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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. M'Raihi |
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Request for Comments: 6287 Verisign, Inc. |
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Category: Informational J. Rydell |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Portwise, Inc. |
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S. Bajaj |
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Symantec Corp. |
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S. Machani |
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Diversinet Corp. |
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D. Naccache |
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Ecole Normale Superieure |
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June 2011 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">OCRA: OATH Challenge-Response Algorithm</span> |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document describes an algorithm for challenge-response |
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authentication developed by the Initiative for Open Authentication |
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(OATH). The specified mechanisms leverage the HMAC-based One-Time |
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Password (HOTP) algorithm and offer one-way and mutual |
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authentication, and electronic signature capabilities. |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents |
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6287">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6287</a>. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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|
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|
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Notation and Terminology ........................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Algorithm Requirements ..........................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. OCRA Background .................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. HOTP Algorithm .............................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Definition of OCRA ..............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. DataInput Parameters .......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. CryptoFunction .............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. The OCRASuite ...................................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Algorithm ..................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. CryptoFunction .............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. DataInput ..................................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. OCRASuite Examples ........................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Algorithm Modes for Authentication .............................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. One-Way Challenge-Response ................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Mutual Challenge-Response .................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Algorithm Modes for Signature .............................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.3.1">7.3.1</a>. Plain Signature ....................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.3.2">7.3.2</a>. Signature with Server Authentication ...............<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Security Analysis of OCRA .................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Implementation Considerations .............................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Conclusion .....................................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. Acknowledgements ..............................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. References ....................................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. Normative References .....................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Informative References ...................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Reference Implementation ..............................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Test Vectors Generation ...............................<a href="#page-26">26</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Test Vectors ..........................................<a href="#page-33">33</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C.1">C.1</a>. One-Way Challenge Response .................................<a href="#page-34">34</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C.2">C.2</a>. Mutual Challenge-Response ..................................<a href="#page-35">35</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-C.3">C.3</a>. Plain Signature ............................................<a href="#page-37">37</a> |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Initiative for Open Authentication (OATH) [<a href="#ref-OATH" title=""OATH Vision"">OATH</a>] has identified |
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several use cases and scenarios that require an asynchronous variant |
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to accommodate users who do not want to maintain a synchronized |
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authentication system. A commonly accepted method for this is to use |
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a challenge-response scheme. |
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Such a challenge-response mode of authentication is widely adopted in |
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the industry. Several vendors already offer software applications |
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and hardware devices implementing challenge-response -- but each of |
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those uses vendor-specific proprietary algorithms. For the benefits |
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of users there is a need for a standardized challenge-response |
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algorithm that allows multi-sourcing of token purchases and |
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validation systems to facilitate the democratization of strong |
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authentication. |
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Additionally, this specification describes the means to create |
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symmetric key-based short 'electronic signatures'. Such signatures |
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are variants of challenge-response mode where the data to be signed |
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becomes the challenge or is used to derive the challenge. Note that |
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the term 'electronic signature' and 'signature' are used |
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interchangeably in this document. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Notation and Terminology</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Algorithm Requirements</span> |
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This section presents the main requirements that drove this algorithm |
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design. A lot of emphasis was placed on flexibility and usability, |
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under the constraints and specificity of the HMAC-based One-Time |
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Password (HOTP) algorithm [<a href="./rfc4226" title=""HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm"">RFC4226</a>] and hardware token capabilities. |
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R1 - The algorithm MUST support challenge-response-based |
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authentication. |
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R2 - The algorithm MUST be capable of supporting symmetric key-based |
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short electronic signatures. Essentially, this is a variation of |
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challenge-response where the challenge is derived from the data that |
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needs to be signed. |
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R3 - The algorithm MUST be capable of supporting server |
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authentication, whereby the user can verify that he/she is talking to |
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a trusted server. |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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R4 - The algorithm SHOULD use HOTP [<a href="./rfc4226" title=""HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm"">RFC4226</a>] as a key building block. |
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R5 - The length and format of the input challenge SHOULD be |
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configurable. |
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R6 - The output length and format of the generated response SHOULD be |
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configurable. |
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R7 - The challenge MAY be generated with integrity checking (e.g., |
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parity bits). This will allow tokens with pin pads to perform simple |
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error checking when the user enters the challenge value into a token. |
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R8 - There MUST be a unique secret (key) for each token/soft token |
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that is shared between the token and the authentication server. The |
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keys MUST be randomly generated or derived using a key derivation |
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algorithm. |
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R9 - The algorithm MAY enable additional data attributes such as a |
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timestamp or session information to be included in the computation. |
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These data inputs MAY be used individually or all together. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. OCRA Background</span> |
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OATH introduced the HOTP algorithm as a first open, freely available |
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building block towards strengthening authentication for end-users in |
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a variety of applications. One-time passwords are very efficient at |
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solving specific security issues thanks to the dynamic nature of OTP |
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computations. |
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After carefully analyzing different use cases, OATH came to the |
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conclusion that providing for extensions to the HOTP algorithms was |
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important. A very natural extension is to introduce a challenge mode |
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for computing HOTP values based on random questions. Equally |
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beneficial is being able to perform mutual authentication between two |
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parties, or short-signature computation for authenticating |
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transaction to improve the security of e-commerce applications. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. HOTP Algorithm</span> |
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The HOTP algorithm, as defined in [<a href="./rfc4226" title=""HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm"">RFC4226</a>], is based on an |
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increasing counter value and a static symmetric key known only to the |
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prover and verifier parties. |
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As a reminder: |
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HOTP(K,C) = Truncate(HMAC-SHA1(K,C)) |
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where Truncate represents the function that converts an HMAC-SHA-1 |
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value into an HOTP value. |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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We refer the reader to [<a href="./rfc4226" title=""HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm"">RFC4226</a>] for the full description and further |
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details on the rationale and security analysis of HOTP. |
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The present document describes the different variants based on |
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similar constructions as HOTP. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Definition of OCRA</span> |
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The OATH Challenge-Response Algorithm (OCRA) is a generalization of |
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HOTP with variable data inputs not solely based on an incremented |
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counter and secret key values. |
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The definition of OCRA requires a cryptographic function, a key K and |
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a set of DataInput parameters. This section first formally |
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introduces OCRA and then introduces the definitions and default |
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values recommended for all parameters. |
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In a nutshell, |
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OCRA = CryptoFunction(K, DataInput) |
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where: |
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o K: a shared secret key known to both parties |
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o DataInput: a structure that contains the concatenation of the |
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various input data values defined in details in <a href="#section-5.1">section 5.1</a> |
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o CryptoFunction: this is the function performing the OCRA |
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computation from the secret key K and the DataInput material; |
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CryptoFunction is described in details in <a href="#section-5.2">Section 5.2</a> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. DataInput Parameters</span> |
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This structure is the concatenation over byte array of the OCRASuite |
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value as defined in <a href="#section-6">section 6</a> with the different parameters used in |
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the computation, save for the secret key K. |
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DataInput = {OCRASuite | 00 | C | Q | P | S | T} where: |
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o OCRASuite is a value representing the suite of operations to |
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compute an OCRA response |
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o 00 is a byte value used as a separator |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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o C is an unsigned 8-byte counter value processed high-order bit |
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first, and MUST be synchronized between all parties; It loops |
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around from "{Hex}0" to "{Hex}FFFFFFFFFFFFFFFF" and then starts |
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over at "{Hex}0". Note that 'C' is optional for all OCRA modes |
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described in this document. |
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o Q, mandatory, is a 128-byte list of (concatenated) challenge |
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question(s) generated by the parties; if Q is less than 128 bytes, |
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then it should be padded with zeroes to the right |
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o P is a hash (SHA-1 [<a href="./rfc3174" title=""US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)"">RFC3174</a>], SHA-256 and SHA-512 [<a href="#ref-SHA2" title=""FIPS PUB 180-3: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">SHA2</a>] are |
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supported) value of PIN/password that is known to all parties |
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during the execution of the algorithm; the length of P will depend |
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on the hash function that is used |
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o S is a UTF-8 [<a href="./rfc3629" title=""UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646"">RFC3629</a>] encoded string of length up to 512 bytes |
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that contains information about the current session; the length of |
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S is defined in the OCRASuite string |
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o T is an 8-byte unsigned integer in big-endian order (i.e., network |
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byte order) representing the number of time-steps (seconds, |
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minutes, hours, or days depending on the specified granularity) |
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since midnight UTC of January 1, 1970 [<a href="#ref-UT" title=""Unix time"">UT</a>]. More specifically, if |
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the OCRA computation includes a timestamp T, you should first |
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convert your current local time to UTC time; you can then derive |
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the UTC time in the proper format (i.e., seconds, minutes, hours, |
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or days elapsed from epoch time); the size of the time-step is |
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specified in the OCRASuite string as described in <a href="#section-6.3">Section 6.3</a> |
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When computing a response, the concatenation order is always the |
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following: |
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C | |
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OTHER-PARTY-GENERATED-CHALLENGE-QUESTION | |
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YOUR-GENERATED-CHALLENGE-QUESTION | |
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P| S | T |
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If a value is empty (i.e., a certain input is not used in the |
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computation) then the value is simply not represented in the string. |
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The counter on the token or client MUST be incremented every time a |
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new computation is requested by the user. The server's counter value |
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MUST only be incremented after a successful OCRA authentication. |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. CryptoFunction</span> |
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The default CryptoFunction is HOTP-SHA1-6, i.e., the default mode of |
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computation for OCRA is HOTP with the default 6-digit dynamic |
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truncation and a combination of DataInput values as the message to |
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compute the HMAC-SHA1 digest. |
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We denote t as the length in decimal digits of the truncation output. |
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For instance, if t = 6, then the output of the truncation is a |
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6-digit (decimal) value. |
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We define the HOTP family of functions as an extension to HOTP: |
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1. HOTP-H-t: these are the different possible truncated versions of |
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HOTP, using the dynamic truncation method for extracting an HOTP |
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value from the HMAC output |
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2. We will denote HOTP-H-t as the realization of an HOTP function |
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that uses an HMAC function with the hash function H, and the |
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dynamic truncation as described in [<a href="./rfc4226" title=""HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm"">RFC4226</a>] to extract a t-digit |
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value |
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3. t=0 means that no truncation is performed and the full HMAC value |
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is used for authentication purposes |
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We list the following preferred modes of computation, where * denotes |
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the default CryptoFunction: |
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o HOTP-SHA1-4: HOTP with SHA-1 as the hash function for HMAC and a |
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dynamic truncation to a 4-digit value; this mode is not |
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recommended in the general case, but it can be useful when a very |
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short authentication code is needed by an application |
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o HOTP-SHA1-6: HOTP with SHA-1 as the hash function for HMAC and a |
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dynamic truncation to a 6-digit value |
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o HOTP-SHA1-8: HOTP with SHA-1 as the hash function for HMAC and a |
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dynamic truncation to an 8-digit value |
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o HOTP-SHA256-6: HOTP with SHA-256 as the hash function for HMAC and |
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a dynamic truncation to a 6-digit value |
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o HOTP-SHA512-6: HOTP with SHA-512 as the hash function for HMAC and |
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a dynamic truncation to a 6-digit value |
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<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
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This table summarizes all possible values for the CryptoFunction: |
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+---------------+--------------------+-------------------------+ |
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| Name | HMAC Function Used | Size of Truncation (t) | |
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+---------------+--------------------+-------------------------+ |
| 398 |
| HOTP-SHA1-t | HMAC-SHA1 | 0 (no truncation), 4-10 | |
| 399 |
| HOTP-SHA256-t | HMAC-SHA256 | 0 (no truncation), 4-10 | |
| 400 |
| HOTP-SHA512-t | HMAC-SHA512 | 0 (no truncation), 4-10 | |
| 401 |
+---------------+--------------------+-------------------------+ |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
Table 1: CryptoFunction Table |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. The OCRASuite</span> |
| 406 |
|
| 407 |
An OCRASuite value is a text string that captures one mode of |
| 408 |
operation for OCRA, completely specifying the various options for |
| 409 |
that computation. An OCRASuite value is represented as follows: |
| 410 |
|
| 411 |
<Algorithm>:<CryptoFunction>:<DataInput> |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
The OCRASuite value is the concatenation of three sub-components that |
| 415 |
are described below. Some example OCRASuite strings are described in |
| 416 |
<a href="#section-6.4">Section 6.4</a>. |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
The client and server need to agree on one or two values of |
| 419 |
OCRASuite. These values may be agreed upon at the time of token |
| 420 |
provisioning or, for more sophisticated client-server interactions, |
| 421 |
these values may be negotiated for every transaction. |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
The provisioning of OCRA keys and related metadata such as OCRASuite |
| 424 |
is out of scope for this document. [<a href="./rfc6030" title=""Portable Symmetric Key Container (PSKC)"">RFC6030</a>] specifies one key |
| 425 |
container specification that facilitates provisioning of such data |
| 426 |
between the client and the server. |
| 427 |
|
| 428 |
Note that for Mutual Challenge-Response or Signature with Server |
| 429 |
Authentication modes, the client and server will need to agree on two |
| 430 |
values of OCRASuite -- one for server computation and another for |
| 431 |
client computation. |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Algorithm</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
Description: Indicates the version of OCRA. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
Values: OCRA-v where v represents the version number (e.g., 1, 2). |
| 454 |
This document specifies version 1 of OCRA. |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. CryptoFunction</span> |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
Description: Indicates the function used to compute OCRA values |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
Values: Permitted values are described in <a href="#section-5.2">Section 5.2</a>. |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a>. DataInput</span> |
| 463 |
|
| 464 |
Description: This component of the OCRASuite string captures the list |
| 465 |
of valid inputs for that computation; [] indicates a value is |
| 466 |
optional: |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
[<a id="ref-C">C</a>] | QFxx | [PH | Snnn | TG] : Challenge-Response computation |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
[<a id="ref-C">C</a>] | QFxx | [PH | TG] : Plain Signature computation |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
Each input that is used for the computation is represented by a |
| 473 |
single letter (except Q), and they are separated by a hyphen. |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
The input for challenge is further qualified by the formats supported |
| 476 |
by the client for challenge question(s). Supported values can be: |
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
+------------------+-------------------+ |
| 479 |
| Format (F) | Up to Length (xx) | |
| 480 |
+------------------+-------------------+ |
| 481 |
| A (alphanumeric) | 04-64 | |
| 482 |
| N (numeric) | 04-64 | |
| 483 |
| H (hexadecimal) | 04-64 | |
| 484 |
+------------------+-------------------+ |
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
Table 2: Challenge Format Table |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
The default challenge format is N08, numeric and up to 8 digits. |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
The input for P is further qualified by the hash function used for |
| 491 |
the PIN/password. Supported values for hash function can be: |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
Hash function (H) - SHA1, SHA256, SHA512. |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
The default hash function for P is SHA1. |
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
The input for S is further qualified by the length of the session |
| 506 |
data in bytes. The client and server could agree to any length but |
| 507 |
the typical values are: |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
Length (nnn) - 064, 128, 256, and 512. |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
The default length is 064 bytes. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
The input for timestamps is further qualified by G, size of the time- |
| 514 |
step. G can be specified in number of seconds, minutes, or hours: |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
+--------------------+------------------------------+ |
| 517 |
| Time-Step Size (G) | Examples | |
| 518 |
+--------------------+------------------------------+ |
| 519 |
| [1-59]S | number of seconds, e.g., 20S | |
| 520 |
| [1-59]M | number of minutes, e.g., 5M | |
| 521 |
| [0-48]H | number of hours, e.g., 24H | |
| 522 |
+--------------------+------------------------------+ |
| 523 |
|
| 524 |
Table 3: Time-step Size Table |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
Default value for G is 1M, i.e., time-step size is one minute and the |
| 527 |
T represents the number of minutes since epoch time [<a href="#ref-UT" title=""Unix time"">UT</a>]. |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a>. OCRASuite Examples</span> |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
Here are some examples of OCRASuite strings: |
| 532 |
|
| 533 |
o "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08-PSHA1" means version 1 of OCRA with |
| 534 |
HMAC-SHA512 function, truncated to an 8-digit value, using the |
| 535 |
counter, a random challenge, and a SHA1 digest of the PIN/password |
| 536 |
as parameters. It also indicates that the client supports only |
| 537 |
numeric challenge up to 8 digits in length |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
o "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-6:QA10-T1M" means version 1 of OCRA with HMAC- |
| 540 |
SHA256 function, truncated to a 6-digit value, using a random |
| 541 |
alphanumeric challenge up to 10 characters in length and a |
| 542 |
timestamp in number of minutes since epoch time |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
o "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA1-4:QH8-S512" means version 1 of OCRA with HMAC- |
| 545 |
SHA1 function, truncated to a 4-digit value, using a random |
| 546 |
hexadecimal challenge up to 8 nibbles and a session value of 512 |
| 547 |
bytes |
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Algorithm Modes for Authentication</span> |
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
This section describes the typical modes in which the above defined |
| 552 |
computation can be used for authentication. |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. One-Way Challenge-Response</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
A challenge-response is a security mechanism in which the verifier |
| 564 |
presents a question (challenge) to the prover, who must provide a |
| 565 |
valid answer (response) to be authenticated. |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
To use this algorithm for a one-way challenge-response, the verifier |
| 568 |
will communicate a challenge value (typically randomly generated) to |
| 569 |
the prover. The prover will use the challenge in the computation as |
| 570 |
described above. The prover then communicates the response to the |
| 571 |
verifier to authenticate. |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
Therefore in this mode, the typical data inputs will be: |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
C - Counter, optional. |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
Q - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the verifier. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
P - Hashed version of PIN/password, optional. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
S - Session information, optional. |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
T - Timestamp, optional. |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
The diagram below shows the message exchange between the client |
| 586 |
(prover) and the server (verifier) to complete a one-way challenge- |
| 587 |
response authentication. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
It is assumed that the client and server have a pre-shared key K that |
| 590 |
is used for the computation. |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
CLIENT SERVER |
| 593 |
(PROVER) VERIFIER) |
| 594 |
| | |
| 595 |
| Verifier sends challenge to prover | |
| 596 |
| Challenge = Q | |
| 597 |
|<---------------------------------------| |
| 598 |
| | |
| 599 |
| Prover Computes Response | |
| 600 |
| R = OCRA(K, {[<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | Q | [P | S | T]}) | |
| 601 |
| Prover sends Response = R | |
| 602 |
|--------------------------------------->| |
| 603 |
| | |
| 604 |
| Verifier Validates Response | |
| 605 |
| If Response is valid, Server sends OK | |
| 606 |
| If Response is not, Server sends NOK | |
| 607 |
|<---------------------------------------| |
| 608 |
| | |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Mutual Challenge-Response</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
Mutual challenge-response is a variation of one-way challenge- |
| 620 |
response where both the client and server mutually authenticate each |
| 621 |
other. |
| 622 |
|
| 623 |
To use this algorithm, the client will first send a random client- |
| 624 |
challenge to the server. The server computes the server-response and |
| 625 |
sends it to the client along with a server-challenge. |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
The client will first verify the server-response to be assured that |
| 628 |
it is talking to a valid server. It will then compute the client- |
| 629 |
response and send it to the server to authenticate. The server |
| 630 |
verifies the client-response to complete the two-way authentication |
| 631 |
process. |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
In this mode there are two computations: client-response and server- |
| 634 |
response. There are two separate challenge questions, generated by |
| 635 |
both parties. We denote these challenge questions Q1 and Q2. |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
Typical data inputs for server-response computation will be: |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
C - Counter, optional. |
| 640 |
|
| 641 |
QC - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the client. |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
QS - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the server. |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
S - Session information, optional. |
| 646 |
|
| 647 |
T - Timestamp, optional. |
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
Typical data inputs for client-response computation will be: |
| 650 |
|
| 651 |
C - Counter, optional. |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
QS - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the server. |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
QC - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the client. |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
P - Hashed version of PIN/password, optional. |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
S - Session information, optional. |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
T - Timestamp, optional. |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
The following diagram shows the messages that are exchanged between |
| 674 |
the client and the server to complete a two-way mutual challenge- |
| 675 |
response authentication. |
| 676 |
|
| 677 |
It is assumed that the client and server have a pre-shared key K (or |
| 678 |
pair of keys if using dual-key mode of computation) that is used for |
| 679 |
the computation. |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
CLIENT SERVER |
| 682 |
(PROVER) (VERIFIER) |
| 683 |
| | |
| 684 |
| 1. Client sends client-challenge | |
| 685 |
| QC = Client-challenge | |
| 686 |
|------------------------------------------------->| |
| 687 |
| | |
| 688 |
| 2. Server computes server-response | |
| 689 |
| and sends server-challenge | |
| 690 |
| RS = OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QC | QS | [S | T]) | |
| 691 |
| QS = Server-challenge | |
| 692 |
| Response = RS, QS | |
| 693 |
|<-------------------------------------------------| |
| 694 |
| | |
| 695 |
| 3. Client verifies server-response | |
| 696 |
| and computes client-response | |
| 697 |
| OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QC | QS | [S | T]) != RS -> STOP | |
| 698 |
| RC = OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QS | QC | [P | S | T]) | |
| 699 |
| Response = RC | |
| 700 |
|------------------------------------------------->| |
| 701 |
| | |
| 702 |
| 4. Server verifies client-response | |
| 703 |
| OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QS | QC | [P|S|T]) != RC -> STOP | |
| 704 |
| Response = OK | |
| 705 |
|<-------------------------------------------------| |
| 706 |
| | |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3" href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Algorithm Modes for Signature</span> |
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
In this section we describe the typical modes in which the above |
| 711 |
defined computation can be used for electronic signatures. |
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3.1" href="#section-7.3.1">7.3.1</a>. Plain Signature</span> |
| 714 |
|
| 715 |
To use this algorithm in plain signature mode, the server will |
| 716 |
communicate a signature-challenge value to the client (signer). The |
| 717 |
signature-challenge is either the data to be signed or derived from |
| 718 |
the data to be signed using a hash function, for example. |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
The client will use the signature-challenge in the computation as |
| 730 |
described above. The client then communicates the signature value |
| 731 |
(response) to the server to authenticate. |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
Therefore in this mode, the data inputs will be: |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
C - Counter, optional. |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
QS - Signature-challenge, mandatory, supplied by the server. |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
P - Hashed version of PIN/password, optional. |
| 740 |
|
| 741 |
T - Timestamp, optional. |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
The picture below shows the messages that are exchanged between the |
| 744 |
client (prover) and the server (verifier) to complete a plain |
| 745 |
signature operation. |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
It is assumed that the client and server have a pre-shared key K that |
| 748 |
is used for the computation. |
| 749 |
|
| 750 |
CLIENT SERVER |
| 751 |
(PROVER) (VERIFIER) |
| 752 |
| | |
| 753 |
| Verifier sends signature-challenge | |
| 754 |
| Challenge = QS | |
| 755 |
|<------------------------------------------| |
| 756 |
| | |
| 757 |
| Client Computes Response | |
| 758 |
| SIGN = OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QS | [P | T]) | |
| 759 |
| Response = SIGN | |
| 760 |
|------------------------------------------>| |
| 761 |
| | |
| 762 |
| Verifier Validates Response | |
| 763 |
| Response = OK | |
| 764 |
|<------------------------------------------| |
| 765 |
| | |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3.2" href="#section-7.3.2">7.3.2</a>. Signature with Server Authentication</span> |
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
This mode is a variation of the plain signature mode where the client |
| 770 |
can first authenticate the server before generating a electronic |
| 771 |
signature. |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
To use this algorithm, the client will first send a random client- |
| 774 |
challenge to the server. The server computes the server-response and |
| 775 |
sends it to the client along with a signature-challenge. |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
The client will first verify the server-response to authenticate that |
| 786 |
it is talking to a valid server. It will then compute the signature |
| 787 |
and send it to the server. |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
In this mode there are two computations: client-signature and server- |
| 790 |
response. |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
Typical data inputs for server-response computation will be: |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
C - Counter, optional. |
| 795 |
|
| 796 |
QC - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the client. |
| 797 |
|
| 798 |
QS - Signature-challenge, mandatory, supplied by the server. |
| 799 |
|
| 800 |
T - Timestamp, optional. |
| 801 |
|
| 802 |
Typical data inputs for client-signature computation will be: |
| 803 |
|
| 804 |
C - Counter, optional. |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
QC - Challenge question, mandatory, supplied by the client. |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
QS - Signature-challenge, mandatory, supplied by the server. |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
P - Hashed version of PIN/password, optional. |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
T - Timestamp, optional. |
| 813 |
|
| 814 |
The diagram below shows the messages that are exchanged between the |
| 815 |
client and the server to complete a signature with server |
| 816 |
authentication transaction. |
| 817 |
|
| 818 |
It is assumed that the client and server have a pre-shared key K (or |
| 819 |
pair of keys if using dual-key mode of computation) that is used for |
| 820 |
the computation. |
| 821 |
|
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
|
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
|
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
|
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
CLIENT SERVER |
| 842 |
(PROVER) VERIFIER) |
| 843 |
| | |
| 844 |
| 1. Client sends client-challenge | |
| 845 |
| QC = Client-challenge | |
| 846 |
|-------------------------------------------------->| |
| 847 |
| | |
| 848 |
| 2. Server computes server-response | |
| 849 |
| and sends signature-challenge | |
| 850 |
| RS = OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QC | QS | [T]) | |
| 851 |
| QS = signature-challenge | |
| 852 |
| Response = RS, QS | |
| 853 |
|<--------------------------------------------------| |
| 854 |
| | |
| 855 |
| 3. Client verifies server-response | |
| 856 |
| and computes signature | |
| 857 |
| OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QC | QS | [T]) != RS -> STOP | |
| 858 |
| SIGN = OCRA( K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QS | QC | [P | T]) | |
| 859 |
| Response = SIGN | |
| 860 |
|-------------------------------------------------->| |
| 861 |
| | |
| 862 |
| 4. Server verifies Signature | |
| 863 |
| OCRA(K, [<a href="#ref-C">C</a>] | QS | QC | [P|T]) != SIGN -> STOP | |
| 864 |
| Response = OK | |
| 865 |
|<--------------------------------------------------| |
| 866 |
| | |
| 867 |
|
| 868 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
Any algorithm is only as secure as the application and the |
| 871 |
authentication protocols that implement it. Therefore, this section |
| 872 |
discusses the critical security requirements that our choice of |
| 873 |
algorithm imposes on the authentication protocol and validation |
| 874 |
software. |
| 875 |
|
| 876 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Security Analysis of OCRA</span> |
| 877 |
|
| 878 |
The security and strength of this algorithm depend on the properties |
| 879 |
of the underlying building block HOTP, which is a construction based |
| 880 |
on HMAC [<a href="./rfc2104" title=""HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication"">RFC2104</a>] using SHA-1 [<a href="./rfc3174" title=""US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)"">RFC3174</a>] (or SHA-256 or SHA-512 |
| 881 |
[<a href="#ref-SHA2" title=""FIPS PUB 180-3: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">SHA2</a>]) as the hash function. |
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
The conclusion of the security analysis detailed in [<a href="./rfc4226" title=""HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password Algorithm"">RFC4226</a>] is |
| 884 |
that, for all practical purposes, the outputs of the dynamic |
| 885 |
truncation on distinct counter inputs are uniformly and independently |
| 886 |
distributed strings. |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
The analysis demonstrates that the best possible attack against the |
| 898 |
HOTP function is the brute force attack. |
| 899 |
|
| 900 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Implementation Considerations</span> |
| 901 |
|
| 902 |
IC1 - In the authentication mode, the client MUST support two-factor |
| 903 |
authentication, i.e., the communication and verification of something |
| 904 |
you know (secret code such as a password, pass phrase, PIN code, |
| 905 |
etc.) and something you have (token). The secret code is known only |
| 906 |
to the user and usually entered with the Response value for |
| 907 |
authentication purpose (two-factor authentication). Alternatively, |
| 908 |
instead of sending something you know to the server, the client may |
| 909 |
use a hash of the password or PIN code in the computation itself, |
| 910 |
thus implicitly enabling two-factor authentication. |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
IC2 - Keys SHOULD be of the length of the CryptoFunction output to |
| 913 |
facilitate interoperability. |
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
IC3 - Keys SHOULD be chosen at random or using a cryptographically |
| 916 |
strong pseudo-random generator properly seeded with a random value. |
| 917 |
We RECOMMEND following the recommendations in [<a href="./rfc4086" title=""Randomness Requirements for Security"">RFC4086</a>] for all |
| 918 |
pseudo-random and random generations. The pseudo-random numbers used |
| 919 |
for generating the keys SHOULD successfully pass the randomness test |
| 920 |
specified in [<a href="#ref-CN" title=""An accurate evaluation of Maurer's universal test"">CN</a>]. |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
IC4 - Challenge questions SHOULD be 20-byte values and MUST be at |
| 923 |
least t-byte values where t stands for the digit-length of the OCRA |
| 924 |
truncation output. |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
IC5 - On the client side, the keys SHOULD be embedded in a tamper- |
| 927 |
resistant device or securely implemented in a software application. |
| 928 |
Additionally, by embedding the keys in a hardware device, you also |
| 929 |
have the advantage of improving the flexibility (mobility) of the |
| 930 |
authentication system. |
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
IC6 - All the communications SHOULD take place over a secure channel, |
| 933 |
e.g., SSL/TLS [<a href="./rfc5246" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">RFC5246</a>], IPsec connections. |
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
IC7 - OCRA, when used in mutual authentication mode or in signature |
| 936 |
with server authentication mode, MAY use dual-key mode -- i.e., there |
| 937 |
are two keys that are shared between the client and the server. One |
| 938 |
shared key is used to generate the server response on the server side |
| 939 |
and to verify it on the client side. The other key is used to create |
| 940 |
the response or signature on the client side and to verify it on the |
| 941 |
server side. |
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
IC8 - We recommend that implementations MAY use the session |
| 954 |
information, S, as an additional input in the computation. For |
| 955 |
example, S could be the session identifier from the TLS session. |
| 956 |
|
| 957 |
This will mitigate against certain types of man-in-the-middle |
| 958 |
attacks. However, this will introduce the additional dependency that |
| 959 |
first of all the prover needs to have access to the session |
| 960 |
identifier to compute the response and the verifier will need access |
| 961 |
to the session identifier to verify the response. [<a href="./rfc5056" title=""On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure Channels"">RFC5056</a>] contains |
| 962 |
a relevant discussion of using Channel Bindings to Secure Channels. |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
IC9 - In the signature mode, whenever the counter or time (defined as |
| 965 |
optional elements) are not used in the computation, there might be a |
| 966 |
risk of replay attack and the implementers should carefully consider |
| 967 |
this issue in the light of their specific application requirements |
| 968 |
and security guidelines. The server SHOULD also provide whenever |
| 969 |
possible a mean for the client (if able) to verify the validity of |
| 970 |
the signature challenge. |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
IC10 - We also RECOMMEND storing the keys securely in the validation |
| 973 |
system, and more specifically, encrypting them using tamper-resistant |
| 974 |
hardware encryption and exposing them only when required: for |
| 975 |
example, the key is decrypted when needed to verify an OCRA response, |
| 976 |
and re-encrypted immediately to limit exposure in the RAM for a short |
| 977 |
period of time. The key store MUST be in a secure area, to avoid as |
| 978 |
much as possible direct attack on the validation system and secrets |
| 979 |
database. Particularly, access to the key material should be limited |
| 980 |
to programs and processes required by the validation system only. |
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Conclusion</span> |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
This document introduced several variants of HOTP for challenge- |
| 985 |
response-based authentication and short signature-like computations. |
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
The OCRASuite provides for an easy integration and support of |
| 988 |
different flavors within an authentication and validation system. |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
Finally, OCRA should enable mutual authentication both in connected |
| 991 |
and off-line modes, with the support of different response sizes and |
| 992 |
mode of operations. |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
We would like to thank Jeff Burstein, Shuh Chang, Oanh Hoang, Philip |
| 997 |
Hoyer, Jon Martinsson, Frederik Mennes, Mingliang Pei, Jonathan |
| 998 |
Tuliani, Stu Vaeth, Enrique Rodriguez, and Robert Zuccherato for |
| 999 |
their comments and suggestions to improve this document. |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. References</span> |
| 1010 |
|
| 1011 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.1" href="#section-11.1">11.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 1012 |
|
| 1013 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2104">RFC2104</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed- |
| 1014 |
Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, |
| 1015 |
February 1997. |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1018 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 1019 |
|
| 1020 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3174">RFC3174</a>] Eastlake, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 |
| 1021 |
(SHA1)", <a href="./rfc3174">RFC 3174</a>, September 2001. |
| 1022 |
|
| 1023 |
[<a id="ref-RFC3629">RFC3629</a>] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO |
| 1024 |
10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, November 2003. |
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4086">RFC4086</a>] Eastlake, D., Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, "Randomness |
| 1027 |
Requirements for Security", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp106">BCP 106</a>, <a href="./rfc4086">RFC 4086</a>, June 2005. |
| 1028 |
|
| 1029 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4226">RFC4226</a>] M'Raihi, D., Bellare, M., Hoornaert, F., Naccache, D., and |
| 1030 |
O. Ranen, "HOTP: An HMAC-Based One-Time Password |
| 1031 |
Algorithm", <a href="./rfc4226">RFC 4226</a>, December 2005. |
| 1032 |
|
| 1033 |
[<a id="ref-SHA2">SHA2</a>] NIST, "FIPS PUB 180-3: Secure Hash Standard (SHS)", |
| 1034 |
October 2008, <<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf">http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/</a> |
| 1035 |
<a href="http://csrc.nist.gov/publications/fips/fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf">fips180-3/fips180-3_final.pdf</a>>. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.2" href="#section-11.2">11.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1038 |
|
| 1039 |
[<a id="ref-CN">CN</a>] Coron, J. and D. Naccache, "An accurate evaluation of |
| 1040 |
Maurer's universal test", LNCS 1556, February 1999, <http: |
| 1041 |
//www.gemplus.com/smart/rd/publications/pdf/CN99maur.pdf>. |
| 1042 |
|
| 1043 |
[<a id="ref-OATH">OATH</a>] Initiative for Open Authentication, "OATH Vision", |
| 1044 |
<<a href="http://www.openauthentication.org/about">http://www.openauthentication.org/about</a>>. |
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5056">RFC5056</a>] Williams, N., "On the Use of Channel Bindings to Secure |
| 1047 |
Channels", <a href="./rfc5056">RFC 5056</a>, November 2007. |
| 1048 |
|
| 1049 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5246">RFC5246</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security |
| 1050 |
(TLS) Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, August 2008. |
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6030">RFC6030</a>] Hoyer, P., Pei, M., and S. Machani, "Portable Symmetric |
| 1053 |
Key Container (PSKC)", <a href="./rfc6030">RFC 6030</a>, October 2010. |
| 1054 |
|
| 1055 |
[<a id="ref-UT">UT</a>] Wikipedia, "Unix time", |
| 1056 |
<<a href="http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time">http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Unix_time</a>>. |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Reference Implementation</span> |
| 1066 |
|
| 1067 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
/** |
| 1070 |
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as |
| 1071 |
authors of the code. All rights reserved. |
| 1072 |
|
| 1073 |
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 1074 |
modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license |
| 1075 |
terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in <a href="#section-4">Section</a> |
| 1076 |
<a href="#section-4">4</a>.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
| 1077 |
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>). |
| 1078 |
*/ |
| 1079 |
|
| 1080 |
import javax.crypto.Mac; |
| 1081 |
import javax.crypto.spec.SecretKeySpec; |
| 1082 |
import java.math.BigInteger; |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
/** |
| 1085 |
* This an example implementation of OCRA. |
| 1086 |
* Visit www.openauthentication.org for more information. |
| 1087 |
* |
| 1088 |
* @author Johan Rydell, PortWise |
| 1089 |
*/ |
| 1090 |
public class OCRA { |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
private OCRA() {} |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
/** |
| 1095 |
* This method uses the JCE to provide the crypto |
| 1096 |
* algorithm. |
| 1097 |
* HMAC computes a Hashed Message Authentication Code with the |
| 1098 |
* crypto hash algorithm as a parameter. |
| 1099 |
* |
| 1100 |
* @param crypto the crypto algorithm (HmacSHA1, HmacSHA256, |
| 1101 |
* HmacSHA512) |
| 1102 |
* @param keyBytes the bytes to use for the HMAC key |
| 1103 |
* @param text the message or text to be authenticated. |
| 1104 |
*/ |
| 1105 |
|
| 1106 |
private static byte[] hmac_sha1(String crypto, |
| 1107 |
byte[] keyBytes, byte[] text){ |
| 1108 |
Mac hmac = null; |
| 1109 |
try { |
| 1110 |
hmac = Mac.getInstance(crypto); |
| 1111 |
SecretKeySpec macKey = |
| 1112 |
new SecretKeySpec(keyBytes, "RAW"); |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
hmac.init(macKey); |
| 1122 |
return hmac.doFinal(text); |
| 1123 |
} catch (Exception e) { |
| 1124 |
e.printStackTrace(); |
| 1125 |
} |
| 1126 |
return null; |
| 1127 |
} |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
private static final int[] DIGITS_POWER |
| 1131 |
// 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 |
| 1132 |
= {1,10,100,1000,10000,100000,1000000,10000000,100000000 }; |
| 1133 |
|
| 1134 |
/** |
| 1135 |
* This method converts HEX string to Byte[] |
| 1136 |
* |
| 1137 |
* @param hex the HEX string |
| 1138 |
* |
| 1139 |
* @return A byte array |
| 1140 |
*/ |
| 1141 |
private static byte[] hexStr2Bytes(String hex){ |
| 1142 |
// Adding one byte to get the right conversion |
| 1143 |
// values starting with "0" can be converted |
| 1144 |
byte[] bArray = new BigInteger("10" + hex,16).toByteArray(); |
| 1145 |
|
| 1146 |
// Copy all the REAL bytes, not the "first" |
| 1147 |
byte[] ret = new byte[bArray.length - 1]; |
| 1148 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 1, ret, 0, ret.length); |
| 1149 |
return ret; |
| 1150 |
} |
| 1151 |
|
| 1152 |
|
| 1153 |
/** |
| 1154 |
* This method generates an OCRA HOTP value for the given |
| 1155 |
* set of parameters. |
| 1156 |
* |
| 1157 |
* @param ocraSuite the OCRA Suite |
| 1158 |
* @param key the shared secret, HEX encoded |
| 1159 |
* @param counter the counter that changes on a per use |
| 1160 |
* basis, HEX encoded |
| 1161 |
* @param question the challenge question, HEX encoded |
| 1162 |
* @param password a password that can be used, HEX encoded |
| 1163 |
* @param sessionInformation Static information that identifies |
| 1164 |
* the current session, Hex encoded |
| 1165 |
* @param timeStamp a value that reflects a time |
| 1166 |
* |
| 1167 |
* @return A numeric String in base 10 that includes |
| 1168 |
* {@link truncationDigits} digits |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
*/ |
| 1178 |
static public String generateOCRA(String ocraSuite, |
| 1179 |
String key, |
| 1180 |
String counter, |
| 1181 |
String question, |
| 1182 |
String password, |
| 1183 |
String sessionInformation, |
| 1184 |
String timeStamp){ |
| 1185 |
|
| 1186 |
int codeDigits = 0; |
| 1187 |
String crypto = ""; |
| 1188 |
String result = null; |
| 1189 |
int ocraSuiteLength = (ocraSuite.getBytes()).length; |
| 1190 |
int counterLength = 0; |
| 1191 |
int questionLength = 0; |
| 1192 |
int passwordLength = 0; |
| 1193 |
int sessionInformationLength = 0; |
| 1194 |
int timeStampLength = 0; |
| 1195 |
|
| 1196 |
// The OCRASuites components |
| 1197 |
String CryptoFunction = ocraSuite.split(":")[1]; |
| 1198 |
String DataInput = ocraSuite.split(":")[2]; |
| 1199 |
|
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
if(CryptoFunction.toLowerCase().indexOf("sha1") > 1) |
| 1202 |
crypto = "HmacSHA1"; |
| 1203 |
if(CryptoFunction.toLowerCase().indexOf("sha256") > 1) |
| 1204 |
crypto = "HmacSHA256"; |
| 1205 |
if(CryptoFunction.toLowerCase().indexOf("sha512") > 1) |
| 1206 |
crypto = "HmacSHA512"; |
| 1207 |
|
| 1208 |
// How many digits should we return |
| 1209 |
codeDigits = Integer.decode(CryptoFunction.substring( |
| 1210 |
CryptoFunction.lastIndexOf("-")+1)); |
| 1211 |
|
| 1212 |
// The size of the byte array message to be encrypted |
| 1213 |
// Counter |
| 1214 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().startsWith("c")) { |
| 1215 |
// Fix the length of the HEX string |
| 1216 |
while(counter.length() < 16) |
| 1217 |
counter = "0" + counter; |
| 1218 |
counterLength=8; |
| 1219 |
} |
| 1220 |
// Question - always 128 bytes |
| 1221 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().startsWith("q") || |
| 1222 |
(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("-q") >= 0)) { |
| 1223 |
while(question.length() < 256) |
| 1224 |
question = question + "0"; |
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
questionLength=128; |
| 1234 |
} |
| 1235 |
|
| 1236 |
// Password - sha1 |
| 1237 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("psha1") > 1){ |
| 1238 |
while(password.length() < 40) |
| 1239 |
password = "0" + password; |
| 1240 |
passwordLength=20; |
| 1241 |
} |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
// Password - sha256 |
| 1244 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("psha256") > 1){ |
| 1245 |
while(password.length() < 64) |
| 1246 |
password = "0" + password; |
| 1247 |
passwordLength=32; |
| 1248 |
} |
| 1249 |
|
| 1250 |
// Password - sha512 |
| 1251 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("psha512") > 1){ |
| 1252 |
while(password.length() < 128) |
| 1253 |
password = "0" + password; |
| 1254 |
passwordLength=64; |
| 1255 |
} |
| 1256 |
|
| 1257 |
// sessionInformation - s064 |
| 1258 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("s064") > 1){ |
| 1259 |
while(sessionInformation.length() < 128) |
| 1260 |
sessionInformation = "0" + sessionInformation; |
| 1261 |
sessionInformationLength=64; |
| 1262 |
} |
| 1263 |
|
| 1264 |
// sessionInformation - s128 |
| 1265 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("s128") > 1){ |
| 1266 |
while(sessionInformation.length() < 256) |
| 1267 |
sessionInformation = "0" + sessionInformation; |
| 1268 |
sessionInformationLength=128; |
| 1269 |
} |
| 1270 |
|
| 1271 |
// sessionInformation - s256 |
| 1272 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("s256") > 1){ |
| 1273 |
while(sessionInformation.length() < 512) |
| 1274 |
sessionInformation = "0" + sessionInformation; |
| 1275 |
sessionInformationLength=256; |
| 1276 |
} |
| 1277 |
|
| 1278 |
// sessionInformation - s512 |
| 1279 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("s512") > 1){ |
| 1280 |
while(sessionInformation.length() < 1024) |
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
sessionInformation = "0" + sessionInformation; |
| 1290 |
sessionInformationLength=512; |
| 1291 |
} |
| 1292 |
|
| 1293 |
// TimeStamp |
| 1294 |
if(DataInput.toLowerCase().startsWith("t") || |
| 1295 |
(DataInput.toLowerCase().indexOf("-t") > 1)){ |
| 1296 |
while(timeStamp.length() < 16) |
| 1297 |
timeStamp = "0" + timeStamp; |
| 1298 |
timeStampLength=8; |
| 1299 |
} |
| 1300 |
|
| 1301 |
// Remember to add "1" for the "00" byte delimiter |
| 1302 |
byte[] msg = new byte[ocraSuiteLength + |
| 1303 |
counterLength + |
| 1304 |
questionLength + |
| 1305 |
passwordLength + |
| 1306 |
sessionInformationLength + |
| 1307 |
timeStampLength + |
| 1308 |
1]; |
| 1309 |
|
| 1310 |
|
| 1311 |
// Put the bytes of "ocraSuite" parameters into the message |
| 1312 |
byte[] bArray = ocraSuite.getBytes(); |
| 1313 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 0, msg, 0, bArray.length); |
| 1314 |
|
| 1315 |
// Delimiter |
| 1316 |
msg[bArray.length] = 0x00; |
| 1317 |
|
| 1318 |
// Put the bytes of "Counter" to the message |
| 1319 |
// Input is HEX encoded |
| 1320 |
if(counterLength > 0 ){ |
| 1321 |
bArray = hexStr2Bytes(counter); |
| 1322 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 0, msg, ocraSuiteLength + 1, |
| 1323 |
bArray.length); |
| 1324 |
} |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
|
| 1327 |
// Put the bytes of "question" to the message |
| 1328 |
// Input is text encoded |
| 1329 |
if(questionLength > 0 ){ |
| 1330 |
bArray = hexStr2Bytes(question); |
| 1331 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 0, msg, ocraSuiteLength + 1 + |
| 1332 |
counterLength, bArray.length); |
| 1333 |
} |
| 1334 |
|
| 1335 |
// Put the bytes of "password" to the message |
| 1336 |
// Input is HEX encoded |
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
if(passwordLength > 0){ |
| 1346 |
bArray = hexStr2Bytes(password); |
| 1347 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 0, msg, ocraSuiteLength + 1 + |
| 1348 |
counterLength + questionLength, bArray.length); |
| 1349 |
|
| 1350 |
} |
| 1351 |
|
| 1352 |
// Put the bytes of "sessionInformation" to the message |
| 1353 |
// Input is text encoded |
| 1354 |
if(sessionInformationLength > 0 ){ |
| 1355 |
bArray = hexStr2Bytes(sessionInformation); |
| 1356 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 0, msg, ocraSuiteLength + 1 + |
| 1357 |
counterLength + questionLength + |
| 1358 |
passwordLength, bArray.length); |
| 1359 |
} |
| 1360 |
|
| 1361 |
// Put the bytes of "time" to the message |
| 1362 |
// Input is text value of minutes |
| 1363 |
if(timeStampLength > 0){ |
| 1364 |
bArray = hexStr2Bytes(timeStamp); |
| 1365 |
System.arraycopy(bArray, 0, msg, ocraSuiteLength + 1 + |
| 1366 |
counterLength + questionLength + |
| 1367 |
passwordLength + sessionInformationLength, |
| 1368 |
bArray.length); |
| 1369 |
} |
| 1370 |
|
| 1371 |
bArray = hexStr2Bytes(key); |
| 1372 |
|
| 1373 |
byte[] hash = hmac_sha1(crypto, bArray, msg); |
| 1374 |
|
| 1375 |
// put selected bytes into result int |
| 1376 |
int offset = hash[hash.length - 1] & 0xf; |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
int binary = |
| 1379 |
((hash[offset] & 0x7f) << 24) | |
| 1380 |
((hash[offset + 1] & 0xff) << 16) | |
| 1381 |
((hash[offset + 2] & 0xff) << 8) | |
| 1382 |
(hash[offset + 3] & 0xff); |
| 1383 |
|
| 1384 |
int otp = binary % DIGITS_POWER[codeDigits]; |
| 1385 |
|
| 1386 |
result = Integer.toString(otp); |
| 1387 |
while (result.length() < codeDigits) { |
| 1388 |
result = "0" + result; |
| 1389 |
} |
| 1390 |
return result; |
| 1391 |
} |
| 1392 |
} |
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 1402 |
|
| 1403 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-B" href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>. Test Vectors Generation</span> |
| 1404 |
|
| 1405 |
<CODE BEGINS> |
| 1406 |
|
| 1407 |
/** |
| 1408 |
Copyright (c) 2011 IETF Trust and the persons identified as |
| 1409 |
authors of the code. All rights reserved. |
| 1410 |
|
| 1411 |
Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without |
| 1412 |
modification, is permitted pursuant to, and subject to the license |
| 1413 |
terms contained in, the Simplified BSD License set forth in <a href="#section-4">Section</a> |
| 1414 |
<a href="#section-4">4</a>.c of the IETF Trust's Legal Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
| 1415 |
(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>). |
| 1416 |
*/ |
| 1417 |
|
| 1418 |
import java.math.BigInteger; |
| 1419 |
import java.util.*; |
| 1420 |
import java.text.DateFormat; |
| 1421 |
import java.text.SimpleDateFormat; |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
public class TestOCRA { |
| 1424 |
|
| 1425 |
public static String asHex (byte buf[]) { |
| 1426 |
StringBuffer strbuf = new StringBuffer(buf.length * 2); |
| 1427 |
int i; |
| 1428 |
|
| 1429 |
for (i = 0; i < buf.length; i++) { |
| 1430 |
if (((int) buf[i] & 0xff) < 0x10) |
| 1431 |
strbuf.append("0"); |
| 1432 |
strbuf.append(Long.toString((int) buf[i] & 0xff, 16)); |
| 1433 |
} |
| 1434 |
return strbuf.toString(); |
| 1435 |
} |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
/** |
| 1438 |
* @param args |
| 1439 |
*/ |
| 1440 |
public static void main(String[] args) { |
| 1441 |
|
| 1442 |
String ocra = ""; |
| 1443 |
String seed = ""; |
| 1444 |
String ocraSuite = ""; |
| 1445 |
String counter = ""; |
| 1446 |
String password = ""; |
| 1447 |
String sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1448 |
String question = ""; |
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
String qHex = ""; |
| 1458 |
String timeStamp = ""; |
| 1459 |
|
| 1460 |
// PASS1234 is SHA1 hash of "1234" |
| 1461 |
String PASS1234 = "7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220"; |
| 1462 |
|
| 1463 |
String SEED = "3132333435363738393031323334353637383930"; |
| 1464 |
String SEED32 = "31323334353637383930313233343536373839" + |
| 1465 |
"30313233343536373839303132"; |
| 1466 |
String SEED64 = "31323334353637383930313233343536373839" + |
| 1467 |
"3031323334353637383930313233343536373839" + |
| 1468 |
"3031323334353637383930313233343536373839" + |
| 1469 |
"3031323334"; |
| 1470 |
int STOP = 5; |
| 1471 |
|
| 1472 |
Date myDate = Calendar.getInstance().getTime(); |
| 1473 |
BigInteger b = new BigInteger("0"); |
| 1474 |
String sDate = "Mar 25 2008, 12:06:30 GMT"; |
| 1475 |
|
| 1476 |
try{ |
| 1477 |
DateFormat df = |
| 1478 |
new SimpleDateFormat("MMM dd yyyy, HH:mm:ss zzz"); |
| 1479 |
myDate = df.parse(sDate); |
| 1480 |
b = new BigInteger("0" + myDate.getTime()); |
| 1481 |
b = b.divide(new BigInteger("60000")); |
| 1482 |
|
| 1483 |
|
| 1484 |
System.out.println("Time of \"" + sDate + "\" is in"); |
| 1485 |
System.out.println("milli sec: " + myDate.getTime()); |
| 1486 |
System.out.println("minutes: " + b.toString()); |
| 1487 |
System.out.println("minutes (HEX encoded): " |
| 1488 |
+ b.toString(16).toUpperCase()); |
| 1489 |
System.out.println("Time of \"" + sDate |
| 1490 |
+ "\" is the same as this localized"); |
| 1491 |
System.out.println("time, \"" |
| 1492 |
+ new Date(myDate.getTime()) + "\""); |
| 1493 |
|
| 1494 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1495 |
System.out.println("Standard 20Byte key: " + |
| 1496 |
"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930"); |
| 1497 |
System.out.println("Standard 32Byte key: " + |
| 1498 |
"3132333435363738393031323334353637383930"); |
| 1499 |
System.out.println(" " + |
| 1500 |
"313233343536373839303132"); |
| 1501 |
System.out.println("Standard 64Byte key: 313233343536373839" |
| 1502 |
+ "3031323334353637383930"); |
| 1503 |
System.out.println(" 313233343536373839" |
| 1504 |
+ "3031323334353637383930"); |
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
System.out.println(" 313233343536373839" |
| 1514 |
+ "3031323334353637383930"); |
| 1515 |
System.out.println(" 31323334"); |
| 1516 |
|
| 1517 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1518 |
System.out.println("Plain challenge response"); |
| 1519 |
System.out.println("========================"); |
| 1520 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1521 |
|
| 1522 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA1-6:QN08"; |
| 1523 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1524 |
System.out.println("======================="); |
| 1525 |
seed = SEED; |
| 1526 |
counter = ""; |
| 1527 |
question = ""; |
| 1528 |
password = ""; |
| 1529 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1530 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1531 |
for(int i=0; i < 10; i++){ |
| 1532 |
question = "" + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i; |
| 1533 |
qHex = new String((new BigInteger(question,10)) |
| 1534 |
.toString(16)).toUpperCase(); |
| 1535 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter, |
| 1536 |
qHex,password, |
| 1537 |
sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1538 |
System.out.println("Key: Standard 20Byte Q: " |
| 1539 |
+ question + " OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1540 |
} |
| 1541 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1542 |
|
| 1543 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:C-QN08-PSHA1"; |
| 1544 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1545 |
System.out.println("================================="); |
| 1546 |
seed = SEED32; |
| 1547 |
counter = ""; |
| 1548 |
question = "12345678"; |
| 1549 |
password = PASS1234; |
| 1550 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1551 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1552 |
for(int i=0; i < 10; i++){ |
| 1553 |
counter = "" + i; |
| 1554 |
qHex = new String((new BigInteger(question,10)) |
| 1555 |
.toString(16)).toUpperCase(); |
| 1556 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter, |
| 1557 |
qHex,password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1558 |
System.out.println("Key: Standard 32Byte C: " |
| 1559 |
+ counter + " Q: " |
| 1560 |
+ question + " PIN(1234): "); |
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 28]</span></pre> |
| 1565 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span> |
| 1566 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
System.out.println(password + " OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1570 |
} |
| 1571 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1572 |
|
| 1573 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QN08-PSHA1"; |
| 1574 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1575 |
System.out.println("==============================="); |
| 1576 |
seed = SEED32; |
| 1577 |
counter = ""; |
| 1578 |
question = ""; |
| 1579 |
password = PASS1234; |
| 1580 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1581 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1582 |
for(int i=0; i < STOP; i++){ |
| 1583 |
question = "" + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i; |
| 1584 |
|
| 1585 |
qHex = new String((new BigInteger(question,10)) |
| 1586 |
.toString(16)).toUpperCase(); |
| 1587 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter, |
| 1588 |
qHex,password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1589 |
System.out.println("Key: Standard 32Byte Q: " |
| 1590 |
+ question + " PIN(1234): "); |
| 1591 |
System.out.println(password + " OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1592 |
} |
| 1593 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1594 |
|
| 1595 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08"; |
| 1596 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1597 |
System.out.println("==========================="); |
| 1598 |
seed = SEED64; |
| 1599 |
counter = ""; |
| 1600 |
question = ""; |
| 1601 |
password = ""; |
| 1602 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1603 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1604 |
for(int i=0; i < 10; i++){ |
| 1605 |
question = "" + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i; |
| 1606 |
qHex = new String((new BigInteger(question,10)) |
| 1607 |
.toString(16)).toUpperCase(); |
| 1608 |
counter = "0000" + i; |
| 1609 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter, |
| 1610 |
qHex,password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1611 |
System.out.println("Key: Standard 64Byte C: " |
| 1612 |
+ counter + " Q: " |
| 1613 |
+ question + " OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1614 |
} |
| 1615 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 29]</span></pre> |
| 1621 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span> |
| 1622 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1623 |
|
| 1624 |
|
| 1625 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QN08-T1M"; |
| 1626 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1627 |
System.out.println("============================="); |
| 1628 |
seed = SEED64; |
| 1629 |
counter = ""; |
| 1630 |
question = ""; |
| 1631 |
password = ""; |
| 1632 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1633 |
timeStamp = b.toString(16); |
| 1634 |
for(int i=0; i < STOP; i++){ |
| 1635 |
question = "" + i + i + i + i + i + i + i + i; |
| 1636 |
counter = ""; |
| 1637 |
qHex = new String((new BigInteger(question,10)) |
| 1638 |
.toString(16)).toUpperCase(); |
| 1639 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter, |
| 1640 |
qHex,password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1641 |
|
| 1642 |
System.out.println("Key: Standard 64Byte Q: " |
| 1643 |
+ question +" T: " |
| 1644 |
+ timeStamp.toUpperCase() |
| 1645 |
+ " OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1646 |
} |
| 1647 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1648 |
|
| 1649 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1650 |
System.out.println("Mutual Challenge Response"); |
| 1651 |
System.out.println("========================="); |
| 1652 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1653 |
|
| 1654 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08"; |
| 1655 |
System.out.println("OCRASuite (server computation) = " |
| 1656 |
+ ocraSuite); |
| 1657 |
System.out.println("OCRASuite (client computation) = " |
| 1658 |
+ ocraSuite); |
| 1659 |
System.out.println("===============================" + |
| 1660 |
"==========================="); |
| 1661 |
seed = SEED32; |
| 1662 |
counter = ""; |
| 1663 |
question = ""; |
| 1664 |
password = ""; |
| 1665 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1666 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1667 |
for(int i=0; i < STOP; i++){ |
| 1668 |
question = "CLI2222" + i + "SRV1111" + i; |
| 1669 |
qHex = asHex(question.getBytes()); |
| 1670 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter,qHex, |
| 1671 |
password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1672 |
System.out.println( |
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 30]</span></pre> |
| 1677 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span> |
| 1678 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1679 |
|
| 1680 |
|
| 1681 |
"(server)Key: Standard 32Byte Q: " |
| 1682 |
+ question + " OCRA: " |
| 1683 |
+ ocra); |
| 1684 |
question = "SRV1111" + i + "CLI2222" + i; |
| 1685 |
qHex = asHex(question.getBytes()); |
| 1686 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter,qHex, |
| 1687 |
password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1688 |
System.out.println( |
| 1689 |
"(client)Key: Standard 32Byte Q: " |
| 1690 |
+ question + " OCRA: " |
| 1691 |
+ ocra); |
| 1692 |
} |
| 1693 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1694 |
|
| 1695 |
String ocraSuite1 = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA08"; |
| 1696 |
String ocraSuite2 = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA08-PSHA1"; |
| 1697 |
System.out.println("OCRASuite (server computation) = " |
| 1698 |
+ ocraSuite1); |
| 1699 |
System.out.println("OCRASuite (client computation) = " |
| 1700 |
+ ocraSuite2); |
| 1701 |
System.out.println("===============================" + |
| 1702 |
"================================="); |
| 1703 |
ocraSuite = ""; |
| 1704 |
seed = SEED64; |
| 1705 |
counter = ""; |
| 1706 |
question = ""; |
| 1707 |
password = ""; |
| 1708 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1709 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1710 |
for(int i=0; i < STOP; i++){ |
| 1711 |
ocraSuite = ocraSuite1; |
| 1712 |
question = "CLI2222" + i + "SRV1111" + i; |
| 1713 |
qHex = asHex(question.getBytes()); |
| 1714 |
password = ""; |
| 1715 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter,qHex, |
| 1716 |
password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1717 |
System.out.println( |
| 1718 |
"(server)Key: Standard 64Byte Q: " |
| 1719 |
+ question + " OCRA: " |
| 1720 |
+ ocra); |
| 1721 |
ocraSuite = ocraSuite2; |
| 1722 |
question = "SRV1111" + i + "CLI2222" + i; |
| 1723 |
qHex = asHex(question.getBytes()); |
| 1724 |
password = PASS1234; |
| 1725 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter,qHex, |
| 1726 |
password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1727 |
System.out.println("(client)Key: Standard 64Byte Q: " |
| 1728 |
+ question); |
| 1729 |
|
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 31]</span></pre> |
| 1733 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span> |
| 1734 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
System.out.println("P: " + password.toUpperCase() |
| 1738 |
+ " OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1739 |
} |
| 1740 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1741 |
|
| 1742 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1743 |
System.out.println("Plain Signature"); |
| 1744 |
System.out.println("==============="); |
| 1745 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1746 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08"; |
| 1747 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1748 |
System.out.println("========================="); |
| 1749 |
seed = SEED32; |
| 1750 |
counter = ""; |
| 1751 |
question = ""; |
| 1752 |
password = ""; |
| 1753 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1754 |
timeStamp = ""; |
| 1755 |
for(int i=0; i < STOP; i++){ |
| 1756 |
question = "SIG1" + i + "000"; |
| 1757 |
qHex = asHex(question.getBytes()); |
| 1758 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter,qHex, |
| 1759 |
password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1760 |
System.out.println( |
| 1761 |
"Key: Standard 32Byte Q(Signature challenge): " |
| 1762 |
+ question); |
| 1763 |
System.out.println(" OCRA: " + ocra); |
| 1764 |
} |
| 1765 |
System.out.println(); |
| 1766 |
|
| 1767 |
ocraSuite = "OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA10-T1M"; |
| 1768 |
System.out.println(ocraSuite); |
| 1769 |
System.out.println("============================="); |
| 1770 |
seed = SEED64; |
| 1771 |
counter = ""; |
| 1772 |
question = ""; |
| 1773 |
password = ""; |
| 1774 |
sessionInformation = ""; |
| 1775 |
timeStamp = b.toString(16); |
| 1776 |
for(int i=0; i < STOP; i++){ |
| 1777 |
question = "SIG1" + i + "00000"; |
| 1778 |
qHex = asHex(question.getBytes()); |
| 1779 |
ocra = OCRA.generateOCRA(ocraSuite,seed,counter, |
| 1780 |
qHex,password,sessionInformation,timeStamp); |
| 1781 |
System.out.println( |
| 1782 |
"Key: Standard 64Byte Q(Signature challenge): " |
| 1783 |
+ question); |
| 1784 |
System.out.println(" T: " |
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 32]</span></pre> |
| 1789 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span> |
| 1790 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 |
+ timeStamp.toUpperCase() + " OCRA: " |
| 1794 |
+ ocra); |
| 1795 |
} |
| 1796 |
|
| 1797 |
}catch (Exception e){ |
| 1798 |
System.out.println("Error : " + e); |
| 1799 |
} |
| 1800 |
} |
| 1801 |
} |
| 1802 |
<CODE ENDS> |
| 1803 |
|
| 1804 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C" href="#appendix-C">Appendix C</a>. Test Vectors</span> |
| 1805 |
|
| 1806 |
This section provides test values that can be used for the OCRA |
| 1807 |
interoperability test. |
| 1808 |
|
| 1809 |
Standard 20Byte key: |
| 1810 |
|
| 1811 |
3132333435363738393031323334353637383930 |
| 1812 |
|
| 1813 |
Standard 32Byte key: |
| 1814 |
|
| 1815 |
3132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343536373839303132 |
| 1816 |
|
| 1817 |
Standard 64Byte key: |
| 1818 |
|
| 1819 |
313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334353637383930313233343 |
| 1820 |
53637383930313233343536373839303132333435363738393031323334 |
| 1821 |
|
| 1822 |
PIN (1234) SHA1 hash value: |
| 1823 |
|
| 1824 |
7110eda4d09e062aa5e4a390b0a572ac0d2c0220 |
| 1825 |
|
| 1826 |
|
| 1827 |
|
| 1828 |
|
| 1829 |
|
| 1830 |
|
| 1831 |
|
| 1832 |
|
| 1833 |
|
| 1834 |
|
| 1835 |
|
| 1836 |
|
| 1837 |
|
| 1838 |
|
| 1839 |
|
| 1840 |
|
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 33]</span></pre> |
| 1845 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span> |
| 1846 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C.1" href="#appendix-C.1">C.1</a>. One-Way Challenge Response</span> |
| 1850 |
|
| 1851 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 1852 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1853 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 1854 |
| Standard 20Byte | 00000000 | 237653 | |
| 1855 |
| Standard 20Byte | 11111111 | 243178 | |
| 1856 |
| Standard 20Byte | 22222222 | 653583 | |
| 1857 |
| Standard 20Byte | 33333333 | 740991 | |
| 1858 |
| Standard 20Byte | 44444444 | 608993 | |
| 1859 |
| Standard 20Byte | 55555555 | 388898 | |
| 1860 |
| Standard 20Byte | 66666666 | 816933 | |
| 1861 |
| Standard 20Byte | 77777777 | 224598 | |
| 1862 |
| Standard 20Byte | 88888888 | 750600 | |
| 1863 |
| Standard 20Byte | 99999999 | 294470 | |
| 1864 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 1865 |
|
| 1866 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA1-6:QN08 |
| 1867 |
|
| 1868 |
+-----------------+---+----------+------------+ |
| 1869 |
| Key | C | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1870 |
+-----------------+---+----------+------------+ |
| 1871 |
| Standard 32Byte | 0 | 12345678 | 65347737 | |
| 1872 |
| Standard 32Byte | 1 | 12345678 | 86775851 | |
| 1873 |
| Standard 32Byte | 2 | 12345678 | 78192410 | |
| 1874 |
| Standard 32Byte | 3 | 12345678 | 71565254 | |
| 1875 |
| Standard 32Byte | 4 | 12345678 | 10104329 | |
| 1876 |
| Standard 32Byte | 5 | 12345678 | 65983500 | |
| 1877 |
| Standard 32Byte | 6 | 12345678 | 70069104 | |
| 1878 |
| Standard 32Byte | 7 | 12345678 | 91771096 | |
| 1879 |
| Standard 32Byte | 8 | 12345678 | 75011558 | |
| 1880 |
| Standard 32Byte | 9 | 12345678 | 08522129 | |
| 1881 |
+-----------------+---+----------+------------+ |
| 1882 |
|
| 1883 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:C-QN08-PSHA1 |
| 1884 |
|
| 1885 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 1886 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1887 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 1888 |
| Standard 32Byte | 00000000 | 83238735 | |
| 1889 |
| Standard 32Byte | 11111111 | 01501458 | |
| 1890 |
| Standard 32Byte | 22222222 | 17957585 | |
| 1891 |
| Standard 32Byte | 33333333 | 86776967 | |
| 1892 |
| Standard 32Byte | 44444444 | 86807031 | |
| 1893 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 1894 |
|
| 1895 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QN08-PSHA1 |
| 1896 |
|
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 34]</span></pre> |
| 1901 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span> |
| 1902 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
+-----------------+-------+----------+------------+ |
| 1906 |
| Key | C | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1907 |
+-----------------+-------+----------+------------+ |
| 1908 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00000 | 00000000 | 07016083 | |
| 1909 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00001 | 11111111 | 63947962 | |
| 1910 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00002 | 22222222 | 70123924 | |
| 1911 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00003 | 33333333 | 25341727 | |
| 1912 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00004 | 44444444 | 33203315 | |
| 1913 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00005 | 55555555 | 34205738 | |
| 1914 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00006 | 66666666 | 44343969 | |
| 1915 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00007 | 77777777 | 51946085 | |
| 1916 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00008 | 88888888 | 20403879 | |
| 1917 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00009 | 99999999 | 31409299 | |
| 1918 |
+-----------------+-------+----------+------------+ |
| 1919 |
|
| 1920 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:C-QN08 |
| 1921 |
|
| 1922 |
+-----------------+----------+---------+------------+ |
| 1923 |
| Key | Q | T | OCRA Value | |
| 1924 |
+-----------------+----------+---------+------------+ |
| 1925 |
| Standard 64Byte | 00000000 | 132d0b6 | 95209754 | |
| 1926 |
| Standard 64Byte | 11111111 | 132d0b6 | 55907591 | |
| 1927 |
| Standard 64Byte | 22222222 | 132d0b6 | 22048402 | |
| 1928 |
| Standard 64Byte | 33333333 | 132d0b6 | 24218844 | |
| 1929 |
| Standard 64Byte | 44444444 | 132d0b6 | 36209546 | |
| 1930 |
+-----------------+----------+---------+------------+ |
| 1931 |
|
| 1932 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QN08-T1M |
| 1933 |
|
| 1934 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C.2" href="#appendix-C.2">C.2</a>. Mutual Challenge-Response</span> |
| 1935 |
|
| 1936 |
OCRASuite (server computation) = OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08 |
| 1937 |
|
| 1938 |
OCRASuite (client computation) = OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08 |
| 1939 |
|
| 1940 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1941 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1942 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1943 |
| Standard 32Byte | CLI22220SRV11110 | 28247970 | |
| 1944 |
| Standard 32Byte | CLI22221SRV11111 | 01984843 | |
| 1945 |
| Standard 32Byte | CLI22222SRV11112 | 65387857 | |
| 1946 |
| Standard 32Byte | CLI22223SRV11113 | 03351211 | |
| 1947 |
| Standard 32Byte | CLI22224SRV11114 | 83412541 | |
| 1948 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1949 |
|
| 1950 |
Server -- OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08 |
| 1951 |
|
| 1952 |
|
| 1953 |
|
| 1954 |
|
| 1955 |
|
| 1956 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 35]</span></pre> |
| 1957 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span> |
| 1958 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
|
| 1961 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1962 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1963 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1964 |
| Standard 32Byte | SRV11110CLI22220 | 15510767 | |
| 1965 |
| Standard 32Byte | SRV11111CLI22221 | 90175646 | |
| 1966 |
| Standard 32Byte | SRV11112CLI22222 | 33777207 | |
| 1967 |
| Standard 32Byte | SRV11113CLI22223 | 95285278 | |
| 1968 |
| Standard 32Byte | SRV11114CLI22224 | 28934924 | |
| 1969 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1970 |
|
| 1971 |
Client -- OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08 |
| 1972 |
|
| 1973 |
OCRASuite (server computation) = OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA08 |
| 1974 |
|
| 1975 |
OCRASuite (client computation) = OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA08-PSHA1 |
| 1976 |
|
| 1977 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1978 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1979 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1980 |
| Standard 64Byte | CLI22220SRV11110 | 79496648 | |
| 1981 |
| Standard 64Byte | CLI22221SRV11111 | 76831980 | |
| 1982 |
| Standard 64Byte | CLI22222SRV11112 | 12250499 | |
| 1983 |
| Standard 64Byte | CLI22223SRV11113 | 90856481 | |
| 1984 |
| Standard 64Byte | CLI22224SRV11114 | 12761449 | |
| 1985 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1986 |
|
| 1987 |
Server -- OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA08 |
| 1988 |
|
| 1989 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1990 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 1991 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1992 |
| Standard 64Byte | SRV11110CLI22220 | 18806276 | |
| 1993 |
| Standard 64Byte | SRV11111CLI22221 | 70020315 | |
| 1994 |
| Standard 64Byte | SRV11112CLI22222 | 01600026 | |
| 1995 |
| Standard 64Byte | SRV11113CLI22223 | 18951020 | |
| 1996 |
| Standard 64Byte | SRV11114CLI22224 | 32528969 | |
| 1997 |
+-----------------+------------------+------------+ |
| 1998 |
|
| 1999 |
Client -- OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA08-PSHA1 |
| 2000 |
|
| 2001 |
|
| 2002 |
|
| 2003 |
|
| 2004 |
|
| 2005 |
|
| 2006 |
|
| 2007 |
|
| 2008 |
|
| 2009 |
|
| 2010 |
|
| 2011 |
|
| 2012 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 36]</span></pre> |
| 2013 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span> |
| 2014 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
|
| 2017 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-C.3" href="#appendix-C.3">C.3</a>. Plain Signature</span> |
| 2018 |
|
| 2019 |
In this mode of operation, Q represents the signature challenge. |
| 2020 |
|
| 2021 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 2022 |
| Key | Q | OCRA Value | |
| 2023 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 2024 |
| Standard 32Byte | SIG10000 | 53095496 | |
| 2025 |
| Standard 32Byte | SIG11000 | 04110475 | |
| 2026 |
| Standard 32Byte | SIG12000 | 31331128 | |
| 2027 |
| Standard 32Byte | SIG13000 | 76028668 | |
| 2028 |
| Standard 32Byte | SIG14000 | 46554205 | |
| 2029 |
+-----------------+----------+------------+ |
| 2030 |
|
| 2031 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA256-8:QA08 |
| 2032 |
|
| 2033 |
+-----------------+------------+---------+------------+ |
| 2034 |
| Key | Q | T | OCRA Value | |
| 2035 |
+-----------------+------------+---------+------------+ |
| 2036 |
| Standard 64Byte | SIG1000000 | 132d0b6 | 77537423 | |
| 2037 |
| Standard 64Byte | SIG1100000 | 132d0b6 | 31970405 | |
| 2038 |
| Standard 64Byte | SIG1200000 | 132d0b6 | 10235557 | |
| 2039 |
| Standard 64Byte | SIG1300000 | 132d0b6 | 95213541 | |
| 2040 |
| Standard 64Byte | SIG1400000 | 132d0b6 | 65360607 | |
| 2041 |
+-----------------+------------+---------+------------+ |
| 2042 |
|
| 2043 |
OCRA-1:HOTP-SHA512-8:QA10-T1M |
| 2044 |
|
| 2045 |
|
| 2046 |
|
| 2047 |
|
| 2048 |
|
| 2049 |
|
| 2050 |
|
| 2051 |
|
| 2052 |
|
| 2053 |
|
| 2054 |
|
| 2055 |
|
| 2056 |
|
| 2057 |
|
| 2058 |
|
| 2059 |
|
| 2060 |
|
| 2061 |
|
| 2062 |
|
| 2063 |
|
| 2064 |
|
| 2065 |
|
| 2066 |
|
| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
<span class="grey">M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 37]</span></pre> |
| 2069 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span> |
| 2070 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc6287">RFC 6287</a> OCRA June 2011</span> |
| 2071 |
|
| 2072 |
|
| 2073 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 2074 |
|
| 2075 |
David M'Raihi |
| 2076 |
Verisign, Inc. |
| 2077 |
487 E. Middlefield Road |
| 2078 |
Mountain View, CA 94043 |
| 2079 |
USA |
| 2080 |
|
| 2081 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 2082 |
|
| 2083 |
|
| 2084 |
Johan Rydell |
| 2085 |
Portwise, Inc. |
| 2086 |
275 Hawthorne Ave, Suite 119 |
| 2087 |
Palo Alto, CA 94301 |
| 2088 |
USA |
| 2089 |
|
| 2090 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 2091 |
|
| 2092 |
|
| 2093 |
Siddharth Bajaj |
| 2094 |
Symantec Corp. |
| 2095 |
350 Ellis Street |
| 2096 |
Mountain View, CA 94043 |
| 2097 |
USA |
| 2098 |
|
| 2099 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 2100 |
|
| 2101 |
|
| 2102 |
Salah Machani |
| 2103 |
Diversinet Corp. |
| 2104 |
2225 Sheppard Avenue East, Suite 1801 |
| 2105 |
Toronto, Ontario M2J 5C2 |
| 2106 |
Canada |
| 2107 |
|
| 2108 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 2109 |
|
| 2110 |
|
| 2111 |
David Naccache |
| 2112 |
Ecole Normale Superieure |
| 2113 |
ENS DI, 45 rue d'Ulm |
| 2114 |
Paris, 75005 |
| 2115 |
France |
| 2116 |
|
| 2117 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 2118 |
|
| 2119 |
|
| 2120 |
|
| 2121 |
|
| 2122 |
|
| 2123 |
|
| 2124 |
M'Raihi, et al. Informational [Page 38] |
| 2125 |
</pre> |