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1 <pre>Network Working Group D. Harkins
2 Request for Comments: 2409 D. Carrel
3 Category: Standards Track cisco Systems
4 November 1998
5
6
7 <span class="h1">The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)</span>
8
9 Status of this Memo
10
11 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
12 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
13 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
14 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
15 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
16
17 Copyright Notice
18
19 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
20
21 Table Of Contents
22
23 <a href="#section-1">1</a> Abstract........................................................ <a href="#page-2">2</a>
24 <a href="#section-2">2</a> Discussion...................................................... <a href="#page-2">2</a>
25 <a href="#section-3">3</a> Terms and Definitions........................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a>
26 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> Requirements Terminology...................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a>
27 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Notation...................................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a>
28 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Perfect Forward Secrecty...................................... <a href="#page-5">5</a>
29 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a> Security Association.......................................... <a href="#page-5">5</a>
30 <a href="#section-4">4</a> Introduction.................................................... <a href="#page-5">5</a>
31 <a href="#section-5">5</a> Exchanges....................................................... <a href="#page-8">8</a>
32 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> Authentication with Digital Signatures........................ <a href="#page-10">10</a>
33 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> Authentication with Public Key Encryption..................... <a href="#page-12">12</a>
34 5.3 A Revised method of Authentication with Public Key Encryption. 13
35 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a> Authentication with a Pre-Shared Key.......................... <a href="#page-16">16</a>
36 <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a> Quick Mode.................................................... <a href="#page-16">16</a>
37 <a href="#section-5.6">5.6</a> New Group Mode................................................ <a href="#page-20">20</a>
38 <a href="#section-5.7">5.7</a> ISAKMP Informational Exchanges................................ <a href="#page-20">20</a>
39 <a href="#section-6">6</a> Oakley Groups................................................... <a href="#page-21">21</a>
40 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> First Oakley Group............................................ <a href="#page-21">21</a>
41 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a> Second Oakley Group........................................... <a href="#page-22">22</a>
42 <a href="#section-6.3">6.3</a> Third Oakley Group............................................ <a href="#page-22">22</a>
43 <a href="#section-6.4">6.4</a> Fourth Oakley Group........................................... <a href="#page-23">23</a>
44 <a href="#section-7">7</a> Payload Explosion of Complete Exchange.......................... <a href="#page-23">23</a>
45 <a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a> Phase 1 with Main Mode........................................ <a href="#page-23">23</a>
46 <a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a> Phase 2 with Quick Mode....................................... <a href="#page-25">25</a>
47 <a href="#section-8">8</a> Perfect Forward Secrecy Example................................. <a href="#page-27">27</a>
48 <a href="#section-9">9</a> Implementation Hints............................................ <a href="#page-27">27</a>
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
55
56
57 <a href="#section-10">10</a> Security Considerations........................................ <a href="#page-28">28</a>
58 <a href="#section-11">11</a> IANA Considerations............................................ <a href="#page-30">30</a>
59 <a href="#section-12">12</a> Acknowledgments................................................ <a href="#page-31">31</a>
60 <a href="#section-13">13</a> References..................................................... <a href="#page-31">31</a>
61 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>........................................................ <a href="#page-33">33</a>
62 <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>........................................................ <a href="#page-37">37</a>
63 Authors' Addresses................................................ <a href="#page-40">40</a>
64 Authors' Note..................................................... <a href="#page-40">40</a>
65 Full Copyright Statement.......................................... <a href="#page-41">41</a>
66
67 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Abstract</span>
68
69 ISAKMP ([<a href="#ref-MSST98" title="&quot;Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)&quot;">MSST98</a>]) provides a framework for authentication and key
70 exchange but does not define them. ISAKMP is designed to be key
71 exchange independant; that is, it is designed to support many
72 different key exchanges.
73
74 Oakley ([<a href="#ref-Orm96" title="&quot;The Oakley Key Determination Protocol&quot;">Orm96</a>]) describes a series of key exchanges-- called
75 "modes"-- and details the services provided by each (e.g. perfect
76 forward secrecy for keys, identity protection, and authentication).
77
78 SKEME ([<a href="#ref-SKEME" title="&quot;SKEME: A Versatile Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet&quot;">SKEME</a>]) describes a versatile key exchange technique which
79 provides anonymity, repudiability, and quick key refreshment.
80
81 This document describes a protocol using part of Oakley and part of
82 SKEME in conjunction with ISAKMP to obtain authenticated keying
83 material for use with ISAKMP, and for other security associations
84 such as AH and ESP for the IETF IPsec DOI.
85
86 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Discussion</span>
87
88 This memo describes a hybrid protocol. The purpose is to negotiate,
89 and provide authenticated keying material for, security associations
90 in a protected manner.
91
92 Processes which implement this memo can be used for negotiating
93 virtual private networks (VPNs) and also for providing a remote user
94 from a remote site (whose IP address need not be known beforehand)
95 access to a secure host or network.
96
97 Client negotiation is supported. Client mode is where the
98 negotiating parties are not the endpoints for which security
99 association negotiation is taking place. When used in client mode,
100 the identities of the end parties remain hidden.
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
111
112
113 This does not implement the entire Oakley protocol, but only a subset
114 necessary to satisfy its goals. It does not claim conformance or
115 compliance with the entire Oakley protocol nor is it dependant in any
116 way on the Oakley protocol.
117
118 Likewise, this does not implement the entire SKEME protocol, but only
119 the method of public key encryption for authentication and its
120 concept of fast re-keying using an exchange of nonces. This protocol
121 is not dependant in any way on the SKEME protocol.
122
123 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Terms and Definitions</span>
124
125 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> Requirements Terminology</span>
126
127 Keywords "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT" and
128 "MAY" that appear in this document are to be interpreted as described
129 in [<a href="#ref-Bra97" title="&quot;Key Words for use in RFCs to indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">Bra97</a>].
130
131 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Notation</span>
132
133 The following notation is used throughout this memo.
134
135 HDR is an ISAKMP header whose exchange type is the mode. When
136 writen as HDR* it indicates payload encryption.
137
138 SA is an SA negotiation payload with one or more proposals. An
139 initiator MAY provide multiple proposals for negotiation; a
140 responder MUST reply with only one.
141
142 &lt;P&gt;_b indicates the body of payload &lt;P&gt;-- the ISAKMP generic
143 vpayload is not included.
144
145 SAi_b is the entire body of the SA payload (minus the ISAKMP
146 generic header)-- i.e. the DOI, situation, all proposals and all
147 transforms offered by the Initiator.
148
149 CKY-I and CKY-R are the Initiator's cookie and the Responder's
150 cookie, respectively, from the ISAKMP header.
151
152 g^xi and g^xr are the Diffie-Hellman ([<a href="#ref-DH" title="&quot;New Directions in Cryptography&quot;">DH</a>]) public values of the
153 initiator and responder respectively.
154
155 g^xy is the Diffie-Hellman shared secret.
156
157 KE is the key exchange payload which contains the public
158 information exchanged in a Diffie-Hellman exchange. There is no
159 particular encoding (e.g. a TLV) used for the data of a KE payload.
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
167
168
169 Nx is the nonce payload; x can be: i or r for the ISAKMP initiator
170 and responder respectively.
171
172 IDx is the identification payload for "x". x can be: "ii" or "ir"
173 for the ISAKMP initiator and responder respectively during phase
174 one negotiation; or "ui" or "ur" for the user initiator and
175 responder respectively during phase two. The ID payload format for
176 the Internet DOI is defined in [Pip97].
177
178 SIG is the signature payload. The data to sign is exchange-
179 specific.
180
181 CERT is the certificate payload.
182
183 HASH (and any derivitive such as HASH(2) or HASH_I) is the hash
184 payload. The contents of the hash are specific to the
185 authentication method.
186
187 prf(key, msg) is the keyed pseudo-random function-- often a keyed
188 hash function-- used to generate a deterministic output that
189 appears pseudo-random. prf's are used both for key derivations and
190 for authentication (i.e. as a keyed MAC). (See [<a href="#ref-KBC96" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">KBC96</a>]).
191
192 SKEYID is a string derived from secret material known only to the
193 active players in the exchange.
194
195 SKEYID_e is the keying material used by the ISAKMP SA to protect
196 the confidentiality of its messages.
197
198 SKEYID_a is the keying material used by the ISAKMP SA to
199 authenticate its messages.
200
201 SKEYID_d is the keying material used to derive keys for non-ISAKMP
202 security associations.
203
204 &lt;x&gt;y indicates that "x" is encrypted with the key "y".
205
206 --&gt; signifies "initiator to responder" communication (requests).
207
208 &lt;-- signifies "responder to initiator" communication (replies).
209
210 | signifies concatenation of information-- e.g. X | Y is the
211 concatentation of X with Y.
212
213 [<a id="ref-x">x</a>] indicates that x is optional.
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
223
224
225 Message encryption (when noted by a '*' after the ISAKMP header) MUST
226 begin immediately after the ISAKMP header. When communication is
227 protected, all payloads following the ISAKMP header MUST be
228 encrypted. Encryption keys are generated from SKEYID_e in a manner
229 that is defined for each algorithm.
230
231 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Perfect Forward Secrecy</span>
232
233 When used in the memo Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) refers to the
234 notion that compromise of a single key will permit access to only
235 data protected by a single key. For PFS to exist the key used to
236 protect transmission of data MUST NOT be used to derive any
237 additional keys, and if the key used to protect transmission of data
238 was derived from some other keying material, that material MUST NOT
239 be used to derive any more keys.
240
241 Perfect Forward Secrecy for both keys and identities is provided in
242 this protocol. (Sections <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a> and <a href="#section-8">8</a>).
243
244 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a> Security Association</span>
245
246 A security association (SA) is a set of policy and key(s) used to
247 protect information. The ISAKMP SA is the shared policy and key(s)
248 used by the negotiating peers in this protocol to protect their
249 communication.
250
251 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Introduction</span>
252
253 Oakley and SKEME each define a method to establish an authenticated
254 key exchange. This includes payloads construction, the information
255 payloads carry, the order in which they are processed and how they
256 are used.
257
258 While Oakley defines "modes", ISAKMP defines "phases". The
259 relationship between the two is very straightforward and IKE presents
260 different exchanges as modes which operate in one of two phases.
261
262 Phase 1 is where the two ISAKMP peers establish a secure,
263 authenticated channel with which to communicate. This is called the
264 ISAKMP Security Association (SA). "Main Mode" and "Aggressive Mode"
265 each accomplish a phase 1 exchange. "Main Mode" and "Aggressive Mode"
266 MUST ONLY be used in phase 1.
267
268 Phase 2 is where Security Associations are negotiated on behalf of
269 services such as IPsec or any other service which needs key material
270 and/or parameter negotiation. "Quick Mode" accomplishes a phase 2
271 exchange. "Quick Mode" MUST ONLY be used in phase 2.
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
279
280
281 "New Group Mode" is not really a phase 1 or phase 2. It follows
282 phase 1, but serves to establish a new group which can be used in
283 future negotiations. "New Group Mode" MUST ONLY be used after phase
284 1.
285
286 The ISAKMP SA is bi-directional. That is, once established, either
287 party may initiate Quick Mode, Informational, and New Group Mode
288 Exchanges. Per the base ISAKMP document, the ISAKMP SA is identified
289 by the Initiator's cookie followed by the Responder's cookie-- the
290 role of each party in the phase 1 exchange dictates which cookie is
291 the Initiator's. The cookie order established by the phase 1 exchange
292 continues to identify the ISAKMP SA regardless of the direction the
293 Quick Mode, Informational, or New Group exchange. In other words, the
294 cookies MUST NOT swap places when the direction of the ISAKMP SA
295 changes.
296
297 With the use of ISAKMP phases, an implementation can accomplish very
298 fast keying when necessary. A single phase 1 negotiation may be used
299 for more than one phase 2 negotiation. Additionally a single phase 2
300 negotiation can request multiple Security Associations. With these
301 optimizations, an implementation can see less than one round trip per
302 SA as well as less than one DH exponentiation per SA. "Main Mode"
303 for phase 1 provides identity protection. When identity protection
304 is not needed, "Aggressive Mode" can be used to reduce round trips
305 even further. Developer hints for doing these optimizations are
306 included below. It should also be noted that using public key
307 encryption to authenticate an Aggressive Mode exchange will still
308 provide identity protection.
309
310 This protocol does not define its own DOI per se. The ISAKMP SA,
311 established in phase 1, MAY use the DOI and situation from a non-
312 ISAKMP service (such as the IETF IPSec DOI [Pip97]). In this case an
313 implementation MAY choose to restrict use of the ISAKMP SA for
314 establishment of SAs for services of the same DOI. Alternately, an
315 ISAKMP SA MAY be established with the value zero in both the DOI and
316 situation (see [<a href="#ref-MSST98" title="&quot;Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)&quot;">MSST98</a>] for a description of these fields) and in
317 this case implementations will be free to establish security services
318 for any defined DOI using this ISAKMP SA. If a DOI of zero is used
319 for establishment of a phase 1 SA, the syntax of the identity
320 payloads used in phase 1 is that defined in [<a href="#ref-MSST98" title="&quot;Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol (ISAKMP)&quot;">MSST98</a>] and not from any
321 DOI-- e.g. [Pip97]-- which may further expand the syntax and
322 semantics of identities.
323
324 The following attributes are used by IKE and are negotiated as part
325 of the ISAKMP Security Association. (These attributes pertain only
326 to the ISAKMP Security Association and not to any Security
327 Associations that ISAKMP may be negotiating on behalf of other
328 services.)
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
335
336
337 - encryption algorithm
338
339 - hash algorithm
340
341 - authentication method
342
343 - information about a group over which to do Diffie-Hellman.
344
345 All of these attributes are mandatory and MUST be negotiated. In
346 addition, it is possible to optionally negotiate a psuedo-random
347 function ("prf"). (There are currently no negotiable pseudo-random
348 functions defined in this document. Private use attribute values can
349 be used for prf negotiation between consenting parties). If a "prf"
350 is not negotiation, the HMAC (see [<a href="#ref-KBC96" title="&quot;HMAC: Keyed- Hashing for Message Authentication&quot;">KBC96</a>]) version of the negotiated
351 hash algorithm is used as a pseudo-random function. Other non-
352 mandatory attributes are described in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. The selected hash
353 algorithm MUST support both native and HMAC modes.
354
355 The Diffie-Hellman group MUST be either specified using a defined
356 group description (<a href="#section-6">section 6</a>) or by defining all attributes of a
357 group (<a href="#section-5.6">section 5.6</a>). Group attributes (such as group type or prime--
358 see <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>) MUST NOT be offered in conjunction with a previously
359 defined group (either a reserved group description or a private use
360 description that is established after conclusion of a New Group Mode
361 exchange).
362
363 IKE implementations MUST support the following attribute values:
364
365 - DES [<a href="#ref-DES" title="&quot;American National Standard for Information Systems-Data Link Encryption&quot;">DES</a>] in CBC mode with a weak, and semi-weak, key check
366 (weak and semi-weak keys are referenced in [<a href="#ref-Sch96" title="&quot;Applied Cryptography, Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C&quot;">Sch96</a>] and listed in
367 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>). The key is derived according to <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>.
368
369 - MD5 [<a href="#ref-MD5" title="&quot;The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm&quot;">MD5</a>] and SHA [SHA}.
370
371 - Authentication via pre-shared keys.
372
373 - MODP over default group number one (see below).
374
375 In addition, IKE implementations SHOULD support: 3DES for encryption;
376 Tiger ([<a href="#ref-TIGER" title="&quot;Fast Software Encryption&quot;">TIGER</a>]) for hash; the Digital Signature Standard, RSA [<a href="#ref-RSA" title="&quot;A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems&quot;">RSA</a>]
377 signatures and authentication with RSA public key encryption; and
378 MODP group number 2. IKE implementations MAY support any additional
379 encryption algorithms defined in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> and MAY support ECP and
380 EC2N groups.
381
382 The IKE modes described here MUST be implemented whenever the IETF
383 IPsec DOI [Pip97] is implemented. Other DOIs MAY use the modes
384 described here.
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Exchanges</span>
394
395 There are two basic methods used to establish an authenticated key
396 exchange: Main Mode and Aggressive Mode. Each generates authenticated
397 keying material from an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Main Mode
398 MUST be implemented; Aggressive Mode SHOULD be implemented. In
399 addition, Quick Mode MUST be implemented as a mechanism to generate
400 fresh keying material and negotiate non-ISAKMP security services. In
401 addition, New Group Mode SHOULD be implemented as a mechanism to
402 define private groups for Diffie-Hellman exchanges. Implementations
403 MUST NOT switch exchange types in the middle of an exchange.
404
405 Exchanges conform to standard ISAKMP payload syntax, attribute
406 encoding, timeouts and retransmits of messages, and informational
407 messages-- e.g a notify response is sent when, for example, a
408 proposal is unacceptable, or a signature verification or decryption
409 was unsuccessful, etc.
410
411 The SA payload MUST precede all other payloads in a phase 1 exchange.
412 Except where otherwise noted, there are no requirements for ISAKMP
413 payloads in any message to be in any particular order.
414
415 The Diffie-Hellman public value passed in a KE payload, in either a
416 phase 1 or phase 2 exchange, MUST be the length of the negotiated
417 Diffie-Hellman group enforced, if necessary, by pre-pending the value
418 with zeros.
419
420 The length of nonce payload MUST be between 8 and 256 bytes
421 inclusive.
422
423 Main Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP Identity Protect
424 Exchange: The first two messages negotiate policy; the next two
425 exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data (e.g.
426 nonces) necessary for the exchange; and the last two messages
427 authenticate the Diffie-Hellman Exchange. The authentication method
428 negotiated as part of the initial ISAKMP exchange influences the
429 composition of the payloads but not their purpose. The XCHG for Main
430 Mode is ISAKMP Identity Protect.
431
432 Similarly, Aggressive Mode is an instantiation of the ISAKMP
433 Aggressive Exchange. The first two messages negotiate policy,
434 exchange Diffie-Hellman public values and ancillary data necessary
435 for the exchange, and identities. In addition the second message
436 authenticates the responder. The third message authenticates the
437 initiator and provides a proof of participation in the exchange. The
438 XCHG for Aggressive Mode is ISAKMP Aggressive. The final message MAY
439 NOT be sent under protection of the ISAKMP SA allowing each party to
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
447
448
449 postpone exponentiation, if desired, until negotiation of this
450 exchange is complete. The graphic depictions of Aggressive Mode show
451 the final payload in the clear; it need not be.
452
453 Exchanges in IKE are not open ended and have a fixed number of
454 messages. Receipt of a Certificate Request payload MUST NOT extend
455 the number of messages transmitted or expected.
456
457 Security Association negotiation is limited with Aggressive Mode. Due
458 to message construction requirements the group in which the Diffie-
459 Hellman exchange is performed cannot be negotiated. In addition,
460 different authentication methods may further constrain attribute
461 negotiation. For example, authentication with public key encryption
462 cannot be negotiated and when using the revised method of public key
463 encryption for authentication the cipher and hash cannot be
464 negotiated. For situations where the rich attribute negotiation
465 capabilities of IKE are required Main Mode may be required.
466
467 Quick Mode and New Group Mode have no analog in ISAKMP. The XCHG
468 values for Quick Mode and New Group Mode are defined in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>.
469
470 Main Mode, Aggressive Mode, and Quick Mode do security association
471 negotiation. Security Association offers take the form of Tranform
472 Payload(s) encapsulated in Proposal Payload(s) encapsulated in
473 Security Association (SA) payload(s). If multiple offers are being
474 made for phase 1 exchanges (Main Mode and Aggressive Mode) they MUST
475 take the form of multiple Transform Payloads for a single Proposal
476 Payload in a single SA payload. To put it another way, for phase 1
477 exchanges there MUST NOT be multiple Proposal Payloads for a single
478 SA payload and there MUST NOT be multiple SA payloads. This document
479 does not proscribe such behavior on offers in phase 2 exchanges.
480
481 There is no limit on the number of offers the initiator may send to
482 the responder but conformant implementations MAY choose to limit the
483 number of offers it will inspect for performance reasons.
484
485 During security association negotiation, initiators present offers
486 for potential security associations to responders. Responders MUST
487 NOT modify attributes of any offer, attribute encoding excepted (see
488 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>). If the initiator of an exchange notices that attribute
489 values have changed or attributes have been added or deleted from an
490 offer made, that response MUST be rejected.
491
492 Four different authentication methods are allowed with either Main
493 Mode or Aggressive Mode-- digital signature, two forms of
494 authentication with public key encryption, or pre-shared key. The
495 value SKEYID is computed seperately for each authentication method.
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
503
504
505 For signatures: SKEYID = prf(Ni_b | Nr_b, g^xy)
506 For public key encryption: SKEYID = prf(hash(Ni_b | Nr_b), CKY-I |
507 CKY-R)
508 For pre-shared keys: SKEYID = prf(pre-shared-key, Ni_b |
509 Nr_b)
510
511 The result of either Main Mode or Aggressive Mode is three groups of
512 authenticated keying material:
513
514 SKEYID_d = prf(SKEYID, g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
515 SKEYID_a = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_d | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 1)
516 SKEYID_e = prf(SKEYID, SKEYID_a | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 2)
517
518 and agreed upon policy to protect further communications. The values
519 of 0, 1, and 2 above are represented by a single octet. The key used
520 for encryption is derived from SKEYID_e in an algorithm-specific
521 manner (see <a href="#appendix-B">appendix B</a>).
522
523 To authenticate either exchange the initiator of the protocol
524 generates HASH_I and the responder generates HASH_R where:
525
526 HASH_I = prf(SKEYID, g^xi | g^xr | CKY-I | CKY-R | SAi_b | IDii_b )
527 HASH_R = prf(SKEYID, g^xr | g^xi | CKY-R | CKY-I | SAi_b | IDir_b )
528
529 For authentication with digital signatures, HASH_I and HASH_R are
530 signed and verified; for authentication with either public key
531 encryption or pre-shared keys, HASH_I and HASH_R directly
532 authenticate the exchange. The entire ID payload (including ID type,
533 port, and protocol but excluding the generic header) is hashed into
534 both HASH_I and HASH_R.
535
536 As mentioned above, the negotiated authentication method influences
537 the content and use of messages for Phase 1 Modes, but not their
538 intent. When using public keys for authentication, the Phase 1
539 exchange can be accomplished either by using signatures or by using
540 public key encryption (if the algorithm supports it). Following are
541 Phase 1 exchanges with different authentication options.
542
543 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a> IKE Phase 1 Authenticated With Signatures</span>
544
545 Using signatures, the ancillary information exchanged during the
546 second roundtrip are nonces; the exchange is authenticated by signing
547 a mutually obtainable hash. Main Mode with signature authentication
548 is described as follows:
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
559
560
561 Initiator Responder
562 ----------- -----------
563 HDR, SA --&gt;
564 &lt;-- HDR, SA
565 HDR, KE, Ni --&gt;
566 &lt;-- HDR, KE, Nr
567 HDR*, IDii, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --&gt;
568 &lt;-- HDR*, IDir, [ CERT, ] SIG_R
569
570 Aggressive mode with signatures in conjunction with ISAKMP is
571 described as follows:
572
573 Initiator Responder
574 ----------- -----------
575 HDR, SA, KE, Ni, IDii --&gt;
576 &lt;-- HDR, SA, KE, Nr, IDir,
577 [ CERT, ] SIG_R
578 HDR, [ CERT, ] SIG_I --&gt;
579
580 In both modes, the signed data, SIG_I or SIG_R, is the result of the
581 negotiated digital signature algorithm applied to HASH_I or HASH_R
582 respectively.
583
584 In general the signature will be over HASH_I and HASH_R as above
585 using the negotiated prf, or the HMAC version of the negotiated hash
586 function (if no prf is negotiated). However, this can be overridden
587 for construction of the signature if the signature algorithm is tied
588 to a particular hash algorithm (e.g. DSS is only defined with SHA's
589 160 bit output). In this case, the signature will be over HASH_I and
590 HASH_R as above, except using the HMAC version of the hash algorithm
591 associated with the signature method. The negotiated prf and hash
592 function would continue to be used for all other prescribed pseudo-
593 random functions.
594
595 Since the hash algorithm used is already known there is no need to
596 encode its OID into the signature. In addition, there is no binding
597 between the OIDs used for RSA signatures in PKCS #1 and those used in
598 this document. Therefore, RSA signatures MUST be encoded as a private
599 key encryption in PKCS #1 format and not as a signature in PKCS #1
600 format (which includes the OID of the hash algorithm). DSS signatures
601 MUST be encoded as r followed by s.
602
603 One or more certificate payloads MAY be optionally passed.
604
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> Phase 1 Authenticated With Public Key Encryption</span>
618
619 Using public key encryption to authenticate the exchange, the
620 ancillary information exchanged is encrypted nonces. Each party's
621 ability to reconstruct a hash (proving that the other party decrypted
622 the nonce) authenticates the exchange.
623
624 In order to perform the public key encryption, the initiator must
625 already have the responder's public key. In the case where the
626 responder has multiple public keys, a hash of the certificate the
627 initiator is using to encrypt the ancillary information is passed as
628 part of the third message. In this way the responder can determine
629 which corresponding private key to use to decrypt the encrypted
630 payloads and identity protection is retained.
631
632 In addition to the nonce, the identities of the parties (IDii and
633 IDir) are also encrypted with the other party's public key. If the
634 authentication method is public key encryption, the nonce and
635 identity payloads MUST be encrypted with the public key of the other
636 party. Only the body of the payloads are encrypted, the payload
637 headers are left in the clear.
638
639 When using encryption for authentication, Main Mode is defined as
640 follows.
641
642 Initiator Responder
643 ----------- -----------
644 HDR, SA --&gt;
645 &lt;-- HDR, SA
646 HDR, KE, [ HASH(1), ]
647 &lt;IDii_b&gt;PubKey_r,
648 &lt;Ni_b&gt;PubKey_r --&gt;
649 HDR, KE, &lt;IDir_b&gt;PubKey_i,
650 &lt;-- &lt;Nr_b&gt;PubKey_i
651 HDR*, HASH_I --&gt;
652 &lt;-- HDR*, HASH_R
653
654 Aggressive Mode authenticated with encryption is described as
655 follows:
656
657 Initiator Responder
658 ----------- -----------
659 HDR, SA, [ HASH(1),] KE,
660 &lt;IDii_b&gt;Pubkey_r,
661 &lt;Ni_b&gt;Pubkey_r --&gt;
662 HDR, SA, KE, &lt;IDir_b&gt;PubKey_i,
663 &lt;-- &lt;Nr_b&gt;PubKey_i, HASH_R
664 HDR, HASH_I --&gt;
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
671
672
673 Where HASH(1) is a hash (using the negotiated hash function) of the
674 certificate which the initiator is using to encrypt the nonce and
675 identity.
676
677 RSA encryption MUST be encoded in PKCS #1 format. While only the body
678 of the ID and nonce payloads is encrypted, the encrypted data must be
679 preceded by a valid ISAKMP generic header. The payload length is the
680 length of the entire encrypted payload plus header. The PKCS #1
681 encoding allows for determination of the actual length of the
682 cleartext payload upon decryption.
683
684 Using encryption for authentication provides for a plausably deniable
685 exchange. There is no proof (as with a digital signature) that the
686 conversation ever took place since each party can completely
687 reconstruct both sides of the exchange. In addition, security is
688 added to secret generation since an attacker would have to
689 successfully break not only the Diffie-Hellman exchange but also both
690 RSA encryptions. This exchange was motivated by [<a href="#ref-SKEME" title="&quot;SKEME: A Versatile Secure Key Exchange Mechanism for Internet&quot;">SKEME</a>].
691
692 Note that, unlike other authentication methods, authentication with
693 public key encryption allows for identity protection with Aggressive
694 Mode.
695
696 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a> Phase 1 Authenticated With a Revised Mode of Public Key Encryption</span>
697
698 Authentication with Public Key Encryption has significant advantages
699 over authentication with signatures (see <a href="#section-5.2">section 5.2</a> above).
700 Unfortunately, this is at the cost of 4 public key operations-- two
701 public key encryptions and two private key decryptions. This
702 authentication mode retains the advantages of authentication using
703 public key encryption but does so with half the public key
704 operations.
705
706 In this mode, the nonce is still encrypted using the public key of
707 the peer, however the peer's identity (and the certificate if it is
708 sent) is encrypted using the negotiated symmetric encryption
709 algorithm (from the SA payload) with a key derived from the nonce.
710 This solution adds minimal complexity and state yet saves two costly
711 public key operations on each side. In addition, the Key Exchange
712 payload is also encrypted using the same derived key. This provides
713 additional protection against cryptanalysis of the Diffie-Hellman
714 exchange.
715
716 As with the public key encryption method of authentication (<a href="#section-5.2">section</a>
717 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>), a HASH payload may be sent to identify a certificate if the
718 responder has multiple certificates which contain useable public keys
719 (e.g. if the certificate is not for signatures only, either due to
720 certificate restrictions or algorithmic restrictions). If the HASH
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
727
728
729 payload is sent it MUST be the first payload of the second message
730 exchange and MUST be followed by the encrypted nonce. If the HASH
731 payload is not sent, the first payload of the second message exchange
732 MUST be the encrypted nonce. In addition, the initiator my optionally
733 send a certificate payload to provide the responder with a public key
734 with which to respond.
735
736 When using the revised encryption mode for authentication, Main Mode
737 is defined as follows.
738
739 Initiator Responder
740 ----------- -----------
741 HDR, SA --&gt;
742 &lt;-- HDR, SA
743 HDR, [ HASH(1), ]
744 &lt;Ni_b&gt;Pubkey_r,
745 &lt;KE_b&gt;Ke_i,
746 &lt;IDii_b&gt;Ke_i,
747 [&lt;&lt;Cert-I_b&gt;Ke_i] --&gt;
748 HDR, &lt;Nr_b&gt;PubKey_i,
749 &lt;KE_b&gt;Ke_r,
750 &lt;-- &lt;IDir_b&gt;Ke_r,
751 HDR*, HASH_I --&gt;
752 &lt;-- HDR*, HASH_R
753
754 Aggressive Mode authenticated with the revised encryption method is
755 described as follows:
756
757 Initiator Responder
758 ----------- -----------
759 HDR, SA, [ HASH(1),]
760 &lt;Ni_b&gt;Pubkey_r,
761 &lt;KE_b&gt;Ke_i, &lt;IDii_b&gt;Ke_i
762 [, &lt;Cert-I_b&gt;Ke_i ] --&gt;
763 HDR, SA, &lt;Nr_b&gt;PubKey_i,
764 &lt;KE_b&gt;Ke_r, &lt;IDir_b&gt;Ke_r,
765 &lt;-- HASH_R
766 HDR, HASH_I --&gt;
767
768 where HASH(1) is identical to <a href="#section-5.2">section 5.2</a>. Ke_i and Ke_r are keys to
769 the symmetric encryption algorithm negotiated in the SA payload
770 exchange. Only the body of the payloads are encrypted (in both public
771 key and symmetric operations), the generic payload headers are left
772 in the clear. The payload length includes that added to perform
773 encryption.
774
775 The symmetric cipher keys are derived from the decrypted nonces as
776 follows. First the values Ne_i and Ne_r are computed:
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
783
784
785 Ne_i = prf(Ni_b, CKY-I)
786 Ne_r = prf(Nr_b, CKY-R)
787
788 The keys Ke_i and Ke_r are then taken from Ne_i and Ne_r respectively
789 in the manner described in <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a> used to derive symmetric keys
790 for use with the negotiated encryption algorithm. If the length of
791 the output of the negotiated prf is greater than or equal to the key
792 length requirements of the cipher, Ke_i and Ke_r are derived from the
793 most significant bits of Ne_i and Ne_r respectively. If the desired
794 length of Ke_i and Ke_r exceed the length of the output of the prf
795 the necessary number of bits is obtained by repeatedly feeding the
796 results of the prf back into itself and concatenating the result
797 until the necessary number has been achieved. For example, if the
798 negotiated encryption algorithm requires 320 bits of key and the
799 output of the prf is only 128 bits, Ke_i is the most significant 320
800 bits of K, where
801
802 K = K1 | K2 | K3 and
803 K1 = prf(Ne_i, 0)
804 K2 = prf(Ne_i, K1)
805 K3 = prf(Ne_i, K2)
806
807 For brevity, only derivation of Ke_i is shown; Ke_r is identical. The
808 length of the value 0 in the computation of K1 is a single octet.
809 Note that Ne_i, Ne_r, Ke_i, and Ke_r are all ephemeral and MUST be
810 discarded after use.
811
812 Save the requirements on the location of the optional HASH payload
813 and the mandatory nonce payload there are no further payload
814 requirements. All payloads-- in whatever order-- following the
815 encrypted nonce MUST be encrypted with Ke_i or Ke_r depending on the
816 direction.
817
818 If CBC mode is used for the symmetric encryption then the
819 initialization vectors (IVs) are set as follows. The IV for
820 encrypting the first payload following the nonce is set to 0 (zero).
821 The IV for subsequent payloads encrypted with the ephemeral symmetric
822 cipher key, Ke_i, is the last ciphertext block of the previous
823 payload. Encrypted payloads are padded up to the nearest block size.
824 All padding bytes, except for the last one, contain 0x00. The last
825 byte of the padding contains the number of the padding bytes used,
826 excluding the last one. Note that this means there will always be
827 padding.
828
829
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a> Phase 1 Authenticated With a Pre-Shared Key</span>
842
843 A key derived by some out-of-band mechanism may also be used to
844 authenticate the exchange. The actual establishment of this key is
845 out of the scope of this document.
846
847 When doing a pre-shared key authentication, Main Mode is defined as
848 follows:
849
850 Initiator Responder
851 ---------- -----------
852 HDR, SA --&gt;
853 &lt;-- HDR, SA
854 HDR, KE, Ni --&gt;
855 &lt;-- HDR, KE, Nr
856 HDR*, IDii, HASH_I --&gt;
857 &lt;-- HDR*, IDir, HASH_R
858
859 Aggressive mode with a pre-shared key is described as follows:
860
861 Initiator Responder
862 ----------- -----------
863 HDR, SA, KE, Ni, IDii --&gt;
864 &lt;-- HDR, SA, KE, Nr, IDir, HASH_R
865 HDR, HASH_I --&gt;
866
867 When using pre-shared key authentication with Main Mode the key can
868 only be identified by the IP address of the peers since HASH_I must
869 be computed before the initiator has processed IDir. Aggressive Mode
870 allows for a wider range of identifiers of the pre-shared secret to
871 be used. In addition, Aggressive Mode allows two parties to maintain
872 multiple, different pre-shared keys and identify the correct one for
873 a particular exchange.
874
875 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a> Phase 2 - Quick Mode</span>
876
877 Quick Mode is not a complete exchange itself (in that it is bound to
878 a phase 1 exchange), but is used as part of the SA negotiation
879 process (phase 2) to derive keying material and negotiate shared
880 policy for non-ISAKMP SAs. The information exchanged along with Quick
881 Mode MUST be protected by the ISAKMP SA-- i.e. all payloads except
882 the ISAKMP header are encrypted. In Quick Mode, a HASH payload MUST
883 immediately follow the ISAKMP header and a SA payload MUST
884 immediately follow the HASH. This HASH authenticates the message and
885 also provides liveliness proofs.
886
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
895
896
897 The message ID in the ISAKMP header identifies a Quick Mode in
898 progress for a particular ISAKMP SA which itself is identified by the
899 cookies in the ISAKMP header. Since each instance of a Quick Mode
900 uses a unique initialization vector (see <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix B</a>) it is possible
901 to have multiple simultaneous Quick Modes, based off a single ISAKMP
902 SA, in progress at any one time.
903
904 Quick Mode is essentially a SA negotiation and an exchange of nonces
905 that provides replay protection. The nonces are used to generate
906 fresh key material and prevent replay attacks from generating bogus
907 security associations. An optional Key Exchange payload can be
908 exchanged to allow for an additional Diffie-Hellman exchange and
909 exponentiation per Quick Mode. While use of the key exchange payload
910 with Quick Mode is optional it MUST be supported.
911
912 Base Quick Mode (without the KE payload) refreshes the keying
913 material derived from the exponentiation in phase 1. This does not
914 provide PFS. Using the optional KE payload, an additional
915 exponentiation is performed and PFS is provided for the keying
916 material.
917
918 The identities of the SAs negotiated in Quick Mode are implicitly
919 assumed to be the IP addresses of the ISAKMP peers, without any
920 implied constraints on the protocol or port numbers allowed, unless
921 client identifiers are specified in Quick Mode. If ISAKMP is acting
922 as a client negotiator on behalf of another party, the identities of
923 the parties MUST be passed as IDci and then IDcr. Local policy will
924 dictate whether the proposals are acceptable for the identities
925 specified. If the client identities are not acceptable to the Quick
926 Mode responder (due to policy or other reasons), a Notify payload
927 with Notify Message Type INVALID-ID-INFORMATION (18) SHOULD be sent.
928
929 The client identities are used to identify and direct traffic to the
930 appropriate tunnel in cases where multiple tunnels exist between two
931 peers and also to allow for unique and shared SAs with different
932 granularities.
933
934 All offers made during a Quick Mode are logically related and must be
935 consistant. For example, if a KE payload is sent, the attribute
936 describing the Diffie-Hellman group (see <a href="#section-6.1">section 6.1</a> and [Pip97])
937 MUST be included in every transform of every proposal of every SA
938 being negotiated. Similarly, if client identities are used, they MUST
939 apply to every SA in the negotiation.
940
941 Quick Mode is defined as follows:
942
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
951
952
953 Initiator Responder
954 ----------- -----------
955 HDR*, HASH(1), SA, Ni
956 [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] --&gt;
957 &lt;-- HDR*, HASH(2), SA, Nr
958 [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
959 HDR*, HASH(3) --&gt;
960
961 Where:
962 HASH(1) is the prf over the message id (M-ID) from the ISAKMP header
963 concatenated with the entire message that follows the hash including
964 all payload headers, but excluding any padding added for encryption.
965 HASH(2) is identical to HASH(1) except the initiator's nonce-- Ni,
966 minus the payload header-- is added after M-ID but before the
967 complete message. The addition of the nonce to HASH(2) is for a
968 liveliness proof. HASH(3)-- for liveliness-- is the prf over the
969 value zero represented as a single octet, followed by a concatenation
970 of the message id and the two nonces-- the initiator's followed by
971 the responder's-- minus the payload header. In other words, the
972 hashes for the above exchange are:
973
974 HASH(1) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | SA | Ni [ | KE ] [ | IDci | IDcr )
975 HASH(2) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | Ni_b | SA | Nr [ | KE ] [ | IDci |
976 IDcr )
977 HASH(3) = prf(SKEYID_a, 0 | M-ID | Ni_b | Nr_b)
978
979 With the exception of the HASH, SA, and the optional ID payloads,
980 there are no payload ordering restrictions on Quick Mode. HASH(1) and
981 HASH(2) may differ from the illustration above if the order of
982 payloads in the message differs from the illustrative example or if
983 any optional payloads, for example a notify payload, have been
984 chained to the message.
985
986 If PFS is not needed, and KE payloads are not exchanged, the new
987 keying material is defined as
988
989 KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b).
990
991 If PFS is desired and KE payloads were exchanged, the new keying
992 material is defined as
993
994 KEYMAT = prf(SKEYID_d, g(qm)^xy | protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b)
995
996 where g(qm)^xy is the shared secret from the ephemeral Diffie-Hellman
997 exchange of this Quick Mode.
998
999 In either case, "protocol" and "SPI" are from the ISAKMP Proposal
1000 Payload that contained the negotiated Transform.
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1007
1008
1009 A single SA negotiation results in two security assocations-- one
1010 inbound and one outbound. Different SPIs for each SA (one chosen by
1011 the initiator, the other by the responder) guarantee a different key
1012 for each direction. The SPI chosen by the destination of the SA is
1013 used to derive KEYMAT for that SA.
1014
1015 For situations where the amount of keying material desired is greater
1016 than that supplied by the prf, KEYMAT is expanded by feeding the
1017 results of the prf back into itself and concatenating results until
1018 the required keying material has been reached. In other words,
1019
1020 KEYMAT = K1 | K2 | K3 | ...
1021 where
1022 K1 = prf(SKEYID_d, [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b | Nr_b)
1023 K2 = prf(SKEYID_d, K1 | [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b |
1024 Nr_b)
1025 K3 = prf(SKEYID_d, K2 | [ g(qm)^xy | ] protocol | SPI | Ni_b |
1026 Nr_b)
1027 etc.
1028
1029 This keying material (whether with PFS or without, and whether
1030 derived directly or through concatenation) MUST be used with the
1031 negotiated SA. It is up to the service to define how keys are derived
1032 from the keying material.
1033
1034 In the case of an ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange in Quick Mode,
1035 the exponential (g(qm)^xy) is irretreivably removed from the current
1036 state and SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a (derived from phase 1 negotiation)
1037 continue to protect and authenticate the ISAKMP SA and SKEYID_d
1038 continues to be used to derive keys.
1039
1040 Using Quick Mode, multiple SA's and keys can be negotiated with one
1041 exchange as follows:
1042
1043 Initiator Responder
1044 ----------- -----------
1045 HDR*, HASH(1), SA0, SA1, Ni,
1046 [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ] --&gt;
1047 &lt;-- HDR*, HASH(2), SA0, SA1, Nr,
1048 [, KE ] [, IDci, IDcr ]
1049 HDR*, HASH(3) --&gt;
1050
1051 The keying material is derived identically as in the case of a single
1052 SA. In this case (negotiation of two SA payloads) the result would be
1053 four security associations-- two each way for both SAs.
1054
1055
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1063
1064
1065 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.6" href="#section-5.6">5.6</a> New Group Mode</span>
1066
1067 New Group Mode MUST NOT be used prior to establishment of an ISAKMP
1068 SA. The description of a new group MUST only follow phase 1
1069 negotiation. (It is not a phase 2 exchange, though).
1070
1071 Initiator Responder
1072 ----------- -----------
1073 HDR*, HASH(1), SA --&gt;
1074 &lt;-- HDR*, HASH(2), SA
1075
1076 where HASH(1) is the prf output, using SKEYID_a as the key, and the
1077 message-ID from the ISAKMP header concatenated with the entire SA
1078 proposal, body and header, as the data; HASH(2) is the prf output,
1079 using SKEYID_a as the key, and the message-ID from the ISAKMP header
1080 concatenated with the reply as the data. In other words the hashes
1081 for the above exchange are:
1082
1083 HASH(1) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | SA)
1084 HASH(2) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | SA)
1085
1086 The proposal will specify the characteristics of the group (see
1087 <a href="#appendix-A">appendix A</a>, "Attribute Assigned Numbers"). Group descriptions for
1088 private Groups MUST be greater than or equal to 2^15. If the group
1089 is not acceptable, the responder MUST reply with a Notify payload
1090 with the message type set to ATTRIBUTES-NOT-SUPPORTED (13).
1091
1092 ISAKMP implementations MAY require private groups to expire with the
1093 SA under which they were established.
1094
1095 Groups may be directly negotiated in the SA proposal with Main Mode.
1096 To do this the component parts-- for a MODP group, the type, prime
1097 and generator; for a EC2N group the type, the Irreducible Polynomial,
1098 Group Generator One, Group Generator Two, Group Curve A, Group Curve
1099 B and Group Order-- are passed as SA attributes (see <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>).
1100 Alternately, the nature of the group can be hidden using New Group
1101 Mode and only the group identifier is passed in the clear during
1102 phase 1 negotiation.
1103
1104 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.7" href="#section-5.7">5.7</a> ISAKMP Informational Exchanges</span>
1105
1106 This protocol protects ISAKMP Informational Exchanges when possible.
1107 Once the ISAKMP security association has been established (and
1108 SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a have been generated) ISAKMP Information
1109 Exchanges, when used with this protocol, are as follows:
1110
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1119
1120
1121 Initiator Responder
1122 ----------- -----------
1123 HDR*, HASH(1), N/D --&gt;
1124
1125 where N/D is either an ISAKMP Notify Payload or an ISAKMP Delete
1126 Payload and HASH(1) is the prf output, using SKEYID_a as the key, and
1127 a M-ID unique to this exchange concatenated with the entire
1128 informational payload (either a Notify or Delete) as the data. In
1129 other words, the hash for the above exchange is:
1130
1131 HASH(1) = prf(SKEYID_a, M-ID | N/D)
1132
1133 As noted the message ID in the ISAKMP header-- and used in the prf
1134 computation-- is unique to this exchange and MUST NOT be the same as
1135 the message ID of another phase 2 exchange which generated this
1136 informational exchange. The derivation of the initialization vector,
1137 used with SKEYID_e to encrypt this message, is described in <a href="#appendix-B">Appendix</a>
1138 <a href="#appendix-B">B</a>.
1139
1140 If the ISAKMP security association has not yet been established at
1141 the time of the Informational Exchange, the exchange is done in the
1142 clear without an accompanying HASH payload.
1143
1144 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a> Oakley Groups</span>
1145
1146 With IKE, the group in which to do the Diffie-Hellman exchange is
1147 negotiated. Four groups-- values 1 through 4-- are defined below.
1148 These groups originated with the Oakley protocol and are therefore
1149 called "Oakley Groups". The attribute class for "Group" is defined in
1150 <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. All values 2^15 and higher are used for private group
1151 identifiers. For a discussion on the strength of the default Oakley
1152 groups please see the Security Considerations section below.
1153
1154 These groups were all generated by Richard Schroeppel at the
1155 University of Arizona. Properties of these groups are described in
1156 [<a href="#ref-Orm96" title="&quot;The Oakley Key Determination Protocol&quot;">Orm96</a>].
1157
1158 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a> First Oakley Default Group</span>
1159
1160 Oakley implementations MUST support a MODP group with the following
1161 prime and generator. This group is assigned id 1 (one).
1162
1163 The prime is: 2^768 - 2 ^704 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^638 pi] + 149686 }
1164 Its hexadecimal value is
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1175
1176
1177 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
1178 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
1179 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
1180 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A63A3620 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
1181
1182 The generator is: 2.
1183
1184 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a> Second Oakley Group</span>
1185
1186 IKE implementations SHOULD support a MODP group with the following
1187 prime and generator. This group is assigned id 2 (two).
1188
1189 The prime is 2^1024 - 2^960 - 1 + 2^64 * { [2^894 pi] + 129093 }.
1190 Its hexadecimal value is
1191
1192 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF C90FDAA2 2168C234 C4C6628B 80DC1CD1
1193 29024E08 8A67CC74 020BBEA6 3B139B22 514A0879 8E3404DD
1194 EF9519B3 CD3A431B 302B0A6D F25F1437 4FE1356D 6D51C245
1195 E485B576 625E7EC6 F44C42E9 A637ED6B 0BFF5CB6 F406B7ED
1196 EE386BFB 5A899FA5 AE9F2411 7C4B1FE6 49286651 ECE65381
1197 FFFFFFFF FFFFFFFF
1198
1199 The generator is 2 (decimal)
1200
1201 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.3" href="#section-6.3">6.3</a> Third Oakley Group</span>
1202
1203 IKE implementations SHOULD support a EC2N group with the following
1204 characteristics. This group is assigned id 3 (three). The curve is
1205 based on the Galois Field GF[2^155]. The field size is 155. The
1206 irreducible polynomial for the field is:
1207 u^155 + u^62 + 1.
1208 The equation for the elliptic curve is:
1209 y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b.
1210
1211 Field Size: 155
1212 Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial:
1213 0x0800000000000000000000004000000000000001
1214 Group Generator One: 0x7b
1215 Group Curve A: 0x0
1216 Group Curve B: 0x07338f
1217
1218 Group Order: 0X0800000000000000000057db5698537193aef944
1219
1220 The data in the KE payload when using this group is the value x from
1221 the solution (x,y), the point on the curve chosen by taking the
1222 randomly chosen secret Ka and computing Ka*P, where * is the
1223 repetition of the group addition and double operations, P is the
1224 curve point with x coordinate equal to generator 1 and the y
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1231
1232
1233 coordinate determined from the defining equation. The equation of
1234 curve is implicitly known by the Group Type and the A and B
1235 coefficients. There are two possible values for the y coordinate;
1236 either one can be used successfully (the two parties need not agree
1237 on the selection).
1238
1239 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.4" href="#section-6.4">6.4</a> Fourth Oakley Group</span>
1240
1241 IKE implementations SHOULD support a EC2N group with the following
1242 characteristics. This group is assigned id 4 (four). The curve is
1243 based on the Galois Field GF[2^185]. The field size is 185. The
1244 irreducible polynomial for the field is:
1245 u^185 + u^69 + 1. The
1246 equation for the elliptic curve is:
1247 y^2 + xy = x^3 + ax^2 + b.
1248
1249 Field Size: 185
1250 Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial:
1251 0x020000000000000000000000000000200000000000000001
1252 Group Generator One: 0x18
1253 Group Curve A: 0x0
1254 Group Curve B: 0x1ee9
1255
1256 Group Order: 0X01ffffffffffffffffffffffdbf2f889b73e484175f94ebc
1257
1258 The data in the KE payload when using this group will be identical to
1259 that as when using Oakley Group 3 (three).
1260
1261 Other groups can be defined using New Group Mode. These default
1262 groups were generated by Richard Schroeppel at the University of
1263 Arizona. Properties of these primes are described in [<a href="#ref-Orm96" title="&quot;The Oakley Key Determination Protocol&quot;">Orm96</a>].
1264
1265 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Payload Explosion for a Complete IKE Exchange</span>
1266
1267 This section illustrates how the IKE protocol is used to:
1268
1269 - establish a secure and authenticated channel between ISAKMP
1270 processes (phase 1); and
1271
1272 - generate key material for, and negotiate, an IPsec SA (phase 2).
1273
1274 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a> Phase 1 using Main Mode</span>
1275
1276 The following diagram illustrates the payloads exchanged between the
1277 two parties in the first round trip exchange. The initiator MAY
1278 propose several proposals; the responder MUST reply with one.
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1287
1288
1289 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1290 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1291 ~ ISAKMP Header with XCHG of Main Mode, ~
1292 ~ and Next Payload of ISA_SA ~
1293 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1294 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1295 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1296 ! Domain of Interpretation !
1297 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1298 ! Situation !
1299 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1300 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1301 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1302 ! Proposal #1 ! PROTO_ISAKMP ! SPI size = 0 | # Transforms !
1303 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1304 ! ISA_TRANS ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1305 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1306 ! Transform #1 ! KEY_OAKLEY | RESERVED2 !
1307 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1308 ~ prefered SA attributes ~
1309 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1310 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1311 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1312 ! Transform #2 ! KEY_OAKLEY | RESERVED2 !
1313 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1314 ~ alternate SA attributes ~
1315 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1316
1317 The responder replies in kind but selects, and returns, one transform
1318 proposal (the ISAKMP SA attributes).
1319
1320 The second exchange consists of the following payloads:
1321
1322 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1323 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1324 ~ ISAKMP Header with XCHG of Main Mode, ~
1325 ~ and Next Payload of ISA_KE ~
1326 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1327 ! ISA_NONCE ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1328 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1329 ~ D-H Public Value (g^xi from initiator g^xr from responder) ~
1330 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1331 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1332 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1333 ~ Ni (from initiator) or Nr (from responder) ~
1334 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1335
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1343
1344
1345 The shared keys, SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a, are now used to protect and
1346 authenticate all further communication. Note that both SKEYID_e and
1347 SKEYID_a are unauthenticated.
1348
1349 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1350 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1351 ~ ISAKMP Header with XCHG of Main Mode, ~
1352 ~ and Next Payload of ISA_ID and the encryption bit set ~
1353 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1354 ! ISA_SIG ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1355 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1356 ~ Identification Data of the ISAKMP negotiator ~
1357 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1358 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1359 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1360 ~ signature verified by the public key of the ID above ~
1361 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1362
1363 The key exchange is authenticated over a signed hash as described in
1364 <a href="#section-5.1">section 5.1</a>. Once the signature has been verified using the
1365 authentication algorithm negotiated as part of the ISAKMP SA, the
1366 shared keys, SKEYID_e and SKEYID_a can be marked as authenticated.
1367 (For brevity, certificate payloads were not exchanged).
1368
1369 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a> Phase 2 using Quick Mode</span>
1370
1371 The following payloads are exchanged in the first round of Quick Mode
1372 with ISAKMP SA negotiation. In this hypothetical exchange, the ISAKMP
1373 negotiators are proxies for other parties which have requested
1374 authentication.
1375
1376 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1377 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1378 ~ ISAKMP Header with XCHG of Quick Mode, ~
1379 ~ Next Payload of ISA_HASH and the encryption bit set ~
1380 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1381 ! ISA_SA ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1382 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1383 ~ keyed hash of message ~
1384 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1385 ! ISA_NONCE ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1386 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1387 ! Domain Of Interpretation !
1388 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1389 ! Situation !
1390 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1391 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1392 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1399
1400
1401 ! Proposal #1 ! PROTO_IPSEC_AH! SPI size = 4 | # Transforms !
1402 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1403 ~ SPI (4 octets) ~
1404 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1405 ! ISA_TRANS ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1406 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1407 ! Transform #1 ! AH_SHA | RESERVED2 !
1408 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1409 ! other SA attributes !
1410 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1411 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1412 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1413 ! Transform #2 ! AH_MD5 | RESERVED2 !
1414 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1415 ! other SA attributes !
1416 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1417 ! ISA_ID ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1418 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1419 ~ nonce ~
1420 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1421 ! ISA_ID ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1422 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1423 ~ ID of source for which ISAKMP is a client ~
1424 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1425 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1426 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1427 ~ ID of destination for which ISAKMP is a client ~
1428 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1429
1430 where the contents of the hash are described in 5.5 above. The
1431 responder replies with a similar message which only contains one
1432 transform-- the selected AH transform. Upon receipt, the initiator
1433 can provide the key engine with the negotiated security association
1434 and the keying material. As a check against replay attacks, the
1435 responder waits until receipt of the next message.
1436
1437 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1
1438 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1439 ~ ISAKMP Header with XCHG of Quick Mode, ~
1440 ~ Next Payload of ISA_HASH and the encryption bit set ~
1441 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1442 ! 0 ! RESERVED ! Payload Length !
1443 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1444 ~ hash data ~
1445 +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+
1446
1447 where the contents of the hash are described in 5.5 above.
1448
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1455
1456
1457 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy Example</span>
1458
1459 This protocol can provide PFS of both keys and identities. The
1460 identies of both the ISAKMP negotiating peer and, if applicable, the
1461 identities for whom the peers are negotiating can be protected with
1462 PFS.
1463
1464 To provide Perfect Forward Secrecy of both keys and all identities,
1465 two parties would perform the following:
1466
1467 o A Main Mode Exchange to protect the identities of the ISAKMP
1468 peers.
1469 This establishes an ISAKMP SA.
1470 o A Quick Mode Exchange to negotiate other security protocol
1471 protection.
1472 This establishes a SA on each end for this protocol.
1473 o Delete the ISAKMP SA and its associated state.
1474
1475 Since the key for use in the non-ISAKMP SA was derived from the
1476 single ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange PFS is preserved.
1477
1478 To provide Perfect Forward Secrecy of merely the keys of a non-ISAKMP
1479 security association, it in not necessary to do a phase 1 exchange if
1480 an ISAKMP SA exists between the two peers. A single Quick Mode in
1481 which the optional KE payload is passed, and an additional Diffie-
1482 Hellman exchange is performed, is all that is required. At this point
1483 the state derived from this Quick Mode must be deleted from the
1484 ISAKMP SA as described in <a href="#section-5.5">section 5.5</a>.
1485
1486 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Implementation Hints</span>
1487
1488 Using a single ISAKMP Phase 1 negotiation makes subsequent Phase 2
1489 negotiations extremely quick. As long as the Phase 1 state remains
1490 cached, and PFS is not needed, Phase 2 can proceed without any
1491 exponentiation. How many Phase 2 negotiations can be performed for a
1492 single Phase 1 is a local policy issue. The decision will depend on
1493 the strength of the algorithms being used and level of trust in the
1494 peer system.
1495
1496 An implementation may wish to negotiate a range of SAs when
1497 performing Quick Mode. By doing this they can speed up the "re-
1498 keying". Quick Mode defines how KEYMAT is defined for a range of SAs.
1499 When one peer feels it is time to change SAs they simply use the next
1500 one within the stated range. A range of SAs can be established by
1501 negotiating multiple SAs (identical attributes, different SPIs) with
1502 one Quick Mode.
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1511
1512
1513 An optimization that is often useful is to establish Security
1514 Associations with peers before they are needed so that when they
1515 become needed they are already in place. This ensures there would be
1516 no delays due to key management before initial data transmission.
1517 This optimization is easily implemented by setting up more than one
1518 Security Association with a peer for each requested Security
1519 Association and caching those not immediately used.
1520
1521 Also, if an ISAKMP implementation is alerted that a SA will soon be
1522 needed (e.g. to replace an existing SA that will expire in the near
1523 future), then it can establish the new SA before that new SA is
1524 needed.
1525
1526 The base ISAKMP specification describes conditions in which one party
1527 of the protocol may inform the other party of some activity-- either
1528 deletion of a security association or in response to some error in
1529 the protocol such as a signature verification failed or a payload
1530 failed to decrypt. It is strongly suggested that these Informational
1531 exchanges not be responded to under any circumstances. Such a
1532 condition may result in a "notify war" in which failure to understand
1533 a message results in a notify to the peer who cannot understand it
1534 and sends his own notify back which is also not understood.
1535
1536 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Security Considerations</span>
1537
1538 This entire memo discusses a hybrid protocol, combining parts of
1539 Oakley and parts of SKEME with ISAKMP, to negotiate, and derive
1540 keying material for, security associations in a secure and
1541 authenticated manner.
1542
1543 Confidentiality is assured by the use of a negotiated encryption
1544 algorithm. Authentication is assured by the use of a negotiated
1545 method: a digital signature algorithm; a public key algorithm which
1546 supports encryption; or, a pre-shared key. The confidentiality and
1547 authentication of this exchange is only as good as the attributes
1548 negotiated as part of the ISAKMP security association.
1549
1550 Repeated re-keying using Quick Mode can consume the entropy of the
1551 Diffie-Hellman shared secret. Implementors should take note of this
1552 fact and set a limit on Quick Mode Exchanges between exponentiations.
1553 This memo does not prescribe such a limit.
1554
1555 Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) of both keying material and identities
1556 is possible with this protocol. By specifying a Diffie-Hellman group,
1557 and passing public values in KE payloads, ISAKMP peers can establish
1558 PFS of keys-- the identities would be protected by SKEYID_e from the
1559 ISAKMP SA and would therefore not be protected by PFS. If PFS of both
1560 keying material and identities is desired, an ISAKMP peer MUST
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1567
1568
1569 establish only one non-ISAKMP security association (e.g. IPsec
1570 Security Association) per ISAKMP SA. PFS for keys and identities is
1571 accomplished by deleting the ISAKMP SA (and optionally issuing a
1572 DELETE message) upon establishment of the single non-ISAKMP SA. In
1573 this way a phase one negotiation is uniquely tied to a single phase
1574 two negotiation, and the ISAKMP SA established during phase one
1575 negotiation is never used again.
1576
1577 The strength of a key derived from a Diffie-Hellman exchange using
1578 any of the groups defined here depends on the inherent strength of
1579 the group, the size of the exponent used, and the entropy provided by
1580 the random number generator used. Due to these inputs it is difficult
1581 to determine the strength of a key for any of the defined groups. The
1582 default Diffie-Hellman group (number one) when used with a strong
1583 random number generator and an exponent no less than 160 bits is
1584 sufficient to use for DES. Groups two through four provide greater
1585 security. Implementations should make note of these conservative
1586 estimates when establishing policy and negotiating security
1587 parameters.
1588
1589 Note that these limitations are on the Diffie-Hellman groups
1590 themselves. There is nothing in IKE which prohibits using stronger
1591 groups nor is there anything which will dilute the strength obtained
1592 from stronger groups. In fact, the extensible framework of IKE
1593 encourages the definition of more groups; use of elliptical curve
1594 groups will greatly increase strength using much smaller numbers.
1595
1596 For situations where defined groups provide insufficient strength New
1597 Group Mode can be used to exchange a Diffie-Hellman group which
1598 provides the necessary strength. In is incumbent upon implementations
1599 to check the primality in groups being offered and independently
1600 arrive at strength estimates.
1601
1602 It is assumed that the Diffie-Hellman exponents in this exchange are
1603 erased from memory after use. In particular, these exponents must not
1604 be derived from long-lived secrets like the seed to a pseudo-random
1605 generator.
1606
1607 IKE exchanges maintain running initialization vectors (IV) where the
1608 last ciphertext block of the last message is the IV for the next
1609 message. To prevent retransmissions (or forged messages with valid
1610 cookies) from causing exchanges to get out of sync IKE
1611 implementations SHOULD NOT update their running IV until the
1612 decrypted message has passed a basic sanity check and has been
1613 determined to actually advance the IKE state machine-- i.e. it is not
1614 a retransmission.
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1623
1624
1625 While the last roundtrip of Main Mode (and optionally the last
1626 message of Aggressive Mode) is encrypted it is not, strictly
1627 speaking, authenticated. An active substitution attack on the
1628 ciphertext could result in payload corruption. If such an attack
1629 corrupts mandatory payloads it would be detected by an authentication
1630 failure, but if it corrupts any optional payloads (e.g. notify
1631 payloads chained onto the last message of a Main Mode exchange) it
1632 might not be detectable.
1633
1634 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
1635
1636 This document contains many "magic numbers" to be maintained by the
1637 IANA. This section explains the criteria to be used by the IANA to
1638 assign additional numbers in each of these lists.
1639
1640 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.1" href="#section-11.1">11.1</a> Attribute Classes</span>
1641
1642 Attributes negotiated in this protocol are identified by their class.
1643 Requests for assignment of new classes must be accompanied by a
1644 standards-track RFC which describes the use of this attribute.
1645
1646 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.2" href="#section-11.2">11.2</a> Encryption Algorithm Class</span>
1647
1648 Values of the Encryption Algorithm Class define an encryption
1649 algorithm to use when called for in this document. Requests for
1650 assignment of new encryption algorithm values must be accompanied by
1651 a reference to a standards-track or Informational RFC or a reference
1652 to published cryptographic literature which describes this algorithm.
1653
1654 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.3" href="#section-11.3">11.3</a> Hash Algorithm</span>
1655
1656 Values of the Hash Algorithm Class define a hash algorithm to use
1657 when called for in this document. Requests for assignment of new hash
1658 algorithm values must be accompanied by a reference to a standards-
1659 track or Informational RFC or a reference to published cryptographic
1660 literature which describes this algorithm. Due to the key derivation
1661 and key expansion uses of HMAC forms of hash algorithms in IKE,
1662 requests for assignment of new hash algorithm values must take into
1663 account the cryptographic properties-- e.g it's resistance to
1664 collision-- of the hash algorithm itself.
1665
1666 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.4" href="#section-11.4">11.4</a> Group Description and Group Type</span>
1667
1668 Values of the Group Description Class identify a group to use in a
1669 Diffie-Hellman exchange. Values of the Group Type Class define the
1670 type of group. Requests for assignment of new groups must be
1671 accompanied by a reference to a standards-track or Informational RFC
1672 which describes this group. Requests for assignment of new group
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1679
1680
1681 types must be accompanied by a reference to a standards-track or
1682 Informational RFC or by a reference to published cryptographic or
1683 mathmatical literature which describes the new type.
1684
1685 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-11.5" href="#section-11.5">11.5</a> Life Type</span>
1686
1687 Values of the Life Type Class define a type of lifetime to which the
1688 ISAKMP Security Association applies. Requests for assignment of new
1689 life types must be accompanied by a detailed description of the units
1690 of this type and its expiry.
1691
1692 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
1693
1694 This document is the result of close consultation with Hugo Krawczyk,
1695 Douglas Maughan, Hilarie Orman, Mark Schertler, Mark Schneider, and
1696 Jeff Turner. It relies on protocols which were written by them.
1697 Without their interest and dedication, this would not have been
1698 written.
1699
1700 Special thanks Rob Adams, Cheryl Madson, Derrell Piper, Harry Varnis,
1701 and Elfed Weaver for technical input, encouragement, and various
1702 sanity checks along the way.
1703
1704 We would also like to thank the many members of the IPSec working
1705 group that contributed to the development of this protocol over the
1706 past year.
1707
1708 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. References</span>
1709
1710 [<a id="ref-CAST">CAST</a>] Adams, C., "The CAST-128 Encryption Algorithm", <a href="./rfc2144">RFC 2144</a>,
1711 May 1997.
1712
1713 [<a id="ref-BLOW">BLOW</a>] Schneier, B., "The Blowfish Encryption Algorithm", Dr.
1714 Dobb's Journal, v. 19, n. 4, April 1994.
1715
1716 [<a id="ref-Bra97">Bra97</a>] Bradner, S., "Key Words for use in RFCs to indicate
1717 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
1718
1719 [<a id="ref-DES">DES</a>] ANSI X3.106, "American National Standard for Information
1720 Systems-Data Link Encryption", American National Standards
1721 Institute, 1983.
1722
1723 [<a id="ref-DH">DH</a>] Diffie, W., and Hellman M., "New Directions in
1724 Cryptography", IEEE Transactions on Information Theory, V.
1725 IT-22, n. 6, June 1977.
1726
1727
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1735
1736
1737 [<a id="ref-DSS">DSS</a>] NIST, "Digital Signature Standard", FIPS 186, National
1738 Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of
1739 Commerce, May, 1994.
1740
1741 [<a id="ref-IDEA">IDEA</a>] Lai, X., "On the Design and Security of Block Ciphers," ETH
1742 Series in Information Processing, v. 1, Konstanz: Hartung-
1743 Gorre Verlag, 1992
1744
1745 [<a id="ref-KBC96">KBC96</a>] Krawczyk, H., Bellare, M., and R. Canetti, "HMAC: Keyed-
1746 Hashing for Message Authentication", <a href="./rfc2104">RFC 2104</a>, February
1747 1997.
1748
1749 [<a id="ref-SKEME">SKEME</a>] Krawczyk, H., "SKEME: A Versatile Secure Key Exchange
1750 Mechanism for Internet", from IEEE Proceedings of the 1996
1751 Symposium on Network and Distributed Systems Security.
1752
1753 [<a id="ref-MD5">MD5</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>,
1754 April 1992.
1755
1756 [<a id="ref-MSST98">MSST98</a>] Maughhan, D., Schertler, M., Schneider, M., and J. Turner,
1757 "Internet Security Association and Key Management Protocol
1758 (ISAKMP)", <a href="./rfc2408">RFC 2408</a>, November 1998.
1759
1760 [<a id="ref-Orm96">Orm96</a>] Orman, H., "The Oakley Key Determination Protocol", <a href="./rfc2412">RFC</a>
1761 <a href="./rfc2412">2412</a>, November 1998.
1762
1763 [<a id="ref-PKCS1">PKCS1</a>] RSA Laboratories, "PKCS #1: RSA Encryption Standard",
1764 November 1993.
1765
1766 [<a id="ref-Pip98">Pip98</a>] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain Of
1767 Interpretation for ISAKMP", <a href="./rfc2407">RFC 2407</a>, November 1998.
1768
1769 [<a id="ref-RC5">RC5</a>] Rivest, R., "The RC5 Encryption Algorithm", Dr. Dobb's
1770 Journal, v. 20, n. 1, January 1995.
1771
1772 [<a id="ref-RSA">RSA</a>] Rivest, R., Shamir, A., and Adleman, L., "A Method for
1773 Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public-Key Cryptosystems",
1774 Communications of the ACM, v. 21, n. 2, February 1978.
1775
1776 [<a id="ref-Sch96">Sch96</a>] Schneier, B., "Applied Cryptography, Protocols, Algorithms,
1777 and Source Code in C", 2nd edition.
1778
1779 [<a id="ref-SHA">SHA</a>] NIST, "Secure Hash Standard", FIPS 180-1, National Institue
1780 of Standards and Technology, U.S. Department of Commerce,
1781 May 1994.
1782
1783 [<a id="ref-TIGER">TIGER</a>] Anderson, R., and Biham, E., "Fast Software Encryption",
1784 Springer LNCS v. 1039, 1996.
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1791
1792
1793 Appendix A
1794
1795 This is a list of DES Weak and Semi-Weak keys. The keys come from
1796 [<a href="#ref-Sch96" title="&quot;Applied Cryptography, Protocols, Algorithms, and Source Code in C&quot;">Sch96</a>]. All keys are listed in hexidecimal.
1797
1798 DES Weak Keys
1799 0101 0101 0101 0101
1800 1F1F 1F1F E0E0 E0E0
1801 E0E0 E0E0 1F1F 1F1F
1802 FEFE FEFE FEFE FEFE
1803
1804 DES Semi-Weak Keys
1805 01FE 01FE 01FE 01FE
1806 1FE0 1FE0 0EF1 0EF1
1807 01E0 01E0 01F1 01F1
1808 1FFE 1FFE 0EFE 0EFE
1809 011F 011F 010E 010E
1810 E0FE E0FE F1FE F1FE
1811
1812 FE01 FE01 FE01 FE01
1813 E01F E01F F10E F10E
1814 E001 E001 F101 F101
1815 FE1F FE1F FE0E FE0E
1816 1F01 1F01 0E01 0E01
1817 FEE0 FEE0 FEF1 FEF1
1818
1819 Attribute Assigned Numbers
1820
1821 Attributes negotiated during phase one use the following definitions.
1822 Phase two attributes are defined in the applicable DOI specification
1823 (for example, IPsec attributes are defined in the IPsec DOI), with
1824 the exception of a group description when Quick Mode includes an
1825 ephemeral Diffie-Hellman exchange. Attribute types can be either
1826 Basic (B) or Variable-length (V). Encoding of these attributes is
1827 defined in the base ISAKMP specification as Type/Value (Basic) and
1828 Type/Length/Value (Variable).
1829
1830 Attributes described as basic MUST NOT be encoded as variable.
1831 Variable length attributes MAY be encoded as basic attributes if
1832 their value can fit into two octets. If this is the case, an
1833 attribute offered as variable (or basic) by the initiator of this
1834 protocol MAY be returned to the initiator as a basic (or variable).
1835
1836
1837
1838
1839
1840
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1847
1848
1849 Attribute Classes
1850
1851 class value type
1852 -------------------------------------------------------------------
1853 Encryption Algorithm 1 B
1854 Hash Algorithm 2 B
1855 Authentication Method 3 B
1856 Group Description 4 B
1857 Group Type 5 B
1858 Group Prime/Irreducible Polynomial 6 V
1859 Group Generator One 7 V
1860 Group Generator Two 8 V
1861 Group Curve A 9 V
1862 Group Curve B 10 V
1863 Life Type 11 B
1864 Life Duration 12 V
1865 PRF 13 B
1866 Key Length 14 B
1867 Field Size 15 B
1868 Group Order 16 V
1869
1870 values 17-16383 are reserved to IANA. Values 16384-32767 are for
1871 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1872
1873 Class Values
1874
1875 - Encryption Algorithm Defined In
1876 DES-CBC 1 <a href="./rfc2405">RFC 2405</a>
1877 IDEA-CBC 2
1878 Blowfish-CBC 3
1879 RC5-R16-B64-CBC 4
1880 3DES-CBC 5
1881 CAST-CBC 6
1882
1883 values 7-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
1884 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1885
1886 - Hash Algorithm Defined In
1887 MD5 1 <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>
1888 SHA 2 FIPS 180-1
1889 Tiger 3 See Reference [<a href="#ref-TIGER" title="&quot;Fast Software Encryption&quot;">TIGER</a>]
1890
1891 values 4-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
1892 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1903
1904
1905 - Authentication Method
1906 pre-shared key 1
1907 DSS signatures 2
1908 RSA signatures 3
1909 Encryption with RSA 4
1910 Revised encryption with RSA 5
1911
1912 values 6-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
1913 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1914
1915 - Group Description
1916 default 768-bit MODP group (<a href="#section-6.1">section 6.1</a>) 1
1917
1918 alternate 1024-bit MODP group (<a href="#section-6.2">section 6.2</a>) 2
1919
1920 EC2N group on GP[2^155] (<a href="#section-6.3">section 6.3</a>) 3
1921
1922 EC2N group on GP[2^185] (<a href="#section-6.4">section 6.4</a>) 4
1923
1924 values 5-32767 are reserved to IANA. Values 32768-65535 are for
1925 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1926
1927 - Group Type
1928 MODP (modular exponentiation group) 1
1929 ECP (elliptic curve group over GF[P]) 2
1930 EC2N (elliptic curve group over GF[2^N]) 3
1931
1932 values 4-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
1933 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1934
1935 - Life Type
1936 seconds 1
1937 kilobytes 2
1938
1939 values 3-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
1940 private use among mutually consenting parties. For a given "Life
1941 Type" the value of the "Life Duration" attribute defines the actual
1942 length of the SA life-- either a number of seconds, or a number of
1943 kbytes protected.
1944
1945 - PRF
1946 There are currently no pseudo-random functions defined.
1947
1948 values 1-65000 are reserved to IANA. Values 65001-65535 are for
1949 private use among mutually consenting parties.
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
1959
1960
1961 - Key Length
1962
1963 When using an Encryption Algorithm that has a variable length key,
1964 this attribute specifies the key length in bits. (MUST use network
1965 byte order). This attribute MUST NOT be used when the specified
1966 Encryption Algorithm uses a fixed length key.
1967
1968 - Field Size
1969
1970 The field size, in bits, of a Diffie-Hellman group.
1971
1972 - Group Order
1973
1974 The group order of an elliptical curve group. Note the length of
1975 this attribute depends on the field size.
1976
1977 Additional Exchanges Defined-- XCHG values
1978 Quick Mode 32
1979 New Group Mode 33
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
2015
2016
2017 Appendix B
2018
2019 This appendix describes encryption details to be used ONLY when
2020 encrypting ISAKMP messages. When a service (such as an IPSEC
2021 transform) utilizes ISAKMP to generate keying material, all
2022 encryption algorithm specific details (such as key and IV generation,
2023 padding, etc...) MUST be defined by that service. ISAKMP does not
2024 purport to ever produce keys that are suitable for any encryption
2025 algorithm. ISAKMP produces the requested amount of keying material
2026 from which the service MUST generate a suitable key. Details, such
2027 as weak key checks, are the responsibility of the service.
2028
2029 Use of negotiated PRFs may require the PRF output to be expanded due
2030 to the PRF feedback mechanism employed by this document. For example,
2031 if the (ficticious) DOORAK-MAC requires 24 bytes of key but produces
2032 only 8 bytes of output, the output must be expanded three times
2033 before being used as the key for another instance of itself. The
2034 output of a PRF is expanded by feeding back the results of the PRF
2035 into itself to generate successive blocks. These blocks are
2036 concatenated until the requisite number of bytes has been acheived.
2037 For example, for pre-shared key authentication with DOORAK-MAC as the
2038 negotiated PRF:
2039
2040 BLOCK1-8 = prf(pre-shared-key, Ni_b | Nr_b)
2041 BLOCK9-16 = prf(pre-shared-key, BLOCK1-8 | Ni_b | Nr_b)
2042 BLOCK17-24 = prf(pre-shared-key, BLOCK9-16 | Ni_b | Nr_b)
2043 and
2044 SKEYID = BLOCK1-8 | BLOCK9-16 | BLOCK17-24
2045
2046 so therefore to derive SKEYID_d:
2047
2048 BLOCK1-8 = prf(SKEYID, g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
2049 BLOCK9-16 = prf(SKEYID, BLOCK1-8 | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
2050 BLOCK17-24 = prf(SKEYID, BLOCK9-16 | g^xy | CKY-I | CKY-R | 0)
2051 and
2052 SKEYID_d = BLOCK1-8 | BLOCK9-16 | BLOCK17-24
2053
2054 Subsequent PRF derivations are done similarly.
2055
2056 Encryption keys used to protect the ISAKMP SA are derived from
2057 SKEYID_e in an algorithm-specific manner. When SKEYID_e is not long
2058 enough to supply all the necessary keying material an algorithm
2059 requires, the key is derived from feeding the results of a pseudo-
2060 random function into itself, concatenating the results, and taking
2061 the highest necessary bits.
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
2071
2072
2073 For example, if (ficticious) algorithm AKULA requires 320-bits of key
2074 (and has no weak key check) and the prf used to generate SKEYID_e
2075 only generates 120 bits of material, the key for AKULA, would be the
2076 first 320-bits of Ka, where:
2077
2078 Ka = K1 | K2 | K3
2079 and
2080 K1 = prf(SKEYID_e, 0)
2081 K2 = prf(SKEYID_e, K1)
2082 K3 = prf(SKEYID_e, K2)
2083
2084 where prf is the negotiated prf or the HMAC version of the negotiated
2085 hash function (if no prf was negotiated) and 0 is represented by a
2086 single octet. Each result of the prf provides 120 bits of material
2087 for a total of 360 bits. AKULA would use the first 320 bits of that
2088 360 bit string.
2089
2090 In phase 1, material for the initialization vector (IV material) for
2091 CBC mode encryption algorithms is derived from a hash of a
2092 concatenation of the initiator's public Diffie-Hellman value and the
2093 responder's public Diffie-Hellman value using the negotiated hash
2094 algorithm. This is used for the first message only. Each message
2095 should be padded up to the nearest block size using bytes containing
2096 0x00. The message length in the header MUST include the length of the
2097 pad since this reflects the size of the ciphertext. Subsequent
2098 messages MUST use the last CBC encryption block from the previous
2099 message as their initialization vector.
2100
2101 In phase 2, material for the initialization vector for CBC mode
2102 encryption of the first message of a Quick Mode exchange is derived
2103 from a hash of a concatenation of the last phase 1 CBC output block
2104 and the phase 2 message id using the negotiated hash algorithm. The
2105 IV for subsequent messages within a Quick Mode exchange is the CBC
2106 output block from the previous message. Padding and IVs for
2107 subsequent messages are done as in phase 1.
2108
2109 After the ISAKMP SA has been authenticated all Informational
2110 Exchanges are encrypted using SKEYID_e. The initiaization vector for
2111 these exchanges is derived in exactly the same fashion as that for a
2112 Quick Mode-- i.e. it is derived from a hash of a concatenation of the
2113 last phase 1 CBC output block and the message id from the ISAKMP
2114 header of the Informational Exchange (not the message id from the
2115 message that may have prompted the Informational Exchange).
2116
2117 Note that the final phase 1 CBC output block, the result of
2118 encryption/decryption of the last phase 1 message, must be retained
2119 in the ISAKMP SA state to allow for generation of unique IVs for each
2120 Quick Mode. Each post- phase 1 exchange (Quick Modes and
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
2127
2128
2129 Informational Exchanges) generates IVs independantly to prevent IVs
2130 from getting out of sync when two different exchanges are started
2131 simultaneously.
2132
2133 In all cases, there is a single bidirectional cipher/IV context.
2134 Having each Quick Mode and Informational Exchange maintain a unique
2135 context prevents IVs from getting out of sync.
2136
2137 The key for DES-CBC is derived from the first eight (8) non-weak and
2138 non-semi-weak (see <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>) bytes of SKEYID_e. The IV is the first
2139 8 bytes of the IV material derived above.
2140
2141 The key for IDEA-CBC is derived from the first sixteen (16) bytes of
2142 SKEYID_e. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material
2143 derived above.
2144
2145 The key for Blowfish-CBC is either the negotiated key size, or the
2146 first fifty-six (56) bytes of a key (if no key size is negotiated)
2147 derived in the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method.
2148 The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above.
2149
2150 The key for RC5-R16-B64-CBC is the negotiated key size, or the first
2151 sixteen (16) bytes of a key (if no key size is negotiated) derived
2152 from the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method if
2153 necessary. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material
2154 derived above. The number of rounds MUST be 16 and the block size
2155 MUST be 64.
2156
2157 The key for 3DES-CBC is the first twenty-four (24) bytes of a key
2158 derived in the aforementioned pseudo-random function feedback method.
2159 3DES-CBC is an encrypt-decrypt-encrypt operation using the first,
2160 middle, and last eight (8) bytes of the entire 3DES-CBC key. The IV
2161 is the first eight (8) bytes of the IV material derived above.
2162
2163 The key for CAST-CBC is either the negotiated key size, or the first
2164 sixteen (16) bytes of a key derived in the aforementioned pseudo-
2165 random function feedback method. The IV is the first eight (8) bytes
2166 of the IV material derived above.
2167
2168 Support for algorithms other than DES-CBC is purely optional. Some
2169 optional algorithms may be subject to intellectual property claims.
2170
2171
2172
2173
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
2183
2184
2185 Authors' Addresses
2186
2187 Dan Harkins
2188 cisco Systems
2189 170 W. Tasman Dr.
2190 San Jose, California, 95134-1706
2191 United States of America
2192
2193 Phone: +1 408 526 4000
2194 EMail: [email protected]
2195
2196
2197 Dave Carrel
2198 76 Lippard Ave.
2199 San Francisco, CA 94131-2947
2200 United States of America
2201
2202 Phone: +1 415 337 8469
2203 EMail: [email protected]
2204
2205 Authors' Note
2206
2207 The authors encourage independent implementation, and
2208 interoperability testing, of this hybrid protocol.
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2236 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a> IKE November 1998</span>
2239
2240
2241 Full Copyright Statement
2242
2243 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved.
2244
2245 This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to
2246 others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it
2247 or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published
2248 and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any
2249 kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are
2250 included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this
2251 document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing
2252 the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other
2253 Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of
2254 developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for
2255 copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be
2256 followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than
2257 English.
2258
2259 The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be
2260 revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns.
2261
2262 This document and the information contained herein is provided on an
2263 "AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING
2264 TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING
2265 BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION
2266 HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
2267 MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
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2292 Harkins &amp; Carrel Standards Track [Page 41]
2293 </pre>