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1 <!DOCTYPE html>
2 <html lang="en" class="RFC">
3 <head>
4 <meta charset="utf-8">
5 <meta content="Common,Latin" name="scripts">
6 <meta content="initial-scale=1.0" name="viewport">
7 <title>RFC 9076: DNS Privacy Considerations</title>
8 <meta content="Tim Wicinski" name="author">
9 <meta content="
10 This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of the DNS
11 by Internet users. It provides general observations about typical current
12 privacy practices. It is intended to be an analysis of the present situation
13 and does not prescribe solutions. This document obsoletes RFC 7626.
14
15 " name="description">
16 <meta content="xml2rfc 3.9.1" name="generator">
17 <meta content="DNS" name="keyword">
18 <meta content="9076" name="rfc.number">
19 <!-- Generator version information:
20 xml2rfc 3.9.1
21 Python 3.6.10
22 appdirs 1.4.4
23 ConfigArgParse 1.2.3
24 google-i18n-address 2.3.5
25 html5lib 1.0.1
26 intervaltree 3.0.2
27 Jinja2 2.11.2
28 kitchen 1.2.6
29 lxml 4.4.2
30 pycairo 1.19.0
31 pycountry 19.8.18
32 pyflakes 2.1.1
33 PyYAML 5.3.1
34 requests 2.22.0
35 setuptools 40.6.2
36 six 1.14.0
37 WeasyPrint 51
38 -->
39 <link href="rfc9076.xml" rel="alternate" type="application/rfc+xml">
40 <link href="#copyright" rel="license">
41 <style type="text/css">/*
42
43 NOTE: Changes at the bottom of this file overrides some earlier settings.
44
45 Once the style has stabilized and has been adopted as an official RFC style,
46 this can be consolidated so that style settings occur only in one place, but
47 for now the contents of this file consists first of the initial CSS work as
48 provided to the RFC Formatter (xml2rfc) work, followed by itemized and
49 commented changes found necssary during the development of the v3
50 formatters.
51
52 */
53
54 /* fonts */
55 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Sans'); /* Sans-serif */
56 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Noto+Serif'); /* Serif (print) */
57 @import url('https://fonts.googleapis.com/css?family=Roboto+Mono'); /* Monospace */
58
59 @viewport {
60 zoom: 1.0;
61 width: extend-to-zoom;
62 }
63 @-ms-viewport {
64 width: extend-to-zoom;
65 zoom: 1.0;
66 }
67 /* general and mobile first */
68 html {
69 }
70 body {
71 max-width: 90%;
72 margin: 1.5em auto;
73 color: #222;
74 background-color: #fff;
75 font-size: 14px;
76 font-family: 'Noto Sans', Arial, Helvetica, sans-serif;
77 line-height: 1.6;
78 scroll-behavior: smooth;
79 }
80 .ears {
81 display: none;
82 }
83
84 /* headings */
85 #title, h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
86 margin: 1em 0 0.5em;
87 font-weight: bold;
88 line-height: 1.3;
89 }
90 #title {
91 clear: both;
92 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
93 margin: 0 0 0.5em 0;
94 padding: 1em 0 0.5em;
95 }
96 .author {
97 padding-bottom: 4px;
98 }
99 h1 {
100 font-size: 26px;
101 margin: 1em 0;
102 }
103 h2 {
104 font-size: 22px;
105 margin-top: -20px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
106 padding-top: 33px;
107 }
108 h3 {
109 font-size: 18px;
110 margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
111 padding-top: 42px;
112 }
113 h4 {
114 font-size: 16px;
115 margin-top: -36px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
116 padding-top: 42px;
117 }
118 h5, h6 {
119 font-size: 14px;
120 }
121 #n-copyright-notice {
122 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
123 padding-bottom: 1em;
124 margin-bottom: 1em;
125 }
126 /* general structure */
127 p {
128 padding: 0;
129 margin: 0 0 1em 0;
130 text-align: left;
131 }
132 div, span {
133 position: relative;
134 }
135 div {
136 margin: 0;
137 }
138 .alignRight.art-text {
139 background-color: #f9f9f9;
140 border: 1px solid #eee;
141 border-radius: 3px;
142 padding: 1em 1em 0;
143 margin-bottom: 1.5em;
144 }
145 .alignRight.art-text pre {
146 padding: 0;
147 }
148 .alignRight {
149 margin: 1em 0;
150 }
151 .alignRight > *:first-child {
152 border: none;
153 margin: 0;
154 float: right;
155 clear: both;
156 }
157 .alignRight > *:nth-child(2) {
158 clear: both;
159 display: block;
160 border: none;
161 }
162 svg {
163 display: block;
164 }
165 .alignCenter.art-text {
166 background-color: #f9f9f9;
167 border: 1px solid #eee;
168 border-radius: 3px;
169 padding: 1em 1em 0;
170 margin-bottom: 1.5em;
171 }
172 .alignCenter.art-text pre {
173 padding: 0;
174 }
175 .alignCenter {
176 margin: 1em 0;
177 }
178 .alignCenter > *:first-child {
179 border: none;
180 /* this isn't optimal, but it's an existence proof. PrinceXML doesn't
181 support flexbox yet.
182 */
183 display: table;
184 margin: 0 auto;
185 }
186
187 /* lists */
188 ol, ul {
189 padding: 0;
190 margin: 0 0 1em 2em;
191 }
192 ol ol, ul ul, ol ul, ul ol {
193 margin-left: 1em;
194 }
195 li {
196 margin: 0 0 0.25em 0;
197 }
198 .ulCompact li {
199 margin: 0;
200 }
201 ul.empty, .ulEmpty {
202 list-style-type: none;
203 }
204 ul.empty li, .ulEmpty li {
205 margin-top: 0.5em;
206 }
207 ul.ulBare, li.ulBare {
208 margin-left: 0em !important;
209 }
210 ul.compact, .ulCompact,
211 ol.compact, .olCompact {
212 line-height: 100%;
213 margin: 0 0 0 2em;
214 }
215
216 /* definition lists */
217 dl {
218 }
219 dl > dt {
220 float: left;
221 margin-right: 1em;
222 }
223 /*
224 dl.nohang > dt {
225 float: none;
226 }
227 */
228 dl > dd {
229 margin-bottom: .8em;
230 min-height: 1.3em;
231 }
232 dl.compact > dd, .dlCompact > dd {
233 margin-bottom: 0em;
234 }
235 dl > dd > dl {
236 margin-top: 0.5em;
237 margin-bottom: 0em;
238 }
239
240 /* links */
241 a {
242 text-decoration: none;
243 }
244 a[href] {
245 color: #22e; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
246 }
247 a[href]:hover {
248 background-color: #f2f2f2;
249 }
250 figcaption a[href],
251 a[href].selfRef {
252 color: #222;
253 }
254 /* XXX probably not this:
255 a.selfRef:hover {
256 background-color: transparent;
257 cursor: default;
258 } */
259
260 /* Figures */
261 tt, code, pre, code {
262 background-color: #f9f9f9;
263 font-family: 'Roboto Mono', monospace;
264 }
265 pre {
266 border: 1px solid #eee;
267 margin: 0;
268 padding: 1em;
269 }
270 img {
271 max-width: 100%;
272 }
273 figure {
274 margin: 0;
275 }
276 figure blockquote {
277 margin: 0.8em 0.4em 0.4em;
278 }
279 figcaption {
280 font-style: italic;
281 margin: 0 0 1em 0;
282 }
283 @media screen {
284 pre {
285 overflow-x: auto;
286 max-width: 100%;
287 max-width: calc(100% - 22px);
288 }
289 }
290
291 /* aside, blockquote */
292 aside, blockquote {
293 margin-left: 0;
294 padding: 1.2em 2em;
295 }
296 blockquote {
297 background-color: #f9f9f9;
298 color: #111; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
299 border: 1px solid #ddd;
300 border-radius: 3px;
301 margin: 1em 0;
302 }
303 cite {
304 display: block;
305 text-align: right;
306 font-style: italic;
307 }
308
309 /* tables */
310 table {
311 width: 100%;
312 margin: 0 0 1em;
313 border-collapse: collapse;
314 border: 1px solid #eee;
315 }
316 th, td {
317 text-align: left;
318 vertical-align: top;
319 padding: 0.5em 0.75em;
320 }
321 th {
322 text-align: left;
323 background-color: #e9e9e9;
324 }
325 tr:nth-child(2n+1) > td {
326 background-color: #f5f5f5;
327 }
328 table caption {
329 font-style: italic;
330 margin: 0;
331 padding: 0;
332 text-align: left;
333 }
334 table p {
335 /* XXX to avoid bottom margin on table row signifiers. If paragraphs should
336 be allowed within tables more generally, it would be far better to select on a class. */
337 margin: 0;
338 }
339
340 /* pilcrow */
341 a.pilcrow {
342 color: #666; /* Arlen: AHDJ 2019 */
343 text-decoration: none;
344 visibility: hidden;
345 user-select: none;
346 -ms-user-select: none;
347 -o-user-select:none;
348 -moz-user-select: none;
349 -khtml-user-select: none;
350 -webkit-user-select: none;
351 -webkit-touch-callout: none;
352 }
353 @media screen {
354 aside:hover > a.pilcrow,
355 p:hover > a.pilcrow,
356 blockquote:hover > a.pilcrow,
357 div:hover > a.pilcrow,
358 li:hover > a.pilcrow,
359 pre:hover > a.pilcrow {
360 visibility: visible;
361 }
362 a.pilcrow:hover {
363 background-color: transparent;
364 }
365 }
366
367 /* misc */
368 hr {
369 border: 0;
370 border-top: 1px solid #eee;
371 }
372 .bcp14 {
373 font-variant: small-caps;
374 }
375
376 .role {
377 font-variant: all-small-caps;
378 }
379
380 /* info block */
381 #identifiers {
382 margin: 0;
383 font-size: 0.9em;
384 }
385 #identifiers dt {
386 width: 3em;
387 clear: left;
388 }
389 #identifiers dd {
390 float: left;
391 margin-bottom: 0;
392 }
393 #identifiers .authors .author {
394 display: inline-block;
395 margin-right: 1.5em;
396 }
397 #identifiers .authors .org {
398 font-style: italic;
399 }
400
401 /* The prepared/rendered info at the very bottom of the page */
402 .docInfo {
403 color: #666; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
404 font-size: 0.9em;
405 font-style: italic;
406 margin-top: 2em;
407 }
408 .docInfo .prepared {
409 float: left;
410 }
411 .docInfo .prepared {
412 float: right;
413 }
414
415 /* table of contents */
416 #toc {
417 padding: 0.75em 0 2em 0;
418 margin-bottom: 1em;
419 }
420 nav.toc ul {
421 margin: 0 0.5em 0 0;
422 padding: 0;
423 list-style: none;
424 }
425 nav.toc li {
426 line-height: 1.3em;
427 margin: 0.75em 0;
428 padding-left: 1.2em;
429 text-indent: -1.2em;
430 }
431 /* references */
432 .references dt {
433 text-align: right;
434 font-weight: bold;
435 min-width: 7em;
436 }
437 .references dd {
438 margin-left: 8em;
439 overflow: auto;
440 }
441
442 .refInstance {
443 margin-bottom: 1.25em;
444 }
445
446 .references .ascii {
447 margin-bottom: 0.25em;
448 }
449
450 /* index */
451 .index ul {
452 margin: 0 0 0 1em;
453 padding: 0;
454 list-style: none;
455 }
456 .index ul ul {
457 margin: 0;
458 }
459 .index li {
460 margin: 0;
461 text-indent: -2em;
462 padding-left: 2em;
463 padding-bottom: 5px;
464 }
465 .indexIndex {
466 margin: 0.5em 0 1em;
467 }
468 .index a {
469 font-weight: 700;
470 }
471 /* make the index two-column on all but the smallest screens */
472 @media (min-width: 600px) {
473 .index ul {
474 -moz-column-count: 2;
475 -moz-column-gap: 20px;
476 }
477 .index ul ul {
478 -moz-column-count: 1;
479 -moz-column-gap: 0;
480 }
481 }
482
483 /* authors */
484 address.vcard {
485 font-style: normal;
486 margin: 1em 0;
487 }
488
489 address.vcard .nameRole {
490 font-weight: 700;
491 margin-left: 0;
492 }
493 address.vcard .label {
494 font-family: "Noto Sans",Arial,Helvetica,sans-serif;
495 margin: 0.5em 0;
496 }
497 address.vcard .type {
498 display: none;
499 }
500 .alternative-contact {
501 margin: 1.5em 0 1em;
502 }
503 hr.addr {
504 border-top: 1px dashed;
505 margin: 0;
506 color: #ddd;
507 max-width: calc(100% - 16px);
508 }
509
510 /* temporary notes */
511 .rfcEditorRemove::before {
512 position: absolute;
513 top: 0.2em;
514 right: 0.2em;
515 padding: 0.2em;
516 content: "The RFC Editor will remove this note";
517 color: #9e2a00; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
518 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
519 }
520 .rfcEditorRemove {
521 position: relative;
522 padding-top: 1.8em;
523 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
524 border-radius: 3px;
525 }
526 .cref {
527 background-color: #ffd; /* Arlen: WCAG 2019 */
528 padding: 2px 4px;
529 }
530 .crefSource {
531 font-style: italic;
532 }
533 /* alternative layout for smaller screens */
534 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
535 body {
536 padding-top: 2em;
537 }
538 #title {
539 padding: 1em 0;
540 }
541 h1 {
542 font-size: 24px;
543 }
544 h2 {
545 font-size: 20px;
546 margin-top: -18px; /* provide offset for in-page anchors */
547 padding-top: 38px;
548 }
549 #identifiers dd {
550 max-width: 60%;
551 }
552 #toc {
553 position: fixed;
554 z-index: 2;
555 top: 0;
556 right: 0;
557 padding: 0;
558 margin: 0;
559 background-color: inherit;
560 border-bottom: 1px solid #ccc;
561 }
562 #toc h2 {
563 margin: -1px 0 0 0;
564 padding: 4px 0 4px 6px;
565 padding-right: 1em;
566 min-width: 190px;
567 font-size: 1.1em;
568 text-align: right;
569 background-color: #444;
570 color: white;
571 cursor: pointer;
572 }
573 #toc h2::before { /* css hamburger */
574 float: right;
575 position: relative;
576 width: 1em;
577 height: 1px;
578 left: -164px;
579 margin: 6px 0 0 0;
580 background: white none repeat scroll 0 0;
581 box-shadow: 0 4px 0 0 white, 0 8px 0 0 white;
582 content: "";
583 }
584 #toc nav {
585 display: none;
586 padding: 0.5em 1em 1em;
587 overflow: auto;
588 height: calc(100vh - 48px);
589 border-left: 1px solid #ddd;
590 }
591 }
592
593 /* alternative layout for wide screens */
594 @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
595 body {
596 max-width: 724px;
597 margin: 42px auto;
598 padding-left: 1.5em;
599 padding-right: 29em;
600 }
601 #toc {
602 position: fixed;
603 top: 42px;
604 right: 42px;
605 width: 25%;
606 margin: 0;
607 padding: 0 1em;
608 z-index: 1;
609 }
610 #toc h2 {
611 border-top: none;
612 border-bottom: 1px solid #ddd;
613 font-size: 1em;
614 font-weight: normal;
615 margin: 0;
616 padding: 0.25em 1em 1em 0;
617 }
618 #toc nav {
619 display: block;
620 height: calc(90vh - 84px);
621 bottom: 0;
622 padding: 0.5em 0 0;
623 overflow: auto;
624 }
625 img { /* future proofing */
626 max-width: 100%;
627 height: auto;
628 }
629 }
630
631 /* pagination */
632 @media print {
633 body {
634
635 width: 100%;
636 }
637 p {
638 orphans: 3;
639 widows: 3;
640 }
641 #n-copyright-notice {
642 border-bottom: none;
643 }
644 #toc, #n-introduction {
645 page-break-before: always;
646 }
647 #toc {
648 border-top: none;
649 padding-top: 0;
650 }
651 figure, pre {
652 page-break-inside: avoid;
653 }
654 figure {
655 overflow: scroll;
656 }
657 h1, h2, h3, h4, h5, h6 {
658 page-break-after: avoid;
659 }
660 h2+*, h3+*, h4+*, h5+*, h6+* {
661 page-break-before: avoid;
662 }
663 pre {
664 white-space: pre-wrap;
665 word-wrap: break-word;
666 font-size: 10pt;
667 }
668 table {
669 border: 1px solid #ddd;
670 }
671 td {
672 border-top: 1px solid #ddd;
673 }
674 }
675
676 /* This is commented out here, as the string-set: doesn't
677 pass W3C validation currently */
678 /*
679 .ears thead .left {
680 string-set: ears-top-left content();
681 }
682
683 .ears thead .center {
684 string-set: ears-top-center content();
685 }
686
687 .ears thead .right {
688 string-set: ears-top-right content();
689 }
690
691 .ears tfoot .left {
692 string-set: ears-bottom-left content();
693 }
694
695 .ears tfoot .center {
696 string-set: ears-bottom-center content();
697 }
698
699 .ears tfoot .right {
700 string-set: ears-bottom-right content();
701 }
702 */
703
704 @page :first {
705 padding-top: 0;
706 @top-left {
707 content: normal;
708 border: none;
709 }
710 @top-center {
711 content: normal;
712 border: none;
713 }
714 @top-right {
715 content: normal;
716 border: none;
717 }
718 }
719
720 @page {
721 size: A4;
722 margin-bottom: 45mm;
723 padding-top: 20px;
724 /* The follwing is commented out here, but set appropriately by in code, as
725 the content depends on the document */
726 /*
727 @top-left {
728 content: 'Internet-Draft';
729 vertical-align: bottom;
730 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
731 }
732 @top-left {
733 content: string(ears-top-left);
734 vertical-align: bottom;
735 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
736 }
737 @top-center {
738 content: string(ears-top-center);
739 vertical-align: bottom;
740 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
741 }
742 @top-right {
743 content: string(ears-top-right);
744 vertical-align: bottom;
745 border-bottom: solid 1px #ccc;
746 }
747 @bottom-left {
748 content: string(ears-bottom-left);
749 vertical-align: top;
750 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
751 }
752 @bottom-center {
753 content: string(ears-bottom-center);
754 vertical-align: top;
755 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
756 }
757 @bottom-right {
758 content: '[Page ' counter(page) ']';
759 vertical-align: top;
760 border-top: solid 1px #ccc;
761 }
762 */
763
764 }
765
766 /* Changes introduced to fix issues found during implementation */
767 /* Make sure links are clickable even if overlapped by following H* */
768 a {
769 z-index: 2;
770 }
771 /* Separate body from document info even without intervening H1 */
772 section {
773 clear: both;
774 }
775
776
777 /* Top align author divs, to avoid names without organization dropping level with org names */
778 .author {
779 vertical-align: top;
780 }
781
782 /* Leave room in document info to show Internet-Draft on one line */
783 #identifiers dt {
784 width: 8em;
785 }
786
787 /* Don't waste quite as much whitespace between label and value in doc info */
788 #identifiers dd {
789 margin-left: 1em;
790 }
791
792 /* Give floating toc a background color (needed when it's a div inside section */
793 #toc {
794 background-color: white;
795 }
796
797 /* Make the collapsed ToC header render white on gray also when it's a link */
798 @media screen and (max-width: 1023px) {
799 #toc h2 a,
800 #toc h2 a:link,
801 #toc h2 a:focus,
802 #toc h2 a:hover,
803 #toc a.toplink,
804 #toc a.toplink:hover {
805 color: white;
806 background-color: #444;
807 text-decoration: none;
808 }
809 }
810
811 /* Give the bottom of the ToC some whitespace */
812 @media screen and (min-width: 1024px) {
813 #toc {
814 padding: 0 0 1em 1em;
815 }
816 }
817
818 /* Style section numbers with more space between number and title */
819 .section-number {
820 padding-right: 0.5em;
821 }
822
823 /* prevent monospace from becoming overly large */
824 tt, code, pre, code {
825 font-size: 95%;
826 }
827
828 /* Fix the height/width aspect for ascii art*/
829 pre.sourcecode,
830 .art-text pre {
831 line-height: 1.12;
832 }
833
834
835 /* Add styling for a link in the ToC that points to the top of the document */
836 a.toplink {
837 float: right;
838 margin-right: 0.5em;
839 }
840
841 /* Fix the dl styling to match the RFC 7992 attributes */
842 dl > dt,
843 dl.dlParallel > dt {
844 float: left;
845 margin-right: 1em;
846 }
847 dl.dlNewline > dt {
848 float: none;
849 }
850
851 /* Provide styling for table cell text alignment */
852 table td.text-left,
853 table th.text-left {
854 text-align: left;
855 }
856 table td.text-center,
857 table th.text-center {
858 text-align: center;
859 }
860 table td.text-right,
861 table th.text-right {
862 text-align: right;
863 }
864
865 /* Make the alternative author contact informatio look less like just another
866 author, and group it closer with the primary author contact information */
867 .alternative-contact {
868 margin: 0.5em 0 0.25em 0;
869 }
870 address .non-ascii {
871 margin: 0 0 0 2em;
872 }
873
874 /* With it being possible to set tables with alignment
875 left, center, and right, { width: 100%; } does not make sense */
876 table {
877 width: auto;
878 }
879
880 /* Avoid reference text that sits in a block with very wide left margin,
881 because of a long floating dt label.*/
882 .references dd {
883 overflow: visible;
884 }
885
886 /* Control caption placement */
887 caption {
888 caption-side: bottom;
889 }
890
891 /* Limit the width of the author address vcard, so names in right-to-left
892 script don't end up on the other side of the page. */
893
894 address.vcard {
895 max-width: 30em;
896 margin-right: auto;
897 }
898
899 /* For address alignment dependent on LTR or RTL scripts */
900 address div.left {
901 text-align: left;
902 }
903 address div.right {
904 text-align: right;
905 }
906
907 /* Provide table alignment support. We can't use the alignX classes above
908 since they do unwanted things with caption and other styling. */
909 table.right {
910 margin-left: auto;
911 margin-right: 0;
912 }
913 table.center {
914 margin-left: auto;
915 margin-right: auto;
916 }
917 table.left {
918 margin-left: 0;
919 margin-right: auto;
920 }
921
922 /* Give the table caption label the same styling as the figcaption */
923 caption a[href] {
924 color: #222;
925 }
926
927 @media print {
928 .toplink {
929 display: none;
930 }
931
932 /* avoid overwriting the top border line with the ToC header */
933 #toc {
934 padding-top: 1px;
935 }
936
937 /* Avoid page breaks inside dl and author address entries */
938 .vcard {
939 page-break-inside: avoid;
940 }
941
942 }
943 /* Tweak the bcp14 keyword presentation */
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1178 </style>
1179 <link href="rfc-local.css" rel="stylesheet" type="text/css">
1180 <link href="https://dx.doi.org/10.17487/rfc9076" rel="alternate">
1181 <link href="urn:issn:2070-1721" rel="alternate">
1182 <link href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/draft-ietf-dprive-rfc7626-bis-09" rel="prev">
1183 </head>
1184 <body>
1185 <script src="https://www.rfc-editor.org/js/metadata.min.js"></script>
1186 <table class="ears">
1187 <thead><tr>
1188 <td class="left">RFC 9076</td>
1189 <td class="center">DNS Privacy Considerations</td>
1190 <td class="right">July 2021</td>
1191 </tr></thead>
1192 <tfoot><tr>
1193 <td class="left">Wicinski</td>
1194 <td class="center">Informational</td>
1195 <td class="right">[Page]</td>
1196 </tr></tfoot>
1197 </table>
1198 <div id="external-metadata" class="document-information"></div>
1199 <div id="internal-metadata" class="document-information">
1200 <dl id="identifiers">
1201 <dt class="label-stream">Stream:</dt>
1202 <dd class="stream">Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF)</dd>
1203 <dt class="label-rfc">RFC:</dt>
1204 <dd class="rfc"><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc9076" class="eref">9076</a></dd>
1205 <dt class="label-obsoletes">Obsoletes:</dt>
1206 <dd class="obsoletes">
1207 <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7626" class="eref">7626</a> </dd>
1208 <dt class="label-category">Category:</dt>
1209 <dd class="category">Informational</dd>
1210 <dt class="label-published">Published:</dt>
1211 <dd class="published">
1212 <time datetime="2021-07" class="published">July 2021</time>
1213 </dd>
1214 <dt class="label-issn">ISSN:</dt>
1215 <dd class="issn">2070-1721</dd>
1216 <dt class="label-authors">Author:</dt>
1217 <dd class="authors">
1218 <div class="author">
1219 <div class="author-name">T. Wicinski, <span class="editor">Ed.</span>
1220 </div>
1221 </div>
1222 </dd>
1223 </dl>
1224 </div>
1225 <h1 id="rfcnum">RFC 9076</h1>
1226 <h1 id="title">DNS Privacy Considerations</h1>
1227 <section id="section-abstract">
1228 <h2 id="abstract"><a href="#abstract" class="selfRef">Abstract</a></h2>
1229 <p id="section-abstract-1">This document describes the privacy issues associated with the use of the DNS
1230 by Internet users. It provides general observations about typical current
1231 privacy practices. It is intended to be an analysis of the present situation
1232 and does not prescribe solutions. This document obsoletes RFC 7626.<a href="#section-abstract-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1233 </section>
1234 <div id="status-of-memo">
1235 <section id="section-boilerplate.1">
1236 <h2 id="name-status-of-this-memo">
1237 <a href="#name-status-of-this-memo" class="section-name selfRef">Status of This Memo</a>
1238 </h2>
1239 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-1">
1240 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
1241 published for informational purposes.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1242 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-2">
1243 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
1244 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
1245 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
1246 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
1247 approved by the IESG are candidates for any level of Internet
1248 Standard; see Section 2 of RFC 7841.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1249 <p id="section-boilerplate.1-3">
1250 Information about the current status of this document, any
1251 errata, and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
1252 <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9076">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9076</a></span>.<a href="#section-boilerplate.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1253 </section>
1254 </div>
1255 <div id="copyright">
1256 <section id="section-boilerplate.2">
1257 <h2 id="name-copyright-notice">
1258 <a href="#name-copyright-notice" class="section-name selfRef">Copyright Notice</a>
1259 </h2>
1260 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-1">
1261 Copyright (c) 2021 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
1262 document authors. All rights reserved.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1263 <p id="section-boilerplate.2-2">
1264 This document is subject to BCP 78 and the IETF Trust's Legal
1265 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
1266 (<span><a href="https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">https://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a></span>) in effect on the date of
1267 publication of this document. Please review these documents
1268 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with
1269 respect to this document. Code Components extracted from this
1270 document must include Simplified BSD License text as described in
1271 Section 4.e of the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without
1272 warranty as described in the Simplified BSD License.<a href="#section-boilerplate.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1273 </section>
1274 </div>
1275 <div id="toc">
1276 <section id="section-toc.1">
1277 <a href="#" onclick="scroll(0,0)" class="toplink">▲</a><h2 id="name-table-of-contents">
1278 <a href="#name-table-of-contents" class="section-name selfRef">Table of Contents</a>
1279 </h2>
1280 <nav class="toc"><ul class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc">
1281 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.1">
1282 <p id="section-toc.1-1.1.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-1" class="xref">1</a>.  <a href="#name-introduction" class="xref">Introduction</a></p>
1283 </li>
1284 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.2">
1285 <p id="section-toc.1-1.2.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-2" class="xref">2</a>.  <a href="#name-scope" class="xref">Scope</a></p>
1286 </li>
1287 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.3">
1288 <p id="section-toc.1-1.3.1" class="keepWithNext"><a href="#section-3" class="xref">3</a>.  <a href="#name-risks" class="xref">Risks</a></p>
1289 </li>
1290 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.4">
1291 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.1"><a href="#section-4" class="xref">4</a>.  <a href="#name-risks-in-the-dns-data" class="xref">Risks in the DNS Data</a></p>
1292 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1293 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1">
1294 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.1.1"><a href="#section-4.1" class="xref">4.1</a>.  <a href="#name-the-public-nature-of-dns-da" class="xref">The Public Nature of DNS Data</a></p>
1295 </li>
1296 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2">
1297 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.1"><a href="#section-4.2" class="xref">4.2</a>.  <a href="#name-data-in-the-dns-request" class="xref">Data in the DNS Request</a></p>
1298 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1299 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.2.1">
1300 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.2.2.1.1"><a href="#section-4.2.1" class="xref">4.2.1</a>.  <a href="#name-data-in-the-dns-payload" class="xref">Data in the DNS Payload</a></p>
1301 </li>
1302 </ul>
1303 </li>
1304 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3">
1305 <p id="section-toc.1-1.4.2.3.1"><a href="#section-4.3" class="xref">4.3</a>.  <a href="#name-cache-snooping" class="xref">Cache Snooping</a></p>
1306 </li>
1307 </ul>
1308 </li>
1309 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.5">
1310 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.1"><a href="#section-5" class="xref">5</a>.  <a href="#name-risks-on-the-wire" class="xref">Risks on the Wire</a></p>
1311 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1312 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1">
1313 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.1.1"><a href="#section-5.1" class="xref">5.1</a>.  <a href="#name-unencrypted-transports" class="xref">Unencrypted Transports</a></p>
1314 </li>
1315 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2">
1316 <p id="section-toc.1-1.5.2.2.1"><a href="#section-5.2" class="xref">5.2</a>.  <a href="#name-encrypted-transports" class="xref">Encrypted Transports</a></p>
1317 </li>
1318 </ul>
1319 </li>
1320 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.6">
1321 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.1"><a href="#section-6" class="xref">6</a>.  <a href="#name-risks-in-the-servers" class="xref">Risks in the Servers</a></p>
1322 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1323 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1">
1324 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.1"><a href="#section-6.1" class="xref">6.1</a>.  <a href="#name-in-the-recursive-resolvers" class="xref">In the Recursive Resolvers</a></p>
1325 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1326 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.1">
1327 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.1.1"><a href="#section-6.1.1" class="xref">6.1.1</a>.  <a href="#name-resolver-selection" class="xref">Resolver Selection</a></p>
1328 </li>
1329 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.2">
1330 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.2.1"><a href="#section-6.1.2" class="xref">6.1.2</a>.  <a href="#name-active-attacks-on-resolver-" class="xref">Active Attacks on Resolver Configuration</a></p>
1331 </li>
1332 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.3">
1333 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.3.1"><a href="#section-6.1.3" class="xref">6.1.3</a>.  <a href="#name-blocking-of-dns-resolution-" class="xref">Blocking of DNS Resolution Services</a></p>
1334 </li>
1335 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.4">
1336 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.1.2.4.1"><a href="#section-6.1.4" class="xref">6.1.4</a>.  <a href="#name-encrypted-transports-and-re" class="xref">Encrypted Transports and Recursive Resolvers</a></p>
1337 </li>
1338 </ul>
1339 </li>
1340 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2">
1341 <p id="section-toc.1-1.6.2.2.1"><a href="#section-6.2" class="xref">6.2</a>.  <a href="#name-in-the-authoritative-name-s" class="xref">In the Authoritative Name Servers</a></p>
1342 </li>
1343 </ul>
1344 </li>
1345 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.7">
1346 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.1"><a href="#section-7" class="xref">7</a>.  <a href="#name-other-risks" class="xref">Other Risks</a></p>
1347 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1348 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1">
1349 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.1.1"><a href="#section-7.1" class="xref">7.1</a>.  <a href="#name-re-identification-and-other" class="xref">Re-identification and Other Inferences</a></p>
1350 </li>
1351 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2">
1352 <p id="section-toc.1-1.7.2.2.1"><a href="#section-7.2" class="xref">7.2</a>.  <a href="#name-more-information" class="xref">More Information</a></p>
1353 </li>
1354 </ul>
1355 </li>
1356 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.8">
1357 <p id="section-toc.1-1.8.1"><a href="#section-8" class="xref">8</a>.  <a href="#name-actual-attacks" class="xref">Actual "Attacks"</a></p>
1358 </li>
1359 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.9">
1360 <p id="section-toc.1-1.9.1"><a href="#section-9" class="xref">9</a>.  <a href="#name-legalities" class="xref">Legalities</a></p>
1361 </li>
1362 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.10">
1363 <p id="section-toc.1-1.10.1"><a href="#section-10" class="xref">10</a>. <a href="#name-security-considerations" class="xref">Security Considerations</a></p>
1364 </li>
1365 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.11">
1366 <p id="section-toc.1-1.11.1"><a href="#section-11" class="xref">11</a>. <a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="xref">IANA Considerations</a></p>
1367 </li>
1368 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.12">
1369 <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.1"><a href="#section-12" class="xref">12</a>. <a href="#name-references" class="xref">References</a></p>
1370 <ul class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty">
1371 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.1">
1372 <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.1.1"><a href="#section-12.1" class="xref">12.1</a>.  <a href="#name-normative-references" class="xref">Normative References</a></p>
1373 </li>
1374 <li class="ulBare compact toc ulEmpty" id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.2">
1375 <p id="section-toc.1-1.12.2.2.1"><a href="#section-12.2" class="xref">12.2</a>.  <a href="#name-informative-references" class="xref">Informative References</a></p>
1376 </li>
1377 </ul>
1378 </li>
1379 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.13">
1380 <p id="section-toc.1-1.13.1"><a href="#appendix-A" class="xref">Appendix A</a>.  <a href="#name-updates-since-rfc-7626" class="xref">Updates since RFC 7626</a></p>
1381 </li>
1382 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.14">
1383 <p id="section-toc.1-1.14.1"><a href="#appendix-B" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-acknowledgments" class="xref">Acknowledgments</a></p>
1384 </li>
1385 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.15">
1386 <p id="section-toc.1-1.15.1"><a href="#appendix-C" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-contributions" class="xref">Contributions</a></p>
1387 </li>
1388 <li class="ulEmpty compact ulBare toc" id="section-toc.1-1.16">
1389 <p id="section-toc.1-1.16.1"><a href="#appendix-D" class="xref"></a><a href="#name-authors-address" class="xref">Author's Address</a></p>
1390 </li>
1391 </ul>
1392 </nav>
1393 </section>
1394 </div>
1395 <div id="introduction">
1396 <section id="section-1">
1397 <h2 id="name-introduction">
1398 <a href="#section-1" class="section-number selfRef">1. </a><a href="#name-introduction" class="section-name selfRef">Introduction</a>
1399 </h2>
1400 <p id="section-1-1">This document is an analysis of the DNS privacy issues, in the spirit
1401 of <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc6973#section-8" class="relref">Section 8</a> of [<a href="#RFC6973" class="xref">RFC6973</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1402 <p id="section-1-2">The Domain Name System (DNS) is specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC1034" class="xref">RFC1034</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#RFC1035" class="xref">RFC1035</a>]</span>, and
1403 many later RFCs, which have never been consolidated. It is one of the most
1404 important infrastructure components of the Internet and is often ignored or
1405 misunderstood by Internet users (and even by many professionals). Almost
1406 every activity on the Internet starts with a DNS query (and often several).
1407 Its use has many privacy implications, and this document is an attempt at a
1408 comprehensive and accurate list.<a href="#section-1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1409 <p id="section-1-3">Let us begin with a simplified reminder of how the DNS works (see also
1410 <span>[<a href="#RFC8499" class="xref">RFC8499</a>]</span>). A client, the stub resolver, issues a
1411 DNS query to a server called the recursive resolver (also called caching
1412 resolver, full resolver, or recursive name server). Let's use the query
1413 "What are the AAAA records for www.example.com?" as an example. AAAA is the
1414 QTYPE (Query Type), and www.example.com is the QNAME (Query Name). (The
1415 description that follows assumes a cold cache, for instance, because the
1416 server just started.) The recursive resolver will first query the root name
1417 servers. In most cases, the root name servers will send a referral. In this
1418 example, the referral will be to the .com name servers. The resolver repeats
1419 the query to one of the .com name servers. The .com name servers, in turn,
1420 will refer to the example.com name servers. The example.com name servers will
1421 then return the answers. The root name servers, the name servers of .com, and
1422 the name servers of example.com are called authoritative name servers. It is
1423 important, when analyzing the privacy issues, to remember that the question
1424 asked to all these name servers is always the original question, not a
1425 derived question. The question sent to the root name servers is "What are
1426 the AAAA records for www.example.com?", not "What are the name servers of
1427 .com?". By repeating the full question, instead of just the relevant part of
1428 the question to the next in line, the DNS provides more information than
1429 necessary to the name server. In this simplified description, recursive
1430 resolvers do not implement QNAME minimization as described in <span>[<a href="#RFC7816" class="xref">RFC7816</a>]</span>,
1431 which will only send the relevant part of the question to the upstream name
1432 server.<a href="#section-1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1433 <p id="section-1-4">DNS relies heavily on caching, so the algorithm described
1434 above is actually a bit more complicated, and not all questions are
1435 sent to the authoritative name servers. If the
1436 stub resolver asks the recursive resolver a few seconds later, "What are the SRV records
1437 of _xmpp-server._tcp.example.com?", the recursive resolver will
1438 remember that it knows the name servers of example.com and will just
1439 query them, bypassing the root and .com. Because there is typically
1440 no caching in the stub resolver, the recursive resolver, unlike the
1441 authoritative servers, sees all the DNS traffic. (Applications, like
1442 web browsers, may have some form of caching that does not follow DNS
1443 rules, for instance, because it may ignore the TTL. So, the
1444 recursive resolver does not see all the name resolution activity.)<a href="#section-1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1445 <p id="section-1-5">It should be noted that DNS recursive resolvers sometimes forward
1446 requests to other recursive resolvers, typically bigger machines,
1447 with a larger and more shared cache (and the query hierarchy can be
1448 even deeper, with more than two levels of recursive resolvers). From
1449 the point of view of privacy, these forwarders are like resolvers
1450 except that they do not see all of the requests being made (due to
1451 caching in the first resolver).<a href="#section-1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1452 <p id="section-1-6">At the time of writing, almost all this DNS traffic is currently
1453 sent unencrypted. However, there is increasing deployment
1454 of DNS over TLS (DoT) <span>[<a href="#RFC7858" class="xref">RFC7858</a>]</span> and DNS over HTTPS (DoH)
1455 <span>[<a href="#RFC8484" class="xref">RFC8484</a>]</span>, particularly in mobile devices, browsers, and by
1456 providers of anycast recursive DNS resolution services. There are a
1457 few cases where there is some alternative channel encryption, for
1458 instance, in an IPsec VPN tunnel, at least between the stub resolver and
1459 the resolver. Some recent analysis on the service quality of encrypted DNS
1460 traffic can be found in <span>[<a href="#dns-over-encryption" class="xref">dns-over-encryption</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1461 <p id="section-1-7">Today, almost all DNS queries are sent over UDP <span>[<a href="#thomas-ditl-tcp" class="xref">thomas-ditl-tcp</a>]</span>. This has
1462 practical consequences when considering encryption of the traffic as a
1463 possible privacy technique. Some encryption solutions are only designed for
1464 TCP, not UDP, although new solutions are still emerging <span>[<a href="#RFC9000" class="xref">RFC9000</a>]</span>
1465 <span>[<a href="#I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic" class="xref">DPRIVE-DNSOQUIC</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1466 <p id="section-1-8">Another important point to keep in mind when analyzing the privacy
1467 issues of DNS is the fact that DNS requests received by a server are
1468 triggered for different reasons. Let's assume an eavesdropper wants
1469 to know which web page is viewed by a user. For a typical web page,
1470 there are three sorts of DNS requests being issued:<a href="#section-1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1471 <span class="break"></span><dl class="dlNewline" id="section-1-9">
1472 <dt id="section-1-9.1">Primary request:</dt>
1473 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-1-9.2"> This is the domain name in the URL that the user
1474 typed, selected from a bookmark, or chose by clicking on a
1475 hyperlink. Presumably, this is what is of interest for the
1476 eavesdropper.<a href="#section-1-9.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1477 </dd>
1478 <dd class="break"></dd>
1479 <dt id="section-1-9.3">Secondary requests:</dt>
1480 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-1-9.4">These are the additional requests performed by
1481 the user agent (here, the web browser) without any direct
1482 involvement or knowledge of the user. For the Web, they are
1483 triggered by embedded content, Cascading Style Sheets (CSS),
1484 JavaScript code, embedded images, etc. In some cases, there can
1485 be dozens of domain names in different contexts on a single web
1486 page.<a href="#section-1-9.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1487 </dd>
1488 <dd class="break"></dd>
1489 <dt id="section-1-9.5">Tertiary requests:</dt>
1490 <dd style="margin-left: 1.5em" id="section-1-9.6"> These are the additional requests performed by
1491 the DNS service itself. For instance, if the answer to a query is
1492 a referral to a set of name servers and the glue records are not
1493 returned, the resolver will have to send additional requests to turn
1494 the name servers' names into IP addresses. Similarly, even if
1495 glue records are returned, a careful recursive server will send
1496 tertiary requests to verify the IP addresses of those records.<a href="#section-1-9.6" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1497 </dd>
1498 <dd class="break"></dd>
1499 </dl>
1500 <p id="section-1-10">It can also be noted that, in the case of a typical web browser, more
1501 DNS requests than strictly necessary are sent, for instance, to
1502 prefetch resources that the user may query later or when
1503 autocompleting the URL in the address bar. Both are a significant privacy
1504 concern since they may leak information even about non-explicit
1505 actions. For instance, just reading a local HTML page, even without
1506 selecting the hyperlinks, may trigger DNS requests.<a href="#section-1-10" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1507 <p id="section-1-11">Privacy-related terminology is from
1508 <span>[<a href="#RFC6973" class="xref">RFC6973</a>]</span>. This document obsoletes <span>[<a href="#RFC7626" class="xref">RFC7626</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-1-11" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1509 </section>
1510 </div>
1511 <div id="scope">
1512 <section id="section-2">
1513 <h2 id="name-scope">
1514 <a href="#section-2" class="section-number selfRef">2. </a><a href="#name-scope" class="section-name selfRef">Scope</a>
1515 </h2>
1516 <p id="section-2-1">This document focuses mostly on the study of privacy risks for the
1517 end user (the one performing DNS requests). The risks of
1518 pervasive surveillance <span>[<a href="#RFC7258" class="xref">RFC7258</a>]</span> are considered as well as risks coming from a more
1519 focused surveillance. In this document, the term "end user" is used
1520 as defined in <span>[<a href="#RFC8890" class="xref">RFC8890</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1521 <p id="section-2-2">This document does not attempt a comparison of specific privacy protections
1522 provided by individual networks or organizations; it makes only general
1523 observations about typical current practices.<a href="#section-2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1524 <p id="section-2-3">Privacy risks for the holder of a zone (the risk that someone gets the data)
1525 are discussed in <span>[<a href="#RFC5155" class="xref">RFC5155</a>]</span> and <span>[<a href="#RFC5936" class="xref">RFC5936</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1526 <p id="section-2-4">Privacy risks for recursive operators (including access providers and
1527 operators in enterprise networks) such as leakage of private namespaces or
1528 blocklists are out of scope for this document.<a href="#section-2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1529 <p id="section-2-5">Non-privacy risks (e.g., security-related considerations such as cache poisoning) are
1530 also out of scope.<a href="#section-2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1531 <p id="section-2-6">The privacy risks associated with the use of other protocols that make use of
1532 DNS information are not considered here.<a href="#section-2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1533 </section>
1534 </div>
1535 <div id="risks">
1536 <section id="section-3">
1537 <h2 id="name-risks">
1538 <a href="#section-3" class="section-number selfRef">3. </a><a href="#name-risks" class="section-name selfRef">Risks</a>
1539 </h2>
1540 <p id="section-3-1">The following four sections outline the privacy considerations associated with
1541 different aspects of the DNS for the end user. When reading these sections, it
1542 needs to be kept in mind that many of the considerations (for example, recursive
1543 resolver and transport protocol) can be specific to the network context that a
1544 device is using at a given point in time. A user may have many devices, and each
1545 device might utilize many different networks (e.g., home, work, public, or
1546 cellular) over a period of time or even concurrently. An exhaustive analysis of
1547 the privacy considerations for an individual user would need to take into
1548 account the set of devices used and the multiple dynamic contexts of each
1549 device. This document does not attempt such a complex analysis; instead, it
1550 presents an overview of the various considerations that could form the basis of
1551 such an analysis.<a href="#section-3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1552 </section>
1553 </div>
1554 <div id="risks-in-the-dns-data">
1555 <section id="section-4">
1556 <h2 id="name-risks-in-the-dns-data">
1557 <a href="#section-4" class="section-number selfRef">4. </a><a href="#name-risks-in-the-dns-data" class="section-name selfRef">Risks in the DNS Data</a>
1558 </h2>
1559 <div id="the-public-nature-of-dns-data">
1560 <section id="section-4.1">
1561 <h3 id="name-the-public-nature-of-dns-da">
1562 <a href="#section-4.1" class="section-number selfRef">4.1. </a><a href="#name-the-public-nature-of-dns-da" class="section-name selfRef">The Public Nature of DNS Data</a>
1563 </h3>
1564 <p id="section-4.1-1">It has been stated that "the data in the DNS is public". This sentence
1565 makes sense for an Internet-wide lookup system, and there
1566 are multiple facets to the data and metadata involved that deserve a
1567 more detailed look. First, access control lists (ACLs) and private
1568 namespaces notwithstanding, the DNS operates under the assumption
1569 that public-facing authoritative name servers will respond to "usual"
1570 DNS queries for any zone they are authoritative for, without further
1571 authentication or authorization of the client (resolver). Due to the
1572 lack of search capabilities, only a given QNAME will reveal the
1573 resource records associated with that name (or that name's nonexistence). In other words: one needs to know what to ask for in
1574 order to receive a response. There are many ways in which supposedly "private"
1575 resources currently leak. A few examples are DNSSEC NSEC zone walking <span>[<a href="#RFC4470" class="xref">RFC4470</a>]</span>,
1576 passive DNS services <span>[<a href="#passive-dns" class="xref">passive-dns</a>]</span>, etc. The zone transfer QTYPE <span>[<a href="#RFC5936" class="xref">RFC5936</a>]</span> is
1577 often blocked or restricted to authenticated/authorized access to
1578 enforce this difference (and maybe for other reasons).<a href="#section-4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1579 <p id="section-4.1-2">Another difference between the DNS data and a particular DNS
1580 transaction (i.e., a DNS name lookup): DNS data and the results of a
1581 DNS query are public, within the boundaries described above, and may
1582 not have any confidentiality requirements. However, the same is not
1583 true of a single transaction or a sequence of transactions; those
1584 transactions are not / should not be public. A single transaction
1585 reveals both the originator of the query and the query contents; this
1586 potentially leaks sensitive information about a specific user. A
1587 typical example from outside the DNS world is that the website of Alcoholics Anonymous is public but the fact that you visit it should not be. Furthermore,
1588 the ability to link queries reveals information about individual use
1589 patterns.<a href="#section-4.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1590 </section>
1591 </div>
1592 <div id="data-in-the-dns-request">
1593 <section id="section-4.2">
1594 <h3 id="name-data-in-the-dns-request">
1595 <a href="#section-4.2" class="section-number selfRef">4.2. </a><a href="#name-data-in-the-dns-request" class="section-name selfRef">Data in the DNS Request</a>
1596 </h3>
1597 <p id="section-4.2-1">The DNS request includes many fields, but two of them seem particularly
1598 relevant for the privacy issues: the QNAME and the source IP address.
1599 "Source IP address" is used in a loose sense of "source IP address + maybe
1600 source
1601 port number", because the port number is also in the request and can be used to
1602 differentiate between several users sharing an IP address (behind a
1603 Carrier-Grade NAT (CGN), for instance <span>[<a href="#RFC6269" class="xref">RFC6269</a>]</span>).<a href="#section-4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1604 <p id="section-4.2-2">The QNAME is the full name sent by the user. It gives information
1605 about what the user does ("What are the MX records of example.net?"
1606 means they probably want to send email to someone at example.net,
1607 which may be a domain used by only a few persons and is therefore
1608 very revealing about communication relationships). Some QNAMEs are
1609 more sensitive than others. For instance, querying the A record of a
1610 well-known web statistics domain reveals very little (everybody
1611 visits websites that use this analytics service), but querying the A
1612 record of www.verybad.example where verybad.example is the domain of
1613 an organization that some people find offensive or objectionable may
1614 create more problems for the user. Also, sometimes, the QNAME embeds
1615 the software one uses, which could be a privacy issue (for instance,
1616 _ldap._tcp.Default-First-Site-Name._sites.gc._msdcs.example.org.
1617 There are also some BitTorrent clients that query an SRV record for
1618 _bittorrent-tracker._tcp.domain.example.<a href="#section-4.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1619 <p id="section-4.2-3">Another important thing about the privacy of the QNAME is future
1620 usages. Today, the lack of privacy is an obstacle to putting
1621 potentially sensitive or personally identifiable data in the DNS. At
1622 the moment, your DNS traffic might reveal that you are exchanging emails but not with whom. If your Mail User Agent (MUA) starts looking up
1623 Pretty Good Privacy (PGP) keys in the DNS <span>[<a href="#RFC7929" class="xref">RFC7929</a>]</span>, then
1624 privacy becomes a lot more important. And email is just an example;
1625 there would be other really interesting uses for a more privacy-friendly DNS.<a href="#section-4.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1626 <p id="section-4.2-4">For the communication between the stub resolver and the recursive resolver,
1627 the source IP address is the address of the user's machine. Therefore, all
1628 the issues and warnings about collection of IP addresses apply here. For the communication between the recursive resolver and the authoritative name
1629 servers, the source IP address has a different meaning; it does not have the
1630 same status as the source address in an HTTP connection. It is typically the
1631 IP address of the recursive resolver that, in a way, "hides" the real user.
1632
1633 However, hiding does not always work. The edns-client-subnet (ECS) EDNS0 option <span>[<a href="#RFC7871" class="xref">RFC7871</a>]</span> is sometimes used (see one privacy analysis in <span>[<a href="#denis-edns-client-subnet" class="xref">denis-edns-client-subnet</a>]</span>).
1634
1635 Sometimes the end user has a personal recursive resolver on their machine.
1636 In both cases, the IP address originating queries to the authoritative server
1637 is as sensitive as it is for HTTP <span>[<a href="#sidn-entrada" class="xref">sidn-entrada</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-4.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1638 <p id="section-4.2-5">A note about IP addresses: there is currently no IETF document that describes
1639 in detail all the privacy issues around IP addressing in general, although
1640 <span>[<a href="#RFC7721" class="xref">RFC7721</a>]</span> does discuss privacy considerations for IPv6 address generation
1641 mechanisms. In the meantime, the discussion here is intended to include both
1642 IPv4 and IPv6 source addresses. For a number of reasons, their assignment and
1643 utilization characteristics are different, which may have implications for
1644 details of information leakage associated with the collection of source
1645 addresses. (For example, a specific IPv6 source address seen on the public
1646 Internet is less likely than an IPv4 address to originate behind an address-sharing scheme.) However, for both IPv4 and IPv6 addresses, it is
1647 important to note that source addresses are propagated with queries
1648 via the ECS option and comprise metadata about the host, user,
1649 or application that originated them.<a href="#section-4.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1650 <div id="data-in-the-dns-payload">
1651 <section id="section-4.2.1">
1652 <h4 id="name-data-in-the-dns-payload">
1653 <a href="#section-4.2.1" class="section-number selfRef">4.2.1. </a><a href="#name-data-in-the-dns-payload" class="section-name selfRef">Data in the DNS Payload</a>
1654 </h4>
1655 <p id="section-4.2.1-1">At the time of writing, there are no standardized client identifiers contained in
1656 the DNS payload itself (ECS, as described in <span>[<a href="#RFC7871" class="xref">RFC7871</a>]</span>, is widely used; however, <span>[<a href="#RFC7871" class="xref">RFC7871</a>]</span> is only an Informational RFC).<a href="#section-4.2.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1657 <p id="section-4.2.1-2">DNS Cookies <span>[<a href="#RFC7873" class="xref">RFC7873</a>]</span> are a lightweight DNS transaction security mechanism that
1658 provides limited protection against a variety of increasingly common
1659 denial-of-service and amplification/forgery or cache poisoning attacks by
1660 off-path attackers. It is noted, however, that they are designed to just verify
1661 IP addresses (and should change once a client's IP address changes), but they are
1662 not designed to actively track users (like HTTP cookies).<a href="#section-4.2.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1663 <p id="section-4.2.1-3">There are anecdotal accounts of <a href="https://lists.dns-oarc.net/pipermail/dns-operations/2016-January/014143.html">Media Access Control (MAC) addresses</a>
1664 and even user names being inserted in nonstandard EDNS(0) options <span>[<a href="#RFC6891" class="xref">RFC6891</a>]</span>
1665 for stub-to-resolver communications to support proprietary functionality
1666 implemented at the resolver (e.g., parental filtering).<a href="#section-4.2.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1667 </section>
1668 </div>
1669 </section>
1670 </div>
1671 <div id="cache-snooping">
1672 <section id="section-4.3">
1673 <h3 id="name-cache-snooping">
1674 <a href="#section-4.3" class="section-number selfRef">4.3. </a><a href="#name-cache-snooping" class="section-name selfRef">Cache Snooping</a>
1675 </h3>
1676 <p id="section-4.3-1">The content of recursive resolvers' caches can reveal data about the
1677 clients using it (the privacy risks depend on the number of clients).
1678 This information can sometimes be examined by sending DNS queries
1679 with RD=0 to inspect cache content, particularly looking at the DNS
1680 TTLs <span>[<a href="#grangeia.snooping" class="xref">grangeia.snooping</a>]</span>. Since this also is a reconnaissance
1681 technique for subsequent cache poisoning attacks, some countermeasures have already been developed and deployed <span>[<a href="#cache-snooping-defence" class="xref">cache-snooping-defence</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-4.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1682 </section>
1683 </div>
1684 </section>
1685 </div>
1686 <div id="risks-on-the-wire">
1687 <section id="section-5">
1688 <h2 id="name-risks-on-the-wire">
1689 <a href="#section-5" class="section-number selfRef">5. </a><a href="#name-risks-on-the-wire" class="section-name selfRef">Risks on the Wire</a>
1690 </h2>
1691 <div id="unencrypted-transports">
1692 <section id="section-5.1">
1693 <h3 id="name-unencrypted-transports">
1694 <a href="#section-5.1" class="section-number selfRef">5.1. </a><a href="#name-unencrypted-transports" class="section-name selfRef">Unencrypted Transports</a>
1695 </h3>
1696 <p id="section-5.1-1">For unencrypted transports, DNS traffic can be seen by an eavesdropper like
1697 any other traffic. (DNSSEC, specified in <span>[<a href="#RFC4033" class="xref">RFC4033</a>]</span>, explicitly excludes
1698 confidentiality from its goals.) So, if an initiator starts an HTTPS
1699 communication with a recipient, the HTTP traffic will be encrypted, but the
1700 DNS exchange prior to it will not be. When other protocols become more
1701 and more privacy aware and secured against surveillance (e.g., <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span>,
1702 <span>[<a href="#RFC9000" class="xref">RFC9000</a>]</span>), the use of unencrypted transports for DNS may
1703 become "the weakest link" in privacy. It is noted that, at the time of writing,
1704 there is ongoing work attempting to encrypt the Server Name Identification (SNI) in the TLS handshake
1705 <span>[<a href="#RFC8744" class="xref">RFC8744</a>]</span>, which is one of the
1706 last remaining non-DNS cleartext identifiers of a connection target.<a href="#section-5.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1707 <p id="section-5.1-2">An important specificity of the DNS traffic is that it may take a
1708 different path than the communication between the initiator and the
1709 recipient. For instance, an eavesdropper may be unable to tap the
1710 wire between the initiator and the recipient but may have access to
1711 the wire going to the recursive resolver or to the authoritative
1712 name servers.<a href="#section-5.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1713 <p id="section-5.1-3">The best place to tap, from an eavesdropper's point of view, is
1714 clearly between the stub resolvers and the recursive resolvers,
1715 because traffic is not limited by DNS caching.<a href="#section-5.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1716 <p id="section-5.1-4">The attack surface between the stub resolver and the rest of the
1717 world can vary widely depending upon how the end user's device is
1718 configured. By order of increasing attack surface:<a href="#section-5.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1719 <ul class="normal">
1720 <li class="normal" id="section-5.1-5.1">The recursive resolver can be on the end user's device. In (currently) a small number of cases, individuals may choose to
1721 operate their own DNS resolver on their local machine. In this
1722 case, the attack surface for the connection between the stub
1723 resolver and the caching resolver is limited to that single
1724 machine. The recursive resolver will expose data to authoritative
1725 resolvers as discussed in <a href="#in-the-authoritative-name-servers" class="xref">Section 6.2</a>.<a href="#section-5.1-5.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1726 </li>
1727 <li class="normal" id="section-5.1-5.2">The recursive resolver may be at the local network edge. For
1728 many/most enterprise networks and for some residential networks, the
1729 caching resolver may exist on a server at the edge of the local
1730 network. In this case, the attack surface is the local network.
1731 Note that in large enterprise networks, the DNS resolver may not
1732 be located at the edge of the local network but rather at the edge
1733 of the overall enterprise network. In this case, the enterprise
1734 network could be thought of as similar to the Internet Access
1735 Provider (IAP) network referenced below.<a href="#section-5.1-5.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1736 </li>
1737 <li class="normal" id="section-5.1-5.3">The recursive resolver can be in the IAP network. For most residential
1738 networks and potentially other networks, the typical case is for the
1739 user's device to be configured (typically automatically through DHCP or
1740 relay agent options) with the addresses of the DNS proxy in the Customer
1741 Premises Equipment (CPE), which in turn
1742 points to the DNS recursive resolvers at the IAP. The attack surface for
1743 on-the-wire attacks is therefore from the end user system across the
1744 local network and across the IAP network to the IAP's recursive resolvers.<a href="#section-5.1-5.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1745 </li>
1746 <li class="normal" id="section-5.1-5.4">The recursive resolver can be a public DNS service (or a privately run DNS
1747 resolver hosted on the public Internet). Some machines
1748 may be configured to use public DNS resolvers such as those
1749 operated by Google Public DNS or OpenDNS. The user may
1750 have configured their machine to use these DNS recursive resolvers
1751 themselves -- or their IAP may have chosen to use the public DNS
1752 resolvers rather than operating their own resolvers. In this
1753 case, the attack surface is the entire public Internet between the
1754 user's connection and the public DNS service. It can be noted that if the
1755 user selects a single resolver with a small client population (even when using
1756 an encrypted transport), it can actually serve to aid tracking of that user as
1757 they move across network environments.<a href="#section-5.1-5.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1758 </li>
1759 </ul>
1760 <p id="section-5.1-6">It is also noted that, typically, a device connected <em>only</em> to a modern cellular
1761 network is<a href="#section-5.1-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1762 <ul class="normal">
1763 <li class="normal" id="section-5.1-7.1">directly configured with only the recursive resolvers of the IAP and<a href="#section-5.1-7.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1764 </li>
1765 <li class="normal" id="section-5.1-7.2">
1766 <p id="section-5.1-7.2.1">afforded some level of protection against some types of eavesdropping
1767 for all traffic (including DNS traffic) due to the cellular network
1768 link-layer encryption.<a href="#section-5.1-7.2.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1769 </li>
1770 </ul>
1771 <p id="section-5.1-8">The attack surface for this specific scenario is not considered here.<a href="#section-5.1-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1772 </section>
1773 </div>
1774 <div id="encrypted-transports">
1775 <section id="section-5.2">
1776 <h3 id="name-encrypted-transports">
1777 <a href="#section-5.2" class="section-number selfRef">5.2. </a><a href="#name-encrypted-transports" class="section-name selfRef">Encrypted Transports</a>
1778 </h3>
1779 <p id="section-5.2-1">The use of encrypted transports directly mitigates passive surveillance of the
1780 DNS payload; however, some privacy attacks are still possible. This section
1781 enumerates the residual privacy risks to an end user when an attacker can
1782 passively monitor encrypted DNS traffic flows on the wire.<a href="#section-5.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1783 <p id="section-5.2-2">These are cases where user identification, fingerprinting, or correlations may be
1784 possible due to the use of certain transport layers or cleartext/observable
1785 features. These issues are not specific to DNS, but DNS traffic is susceptible
1786 to these attacks when using specific transports.<a href="#section-5.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1787 <p id="section-5.2-3">Some general examples exist; for example, certain studies highlight
1788 that the <a href="http://netres.ec/?b=11B99BD">OS fingerprint values</a> of IPv4 TTL, IPv6 Hop Limit, or TCP Window size can be used to fingerprint client OSes or that various techniques can be
1789 used to de-NAT DNS queries <span>[<a href="#dns-de-nat" class="xref">dns-de-nat</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1790 <p id="section-5.2-4">Note that even when using encrypted transports, the use of cleartext transport
1791 options to decrease latency can provide correlation of a user's connections,
1792 e.g., using TCP Fast Open <span>[<a href="#RFC7413" class="xref">RFC7413</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-5.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1793 <p id="section-5.2-5">Implementations that support encrypted transports also commonly reuse
1794 connections for multiple DNS queries to optimize performance (e.g., via DNS
1795 pipelining or HTTPS multiplexing). Default configuration options for encrypted
1796 transports could, in principle, fingerprint a specific client application.
1797 For
1798 example:<a href="#section-5.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1799 <ul class="normal">
1800 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-6.1">TLS version or cipher suite selection<a href="#section-5.2-6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1801 </li>
1802 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-6.2">session resumption<a href="#section-5.2-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1803 </li>
1804 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-6.3">the maximum number of messages to send and<a href="#section-5.2-6.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1805 </li>
1806 <li class="normal" id="section-5.2-6.4">a maximum connection time before closing a connections and reopening.<a href="#section-5.2-6.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1807 </li>
1808 </ul>
1809 <p id="section-5.2-7">If libraries or applications offer user configuration of such options (e.g.,
1810 <span>[<a href="#getdns" class="xref">getdns</a>]</span>), then they could, in principle, help to identify a specific user. Users
1811 may want to use only the defaults to avoid this issue.<a href="#section-5.2-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1812 <p id="section-5.2-8">While there are known attacks on older versions of TLS, the most recent
1813 recommendations <span>[<a href="#RFC7525" class="xref">RFC7525</a>]</span> and the development of TLS 1.3 <span>[<a href="#RFC8446" class="xref">RFC8446</a>]</span> largely
1814 mitigate those.<a href="#section-5.2-8" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1815 <p id="section-5.2-9">Traffic analysis of unpadded encrypted traffic is also possible
1816 <span>[<a href="#pitfalls-of-dns-encryption" class="xref">pitfalls-of-dns-encryption</a>]</span> because the sizes and timing of encrypted DNS
1817 requests and responses can be correlated to unencrypted DNS requests upstream
1818 of a recursive resolver.<a href="#section-5.2-9" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1819 </section>
1820 </div>
1821 </section>
1822 </div>
1823 <div id="risks-in-the-servers">
1824 <section id="section-6">
1825 <h2 id="name-risks-in-the-servers">
1826 <a href="#section-6" class="section-number selfRef">6. </a><a href="#name-risks-in-the-servers" class="section-name selfRef">Risks in the Servers</a>
1827 </h2>
1828 <p id="section-6-1">Using the terminology of <span>[<a href="#RFC6973" class="xref">RFC6973</a>]</span>, the DNS servers (recursive
1829 resolvers and authoritative servers) are enablers: "they facilitate
1830 communication between an initiator and a recipient without being
1831 directly in the communications path". As a result, they are often
1832 forgotten in risk analysis. But, to quote <span>[<a href="#RFC6973" class="xref">RFC6973</a>]</span> again, "Although
1833 [...] enablers may not generally be considered as attackers, they may
1834 all pose privacy threats (depending on the context) because they are
1835 able to observe, collect, process, and transfer privacy-relevant
1836 data". In <span>[<a href="#RFC6973" class="xref">RFC6973</a>]</span> parlance, enablers become observers when they
1837 start collecting data.<a href="#section-6-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1838 <p id="section-6-2">Many programs exist to collect and analyze DNS data at the servers -- from
1839 the "query log" of some programs like BIND to tcpdump and more sophisticated
1840 programs like PacketQ <span>[<a href="#packetq" class="xref">packetq</a>]</span> and DNSmezzo <span>[<a href="#dnsmezzo" class="xref">dnsmezzo</a>]</span>. The
1841 organization managing the DNS server can use this data itself, or it can be
1842 part of a surveillance program like PRISM <span>[<a href="#prism" class="xref">prism</a>]</span> and pass data to an
1843 outside observer.<a href="#section-6-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1844 <p id="section-6-3">Sometimes this data is kept for a long time and/or distributed to
1845 third parties for research purposes <span>[<a href="#ditl" class="xref">ditl</a>]</span> <span>[<a href="#day-at-root" class="xref">day-at-root</a>]</span>, security
1846 analysis, or surveillance tasks. These uses are sometimes under some
1847 sort of contract, with various limitations, for instance, on
1848 redistribution, given the sensitive nature of the data. Also, there
1849 are observation points in the network that gather DNS data and then
1850 make it accessible to third parties for research or security purposes
1851 ("passive DNS" <span>[<a href="#passive-dns" class="xref">passive-dns</a>]</span>).<a href="#section-6-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1852 <div id="in-the-recursive-resolvers">
1853 <section id="section-6.1">
1854 <h3 id="name-in-the-recursive-resolvers">
1855 <a href="#section-6.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1. </a><a href="#name-in-the-recursive-resolvers" class="section-name selfRef">In the Recursive Resolvers</a>
1856 </h3>
1857 <p id="section-6.1-1">Recursive resolvers see all the traffic since there is typically no
1858 caching before them. To summarize: your recursive resolver knows a
1859 lot about you. The resolver of a large IAP, or a large public
1860 resolver, can collect data from many users.<a href="#section-6.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1861 <div id="resolver-selection">
1862 <section id="section-6.1.1">
1863 <h4 id="name-resolver-selection">
1864 <a href="#section-6.1.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.1. </a><a href="#name-resolver-selection" class="section-name selfRef">Resolver Selection</a>
1865 </h4>
1866 <p id="section-6.1.1-1">Given all the above considerations, the choice of recursive resolver has
1867 direct privacy considerations for end users. Historically, end user devices
1868 have used the DHCP-provided local network recursive resolver. The choice by a
1869 user to join a particular network (e.g., by physically plugging in a cable or
1870 selecting a network in an OS dialogue) typically updates a number of system
1871 resources -- these can include IP addresses, the availability of IPv4/IPv6, DHCP
1872 server, and DNS resolver. These individual changes, including the change in
1873 DNS resolver, are not normally communicated directly to the user by the OS
1874 when the network is joined. The choice of network has historically determined
1875 the default system DNS resolver selection; the two are directly coupled in
1876 this model.<a href="#section-6.1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1877 <p id="section-6.1.1-2">The vast majority of users do not change their default system DNS settings
1878 and so implicitly accept the network settings for the DNS. The network resolvers
1879 have therefore historically been the sole destination for all of the DNS
1880 queries from a device. These resolvers may have varied
1881 privacy policies depending on the network. Privacy policies for these servers
1882 may or may not be available, and users need to be aware that privacy
1883 guarantees will vary with the network.<a href="#section-6.1.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1884 <p id="section-6.1.1-3">All major OSes expose the system DNS settings and allow users to manually
1885 override them if desired.<a href="#section-6.1.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1886 <p id="section-6.1.1-4">More recently, some networks and users have actively chosen
1887 to use a large public resolver, e.g., <a href="https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns">Google Public
1888 DNS</a>,
1889 <a href="https://developers.cloudflare.com/1.1.1.1/setting-up-1.1.1.1/">Cloudflare</a>,
1890 or <a href="https://www.quad9.net">Quad9</a>. There can be many reasons: cost
1891 considerations for network operators, better reliability, or anti-censorship
1892 considerations are just a few. Such services typically do provide a privacy
1893 policy, and the user can get an idea of the data collected by such
1894 operators by reading one, e.g., <a href="https://developers.google.com/speed/public-dns/privacy">Google Public DNS - Your
1895 Privacy</a>.<a href="#section-6.1.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1896 <p id="section-6.1.1-5">In general, as with many other protocols, issues around centralization also
1897 arise with DNS.
1898
1899 The picture is fluid with several competing factors
1900 contributing, where these factors can also vary by geographic region. These include:<a href="#section-6.1.1-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1901 <ul class="normal">
1902 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.1-6.1">ISP outsourcing, including to third-party and public resolvers<a href="#section-6.1.1-6.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1903 </li>
1904 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.1-6.2">regional market domination by one or only a few ISPs<a href="#section-6.1.1-6.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1905 </li>
1906 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.1-6.3">applications directing DNS traffic by default to a limited subset of resolvers (see <a href="#applicationspecific-resolver-selection" class="xref">Section 6.1.1.2</a>)<a href="#section-6.1.1-6.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1907 </li>
1908 </ul>
1909 <p id="section-6.1.1-7">An increased proportion of the global DNS resolution traffic being served by
1910 only a few entities means that the privacy considerations for users are
1911 highly dependent on the privacy policies and practices of those
1912 entities. Many of the issues around centralization are discussed in
1913 <span>[<a href="#centralisation-and-data-sovereignty" class="xref">centralisation-and-data-sovereignty</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.1.1-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1914 <div id="dynamic-discovery-of-doh-and-strict-dot">
1915 <section id="section-6.1.1.1">
1916 <h5 id="name-dynamic-discovery-of-doh-an">
1917 <a href="#section-6.1.1.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.1.1. </a><a href="#name-dynamic-discovery-of-doh-an" class="section-name selfRef">Dynamic Discovery of DoH and Strict DoT</a>
1918 </h5>
1919 <p id="section-6.1.1.1-1">While support for opportunistic DoT can be determined by probing a resolver on
1920 port 853, there is currently no standardized discovery mechanism for DoH and
1921 Strict DoT servers.<a href="#section-6.1.1.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1922 <p id="section-6.1.1.1-2">This means that clients that might want to dynamically discover such encrypted
1923 services, and where users are willing to trust such services, are not able to do
1924 so. At the time of writing, efforts to provide standardized signaling mechanisms
1925 to discover the services offered by local resolvers are in progress
1926 <span>[<a href="#I-D.ietf-dnsop-resolver-information" class="xref">DNSOP-RESOLVER</a>]</span>. Note that an increasing number of ISPs
1927 are deploying encrypted DNS; for example, see the Encrypted DNS Deployment
1928 Initiative <span>[<a href="#EDDI" class="xref">EDDI</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-6.1.1.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1929 </section>
1930 </div>
1931 <div id="applicationspecific-resolver-selection">
1932 <section id="section-6.1.1.2">
1933 <h5 id="name-application-specific-resolv">
1934 <a href="#section-6.1.1.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.1.2. </a><a href="#name-application-specific-resolv" class="section-name selfRef">Application-Specific Resolver Selection</a>
1935 </h5>
1936 <p id="section-6.1.1.2-1">An increasing number of applications are offering application-specific encrypted DNS resolution settings, rather than defaulting to
1937 using only the system resolver. A variety of heuristics and
1938 resolvers are available in different applications, including hard-coded lists of recognized DoH/DoT servers.<a href="#section-6.1.1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1939 <p id="section-6.1.1.2-2">Generally, users are not aware of application-specific DNS settings and may
1940 not have control over those settings. To address these limitations, users
1941 will only be aware of and have the ability to control such settings if
1942 applications provide the following functions:<a href="#section-6.1.1.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1943 <ul class="normal">
1944 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.1.2-3.1">communicate the change clearly to users when the default application
1945 resolver changes away from the system resolver<a href="#section-6.1.1.2-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1946 </li>
1947 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.1.2-3.2">provide configuration options to change the default
1948 application resolver, including a choice to always use the system resolver<a href="#section-6.1.1.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1949 </li>
1950 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.1.2-3.3">provide mechanisms for users to locally inspect, selectively forward,
1951 and filter queries (either via the application itself or use of the
1952 system resolver)<a href="#section-6.1.1.2-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
1953 </li>
1954 </ul>
1955 <p id="section-6.1.1.2-4">Application-specific changes to default destinations for users' DNS
1956 queries might increase or decrease user privacy; it is highly
1957 dependent on the network context and the application-specific
1958 default. This is an area of active debate, and the IETF is working on
1959 a number of issues related to application-specific DNS settings.<a href="#section-6.1.1.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1960 </section>
1961 </div>
1962 </section>
1963 </div>
1964 <div id="active-attacks-on-resolver-configuration">
1965 <section id="section-6.1.2">
1966 <h4 id="name-active-attacks-on-resolver-">
1967 <a href="#section-6.1.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.2. </a><a href="#name-active-attacks-on-resolver-" class="section-name selfRef">Active Attacks on Resolver Configuration</a>
1968 </h4>
1969 <p id="section-6.1.2-1">The previous section discussed DNS privacy, assuming that all the traffic
1970 was directed to the intended servers (i.e., those that would be used in the
1971 absence of an active attack) and that the potential attacker was purely
1972 passive. But, in reality, there can be active attackers in the network.<a href="#section-6.1.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1973 <p id="section-6.1.2-2">The Internet Threat model, as described in <span>[<a href="#RFC3552" class="xref">RFC3552</a>]</span>, assumes that the attacker
1974 controls the network. Such an attacker can completely control any insecure DNS
1975 resolution, both passively monitoring the queries and responses and substituting
1976 their own responses. Even if encrypted DNS such as DoH or DoT is used, unless
1977 the client has been configured in a secure way with the server identity, an active attacker can impersonate the server. This implies that opportunistic
1978 modes of DoH/DoT as well as modes where the client learns of the DoH/DoT server
1979 via in-network mechanisms such as DHCP are vulnerable to attack. In addition, if
1980 the client is compromised, the attacker can replace the DNS configuration with
1981 one of its own choosing.<a href="#section-6.1.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1982 </section>
1983 </div>
1984 <div id="blocking-of-dns-resolution-services">
1985 <section id="section-6.1.3">
1986 <h4 id="name-blocking-of-dns-resolution-">
1987 <a href="#section-6.1.3" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.3. </a><a href="#name-blocking-of-dns-resolution-" class="section-name selfRef">Blocking of DNS Resolution Services</a>
1988 </h4>
1989 <p id="section-6.1.3-1">User privacy can also be at risk if there is blocking
1990 of access to remote recursive servers
1991 that offer encrypted transports, e.g., when the local resolver does not offer
1992 encryption and/or has very poor privacy policies. For example, active blocking
1993 of port 853 for DoT or blocking of specific IP addresses could restrict the resolvers
1994 available to the user. The extent of the risk to user privacy is highly
1995 dependent on the specific network and user context; a user on a network that
1996 is known to perform surveillance would be compromised if they could not access
1997 such services, whereas a user on a trusted network might have no privacy
1998 motivation to do so.<a href="#section-6.1.3-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
1999 <p id="section-6.1.3-2">As a matter of policy, some recursive resolvers use their position in the query
2000 path to selectively block access to certain DNS records. This is a form of
2001 rendezvous-based blocking as described in <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc7754#section-4.3" class="relref">Section 4.3</a> of [<a href="#RFC7754" class="xref">RFC7754</a>]</span>. Such
2002 blocklists often include servers known to be used for malware, bots, or other
2003 security risks. In order to prevent circumvention of their blocking policies,
2004 some networks also block access to resolvers with incompatible policies.<a href="#section-6.1.3-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2005 <p id="section-6.1.3-3">It is also noted that attacks on remote resolver services, e.g., DDoS, could
2006 force users to switch to other services that do not offer encrypted transports
2007 for DNS.<a href="#section-6.1.3-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2008 </section>
2009 </div>
2010 <div id="encrypted-transports-and-recursive-resolvers">
2011 <section id="section-6.1.4">
2012 <h4 id="name-encrypted-transports-and-re">
2013 <a href="#section-6.1.4" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.4. </a><a href="#name-encrypted-transports-and-re" class="section-name selfRef">Encrypted Transports and Recursive Resolvers</a>
2014 </h4>
2015 <div id="dot-and-doh">
2016 <section id="section-6.1.4.1">
2017 <h5 id="name-dot-and-doh">
2018 <a href="#section-6.1.4.1" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.4.1. </a><a href="#name-dot-and-doh" class="section-name selfRef">DoT and DoH</a>
2019 </h5>
2020 <p id="section-6.1.4.1-1">Use of encrypted transports does not reduce the data available in the recursive
2021 resolver and ironically can actually expose more information about users to
2022 operators. As described in <a href="#encrypted-transports" class="xref">Section 5.2</a>, use of session-based encrypted
2023 transports (TCP/TLS) can expose correlation data about users.<a href="#section-6.1.4.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2024 </section>
2025 </div>
2026 <div id="doh-specific-considerations">
2027 <section id="section-6.1.4.2">
2028 <h5 id="name-doh-specific-considerations">
2029 <a href="#section-6.1.4.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.1.4.2. </a><a href="#name-doh-specific-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">DoH-Specific Considerations</a>
2030 </h5>
2031 <p id="section-6.1.4.2-1">DoH inherits the full privacy properties of the HTTPS stack and as a consequence
2032 introduces new privacy considerations when compared with DNS over UDP, TCP, or
2033 TLS <span>[<a href="#RFC7858" class="xref">RFC7858</a>]</span>. <span><a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/rfc/rfc8484#section-8.2" class="relref">Section 8.2</a> of [<a href="#RFC8484" class="xref">RFC8484</a>]</span> describes the privacy considerations in
2034 the server of the DoH protocol.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2035 <p id="section-6.1.4.2-2">A brief summary of some of the issues includes the following:<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2036 <ul class="normal">
2037 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.4.2-3.1">HTTPS presents new considerations for correlation, such as explicit HTTP
2038 cookies and implicit fingerprinting of the unique set and ordering of HTTP
2039 request header fields.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-3.1" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2040 </li>
2041 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.4.2-3.2">The User-Agent and Accept-Language request header fields often convey specific
2042 information about the client version or locale.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-3.2" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2043 </li>
2044 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.4.2-3.3">Utilizing the full set of HTTP features enables DoH to be more than an HTTP
2045 tunnel, but it is at the cost of opening up implementations to the full set of
2046 privacy considerations of HTTP.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-3.3" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2047 </li>
2048 <li class="normal" id="section-6.1.4.2-3.4">Implementations are advised to expose the minimal set of data needed to
2049 achieve the desired feature set.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-3.4" class="pilcrow">¶</a>
2050 </li>
2051 </ul>
2052 <p id="section-6.1.4.2-4"><span>[<a href="#RFC8484" class="xref">RFC8484</a>]</span> specifically makes selection of HTTPS functionality vs. privacy an
2053 implementation choice. At the extremes, there may be implementations that
2054 attempt to achieve parity with DoT from a privacy perspective at the cost of
2055 using no identifiable HTTP headers, and there might be others that provide feature-rich data flows where the low-level origin of the DNS query is easily
2056 identifiable. Some implementations have, in fact, chosen to restrict the use of the User-Agent header so that resolver operators cannot identify the specific
2057 application that is originating the DNS queries.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2058 <p id="section-6.1.4.2-5">Privacy-focused users should be aware of the potential for additional client
2059 identifiers in DoH compared to DoT and may want to only use DoH client
2060 implementations that provide clear guidance on what identifiers they add.<a href="#section-6.1.4.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2061 </section>
2062 </div>
2063 </section>
2064 </div>
2065 </section>
2066 </div>
2067 <div id="in-the-authoritative-name-servers">
2068 <section id="section-6.2">
2069 <h3 id="name-in-the-authoritative-name-s">
2070 <a href="#section-6.2" class="section-number selfRef">6.2. </a><a href="#name-in-the-authoritative-name-s" class="section-name selfRef">In the Authoritative Name Servers</a>
2071 </h3>
2072 <p id="section-6.2-1">Unlike what happens for recursive resolvers, the observation capabilities of
2073 authoritative name servers are limited by caching; they see only the requests
2074 for which the answer was not in the cache. For aggregated statistics ("What
2075 is the percentage of LOC queries?"), this is sufficient, but it prevents an
2076 observer from seeing everything. Similarly, the increasing deployment of QNAME
2077 minimization <span>[<a href="#ripe-qname-measurements" class="xref">ripe-qname-measurements</a>]</span> reduces the data visible at the
2078 authoritative name server. Still, the authoritative name servers see a part
2079 of the traffic, and this subset may be sufficient to violate some privacy
2080 expectations.<a href="#section-6.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2081 <p id="section-6.2-2">Also, the user often has some legal/contractual link with the
2082 recursive resolver (they have chosen the IAP, or they have chosen to use a
2083 given public resolver) while having no control and perhaps no
2084 awareness of the role of the authoritative name servers and their
2085 observation abilities.<a href="#section-6.2-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2086 <p id="section-6.2-3">As noted before, using a local resolver or a resolver close to the
2087 machine decreases the attack surface for an on-the-wire eavesdropper.
2088 But it may decrease privacy against an observer located on an
2089 authoritative name server. This authoritative name server will see
2090 the IP address of the end client instead of the address of a big
2091 recursive resolver shared by many users.<a href="#section-6.2-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2092 <p id="section-6.2-4">This "protection", when using a large resolver with many clients, is
2093 no longer present if ECS <span>[<a href="#RFC7871" class="xref">RFC7871</a>]</span> is used because, in this case,
2094 the authoritative name server sees the original IP address (or
2095 prefix, depending on the setup).<a href="#section-6.2-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2096 <p id="section-6.2-5">As of today, all the instances of one root name server, L-root,
2097 receive together around 50,000 queries per second. While most of it
2098 is "junk" (errors on the Top-Level Domain (TLD) name), it gives an
2099 idea of the amount of big data that pours into name servers. (And
2100 even "junk" can leak information; for instance, if there is a typing
2101 error in the TLD, the user will send data to a TLD that is not the
2102 usual one.)<a href="#section-6.2-5" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2103 <p id="section-6.2-6">Many domains, including TLDs, are partially hosted by third-party
2104 servers, sometimes in a different country. The contracts between the
2105 domain manager and these servers may or may not take privacy into
2106 account. Whatever the contract, the third-party hoster may or may not be honest; in any case, it will have to follow its local laws. For
2107 example,
2108 requests to a given ccTLD may go to servers managed by organizations
2109 outside of the ccTLD's country. Users may not anticipate that
2110 when doing a security analysis.<a href="#section-6.2-6" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2111 <p id="section-6.2-7">Also, it seems (see the survey described in <span>[<a href="#aeris-dns" class="xref">aeris-dns</a>]</span>) that there is a
2112 strong concentration of authoritative name servers among "popular" domains
2113 (such as the Alexa Top N list). For instance, among the <a href="https://www.alexa.com/topsites">Alexa Top
2114 100K</a>, one DNS provider hosts 10% of
2115 the domains today. The ten most important DNS providers together host one-third of
2116 all domains. With the control (or the ability to sniff the traffic) of a few
2117 name servers, you can gather a lot of information.<a href="#section-6.2-7" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2118 </section>
2119 </div>
2120 </section>
2121 </div>
2122 <div id="other-risks">
2123 <section id="section-7">
2124 <h2 id="name-other-risks">
2125 <a href="#section-7" class="section-number selfRef">7. </a><a href="#name-other-risks" class="section-name selfRef">Other Risks</a>
2126 </h2>
2127 <div id="reidentification-and-other-inferences">
2128 <section id="section-7.1">
2129 <h3 id="name-re-identification-and-other">
2130 <a href="#section-7.1" class="section-number selfRef">7.1. </a><a href="#name-re-identification-and-other" class="section-name selfRef">Re-identification and Other Inferences</a>
2131 </h3>
2132 <p id="section-7.1-1">An observer has access not only to the data they directly collect but also
2133 to the results of various inferences about this data. The term "observer" here is used very generally; for example, the observer might
2134 passively observe cleartext DNS traffic or be in the network
2135 that is actively attacking the user by redirecting DNS resolution, or it might be a
2136 local or remote resolver operator.<a href="#section-7.1-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2137 <p id="section-7.1-2">For instance, a user can be re-identified via DNS queries. If the
2138 adversary knows a user's identity and can watch their DNS queries for
2139 a period, then that same adversary may be able to re-identify the
2140 user solely based on their pattern of DNS queries later on regardless
2141 of the location from which the user makes those queries. For
2142 example, one study <span>[<a href="#herrmann-reidentification" class="xref">herrmann-reidentification</a>]</span> found that such re-identification is possible so that "73.1% of all day-to-day links
2143 were correctly established, i.e. user u was either re-identified
2144 unambiguously (1) or the classifier correctly reported that u was not
2145 present on day t + 1 any more (2)". While that study related to web
2146 browsing behavior, equally characteristic patterns may be produced
2147 even in machine-to-machine communications or without a user taking
2148 specific actions, e.g., at reboot time if a characteristic set of
2149 services are accessed by the device.<a href="#section-7.1-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2150 <p id="section-7.1-3">For instance, one could imagine that an intelligence agency
2151 identifies people going to a site by putting in a very long DNS name
2152 and looking for queries of a specific length. Such traffic analysis
2153 could weaken some privacy solutions.<a href="#section-7.1-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2154 <p id="section-7.1-4">The IAB Privacy and Security Program also has a document
2155 <span>[<a href="#RFC7624" class="xref">RFC7624</a>]</span> that considers such inference-based attacks in a more
2156 general framework.<a href="#section-7.1-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2157 </section>
2158 </div>
2159 <div id="more-information">
2160 <section id="section-7.2">
2161 <h3 id="name-more-information">
2162 <a href="#section-7.2" class="section-number selfRef">7.2. </a><a href="#name-more-information" class="section-name selfRef">More Information</a>
2163 </h3>
2164 <p id="section-7.2-1">Useful background information can also be found in <span>[<a href="#tor-leak" class="xref">tor-leak</a>]</span> (regarding the risk of privacy leaks through DNS) and in a few academic papers:
2165 <span>[<a href="#yanbin-tsudik" class="xref">yanbin-tsudik</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#castillo-garcia" class="xref">castillo-garcia</a>]</span>, <span>[<a href="#fangming-hori-sakurai" class="xref">fangming-hori-sakurai</a>]</span>, and
2166 <span>[<a href="#federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny" class="xref">federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-7.2-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2167 </section>
2168 </div>
2169 </section>
2170 </div>
2171 <div id="actual-attacks">
2172 <section id="section-8">
2173 <h2 id="name-actual-attacks">
2174 <a href="#section-8" class="section-number selfRef">8. </a><a href="#name-actual-attacks" class="section-name selfRef">Actual "Attacks"</a>
2175 </h2>
2176 <p id="section-8-1">A very quick examination of DNS traffic may lead to the false conclusion that
2177 extracting the needle from the haystack is difficult. "Interesting" primary
2178 DNS requests are mixed with useless (for the eavesdropper) secondary and
2179 tertiary requests (see the terminology in <a href="#introduction" class="xref">Section 1</a>). But, in
2180 this time of "big data" processing, powerful techniques now exist to get from
2181 the raw data to what the eavesdropper is actually interested in.<a href="#section-8-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2182 <p id="section-8-2">Many research papers about malware detection use DNS traffic to
2183 detect "abnormal" behavior that can be traced back to the activity of
2184 malware on infected machines.
2185 Yes, this research was done for the greater good, but technically it is a privacy attack and it demonstrates the
2186 power of the observation of DNS traffic. See <span>[<a href="#dns-footprint" class="xref">dns-footprint</a>]</span>,
2187 <span>[<a href="#dagon-malware" class="xref">dagon-malware</a>]</span>, and <span>[<a href="#darkreading-dns" class="xref">darkreading-dns</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-8-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2188 <p id="section-8-3">Passive DNS services <span>[<a href="#passive-dns" class="xref">passive-dns</a>]</span> allow reconstruction of the data of sometimes an entire zone. Well-known passive DNS services keep only the DNS
2189 responses and not the source IP address of the client, precisely for
2190 privacy reasons. Other passive DNS services may not be so careful.
2191 And there are still potential problems with revealing QNAMEs.<a href="#section-8-3" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2192 <p id="section-8-4">The revelations from the Edward Snowden documents, which were leaked from the
2193 National Security Agency (NSA), provide evidence of the use of the DNS in mass
2194 surveillance operations <span>[<a href="#morecowbell" class="xref">morecowbell</a>]</span>. For example, the MORECOWBELL
2195 surveillance program uses a dedicated covert monitoring infrastructure
2196 to actively query DNS servers and perform HTTP requests to obtain meta-information about services and to check their availability. Also, the
2197 <a href="https://theintercept.com/document/2014/03/12/nsa-gchqs-quantumtheory-hacking-tactics/">QUANTUMTHEORY</a>
2198 project, which includes detecting lookups for certain addresses and injecting
2199 bogus replies, is another good example showing that the lack of privacy
2200 protections in the DNS is actively exploited.<a href="#section-8-4" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2201 </section>
2202 </div>
2203 <div id="legalities">
2204 <section id="section-9">
2205 <h2 id="name-legalities">
2206 <a href="#section-9" class="section-number selfRef">9. </a><a href="#name-legalities" class="section-name selfRef">Legalities</a>
2207 </h2>
2208 <p id="section-9-1">To our knowledge, there are no specific privacy laws for DNS data in any
2209 country. Interpreting general privacy laws, like the European Union's <span>[<a href="#data-protection-directive" class="xref">data-protection-directive</a>]</span>
2210 or <a href="https://gdpr.eu/tag/gdpr/">GDPR</a>, in the context of DNS traffic data is not an easy task, and
2211 there is no known court precedent. See an interesting analysis in
2212 <span>[<a href="#sidn-entrada" class="xref">sidn-entrada</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-9-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2213 </section>
2214 </div>
2215 <div id="security-considerations">
2216 <section id="section-10">
2217 <h2 id="name-security-considerations">
2218 <a href="#section-10" class="section-number selfRef">10. </a><a href="#name-security-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">Security Considerations</a>
2219 </h2>
2220 <p id="section-10-1">This document is entirely about security -- more precisely, privacy. It just
2221 lays out the problem; it does not try to set requirements (with the choices
2222 and compromises they imply), much less define solutions. Possible solutions
2223 to the issues described here are discussed in other documents (currently too
2224 many to all be mentioned); see, for instance, "Recommendations for DNS
2225 Privacy Operators" <span>[<a href="#RFC8932" class="xref">RFC8932</a>]</span>.<a href="#section-10-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2226 </section>
2227 </div>
2228 <div id="iana-considerations">
2229 <section id="section-11">
2230 <h2 id="name-iana-considerations">
2231 <a href="#section-11" class="section-number selfRef">11. </a><a href="#name-iana-considerations" class="section-name selfRef">IANA Considerations</a>
2232 </h2>
2233 <p id="section-11-1">This document has no IANA actions.<a href="#section-11-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2234 </section>
2235 </div>
2236 <section id="section-12">
2237 <h2 id="name-references">
2238 <a href="#section-12" class="section-number selfRef">12. </a><a href="#name-references" class="section-name selfRef">References</a>
2239 </h2>
2240 <section id="section-12.1">
2241 <h3 id="name-normative-references">
2242 <a href="#section-12.1" class="section-number selfRef">12.1. </a><a href="#name-normative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Normative References</a>
2243 </h3>
2244 <dl class="references">
2245 <dt id="RFC1034">[RFC1034]</dt>
2246 <dd>
2247 <span class="refAuthor">Mockapetris, P.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Domain names - concepts and facilities"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 13</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 1034</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC1034</span>, <time datetime="1987-11" class="refDate">November 1987</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1034</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2248 <dd class="break"></dd>
2249 <dt id="RFC1035">[RFC1035]</dt>
2250 <dd>
2251 <span class="refAuthor">Mockapetris, P.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Domain names - implementation and specification"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 13</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 1035</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC1035</span>, <time datetime="1987-11" class="refDate">November 1987</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1035</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2252 <dd class="break"></dd>
2253 <dt id="RFC6973">[RFC6973]</dt>
2254 <dd>
2255 <span class="refAuthor">Cooper, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Tschofenig, H.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Aboba, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Peterson, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Morris, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Hansen, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">R. Smith</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Privacy Considerations for Internet Protocols"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6973</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6973</span>, <time datetime="2013-07" class="refDate">July 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6973</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2256 <dd class="break"></dd>
2257 <dt id="RFC7258">[RFC7258]</dt>
2258 <dd>
2259 <span class="refAuthor">Farrell, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">H. Tschofenig</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Pervasive Monitoring Is an Attack"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 188</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7258</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7258</span>, <time datetime="2014-05" class="refDate">May 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7258</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2260 <dd class="break"></dd>
2261 </dl>
2262 </section>
2263 <section id="section-12.2">
2264 <h3 id="name-informative-references">
2265 <a href="#section-12.2" class="section-number selfRef">12.2. </a><a href="#name-informative-references" class="section-name selfRef">Informative References</a>
2266 </h3>
2267 <dl class="references">
2268 <dt id="aeris-dns">[aeris-dns]</dt>
2269 <dd>
2270 <span class="refAuthor">Vinot, N.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Vie privée: et le DNS alors? [Privacy: what about DNS?]"</span>, <time datetime="2015-02" class="refDate">February 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://blog.imirhil.fr/vie-privee-et-le-dns-alors.html">https://blog.imirhil.fr/vie-privee-et-le-dns-alors.html</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2271 <dd class="break"></dd>
2272 <dt id="cache-snooping-defence">[cache-snooping-defence]</dt>
2273 <dd>
2274 <span class="refAuthor">ISC</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Cache snooping - should I be concerned?"</span>, <time datetime="2018-10" class="refDate">October 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://kb.isc.org/docs/aa-00482">https://kb.isc.org/docs/aa-00482</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2275 <dd class="break"></dd>
2276 <dt id="castillo-garcia">[castillo-garcia]</dt>
2277 <dd>
2278 <span class="refAuthor">Castillo-Perez, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">J. Garcia-Alfaro</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Anonymous Resolution of DNS Queries"</span>, <span class="refContent">Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 5332</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1007/978-3-540-88873-4_5</span>, <time datetime="2008" class="refDate">2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-540-88873-4_5">https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1007/978-3-540-88873-4_5</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2279 <dd class="break"></dd>
2280 <dt id="centralisation-and-data-sovereignty">[centralisation-and-data-sovereignty]</dt>
2281 <dd>
2282 <span class="refAuthor">De Filippi, P.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">S. McCarthy</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cloud Computing: Centralization and Data Sovereignty"</span>, <span class="refContent">European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 3, No. 2</span>, <time datetime="2012-10" class="refDate">October 2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167372">https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2167372</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2283 <dd class="break"></dd>
2284 <dt id="dagon-malware">[dagon-malware]</dt>
2285 <dd>
2286 <span class="refAuthor">Dagon, D.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Corrupted DNS Resolution Paths: The Rise of a Malicious Resolution Authority"</span>, <span class="refContent">ISC/OARC Workshop</span>, <time datetime="2007" class="refDate">2007</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.dns-oarc.net/files/workshop-2007/Dagon-Resolution-corruption.pdf">https://www.dns-oarc.net/files/workshop-2007/Dagon-Resolution-corruption.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2287 <dd class="break"></dd>
2288 <dt id="darkreading-dns">[darkreading-dns]</dt>
2289 <dd>
2290 <span class="refAuthor">Lemos, R.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Got Malware? Three Signs Revealed In DNS Traffic"</span>, <time datetime="2013-05" class="refDate">May 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680">https://www.darkreading.com/analytics/security-monitoring/got-malware-three-signs-revealed-in-dns-traffic/d/d-id/1139680</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2291 <dd class="break"></dd>
2292 <dt id="data-protection-directive">[data-protection-directive]</dt>
2293 <dd>
2294 <span class="refAuthor">European Parliament</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such data"</span>, <span class="refContent">Official Journal L 281, pp. 31-50</span>, <time datetime="1995-11" class="refDate">November 1995</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML">https://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31995L0046:EN:HTML</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2295 <dd class="break"></dd>
2296 <dt id="day-at-root">[day-at-root]</dt>
2297 <dd>
2298 <span class="refAuthor">Castro, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Wessels, D.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Fomenkov, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">K. Claffy</span>, <span class="refTitle">"A Day at the Root of the Internet"</span>, <span class="refContent">ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, Vol. 38, No. 5</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1145/1452335.1452341</span>, <time datetime="2008-10" class="refDate">October 2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/papers/2008/October/1452335-1452341.pdf">https://www.sigcomm.org/sites/default/files/ccr/papers/2008/October/1452335-1452341.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2299 <dd class="break"></dd>
2300 <dt id="denis-edns-client-subnet">[denis-edns-client-subnet]</dt>
2301 <dd>
2302 <span class="refAuthor">Denis, F.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Security and privacy issues of edns-client-subnet"</span>, <time datetime="2013-08" class="refDate">August 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://00f.net/2013/08/07/edns-client-subnet/">https://00f.net/2013/08/07/edns-client-subnet/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2303 <dd class="break"></dd>
2304 <dt id="ditl">[ditl]</dt>
2305 <dd>
2306 <span class="refAuthor">CAIDA</span>, <span class="refTitle">"A Day in the Life of the Internet (DITL)"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.caida.org/projects/ditl/">https://www.caida.org/projects/ditl/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2307 <dd class="break"></dd>
2308 <dt id="dns-de-nat">[dns-de-nat]</dt>
2309 <dd>
2310 <span class="refAuthor">Orevi, L.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Herzberg, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Zlatokrilov, H.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">D. Sigron</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS-DNS: DNS-based De-NAT Scheme"</span>, <time datetime="2017-01" class="refDate">January 2017</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320322146_DNS-DNS_DNS-based_De-NAT_Scheme">https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320322146_DNS-DNS_DNS-based_De-NAT_Scheme</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2311 <dd class="break"></dd>
2312 <dt id="dns-footprint">[dns-footprint]</dt>
2313 <dd>
2314 <span class="refAuthor">Stoner, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Footprint of Malware"</span>, <span class="refContent">OARC Workshop</span>, <time datetime="2010-10" class="refDate">October 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.dns-oarc.net/files/workshop-201010/OARC-ers-20101012.pdf">https://www.dns-oarc.net/files/workshop-201010/OARC-ers-20101012.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2315 <dd class="break"></dd>
2316 <dt id="dns-over-encryption">[dns-over-encryption]</dt>
2317 <dd>
2318 <span class="refAuthor">Lu, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Liu, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Li, Z.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Hao, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Duan, H.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Zhang, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Leng, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Liu, Y.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Zhang, Z.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">J. Wu</span>, <span class="refTitle">"An End-to-End, Large-Scale Measurement of DNS-over-Encryption: How Far Have We Come?"</span>, <span class="refContent">IMC '19: Proceedings of the Internet Measurement Conference, pp. 22-35</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1145/3355369.3355580</span>, <time datetime="2019-10" class="refDate">October 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355369.3355580">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=3355369.3355580</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2319 <dd class="break"></dd>
2320 <dt id="dnsmezzo">[dnsmezzo]</dt>
2321 <dd>
2322 <span class="refAuthor">Bortzmeyer, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNSmezzo"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="http://www.dnsmezzo.net/">http://www.dnsmezzo.net/</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2323 <dd class="break"></dd>
2324 <dt id="I-D.ietf-dnsop-resolver-information">[DNSOP-RESOLVER]</dt>
2325 <dd>
2326 <span class="refAuthor">Sood, P.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Arends, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Hoffman</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Resolver Information Self-publication"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-information-01</span>, <time datetime="2020-02-11" class="refDate">11 February 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-information-01">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dnsop-resolver-information-01</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2327 <dd class="break"></dd>
2328 <dt id="I-D.ietf-dprive-dnsoquic">[DPRIVE-DNSOQUIC]</dt>
2329 <dd>
2330 <span class="refAuthor">Huitema, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Dickinson, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">A. Mankin</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Specification of DNS over Dedicated QUIC Connections"</span>, <span class="refContent">Work in Progress</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">Internet-Draft, draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-03</span>, <time datetime="2021-07-12" class="refDate">12 July 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-03">https://datatracker.ietf.org/doc/html/draft-ietf-dprive-dnsoquic-03</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2331 <dd class="break"></dd>
2332 <dt id="EDDI">[EDDI]</dt>
2333 <dd>
2334 <span class="refAuthor">EDDI</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Encrypted DNS Deployment Initiative"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.encrypted-dns.org">https://www.encrypted-dns.org</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2335 <dd class="break"></dd>
2336 <dt id="fangming-hori-sakurai">[fangming-hori-sakurai]</dt>
2337 <dd>
2338 <span class="refAuthor">Zhao, F.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Hori, Y.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">K. Sakurai</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Analysis of Privacy Disclosure in DNS Query"</span>, <span class="refContent">MUE '07: Proceedings of the 2007 International Conference on Multimedia and Ubiquitous Engineering</span>, <span class="refContent">pp. 952-957</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1109/MUE.2007.84</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">ISBN 0-7695-2777-9</span>, <time datetime="2007-04" class="refDate">April 2007</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1262690.1262986">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=1262690.1262986</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2339 <dd class="break"></dd>
2340 <dt id="federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny">[federrath-fuchs-herrmann-piosecny]</dt>
2341 <dd>
2342 <span class="refAuthor">Federrath, H.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Fuchs, K.-P.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Herrmann, D.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">C. Piosecny</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Privacy-Preserving DNS: Analysis of Broadcast, Range Queries and Mix-based Protection Methods"</span>, <span class="refContent">ESORICS 2011, pp. 665-683</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-23822-2_36</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">ISBN 978-3-642-23822-2</span>, <time datetime="2011" class="refDate">2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://svs.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/publications/2011/2011-09-14_FFHP_PrivacyPreservingDNS_ESORICS2011.pdf">https://svs.informatik.uni-hamburg.de/publications/2011/2011-09-14_FFHP_PrivacyPreservingDNS_ESORICS2011.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2343 <dd class="break"></dd>
2344 <dt id="getdns">[getdns]</dt>
2345 <dd>
2346 <span class="refTitle">"getdns"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://getdnsapi.net">https://getdnsapi.net</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2347 <dd class="break"></dd>
2348 <dt id="grangeia.snooping">[grangeia.snooping]</dt>
2349 <dd>
2350 <span class="refAuthor">Grangeia, L.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Cache Snooping or Snooping the Cache for Fun and Profit"</span>, <time datetime="2005" class="refDate">2005</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Cache-Snooping-or-Snooping-the-Cache-for-Fun-and-1-Grangeia/9b22f606e10b3609eafbdcbfc9090b63be8778c3">https://www.semanticscholar.org/paper/Cache-Snooping-or-Snooping-the-Cache-for-Fun-and-1-Grangeia/9b22f606e10b3609eafbdcbfc9090b63be8778c3</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2351 <dd class="break"></dd>
2352 <dt id="herrmann-reidentification">[herrmann-reidentification]</dt>
2353 <dd>
2354 <span class="refAuthor">Herrmann, D.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Gerber, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Banse, C.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">H. Federrath</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Analyzing Characteristic Host Access Patterns for Re-Identification of Web User Sessions"</span>, <span class="refContent">Lecture Notes in Computer Science, Vol. 7127</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1007/978-3-642-27937-9_10</span>, <time datetime="2012" class="refDate">2012</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/21103/1/Paper_PUL_nordsec_published.pdf">https://epub.uni-regensburg.de/21103/1/Paper_PUL_nordsec_published.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2355 <dd class="break"></dd>
2356 <dt id="morecowbell">[morecowbell]</dt>
2357 <dd>
2358 <span class="refAuthor">Grothoff, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Wachs, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Ermert, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">J. Appelbaum</span>, <span class="refTitle">"NSA's MORECOWBELL: Knell for DNS"</span>, <time datetime="2015-01" class="refDate">January 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2610/2b99bdd6a258a98740af8217ba8da8a1e4fa.pdf">https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/2610/2b99bdd6a258a98740af8217ba8da8a1e4fa.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2359 <dd class="break"></dd>
2360 <dt id="packetq">[packetq]</dt>
2361 <dd>
2362 <span class="refAuthor">DNS-OARC</span>, <span class="refTitle">"A tool that provides a basic SQL-frontend to PCAP-files"</span>, <span class="refContent">Release 1.4.3</span>, <span class="refContent">commit 29a8288</span>, <time datetime="2020-10" class="refDate">October 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://github.com/DNS-OARC/PacketQ">https://github.com/DNS-OARC/PacketQ</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2363 <dd class="break"></dd>
2364 <dt id="passive-dns">[passive-dns]</dt>
2365 <dd>
2366 <span class="refAuthor">Weimer, F.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Passive DNS Replication"</span>, <span class="refContent">17th Annual FIRST Conference</span>, <time datetime="2005-04" class="refDate">April 2005</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.first.org/conference/2005/papers/florian-weimer-slides-1.pdf">https://www.first.org/conference/2005/papers/florian-weimer-slides-1.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2367 <dd class="break"></dd>
2368 <dt id="pitfalls-of-dns-encryption">[pitfalls-of-dns-encryption]</dt>
2369 <dd>
2370 <span class="refAuthor">Shulman, H.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Pretty Bad Privacy: Pitfalls of DNS Encryption"</span>, <span class="refContent">WPES '14: Proceedings of the 13th Workshop on Privacy in the Electronic Society, pp. 191-200</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.1145/2665943.2665959</span>, <time datetime="2014-11" class="refDate">November 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2665959">https://dl.acm.org/citation.cfm?id=2665959</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2371 <dd class="break"></dd>
2372 <dt id="prism">[prism]</dt>
2373 <dd>
2374 <span class="refAuthor">Wikipedia</span>, <span class="refTitle">"PRISM (surveillance program)"</span>, <time datetime="2015-07" class="refDate">July 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=PRISM_(surveillance_program)&amp;oldid=673789455">https://en.wikipedia.org/w/index.php?title=PRISM_(surveillance_program)&amp;oldid=673789455</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2375 <dd class="break"></dd>
2376 <dt id="RFC3552">[RFC3552]</dt>
2377 <dd>
2378 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">B. Korver</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Guidelines for Writing RFC Text on Security Considerations"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 72</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 3552</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC3552</span>, <time datetime="2003-07" class="refDate">July 2003</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3552</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2379 <dd class="break"></dd>
2380 <dt id="RFC4033">[RFC4033]</dt>
2381 <dd>
2382 <span class="refAuthor">Arends, R.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Austein, R.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Larson, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Massey, D.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">S. Rose</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4033</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4033</span>, <time datetime="2005-03" class="refDate">March 2005</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4033</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2383 <dd class="break"></dd>
2384 <dt id="RFC4470">[RFC4470]</dt>
2385 <dd>
2386 <span class="refAuthor">Weiler, S.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">J. Ihren</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Minimally Covering NSEC Records and DNSSEC On-line Signing"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 4470</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC4470</span>, <time datetime="2006-04" class="refDate">April 2006</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4470">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4470</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2387 <dd class="break"></dd>
2388 <dt id="RFC5155">[RFC5155]</dt>
2389 <dd>
2390 <span class="refAuthor">Laurie, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Sisson, G.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Arends, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">D. Blacka</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Security (DNSSEC) Hashed Authenticated Denial of Existence"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5155</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5155</span>, <time datetime="2008-03" class="refDate">March 2008</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5155</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2391 <dd class="break"></dd>
2392 <dt id="RFC5936">[RFC5936]</dt>
2393 <dd>
2394 <span class="refAuthor">Lewis, E.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">A. Hoenes, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Zone Transfer Protocol (AXFR)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 5936</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC5936</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5936</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2395 <dd class="break"></dd>
2396 <dt id="RFC6269">[RFC6269]</dt>
2397 <dd>
2398 <span class="refAuthor">Ford, M., Ed.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Boucadair, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Durand, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Levis, P.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Roberts</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Issues with IP Address Sharing"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6269</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6269</span>, <time datetime="2011-06" class="refDate">June 2011</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6269</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2399 <dd class="break"></dd>
2400 <dt id="RFC6891">[RFC6891]</dt>
2401 <dd>
2402 <span class="refAuthor">Damas, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Graff, M.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Vixie</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Extension Mechanisms for DNS (EDNS(0))"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">STD 75</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 6891</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC6891</span>, <time datetime="2013-04" class="refDate">April 2013</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6891</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2403 <dd class="break"></dd>
2404 <dt id="RFC7413">[RFC7413]</dt>
2405 <dd>
2406 <span class="refAuthor">Cheng, Y.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Chu, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Radhakrishnan, S.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">A. Jain</span>, <span class="refTitle">"TCP Fast Open"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7413</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7413</span>, <time datetime="2014-12" class="refDate">December 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7413</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2407 <dd class="break"></dd>
2408 <dt id="RFC7525">[RFC7525]</dt>
2409 <dd>
2410 <span class="refAuthor">Sheffer, Y.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Holz, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Saint-Andre</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Recommendations for Secure Use of Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram Transport Layer Security (DTLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 195</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7525</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7525</span>, <time datetime="2015-05" class="refDate">May 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7525</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2411 <dd class="break"></dd>
2412 <dt id="RFC7624">[RFC7624]</dt>
2413 <dd>
2414 <span class="refAuthor">Barnes, R.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Schneier, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Jennings, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Hardie, T.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Trammell, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Huitema, C.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">D. Borkmann</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Confidentiality in the Face of Pervasive Surveillance: A Threat Model and Problem Statement"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7624</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7624</span>, <time datetime="2015-08" class="refDate">August 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7624</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2415 <dd class="break"></dd>
2416 <dt id="RFC7626">[RFC7626]</dt>
2417 <dd>
2418 <span class="refAuthor">Bortzmeyer, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Privacy Considerations"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7626</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7626</span>, <time datetime="2015-08" class="refDate">August 2015</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7626">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7626</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2419 <dd class="break"></dd>
2420 <dt id="RFC7721">[RFC7721]</dt>
2421 <dd>
2422 <span class="refAuthor">Cooper, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Gont, F.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">D. Thaler</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Security and Privacy Considerations for IPv6 Address Generation Mechanisms"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7721</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7721</span>, <time datetime="2016-03" class="refDate">March 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7721</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2423 <dd class="break"></dd>
2424 <dt id="RFC7754">[RFC7754]</dt>
2425 <dd>
2426 <span class="refAuthor">Barnes, R.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Cooper, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Kolkman, O.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Thaler, D.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">E. Nordmark</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Technical Considerations for Internet Service Blocking and Filtering"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7754</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7754</span>, <time datetime="2016-03" class="refDate">March 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7754">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7754</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2427 <dd class="break"></dd>
2428 <dt id="RFC7816">[RFC7816]</dt>
2429 <dd>
2430 <span class="refAuthor">Bortzmeyer, S.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Query Name Minimisation to Improve Privacy"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7816</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7816</span>, <time datetime="2016-03" class="refDate">March 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7816">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7816</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2431 <dd class="break"></dd>
2432 <dt id="RFC7858">[RFC7858]</dt>
2433 <dd>
2434 <span class="refAuthor">Hu, Z.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Zhu, L.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Heidemann, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Mankin, A.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Wessels, D.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">P. Hoffman</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Specification for DNS over Transport Layer Security (TLS)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7858</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7858</span>, <time datetime="2016-05" class="refDate">May 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7858</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2435 <dd class="break"></dd>
2436 <dt id="RFC7871">[RFC7871]</dt>
2437 <dd>
2438 <span class="refAuthor">Contavalli, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">van der Gaast, W.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Lawrence, D.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">W. Kumari</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Client Subnet in DNS Queries"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7871</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7871</span>, <time datetime="2016-05" class="refDate">May 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7871</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2439 <dd class="break"></dd>
2440 <dt id="RFC7873">[RFC7873]</dt>
2441 <dd>
2442 <span class="refAuthor">Eastlake 3rd, D.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">M. Andrews</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Domain Name System (DNS) Cookies"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7873</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7873</span>, <time datetime="2016-05" class="refDate">May 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7873</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2443 <dd class="break"></dd>
2444 <dt id="RFC7929">[RFC7929]</dt>
2445 <dd>
2446 <span class="refAuthor">Wouters, P.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS-Based Authentication of Named Entities (DANE) Bindings for OpenPGP"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 7929</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC7929</span>, <time datetime="2016-08" class="refDate">August 2016</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7929">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7929</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2447 <dd class="break"></dd>
2448 <dt id="RFC8446">[RFC8446]</dt>
2449 <dd>
2450 <span class="refAuthor">Rescorla, E.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.3"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8446</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8446</span>, <time datetime="2018-08" class="refDate">August 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8446</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2451 <dd class="break"></dd>
2452 <dt id="RFC8484">[RFC8484]</dt>
2453 <dd>
2454 <span class="refAuthor">Hoffman, P.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">P. McManus</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Queries over HTTPS (DoH)"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8484</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8484</span>, <time datetime="2018-10" class="refDate">October 2018</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8484</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2455 <dd class="break"></dd>
2456 <dt id="RFC8499">[RFC8499]</dt>
2457 <dd>
2458 <span class="refAuthor">Hoffman, P.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Sullivan, A.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">K. Fujiwara</span>, <span class="refTitle">"DNS Terminology"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 219</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8499</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8499</span>, <time datetime="2019-01" class="refDate">January 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8499</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2459 <dd class="break"></dd>
2460 <dt id="RFC8744">[RFC8744]</dt>
2461 <dd>
2462 <span class="refAuthor">Huitema, C.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Issues and Requirements for Server Name Identification (SNI) Encryption in TLS"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8744</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8744</span>, <time datetime="2020-07" class="refDate">July 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8744">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8744</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2463 <dd class="break"></dd>
2464 <dt id="RFC8890">[RFC8890]</dt>
2465 <dd>
2466 <span class="refAuthor">Nottingham, M.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"The Internet is for End Users"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8890</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8890</span>, <time datetime="2020-08" class="refDate">August 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8890">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8890</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2467 <dd class="break"></dd>
2468 <dt id="RFC8932">[RFC8932]</dt>
2469 <dd>
2470 <span class="refAuthor">Dickinson, S.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Overeinder, B.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">van Rijswijk-Deij, R.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">A. Mankin</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Recommendations for DNS Privacy Service Operators"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">BCP 232</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 8932</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC8932</span>, <time datetime="2020-10" class="refDate">October 2020</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8932">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8932</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2471 <dd class="break"></dd>
2472 <dt id="RFC9000">[RFC9000]</dt>
2473 <dd>
2474 <span class="refAuthor">Iyengar, J., Ed.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">M. Thomson, Ed.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"QUIC: A UDP-Based Multiplexed and Secure Transport"</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">RFC 9000</span>, <span class="seriesInfo">DOI 10.17487/RFC9000</span>, <time datetime="2021-05" class="refDate">May 2021</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000">https://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc9000</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2475 <dd class="break"></dd>
2476 <dt id="ripe-qname-measurements">[ripe-qname-measurements]</dt>
2477 <dd>
2478 <span class="refAuthor">de Vries, W.</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Making the DNS More Private with QNAME Minimisation"</span>, <time datetime="2019-04" class="refDate">April 2019</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://labs.ripe.net/Members/wouter_de_vries/make-dns-a-bit-more-private-with-qname-minimisation">https://labs.ripe.net/Members/wouter_de_vries/make-dns-a-bit-more-private-with-qname-minimisation</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2479 <dd class="break"></dd>
2480 <dt id="sidn-entrada">[sidn-entrada]</dt>
2481 <dd>
2482 <span class="refAuthor">Hesselman, C.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Jansen, J.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Wullink, M.</span>, <span class="refAuthor">Vink, K.</span>, and <span class="refAuthor">M. Simon</span>, <span class="refTitle">"A privacy framework for 'DNS big data' applications"</span>, <time datetime="2014-11" class="refDate">November 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.sidnlabs.nl/downloads/yBW6hBoaSZe4m6GJc_0b7w/2211058ab6330c7f3788141ea19d3db7/SIDN_Labs_Privacyraamwerk_Position_Paper_V1.4_ENG.pdf">https://www.sidnlabs.nl/downloads/yBW6hBoaSZe4m6GJc_0b7w/2211058ab6330c7f3788141ea19d3db7/SIDN_Labs_Privacyraamwerk_Position_Paper_V1.4_ENG.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2483 <dd class="break"></dd>
2484 <dt id="thomas-ditl-tcp">[thomas-ditl-tcp]</dt>
2485 <dd>
2486 <span class="refAuthor">Thomas, M.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">D. Wessels</span>, <span class="refTitle">"An Analysis of TCP Traffic in Root Server DITL Data"</span>, <span class="refContent">DNS-OARC 2014 Fall Workshop</span>, <time datetime="2014-10" class="refDate">October 2014</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/20/session/2/contribution/15/material/slides/1.pdf">https://indico.dns-oarc.net/event/20/session/2/contribution/15/material/slides/1.pdf</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2487 <dd class="break"></dd>
2488 <dt id="tor-leak">[tor-leak]</dt>
2489 <dd>
2490 <span class="refAuthor">Tor</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Tor FAQs: I keep seeing these warnings about SOCKS and DNS information leaks. Should I worry?"</span>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks">https://www.torproject.org/docs/faq.html.en#WarningsAboutSOCKSandDNSInformationLeaks</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2491 <dd class="break"></dd>
2492 <dt id="yanbin-tsudik">[yanbin-tsudik]</dt>
2493 <dd>
2494 <span class="refAuthor">Yanbin, L.</span> and <span class="refAuthor">G. Tsudik</span>, <span class="refTitle">"Towards Plugging Privacy Leaks in Domain Name System"</span>, <time datetime="2010-06" class="refDate">June 2010</time>, <span>&lt;<a href="https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.2472">https://arxiv.org/abs/0910.2472</a>&gt;</span>. </dd>
2495 <dd class="break"></dd>
2496 </dl>
2497 </section>
2498 </section>
2499 <div id="updates-since-rfc7626">
2500 <section id="appendix-A">
2501 <h2 id="name-updates-since-rfc-7626">
2502 <a href="#appendix-A" class="section-number selfRef">Appendix A. </a><a href="#name-updates-since-rfc-7626" class="section-name selfRef">Updates since RFC 7626</a>
2503 </h2>
2504 <p id="appendix-A-1">Many references were updated. Discussions of encrypted transports, including
2505 DoT and DoH, and sections on DNS payload, authentication of servers, and blocking of services were added.
2506
2507 With the publishing of
2508 <span>[<a href="#RFC7816" class="xref">RFC7816</a>]</span> on QNAME minimization, text, references, and initial attempts to
2509 measure deployment were added to reflect this. The text and references on the
2510 Snowden revelations were updated.<a href="#appendix-A-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2511 <p id="appendix-A-2">The "Risks Overview" section was changed to "Scope" to help clarify the risks
2512 being considered. Text on cellular network DNS, blocking, and
2513 security was added. Considerations for recursive resolvers were collected and placed
2514 together. A discussion on resolver selection was added.<a href="#appendix-A-2" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2515 </section>
2516 </div>
2517 <div id="acknowledgments">
2518 <section id="appendix-B">
2519 <h2 id="name-acknowledgments">
2520 <a href="#name-acknowledgments" class="section-name selfRef">Acknowledgments</a>
2521 </h2>
2522 <p id="appendix-B-1">Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Nathalie Boulvard</span> and to the CENTR members for the original work
2523 that led to this document. Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Ondrej Sury</span> for the interesting
2524 discussions. Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Mohsen Souissi</span> and <span class="contact-name">John Heidemann</span> for proofreading and
2525 to <span class="contact-name">Paul Hoffman</span>, <span class="contact-name">Matthijs Mekking</span>, <span class="contact-name">Marcos Sanz</span>, <span class="contact-name">Francis Dupont</span>,
2526 <span class="contact-name">Allison Mankin</span>, and <span class="contact-name">Warren Kumari</span> for proofreading, providing technical
2527 remarks, and making many readability improvements. Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Dan York</span>,
2528 <span class="contact-name">Suzanne Woolf</span>, <span class="contact-name">Tony Finch</span>, <span class="contact-name">Stephen Farrell</span>, <span class="contact-name">Peter Koch</span>, <span class="contact-name">Simon Josefsson</span>, and
2529 <span class="contact-name">Frank Denis</span> for good written contributions. Thanks to <span class="contact-name">Vittorio Bertola</span> and
2530 <span class="contact-name">Mohamed Boucadair</span> for a detailed review of the -bis. And thanks to the IESG
2531 members for the last remarks.<a href="#appendix-B-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2532 </section>
2533 </div>
2534 <div id="contributions">
2535 <section id="appendix-C">
2536 <h2 id="name-contributions">
2537 <a href="#name-contributions" class="section-name selfRef">Contributions</a>
2538 </h2>
2539 <p id="appendix-C-1"><span class="contact-name">Sara Dickinson</span> and <span class="contact-name">Stephane Bortzmeyer</span> were the original authors of the
2540 document, and their contribution to the initial draft of this document is greatly appreciated.<a href="#appendix-C-1" class="pilcrow">¶</a></p>
2541 </section>
2542 </div>
2543 <div id="authors-addresses">
2544 <section id="appendix-D">
2545 <h2 id="name-authors-address">
2546 <a href="#name-authors-address" class="section-name selfRef">Author's Address</a>
2547 </h2>
2548 <address class="vcard">
2549 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="fn nameRole">Tim Wicinski (<span class="role">editor</span>)</span></div>
2550 <div dir="auto" class="left">
2551 <span class="locality">Elkins</span>, <span class="region">WV</span> <span class="postal-code">26241</span>
2552 </div>
2553 <div dir="auto" class="left"><span class="country-name">United States of America</span></div>
2554 <div class="email">
2555 <span>Email:</span>
2556 <a href="mailto:[email protected]" class="email">[email protected]</a>
2557 </div>
2558 </address>
2559 </section>
2560 </div>
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