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<pre>Network Working Group P. Metzger |
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Request for Comments: 1852 Piermont |
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Category: Experimental W. Simpson |
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Daydreamer |
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September 1995 |
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<span class="h1">IP Authentication using Keyed SHA</span> |
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Status of this Memo |
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This document defines an Experimental Protocol for the Internet |
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community. This does not specify an Internet standard of any kind. |
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Discussion and suggestions for improvement are requested. |
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Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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Abstract |
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This document describes the use of keyed SHA with the IP |
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Authentication Header. |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction .......................................... <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a> Keys ............................................ <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a> Data Size ....................................... <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a> Performance ..................................... <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Calculation ........................................... <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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SECURITY CONSIDERATIONS ...................................... <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ............................................. <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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REFERENCES ................................................... <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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AUTHOR'S ADDRESS ............................................. <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<span class="grey">Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1852">RFC 1852</a> AH SHA September 1995</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Authentication Header (AH) [<a href="./rfc1826">RFC-1826</a>] provides integrity and |
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authentication for IP datagrams. This specification describes the AH |
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use of keys with the Secure Hash Algorithm (SHA) [<a href="#ref-FIPS-180-1">FIPS-180-1</a>]. |
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It should be noted that this document specifies a newer version of |
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the SHA than that described in [<a href="#ref-FIPS-180">FIPS-180</a>], which was flawed. The |
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older version is not interoperable with the newer version. |
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This document assumes that the reader is familiar with the related |
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document "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [RFC- |
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1825], which defines the overall security plan for IP, and provides |
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important background for this specification. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Keys</span> |
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The secret authentication key shared between the communicating |
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parties SHOULD be a cryptographically strong random number, not a |
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guessable string of any sort. |
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The shared key is not constrained by this transform to any particular |
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size. Lengths of up to 160 bits MUST be supported by the |
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implementation, although any particular key may be shorter. Longer |
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keys are encouraged. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Data Size</span> |
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SHA's 160-bit output is naturally 32-bit aligned. However, many |
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implementations require 64-bit alignment of the following headers, in |
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which case an additional 32 bits of padding is added, either before |
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or after the SHA output. |
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The size and position of this padding are negotiated as part of the |
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key management. Padding bits are filled with unspecified |
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implementation dependent (random) values, which are ignored on |
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receipt. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Performance</span> |
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Preliminary results indicate that SHA is 62% as fast as MD5, and 80% |
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as fast as DES hashing. That is, |
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<span class="grey">Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1852">RFC 1852</a> AH SHA September 1995</span> |
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SHA < DES < MD5 |
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Nota Bene: |
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Suggestions are sought on alternative authentication algorithms |
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that have significantly faster throughput, are not patent- |
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encumbered, and still retain adequate cryptographic strength. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Calculation</span> |
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The 160-bit digest is calculated as described in [<a href="#ref-FIPS-180-1">FIPS-180-1</a>]. At |
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the time of writing, a portable C language implementation of SHA is |
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available via FTP from <a href="ftp://rand.org/pub/jim/sha.tar.gz">ftp://rand.org/pub/jim/sha.tar.gz</a>. |
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The form of the authenticated message is |
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key, keyfill, datagram, key, SHAfill |
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First, the variable length secret authentication key is filled to the |
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next 512-bit boundary, using the same pad with length technique |
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defined for SHA. |
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Then, the filled key is concatenated with (immediately followed by) |
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the invariant fields of the entire IP datagram (variant fields are |
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zeroed), concatenated with (immediately followed by) the original |
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variable length key again. |
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A trailing pad with length to the next 512-bit boundary for the |
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entire message is added by SHA itself. The 160-bit SHA digest is |
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calculated, and the result is inserted into the Authentication Data |
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field. |
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Discussion: |
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The leading copy of the key is padded in order to facilitate |
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copying of the key at machine boundaries without requiring re- |
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alignment of the following datagram. The padding technique |
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includes a length which protects arbitrary length keys. Filling |
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to the SHA block size also allows the key to be prehashed to avoid |
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the physical copy in some implementations. |
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The trailing copy of the key is not necessary to protect against |
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appending attacks, as the IP datagram already includes a total |
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length field. It reintroduces mixing of the entire key, providing |
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minimal protection for very long and very short datagrams, and |
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marginal robustness against possible attacks on the IP length |
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field itself. |
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<span class="grey">Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1852">RFC 1852</a> AH SHA September 1995</span> |
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When the implementation adds the keys and padding in place before |
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and after the IP datagram, care must be taken that the keys and/or |
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padding are not sent over the link by the link driver. |
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Security Considerations |
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Users need to understand that the quality of the security provided by |
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this specification depends completely on the strength of the SHA hash |
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function, the correctness of that algorithm's implementation, the |
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security of the key management mechanism and its implementation, the |
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strength of the key [<a href="#ref-CN94" title=""On Weak Keys and Weak Data: Foiling the Two Nemeses"">CN94</a>], and upon the correctness of the |
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implementations in all of the participating nodes. |
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The SHA algorithm was originally derived from the MD4 algorithm |
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[<a href="./rfc1320">RFC-1320</a>]. A flaw was apparently found in the original |
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specification of SHA [<a href="#ref-FIPS-180">FIPS-180</a>], and this document specifies the use |
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of a corrected version [<a href="#ref-FIPS-180-1">FIPS-180-1</a>]. |
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At the time of writing of this document, there are no known flaws in |
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the SHA algorithm. That is, there are no known attacks on SHA or any |
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of its components that are better than brute force, and the 160-bit |
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hash output by SHA is substantially more resistant to brute force |
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attacks than the 128-bit hash size of MD4 and MD5. |
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However, as the flaw in the original SHA algorithm shows, |
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cryptographers are fallible, and there may be substantial |
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deficiencies yet to be discovered in the algorithm. |
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Acknowledgements |
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Some of the text of this specification was derived from work by |
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Randall Atkinson for the SIP, SIPP, and IPv6 Working Groups. |
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Preliminary performance analysis was provided by Joe Touch. |
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Comments should be submitted to the [email protected] mailing list. |
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<span class="grey">Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1852">RFC 1852</a> AH SHA September 1995</span> |
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References |
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[<a id="ref-CN94">CN94</a>] John M. Carroll & Sri Nudiati, "On Weak Keys and Weak Data: |
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Foiling the Two Nemeses", Cryptologia, Vol. 18 No. 23 pp. |
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253-280, July 1994. |
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[<a id="ref-FIPS-180">FIPS-180</a>] |
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"Secure Hash Standard", Computer Systems Laboratory, |
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National Institute of Standards and Technology, U.S. |
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Department Of Commerce, May 1993. |
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Also known as: 58 Fed Reg 27712 (1993). |
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[<a id="ref-FIPS-180-1">FIPS-180-1</a>] |
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"Secure Hash Standard", National Institute of Standards and |
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Technology, U.S. Department Of Commerce, April 1995. |
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Also known as: 59 Fed Reg 35317 (1994). |
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[<a id="ref-RFC-1320">RFC-1320</a>] |
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Ronald Rivest, "The MD4 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1320">RFC-1320</a>, |
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April 1992. |
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[<a id="ref-RFC-1700">RFC-1700</a>] |
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Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, <a href="./rfc1700">RFC</a> |
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<a href="./rfc1700">1700</a>, USC/Information Sciences Institute, October 1994. |
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[<a id="ref-RFC-1825">RFC-1825</a>] |
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Atkinson, R., "Security Architecture for the Internet |
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Protocol", <a href="./rfc1825">RFC-1825</a>, Naval Research Laboratory, July 1995. |
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[<a id="ref-RFC-1826">RFC-1826</a>] |
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Atkinson, R., "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc1826">RFC-1826</a>, Naval |
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Research Laboratory, July 1995. |
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<span class="grey">Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc1852">RFC 1852</a> AH SHA September 1995</span> |
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Author's Address |
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Questions about this memo can also be directed to: |
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Perry Metzger |
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Piermont Information Systems Inc. |
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160 Cabrini Blvd., Suite #2 |
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New York, NY 10033 |
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[email protected] |
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William Allen Simpson |
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Daydreamer |
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Computer Systems Consulting Services |
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1384 Fontaine |
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Madison Heights, Michigan 48071 |
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[email protected] |
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[email protected] |
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Metzger & Simpson Experimental [Page 6] |
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</pre> |