 1a b7 79 37 36 R.QM.........y76
746 096 5a f9 0b bf 74 a3 5b e6 b4 0b 8e ed f2 78 5e 42 Z...t.[......x^B
747 112 87 4d .M
748
749 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithm</span>
750
751 Poly1305 is a one-time authenticator designed by D. J. Bernstein.
752 Poly1305 takes a 32-byte one-time key and a message and produces a
753 16-byte tag. This tag is used to authenticate the message.
754
755 The original article ([<a href="#ref-Poly1305">Poly1305</a>]) is titled "The Poly1305-AES
756 message-authentication code", and the MAC function there requires a
757 128-bit AES key, a 128-bit "additional key", and a 128-bit (non-
758 secret) nonce. AES is used there for encrypting the nonce, so as to
759 get a unique (and secret) 128-bit string, but as the paper states,
760 "There is nothing special about AES here. One can replace AES with
761 an arbitrary keyed function from an arbitrary set of nonces to
762 16-byte strings."
763
764 Regardless of how the key is generated, the key is partitioned into
765 two parts, called "r" and "s". The pair (r,s) should be unique, and
766 MUST be unpredictable for each invocation (that is why it was
767 originally obtained by encrypting a nonce), while "r" MAY be
768 constant, but needs to be modified as follows before being used: ("r"
769 is treated as a 16-octet little-endian number):
770
771 o r[3], r[7], r[11], and r[15] are required to have their top four
772 bits clear (be smaller than 16)
773
774 o r[4], r[8], and r[12] are required to have their bottom two bits
775 clear (be divisible by 4)
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
783
784
785 The following sample code clamps "r" to be appropriate:
786
787 /*
788 Adapted from poly1305aes_test_clamp.c version 20050207
789 D. J. Bernstein
790 Public domain.
791 */
792
793 #include "poly1305aes_test.h"
794
795 void poly1305aes_test_clamp(unsigned char r[16])
796 {
797 r[3] &amp;= 15;
798 r[7] &amp;= 15;
799 r[11] &amp;= 15;
800 r[15] &amp;= 15;
801 r[4] &amp;= 252;
802 r[8] &amp;= 252;
803 r[12] &amp;= 252;
804 }
805
806 Where "&amp;=" is the C language bitwise AND assignment operator.
807
808 The "s" should be unpredictable, but it is perfectly acceptable to
809 generate both "r" and "s" uniquely each time. Because each of them
810 is 128 bits, pseudorandomly generating them (see <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a>) is also
811 acceptable.
812
813 The inputs to Poly1305 are:
814
815 o A 256-bit one-time key
816
817 o An arbitrary length message
818
819 The output is a 128-bit tag.
820
821 First, the "r" value is clamped.
822
823 Next, set the constant prime "P" be 2^130-5:
824 3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffb. Also set a variable "accumulator"
825 to zero.
826
827
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
839
840
841 Next, divide the message into 16-byte blocks. The last one might be
842 shorter:
843
844 o Read the block as a little-endian number.
845
846 o Add one bit beyond the number of octets. For a 16-byte block,
847 this is equivalent to adding 2^128 to the number. For the shorter
848
849 block, it can be 2^120, 2^112, or any power of two that is evenly
850 divisible by 8, all the way down to 2^8.
851
852 o If the block is not 17 bytes long (the last block), pad it with
853 zeros. This is meaningless if you are treating the blocks as
854 numbers.
855
856 o Add this number to the accumulator.
857
858 o Multiply by "r".
859
860 o Set the accumulator to the result modulo p. To summarize: Acc =
861 ((Acc+block)*r) % p.
862
863 Finally, the value of the secret key "s" is added to the accumulator,
864 and the 128 least significant bits are serialized in little-endian
865 order to form the tag.
866
867 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1" href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithms in Pseudocode</span>
868
869 clamp(r): r &amp;= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff
870 poly1305_mac(msg, key):
871 r = le_bytes_to_num(key[0..15])
872 clamp(r)
873 s = le_bytes_to_num(key[16..31])
874 a = 0 /* a is the accumulator */
875 p = (1&lt;&lt;130)-5
876 for i=1 upto ceil(msg length in bytes / 16)
877 n = le_bytes_to_num(msg[((i-1)*16)..(i*16)] | [0x01])
878 a += n
879 a = (r * a) % p
880 end
881 a += s
882 return num_to_16_le_bytes(a)
883 end
884
885
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
895
896
897 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.2" href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector</span>
898
899 For our example, we will dispense with generating the one-time key
900 using AES, and assume that we got the following keying material:
901
902 o Key Material: 85:d6:be:78:57:55:6d:33:7f:44:52:fe:42:d5:06:a8:01:0
903 3:80:8a:fb:0d:b2:fd:4a:bf:f6:af:41:49:f5:1b
904
905 o s as an octet string:
906 01:03:80:8a:fb:0d:b2:fd:4a:bf:f6:af:41:49:f5:1b
907
908 o s as a 128-bit number: 1bf54941aff6bf4afdb20dfb8a800301
909
910 o r before clamping: 85:d6:be:78:57:55:6d:33:7f:44:52:fe:42:d5:06:a8
911
912 o Clamped r as a number: 806d5400e52447c036d555408bed685
913
914 For our message, we'll use a short text:
915
916 Message to be Authenticated:
917 000 43 72 79 70 74 6f 67 72 61 70 68 69 63 20 46 6f Cryptographic Fo
918 016 72 75 6d 20 52 65 73 65 61 72 63 68 20 47 72 6f rum Research Gro
919 032 75 70 up
920
921 Since Poly1305 works in 16-byte chunks, the 34-byte message divides
922 into three blocks. In the following calculation, "Acc" denotes the
923 accumulator and "Block" the current block:
924
925 Block #1
926
927 Acc = 00
928 Block = 6f4620636968706172676f7470797243
929 Block with 0x01 byte = 016f4620636968706172676f7470797243
930 Acc + block = 016f4620636968706172676f7470797243
931 (Acc+Block) * r =
932 b83fe991ca66800489155dcd69e8426ba2779453994ac90ed284034da565ecf
933 Acc = ((Acc+Block)*r) % P = 2c88c77849d64ae9147ddeb88e69c83fc
934
935 Block #2
936
937 Acc = 2c88c77849d64ae9147ddeb88e69c83fc
938 Block = 6f7247206863726165736552206d7572
939 Block with 0x01 byte = 016f7247206863726165736552206d7572
940 Acc + block = 437febea505c820f2ad5150db0709f96e
941 (Acc+Block) * r =
942 21dcc992d0c659ba4036f65bb7f88562ae59b32c2b3b8f7efc8b00f78e548a26
943 Acc = ((Acc+Block)*r) % P = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344b30de
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
951
952
953 Last Block
954
955 Acc = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344b30de
956 Block = 7075
957 Block with 0x01 byte = 017075
958 Acc + block = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344ca153
959 (Acc + Block) * r =
960 16d8e08a0f3fe1de4fe4a15486aca7a270a29f1e6c849221e4a6798b8e45321f
961 ((Acc + Block) * r) % P = 28d31b7caff946c77c8844335369d03a7
962
963 Adding s, we get this number, and serialize if to get the tag:
964
965 Acc + s = 2a927010caf8b2bc2c6365130c11d06a8
966
967 Tag: a8:06:1d:c1:30:51:36:c6:c2:2b:8b:af:0c:01:27:a9
968
969 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Generating the Poly1305 Key Using ChaCha20</span>
970
971 As said in <a href="#section-2.5">Section 2.5</a>, it is acceptable to generate the one-time
972 Poly1305 key pseudorandomly. This section defines such a method.
973
974 To generate such a key pair (r,s), we will use the ChaCha20 block
975 function described in <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>. This assumes that we have a
976 256-bit session key specifically for the Message Authentication Code
977 (MAC) function. Any document that specifies the use of Poly1305 as a
978 MAC algorithm for some protocol MUST specify that 256 bits are
979 allocated for the integrity key. Note that in the AEAD construction
980 defined in <a href="#section-2.8">Section 2.8</a>, the same key is used for encryption and key
981 generation.
982
983 The method is to call the block function with the following
984 parameters:
985
986 o The 256-bit session integrity key is used as the ChaCha20 key.
987
988 o The block counter is set to zero.
989
990 o The protocol will specify a 96-bit or 64-bit nonce. This MUST be
991 unique per invocation with the same key, so it MUST NOT be
992 randomly generated. A counter is a good way to implement this,
993 but other methods, such as a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR)
994 are also acceptable. ChaCha20 as specified here requires a 96-bit
995 nonce. So if the provided nonce is only 64-bit, then the first 32
996 bits of the nonce will be set to a constant number. This will
997 usually be zero, but for protocols with multiple senders it may be
998 different for each sender, but SHOULD be the same for all
999 invocations of the function with the same key by a particular
1000 sender.
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1007
1008
1009 After running the block function, we have a 512-bit state. We take
1010 the first 256 bits of the serialized state, and use those as the one-
1011 time Poly1305 key: the first 128 bits are clamped and form "r", while
1012 the next 128 bits become "s". The other 256 bits are discarded.
1013
1014 Note that while many protocols have provisions for a nonce for
1015 encryption algorithms (often called Initialization Vectors, or IVs),
1016 they usually don't have such a provision for the MAC function. In
1017 that case, the per-invocation nonce will have to come from somewhere
1018 else, such as a message counter.
1019
1020 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6.1" href="#section-2.6.1">2.6.1</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation in Pseudocode</span>
1021
1022 poly1305_key_gen(key,nonce):
1023 counter = 0
1024 block = chacha20_block(key,counter,nonce)
1025 return block[0..31]
1026 end
1027
1028 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6.2" href="#section-2.6.2">2.6.2</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Test Vector</span>
1029
1030 For this example, we'll set:
1031
1032 Key:
1033 000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f ................
1034 016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f ................
1035
1036 Nonce:
1037 000 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ............
1038
1039 The ChaCha state setup with key, nonce, and block counter zero:
1040 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
1041 83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c
1042 93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c
1043 00000000 00000000 03020100 07060504
1044
1045 The ChaCha state after 20 rounds:
1046 8ba0d58a cc815f90 27405081 7194b24a
1047 37b633a8 a50dfde3 e2b8db08 46a6d1fd
1048 7da03782 9183a233 148ad271 b46773d1
1049 3cc1875a 8607def1 ca5c3086 7085eb87
1050
1051 Output bytes:
1052 000 8a d5 a0 8b 90 5f 81 cc 81 50 40 27 4a b2 94 71 ....._...P@'J..q
1053 016 a8 33 b6 37 e3 fd 0d a5 08 db b8 e2 fd d1 a6 46 .3.7...........F
1054
1055 And that output is also the 32-byte one-time key used for Poly1305.
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1063
1064
1065 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. A Pseudorandom Function for Crypto Suites Based on ChaCha/Poly1305</span>
1066
1067 Some protocols, such as IKEv2 ([<a href="./rfc7296" title="&quot;Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)&quot;">RFC7296</a>]), require a Pseudorandom
1068 Function (PRF), mostly for key derivation. In the IKEv2 definition,
1069 a PRF is a function that accepts a variable-length key and a
1070 variable-length input, and returns a fixed-length output. Most
1071 commonly, Hashed MAC (HMAC) constructions are used for this purpose,
1072 and often the same function is used for both message authentication
1073 and PRF.
1074
1075 Poly1305 is not a suitable choice for a PRF. Poly1305 prohibits
1076 using the same key twice, whereas the PRF in IKEv2 is used multiple
1077 times with the same key. Additionally, unlike HMAC, Poly1305 is
1078 biased, so using it for key derivation would reduce the security of
1079 the symmetric encryption.
1080
1081 Chacha20 could be used as a key-derivation function, by generating an
1082 arbitrarily long keystream. However, that is not what protocols such
1083 as IKEv2 require.
1084
1085 For this reason, this document does not specify a PRF.
1086
1087 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8" href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. AEAD Construction</span>
1088
1089 AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is an authenticated encryption with additional
1090 data algorithm. The inputs to AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 are:
1091
1092 o A 256-bit key
1093
1094 o A 96-bit nonce -- different for each invocation with the same key
1095
1096 o An arbitrary length plaintext
1097
1098 o Arbitrary length additional authenticated data (AAD)
1099
1100 Some protocols may have unique per-invocation inputs that are not 96
1101 bits in length. For example, IPsec may specify a 64-bit nonce. In
1102 such a case, it is up to the protocol document to define how to
1103 transform the protocol nonce into a 96-bit nonce, for example, by
1104 concatenating a constant value.
1105
1106 The ChaCha20 and Poly1305 primitives are combined into an AEAD that
1107 takes a 256-bit key and 96-bit nonce as follows:
1108
1109 o First, a Poly1305 one-time key is generated from the 256-bit key
1110 and nonce using the procedure described in <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a>.
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1119
1120
1121 o Next, the ChaCha20 encryption function is called to encrypt the
1122 plaintext, using the same key and nonce, and with the initial
1123 counter set to 1.
1124
1125 o Finally, the Poly1305 function is called with the Poly1305 key
1126 calculated above, and a message constructed as a concatenation of
1127 the following:
1128
1129 * The AAD
1130
1131 * padding1 -- the padding is up to 15 zero bytes, and it brings
1132 the total length so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the
1133 length of the AAD was already an integral multiple of 16 bytes,
1134 this field is zero-length.
1135
1136 * The ciphertext
1137
1138 * padding2 -- the padding is up to 15 zero bytes, and it brings
1139 the total length so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the
1140 length of the ciphertext was already an integral multiple of 16
1141 bytes, this field is zero-length.
1142
1143 * The length of the additional data in octets (as a 64-bit
1144 little-endian integer).
1145
1146 * The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little-
1147 endian integer).
1148
1149 The output from the AEAD is the concatenation of:
1150
1151 o A ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext.
1152
1153 o A 128-bit tag, which is the output of the Poly1305 function.
1154
1155 Decryption is similar with the following differences:
1156
1157 o The roles of ciphertext and plaintext are reversed, so the
1158 ChaCha20 encryption function is applied to the ciphertext,
1159 producing the plaintext.
1160
1161 o The Poly1305 function is still run on the AAD and the ciphertext,
1162 not the plaintext.
1163
1164 o The calculated tag is bitwise compared to the received tag. The
1165 message is authenticated if and only if the tags match.
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1175
1176
1177 A few notes about this design:
1178
1179 1. The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation is
1180 2^32-1 blocks of 64 bytes each, because of the size of the block
1181 counter field in the ChaCha20 block function. This gives a total
1182 of 274,877,906,880 bytes, or nearly 256 GB. This should be
1183 enough for traffic protocols such as IPsec and TLS, but may be
1184 too small for file and/or disk encryption. For such uses, we can
1185 return to the original design, reduce the nonce to 64 bits, and
1186 use the integer at position 13 as the top 32 bits of a 64-bit
1187 block counter, increasing the total message size to over a
1188 million petabytes (1,180,591,620,717,411,303,360 bytes to be
1189 exact).
1190
1191 2. Despite the previous item, the ciphertext length field in the
1192 construction of the buffer on which Poly1305 runs limits the
1193 ciphertext (and hence, the plaintext) size to 2^64 bytes, or
1194 sixteen thousand petabytes (18,446,744,073,709,551,616 bytes to
1195 be exact).
1196
1197 The AEAD construction in this section is a novel composition of
1198 ChaCha20 and Poly1305. A security analysis of this composition is
1199 given in [<a href="#ref-Procter" title="&quot;A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305&quot;">Procter</a>].
1200
1201 Here is a list of the parameters for this construction as defined in
1202 <a href="./rfc5116#section-4">Section&nbsp;4 of [RFC5116]</a>:
1203
1204 o K_LEN (key length) is 32 octets.
1205
1206 o P_MAX (maximum size of the plaintext) is 274,877,906,880 bytes, or
1207 nearly 256 GB.
1208
1209 o A_MAX (maximum size of the associated data) is set to 2^64-1
1210 octets by the length field for associated data.
1211
1212 o N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 octets.
1213
1214 o C_MAX = P_MAX + tag length = 274,877,906,896 octets.
1215
1216 Distinct AAD inputs (as described in <a href="./rfc5116#section-3.3">Section&nbsp;3.3 of [RFC5116]</a>) shall
1217 be concatenated into a single input to AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305. It is
1218 up to the application to create a structure in the AAD input if it is
1219 needed.
1220
1221
1222
1223
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1231
1232
1233 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.1" href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Pseudocode for the AEAD Construction</span>
1234
1235 pad16(x):
1236 if (len(x) % 16)==0
1237 then return NULL
1238 else return copies(0, 16-(len(x)%16))
1239 end
1240
1241 chacha20_aead_encrypt(aad, key, iv, constant, plaintext):
1242 nonce = constant | iv
1243 otk = poly1305_key_gen(key, nonce)
1244 ciphertext = chacha20_encrypt(key, 1, nonce, plaintext)
1245 mac_data = aad | pad16(aad)
1246 mac_data |= ciphertext | pad16(ciphertext)
1247 mac_data |= num_to_8_le_bytes(aad.length)
1248 mac_data |= num_to_8_le_bytes(ciphertext.length)
1249 tag = poly1305_mac(mac_data, otk)
1250 return (ciphertext, tag)
1251
1252 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.2" href="#section-2.8.2">2.8.2</a>. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305</span>
1253
1254 For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the
1255 AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 function:
1256
1257 Plaintext:
1258 000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c Ladies and Gentl
1259 016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73 emen of the clas
1260 032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63 s of '99: If I c
1261 048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f ould offer you o
1262 064 6e 6c 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20 nly one tip for
1263 080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75 6e 73 the future, suns
1264 096 63 72 65 65 6e 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 creen would be i
1265 112 74 2e t.
1266
1267 AAD:
1268 000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 PQRS........
1269
1270 Key:
1271 000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f ................
1272 016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f ................
1273
1274 IV:
1275 000 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 @ABCDEFG
1276
1277 32-bit fixed-common part:
1278 000 07 00 00 00 ....
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1287
1288
1289 Setup for generating Poly1305 one-time key (sender id=7):
1290 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
1291 83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c
1292 93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c
1293 00000000 00000007 43424140 47464544
1294
1295 After generating Poly1305 one-time key:
1296 252bac7b af47b42d 557ab609 8455e9a4
1297 73d6e10a ebd97510 7875932a ff53d53e
1298 decc7ea2 b44ddbad e49c17d1 d8430bc9
1299 8c94b7bc 8b7d4b4b 3927f67d 1669a432
1300
1301 Poly1305 Key:
1302 000 7b ac 2b 25 2d b4 47 af 09 b6 7a 55 a4 e9 55 84 {.+%-.G...zU..U.
1303 016 0a e1 d6 73 10 75 d9 eb 2a 93 75 78 3e d5 53 ff ...s.u..*.ux&gt;.S.
1304
1305 Poly1305 r = 455e9a4057ab6080f47b42c052bac7b
1306 Poly1305 s = ff53d53e7875932aebd9751073d6e10a
1307
1308 keystream bytes:
1309 9f:7b:e9:5d:01:fd:40:ba:15:e2:8f:fb:36:81:0a:ae:
1310 c1:c0:88:3f:09:01:6e:de:dd:8a:d0:87:55:82:03:a5:
1311 4e:9e:cb:38:ac:8e:5e:2b:b8:da:b2:0f:fa:db:52:e8:
1312 75:04:b2:6e:be:69:6d:4f:60:a4:85:cf:11:b8:1b:59:
1313 fc:b1:c4:5f:42:19:ee:ac:ec:6a:de:c3:4e:66:69:78:
1314 8e:db:41:c4:9c:a3:01:e1:27:e0:ac:ab:3b:44:b9:cf:
1315 5c:86:bb:95:e0:6b:0d:f2:90:1a:b6:45:e4:ab:e6:22:
1316 15:38
1317
1318 Ciphertext:
1319 000 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc 53 ef 7e c2 ...4d.`.{...S.~.
1320 016 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7 36 ee 62 d6 ...Q)n......6.b.
1321 032 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69 da 92 72 8b =..^..g....i..r.
1322 <a href="#section-048">048</a> 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6 7e cd 3b 36 .q.....)....~.;6
1323 064 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3 28 09 1b 58 ....-w......(..X
1324 080 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b 48 31 d7 bc ..$...u.U...H1..
1325 096 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65 86 ce c6 4b ?....Kz..v.e...K
1326 112 61 16 a.
1327
1328
1329
1330
1331
1332
1333
1334
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1343
1344
1345 AEAD Construction for Poly1305:
1346 000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 00 00 00 00 PQRS............
1347 016 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc 53 ef 7e c2 ...4d.`.{...S.~.
1348 032 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7 36 ee 62 d6 ...Q)n......6.b.
1349 048 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69 da 92 72 8b =..^..g....i..r.
1350 <a href="#section-064">064</a> 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6 7e cd 3b 36 .q.....)....~.;6
1351 080 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3 28 09 1b 58 ....-w......(..X
1352 096 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b 48 31 d7 bc ..$...u.U...H1..
1353 112 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65 86 ce c6 4b ?....Kz..v.e...K
1354 128 61 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a...............
1355 144 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........r.......
1356
1357 Note the four zero bytes in line 000 and the 14 zero bytes in line
1358 128
1359
1360 Tag:
1361 1a:e1:0b:59:4f:09:e2:6a:7e:90:2e:cb:d0:60:06:91
1362
1363 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Implementation Advice</span>
1364
1365 Each block of ChaCha20 involves 16 move operations and one increment
1366 operation for loading the state, 80 each of XOR, addition and roll
1367 operations for the rounds, 16 more add operations and 16 XOR
1368 operations for protecting the plaintext. <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a> describes the
1369 ChaCha block function as "adding the original input words". This
1370 implies that before starting the rounds on the ChaCha state, we copy
1371 it aside, only to add it in later. This is correct, but we can save
1372 a few operations if we instead copy the state and do the work on the
1373 copy. This way, for the next block you don't need to recreate the
1374 state, but only to increment the block counter. This saves
1375 approximately 5.5% of the cycles.
1376
1377 It is not recommended to use a generic big number library such as the
1378 one in OpenSSL for the arithmetic operations in Poly1305. Such
1379 libraries use dynamic allocation to be able to handle an integer of
1380 any size, but that flexibility comes at the expense of performance as
1381 well as side-channel security. More efficient implementations that
1382 run in constant time are available, one of them in D. J. Bernstein's
1383 own library, NaCl ([<a href="#ref-NaCl" title="&quot;NaCl: Networking and Cryptography library&quot;">NaCl</a>]). A constant-time but not optimal approach
1384 would be to naively implement the arithmetic operations for 288-bit
1385 integers, because even a naive implementation will not exceed 2^288
1386 in the multiplication of (acc+block) and r. An efficient constant-
1387 time implementation can be found in the public domain library
1388 poly1305-donna ([<a href="#ref-Poly1305_Donna">Poly1305_Donna</a>]).
1389
1390
1391
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1399
1400
1401 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span>
1402
1403 The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security.
1404
1405 The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages
1406 are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-byte
1407 message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages, so it is
1408 SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability against chosen-message attacks) in the
1409 terminology of [<a href="#ref-AE" title="&quot;Authenticated Encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm&quot;">AE</a>].
1410
1411 Proving the security of either of these is beyond the scope of this
1412 document. Such proofs are available in the referenced academic
1413 papers ([<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title="&quot;ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20&quot;">ChaCha</a>], [<a href="#ref-Poly1305">Poly1305</a>], [<a href="#ref-LatinDances">LatinDances</a>], [<a href="#ref-LatinDances2">LatinDances2</a>], and
1414 [<a href="#ref-Zhenqing2012">Zhenqing2012</a>]).
1415
1416 The most important security consideration in implementing this
1417 document is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. Counters
1418 and LFSRs are both acceptable ways of generating unique nonces, as is
1419 encrypting a counter using a block cipher with a 64-bit block size
1420 such as DES. Note that it is not acceptable to use a truncation of a
1421 counter encrypted with block ciphers with 128-bit or 256-bit blocks,
1422 because such a truncation may repeat after a short time.
1423
1424 Consequences of repeating a nonce: If a nonce is repeated, then both
1425 the one-time Poly1305 key and the keystream are identical between the
1426 messages. This reveals the XOR of the plaintexts, because the XOR of
1427 the plaintexts is equal to the XOR of the ciphertexts.
1428
1429 The Poly1305 key MUST be unpredictable to an attacker. Randomly
1430 generating the key would fulfill this requirement, except that
1431 Poly1305 is often used in communications protocols, so the receiver
1432 should know the key. Pseudorandom number generation such as by
1433 encrypting a counter is acceptable. Using ChaCha with a secret key
1434 and a nonce is also acceptable.
1435
1436 The algorithms presented here were designed to be easy to implement
1437 in constant time to avoid side-channel vulnerabilities. The
1438 operations used in ChaCha20 are all additions, XORs, and fixed rolls.
1439 All of these can and should be implemented in constant time. Access
1440 to offsets into the ChaCha state and the number of operations do not
1441 depend on any property of the key, eliminating the chance of
1442 information about the key leaking through the timing of cache misses.
1443
1444 For Poly1305, the operations are addition, multiplication. and
1445 modulus, all on numbers with greater than 128 bits. This can be done
1446 in constant time, but a naive implementation (such as using some
1447 generic big number library) will not be constant time. For example,
1448 if the multiplication is performed as a separate operation from the
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1455
1456
1457 modulus, the result will sometimes be under 2^256 and sometimes be
1458 above 2^256. Implementers should be careful about timing side-
1459 channels for Poly1305 by using the appropriate implementation of
1460 these operations.
1461
1462 Validating the authenticity of a message involves a bitwise
1463 comparison of the calculated tag with the received tag. In most use
1464 cases, nonces and AAD contents are not "used up" until a valid
1465 message is received. This allows an attacker to send multiple
1466 identical messages with different tags until one passes the tag
1467 comparison. This is hard if the attacker has to try all 2^128
1468 possible tags one by one. However, if the timing of the tag
1469 comparison operation reveals how long a prefix of the calculated and
1470 received tags is identical, the number of messages can be reduced
1471 significantly. For this reason, with online protocols,
1472 implementation MUST use a constant-time comparison function rather
1473 than relying on optimized but insecure library functions such as the
1474 C language's memcmp().
1475
1476 Additionally, any protocol using this algorithm MUST include the
1477 complete tag to minimize the opportunity for forgery. Tag truncation
1478 MUST NOT be done.
1479
1480 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
1481
1482 IANA has updated the entry in the "Authenticated Encryption with
1483 Associated Data (AEAD) Parameters" registry with 29 as the Numeric ID
1484 and "AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305" as the name to point to this document as
1485 its reference.
1486
1487 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span>
1488
1489 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span>
1490
1491 [<a id="ref-ChaCha">ChaCha</a>] Bernstein, D., "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", January
1492 2008, &lt;<a href="http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf">http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf</a>&gt;.
1493
1494 [<a id="ref-Poly1305">Poly1305</a>]
1495 Bernstein, D., "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication
1496 code", March 2005,
1497 &lt;<a href="http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf">http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf</a>&gt;.
1498
1499 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
1500 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
1501 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
1502 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1511
1512
1513 [<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a>
1514 <a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174,
1515 May 2017, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>&gt;.
1516
1517 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span>
1518
1519 [<a id="ref-AE">AE</a>] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption:
1520 Relations among notions and analysis of the generic
1521 composition paradigm", DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x,
1522 September 2008,
1523 &lt;<a href="http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1410269">http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1410269</a>&gt;.
1524
1525 [<a id="ref-Cache-Collisions">Cache-Collisions</a>]
1526 Bonneau, J. and I. Mironov, "Cache-Collision Timing
1527 Attacks Against AES", 2006,
1528 &lt;<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/64024/aes-timing.pdf">http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/64024/aes-timing.pdf</a>&gt;.
1529
1530 [<a id="ref-FIPS-197">FIPS-197</a>]
1531 National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced
1532 Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001,
1533 &lt;<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf">http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/</a>
1534 <a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf">fips-197.pdf</a>&gt;.
1535
1536 [<a id="ref-LatinDances">LatinDances</a>]
1537 Aumasson, J., Fischer, S., Khazaei, S., Meier, W., and C.
1538 Rechberger, "New Features of Latin Dances: Analysis of
1539 Salsa, ChaCha, and Rumba", December 2007,
1540 &lt;<a href="http://cr.yp.to/rumba20/newfeatures-20071218.pdf">http://cr.yp.to/rumba20/newfeatures-20071218.pdf</a>&gt;.
1541
1542 [<a id="ref-LatinDances2">LatinDances2</a>]
1543 Ishiguro, T., Kiyomoto, S., and Y. Miyake, "Modified
1544 version of 'Latin Dances Revisited: New Analytic Results
1545 of Salsa20 and ChaCha'", February 2012,
1546 &lt;<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/065.pdf">https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/065.pdf</a>&gt;.
1547
1548 [<a id="ref-NaCl">NaCl</a>] Bernstein, D., Lange, T., and P. Schwabe, "NaCl:
1549 Networking and Cryptography library", July 2012,
1550 &lt;<a href="http://nacl.cr.yp.to">http://nacl.cr.yp.to</a>&gt;.
1551
1552 [<a id="ref-Poly1305_Donna">Poly1305_Donna</a>]
1553 "poly1305-donna", commit e6ad6e0, March 2016,
1554 &lt;<a href="https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna">https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna</a>&gt;.
1555
1556 [<a id="ref-Procter">Procter</a>] Procter, G., "A Security Analysis of the Composition of
1557 ChaCha20 and Poly1305", August 2014,
1558 &lt;<a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf</a>&gt;.
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1567
1568
1569 [<a id="ref-RFC5116">RFC5116</a>] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated
1570 Encryption", <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008,
1571 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116</a>&gt;.
1572
1573 [<a id="ref-RFC7296">RFC7296</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T.
1574 Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2
1575 (IKEv2)", STD 79, <a href="./rfc7296">RFC 7296</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October
1576 2014, &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296</a>&gt;.
1577
1578 [<a id="ref-RFC7539">RFC7539</a>] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF
1579 Protocols", <a href="./rfc7539">RFC 7539</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015,
1580 &lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539</a>&gt;.
1581
1582 [<a id="ref-SP800-67">SP800-67</a>]
1583 National Institute of Standards and Technology,
1584 "Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm
1585 (TDEA) Block Cipher", NIST 800-67, Rev. 2, November 2017,
1586 &lt;<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/rev-2/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/</a>
1587 <a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/rev-2/final">rev-2/final</a>&gt;.
1588
1589 [<a id="ref-Standby-Cipher">Standby-Cipher</a>]
1590 McGrew, D., Grieco, A., and Y. Sheffer, "Selection of
1591 Future Cryptographic Standards", Work in Progress, <a href="./draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00">draft-</a>
1592 <a href="./draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00">mcgrew-standby-cipher-00</a>, January 2013.
1593
1594 [<a id="ref-Zhenqing2012">Zhenqing2012</a>]
1595 Zhenqing, S., Bin, Z., Dengguo, F., and W. Wenling,
1596 "Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round Salsa20
1597 and ChaCha*", 2012.
1598
1599
1600
1601
1602
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1623
1624
1625 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Additional Test Vectors</span>
1626
1627 The subsections of this appendix contain more test vectors for the
1628 algorithms in the subsections of <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>.
1629
1630 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Functions</span>
1631
1632 Test Vector #1:
1633 ==============
1634
1635 Key:
1636 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1637 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1638
1639 Nonce:
1640 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
1641
1642 Block Counter = 0
1643
1644 ChaCha state at the end
1645 ade0b876 903df1a0 e56a5d40 28bd8653
1646 b819d2bd 1aed8da0 ccef36a8 c70d778b
1647 7c5941da 8d485751 3fe02477 374ad8b8
1648 f4b8436a 1ca11815 69b687c3 8665eeb2
1649
1650 Keystream:
1651 000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..(
1652 016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w..
1653 <a href="#section-032">032</a> da 41 59 7c 51 57 48 8d 77 24 e0 3f b8 d8 4a 37 .AY|QWH.w$.?..J7
1654 048 6a 43 b8 f4 15 18 a1 1c c3 87 b6 69 b2 ee 65 86 jC.........i..e.
1655
1656 Test Vector #2:
1657 ==============
1658
1659 Key:
1660 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1661 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1662
1663 Nonce:
1664 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
1665
1666 Block Counter = 1
1667
1668 ChaCha state at the end
1669 bee7079f 7a385155 7c97ba98 0d082d73
1670 a0290fcb 6965e348 3e53c612 ed7aee32
1671 7621b729 434ee69c b03371d5 d539d874
1672 281fed31 45fb0a51 1f0ae1ac 6f4d794b
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1679
1680
1681 Keystream:
1682 000 9f 07 e7 be 55 51 38 7a 98 ba 97 7c 73 2d 08 0d ....UQ8z...|s-..
1683 016 cb 0f 29 a0 48 e3 65 69 12 c6 53 3e 32 ee 7a ed ..).H.ei..S&gt;2.z.
1684 032 29 b7 21 76 9c e6 4e 43 d5 71 33 b0 74 d8 39 d5 ).!v..NC.q3.t.9.
1685 048 31 ed 1f 28 51 0a fb 45 ac e1 0a 1f 4b 79 4d 6f 1..(Q..E....KyMo
1686
1687 Test Vector #3:
1688 ==============
1689
1690 Key:
1691 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1692 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................
1693
1694 Nonce:
1695 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
1696
1697 Block Counter = 1
1698
1699 ChaCha state at the end
1700 2452eb3a 9249f8ec 8d829d9b ddd4ceb1
1701 e8252083 60818b01 f38422b8 5aaa49c9
1702 bb00ca8e da3ba7b4 c4b592d1 fdf2732f
1703 4436274e 2561b3c8 ebdd4aa6 a0136c00
1704
1705 Keystream:
1706 000 3a eb 52 24 ec f8 49 92 9b 9d 82 8d b1 ce d4 dd :.R$..I.........
1707 016 83 20 25 e8 01 8b 81 60 b8 22 84 f3 c9 49 aa 5a . %....`."...I.Z
1708 032 8e ca 00 bb b4 a7 3b da d1 92 b5 c4 2f 73 f2 fd ......;...../s..
1709 048 4e 27 36 44 c8 b3 61 25 a6 4a dd eb 00 6c 13 a0 N'6D..a%.J...l..
1710
1711 Test Vector #4:
1712 ==============
1713
1714 Key:
1715 000 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1716 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1717
1718 Nonce:
1719 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
1720
1721 Block Counter = 2
1722
1723 ChaCha state at the end
1724 fb4dd572 4bc42ef1 df922636 327f1394
1725 a78dea8f 5e269039 a1bebbc1 caf09aae
1726 a25ab213 48a6b46c 1b9d9bcb 092c5be6
1727 546ca624 1bec45d5 87f47473 96f0992e
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1735
1736
1737 Keystream:
1738 <a href="#section-000">000</a> 72 d5 4d fb f1 2e c4 4b 36 26 92 df 94 13 7f 32 r.M....K6&amp;.....<a href="#page-2">2</a>
1739 016 8f ea 8d a7 39 90 26 5e c1 bb be a1 ae 9a f0 ca ....9.&amp;^........
1740 032 13 b2 5a a2 6c b4 a6 48 cb 9b 9d 1b e6 5b 2c 09 ..Z.l..H.....[,.
1741 048 24 a6 6c 54 d5 45 ec 1b 73 74 f4 87 2e 99 f0 96 $.lT.E..st......
1742
1743 Test Vector #5:
1744 ==============
1745
1746 Key:
1747 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1748 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1749
1750 Nonce:
1751 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............
1752
1753 Block Counter = 0
1754
1755 ChaCha state at the end
1756 374dc6c2 3736d58c b904e24a cd3f93ef
1757 88228b1a 96a4dfb3 5b76ab72 c727ee54
1758 0e0e978a f3145c95 1b748ea8 f786c297
1759 99c28f5f 628314e8 398a19fa 6ded1b53
1760
1761 Keystream:
1762 000 c2 c6 4d 37 8c d5 36 37 4a e2 04 b9 ef 93 3f cd ..M7..67J.....?.
1763 016 1a 8b 22 88 b3 df a4 96 72 ab 76 5b 54 ee 27 c7 ..".....r.v[T.'.
1764 032 8a 97 0e 0e 95 5c 14 f3 a8 8e 74 1b 97 c2 86 f7 .....\....t.....
1765 048 5f 8f c2 99 e8 14 83 62 fa 19 8a 39 53 1b ed 6d _......b...9S..m
1766
1767
1768
1769
1770
1771
1772
1773
1774
1775
1776
1777
1778
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1791
1792
1793 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. ChaCha20 Encryption</span>
1794
1795 Test Vector #1:
1796 ==============
1797
1798 Key:
1799 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1800 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1801
1802 Nonce:
1803 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
1804
1805 Initial Block Counter = 0
1806
1807 Plaintext:
1808 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1809 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1810 032 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1811 048 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1812
1813 Ciphertext:
1814 000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..(
1815 016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w..
1816 <a href="#section-032">032</a> da 41 59 7c 51 57 48 8d 77 24 e0 3f b8 d8 4a 37 .AY|QWH.w$.?..J7
1817 048 6a 43 b8 f4 15 18 a1 1c c3 87 b6 69 b2 ee 65 86 jC.........i..e.
1818
1819 Test Vector #2:
1820 ==============
1821
1822 Key:
1823 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1824 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................
1825
1826 Nonce:
1827 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............
1828
1829 Initial Block Counter = 1
1830
1831
1832
1833
1834
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1847
1848
1849 Plaintext:
1850 000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t
1851 016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten
1852 032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr
1853 048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi
1854 064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or
1855 080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF
1856 096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft
1857 112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s
1858 128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi
1859 144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context
1860 160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti
1861 176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider
1862 192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont
1863 208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such
1864 224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu
1865 240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen
1866 256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi
1867 272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as
1868 288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec
1869 304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica
1870 320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an
1871 336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place,
1872 352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre
1873 368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to
1874
1875
1876
1877
1878
1879
1880
1881
1882
1883
1884
1885
1886
1887
1888
1889
1890
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1903
1904
1905 Ciphertext:
1906 000 a3 fb f0 7d f3 fa 2f de 4f 37 6c a2 3e 82 73 70 ...}../.O7l.&gt;.sp
1907 016 41 60 5d 9f 4f 4f 57 bd 8c ff 2c 1d 4b 79 55 ec A`].OOW...,.KyU.
1908 032 2a 97 94 8b d3 72 29 15 c8 f3 d3 37 f7 d3 70 05 *....r)....7..p.
1909 048 0e 9e 96 d6 47 b7 c3 9f 56 e0 31 ca 5e b6 25 0d ....G...V.1.^.%.
1910 064 40 42 e0 27 85 ec ec fa 4b 4b b5 e8 ea d0 44 0e @B.'....KK....D.
1911 080 20 b6 e8 db 09 d8 81 a7 c6 13 2f 42 0e 52 79 50 ........./B.RyP
1912 096 42 bd fa 77 73 d8 a9 05 14 47 b3 29 1c e1 41 1c B..ws....G.)..A.
1913 112 68 04 65 55 2a a6 c4 05 b7 76 4d 5e 87 be a8 5a h.eU*....vM^...Z
1914 128 d0 0f 84 49 ed 8f 72 d0 d6 62 ab 05 26 91 ca 66 ...I..r..b..&amp;..f
1915 144 42 4b c8 6d 2d f8 0e a4 1f 43 ab f9 37 d3 25 9d BK.m-....C..7.%.
1916 160 c4 b2 d0 df b4 8a 6c 91 39 dd d7 f7 69 66 e9 28 ......l.9...if.(
1917 176 e6 35 55 3b a7 6c 5c 87 9d 7b 35 d4 9e b2 e6 2b .5U;.l\..{5....+
1918 192 08 71 cd ac 63 89 39 e2 5e 8a 1e 0e f9 d5 28 0f .q..c.9.^.....(.
1919 208 a8 ca 32 8b 35 1c 3c 76 59 89 cb cf 3d aa 8b 6c ..2.5.&lt;vY...=..l
1920 224 cc 3a af 9f 39 79 c9 2b 37 20 fc 88 dc 95 ed 84 .:..9y.+7 ......
1921 240 a1 be 05 9c 64 99 b9 fd a2 36 e7 e8 18 b0 4b 0b ....d....6....K.
1922 256 c3 9c 1e 87 6b 19 3b fe 55 69 75 3f 88 12 8c c0 ....k.;.Uiu?....
1923 272 8a aa 9b 63 d1 a1 6f 80 ef 25 54 d7 18 9c 41 1f ...c..o..%T...A.
1924 288 58 69 ca 52 c5 b8 3f a3 6f f2 16 b9 c1 d3 00 62 Xi.R..?.o......b
1925 304 be bc fd 2d c5 bc e0 91 19 34 fd a7 9a 86 f6 e6 ...-.....4......
1926 320 98 ce d7 59 c3 ff 9b 64 77 33 8f 3d a4 f9 cd 85 ...Y...dw3.=....
1927 336 14 ea 99 82 cc af b3 41 b2 38 4d d9 02 f3 d1 ab .......A.8M.....
1928 352 7a c6 1d d2 9c 6f 21 ba 5b 86 2f 37 30 e3 7c fd z....o!.[./70.|.
1929 368 c4 fd 80 6c 22 f2 21 ...l".!
1930
1931 Test Vector #3:
1932 ==============
1933
1934 Key:
1935 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]......
1936 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu.
1937
1938 Nonce:
1939 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............
1940
1941 Initial Block Counter = 42
1942
1943 Plaintext:
1944 000 27 54 77 61 73 20 62 72 69 6c 6c 69 67 2c 20 61 'Twas brillig, a
1945 016 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 73 6c 69 74 68 79 20 74 6f nd the slithy to
1946 032 76 65 73 0a 44 69 64 20 67 79 72 65 20 61 6e 64 ves.Did gyre and
1947 048 20 67 69 6d 62 6c 65 20 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 77 gimble in the w
1948 064 61 62 65 3a 0a 41 6c 6c 20 6d 69 6d 73 79 20 77 abe:.All mimsy w
1949 080 65 72 65 20 74 68 65 20 62 6f 72 6f 67 6f 76 65 ere the borogove
1950 096 73 2c 0a 41 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 6d 6f 6d 65 20 s,.And the mome
1951 112 72 61 74 68 73 20 6f 75 74 67 72 61 62 65 2e raths outgrabe.
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
1959
1960
1961 Ciphertext:
1962 000 62 e6 34 7f 95 ed 87 a4 5f fa e7 42 6f 27 a1 df b.4....._..Bo'..
1963 016 5f b6 91 10 04 4c 0d 73 11 8e ff a9 5b 01 e5 cf _....L.s....[...
1964 032 16 6d 3d f2 d7 21 ca f9 b2 1e 5f b1 4c 61 68 71 .m=..!...._.Lahq
1965 048 fd 84 c5 4f 9d 65 b2 83 19 6c 7f e4 f6 05 53 eb ...O.e...l....S.
1966 064 f3 9c 64 02 c4 22 34 e3 2a 35 6b 3e 76 43 12 a6 ..d.."4.*5k&gt;vC..
1967 080 1a 55 32 05 57 16 ea d6 96 25 68 f8 7d 3f 3f 77 .U2.W....%h.}??w
1968 096 04 c6 a8 d1 bc d1 bf 4d 50 d6 15 4b 6d a7 31 b1 .......MP..Km.1.
1969 112 87 b5 8d fd 72 8a fa 36 75 7a 79 7a c1 88 d1 ....r..6uzyz...
1970
1971 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Poly1305 Message Authentication Code</span>
1972
1973 Notice how, in test vector #2, r is equal to zero. The part of the
1974 Poly1305 algorithm where the accumulator is multiplied by r means
1975 that with r equal zero, the tag will be equal to s regardless of the
1976 content of the text. Fortunately, all the proposed methods of
1977 generating r are such that getting this particular weak key is very
1978 unlikely.
1979
1980 Test Vector #1:
1981 ==============
1982
1983 One-time Poly1305 Key:
1984 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1985 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1986
1987 Text to MAC:
1988 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1989 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1990 032 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1991 048 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1992
1993 Tag:
1994 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
1995
1996 Test Vector #2:
1997 ==============
1998
1999 One-time Poly1305 Key:
2000 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2001 016 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.&gt;
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2015
2016
2017 Text to MAC:
2018 000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t
2019 016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten
2020 032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr
2021 048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi
2022 064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or
2023 080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF
2024 096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft
2025 112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s
2026 128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi
2027 144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context
2028 160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti
2029 176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider
2030 192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont
2031 208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such
2032 224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu
2033 240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen
2034 256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi
2035 272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as
2036 288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec
2037 304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica
2038 320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an
2039 336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place,
2040 352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre
2041 368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to
2042
2043 Tag:
2044 000 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.&gt;
2045
2046 Test Vector #3:
2047 ==============
2048
2049 One-time Poly1305 Key:
2050 000 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.&gt;
2051 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2052
2053
2054
2055
2056
2057
2058
2059
2060
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2071
2072
2073 Text to MAC:
2074 000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t
2075 016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten
2076 032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr
2077 048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi
2078 064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or
2079 080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF
2080 096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft
2081 112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s
2082 128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi
2083 144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context
2084 160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti
2085 176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider
2086 192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont
2087 208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such
2088 224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu
2089 240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen
2090 256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi
2091 272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as
2092 288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec
2093 304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica
2094 320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an
2095 336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place,
2096 352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre
2097 368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to
2098
2099 Tag:
2100 000 f3 47 7e 7c d9 54 17 af 89 a6 b8 79 4c 31 0c f0 .G~|.T.....yL1..
2101
2102
2103
2104
2105
2106
2107
2108
2109
2110
2111
2112
2113
2114
2115
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2127
2128
2129 Test Vector #4:
2130 ==============
2131
2132 One-time Poly1305 Key:
2133 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]......
2134 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu.
2135
2136 Text to MAC:
2137 000 27 54 77 61 73 20 62 72 69 6c 6c 69 67 2c 20 61 'Twas brillig, a
2138 016 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 73 6c 69 74 68 79 20 74 6f nd the slithy to
2139 032 76 65 73 0a 44 69 64 20 67 79 72 65 20 61 6e 64 ves.Did gyre and
2140 048 20 67 69 6d 62 6c 65 20 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 77 gimble in the w
2141 064 61 62 65 3a 0a 41 6c 6c 20 6d 69 6d 73 79 20 77 abe:.All mimsy w
2142 080 65 72 65 20 74 68 65 20 62 6f 72 6f 67 6f 76 65 ere the borogove
2143 096 73 2c 0a 41 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 6d 6f 6d 65 20 s,.And the mome
2144 112 72 61 74 68 73 20 6f 75 74 67 72 61 62 65 2e raths outgrabe.
2145
2146 Tag:
2147 000 45 41 66 9a 7e aa ee 61 e7 08 dc 7c bc c5 eb 62 EAf.~..a...|...b
2148
2149 Test Vector #5: If one uses 130-bit partial reduction, does the code
2150 handle the case where partially reduced final result is not fully
2151 reduced?
2152
2153 R:
2154 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2155 S:
2156 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2157 data:
2158 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2159 tag:
2160 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2161
2162 Test Vector #6: What happens if addition of s overflows modulo 2^128?
2163
2164 R:
2165 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2166 S:
2167 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2168 data:
2169 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2170 tag:
2171 03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2172
2173
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2183
2184
2185 Test Vector #7: What happens if data limb is all ones and there is
2186 carry from lower limb?
2187
2188 R:
2189 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2190 S:
2191 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2192 data:
2193 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2194 F0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2195 11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2196 tag:
2197 05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2198
2199 Test Vector #8: What happens if final result from polynomial part is
2200 exactly 2^130-5?
2201
2202 R:
2203 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2204 S:
2205 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2206 data:
2207 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2208 FB FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE
2209 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01
2210 tag:
2211 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2212
2213 Test Vector #9: What happens if final result from polynomial part is
2214 exactly 2^130-6?
2215
2216 R:
2217 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2218 S:
2219 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2220 data:
2221 FD FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2222 tag:
2223 FA FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF
2224
2225
2226
2227
2228
2229
2230
2231
2232
2233
2234
2235
2236 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2239
2240
2241 Test Vector #10: What happens if 5*H+L-type reduction produces
2242 131-bit intermediate result?
2243
2244 R:
2245 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2246 S:
2247 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2248 data:
2249 E3 35 94 D7 50 5E 43 B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2250 33 94 D7 50 5E 43 79 CD 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2251 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2252 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2253 tag:
2254 14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2255
2256 Test Vector #11: What happens if 5*H+L-type reduction produces
2257 131-bit final result?
2258
2259 R:
2260 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2261 S:
2262 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2263 data:
2264 E3 35 94 D7 50 5E 43 B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2265 33 94 D7 50 5E 43 79 CD 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2266 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2267 tag:
2268 13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00
2269
2270 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.4" href="#appendix-A.4">A.4</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Using ChaCha20</span>
2271
2272 Test Vector #1:
2273 ==============
2274
2275 The ChaCha20 Key:
2276 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2277 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2278
2279 The nonce:
2280 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............
2281
2282 Poly1305 one-time key:
2283 000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..(
2284 016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w..
2285
2286
2287
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 41]</span></pre>
2293 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span>
2294 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2295
2296
2297 Test Vector #2:
2298 ==============
2299
2300 The ChaCha20 Key
2301 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2302 016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................
2303
2304 The nonce:
2305 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............
2306
2307 Poly1305 one-time key:
2308 000 ec fa 25 4f 84 5f 64 74 73 d3 cb 14 0d a9 e8 76 ..%O._dts......<a href="#page-v">v</a>
2309 <a href="#section-016">016</a> 06 cb 33 06 6c 44 7b 87 bc 26 66 dd e3 fb b7 39 ..3.lD{..&amp;f....<a href="#page-9">9</a>
2310
2311 Test Vector #3:
2312 ==============
2313
2314 The ChaCha20 Key
2315 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]......
2316 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu.
2317
2318 The nonce:
2319 000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............
2320
2321 Poly1305 one-time key:
2322 000 96 5e 3b c6 f9 ec 7e d9 56 08 08 f4 d2 29 f9 4b .^;...~.V....).K
2323 016 13 7f f2 75 ca 9b 3f cb dd 59 de aa d2 33 10 ae ...u..?..Y...3..
2324
2325 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.5" href="#appendix-A.5">A.5</a>. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD Decryption</span>
2326
2327 Below we see decrypting a message. We receive a ciphertext, a nonce,
2328 and a tag. We know the key. We will check the tag and then
2329 (assuming that it validates) decrypt the ciphertext. In this
2330 particular protocol, we'll assume that there is no padding of the
2331 plaintext.
2332
2333
2334
2335
2336
2337
2338
2339
2340
2341
2342
2343
2344
2345
2346
2347
2348 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 42]</span></pre>
2349 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-43" ></span>
2350 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2351
2352
2353 The ChaCha20 Key
2354 000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]......
2355 016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu.
2356
2357 Ciphertext:
2358 000 64 a0 86 15 75 86 1a f4 60 f0 62 c7 9b e6 43 bd d...u...`.b...C.
2359 016 5e 80 5c fd 34 5c f3 89 f1 08 67 0a c7 6c 8c b2 ^.\.4\....g..l..
2360 032 4c 6c fc 18 75 5d 43 ee a0 9e e9 4e 38 2d 26 b0 Ll..u]C....N8-&amp;.
2361 048 bd b7 b7 3c 32 1b 01 00 d4 f0 3b 7f 35 58 94 cf ...&lt;2.....;.5X..
2362 064 33 2f 83 0e 71 0b 97 ce 98 c8 a8 4a bd 0b 94 81 3/..q......J....
2363 080 14 ad 17 6e 00 8d 33 bd 60 f9 82 b1 ff 37 c8 55 ...n..3.`....7.U
2364 <a href="#section-096">096</a> 97 97 a0 6e f4 f0 ef 61 c1 86 32 4e 2b 35 06 38 ...n...a..2N+5.8
2365 112 36 06 90 7b 6a 7c 02 b0 f9 f6 15 7b 53 c8 67 e4 6..{j|.....{S.g.
2366 128 b9 16 6c 76 7b 80 4d 46 a5 9b 52 16 cd e7 a4 e9 ..lv{.MF..R.....
2367 144 90 40 c5 a4 04 33 22 5e e2 82 a1 b0 a0 6c 52 3e [email protected]"^.....lR&gt;
2368 160 af 45 34 d7 f8 3f a1 15 5b 00 47 71 8c bc 54 6a .E4..?..[.Gq..Tj
2369 176 0d 07 2b 04 b3 56 4e ea 1b 42 22 73 f5 48 27 1a ..+..VN..B"s.H'.
2370 192 0b b2 31 60 53 fa 76 99 19 55 eb d6 31 59 43 4e ..1`S.v..U..1YCN
2371 208 ce bb 4e 46 6d ae 5a 10 73 a6 72 76 27 09 7a 10 ..NFm.Z.s.rv'.z.
2372 <a href="#section-224">224</a> 49 e6 17 d9 1d 36 10 94 fa 68 f0 ff 77 98 71 30 I....6...h..w.q0
2373 240 30 5b ea ba 2e da 04 df 99 7b 71 4d 6c 6f 2c 29 0[.......{qMlo,)
2374 256 a6 ad 5c b4 02 2b 02 70 9b ..\..+.p.
2375
2376 The nonce:
2377 000 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 ............
2378
2379 The AAD:
2380 000 f3 33 88 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 91 .3........N.
2381
2382 Received Tag:
2383 <a href="#section-000">000</a> ee ad 9d 67 89 0c bb 22 39 23 36 fe a1 85 1f 38 ...g..."9#6....<a href="#page-8">8</a>
2384
2385
2386
2387
2388
2389
2390
2391
2392
2393
2394
2395
2396
2397
2398
2399
2400
2401
2402
2403
2404 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 43]</span></pre>
2405 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-44" ></span>
2406 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2407
2408
2409 First, we calculate the one-time Poly1305 key
2410
2411 ChaCha state with key setup
2412 61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574
2413 a540921c 8ad355eb 868833f3 f0b5f604
2414 c1173947 09802b40 bc5cca9d c0757020
2415 00000000 00000000 04030201 08070605
2416
2417 ChaCha state after 20 rounds
2418 a94af0bd 89dee45c b64bb195 afec8fa1
2419 508f4726 63f554c0 1ea2c0db aa721526
2420 11b1e514 a0bacc0f 828a6015 d7825481
2421 e8a4a850 d9dcbbd6 4c2de33a f8ccd912
2422
2423 out bytes:
2424 bd:f0:4a:a9:5c:e4:de:89:95:b1:4b:b6:a1:8f:ec:af:
2425 26:47:8f:50:c0:54:f5:63:db:c0:a2:1e:26:15:72:aa
2426
2427 Poly1305 one-time key:
2428 000 bd f0 4a a9 5c e4 de 89 95 b1 4b b6 a1 8f ec af ..J.\.....K.....
2429 016 26 47 8f 50 c0 54 f5 63 db c0 a2 1e 26 15 72 aa &amp;G.P.T.c....&amp;.r.
2430
2431 Next, we construct the AEAD buffer
2432
2433 Poly1305 Input:
2434 000 f3 33 88 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 91 00 00 00 00 .3........N.....
2435 016 64 a0 86 15 75 86 1a f4 60 f0 62 c7 9b e6 43 bd d...u...`.b...C.
2436 032 5e 80 5c fd 34 5c f3 89 f1 08 67 0a c7 6c 8c b2 ^.\.4\....g..l..
2437 048 4c 6c fc 18 75 5d 43 ee a0 9e e9 4e 38 2d 26 b0 Ll..u]C....N8-&amp;.
2438 064 bd b7 b7 3c 32 1b 01 00 d4 f0 3b 7f 35 58 94 cf ...&lt;2.....;.5X..
2439 080 33 2f 83 0e 71 0b 97 ce 98 c8 a8 4a bd 0b 94 81 3/..q......J....
2440 096 14 ad 17 6e 00 8d 33 bd 60 f9 82 b1 ff 37 c8 55 ...n..3.`....7.U
2441 <a href="#section-112">112</a> 97 97 a0 6e f4 f0 ef 61 c1 86 32 4e 2b 35 06 38 ...n...a..2N+5.8
2442 128 36 06 90 7b 6a 7c 02 b0 f9 f6 15 7b 53 c8 67 e4 6..{j|.....{S.g.
2443 144 b9 16 6c 76 7b 80 4d 46 a5 9b 52 16 cd e7 a4 e9 ..lv{.MF..R.....
2444 160 90 40 c5 a4 04 33 22 5e e2 82 a1 b0 a0 6c 52 3e [email protected]"^.....lR&gt;
2445 176 af 45 34 d7 f8 3f a1 15 5b 00 47 71 8c bc 54 6a .E4..?..[.Gq..Tj
2446 192 0d 07 2b 04 b3 56 4e ea 1b 42 22 73 f5 48 27 1a ..+..VN..B"s.H'.
2447 208 0b b2 31 60 53 fa 76 99 19 55 eb d6 31 59 43 4e ..1`S.v..U..1YCN
2448 224 ce bb 4e 46 6d ae 5a 10 73 a6 72 76 27 09 7a 10 ..NFm.Z.s.rv'.z.
2449 <a href="#section-240">240</a> 49 e6 17 d9 1d 36 10 94 fa 68 f0 ff 77 98 71 30 I....6...h..w.q0
2450 256 30 5b ea ba 2e da 04 df 99 7b 71 4d 6c 6f 2c 29 0[.......{qMlo,)
2451 272 a6 ad 5c b4 02 2b 02 70 9b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..\..+.p........
2452 288 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................
2453
2454
2455
2456
2457
2458
2459
2460 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 44]</span></pre>
2461 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-45" ></span>
2462 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2463
2464
2465 We calculate the Poly1305 tag and find that it matches
2466
2467 Calculated Tag:
2468 <a href="#section-000">000</a> ee ad 9d 67 89 0c bb 22 39 23 36 fe a1 85 1f 38 ...g..."9#6....<a href="#page-8">8</a>
2469
2470 Finally, we decrypt the ciphertext
2471
2472 Plaintext::
2473 000 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 73 20 Internet-Drafts
2474 016 61 72 65 20 64 72 61 66 74 20 64 6f 63 75 6d 65 are draft docume
2475 032 6e 74 73 20 76 61 6c 69 64 20 66 6f 72 20 61 20 nts valid for a
2476 048 6d 61 78 69 6d 75 6d 20 6f 66 20 73 69 78 20 6d maximum of six m
2477 064 6f 6e 74 68 73 20 61 6e 64 20 6d 61 79 20 62 65 onths and may be
2478 080 20 75 70 64 61 74 65 64 2c 20 72 65 70 6c 61 63 updated, replac
2479 096 65 64 2c 20 6f 72 20 6f 62 73 6f 6c 65 74 65 64 ed, or obsoleted
2480 112 20 62 79 20 6f 74 68 65 72 20 64 6f 63 75 6d 65 by other docume
2481 128 6e 74 73 20 61 74 20 61 6e 79 20 74 69 6d 65 2e nts at any time.
2482 144 20 49 74 20 69 73 20 69 6e 61 70 70 72 6f 70 72 It is inappropr
2483 160 69 61 74 65 20 74 6f 20 75 73 65 20 49 6e 74 65 iate to use Inte
2484 176 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 73 20 61 73 20 72 rnet-Drafts as r
2485 192 65 66 65 72 65 6e 63 65 20 6d 61 74 65 72 69 61 eference materia
2486 208 6c 20 6f 72 20 74 6f 20 63 69 74 65 20 74 68 65 l or to cite the
2487 224 6d 20 6f 74 68 65 72 20 74 68 61 6e 20 61 73 20 m other than as
2488 240 2f e2 80 9c 77 6f 72 6b 20 69 6e 20 70 72 6f 67 /...work in prog
2489 256 72 65 73 73 2e 2f e2 80 9d ress./...
2490
2491 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Performance Measurements of ChaCha20</span>
2492
2493 The following measurements were made by Adam Langley for a blog post
2494 published on February 27th, 2014. The original blog post was
2495 available at the time of this writing at
2496 &lt;<a href="https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto.html">https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto.html</a>&gt;.
2497
2498 +----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+
2499 | Chip | AES-128-GCM | ChaCha20-Poly1305 |
2500 +----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+
2501 | OMAP 4460 | 24.1 MB/s | 75.3 MB/s |
2502 | Snapdragon S4 Pro | 41.5 MB/s | 130.9 MB/s |
2503 | Sandy Bridge Xeon (AES-NI) | 900 MB/s | 500 MB/s |
2504 +----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+
2505
2506 Table 1: Speed Comparison
2507
2508
2509
2510
2511
2512
2513
2514
2515
2516 <span class="grey">Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 45]</span></pre>
2517 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-46" ></span>
2518 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 &amp; Poly1305 June 2018</span>
2519
2520
2521 Acknowledgements
2522
2523 ChaCha20 and Poly1305 were invented by Daniel J. Bernstein. The AEAD
2524 construction and the method of creating the one-time Poly1305 key
2525 were invented by Adam Langley.
2526
2527 Thanks to Robert Ransom, Watson Ladd, Stefan Buhler, Dan Harkins, and
2528 Kenny Paterson for their helpful comments and explanations. Thanks
2529 to Niels Moller for suggesting the more efficient AEAD construction
2530 in this document. Special thanks to Ilari Liusvaara for providing
2531 extra test vectors, helpful comments, and for being the first to
2532 attempt an implementation from this document. Thanks to Sean
2533 Parkinson for suggesting improvements to the examples and the
2534 pseudocode. Thanks to David Ireland for pointing out a bug in the
2535 pseudocode, and to Stephen Farrell and Alyssa Rowan for pointing out
2536 missing advise in the security considerations.
2537
2538 Special thanks goes to Gordon Procter for performing a security
2539 analysis of the composition and publishing [<a href="#ref-Procter" title="&quot;A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305&quot;">Procter</a>].
2540
2541 Jim Schaad and John Mattson provided feedback on tag truncation, and
2542 Russ Housley, Stanislav Smyshlyaev, and John Mattson each provided a
2543 review of this version.
2544
2545 Authors' Addresses
2546
2547 Yoav Nir
2548 Dell EMC
2549 9 Andrei Sakharov St
2550 Haifa 3190500
2551 Israel
2552
2553 Email: [email protected]
2554
2555
2556 Adam Langley
2557 Google, Inc.
2558
2559 Email: [email protected]
2560
2561
2562
2563
2564
2565
2566
2567
2568
2569
2570
2571
2572 Nir &amp; Langley Informational [Page 46]
2573 </pre>