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<pre>Internet Research Task Force (IRTF) Y. Nir |
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Request for Comments: 8439 Dell EMC |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc7539">7539</a> A. Langley |
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Category: Informational Google, Inc. |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 June 2018 |
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<span class="h1">ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols</span> |
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Abstract |
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This document defines the ChaCha20 stream cipher as well as the use |
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of the Poly1305 authenticator, both as stand-alone algorithms and as |
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a "combined mode", or Authenticated Encryption with Associated Data |
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(AEAD) algorithm. |
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|
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<a href="./rfc7539">RFC 7539</a>, the predecessor of this document, was meant to serve as a |
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stable reference and an implementation guide. It was a product of |
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the Crypto Forum Research Group (CFRG). This document merges the |
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errata filed against <a href="./rfc7539">RFC 7539</a> and adds a little text to the Security |
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Considerations section. |
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Status of This Memo |
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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This document is a product of the Internet Research Task Force |
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(IRTF). The IRTF publishes the results of Internet-related research |
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and development activities. These results might not be suitable for |
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deployment. This RFC represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum |
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Research Group of the Internet Research Task Force (IRTF). Documents |
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approved for publication by the IRSG are not candidates for any level |
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of Internet Standard; see <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8439</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2018 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. |
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<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions Used in This Document . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. The Algorithms . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. The ChaCha Quarter Round . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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2.2.1. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha State 7 |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3.1">2.3.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3.2">2.3.2</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4.1">2.4.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm in Pseudocode . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4.2">2.4.2</a>. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithm . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithms in Pseudocode . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Generating the Poly1305 Key Using ChaCha20 . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.6.1">2.6.1</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation in Pseudocode . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.6.2">2.6.2</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Test Vector . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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2.7. A Pseudorandom Function for Crypto Suites Based on |
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ChaCha/Poly1305 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. AEAD Construction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Pseudocode for the AEAD Construction . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a> |
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2.8.2. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 . 23 |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Implementation Advice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Additional Test Vectors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Functions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. ChaCha20 Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Poly1305 Message Authentication Code . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-36">36</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A.4">A.4</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Using ChaCha20 . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-41">41</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A.5">A.5</a>. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD Decryption . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-42">42</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Performance Measurements of ChaCha20 . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-45">45</a> |
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Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-46">46</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-46">46</a> |
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<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Advanced Encryption Standard (AES -- [<a href="#ref-FIPS-197">FIPS-197</a>]) has become the |
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gold standard in encryption. Its efficient design, widespread |
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implementation, and hardware support allow for high performance in |
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many areas. On most modern platforms, AES is anywhere from four to |
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ten times as fast as the previous most-used cipher, Triple Data |
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Encryption Standard (3DES -- [<a href="#ref-SP800-67">SP800-67</a>]), which makes it not only the |
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best choice, but the only practical choice. |
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There are several problems with this. If future advances in |
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cryptanalysis reveal a weakness in AES, users will be in an |
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unenviable position. With the only other widely supported cipher |
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being the much slower 3DES, it is not feasible to reconfigure |
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deployments to use 3DES. [<a href="#ref-Standby-Cipher">Standby-Cipher</a>] describes this issue and |
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the need for a standby cipher in greater detail. Another problem is |
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that while AES is very fast on dedicated hardware, its performance on |
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platforms that lack such hardware is considerably lower. Yet another |
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problem is that many AES implementations are vulnerable to cache- |
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collision timing attacks ([<a href="#ref-Cache-Collisions">Cache-Collisions</a>]). |
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This document provides a definition and implementation guide for |
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three algorithms: |
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1. The ChaCha20 cipher. This is a high-speed cipher first described |
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in [<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title=""ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"">ChaCha</a>]. It is considerably faster than AES in software-only |
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implementations, making it around three times as fast on |
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platforms that lack specialized AES hardware. See <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> for |
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some hard numbers. ChaCha20 is also not sensitive to timing |
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attacks (see the security considerations in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>). This |
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algorithm is described in <a href="#section-2.4">Section 2.4</a> |
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2. The Poly1305 authenticator. This is a high-speed message |
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authentication code. Implementation is also straightforward and |
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easy to get right. The algorithm is described in <a href="#section-2.5">Section 2.5</a>. |
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3. The CHACHA20-POLY1305 Authenticated Encryption with Associated |
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Data (AEAD) construction, described in <a href="#section-2.8">Section 2.8</a>. |
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This document and its predecessor do not introduce these new |
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algorithms for the first time. They have been defined in scientific |
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papers by D. J. Bernstein [<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title=""ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"">ChaCha</a>][Poly1305]. The purpose of this |
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document is to serve as a stable reference for IETF documents making |
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use of these algorithms. |
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These algorithms have undergone rigorous analysis. Several papers |
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discuss the security of Salsa and ChaCha ([<a href="#ref-LatinDances">LatinDances</a>], |
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[<a href="#ref-LatinDances2">LatinDances2</a>], [<a href="#ref-Zhenqing2012">Zhenqing2012</a>]). |
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<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
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This document represents the consensus of the Crypto Forum Research |
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Group (CFRG). It replaces [<a href="./rfc7539" title=""ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF Protocols"">RFC7539</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "NOT RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and |
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"OPTIONAL" in this document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP</a> |
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<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">14</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>] [<a href="./rfc8174" title=""Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in RFC 2119 Key Words"">RFC8174</a>] when, and only when, they appear in all |
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capitals, as shown here. |
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The description of the ChaCha algorithm will at various time refer to |
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the ChaCha state as a "vector" or as a "matrix". This follows the |
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use of these terms in [<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title=""ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"">ChaCha</a>]. The matrix notation is more visually |
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convenient and gives a better notion as to why some rounds are called |
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"column rounds" while others are called "diagonal rounds". Here's a |
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diagram of how the matrices relate to vectors (using the C language |
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convention of zero being the index origin). |
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0 1 2 3 |
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4 5 6 7 |
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8 9 10 11 |
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12 13 14 15 |
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The elements in this vector or matrix are 32-bit unsigned integers. |
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The algorithm name is "ChaCha". "ChaCha20" is a specific instance |
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where 20 "rounds" (or 80 quarter rounds -- see <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>) are used. |
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Other variations are defined, with 8 or 12 rounds, but in this |
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document we only describe the 20-round ChaCha, so the names "ChaCha" |
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and "ChaCha20" will be used interchangeably. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. The Algorithms</span> |
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The subsections below describe the algorithms used and the AEAD |
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construction. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. The ChaCha Quarter Round</span> |
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The basic operation of the ChaCha algorithm is the quarter round. It |
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operates on four 32-bit unsigned integers, denoted a, b, c, and d. |
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The operation is as follows (in C-like notation): |
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a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 16; |
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c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 12; |
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a += b; d ^= a; d <<<= 8; |
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c += d; b ^= c; b <<<= 7; |
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<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
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Where "+" denotes integer addition modulo 2^32, "^" denotes a bitwise |
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Exclusive OR (XOR), and "<<< n" denotes an n-bit left roll (towards |
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the high bits). |
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For example, let's see the add, XOR, and roll operations from the |
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fourth line with sample numbers: |
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a = 0x11111111 |
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b = 0x01020304 |
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c = 0x77777777 |
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d = 0x01234567 |
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c = c + d = 0x77777777 + 0x01234567 = 0x789abcde |
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b = b ^ c = 0x01020304 ^ 0x789abcde = 0x7998bfda |
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b = b <<< 7 = 0x7998bfda <<< 7 = 0xcc5fed3c |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1.1" href="#section-2.1.1">2.1.1</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha Quarter Round</span> |
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For a test vector, we will use the same numbers as in the example, |
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adding something random for c. |
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a = 0x11111111 |
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b = 0x01020304 |
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c = 0x9b8d6f43 |
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d = 0x01234567 |
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After running a Quarter Round on these four numbers, we get these: |
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a = 0xea2a92f4 |
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b = 0xcb1cf8ce |
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c = 0x4581472e |
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d = 0x5881c4bb |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. A Quarter Round on the ChaCha State</span> |
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The ChaCha state does not have four integer numbers: it has 16. So |
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the quarter-round operation works on only four of them -- hence the |
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name. Each quarter round operates on four predetermined numbers in |
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the ChaCha state. We will denote by QUARTERROUND(x, y, z, w) a |
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quarter-round operation on the numbers at indices x, y, z, and w of |
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the ChaCha state when viewed as a vector. For example, if we apply |
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QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13) to a state, this means running the quarter- |
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round operation on the elements marked with an asterisk, while |
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leaving the others alone: |
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0 *a 2 3 |
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4 *b 6 7 |
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8 *c 10 11 |
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12 *d 14 15 |
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<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
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Note that this run of quarter round is part of what is called a |
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"column round". |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2.1" href="#section-2.2.1">2.2.1</a>. Test Vector for the Quarter Round on the ChaCha State</span> |
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For a test vector, we will use a ChaCha state that was generated |
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randomly: |
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Sample ChaCha State |
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879531e0 c5ecf37d 516461b1 c9a62f8a |
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44c20ef3 3390af7f d9fc690b 2a5f714c |
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53372767 b00a5631 974c541a 359e9963 |
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5c971061 3d631689 2098d9d6 91dbd320 |
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We will apply the QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) operation to this state. |
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For obvious reasons, this one is part of what is called a "diagonal |
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round": |
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After applying QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) |
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879531e0 c5ecf37d *bdb886dc c9a62f8a |
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44c20ef3 3390af7f d9fc690b *cfacafd2 |
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*e46bea80 b00a5631 974c541a 359e9963 |
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5c971061 *ccc07c79 2098d9d6 91dbd320 |
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Note that only the numbers in positions 2, 7, 8, and 13 changed. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function</span> |
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| 367 |
The ChaCha block function transforms a ChaCha state by running |
| 368 |
multiple quarter rounds. |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
The inputs to ChaCha20 are: |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
o A 256-bit key, treated as a concatenation of eight 32-bit little- |
| 373 |
endian integers. |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
o A 96-bit nonce, treated as a concatenation of three 32-bit little- |
| 376 |
endian integers. |
| 377 |
|
| 378 |
o A 32-bit block count parameter, treated as a 32-bit little-endian |
| 379 |
integer. |
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
The output is 64 random-looking bytes. |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
The ChaCha algorithm described here uses a 256-bit key. The original |
| 394 |
algorithm also specified 128-bit keys and 8- and 12-round variants, |
| 395 |
but these are out of scope for this document. In this section, we |
| 396 |
describe the ChaCha block function. |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
Note also that the original ChaCha had a 64-bit nonce and 64-bit |
| 399 |
block count. We have modified this here to be more consistent with |
| 400 |
recommendations in <a href="./rfc5116#section-3.2">Section 3.2 of [RFC5116]</a>. This limits the use of |
| 401 |
a single (key,nonce) combination to 2^32 blocks, or 256 GB, but that |
| 402 |
is enough for most uses. In cases where a single key is used by |
| 403 |
multiple senders, it is important to make sure that they don't use |
| 404 |
the same nonces. This can be assured by partitioning the nonce space |
| 405 |
so that the first 32 bits are unique per sender, while the other 64 |
| 406 |
bits come from a counter. |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
The ChaCha20 state is initialized as follows: |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
o The first four words (0-3) are constants: 0x61707865, 0x3320646e, |
| 411 |
0x79622d32, 0x6b206574. |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
o The next eight words (4-11) are taken from the 256-bit key by |
| 414 |
reading the bytes in little-endian order, in 4-byte chunks. |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
o Word 12 is a block counter. Since each block is 64-byte, a 32-bit |
| 417 |
word is enough for 256 gigabytes of data. |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
o Words 13-15 are a nonce, which MUST not be repeated for the same |
| 420 |
key. The 13th word is the first 32 bits of the input nonce taken |
| 421 |
as a little-endian integer, while the 15th word is the last 32 |
| 422 |
bits. |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc cccccccc |
| 425 |
kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk |
| 426 |
kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk kkkkkkkk |
| 427 |
bbbbbbbb nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn nnnnnnnn |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
c=constant k=key b=blockcount n=nonce |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
ChaCha20 runs 20 rounds, alternating between "column rounds" and |
| 450 |
"diagonal rounds". Each round consists of four quarter-rounds, and |
| 451 |
they are run as follows. Quarter rounds 1-4 are part of a "column" |
| 452 |
round, while 5-8 are part of a "diagonal" round: |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
QUARTERROUND(0, 4, 8, 12) |
| 455 |
QUARTERROUND(1, 5, 9, 13) |
| 456 |
QUARTERROUND(2, 6, 10, 14) |
| 457 |
QUARTERROUND(3, 7, 11, 15) |
| 458 |
QUARTERROUND(0, 5, 10, 15) |
| 459 |
QUARTERROUND(1, 6, 11, 12) |
| 460 |
QUARTERROUND(2, 7, 8, 13) |
| 461 |
QUARTERROUND(3, 4, 9, 14) |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
At the end of 20 rounds (or 10 iterations of the above list), we add |
| 464 |
the original input words to the output words, and serialize the |
| 465 |
result by sequencing the words one-by-one in little-endian order. |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
Note: "addition" in the above paragraph is done modulo 2^32. In some |
| 468 |
machine languages, this is called carryless addition on a 32-bit |
| 469 |
word. |
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3.1" href="#section-2.3.1">2.3.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Function in Pseudocode</span> |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
Note: This section and a few others contain pseudocode for the |
| 474 |
algorithm explained in a previous section. Every effort was made for |
| 475 |
the pseudocode to accurately reflect the algorithm as described in |
| 476 |
the preceding section. If a conflict is still present, the textual |
| 477 |
explanation and the test vectors are normative. |
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
inner_block (state): |
| 480 |
Qround(state, 0, 4, 8, 12) |
| 481 |
Qround(state, 1, 5, 9, 13) |
| 482 |
Qround(state, 2, 6, 10, 14) |
| 483 |
Qround(state, 3, 7, 11, 15) |
| 484 |
Qround(state, 0, 5, 10, 15) |
| 485 |
Qround(state, 1, 6, 11, 12) |
| 486 |
Qround(state, 2, 7, 8, 13) |
| 487 |
Qround(state, 3, 4, 9, 14) |
| 488 |
end |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
chacha20_block(key, counter, nonce): |
| 506 |
state = constants | key | counter | nonce |
| 507 |
initial_state = state |
| 508 |
for i=1 upto 10 |
| 509 |
inner_block(state) |
| 510 |
end |
| 511 |
state += initial_state |
| 512 |
return serialize(state) |
| 513 |
end |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
Where the pipe character ("|") denotes concatenation. |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3.2" href="#section-2.3.2">2.3.2</a>. Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Block Function</span> |
| 518 |
|
| 519 |
For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20 |
| 520 |
block function: |
| 521 |
|
| 522 |
o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13: |
| 523 |
14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. The key is a sequence of |
| 524 |
octets with no particular structure before we copy it into the |
| 525 |
ChaCha state. |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
o Nonce = (00:00:00:09:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00) |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
o Block Count = 1. |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
After setting up the ChaCha state, it looks like this: |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
ChaCha state with the key setup. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 |
| 536 |
03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c |
| 537 |
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c |
| 538 |
00000001 09000000 4a000000 00000000 |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
After running 20 rounds (10 column rounds interleaved with 10 |
| 541 |
"diagonal rounds"), the ChaCha state looks like this: |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
ChaCha state after 20 rounds |
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
837778ab e238d763 a67ae21e 5950bb2f |
| 546 |
c4f2d0c7 fc62bb2f 8fa018fc 3f5ec7b7 |
| 547 |
335271c2 f29489f3 eabda8fc 82e46ebd |
| 548 |
d19c12b4 b04e16de 9e83d0cb 4e3c50a2 |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
Finally, we add the original state to the result (simple vector or |
| 551 |
matrix addition), giving this: |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
ChaCha state at the end of the ChaCha20 operation |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
e4e7f110 15593bd1 1fdd0f50 c47120a3 |
| 564 |
c7f4d1c7 0368c033 9aaa2204 4e6cd4c3 |
| 565 |
466482d2 09aa9f07 05d7c214 a2028bd9 |
| 566 |
d19c12b5 b94e16de e883d0cb 4e3c50a2 |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
After we serialize the state, we get this: |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
Serialized Block: |
| 571 |
000 10 f1 e7 e4 d1 3b 59 15 50 0f dd 1f a3 20 71 c4 .....;Y.P.... q. |
| 572 |
016 c7 d1 f4 c7 33 c0 68 03 04 22 aa 9a c3 d4 6c 4e ....3.h.."....lN |
| 573 |
032 d2 82 64 46 07 9f aa 09 14 c2 d7 05 d9 8b 02 a2 ..dF............ |
| 574 |
048 b5 12 9c d1 de 16 4e b9 cb d0 83 e8 a2 50 3c 4e ......N......P<N |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm</span> |
| 577 |
|
| 578 |
ChaCha20 is a stream cipher designed by D. J. Bernstein. It is a |
| 579 |
refinement of the Salsa20 algorithm, and it uses a 256-bit key. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
ChaCha20 successively calls the ChaCha20 block function, with the |
| 582 |
same key and nonce, and with successively increasing block counter |
| 583 |
parameters. ChaCha20 then serializes the resulting state by writing |
| 584 |
the numbers in little-endian order, creating a keystream block. |
| 585 |
Concatenating the keystream blocks from the successive blocks forms a |
| 586 |
keystream. The ChaCha20 function then performs an XOR of this |
| 587 |
keystream with the plaintext. Alternatively, each keystream block |
| 588 |
can be XORed with a plaintext block before proceeding to create the |
| 589 |
next block, saving some memory. There is no requirement for the |
| 590 |
plaintext to be an integral multiple of 512 bits. If there is extra |
| 591 |
keystream from the last block, it is discarded. Specific protocols |
| 592 |
MAY require that the plaintext and ciphertext have certain length. |
| 593 |
Such protocols need to specify how the plaintext is padded and how |
| 594 |
much padding it receives. |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
The inputs to ChaCha20 are: |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
o A 256-bit key |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
o A 32-bit initial counter. This can be set to any number, but will |
| 601 |
usually be zero or one. It makes sense to use one if we use the |
| 602 |
zero block for something else, such as generating a one-time |
| 603 |
authenticator key as part of an AEAD algorithm. |
| 604 |
|
| 605 |
o A 96-bit nonce. In some protocols, this is known as the |
| 606 |
Initialization Vector. |
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
o An arbitrary-length plaintext |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
The output is an encrypted message, or "ciphertext", of the same |
| 618 |
length. |
| 619 |
|
| 620 |
Decryption is done in the same way. The ChaCha20 block function is |
| 621 |
used to expand the key into a keystream, which is XORed with the |
| 622 |
ciphertext giving back the plaintext. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.1" href="#section-2.4.1">2.4.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Encryption Algorithm in Pseudocode</span> |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
chacha20_encrypt(key, counter, nonce, plaintext): |
| 627 |
for j = 0 upto floor(len(plaintext)/64)-1 |
| 628 |
key_stream = chacha20_block(key, counter+j, nonce) |
| 629 |
block = plaintext[(j*64)..(j*64+63)] |
| 630 |
encrypted_message += block ^ key_stream |
| 631 |
end |
| 632 |
if ((len(plaintext) % 64) != 0) |
| 633 |
j = floor(len(plaintext)/64) |
| 634 |
key_stream = chacha20_block(key, counter+j, nonce) |
| 635 |
block = plaintext[(j*64)..len(plaintext)-1] |
| 636 |
encrypted_message += (block^key_stream)[0..len(plaintext)%64] |
| 637 |
end |
| 638 |
return encrypted_message |
| 639 |
end |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.2" href="#section-2.4.2">2.4.2</a>. Example and Test Vector for the ChaCha20 Cipher</span> |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the ChaCha20 |
| 644 |
block function: |
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
o Key = 00:01:02:03:04:05:06:07:08:09:0a:0b:0c:0d:0e:0f:10:11:12:13: |
| 647 |
14:15:16:17:18:19:1a:1b:1c:1d:1e:1f. |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
o Nonce = (00:00:00:00:00:00:00:4a:00:00:00:00). |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
o Initial Counter = 1. |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
We use the following for the plaintext. It was chosen to be long |
| 654 |
enough to require more than one block, but not so long that it would |
| 655 |
make this example cumbersome (so, less than 3 blocks): |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
Plaintext Sunscreen: |
| 674 |
000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c Ladies and Gentl |
| 675 |
016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73 emen of the clas |
| 676 |
032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63 s of '99: If I c |
| 677 |
048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f ould offer you o |
| 678 |
064 6e 6c 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20 nly one tip for |
| 679 |
080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75 6e 73 the future, suns |
| 680 |
096 63 72 65 65 6e 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 creen would be i |
| 681 |
112 74 2e t. |
| 682 |
|
| 683 |
The following figure shows four ChaCha state matrices: |
| 684 |
|
| 685 |
1. First block as it is set up. |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
2. Second block as it is set up. Note that these blocks are only |
| 688 |
two bits apart -- only the counter in position 12 is different. |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
3. Third block is the first block after the ChaCha20 block operation |
| 691 |
was applied. |
| 692 |
|
| 693 |
4. Final block is the second block after the ChaCha20 block |
| 694 |
operation was applied. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
After that, we show the keystream. |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
First block setup: |
| 699 |
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 |
| 700 |
03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c |
| 701 |
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c |
| 702 |
00000001 00000000 4a000000 00000000 |
| 703 |
|
| 704 |
Second block setup: |
| 705 |
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 |
| 706 |
03020100 07060504 0b0a0908 0f0e0d0c |
| 707 |
13121110 17161514 1b1a1918 1f1e1d1c |
| 708 |
00000002 00000000 4a000000 00000000 |
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
First block after block operation: |
| 711 |
f3514f22 e1d91b40 6f27de2f ed1d63b8 |
| 712 |
821f138c e2062c3d ecca4f7e 78cff39e |
| 713 |
a30a3b8a 920a6072 cd7479b5 34932bed |
| 714 |
40ba4c79 cd343ec6 4c2c21ea b7417df0 |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
Second block after block operation: |
| 717 |
9f74a669 410f633f 28feca22 7ec44dec |
| 718 |
6d34d426 738cb970 3ac5e9f3 45590cc4 |
| 719 |
da6e8b39 892c831a cdea67c1 2b7e1d90 |
| 720 |
037463f3 a11a2073 e8bcfb88 edc49139 |
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
Keystream: |
| 730 |
22:4f:51:f3:40:1b:d9:e1:2f:de:27:6f:b8:63:1d:ed:8c:13:1f:82:3d:2c:06 |
| 731 |
e2:7e:4f:ca:ec:9e:f3:cf:78:8a:3b:0a:a3:72:60:0a:92:b5:79:74:cd:ed:2b |
| 732 |
93:34:79:4c:ba:40:c6:3e:34:cd:ea:21:2c:4c:f0:7d:41:b7:69:a6:74:9f:3f |
| 733 |
63:0f:41:22:ca:fe:28:ec:4d:c4:7e:26:d4:34:6d:70:b9:8c:73:f3:e9:c5:3a |
| 734 |
c4:0c:59:45:39:8b:6e:da:1a:83:2c:89:c1:67:ea:cd:90:1d:7e:2b:f3:63 |
| 735 |
|
| 736 |
Finally, we XOR the keystream with the plaintext, yielding the |
| 737 |
ciphertext: |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
Ciphertext Sunscreen: |
| 740 |
000 6e 2e 35 9a 25 68 f9 80 41 ba 07 28 dd 0d 69 81 n.5.%h..A..(..i. |
| 741 |
016 e9 7e 7a ec 1d 43 60 c2 0a 27 af cc fd 9f ae 0b .~z..C`..'...... |
| 742 |
032 f9 1b 65 c5 52 47 33 ab 8f 59 3d ab cd 62 b3 57 ..e.RG3..Y=..b.W |
| 743 |
048 16 39 d6 24 e6 51 52 ab 8f 53 0c 35 9f 08 61 d8 .9.$.QR..S.5..a. |
| 744 |
064 07 ca 0d bf 50 0d 6a 61 56 a3 8e 08 8a 22 b6 5e ....P.jaV....".^ |
| 745 |
<a href="#section-080">080</a> 52 bc 51 4d 16 cc f8 06 81 8c e9 1a b7 79 37 36 R.QM.........y76 |
| 746 |
096 5a f9 0b bf 74 a3 5b e6 b4 0b 8e ed f2 78 5e 42 Z...t.[......x^B |
| 747 |
112 87 4d .M |
| 748 |
|
| 749 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithm</span> |
| 750 |
|
| 751 |
Poly1305 is a one-time authenticator designed by D. J. Bernstein. |
| 752 |
Poly1305 takes a 32-byte one-time key and a message and produces a |
| 753 |
16-byte tag. This tag is used to authenticate the message. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
The original article ([<a href="#ref-Poly1305">Poly1305</a>]) is titled "The Poly1305-AES |
| 756 |
message-authentication code", and the MAC function there requires a |
| 757 |
128-bit AES key, a 128-bit "additional key", and a 128-bit (non- |
| 758 |
secret) nonce. AES is used there for encrypting the nonce, so as to |
| 759 |
get a unique (and secret) 128-bit string, but as the paper states, |
| 760 |
"There is nothing special about AES here. One can replace AES with |
| 761 |
an arbitrary keyed function from an arbitrary set of nonces to |
| 762 |
16-byte strings." |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
Regardless of how the key is generated, the key is partitioned into |
| 765 |
two parts, called "r" and "s". The pair (r,s) should be unique, and |
| 766 |
MUST be unpredictable for each invocation (that is why it was |
| 767 |
originally obtained by encrypting a nonce), while "r" MAY be |
| 768 |
constant, but needs to be modified as follows before being used: ("r" |
| 769 |
is treated as a 16-octet little-endian number): |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
o r[3], r[7], r[11], and r[15] are required to have their top four |
| 772 |
bits clear (be smaller than 16) |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
o r[4], r[8], and r[12] are required to have their bottom two bits |
| 775 |
clear (be divisible by 4) |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
The following sample code clamps "r" to be appropriate: |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
/* |
| 788 |
Adapted from poly1305aes_test_clamp.c version 20050207 |
| 789 |
D. J. Bernstein |
| 790 |
Public domain. |
| 791 |
*/ |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
#include "poly1305aes_test.h" |
| 794 |
|
| 795 |
void poly1305aes_test_clamp(unsigned char r[16]) |
| 796 |
{ |
| 797 |
r[3] &= 15; |
| 798 |
r[7] &= 15; |
| 799 |
r[11] &= 15; |
| 800 |
r[15] &= 15; |
| 801 |
r[4] &= 252; |
| 802 |
r[8] &= 252; |
| 803 |
r[12] &= 252; |
| 804 |
} |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
Where "&=" is the C language bitwise AND assignment operator. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
The "s" should be unpredictable, but it is perfectly acceptable to |
| 809 |
generate both "r" and "s" uniquely each time. Because each of them |
| 810 |
is 128 bits, pseudorandomly generating them (see <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a>) is also |
| 811 |
acceptable. |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
The inputs to Poly1305 are: |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
o A 256-bit one-time key |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
o An arbitrary length message |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
The output is a 128-bit tag. |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
First, the "r" value is clamped. |
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
Next, set the constant prime "P" be 2^130-5: |
| 824 |
3fffffffffffffffffffffffffffffffb. Also set a variable "accumulator" |
| 825 |
to zero. |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
Next, divide the message into 16-byte blocks. The last one might be |
| 842 |
shorter: |
| 843 |
|
| 844 |
o Read the block as a little-endian number. |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
o Add one bit beyond the number of octets. For a 16-byte block, |
| 847 |
this is equivalent to adding 2^128 to the number. For the shorter |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
block, it can be 2^120, 2^112, or any power of two that is evenly |
| 850 |
divisible by 8, all the way down to 2^8. |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
o If the block is not 17 bytes long (the last block), pad it with |
| 853 |
zeros. This is meaningless if you are treating the blocks as |
| 854 |
numbers. |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
o Add this number to the accumulator. |
| 857 |
|
| 858 |
o Multiply by "r". |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
o Set the accumulator to the result modulo p. To summarize: Acc = |
| 861 |
((Acc+block)*r) % p. |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
Finally, the value of the secret key "s" is added to the accumulator, |
| 864 |
and the 128 least significant bits are serialized in little-endian |
| 865 |
order to form the tag. |
| 866 |
|
| 867 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.1" href="#section-2.5.1">2.5.1</a>. The Poly1305 Algorithms in Pseudocode</span> |
| 868 |
|
| 869 |
clamp(r): r &= 0x0ffffffc0ffffffc0ffffffc0fffffff |
| 870 |
poly1305_mac(msg, key): |
| 871 |
r = le_bytes_to_num(key[0..15]) |
| 872 |
clamp(r) |
| 873 |
s = le_bytes_to_num(key[16..31]) |
| 874 |
a = 0 /* a is the accumulator */ |
| 875 |
p = (1<<130)-5 |
| 876 |
for i=1 upto ceil(msg length in bytes / 16) |
| 877 |
n = le_bytes_to_num(msg[((i-1)*16)..(i*16)] | [0x01]) |
| 878 |
a += n |
| 879 |
a = (r * a) % p |
| 880 |
end |
| 881 |
a += s |
| 882 |
return num_to_16_le_bytes(a) |
| 883 |
end |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
|
| 886 |
|
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5.2" href="#section-2.5.2">2.5.2</a>. Poly1305 Example and Test Vector</span> |
| 898 |
|
| 899 |
For our example, we will dispense with generating the one-time key |
| 900 |
using AES, and assume that we got the following keying material: |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
o Key Material: 85:d6:be:78:57:55:6d:33:7f:44:52:fe:42:d5:06:a8:01:0 |
| 903 |
3:80:8a:fb:0d:b2:fd:4a:bf:f6:af:41:49:f5:1b |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
o s as an octet string: |
| 906 |
01:03:80:8a:fb:0d:b2:fd:4a:bf:f6:af:41:49:f5:1b |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
o s as a 128-bit number: 1bf54941aff6bf4afdb20dfb8a800301 |
| 909 |
|
| 910 |
o r before clamping: 85:d6:be:78:57:55:6d:33:7f:44:52:fe:42:d5:06:a8 |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
o Clamped r as a number: 806d5400e52447c036d555408bed685 |
| 913 |
|
| 914 |
For our message, we'll use a short text: |
| 915 |
|
| 916 |
Message to be Authenticated: |
| 917 |
000 43 72 79 70 74 6f 67 72 61 70 68 69 63 20 46 6f Cryptographic Fo |
| 918 |
016 72 75 6d 20 52 65 73 65 61 72 63 68 20 47 72 6f rum Research Gro |
| 919 |
032 75 70 up |
| 920 |
|
| 921 |
Since Poly1305 works in 16-byte chunks, the 34-byte message divides |
| 922 |
into three blocks. In the following calculation, "Acc" denotes the |
| 923 |
accumulator and "Block" the current block: |
| 924 |
|
| 925 |
Block #1 |
| 926 |
|
| 927 |
Acc = 00 |
| 928 |
Block = 6f4620636968706172676f7470797243 |
| 929 |
Block with 0x01 byte = 016f4620636968706172676f7470797243 |
| 930 |
Acc + block = 016f4620636968706172676f7470797243 |
| 931 |
(Acc+Block) * r = |
| 932 |
b83fe991ca66800489155dcd69e8426ba2779453994ac90ed284034da565ecf |
| 933 |
Acc = ((Acc+Block)*r) % P = 2c88c77849d64ae9147ddeb88e69c83fc |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
Block #2 |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
Acc = 2c88c77849d64ae9147ddeb88e69c83fc |
| 938 |
Block = 6f7247206863726165736552206d7572 |
| 939 |
Block with 0x01 byte = 016f7247206863726165736552206d7572 |
| 940 |
Acc + block = 437febea505c820f2ad5150db0709f96e |
| 941 |
(Acc+Block) * r = |
| 942 |
21dcc992d0c659ba4036f65bb7f88562ae59b32c2b3b8f7efc8b00f78e548a26 |
| 943 |
Acc = ((Acc+Block)*r) % P = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344b30de |
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
Last Block |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
Acc = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344b30de |
| 956 |
Block = 7075 |
| 957 |
Block with 0x01 byte = 017075 |
| 958 |
Acc + block = 2d8adaf23b0337fa7cccfb4ea344ca153 |
| 959 |
(Acc + Block) * r = |
| 960 |
16d8e08a0f3fe1de4fe4a15486aca7a270a29f1e6c849221e4a6798b8e45321f |
| 961 |
((Acc + Block) * r) % P = 28d31b7caff946c77c8844335369d03a7 |
| 962 |
|
| 963 |
Adding s, we get this number, and serialize if to get the tag: |
| 964 |
|
| 965 |
Acc + s = 2a927010caf8b2bc2c6365130c11d06a8 |
| 966 |
|
| 967 |
Tag: a8:06:1d:c1:30:51:36:c6:c2:2b:8b:af:0c:01:27:a9 |
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a>. Generating the Poly1305 Key Using ChaCha20</span> |
| 970 |
|
| 971 |
As said in <a href="#section-2.5">Section 2.5</a>, it is acceptable to generate the one-time |
| 972 |
Poly1305 key pseudorandomly. This section defines such a method. |
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
To generate such a key pair (r,s), we will use the ChaCha20 block |
| 975 |
function described in <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>. This assumes that we have a |
| 976 |
256-bit session key specifically for the Message Authentication Code |
| 977 |
(MAC) function. Any document that specifies the use of Poly1305 as a |
| 978 |
MAC algorithm for some protocol MUST specify that 256 bits are |
| 979 |
allocated for the integrity key. Note that in the AEAD construction |
| 980 |
defined in <a href="#section-2.8">Section 2.8</a>, the same key is used for encryption and key |
| 981 |
generation. |
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
The method is to call the block function with the following |
| 984 |
parameters: |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
o The 256-bit session integrity key is used as the ChaCha20 key. |
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
o The block counter is set to zero. |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
o The protocol will specify a 96-bit or 64-bit nonce. This MUST be |
| 991 |
unique per invocation with the same key, so it MUST NOT be |
| 992 |
randomly generated. A counter is a good way to implement this, |
| 993 |
but other methods, such as a Linear Feedback Shift Register (LFSR) |
| 994 |
are also acceptable. ChaCha20 as specified here requires a 96-bit |
| 995 |
nonce. So if the provided nonce is only 64-bit, then the first 32 |
| 996 |
bits of the nonce will be set to a constant number. This will |
| 997 |
usually be zero, but for protocols with multiple senders it may be |
| 998 |
different for each sender, but SHOULD be the same for all |
| 999 |
invocations of the function with the same key by a particular |
| 1000 |
sender. |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
After running the block function, we have a 512-bit state. We take |
| 1010 |
the first 256 bits of the serialized state, and use those as the one- |
| 1011 |
time Poly1305 key: the first 128 bits are clamped and form "r", while |
| 1012 |
the next 128 bits become "s". The other 256 bits are discarded. |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
Note that while many protocols have provisions for a nonce for |
| 1015 |
encryption algorithms (often called Initialization Vectors, or IVs), |
| 1016 |
they usually don't have such a provision for the MAC function. In |
| 1017 |
that case, the per-invocation nonce will have to come from somewhere |
| 1018 |
else, such as a message counter. |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6.1" href="#section-2.6.1">2.6.1</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation in Pseudocode</span> |
| 1021 |
|
| 1022 |
poly1305_key_gen(key,nonce): |
| 1023 |
counter = 0 |
| 1024 |
block = chacha20_block(key,counter,nonce) |
| 1025 |
return block[0..31] |
| 1026 |
end |
| 1027 |
|
| 1028 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6.2" href="#section-2.6.2">2.6.2</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Test Vector</span> |
| 1029 |
|
| 1030 |
For this example, we'll set: |
| 1031 |
|
| 1032 |
Key: |
| 1033 |
000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f ................ |
| 1034 |
016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f ................ |
| 1035 |
|
| 1036 |
Nonce: |
| 1037 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 ............ |
| 1038 |
|
| 1039 |
The ChaCha state setup with key, nonce, and block counter zero: |
| 1040 |
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 |
| 1041 |
83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c |
| 1042 |
93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c |
| 1043 |
00000000 00000000 03020100 07060504 |
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 |
The ChaCha state after 20 rounds: |
| 1046 |
8ba0d58a cc815f90 27405081 7194b24a |
| 1047 |
37b633a8 a50dfde3 e2b8db08 46a6d1fd |
| 1048 |
7da03782 9183a233 148ad271 b46773d1 |
| 1049 |
3cc1875a 8607def1 ca5c3086 7085eb87 |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
Output bytes: |
| 1052 |
000 8a d5 a0 8b 90 5f 81 cc 81 50 40 27 4a b2 94 71 ....._...P@'J..q |
| 1053 |
016 a8 33 b6 37 e3 fd 0d a5 08 db b8 e2 fd d1 a6 46 .3.7...........F |
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
And that output is also the 32-byte one-time key used for Poly1305. |
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a>. A Pseudorandom Function for Crypto Suites Based on ChaCha/Poly1305</span> |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
Some protocols, such as IKEv2 ([<a href="./rfc7296" title=""Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 (IKEv2)"">RFC7296</a>]), require a Pseudorandom |
| 1068 |
Function (PRF), mostly for key derivation. In the IKEv2 definition, |
| 1069 |
a PRF is a function that accepts a variable-length key and a |
| 1070 |
variable-length input, and returns a fixed-length output. Most |
| 1071 |
commonly, Hashed MAC (HMAC) constructions are used for this purpose, |
| 1072 |
and often the same function is used for both message authentication |
| 1073 |
and PRF. |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
Poly1305 is not a suitable choice for a PRF. Poly1305 prohibits |
| 1076 |
using the same key twice, whereas the PRF in IKEv2 is used multiple |
| 1077 |
times with the same key. Additionally, unlike HMAC, Poly1305 is |
| 1078 |
biased, so using it for key derivation would reduce the security of |
| 1079 |
the symmetric encryption. |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
Chacha20 could be used as a key-derivation function, by generating an |
| 1082 |
arbitrarily long keystream. However, that is not what protocols such |
| 1083 |
as IKEv2 require. |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
For this reason, this document does not specify a PRF. |
| 1086 |
|
| 1087 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8" href="#section-2.8">2.8</a>. AEAD Construction</span> |
| 1088 |
|
| 1089 |
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 is an authenticated encryption with additional |
| 1090 |
data algorithm. The inputs to AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 are: |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
o A 256-bit key |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
o A 96-bit nonce -- different for each invocation with the same key |
| 1095 |
|
| 1096 |
o An arbitrary length plaintext |
| 1097 |
|
| 1098 |
o Arbitrary length additional authenticated data (AAD) |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
Some protocols may have unique per-invocation inputs that are not 96 |
| 1101 |
bits in length. For example, IPsec may specify a 64-bit nonce. In |
| 1102 |
such a case, it is up to the protocol document to define how to |
| 1103 |
transform the protocol nonce into a 96-bit nonce, for example, by |
| 1104 |
concatenating a constant value. |
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
The ChaCha20 and Poly1305 primitives are combined into an AEAD that |
| 1107 |
takes a 256-bit key and 96-bit nonce as follows: |
| 1108 |
|
| 1109 |
o First, a Poly1305 one-time key is generated from the 256-bit key |
| 1110 |
and nonce using the procedure described in <a href="#section-2.6">Section 2.6</a>. |
| 1111 |
|
| 1112 |
|
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
o Next, the ChaCha20 encryption function is called to encrypt the |
| 1122 |
plaintext, using the same key and nonce, and with the initial |
| 1123 |
counter set to 1. |
| 1124 |
|
| 1125 |
o Finally, the Poly1305 function is called with the Poly1305 key |
| 1126 |
calculated above, and a message constructed as a concatenation of |
| 1127 |
the following: |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
* The AAD |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
* padding1 -- the padding is up to 15 zero bytes, and it brings |
| 1132 |
the total length so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the |
| 1133 |
length of the AAD was already an integral multiple of 16 bytes, |
| 1134 |
this field is zero-length. |
| 1135 |
|
| 1136 |
* The ciphertext |
| 1137 |
|
| 1138 |
* padding2 -- the padding is up to 15 zero bytes, and it brings |
| 1139 |
the total length so far to an integral multiple of 16. If the |
| 1140 |
length of the ciphertext was already an integral multiple of 16 |
| 1141 |
bytes, this field is zero-length. |
| 1142 |
|
| 1143 |
* The length of the additional data in octets (as a 64-bit |
| 1144 |
little-endian integer). |
| 1145 |
|
| 1146 |
* The length of the ciphertext in octets (as a 64-bit little- |
| 1147 |
endian integer). |
| 1148 |
|
| 1149 |
The output from the AEAD is the concatenation of: |
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
o A ciphertext of the same length as the plaintext. |
| 1152 |
|
| 1153 |
o A 128-bit tag, which is the output of the Poly1305 function. |
| 1154 |
|
| 1155 |
Decryption is similar with the following differences: |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
o The roles of ciphertext and plaintext are reversed, so the |
| 1158 |
ChaCha20 encryption function is applied to the ciphertext, |
| 1159 |
producing the plaintext. |
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 |
o The Poly1305 function is still run on the AAD and the ciphertext, |
| 1162 |
not the plaintext. |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
o The calculated tag is bitwise compared to the received tag. The |
| 1165 |
message is authenticated if and only if the tags match. |
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
A few notes about this design: |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
1. The amount of encrypted data possible in a single invocation is |
| 1180 |
2^32-1 blocks of 64 bytes each, because of the size of the block |
| 1181 |
counter field in the ChaCha20 block function. This gives a total |
| 1182 |
of 274,877,906,880 bytes, or nearly 256 GB. This should be |
| 1183 |
enough for traffic protocols such as IPsec and TLS, but may be |
| 1184 |
too small for file and/or disk encryption. For such uses, we can |
| 1185 |
return to the original design, reduce the nonce to 64 bits, and |
| 1186 |
use the integer at position 13 as the top 32 bits of a 64-bit |
| 1187 |
block counter, increasing the total message size to over a |
| 1188 |
million petabytes (1,180,591,620,717,411,303,360 bytes to be |
| 1189 |
exact). |
| 1190 |
|
| 1191 |
2. Despite the previous item, the ciphertext length field in the |
| 1192 |
construction of the buffer on which Poly1305 runs limits the |
| 1193 |
ciphertext (and hence, the plaintext) size to 2^64 bytes, or |
| 1194 |
sixteen thousand petabytes (18,446,744,073,709,551,616 bytes to |
| 1195 |
be exact). |
| 1196 |
|
| 1197 |
The AEAD construction in this section is a novel composition of |
| 1198 |
ChaCha20 and Poly1305. A security analysis of this composition is |
| 1199 |
given in [<a href="#ref-Procter" title=""A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305"">Procter</a>]. |
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
Here is a list of the parameters for this construction as defined in |
| 1202 |
<a href="./rfc5116#section-4">Section 4 of [RFC5116]</a>: |
| 1203 |
|
| 1204 |
o K_LEN (key length) is 32 octets. |
| 1205 |
|
| 1206 |
o P_MAX (maximum size of the plaintext) is 274,877,906,880 bytes, or |
| 1207 |
nearly 256 GB. |
| 1208 |
|
| 1209 |
o A_MAX (maximum size of the associated data) is set to 2^64-1 |
| 1210 |
octets by the length field for associated data. |
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
o N_MIN = N_MAX = 12 octets. |
| 1213 |
|
| 1214 |
o C_MAX = P_MAX + tag length = 274,877,906,896 octets. |
| 1215 |
|
| 1216 |
Distinct AAD inputs (as described in <a href="./rfc5116#section-3.3">Section 3.3 of [RFC5116]</a>) shall |
| 1217 |
be concatenated into a single input to AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305. It is |
| 1218 |
up to the application to create a structure in the AAD input if it is |
| 1219 |
needed. |
| 1220 |
|
| 1221 |
|
| 1222 |
|
| 1223 |
|
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.1" href="#section-2.8.1">2.8.1</a>. Pseudocode for the AEAD Construction</span> |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
pad16(x): |
| 1236 |
if (len(x) % 16)==0 |
| 1237 |
then return NULL |
| 1238 |
else return copies(0, 16-(len(x)%16)) |
| 1239 |
end |
| 1240 |
|
| 1241 |
chacha20_aead_encrypt(aad, key, iv, constant, plaintext): |
| 1242 |
nonce = constant | iv |
| 1243 |
otk = poly1305_key_gen(key, nonce) |
| 1244 |
ciphertext = chacha20_encrypt(key, 1, nonce, plaintext) |
| 1245 |
mac_data = aad | pad16(aad) |
| 1246 |
mac_data |= ciphertext | pad16(ciphertext) |
| 1247 |
mac_data |= num_to_8_le_bytes(aad.length) |
| 1248 |
mac_data |= num_to_8_le_bytes(ciphertext.length) |
| 1249 |
tag = poly1305_mac(mac_data, otk) |
| 1250 |
return (ciphertext, tag) |
| 1251 |
|
| 1252 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.8.2" href="#section-2.8.2">2.8.2</a>. Example and Test Vector for AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305</span> |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
For a test vector, we will use the following inputs to the |
| 1255 |
AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305 function: |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
Plaintext: |
| 1258 |
000 4c 61 64 69 65 73 20 61 6e 64 20 47 65 6e 74 6c Ladies and Gentl |
| 1259 |
016 65 6d 65 6e 20 6f 66 20 74 68 65 20 63 6c 61 73 emen of the clas |
| 1260 |
032 73 20 6f 66 20 27 39 39 3a 20 49 66 20 49 20 63 s of '99: If I c |
| 1261 |
048 6f 75 6c 64 20 6f 66 66 65 72 20 79 6f 75 20 6f ould offer you o |
| 1262 |
064 6e 6c 79 20 6f 6e 65 20 74 69 70 20 66 6f 72 20 nly one tip for |
| 1263 |
080 74 68 65 20 66 75 74 75 72 65 2c 20 73 75 6e 73 the future, suns |
| 1264 |
096 63 72 65 65 6e 20 77 6f 75 6c 64 20 62 65 20 69 creen would be i |
| 1265 |
112 74 2e t. |
| 1266 |
|
| 1267 |
AAD: |
| 1268 |
000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 PQRS........ |
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
Key: |
| 1271 |
000 80 81 82 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 8a 8b 8c 8d 8e 8f ................ |
| 1272 |
016 90 91 92 93 94 95 96 97 98 99 9a 9b 9c 9d 9e 9f ................ |
| 1273 |
|
| 1274 |
IV: |
| 1275 |
000 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 @ABCDEFG |
| 1276 |
|
| 1277 |
32-bit fixed-common part: |
| 1278 |
000 07 00 00 00 .... |
| 1279 |
|
| 1280 |
|
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
Setup for generating Poly1305 one-time key (sender id=7): |
| 1290 |
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 |
| 1291 |
83828180 87868584 8b8a8988 8f8e8d8c |
| 1292 |
93929190 97969594 9b9a9998 9f9e9d9c |
| 1293 |
00000000 00000007 43424140 47464544 |
| 1294 |
|
| 1295 |
After generating Poly1305 one-time key: |
| 1296 |
252bac7b af47b42d 557ab609 8455e9a4 |
| 1297 |
73d6e10a ebd97510 7875932a ff53d53e |
| 1298 |
decc7ea2 b44ddbad e49c17d1 d8430bc9 |
| 1299 |
8c94b7bc 8b7d4b4b 3927f67d 1669a432 |
| 1300 |
|
| 1301 |
Poly1305 Key: |
| 1302 |
000 7b ac 2b 25 2d b4 47 af 09 b6 7a 55 a4 e9 55 84 {.+%-.G...zU..U. |
| 1303 |
016 0a e1 d6 73 10 75 d9 eb 2a 93 75 78 3e d5 53 ff ...s.u..*.ux>.S. |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
Poly1305 r = 455e9a4057ab6080f47b42c052bac7b |
| 1306 |
Poly1305 s = ff53d53e7875932aebd9751073d6e10a |
| 1307 |
|
| 1308 |
keystream bytes: |
| 1309 |
9f:7b:e9:5d:01:fd:40:ba:15:e2:8f:fb:36:81:0a:ae: |
| 1310 |
c1:c0:88:3f:09:01:6e:de:dd:8a:d0:87:55:82:03:a5: |
| 1311 |
4e:9e:cb:38:ac:8e:5e:2b:b8:da:b2:0f:fa:db:52:e8: |
| 1312 |
75:04:b2:6e:be:69:6d:4f:60:a4:85:cf:11:b8:1b:59: |
| 1313 |
fc:b1:c4:5f:42:19:ee:ac:ec:6a:de:c3:4e:66:69:78: |
| 1314 |
8e:db:41:c4:9c:a3:01:e1:27:e0:ac:ab:3b:44:b9:cf: |
| 1315 |
5c:86:bb:95:e0:6b:0d:f2:90:1a:b6:45:e4:ab:e6:22: |
| 1316 |
15:38 |
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 |
Ciphertext: |
| 1319 |
000 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc 53 ef 7e c2 ...4d.`.{...S.~. |
| 1320 |
016 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7 36 ee 62 d6 ...Q)n......6.b. |
| 1321 |
032 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69 da 92 72 8b =..^..g....i..r. |
| 1322 |
<a href="#section-048">048</a> 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6 7e cd 3b 36 .q.....)....~.;6 |
| 1323 |
064 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3 28 09 1b 58 ....-w......(..X |
| 1324 |
080 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b 48 31 d7 bc ..$...u.U...H1.. |
| 1325 |
096 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65 86 ce c6 4b ?....Kz..v.e...K |
| 1326 |
112 61 16 a. |
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
|
| 1329 |
|
| 1330 |
|
| 1331 |
|
| 1332 |
|
| 1333 |
|
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
|
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
AEAD Construction for Poly1305: |
| 1346 |
000 50 51 52 53 c0 c1 c2 c3 c4 c5 c6 c7 00 00 00 00 PQRS............ |
| 1347 |
016 d3 1a 8d 34 64 8e 60 db 7b 86 af bc 53 ef 7e c2 ...4d.`.{...S.~. |
| 1348 |
032 a4 ad ed 51 29 6e 08 fe a9 e2 b5 a7 36 ee 62 d6 ...Q)n......6.b. |
| 1349 |
048 3d be a4 5e 8c a9 67 12 82 fa fb 69 da 92 72 8b =..^..g....i..r. |
| 1350 |
<a href="#section-064">064</a> 1a 71 de 0a 9e 06 0b 29 05 d6 a5 b6 7e cd 3b 36 .q.....)....~.;6 |
| 1351 |
080 92 dd bd 7f 2d 77 8b 8c 98 03 ae e3 28 09 1b 58 ....-w......(..X |
| 1352 |
096 fa b3 24 e4 fa d6 75 94 55 85 80 8b 48 31 d7 bc ..$...u.U...H1.. |
| 1353 |
112 3f f4 de f0 8e 4b 7a 9d e5 76 d2 65 86 ce c6 4b ?....Kz..v.e...K |
| 1354 |
128 61 16 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 a............... |
| 1355 |
144 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 72 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ........r....... |
| 1356 |
|
| 1357 |
Note the four zero bytes in line 000 and the 14 zero bytes in line |
| 1358 |
128 |
| 1359 |
|
| 1360 |
Tag: |
| 1361 |
1a:e1:0b:59:4f:09:e2:6a:7e:90:2e:cb:d0:60:06:91 |
| 1362 |
|
| 1363 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Implementation Advice</span> |
| 1364 |
|
| 1365 |
Each block of ChaCha20 involves 16 move operations and one increment |
| 1366 |
operation for loading the state, 80 each of XOR, addition and roll |
| 1367 |
operations for the rounds, 16 more add operations and 16 XOR |
| 1368 |
operations for protecting the plaintext. <a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a> describes the |
| 1369 |
ChaCha block function as "adding the original input words". This |
| 1370 |
implies that before starting the rounds on the ChaCha state, we copy |
| 1371 |
it aside, only to add it in later. This is correct, but we can save |
| 1372 |
a few operations if we instead copy the state and do the work on the |
| 1373 |
copy. This way, for the next block you don't need to recreate the |
| 1374 |
state, but only to increment the block counter. This saves |
| 1375 |
approximately 5.5% of the cycles. |
| 1376 |
|
| 1377 |
It is not recommended to use a generic big number library such as the |
| 1378 |
one in OpenSSL for the arithmetic operations in Poly1305. Such |
| 1379 |
libraries use dynamic allocation to be able to handle an integer of |
| 1380 |
any size, but that flexibility comes at the expense of performance as |
| 1381 |
well as side-channel security. More efficient implementations that |
| 1382 |
run in constant time are available, one of them in D. J. Bernstein's |
| 1383 |
own library, NaCl ([<a href="#ref-NaCl" title=""NaCl: Networking and Cryptography library"">NaCl</a>]). A constant-time but not optimal approach |
| 1384 |
would be to naively implement the arithmetic operations for 288-bit |
| 1385 |
integers, because even a naive implementation will not exceed 2^288 |
| 1386 |
in the multiplication of (acc+block) and r. An efficient constant- |
| 1387 |
time implementation can be found in the public domain library |
| 1388 |
poly1305-donna ([<a href="#ref-Poly1305_Donna">Poly1305_Donna</a>]). |
| 1389 |
|
| 1390 |
|
| 1391 |
|
| 1392 |
|
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 1402 |
|
| 1403 |
The ChaCha20 cipher is designed to provide 256-bit security. |
| 1404 |
|
| 1405 |
The Poly1305 authenticator is designed to ensure that forged messages |
| 1406 |
are rejected with a probability of 1-(n/(2^102)) for a 16n-byte |
| 1407 |
message, even after sending 2^64 legitimate messages, so it is |
| 1408 |
SUF-CMA (strong unforgeability against chosen-message attacks) in the |
| 1409 |
terminology of [<a href="#ref-AE" title=""Authenticated Encryption: Relations among notions and analysis of the generic composition paradigm"">AE</a>]. |
| 1410 |
|
| 1411 |
Proving the security of either of these is beyond the scope of this |
| 1412 |
document. Such proofs are available in the referenced academic |
| 1413 |
papers ([<a href="#ref-ChaCha" title=""ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20"">ChaCha</a>], [<a href="#ref-Poly1305">Poly1305</a>], [<a href="#ref-LatinDances">LatinDances</a>], [<a href="#ref-LatinDances2">LatinDances2</a>], and |
| 1414 |
[<a href="#ref-Zhenqing2012">Zhenqing2012</a>]). |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
The most important security consideration in implementing this |
| 1417 |
document is the uniqueness of the nonce used in ChaCha20. Counters |
| 1418 |
and LFSRs are both acceptable ways of generating unique nonces, as is |
| 1419 |
encrypting a counter using a block cipher with a 64-bit block size |
| 1420 |
such as DES. Note that it is not acceptable to use a truncation of a |
| 1421 |
counter encrypted with block ciphers with 128-bit or 256-bit blocks, |
| 1422 |
because such a truncation may repeat after a short time. |
| 1423 |
|
| 1424 |
Consequences of repeating a nonce: If a nonce is repeated, then both |
| 1425 |
the one-time Poly1305 key and the keystream are identical between the |
| 1426 |
messages. This reveals the XOR of the plaintexts, because the XOR of |
| 1427 |
the plaintexts is equal to the XOR of the ciphertexts. |
| 1428 |
|
| 1429 |
The Poly1305 key MUST be unpredictable to an attacker. Randomly |
| 1430 |
generating the key would fulfill this requirement, except that |
| 1431 |
Poly1305 is often used in communications protocols, so the receiver |
| 1432 |
should know the key. Pseudorandom number generation such as by |
| 1433 |
encrypting a counter is acceptable. Using ChaCha with a secret key |
| 1434 |
and a nonce is also acceptable. |
| 1435 |
|
| 1436 |
The algorithms presented here were designed to be easy to implement |
| 1437 |
in constant time to avoid side-channel vulnerabilities. The |
| 1438 |
operations used in ChaCha20 are all additions, XORs, and fixed rolls. |
| 1439 |
All of these can and should be implemented in constant time. Access |
| 1440 |
to offsets into the ChaCha state and the number of operations do not |
| 1441 |
depend on any property of the key, eliminating the chance of |
| 1442 |
information about the key leaking through the timing of cache misses. |
| 1443 |
|
| 1444 |
For Poly1305, the operations are addition, multiplication. and |
| 1445 |
modulus, all on numbers with greater than 128 bits. This can be done |
| 1446 |
in constant time, but a naive implementation (such as using some |
| 1447 |
generic big number library) will not be constant time. For example, |
| 1448 |
if the multiplication is performed as a separate operation from the |
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
modulus, the result will sometimes be under 2^256 and sometimes be |
| 1458 |
above 2^256. Implementers should be careful about timing side- |
| 1459 |
channels for Poly1305 by using the appropriate implementation of |
| 1460 |
these operations. |
| 1461 |
|
| 1462 |
Validating the authenticity of a message involves a bitwise |
| 1463 |
comparison of the calculated tag with the received tag. In most use |
| 1464 |
cases, nonces and AAD contents are not "used up" until a valid |
| 1465 |
message is received. This allows an attacker to send multiple |
| 1466 |
identical messages with different tags until one passes the tag |
| 1467 |
comparison. This is hard if the attacker has to try all 2^128 |
| 1468 |
possible tags one by one. However, if the timing of the tag |
| 1469 |
comparison operation reveals how long a prefix of the calculated and |
| 1470 |
received tags is identical, the number of messages can be reduced |
| 1471 |
significantly. For this reason, with online protocols, |
| 1472 |
implementation MUST use a constant-time comparison function rather |
| 1473 |
than relying on optimized but insecure library functions such as the |
| 1474 |
C language's memcmp(). |
| 1475 |
|
| 1476 |
Additionally, any protocol using this algorithm MUST include the |
| 1477 |
complete tag to minimize the opportunity for forgery. Tag truncation |
| 1478 |
MUST NOT be done. |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 1481 |
|
| 1482 |
IANA has updated the entry in the "Authenticated Encryption with |
| 1483 |
Associated Data (AEAD) Parameters" registry with 29 as the Numeric ID |
| 1484 |
and "AEAD_CHACHA20_POLY1305" as the name to point to this document as |
| 1485 |
its reference. |
| 1486 |
|
| 1487 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. References</span> |
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
[<a id="ref-ChaCha">ChaCha</a>] Bernstein, D., "ChaCha, a variant of Salsa20", January |
| 1492 |
2008, <<a href="http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf">http://cr.yp.to/chacha/chacha-20080128.pdf</a>>. |
| 1493 |
|
| 1494 |
[<a id="ref-Poly1305">Poly1305</a>] |
| 1495 |
Bernstein, D., "The Poly1305-AES message-authentication |
| 1496 |
code", March 2005, |
| 1497 |
<<a href="http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf">http://cr.yp.to/mac/poly1305-20050329.pdf</a>>. |
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1500 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 1501 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 1502 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 1503 |
|
| 1504 |
|
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
[<a id="ref-RFC8174">RFC8174</a>] Leiba, B., "Ambiguity of Uppercase vs Lowercase in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC</a> |
| 1514 |
<a href="./rfc2119">2119</a> Key Words", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc8174">RFC 8174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC8174, |
| 1515 |
May 2017, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8174</a>>. |
| 1516 |
|
| 1517 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1518 |
|
| 1519 |
[<a id="ref-AE">AE</a>] Bellare, M. and C. Namprempre, "Authenticated Encryption: |
| 1520 |
Relations among notions and analysis of the generic |
| 1521 |
composition paradigm", DOI 10.1007/s00145-008-9026-x, |
| 1522 |
September 2008, |
| 1523 |
<<a href="http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1410269">http://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1410269</a>>. |
| 1524 |
|
| 1525 |
[<a id="ref-Cache-Collisions">Cache-Collisions</a>] |
| 1526 |
Bonneau, J. and I. Mironov, "Cache-Collision Timing |
| 1527 |
Attacks Against AES", 2006, |
| 1528 |
<<a href="http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/64024/aes-timing.pdf">http://research.microsoft.com/pubs/64024/aes-timing.pdf</a>>. |
| 1529 |
|
| 1530 |
[<a id="ref-FIPS-197">FIPS-197</a>] |
| 1531 |
National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Advanced |
| 1532 |
Encryption Standard (AES)", FIPS PUB 197, November 2001, |
| 1533 |
<<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf">http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/</a> |
| 1534 |
<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips197/fips-197.pdf">fips-197.pdf</a>>. |
| 1535 |
|
| 1536 |
[<a id="ref-LatinDances">LatinDances</a>] |
| 1537 |
Aumasson, J., Fischer, S., Khazaei, S., Meier, W., and C. |
| 1538 |
Rechberger, "New Features of Latin Dances: Analysis of |
| 1539 |
Salsa, ChaCha, and Rumba", December 2007, |
| 1540 |
<<a href="http://cr.yp.to/rumba20/newfeatures-20071218.pdf">http://cr.yp.to/rumba20/newfeatures-20071218.pdf</a>>. |
| 1541 |
|
| 1542 |
[<a id="ref-LatinDances2">LatinDances2</a>] |
| 1543 |
Ishiguro, T., Kiyomoto, S., and Y. Miyake, "Modified |
| 1544 |
version of 'Latin Dances Revisited: New Analytic Results |
| 1545 |
of Salsa20 and ChaCha'", February 2012, |
| 1546 |
<<a href="https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/065.pdf">https://eprint.iacr.org/2012/065.pdf</a>>. |
| 1547 |
|
| 1548 |
[<a id="ref-NaCl">NaCl</a>] Bernstein, D., Lange, T., and P. Schwabe, "NaCl: |
| 1549 |
Networking and Cryptography library", July 2012, |
| 1550 |
<<a href="http://nacl.cr.yp.to">http://nacl.cr.yp.to</a>>. |
| 1551 |
|
| 1552 |
[<a id="ref-Poly1305_Donna">Poly1305_Donna</a>] |
| 1553 |
"poly1305-donna", commit e6ad6e0, March 2016, |
| 1554 |
<<a href="https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna">https://github.com/floodyberry/poly1305-donna</a>>. |
| 1555 |
|
| 1556 |
[<a id="ref-Procter">Procter</a>] Procter, G., "A Security Analysis of the Composition of |
| 1557 |
ChaCha20 and Poly1305", August 2014, |
| 1558 |
<<a href="http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf">http://eprint.iacr.org/2014/613.pdf</a>>. |
| 1559 |
|
| 1560 |
|
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 28]</span></pre> |
| 1565 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span> |
| 1566 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5116">RFC5116</a>] McGrew, D., "An Interface and Algorithms for Authenticated |
| 1570 |
Encryption", <a href="./rfc5116">RFC 5116</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5116, January 2008, |
| 1571 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5116</a>>. |
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7296">RFC7296</a>] Kaufman, C., Hoffman, P., Nir, Y., Eronen, P., and T. |
| 1574 |
Kivinen, "Internet Key Exchange Protocol Version 2 |
| 1575 |
(IKEv2)", STD 79, <a href="./rfc7296">RFC 7296</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7296, October |
| 1576 |
2014, <<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7296</a>>. |
| 1577 |
|
| 1578 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7539">RFC7539</a>] Nir, Y. and A. Langley, "ChaCha20 and Poly1305 for IETF |
| 1579 |
Protocols", <a href="./rfc7539">RFC 7539</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7539, May 2015, |
| 1580 |
<<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7539</a>>. |
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 |
[<a id="ref-SP800-67">SP800-67</a>] |
| 1583 |
National Institute of Standards and Technology, |
| 1584 |
"Recommendation for the Triple Data Encryption Algorithm |
| 1585 |
(TDEA) Block Cipher", NIST 800-67, Rev. 2, November 2017, |
| 1586 |
<<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/rev-2/final">https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/</a> |
| 1587 |
<a href="https://csrc.nist.gov/publications/detail/sp/800-67/rev-2/final">rev-2/final</a>>. |
| 1588 |
|
| 1589 |
[<a id="ref-Standby-Cipher">Standby-Cipher</a>] |
| 1590 |
McGrew, D., Grieco, A., and Y. Sheffer, "Selection of |
| 1591 |
Future Cryptographic Standards", Work in Progress, <a href="./draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00">draft-</a> |
| 1592 |
<a href="./draft-mcgrew-standby-cipher-00">mcgrew-standby-cipher-00</a>, January 2013. |
| 1593 |
|
| 1594 |
[<a id="ref-Zhenqing2012">Zhenqing2012</a>] |
| 1595 |
Zhenqing, S., Bin, Z., Dengguo, F., and W. Wenling, |
| 1596 |
"Improved Key Recovery Attacks on Reduced-Round Salsa20 |
| 1597 |
and ChaCha*", 2012. |
| 1598 |
|
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
|
| 1601 |
|
| 1602 |
|
| 1603 |
|
| 1604 |
|
| 1605 |
|
| 1606 |
|
| 1607 |
|
| 1608 |
|
| 1609 |
|
| 1610 |
|
| 1611 |
|
| 1612 |
|
| 1613 |
|
| 1614 |
|
| 1615 |
|
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 29]</span></pre> |
| 1621 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span> |
| 1622 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1623 |
|
| 1624 |
|
| 1625 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Additional Test Vectors</span> |
| 1626 |
|
| 1627 |
The subsections of this appendix contain more test vectors for the |
| 1628 |
algorithms in the subsections of <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>. |
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.1" href="#appendix-A.1">A.1</a>. The ChaCha20 Block Functions</span> |
| 1631 |
|
| 1632 |
Test Vector #1: |
| 1633 |
============== |
| 1634 |
|
| 1635 |
Key: |
| 1636 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1637 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1638 |
|
| 1639 |
Nonce: |
| 1640 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ |
| 1641 |
|
| 1642 |
Block Counter = 0 |
| 1643 |
|
| 1644 |
ChaCha state at the end |
| 1645 |
ade0b876 903df1a0 e56a5d40 28bd8653 |
| 1646 |
b819d2bd 1aed8da0 ccef36a8 c70d778b |
| 1647 |
7c5941da 8d485751 3fe02477 374ad8b8 |
| 1648 |
f4b8436a 1ca11815 69b687c3 8665eeb2 |
| 1649 |
|
| 1650 |
Keystream: |
| 1651 |
000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..( |
| 1652 |
016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w.. |
| 1653 |
<a href="#section-032">032</a> da 41 59 7c 51 57 48 8d 77 24 e0 3f b8 d8 4a 37 .AY|QWH.w$.?..J7 |
| 1654 |
048 6a 43 b8 f4 15 18 a1 1c c3 87 b6 69 b2 ee 65 86 jC.........i..e. |
| 1655 |
|
| 1656 |
Test Vector #2: |
| 1657 |
============== |
| 1658 |
|
| 1659 |
Key: |
| 1660 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1661 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1662 |
|
| 1663 |
Nonce: |
| 1664 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ |
| 1665 |
|
| 1666 |
Block Counter = 1 |
| 1667 |
|
| 1668 |
ChaCha state at the end |
| 1669 |
bee7079f 7a385155 7c97ba98 0d082d73 |
| 1670 |
a0290fcb 6965e348 3e53c612 ed7aee32 |
| 1671 |
7621b729 434ee69c b03371d5 d539d874 |
| 1672 |
281fed31 45fb0a51 1f0ae1ac 6f4d794b |
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 30]</span></pre> |
| 1677 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span> |
| 1678 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1679 |
|
| 1680 |
|
| 1681 |
Keystream: |
| 1682 |
000 9f 07 e7 be 55 51 38 7a 98 ba 97 7c 73 2d 08 0d ....UQ8z...|s-.. |
| 1683 |
016 cb 0f 29 a0 48 e3 65 69 12 c6 53 3e 32 ee 7a ed ..).H.ei..S>2.z. |
| 1684 |
032 29 b7 21 76 9c e6 4e 43 d5 71 33 b0 74 d8 39 d5 ).!v..NC.q3.t.9. |
| 1685 |
048 31 ed 1f 28 51 0a fb 45 ac e1 0a 1f 4b 79 4d 6f 1..(Q..E....KyMo |
| 1686 |
|
| 1687 |
Test Vector #3: |
| 1688 |
============== |
| 1689 |
|
| 1690 |
Key: |
| 1691 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1692 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................ |
| 1693 |
|
| 1694 |
Nonce: |
| 1695 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ |
| 1696 |
|
| 1697 |
Block Counter = 1 |
| 1698 |
|
| 1699 |
ChaCha state at the end |
| 1700 |
2452eb3a 9249f8ec 8d829d9b ddd4ceb1 |
| 1701 |
e8252083 60818b01 f38422b8 5aaa49c9 |
| 1702 |
bb00ca8e da3ba7b4 c4b592d1 fdf2732f |
| 1703 |
4436274e 2561b3c8 ebdd4aa6 a0136c00 |
| 1704 |
|
| 1705 |
Keystream: |
| 1706 |
000 3a eb 52 24 ec f8 49 92 9b 9d 82 8d b1 ce d4 dd :.R$..I......... |
| 1707 |
016 83 20 25 e8 01 8b 81 60 b8 22 84 f3 c9 49 aa 5a . %....`."...I.Z |
| 1708 |
032 8e ca 00 bb b4 a7 3b da d1 92 b5 c4 2f 73 f2 fd ......;...../s.. |
| 1709 |
048 4e 27 36 44 c8 b3 61 25 a6 4a dd eb 00 6c 13 a0 N'6D..a%.J...l.. |
| 1710 |
|
| 1711 |
Test Vector #4: |
| 1712 |
============== |
| 1713 |
|
| 1714 |
Key: |
| 1715 |
000 00 ff 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1716 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1717 |
|
| 1718 |
Nonce: |
| 1719 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ |
| 1720 |
|
| 1721 |
Block Counter = 2 |
| 1722 |
|
| 1723 |
ChaCha state at the end |
| 1724 |
fb4dd572 4bc42ef1 df922636 327f1394 |
| 1725 |
a78dea8f 5e269039 a1bebbc1 caf09aae |
| 1726 |
a25ab213 48a6b46c 1b9d9bcb 092c5be6 |
| 1727 |
546ca624 1bec45d5 87f47473 96f0992e |
| 1728 |
|
| 1729 |
|
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 31]</span></pre> |
| 1733 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span> |
| 1734 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
Keystream: |
| 1738 |
<a href="#section-000">000</a> 72 d5 4d fb f1 2e c4 4b 36 26 92 df 94 13 7f 32 r.M....K6&.....<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
| 1739 |
016 8f ea 8d a7 39 90 26 5e c1 bb be a1 ae 9a f0 ca ....9.&^........ |
| 1740 |
032 13 b2 5a a2 6c b4 a6 48 cb 9b 9d 1b e6 5b 2c 09 ..Z.l..H.....[,. |
| 1741 |
048 24 a6 6c 54 d5 45 ec 1b 73 74 f4 87 2e 99 f0 96 $.lT.E..st...... |
| 1742 |
|
| 1743 |
Test Vector #5: |
| 1744 |
============== |
| 1745 |
|
| 1746 |
Key: |
| 1747 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1748 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1749 |
|
| 1750 |
Nonce: |
| 1751 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ |
| 1752 |
|
| 1753 |
Block Counter = 0 |
| 1754 |
|
| 1755 |
ChaCha state at the end |
| 1756 |
374dc6c2 3736d58c b904e24a cd3f93ef |
| 1757 |
88228b1a 96a4dfb3 5b76ab72 c727ee54 |
| 1758 |
0e0e978a f3145c95 1b748ea8 f786c297 |
| 1759 |
99c28f5f 628314e8 398a19fa 6ded1b53 |
| 1760 |
|
| 1761 |
Keystream: |
| 1762 |
000 c2 c6 4d 37 8c d5 36 37 4a e2 04 b9 ef 93 3f cd ..M7..67J.....?. |
| 1763 |
016 1a 8b 22 88 b3 df a4 96 72 ab 76 5b 54 ee 27 c7 ..".....r.v[T.'. |
| 1764 |
032 8a 97 0e 0e 95 5c 14 f3 a8 8e 74 1b 97 c2 86 f7 .....\....t..... |
| 1765 |
048 5f 8f c2 99 e8 14 83 62 fa 19 8a 39 53 1b ed 6d _......b...9S..m |
| 1766 |
|
| 1767 |
|
| 1768 |
|
| 1769 |
|
| 1770 |
|
| 1771 |
|
| 1772 |
|
| 1773 |
|
| 1774 |
|
| 1775 |
|
| 1776 |
|
| 1777 |
|
| 1778 |
|
| 1779 |
|
| 1780 |
|
| 1781 |
|
| 1782 |
|
| 1783 |
|
| 1784 |
|
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 32]</span></pre> |
| 1789 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span> |
| 1790 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.2" href="#appendix-A.2">A.2</a>. ChaCha20 Encryption</span> |
| 1794 |
|
| 1795 |
Test Vector #1: |
| 1796 |
============== |
| 1797 |
|
| 1798 |
Key: |
| 1799 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1800 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1801 |
|
| 1802 |
Nonce: |
| 1803 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ |
| 1804 |
|
| 1805 |
Initial Block Counter = 0 |
| 1806 |
|
| 1807 |
Plaintext: |
| 1808 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1809 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1810 |
032 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1811 |
048 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1812 |
|
| 1813 |
Ciphertext: |
| 1814 |
000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..( |
| 1815 |
016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w.. |
| 1816 |
<a href="#section-032">032</a> da 41 59 7c 51 57 48 8d 77 24 e0 3f b8 d8 4a 37 .AY|QWH.w$.?..J7 |
| 1817 |
048 6a 43 b8 f4 15 18 a1 1c c3 87 b6 69 b2 ee 65 86 jC.........i..e. |
| 1818 |
|
| 1819 |
Test Vector #2: |
| 1820 |
============== |
| 1821 |
|
| 1822 |
Key: |
| 1823 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1824 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................ |
| 1825 |
|
| 1826 |
Nonce: |
| 1827 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ |
| 1828 |
|
| 1829 |
Initial Block Counter = 1 |
| 1830 |
|
| 1831 |
|
| 1832 |
|
| 1833 |
|
| 1834 |
|
| 1835 |
|
| 1836 |
|
| 1837 |
|
| 1838 |
|
| 1839 |
|
| 1840 |
|
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 33]</span></pre> |
| 1845 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span> |
| 1846 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
Plaintext: |
| 1850 |
000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t |
| 1851 |
016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten |
| 1852 |
032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr |
| 1853 |
048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi |
| 1854 |
064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or |
| 1855 |
080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF |
| 1856 |
096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft |
| 1857 |
112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s |
| 1858 |
128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi |
| 1859 |
144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context |
| 1860 |
160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti |
| 1861 |
176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider |
| 1862 |
192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont |
| 1863 |
208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such |
| 1864 |
224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu |
| 1865 |
240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen |
| 1866 |
256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi |
| 1867 |
272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as |
| 1868 |
288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec |
| 1869 |
304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica |
| 1870 |
320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an |
| 1871 |
336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place, |
| 1872 |
352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre |
| 1873 |
368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to |
| 1874 |
|
| 1875 |
|
| 1876 |
|
| 1877 |
|
| 1878 |
|
| 1879 |
|
| 1880 |
|
| 1881 |
|
| 1882 |
|
| 1883 |
|
| 1884 |
|
| 1885 |
|
| 1886 |
|
| 1887 |
|
| 1888 |
|
| 1889 |
|
| 1890 |
|
| 1891 |
|
| 1892 |
|
| 1893 |
|
| 1894 |
|
| 1895 |
|
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 34]</span></pre> |
| 1901 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span> |
| 1902 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
Ciphertext: |
| 1906 |
000 a3 fb f0 7d f3 fa 2f de 4f 37 6c a2 3e 82 73 70 ...}../.O7l.>.sp |
| 1907 |
016 41 60 5d 9f 4f 4f 57 bd 8c ff 2c 1d 4b 79 55 ec A`].OOW...,.KyU. |
| 1908 |
032 2a 97 94 8b d3 72 29 15 c8 f3 d3 37 f7 d3 70 05 *....r)....7..p. |
| 1909 |
048 0e 9e 96 d6 47 b7 c3 9f 56 e0 31 ca 5e b6 25 0d ....G...V.1.^.%. |
| 1910 |
064 40 42 e0 27 85 ec ec fa 4b 4b b5 e8 ea d0 44 0e @B.'....KK....D. |
| 1911 |
080 20 b6 e8 db 09 d8 81 a7 c6 13 2f 42 0e 52 79 50 ........./B.RyP |
| 1912 |
096 42 bd fa 77 73 d8 a9 05 14 47 b3 29 1c e1 41 1c B..ws....G.)..A. |
| 1913 |
112 68 04 65 55 2a a6 c4 05 b7 76 4d 5e 87 be a8 5a h.eU*....vM^...Z |
| 1914 |
128 d0 0f 84 49 ed 8f 72 d0 d6 62 ab 05 26 91 ca 66 ...I..r..b..&..f |
| 1915 |
144 42 4b c8 6d 2d f8 0e a4 1f 43 ab f9 37 d3 25 9d BK.m-....C..7.%. |
| 1916 |
160 c4 b2 d0 df b4 8a 6c 91 39 dd d7 f7 69 66 e9 28 ......l.9...if.( |
| 1917 |
176 e6 35 55 3b a7 6c 5c 87 9d 7b 35 d4 9e b2 e6 2b .5U;.l\..{5....+ |
| 1918 |
192 08 71 cd ac 63 89 39 e2 5e 8a 1e 0e f9 d5 28 0f .q..c.9.^.....(. |
| 1919 |
208 a8 ca 32 8b 35 1c 3c 76 59 89 cb cf 3d aa 8b 6c ..2.5.<vY...=..l |
| 1920 |
224 cc 3a af 9f 39 79 c9 2b 37 20 fc 88 dc 95 ed 84 .:..9y.+7 ...... |
| 1921 |
240 a1 be 05 9c 64 99 b9 fd a2 36 e7 e8 18 b0 4b 0b ....d....6....K. |
| 1922 |
256 c3 9c 1e 87 6b 19 3b fe 55 69 75 3f 88 12 8c c0 ....k.;.Uiu?.... |
| 1923 |
272 8a aa 9b 63 d1 a1 6f 80 ef 25 54 d7 18 9c 41 1f ...c..o..%T...A. |
| 1924 |
288 58 69 ca 52 c5 b8 3f a3 6f f2 16 b9 c1 d3 00 62 Xi.R..?.o......b |
| 1925 |
304 be bc fd 2d c5 bc e0 91 19 34 fd a7 9a 86 f6 e6 ...-.....4...... |
| 1926 |
320 98 ce d7 59 c3 ff 9b 64 77 33 8f 3d a4 f9 cd 85 ...Y...dw3.=.... |
| 1927 |
336 14 ea 99 82 cc af b3 41 b2 38 4d d9 02 f3 d1 ab .......A.8M..... |
| 1928 |
352 7a c6 1d d2 9c 6f 21 ba 5b 86 2f 37 30 e3 7c fd z....o!.[./70.|. |
| 1929 |
368 c4 fd 80 6c 22 f2 21 ...l".! |
| 1930 |
|
| 1931 |
Test Vector #3: |
| 1932 |
============== |
| 1933 |
|
| 1934 |
Key: |
| 1935 |
000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]...... |
| 1936 |
016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. |
| 1937 |
|
| 1938 |
Nonce: |
| 1939 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ |
| 1940 |
|
| 1941 |
Initial Block Counter = 42 |
| 1942 |
|
| 1943 |
Plaintext: |
| 1944 |
000 27 54 77 61 73 20 62 72 69 6c 6c 69 67 2c 20 61 'Twas brillig, a |
| 1945 |
016 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 73 6c 69 74 68 79 20 74 6f nd the slithy to |
| 1946 |
032 76 65 73 0a 44 69 64 20 67 79 72 65 20 61 6e 64 ves.Did gyre and |
| 1947 |
048 20 67 69 6d 62 6c 65 20 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 77 gimble in the w |
| 1948 |
064 61 62 65 3a 0a 41 6c 6c 20 6d 69 6d 73 79 20 77 abe:.All mimsy w |
| 1949 |
080 65 72 65 20 74 68 65 20 62 6f 72 6f 67 6f 76 65 ere the borogove |
| 1950 |
096 73 2c 0a 41 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 6d 6f 6d 65 20 s,.And the mome |
| 1951 |
112 72 61 74 68 73 20 6f 75 74 67 72 61 62 65 2e raths outgrabe. |
| 1952 |
|
| 1953 |
|
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
|
| 1956 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 35]</span></pre> |
| 1957 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span> |
| 1958 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
Ciphertext: |
| 1962 |
000 62 e6 34 7f 95 ed 87 a4 5f fa e7 42 6f 27 a1 df b.4....._..Bo'.. |
| 1963 |
016 5f b6 91 10 04 4c 0d 73 11 8e ff a9 5b 01 e5 cf _....L.s....[... |
| 1964 |
032 16 6d 3d f2 d7 21 ca f9 b2 1e 5f b1 4c 61 68 71 .m=..!...._.Lahq |
| 1965 |
048 fd 84 c5 4f 9d 65 b2 83 19 6c 7f e4 f6 05 53 eb ...O.e...l....S. |
| 1966 |
064 f3 9c 64 02 c4 22 34 e3 2a 35 6b 3e 76 43 12 a6 ..d.."4.*5k>vC.. |
| 1967 |
080 1a 55 32 05 57 16 ea d6 96 25 68 f8 7d 3f 3f 77 .U2.W....%h.}??w |
| 1968 |
096 04 c6 a8 d1 bc d1 bf 4d 50 d6 15 4b 6d a7 31 b1 .......MP..Km.1. |
| 1969 |
112 87 b5 8d fd 72 8a fa 36 75 7a 79 7a c1 88 d1 ....r..6uzyz... |
| 1970 |
|
| 1971 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.3" href="#appendix-A.3">A.3</a>. Poly1305 Message Authentication Code</span> |
| 1972 |
|
| 1973 |
Notice how, in test vector #2, r is equal to zero. The part of the |
| 1974 |
Poly1305 algorithm where the accumulator is multiplied by r means |
| 1975 |
that with r equal zero, the tag will be equal to s regardless of the |
| 1976 |
content of the text. Fortunately, all the proposed methods of |
| 1977 |
generating r are such that getting this particular weak key is very |
| 1978 |
unlikely. |
| 1979 |
|
| 1980 |
Test Vector #1: |
| 1981 |
============== |
| 1982 |
|
| 1983 |
One-time Poly1305 Key: |
| 1984 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1985 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1986 |
|
| 1987 |
Text to MAC: |
| 1988 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1989 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1990 |
032 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1991 |
048 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1992 |
|
| 1993 |
Tag: |
| 1994 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 1995 |
|
| 1996 |
Test Vector #2: |
| 1997 |
============== |
| 1998 |
|
| 1999 |
One-time Poly1305 Key: |
| 2000 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 2001 |
016 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.> |
| 2002 |
|
| 2003 |
|
| 2004 |
|
| 2005 |
|
| 2006 |
|
| 2007 |
|
| 2008 |
|
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
|
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 36]</span></pre> |
| 2013 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span> |
| 2014 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
|
| 2017 |
Text to MAC: |
| 2018 |
000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t |
| 2019 |
016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten |
| 2020 |
032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr |
| 2021 |
048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi |
| 2022 |
064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or |
| 2023 |
080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF |
| 2024 |
096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft |
| 2025 |
112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s |
| 2026 |
128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi |
| 2027 |
144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context |
| 2028 |
160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti |
| 2029 |
176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider |
| 2030 |
192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont |
| 2031 |
208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such |
| 2032 |
224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu |
| 2033 |
240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen |
| 2034 |
256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi |
| 2035 |
272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as |
| 2036 |
288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec |
| 2037 |
304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica |
| 2038 |
320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an |
| 2039 |
336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place, |
| 2040 |
352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre |
| 2041 |
368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to |
| 2042 |
|
| 2043 |
Tag: |
| 2044 |
000 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.> |
| 2045 |
|
| 2046 |
Test Vector #3: |
| 2047 |
============== |
| 2048 |
|
| 2049 |
One-time Poly1305 Key: |
| 2050 |
000 36 e5 f6 b5 c5 e0 60 70 f0 ef ca 96 22 7a 86 3e 6.....`p...."z.> |
| 2051 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 2052 |
|
| 2053 |
|
| 2054 |
|
| 2055 |
|
| 2056 |
|
| 2057 |
|
| 2058 |
|
| 2059 |
|
| 2060 |
|
| 2061 |
|
| 2062 |
|
| 2063 |
|
| 2064 |
|
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 37]</span></pre> |
| 2069 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span> |
| 2070 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 |
Text to MAC: |
| 2074 |
000 41 6e 79 20 73 75 62 6d 69 73 73 69 6f 6e 20 74 Any submission t |
| 2075 |
016 6f 20 74 68 65 20 49 45 54 46 20 69 6e 74 65 6e o the IETF inten |
| 2076 |
032 64 65 64 20 62 79 20 74 68 65 20 43 6f 6e 74 72 ded by the Contr |
| 2077 |
048 69 62 75 74 6f 72 20 66 6f 72 20 70 75 62 6c 69 ibutor for publi |
| 2078 |
064 63 61 74 69 6f 6e 20 61 73 20 61 6c 6c 20 6f 72 cation as all or |
| 2079 |
080 20 70 61 72 74 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 part of an IETF |
| 2080 |
096 20 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 20 Internet-Draft |
| 2081 |
112 6f 72 20 52 46 43 20 61 6e 64 20 61 6e 79 20 73 or RFC and any s |
| 2082 |
128 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 20 6d 61 64 65 20 77 69 tatement made wi |
| 2083 |
144 74 68 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 63 6f 6e 74 65 78 74 thin the context |
| 2084 |
160 20 6f 66 20 61 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 61 63 74 69 of an IETF acti |
| 2085 |
176 76 69 74 79 20 69 73 20 63 6f 6e 73 69 64 65 72 vity is consider |
| 2086 |
192 65 64 20 61 6e 20 22 49 45 54 46 20 43 6f 6e 74 ed an "IETF Cont |
| 2087 |
208 72 69 62 75 74 69 6f 6e 22 2e 20 53 75 63 68 20 ribution". Such |
| 2088 |
224 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e 74 73 20 69 6e 63 6c 75 statements inclu |
| 2089 |
240 64 65 20 6f 72 61 6c 20 73 74 61 74 65 6d 65 6e de oral statemen |
| 2090 |
256 74 73 20 69 6e 20 49 45 54 46 20 73 65 73 73 69 ts in IETF sessi |
| 2091 |
272 6f 6e 73 2c 20 61 73 20 77 65 6c 6c 20 61 73 20 ons, as well as |
| 2092 |
288 77 72 69 74 74 65 6e 20 61 6e 64 20 65 6c 65 63 written and elec |
| 2093 |
304 74 72 6f 6e 69 63 20 63 6f 6d 6d 75 6e 69 63 61 tronic communica |
| 2094 |
320 74 69 6f 6e 73 20 6d 61 64 65 20 61 74 20 61 6e tions made at an |
| 2095 |
336 79 20 74 69 6d 65 20 6f 72 20 70 6c 61 63 65 2c y time or place, |
| 2096 |
352 20 77 68 69 63 68 20 61 72 65 20 61 64 64 72 65 which are addre |
| 2097 |
368 73 73 65 64 20 74 6f ssed to |
| 2098 |
|
| 2099 |
Tag: |
| 2100 |
000 f3 47 7e 7c d9 54 17 af 89 a6 b8 79 4c 31 0c f0 .G~|.T.....yL1.. |
| 2101 |
|
| 2102 |
|
| 2103 |
|
| 2104 |
|
| 2105 |
|
| 2106 |
|
| 2107 |
|
| 2108 |
|
| 2109 |
|
| 2110 |
|
| 2111 |
|
| 2112 |
|
| 2113 |
|
| 2114 |
|
| 2115 |
|
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 |
|
| 2118 |
|
| 2119 |
|
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 |
|
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 38]</span></pre> |
| 2125 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span> |
| 2126 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2127 |
|
| 2128 |
|
| 2129 |
Test Vector #4: |
| 2130 |
============== |
| 2131 |
|
| 2132 |
One-time Poly1305 Key: |
| 2133 |
000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]...... |
| 2134 |
016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. |
| 2135 |
|
| 2136 |
Text to MAC: |
| 2137 |
000 27 54 77 61 73 20 62 72 69 6c 6c 69 67 2c 20 61 'Twas brillig, a |
| 2138 |
016 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 73 6c 69 74 68 79 20 74 6f nd the slithy to |
| 2139 |
032 76 65 73 0a 44 69 64 20 67 79 72 65 20 61 6e 64 ves.Did gyre and |
| 2140 |
048 20 67 69 6d 62 6c 65 20 69 6e 20 74 68 65 20 77 gimble in the w |
| 2141 |
064 61 62 65 3a 0a 41 6c 6c 20 6d 69 6d 73 79 20 77 abe:.All mimsy w |
| 2142 |
080 65 72 65 20 74 68 65 20 62 6f 72 6f 67 6f 76 65 ere the borogove |
| 2143 |
096 73 2c 0a 41 6e 64 20 74 68 65 20 6d 6f 6d 65 20 s,.And the mome |
| 2144 |
112 72 61 74 68 73 20 6f 75 74 67 72 61 62 65 2e raths outgrabe. |
| 2145 |
|
| 2146 |
Tag: |
| 2147 |
000 45 41 66 9a 7e aa ee 61 e7 08 dc 7c bc c5 eb 62 EAf.~..a...|...b |
| 2148 |
|
| 2149 |
Test Vector #5: If one uses 130-bit partial reduction, does the code |
| 2150 |
handle the case where partially reduced final result is not fully |
| 2151 |
reduced? |
| 2152 |
|
| 2153 |
R: |
| 2154 |
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2155 |
S: |
| 2156 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2157 |
data: |
| 2158 |
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2159 |
tag: |
| 2160 |
03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2161 |
|
| 2162 |
Test Vector #6: What happens if addition of s overflows modulo 2^128? |
| 2163 |
|
| 2164 |
R: |
| 2165 |
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2166 |
S: |
| 2167 |
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2168 |
data: |
| 2169 |
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2170 |
tag: |
| 2171 |
03 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2172 |
|
| 2173 |
|
| 2174 |
|
| 2175 |
|
| 2176 |
|
| 2177 |
|
| 2178 |
|
| 2179 |
|
| 2180 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 39]</span></pre> |
| 2181 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span> |
| 2182 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2183 |
|
| 2184 |
|
| 2185 |
Test Vector #7: What happens if data limb is all ones and there is |
| 2186 |
carry from lower limb? |
| 2187 |
|
| 2188 |
R: |
| 2189 |
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2190 |
S: |
| 2191 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2192 |
data: |
| 2193 |
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2194 |
F0 FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2195 |
11 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2196 |
tag: |
| 2197 |
05 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2198 |
|
| 2199 |
Test Vector #8: What happens if final result from polynomial part is |
| 2200 |
exactly 2^130-5? |
| 2201 |
|
| 2202 |
R: |
| 2203 |
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2204 |
S: |
| 2205 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2206 |
data: |
| 2207 |
FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2208 |
FB FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE FE |
| 2209 |
01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 01 |
| 2210 |
tag: |
| 2211 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2212 |
|
| 2213 |
Test Vector #9: What happens if final result from polynomial part is |
| 2214 |
exactly 2^130-6? |
| 2215 |
|
| 2216 |
R: |
| 2217 |
02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2218 |
S: |
| 2219 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2220 |
data: |
| 2221 |
FD FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2222 |
tag: |
| 2223 |
FA FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF |
| 2224 |
|
| 2225 |
|
| 2226 |
|
| 2227 |
|
| 2228 |
|
| 2229 |
|
| 2230 |
|
| 2231 |
|
| 2232 |
|
| 2233 |
|
| 2234 |
|
| 2235 |
|
| 2236 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 40]</span></pre> |
| 2237 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span> |
| 2238 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2239 |
|
| 2240 |
|
| 2241 |
Test Vector #10: What happens if 5*H+L-type reduction produces |
| 2242 |
131-bit intermediate result? |
| 2243 |
|
| 2244 |
R: |
| 2245 |
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2246 |
S: |
| 2247 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2248 |
data: |
| 2249 |
E3 35 94 D7 50 5E 43 B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2250 |
33 94 D7 50 5E 43 79 CD 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2251 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2252 |
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2253 |
tag: |
| 2254 |
14 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 55 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2255 |
|
| 2256 |
Test Vector #11: What happens if 5*H+L-type reduction produces |
| 2257 |
131-bit final result? |
| 2258 |
|
| 2259 |
R: |
| 2260 |
01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 04 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2261 |
S: |
| 2262 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2263 |
data: |
| 2264 |
E3 35 94 D7 50 5E 43 B9 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2265 |
33 94 D7 50 5E 43 79 CD 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2266 |
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2267 |
tag: |
| 2268 |
13 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 |
| 2269 |
|
| 2270 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.4" href="#appendix-A.4">A.4</a>. Poly1305 Key Generation Using ChaCha20</span> |
| 2271 |
|
| 2272 |
Test Vector #1: |
| 2273 |
============== |
| 2274 |
|
| 2275 |
The ChaCha20 Key: |
| 2276 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 2277 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 2278 |
|
| 2279 |
The nonce: |
| 2280 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ............ |
| 2281 |
|
| 2282 |
Poly1305 one-time key: |
| 2283 |
000 76 b8 e0 ad a0 f1 3d 90 40 5d 6a e5 53 86 bd 28 v.....=.@]j.S..( |
| 2284 |
016 bd d2 19 b8 a0 8d ed 1a a8 36 ef cc 8b 77 0d c7 .........6...w.. |
| 2285 |
|
| 2286 |
|
| 2287 |
|
| 2288 |
|
| 2289 |
|
| 2290 |
|
| 2291 |
|
| 2292 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 41]</span></pre> |
| 2293 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-42" ></span> |
| 2294 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2295 |
|
| 2296 |
|
| 2297 |
Test Vector #2: |
| 2298 |
============== |
| 2299 |
|
| 2300 |
The ChaCha20 Key |
| 2301 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 2302 |
016 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 ................ |
| 2303 |
|
| 2304 |
The nonce: |
| 2305 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ |
| 2306 |
|
| 2307 |
Poly1305 one-time key: |
| 2308 |
000 ec fa 25 4f 84 5f 64 74 73 d3 cb 14 0d a9 e8 76 ..%O._dts......<a href="#page-v">v</a> |
| 2309 |
<a href="#section-016">016</a> 06 cb 33 06 6c 44 7b 87 bc 26 66 dd e3 fb b7 39 ..3.lD{..&f....<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
| 2310 |
|
| 2311 |
Test Vector #3: |
| 2312 |
============== |
| 2313 |
|
| 2314 |
The ChaCha20 Key |
| 2315 |
000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]...... |
| 2316 |
016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. |
| 2317 |
|
| 2318 |
The nonce: |
| 2319 |
000 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 02 ............ |
| 2320 |
|
| 2321 |
Poly1305 one-time key: |
| 2322 |
000 96 5e 3b c6 f9 ec 7e d9 56 08 08 f4 d2 29 f9 4b .^;...~.V....).K |
| 2323 |
016 13 7f f2 75 ca 9b 3f cb dd 59 de aa d2 33 10 ae ...u..?..Y...3.. |
| 2324 |
|
| 2325 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A.5" href="#appendix-A.5">A.5</a>. ChaCha20-Poly1305 AEAD Decryption</span> |
| 2326 |
|
| 2327 |
Below we see decrypting a message. We receive a ciphertext, a nonce, |
| 2328 |
and a tag. We know the key. We will check the tag and then |
| 2329 |
(assuming that it validates) decrypt the ciphertext. In this |
| 2330 |
particular protocol, we'll assume that there is no padding of the |
| 2331 |
plaintext. |
| 2332 |
|
| 2333 |
|
| 2334 |
|
| 2335 |
|
| 2336 |
|
| 2337 |
|
| 2338 |
|
| 2339 |
|
| 2340 |
|
| 2341 |
|
| 2342 |
|
| 2343 |
|
| 2344 |
|
| 2345 |
|
| 2346 |
|
| 2347 |
|
| 2348 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 42]</span></pre> |
| 2349 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-43" ></span> |
| 2350 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2351 |
|
| 2352 |
|
| 2353 |
The ChaCha20 Key |
| 2354 |
000 1c 92 40 a5 eb 55 d3 8a f3 33 88 86 04 f6 b5 f0 [email protected]...... |
| 2355 |
016 47 39 17 c1 40 2b 80 09 9d ca 5c bc 20 70 75 c0 G9..@+....\. pu. |
| 2356 |
|
| 2357 |
Ciphertext: |
| 2358 |
000 64 a0 86 15 75 86 1a f4 60 f0 62 c7 9b e6 43 bd d...u...`.b...C. |
| 2359 |
016 5e 80 5c fd 34 5c f3 89 f1 08 67 0a c7 6c 8c b2 ^.\.4\....g..l.. |
| 2360 |
032 4c 6c fc 18 75 5d 43 ee a0 9e e9 4e 38 2d 26 b0 Ll..u]C....N8-&. |
| 2361 |
048 bd b7 b7 3c 32 1b 01 00 d4 f0 3b 7f 35 58 94 cf ...<2.....;.5X.. |
| 2362 |
064 33 2f 83 0e 71 0b 97 ce 98 c8 a8 4a bd 0b 94 81 3/..q......J.... |
| 2363 |
080 14 ad 17 6e 00 8d 33 bd 60 f9 82 b1 ff 37 c8 55 ...n..3.`....7.U |
| 2364 |
<a href="#section-096">096</a> 97 97 a0 6e f4 f0 ef 61 c1 86 32 4e 2b 35 06 38 ...n...a..2N+5.8 |
| 2365 |
112 36 06 90 7b 6a 7c 02 b0 f9 f6 15 7b 53 c8 67 e4 6..{j|.....{S.g. |
| 2366 |
128 b9 16 6c 76 7b 80 4d 46 a5 9b 52 16 cd e7 a4 e9 ..lv{.MF..R..... |
| 2367 |
144 90 40 c5 a4 04 33 22 5e e2 82 a1 b0 a0 6c 52 3e [email protected]"^.....lR> |
| 2368 |
160 af 45 34 d7 f8 3f a1 15 5b 00 47 71 8c bc 54 6a .E4..?..[.Gq..Tj |
| 2369 |
176 0d 07 2b 04 b3 56 4e ea 1b 42 22 73 f5 48 27 1a ..+..VN..B"s.H'. |
| 2370 |
192 0b b2 31 60 53 fa 76 99 19 55 eb d6 31 59 43 4e ..1`S.v..U..1YCN |
| 2371 |
208 ce bb 4e 46 6d ae 5a 10 73 a6 72 76 27 09 7a 10 ..NFm.Z.s.rv'.z. |
| 2372 |
<a href="#section-224">224</a> 49 e6 17 d9 1d 36 10 94 fa 68 f0 ff 77 98 71 30 I....6...h..w.q0 |
| 2373 |
240 30 5b ea ba 2e da 04 df 99 7b 71 4d 6c 6f 2c 29 0[.......{qMlo,) |
| 2374 |
256 a6 ad 5c b4 02 2b 02 70 9b ..\..+.p. |
| 2375 |
|
| 2376 |
The nonce: |
| 2377 |
000 00 00 00 00 01 02 03 04 05 06 07 08 ............ |
| 2378 |
|
| 2379 |
The AAD: |
| 2380 |
000 f3 33 88 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 91 .3........N. |
| 2381 |
|
| 2382 |
Received Tag: |
| 2383 |
<a href="#section-000">000</a> ee ad 9d 67 89 0c bb 22 39 23 36 fe a1 85 1f 38 ...g..."9#6....<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 2384 |
|
| 2385 |
|
| 2386 |
|
| 2387 |
|
| 2388 |
|
| 2389 |
|
| 2390 |
|
| 2391 |
|
| 2392 |
|
| 2393 |
|
| 2394 |
|
| 2395 |
|
| 2396 |
|
| 2397 |
|
| 2398 |
|
| 2399 |
|
| 2400 |
|
| 2401 |
|
| 2402 |
|
| 2403 |
|
| 2404 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 43]</span></pre> |
| 2405 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-44" ></span> |
| 2406 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2407 |
|
| 2408 |
|
| 2409 |
First, we calculate the one-time Poly1305 key |
| 2410 |
|
| 2411 |
ChaCha state with key setup |
| 2412 |
61707865 3320646e 79622d32 6b206574 |
| 2413 |
a540921c 8ad355eb 868833f3 f0b5f604 |
| 2414 |
c1173947 09802b40 bc5cca9d c0757020 |
| 2415 |
00000000 00000000 04030201 08070605 |
| 2416 |
|
| 2417 |
ChaCha state after 20 rounds |
| 2418 |
a94af0bd 89dee45c b64bb195 afec8fa1 |
| 2419 |
508f4726 63f554c0 1ea2c0db aa721526 |
| 2420 |
11b1e514 a0bacc0f 828a6015 d7825481 |
| 2421 |
e8a4a850 d9dcbbd6 4c2de33a f8ccd912 |
| 2422 |
|
| 2423 |
out bytes: |
| 2424 |
bd:f0:4a:a9:5c:e4:de:89:95:b1:4b:b6:a1:8f:ec:af: |
| 2425 |
26:47:8f:50:c0:54:f5:63:db:c0:a2:1e:26:15:72:aa |
| 2426 |
|
| 2427 |
Poly1305 one-time key: |
| 2428 |
000 bd f0 4a a9 5c e4 de 89 95 b1 4b b6 a1 8f ec af ..J.\.....K..... |
| 2429 |
016 26 47 8f 50 c0 54 f5 63 db c0 a2 1e 26 15 72 aa &G.P.T.c....&.r. |
| 2430 |
|
| 2431 |
Next, we construct the AEAD buffer |
| 2432 |
|
| 2433 |
Poly1305 Input: |
| 2434 |
000 f3 33 88 86 00 00 00 00 00 00 4e 91 00 00 00 00 .3........N..... |
| 2435 |
016 64 a0 86 15 75 86 1a f4 60 f0 62 c7 9b e6 43 bd d...u...`.b...C. |
| 2436 |
032 5e 80 5c fd 34 5c f3 89 f1 08 67 0a c7 6c 8c b2 ^.\.4\....g..l.. |
| 2437 |
048 4c 6c fc 18 75 5d 43 ee a0 9e e9 4e 38 2d 26 b0 Ll..u]C....N8-&. |
| 2438 |
064 bd b7 b7 3c 32 1b 01 00 d4 f0 3b 7f 35 58 94 cf ...<2.....;.5X.. |
| 2439 |
080 33 2f 83 0e 71 0b 97 ce 98 c8 a8 4a bd 0b 94 81 3/..q......J.... |
| 2440 |
096 14 ad 17 6e 00 8d 33 bd 60 f9 82 b1 ff 37 c8 55 ...n..3.`....7.U |
| 2441 |
<a href="#section-112">112</a> 97 97 a0 6e f4 f0 ef 61 c1 86 32 4e 2b 35 06 38 ...n...a..2N+5.8 |
| 2442 |
128 36 06 90 7b 6a 7c 02 b0 f9 f6 15 7b 53 c8 67 e4 6..{j|.....{S.g. |
| 2443 |
144 b9 16 6c 76 7b 80 4d 46 a5 9b 52 16 cd e7 a4 e9 ..lv{.MF..R..... |
| 2444 |
160 90 40 c5 a4 04 33 22 5e e2 82 a1 b0 a0 6c 52 3e [email protected]"^.....lR> |
| 2445 |
176 af 45 34 d7 f8 3f a1 15 5b 00 47 71 8c bc 54 6a .E4..?..[.Gq..Tj |
| 2446 |
192 0d 07 2b 04 b3 56 4e ea 1b 42 22 73 f5 48 27 1a ..+..VN..B"s.H'. |
| 2447 |
208 0b b2 31 60 53 fa 76 99 19 55 eb d6 31 59 43 4e ..1`S.v..U..1YCN |
| 2448 |
224 ce bb 4e 46 6d ae 5a 10 73 a6 72 76 27 09 7a 10 ..NFm.Z.s.rv'.z. |
| 2449 |
<a href="#section-240">240</a> 49 e6 17 d9 1d 36 10 94 fa 68 f0 ff 77 98 71 30 I....6...h..w.q0 |
| 2450 |
256 30 5b ea ba 2e da 04 df 99 7b 71 4d 6c 6f 2c 29 0[.......{qMlo,) |
| 2451 |
272 a6 ad 5c b4 02 2b 02 70 9b 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ..\..+.p........ |
| 2452 |
288 0c 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 09 01 00 00 00 00 00 00 ................ |
| 2453 |
|
| 2454 |
|
| 2455 |
|
| 2456 |
|
| 2457 |
|
| 2458 |
|
| 2459 |
|
| 2460 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 44]</span></pre> |
| 2461 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-45" ></span> |
| 2462 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2463 |
|
| 2464 |
|
| 2465 |
We calculate the Poly1305 tag and find that it matches |
| 2466 |
|
| 2467 |
Calculated Tag: |
| 2468 |
<a href="#section-000">000</a> ee ad 9d 67 89 0c bb 22 39 23 36 fe a1 85 1f 38 ...g..."9#6....<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 2469 |
|
| 2470 |
Finally, we decrypt the ciphertext |
| 2471 |
|
| 2472 |
Plaintext:: |
| 2473 |
000 49 6e 74 65 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 73 20 Internet-Drafts |
| 2474 |
016 61 72 65 20 64 72 61 66 74 20 64 6f 63 75 6d 65 are draft docume |
| 2475 |
032 6e 74 73 20 76 61 6c 69 64 20 66 6f 72 20 61 20 nts valid for a |
| 2476 |
048 6d 61 78 69 6d 75 6d 20 6f 66 20 73 69 78 20 6d maximum of six m |
| 2477 |
064 6f 6e 74 68 73 20 61 6e 64 20 6d 61 79 20 62 65 onths and may be |
| 2478 |
080 20 75 70 64 61 74 65 64 2c 20 72 65 70 6c 61 63 updated, replac |
| 2479 |
096 65 64 2c 20 6f 72 20 6f 62 73 6f 6c 65 74 65 64 ed, or obsoleted |
| 2480 |
112 20 62 79 20 6f 74 68 65 72 20 64 6f 63 75 6d 65 by other docume |
| 2481 |
128 6e 74 73 20 61 74 20 61 6e 79 20 74 69 6d 65 2e nts at any time. |
| 2482 |
144 20 49 74 20 69 73 20 69 6e 61 70 70 72 6f 70 72 It is inappropr |
| 2483 |
160 69 61 74 65 20 74 6f 20 75 73 65 20 49 6e 74 65 iate to use Inte |
| 2484 |
176 72 6e 65 74 2d 44 72 61 66 74 73 20 61 73 20 72 rnet-Drafts as r |
| 2485 |
192 65 66 65 72 65 6e 63 65 20 6d 61 74 65 72 69 61 eference materia |
| 2486 |
208 6c 20 6f 72 20 74 6f 20 63 69 74 65 20 74 68 65 l or to cite the |
| 2487 |
224 6d 20 6f 74 68 65 72 20 74 68 61 6e 20 61 73 20 m other than as |
| 2488 |
240 2f e2 80 9c 77 6f 72 6b 20 69 6e 20 70 72 6f 67 /...work in prog |
| 2489 |
256 72 65 73 73 2e 2f e2 80 9d ress./... |
| 2490 |
|
| 2491 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Performance Measurements of ChaCha20</span> |
| 2492 |
|
| 2493 |
The following measurements were made by Adam Langley for a blog post |
| 2494 |
published on February 27th, 2014. The original blog post was |
| 2495 |
available at the time of this writing at |
| 2496 |
<<a href="https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto.html">https://www.imperialviolet.org/2014/02/27/tlssymmetriccrypto.html</a>>. |
| 2497 |
|
| 2498 |
+----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+ |
| 2499 |
| Chip | AES-128-GCM | ChaCha20-Poly1305 | |
| 2500 |
+----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+ |
| 2501 |
| OMAP 4460 | 24.1 MB/s | 75.3 MB/s | |
| 2502 |
| Snapdragon S4 Pro | 41.5 MB/s | 130.9 MB/s | |
| 2503 |
| Sandy Bridge Xeon (AES-NI) | 900 MB/s | 500 MB/s | |
| 2504 |
+----------------------------+-------------+-------------------+ |
| 2505 |
|
| 2506 |
Table 1: Speed Comparison |
| 2507 |
|
| 2508 |
|
| 2509 |
|
| 2510 |
|
| 2511 |
|
| 2512 |
|
| 2513 |
|
| 2514 |
|
| 2515 |
|
| 2516 |
<span class="grey">Nir & Langley Informational [Page 45]</span></pre> |
| 2517 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-46" ></span> |
| 2518 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8439">RFC 8439</a> ChaCha20 & Poly1305 June 2018</span> |
| 2519 |
|
| 2520 |
|
| 2521 |
Acknowledgements |
| 2522 |
|
| 2523 |
ChaCha20 and Poly1305 were invented by Daniel J. Bernstein. The AEAD |
| 2524 |
construction and the method of creating the one-time Poly1305 key |
| 2525 |
were invented by Adam Langley. |
| 2526 |
|
| 2527 |
Thanks to Robert Ransom, Watson Ladd, Stefan Buhler, Dan Harkins, and |
| 2528 |
Kenny Paterson for their helpful comments and explanations. Thanks |
| 2529 |
to Niels Moller for suggesting the more efficient AEAD construction |
| 2530 |
in this document. Special thanks to Ilari Liusvaara for providing |
| 2531 |
extra test vectors, helpful comments, and for being the first to |
| 2532 |
attempt an implementation from this document. Thanks to Sean |
| 2533 |
Parkinson for suggesting improvements to the examples and the |
| 2534 |
pseudocode. Thanks to David Ireland for pointing out a bug in the |
| 2535 |
pseudocode, and to Stephen Farrell and Alyssa Rowan for pointing out |
| 2536 |
missing advise in the security considerations. |
| 2537 |
|
| 2538 |
Special thanks goes to Gordon Procter for performing a security |
| 2539 |
analysis of the composition and publishing [<a href="#ref-Procter" title=""A Security Analysis of the Composition of ChaCha20 and Poly1305"">Procter</a>]. |
| 2540 |
|
| 2541 |
Jim Schaad and John Mattson provided feedback on tag truncation, and |
| 2542 |
Russ Housley, Stanislav Smyshlyaev, and John Mattson each provided a |
| 2543 |
review of this version. |
| 2544 |
|
| 2545 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 2546 |
|
| 2547 |
Yoav Nir |
| 2548 |
Dell EMC |
| 2549 |
9 Andrei Sakharov St |
| 2550 |
Haifa 3190500 |
| 2551 |
Israel |
| 2552 |
|
| 2553 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 2554 |
|
| 2555 |
|
| 2556 |
Adam Langley |
| 2557 |
Google, Inc. |
| 2558 |
|
| 2559 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 2560 |
|
| 2561 |
|
| 2562 |
|
| 2563 |
|
| 2564 |
|
| 2565 |
|
| 2566 |
|
| 2567 |
|
| 2568 |
|
| 2569 |
|
| 2570 |
|
| 2571 |
|
| 2572 |
Nir & Langley Informational [Page 46] |
| 2573 |
</pre> |