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<pre>Network Working Group S. Kent |
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Request for Comments: 2402 BBN Corp |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc1826">1826</a> R. Atkinson |
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Category: Standards Track @Home Network |
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November 1998 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">IP Authentication Header</span> |
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|
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction......................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Authentication Header Format......................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Next Header...................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Payload Length................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a> Reserved......................................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a> Security Parameters Index (SPI)...............................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a> Sequence Number...............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a> Authentication Data ..........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Authentication Header Processing..................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> Authentication Header Location...............................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Authentication Algorithms....................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Outbound Packet Processing...................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a> Security Association Lookup.............................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a> Sequence Number Generation..............................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a> Integrity Check Value Calculation.......................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1">3.3.3.1</a> Handling Mutable Fields............................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1.1">3.3.3.1.1</a> ICV Computation for IPv4.....................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1.1.1">3.3.3.1.1.1</a> Base Header Fields.......................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1.1.2">3.3.3.1.1.2</a> Options..................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1.2">3.3.3.1.2</a> ICV Computation for IPv6.....................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1.2.1">3.3.3.1.2.1</a> Base Header Fields.......................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.1.2.2">3.3.3.1.2.2</a> Extension Headers Containing Options.....<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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3.3.3.1.2.3 Extension Headers Not Containing Options.11 |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.2">3.3.3.2</a> Padding...........................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.2.1">3.3.3.2.1</a> Authentication Data Padding..................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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<a href="#section-3.3.3.2.2">3.3.3.2.2</a> Implicit Packet Padding......................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a> Fragmentation..........................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a> Inbound Packet Processing...................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a> Reassembly.............................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a> Security Association Lookup............................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.3">3.4.3</a> Sequence Number Verification...........................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.4">3.4.4</a> Integrity Check Value Verification.....................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Auditing.........................................................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements.........................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations..........................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>........................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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Acknowledgements....................................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> -- Mutability of IP Options/Extension Headers............<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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A1. IPv4 Options.................................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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A2. IPv6 Extension Headers.......................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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References..........................................................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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Disclaimer..........................................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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Author Information..................................................<a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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Full Copyright Statement............................................<a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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|
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The IP Authentication Header (AH) is used to provide connectionless |
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integrity and data origin authentication for IP datagrams (hereafter |
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referred to as just "authentication"), and to provide protection |
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against replays. This latter, optional service may be selected, by |
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the receiver, when a Security Association is established. (Although |
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the default calls for the sender to increment the Sequence Number |
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used for anti-replay, the service is effective only if the receiver |
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checks the Sequence Number.) AH provides authentication for as much |
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of the IP header as possible, as well as for upper level protocol |
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data. However, some IP header fields may change in transit and the |
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value of these fields, when the packet arrives at the receiver, may |
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not be predictable by the sender. The values of such fields cannot |
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be protected by AH. Thus the protection provided to the IP header by |
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AH is somewhat piecemeal. |
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|
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AH may be applied alone, in combination with the IP Encapsulating |
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Security Payload (ESP) [<a href="#ref-KA97b" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">KA97b</a>], or in a nested fashion through the |
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use of tunnel mode (see "Security Architecture for the Internet |
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Protocol" [<a href="#ref-KA97a" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">KA97a</a>], hereafter referred to as the Security Architecture |
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document). Security services can be provided between a pair of |
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communicating hosts, between a pair of communicating security |
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gateways, or between a security gateway and a host. ESP may be used |
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to provide the same security services, and it also provides a |
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confidentiality (encryption) service. The primary difference between |
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the authentication provided by ESP and AH is the extent of the |
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coverage. Specifically, ESP does not protect any IP header fields |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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unless those fields are encapsulated by ESP (tunnel mode). For more |
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details on how to use AH and ESP in various network environments, see |
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the Security Architecture document [<a href="#ref-KA97a" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">KA97a</a>]. |
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|
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It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts |
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described in the Security Architecture document. In particular, the |
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reader should be familiar with the definitions of security services |
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offered by AH and ESP, the concept of Security Associations, the ways |
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in which AH can be used in conjunction with ESP, and the different |
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key management options available for AH and ESP. (With regard to the |
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last topic, the current key management options required for both AH |
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and ESP are manual keying and automated keying via IKE [<a href="#ref-HC98" title=""The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">HC98</a>].) |
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|
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The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, |
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SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this |
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document, are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-Bra97" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Level"">Bra97</a>]. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Authentication Header Format</span> |
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|
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The protocol header (IPv4, IPv6, or Extension) immediately preceding |
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the AH header will contain the value 51 in its Protocol (IPv4) or |
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Next Header (IPv6, Extension) field [<a href="#ref-STD-2" title=""Assigned Numbers"">STD-2</a>]. |
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|
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0 1 2 3 |
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
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| Next Header | Payload Len | RESERVED | |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
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| Security Parameters Index (SPI) | |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
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| Sequence Number Field | |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
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| | |
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+ Authentication Data (variable) | |
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| | |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
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|
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The following subsections define the fields that comprise the AH |
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format. All the fields described here are mandatory, i.e., they are |
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always present in the AH format and are included in the Integrity |
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Check Value (ICV) computation (see Sections <a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a> and <a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>). |
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Next Header</span> |
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|
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The Next Header is an 8-bit field that identifies the type of the |
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next payload after the Authentication Header. The value of this |
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field is chosen from the set of IP Protocol Numbers defined in the |
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most recent "Assigned Numbers" [<a href="#ref-STD-2" title=""Assigned Numbers"">STD-2</a>] RFC from the Internet Assigned |
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Numbers Authority (IANA). |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Payload Length</span> |
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|
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This 8-bit field specifies the length of AH in 32-bit words (4-byte |
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units), minus "2". (All IPv6 extension headers, as per <a href="./rfc1883">RFC 1883</a>, |
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encode the "Hdr Ext Len" field by first subtracting 1 (64-bit word) |
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from the header length (measured in 64-bit words). AH is an IPv6 |
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extension header. However, since its length is measured in 32-bit |
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words, the "Payload Length" is calculated by subtracting 2 (32 bit |
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words).) In the "standard" case of a 96-bit authentication value |
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plus the 3 32-bit word fixed portion, this length field will be "4". |
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A "null" authentication algorithm may be used only for debugging |
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purposes. Its use would result in a "1" value for this field for |
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IPv4 or a "2" for IPv6, as there would be no corresponding |
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Authentication Data field (see <a href="#section-3.3.3.2.1">Section 3.3.3.2.1</a> on "Authentication |
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Data Padding"). |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a> Reserved</span> |
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|
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This 16-bit field is reserved for future use. It MUST be set to |
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"zero." (Note that the value is included in the Authentication Data |
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calculation, but is otherwise ignored by the recipient.) |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a> Security Parameters Index (SPI)</span> |
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|
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The SPI is an arbitrary 32-bit value that, in combination with the |
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destination IP address and security protocol (AH), uniquely |
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identifies the Security Association for this datagram. The set of |
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SPI values in the range 1 through 255 are reserved by the Internet |
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Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for future use; a reserved SPI |
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value will not normally be assigned by IANA unless the use of the |
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assigned SPI value is specified in an RFC. It is ordinarily selected |
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by the destination system upon establishment of an SA (see the |
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Security Architecture document for more details). |
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|
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The SPI value of zero (0) is reserved for local, implementation- |
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specific use and MUST NOT be sent on the wire. For example, a key |
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management implementation MAY use the zero SPI value to mean "No |
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Security Association Exists" during the period when the IPsec |
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implementation has requested that its key management entity establish |
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a new SA, but the SA has not yet been established. |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a> Sequence Number</span> |
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|
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This unsigned 32-bit field contains a monotonically increasing |
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counter value (sequence number). It is mandatory and is always |
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present even if the receiver does not elect to enable the anti-replay |
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service for a specific SA. Processing of the Sequence Number field |
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is at the discretion of the receiver, i.e., the sender MUST always |
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transmit this field, but the receiver need not act upon it (see the |
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discussion of Sequence Number Verification in the "Inbound Packet |
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Processing" section below). |
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|
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The sender's counter and the receiver's counter are initialized to 0 |
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when an SA is established. (The first packet sent using a given SA |
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will have a Sequence Number of 1; see <a href="#section-3.3.2">Section 3.3.2</a> for more details |
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on how the Sequence Number is generated.) If anti-replay is enabled |
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(the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed |
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to cycle. Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST |
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be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the |
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transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a> Authentication Data</span> |
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|
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This is a variable-length field that contains the Integrity Check |
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Value (ICV) for this packet. The field must be an integral multiple |
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of 32 bits in length. The details of the ICV computation are |
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described in <a href="#section-3.3.2">Section 3.3.2</a> below. This field may include explicit |
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padding. This padding is included to ensure that the length of the |
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AH header is an integral multiple of 32 bits (IPv4) or 64 bits |
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(IPv6). All implementations MUST support such padding. Details of |
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how to compute the required padding length are provided below. The |
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authentication algorithm specification MUST specify the length of the |
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ICV and the comparison rules and processing steps for validation. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Authentication Header Processing</span> |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> Authentication Header Location</span> |
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|
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Like ESP, AH may be employed in two ways: transport mode or tunnel |
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mode. The former mode is applicable only to host implementations and |
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provides protection for upper layer protocols, in addition to |
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selected IP header fields. (In this mode, note that for "bump-in- |
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the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire" implementations, as defined in the |
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Security Architecture document, inbound and outbound IP fragments may |
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require an IPsec implementation to perform extra IP |
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reassembly/fragmentation in order to both conform to this |
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specification and provide transparent IPsec support. Special care is |
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required to perform such operations within these implementations when |
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multiple interfaces are in use.) |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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In transport mode, AH is inserted after the IP header and before an |
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upper layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. or before any other |
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IPsec headers that have already been inserted. In the context of |
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IPv4, this calls for placing AH after the IP header (and any options |
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that it contains), but before the upper layer protocol. (Note that |
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the term "transport" mode should not be misconstrued as restricting |
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its use to TCP and UDP. For example, an ICMP message MAY be sent |
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using either "transport" mode or "tunnel" mode.) The following |
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diagram illustrates AH transport mode positioning for a typical IPv4 |
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packet, on a "before and after" basis. |
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|
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BEFORE APPLYING AH |
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---------------------------- |
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IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | |
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|(any options)| TCP | Data | |
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---------------------------- |
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|
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AFTER APPLYING AH |
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--------------------------------- |
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IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | | |
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|(any options)| AH | TCP | Data | |
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--------------------------------- |
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|<------- authenticated ------->| |
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except for mutable fields |
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|
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In the IPv6 context, AH is viewed as an end-to-end payload, and thus |
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should appear after hop-by-hop, routing, and fragmentation extension |
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headers. The destination options extension header(s) could appear |
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either before or after the AH header depending on the semantics |
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desired. The following diagram illustrates AH transport mode |
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positioning for a typical IPv6 packet. |
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|
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BEFORE APPLYING AH |
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--------------------------------------- |
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IPv6 | | ext hdrs | | | |
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| orig IP hdr |if present| TCP | Data | |
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--------------------------------------- |
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|
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AFTER APPLYING AH |
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------------------------------------------------------------ |
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IPv6 | |hop-by-hop, dest*, | | dest | | | |
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|orig IP hdr |routing, fragment. | AH | opt* | TCP | Data | |
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------------------------------------------------------------ |
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|<---- authenticated except for mutable fields ----------->| |
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|
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* = if present, could be before AH, after AH, or both |
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|
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|
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 335 |
|
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|
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ESP and AH headers can be combined in a variety of modes. The IPsec |
| 338 |
Architecture document describes the combinations of security |
| 339 |
associations that must be supported. |
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|
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Tunnel mode AH may be employed in either hosts or security gateways |
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(or in so-called "bump-in-the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire" |
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implementations, as defined in the Security Architecture document). |
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When AH is implemented in a security gateway (to protect transit |
| 345 |
traffic), tunnel mode must be used. In tunnel mode, the "inner" IP |
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header carries the ultimate source and destination addresses, while |
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an "outer" IP header may contain distinct IP addresses, e.g., |
| 348 |
addresses of security gateways. In tunnel mode, AH protects the |
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entire inner IP packet, including the entire inner IP header. The |
| 350 |
position of AH in tunnel mode, relative to the outer IP header, is |
| 351 |
the same as for AH in transport mode. The following diagram |
| 352 |
illustrates AH tunnel mode positioning for typical IPv4 and IPv6 |
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packets. |
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|
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------------------------------------------------ |
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IPv4 | new IP hdr* | | orig IP hdr* | | | |
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|(any options)| AH | (any options) |TCP | Data | |
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------------------------------------------------ |
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|<- authenticated except for mutable fields -->| |
| 360 |
| in the new IP hdr | |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
-------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 363 |
IPv6 | | ext hdrs*| | | ext hdrs*| | | |
| 364 |
|new IP hdr*|if present| AH |orig IP hdr*|if present|TCP|Data| |
| 365 |
-------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 366 |
|<-- authenticated except for mutable fields in new IP hdr ->| |
| 367 |
|
| 368 |
* = construction of outer IP hdr/extensions and modification |
| 369 |
of inner IP hdr/extensions is discussed below. |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Authentication Algorithms</span> |
| 372 |
|
| 373 |
The authentication algorithm employed for the ICV computation is |
| 374 |
specified by the SA. For point-to-point communication, suitable |
| 375 |
authentication algorithms include keyed Message Authentication Codes |
| 376 |
(MACs) based on symmetric encryption algorithms (e.g., DES) or on |
| 377 |
one-way hash functions (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1). For multicast |
| 378 |
communication, one-way hash algorithms combined with asymmetric |
| 379 |
signature algorithms are appropriate, though performance and space |
| 380 |
considerations currently preclude use of such algorithms. The |
| 381 |
mandatory-to-implement authentication algorithms are described in |
| 382 |
<a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> "Conformance Requirements". Other algorithms MAY be |
| 383 |
supported. |
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Outbound Packet Processing</span> |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
In transport mode, the sender inserts the AH header after the IP |
| 396 |
header and before an upper layer protocol header, as described above. |
| 397 |
In tunnel mode, the outer and inner IP header/extensions can be |
| 398 |
inter-related in a variety of ways. The construction of the outer IP |
| 399 |
header/extensions during the encapsulation process is described in |
| 400 |
the Security Architecture document. |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
If there is more than one IPsec header/extension required, the order |
| 403 |
of the application of the security headers MUST be defined by |
| 404 |
security policy. For simplicity of processing, each IPsec header |
| 405 |
SHOULD ignore the existence (i.e., not zero the contents or try to |
| 406 |
predict the contents) of IPsec headers to be applied later. (While a |
| 407 |
native IP or bump-in-the-stack implementation could predict the |
| 408 |
contents of later IPsec headers that it applies itself, it won't be |
| 409 |
possible for it to predict any IPsec headers added by a bump-in-the- |
| 410 |
wire implementation between the host and the network.) |
| 411 |
|
| 412 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a> Security Association Lookup</span> |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
AH is applied to an outbound packet only after an IPsec |
| 415 |
implementation determines that the packet is associated with an SA |
| 416 |
that calls for AH processing. The process of determining what, if |
| 417 |
any, IPsec processing is applied to outbound traffic is described in |
| 418 |
the Security Architecture document. |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a> Sequence Number Generation</span> |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established. |
| 423 |
The sender increments the Sequence Number for this SA and inserts the |
| 424 |
new value into the Sequence Number Field. Thus the first packet sent |
| 425 |
using a given SA will have a Sequence Number of 1. |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
If anti-replay is enabled (the default), the sender checks to ensure |
| 428 |
that the counter has not cycled before inserting the new value in the |
| 429 |
Sequence Number field. In other words, the sender MUST NOT send a |
| 430 |
packet on an SA if doing so would cause the Sequence Number to cycle. |
| 431 |
An attempt to transmit a packet that would result in Sequence Number |
| 432 |
overflow is an auditable event. (Note that this approach to Sequence |
| 433 |
Number management does not require use of modular arithmetic.) |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
The sender assumes anti-replay is enabled as a default, unless |
| 436 |
otherwise notified by the receiver (see 3.4.3). Thus, if the counter |
| 437 |
has cycled, the sender will set up a new SA and key (unless the SA |
| 438 |
was configured with manual key management). |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
If anti-replay is disabled, the sender does not need to monitor or |
| 450 |
reset the counter, e.g., in the case of manual key management (see |
| 451 |
<a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.) However, the sender still increments the counter and when |
| 452 |
it reaches the maximum value, the counter rolls over back to zero. |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3" href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a> Integrity Check Value Calculation</span> |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
The AH ICV is computed over: |
| 457 |
o IP header fields that are either immutable in transit or |
| 458 |
that are predictable in value upon arrival at the endpoint |
| 459 |
for the AH SA |
| 460 |
o the AH header (Next Header, Payload Len, Reserved, SPI, |
| 461 |
Sequence Number, and the Authentication Data (which is set |
| 462 |
to zero for this computation), and explicit padding bytes |
| 463 |
(if any)) |
| 464 |
o the upper level protocol data, which is assumed to be |
| 465 |
immutable in transit |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.3.1">3.3.3.1</a> Handling Mutable Fields</span> |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
If a field may be modified during transit, the value of the field is |
| 470 |
set to zero for purposes of the ICV computation. If a field is |
| 471 |
mutable, but its value at the (IPsec) receiver is predictable, then |
| 472 |
that value is inserted into the field for purposes of the ICV |
| 473 |
calculation. The Authentication Data field is also set to zero in |
| 474 |
preparation for this computation. Note that by replacing each |
| 475 |
field's value with zero, rather than omitting the field, alignment is |
| 476 |
preserved for the ICV calculation. Also, the zero-fill approach |
| 477 |
ensures that the length of the fields that are so handled cannot be |
| 478 |
changed during transit, even though their contents are not explicitly |
| 479 |
covered by the ICV. |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
As a new extension header or IPv4 option is created, it will be |
| 482 |
defined in its own RFC and SHOULD include (in the Security |
| 483 |
Considerations section) directions for how it should be handled when |
| 484 |
calculating the AH ICV. If the IP (v4 or v6) implementation |
| 485 |
encounters an extension header that it does not recognize, it will |
| 486 |
discard the packet and send an ICMP message. IPsec will never see |
| 487 |
the packet. If the IPsec implementation encounters an IPv4 option |
| 488 |
that it does not recognize, it should zero the whole option, using |
| 489 |
the second byte of the option as the length. IPv6 options (in |
| 490 |
Destination extension headers or Hop by Hop extension header) contain |
| 491 |
a flag indicating mutability, which determines appropriate processing |
| 492 |
for such options. |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.1" href="#section-3.3.3.1.1">3.3.3.1.1</a> ICV Computation for IPv4</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.1.1" href="#section-3.3.3.1.1.1">3.3.3.1.1.1</a> Base Header Fields</span> |
| 508 |
|
| 509 |
The IPv4 base header fields are classified as follows: |
| 510 |
|
| 511 |
Immutable |
| 512 |
Version |
| 513 |
Internet Header Length |
| 514 |
Total Length |
| 515 |
Identification |
| 516 |
Protocol (This should be the value for AH.) |
| 517 |
Source Address |
| 518 |
Destination Address (without loose or strict source routing) |
| 519 |
|
| 520 |
Mutable but predictable |
| 521 |
Destination Address (with loose or strict source routing) |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
Mutable (zeroed prior to ICV calculation) |
| 524 |
Type of Service (TOS) |
| 525 |
Flags |
| 526 |
Fragment Offset |
| 527 |
Time to Live (TTL) |
| 528 |
Header Checksum |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
TOS -- This field is excluded because some routers are known to |
| 531 |
change the value of this field, even though the IP |
| 532 |
specification does not consider TOS to be a mutable header |
| 533 |
field. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
Flags -- This field is excluded since an intermediate router might |
| 536 |
set the DF bit, even if the source did not select it. |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
Fragment Offset -- Since AH is applied only to non-fragmented IP |
| 539 |
packets, the Offset Field must always be zero, and thus it |
| 540 |
is excluded (even though it is predictable). |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
TTL -- This is changed en-route as a normal course of processing |
| 543 |
by routers, and thus its value at the receiver is not |
| 544 |
predictable by the sender. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
Header Checksum -- This will change if any of these other fields |
| 547 |
changes, and thus its value upon reception cannot be |
| 548 |
predicted by the sender. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.1.2" href="#section-3.3.3.1.1.2">3.3.3.1.1.2</a> Options</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
For IPv4 (unlike IPv6), there is no mechanism for tagging options as |
| 564 |
mutable in transit. Hence the IPv4 options are explicitly listed in |
| 565 |
<a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> and classified as immutable, mutable but predictable, or |
| 566 |
mutable. For IPv4, the entire option is viewed as a unit; so even |
| 567 |
though the type and length fields within most options are immutable |
| 568 |
in transit, if an option is classified as mutable, the entire option |
| 569 |
is zeroed for ICV computation purposes. |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.2" href="#section-3.3.3.1.2">3.3.3.1.2</a> ICV Computation for IPv6</span> |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.2.1" href="#section-3.3.3.1.2.1">3.3.3.1.2.1</a> Base Header Fields</span> |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
The IPv6 base header fields are classified as follows: |
| 576 |
|
| 577 |
Immutable |
| 578 |
Version |
| 579 |
Payload Length |
| 580 |
Next Header (This should be the value for AH.) |
| 581 |
Source Address |
| 582 |
Destination Address (without Routing Extension Header) |
| 583 |
|
| 584 |
Mutable but predictable |
| 585 |
Destination Address (with Routing Extension Header) |
| 586 |
|
| 587 |
Mutable (zeroed prior to ICV calculation) |
| 588 |
Class |
| 589 |
Flow Label |
| 590 |
Hop Limit |
| 591 |
|
| 592 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.2.2" href="#section-3.3.3.1.2.2">3.3.3.1.2.2</a> Extension Headers Containing Options</span> |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
IPv6 options in the Hop-by-Hop and Destination Extension Headers |
| 595 |
contain a bit that indicates whether the option might change |
| 596 |
(unpredictably) during transit. For any option for which contents |
| 597 |
may change en-route, the entire "Option Data" field must be treated |
| 598 |
as zero-valued octets when computing or verifying the ICV. The |
| 599 |
Option Type and Opt Data Len are included in the ICV calculation. |
| 600 |
All options for which the bit indicates immutability are included in |
| 601 |
the ICV calculation. See the IPv6 specification [<a href="#ref-DH95" title=""Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">DH95</a>] for more |
| 602 |
information. |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.1.2.3" href="#section-3.3.3.1.2.3">3.3.3.1.2.3</a> Extension Headers Not Containing Options</span> |
| 605 |
|
| 606 |
The IPv6 extension headers that do not contain options are explicitly |
| 607 |
listed in <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> and classified as immutable, mutable but |
| 608 |
predictable, or mutable. |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h5"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.3.2">3.3.3.2</a> Padding</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.2.1" href="#section-3.3.3.2.1">3.3.3.2.1</a> Authentication Data Padding</span> |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
As mentioned in <a href="#section-2.6">section 2.6</a>, the Authentication Data field explicitly |
| 622 |
includes padding to ensure that the AH header is a multiple of 32 |
| 623 |
bits (IPv4) or 64 bits (IPv6). If padding is required, its length is |
| 624 |
determined by two factors: |
| 625 |
|
| 626 |
- the length of the ICV |
| 627 |
- the IP protocol version (v4 or v6) |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
For example, if the output of the selected algorithm is 96-bits, no |
| 630 |
padding is required for either IPv4 or for IPv6. However, if a |
| 631 |
different length ICV is generated, due to use of a different |
| 632 |
algorithm, then padding may be required depending on the length and |
| 633 |
IP protocol version. The content of the padding field is arbitrarily |
| 634 |
selected by the sender. (The padding is arbitrary, but need not be |
| 635 |
random to achieve security.) These padding bytes are included in the |
| 636 |
Authentication Data calculation, counted as part of the Payload |
| 637 |
Length, and transmitted at the end of the Authentication Data field |
| 638 |
to enable the receiver to perform the ICV calculation. |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
<span class="h6"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3.2.2" href="#section-3.3.3.2.2">3.3.3.2.2</a> Implicit Packet Padding</span> |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
For some authentication algorithms, the byte string over which the |
| 643 |
ICV computation is performed must be a multiple of a blocksize |
| 644 |
specified by the algorithm. If the IP packet length (including AH) |
| 645 |
does not match the blocksize requirements for the algorithm, implicit |
| 646 |
padding MUST be appended to the end of the packet, prior to ICV |
| 647 |
computation. The padding octets MUST have a value of zero. The |
| 648 |
blocksize (and hence the length of the padding) is specified by the |
| 649 |
algorithm specification. This padding is not transmitted with the |
| 650 |
packet. Note that MD5 and SHA-1 are viewed as having a 1-byte |
| 651 |
blocksize because of their internal padding conventions. |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.4" href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a> Fragmentation</span> |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
If required, IP fragmentation occurs after AH processing within an |
| 656 |
IPsec implementation. Thus, transport mode AH is applied only to |
| 657 |
whole IP datagrams (not to IP fragments). An IP packet to which AH |
| 658 |
has been applied may itself be fragmented by routers en route, and |
| 659 |
such fragments must be reassembled prior to AH processing at a |
| 660 |
receiver. In tunnel mode, AH is applied to an IP packet, the payload |
| 661 |
of which may be a fragmented IP packet. For example, a security |
| 662 |
gateway or a "bump-in-the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire" IPsec |
| 663 |
implementation (see the Security Architecture document for details) |
| 664 |
may apply tunnel mode AH to such fragments. |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a> Inbound Packet Processing</span> |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
If there is more than one IPsec header/extension present, the |
| 676 |
processing for each one ignores (does not zero, does not use) any |
| 677 |
IPsec headers applied subsequent to the header being processed. |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.1" href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a> Reassembly</span> |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
If required, reassembly is performed prior to AH processing. If a |
| 682 |
packet offered to AH for processing appears to be an IP fragment, |
| 683 |
i.e., the OFFSET field is non-zero or the MORE FRAGMENTS flag is set, |
| 684 |
the receiver MUST discard the packet; this is an auditable event. The |
| 685 |
audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI value, |
| 686 |
date/time, Source Address, Destination Address, and (in IPv6) the |
| 687 |
Flow ID. |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
NOTE: For packet reassembly, the current IPv4 spec does NOT require |
| 690 |
either the zero'ing of the OFFSET field or the clearing of the MORE |
| 691 |
FRAGMENTS flag. In order for a reassembled packet to be processed by |
| 692 |
IPsec (as opposed to discarded as an apparent fragment), the IP code |
| 693 |
must do these two things after it reassembles a packet. |
| 694 |
|
| 695 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.2" href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a> Security Association Lookup</span> |
| 696 |
|
| 697 |
Upon receipt of a packet containing an IP Authentication Header, the |
| 698 |
receiver determines the appropriate (unidirectional) SA, based on the |
| 699 |
destination IP address, security protocol (AH), and the SPI. (This |
| 700 |
process is described in more detail in the Security Architecture |
| 701 |
document.) The SA indicates whether the Sequence Number field will |
| 702 |
be checked, specifies the algorithm(s) employed for ICV computation, |
| 703 |
and indicates the key(s) required to validate the ICV. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
If no valid Security Association exists for this session (e.g., the |
| 706 |
receiver has no key), the receiver MUST discard the packet; this is |
| 707 |
an auditable event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD |
| 708 |
include the SPI value, date/time, Source Address, Destination |
| 709 |
Address, and (in IPv6) the Flow ID. |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.3" href="#section-3.4.3">3.4.3</a> Sequence Number Verification</span> |
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
All AH implementations MUST support the anti-replay service, though |
| 714 |
its use may be enabled or disabled by the receiver on a per-SA basis. |
| 715 |
(Note that there are no provisions for managing transmitted Sequence |
| 716 |
Number values among multiple senders directing traffic to a single SA |
| 717 |
(irrespective of whether the destination address is unicast, |
| 718 |
broadcast, or multicast). Thus the anti-replay service SHOULD NOT be |
| 719 |
used in a multi-sender environment that employs a single SA.) |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
If the receiver does not enable anti-replay for an SA, no inbound |
| 730 |
checks are performed on the Sequence Number. However, from the |
| 731 |
perspective of the sender, the default is to assume that anti-replay |
| 732 |
is enabled at the receiver. To avoid having the sender do |
| 733 |
unnecessary sequence number monitoring and SA setup (see <a href="#section-3.3.2">section</a> |
| 734 |
<a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>), if an SA establishment protocol such as IKE is employed, the |
| 735 |
receiver SHOULD notify the sender, during SA establishment, if the |
| 736 |
receiver will not provide anti-replay protection. |
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
If the receiver has enabled the anti-replay service for this SA, the |
| 739 |
receiver packet counter for the SA MUST be initialized to zero when |
| 740 |
the SA is established. For each received packet, the receiver MUST |
| 741 |
verify that the packet contains a Sequence Number that does not |
| 742 |
duplicate the Sequence Number of any other packets received during |
| 743 |
the life of this SA. This SHOULD be the first AH check applied to a |
| 744 |
packet after it has been matched to an SA, to speed rejection of |
| 745 |
duplicate packets. |
| 746 |
|
| 747 |
Duplicates are rejected through the use of a sliding receive window. |
| 748 |
(How the window is implemented is a local matter, but the following |
| 749 |
text describes the functionality that the implementation must |
| 750 |
exhibit.) A MINIMUM window size of 32 MUST be supported; but a |
| 751 |
window size of 64 is preferred and SHOULD be employed as the default. |
| 752 |
Another window size (larger than the MINIMUM) MAY be chosen by the |
| 753 |
receiver. (The receiver does NOT notify the sender of the window |
| 754 |
size.) |
| 755 |
|
| 756 |
The "right" edge of the window represents the highest, validated |
| 757 |
Sequence Number value received on this SA. Packets that contain |
| 758 |
Sequence Numbers lower than the "left" edge of the window are |
| 759 |
rejected. Packets falling within the window are checked against a |
| 760 |
list of received packets within the window. An efficient means for |
| 761 |
performing this check, based on the use of a bit mask, is described |
| 762 |
in the Security Architecture document. |
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
If the received packet falls within the window and is new, or if the |
| 765 |
packet is to the right of the window, then the receiver proceeds to |
| 766 |
ICV verification. If the ICV validation fails, the receiver MUST |
| 767 |
discard the received IP datagram as invalid; this is an auditable |
| 768 |
event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI |
| 769 |
value, date/time, Source Address, Destination Address, the Sequence |
| 770 |
Number, and (in IPv6) the Flow ID. The receive window is updated |
| 771 |
only if the ICV verification succeeds. |
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
DISCUSSION: |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
Note that if the packet is either inside the window and new, or is |
| 788 |
outside the window on the "right" side, the receiver MUST |
| 789 |
authenticate the packet before updating the Sequence Number window |
| 790 |
data. |
| 791 |
|
| 792 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.4" href="#section-3.4.4">3.4.4</a> Integrity Check Value Verification</span> |
| 793 |
|
| 794 |
The receiver computes the ICV over the appropriate fields of the |
| 795 |
packet, using the specified authentication algorithm, and verifies |
| 796 |
that it is the same as the ICV included in the Authentication Data |
| 797 |
field of the packet. Details of the computation are provided below. |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
If the computed and received ICV's match, then the datagram is valid, |
| 800 |
and it is accepted. If the test fails, then the receiver MUST |
| 801 |
discard the received IP datagram as invalid; this is an auditable |
| 802 |
event. The audit log entry SHOULD include the SPI value, date/time |
| 803 |
received, Source Address, Destination Address, and (in IPv6) the Flow |
| 804 |
ID. |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
DISCUSSION: |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
Begin by saving the ICV value and replacing it (but not any |
| 809 |
Authentication Data padding) with zero. Zero all other fields |
| 810 |
that may have been modified during transit. (See <a href="#section-3.3.3.1">section 3.3.3.1</a> |
| 811 |
for a discussion of which fields are zeroed before performing the |
| 812 |
ICV calculation.) Check the overall length of the packet, and if |
| 813 |
it requires implicit padding based on the requirements of the |
| 814 |
authentication algorithm, append zero-filled bytes to the end of |
| 815 |
the packet as required. Perform the ICV computation and compare |
| 816 |
the result with the saved value, using the comparison rules |
| 817 |
defined by the algorithm specification. (For example, if a |
| 818 |
digital signature and one-way hash are used for the ICV |
| 819 |
computation, the matching process is more complex.) |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Auditing</span> |
| 822 |
|
| 823 |
Not all systems that implement AH will implement auditing. However, |
| 824 |
if AH is incorporated into a system that supports auditing, then the |
| 825 |
AH implementation MUST also support auditing and MUST allow a system |
| 826 |
administrator to enable or disable auditing for AH. For the most |
| 827 |
part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter. However, |
| 828 |
several auditable events are identified in this specification and for |
| 829 |
each of these events a minimum set of information that SHOULD be |
| 830 |
included in an audit log is defined. Additional information also MAY |
| 831 |
be included in the audit log for each of these events, and additional |
| 832 |
events, not explicitly called out in this specification, also MAY |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
result in audit log entries. There is no requirement for the |
| 842 |
receiver to transmit any message to the purported sender in response |
| 843 |
to the detection of an auditable event, because of the potential to |
| 844 |
induce denial of service via such action. |
| 845 |
|
| 846 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements</span> |
| 847 |
|
| 848 |
Implementations that claim conformance or compliance with this |
| 849 |
specification MUST fully implement the AH syntax and processing |
| 850 |
described here and MUST comply with all requirements of the Security |
| 851 |
Architecture document. If the key used to compute an ICV is manually |
| 852 |
distributed, correct provision of the anti-replay service would |
| 853 |
require correct maintenance of the counter state at the sender, until |
| 854 |
the key is replaced, and there likely would be no automated recovery |
| 855 |
provision if counter overflow were imminent. Thus a compliant |
| 856 |
implementation SHOULD NOT provide this service in conjunction with |
| 857 |
SAs that are manually keyed. A compliant AH implementation MUST |
| 858 |
support the following mandatory-to-implement algorithms: |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
- HMAC with MD5 [<a href="#ref-MG97a" title=""The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH"">MG97a</a>] |
| 861 |
- HMAC with SHA-1 [<a href="#ref-MG97b" title=""The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH"">MG97b</a>] |
| 862 |
|
| 863 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 864 |
|
| 865 |
Security is central to the design of this protocol, and these |
| 866 |
security considerations permeate the specification. Additional |
| 867 |
security-relevant aspects of using the IPsec protocol are discussed |
| 868 |
in the Security Architecture document. |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a></span> |
| 871 |
|
| 872 |
This specification of AH differs from <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a> [<a href="#ref-ATK95" title=""The IP Authentication Header"">ATK95</a>] in several |
| 873 |
important respects, but the fundamental features of AH remain intact. |
| 874 |
One goal of the revision of <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a> was to provide a complete |
| 875 |
framework for AH, with ancillary RFCs required only for algorithm |
| 876 |
specification. For example, the anti-replay service is now an |
| 877 |
integral, mandatory part of AH, not a feature of a transform defined |
| 878 |
in another RFC. Carriage of a sequence number to support this |
| 879 |
service is now required at all times. The default algorithms |
| 880 |
required for interoperability have been changed to HMAC with MD5 or |
| 881 |
SHA-1 (vs. keyed MD5), for security reasons. The list of IPv4 header |
| 882 |
fields excluded from the ICV computation has been expanded to include |
| 883 |
the OFFSET and FLAGS fields. |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
Another motivation for revision was to provide additional detail and |
| 886 |
clarification of subtle points. This specification provides |
| 887 |
rationale for exclusion of selected IPv4 header fields from AH |
| 888 |
coverage and provides examples on positioning of AH in both the IPv4 |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
and v6 contexts. Auditing requirements have been clarified in this |
| 898 |
version of the specification. Tunnel mode AH was mentioned only in |
| 899 |
passing in <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>, but now is a mandatory feature of AH. |
| 900 |
Discussion of interactions with key management and with security |
| 901 |
labels have been moved to the Security Architecture document. |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
Acknowledgements |
| 904 |
|
| 905 |
For over 3 years, this document has evolved through multiple versions |
| 906 |
and iterations. During this time, many people have contributed |
| 907 |
significant ideas and energy to the process and the documents |
| 908 |
themselves. The authors would like to thank Karen Seo for providing |
| 909 |
extensive help in the review, editing, background research, and |
| 910 |
coordination for this version of the specification. The authors |
| 911 |
would also like to thank the members of the IPsec and IPng working |
| 912 |
groups, with special mention of the efforts of (in alphabetic order): |
| 913 |
Steve Bellovin, Steve Deering, Francis Dupont, Phil Karn, Frank |
| 914 |
Kastenholz, Perry Metzger, David Mihelcic, Hilarie Orman, Norman |
| 915 |
Shulman, William Simpson, and Nina Yuan. |
| 916 |
|
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
|
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
|
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
|
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
|
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
|
| 927 |
|
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
|
| 931 |
|
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
|
| 934 |
|
| 935 |
|
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
Appendix A -- Mutability of IP Options/Extension Headers |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
A1. IPv4 Options |
| 956 |
|
| 957 |
This table shows how the IPv4 options are classified with regard to |
| 958 |
"mutability". Where two references are provided, the second one |
| 959 |
supercedes the first. This table is based in part on information |
| 960 |
provided in <a href="./rfc1700">RFC1700</a>, "ASSIGNED NUMBERS", (October 1994). |
| 961 |
|
| 962 |
Opt. |
| 963 |
Copy Class # Name Reference |
| 964 |
---- ----- --- ------------------------ --------- |
| 965 |
IMMUTABLE -- included in ICV calculation |
| 966 |
0 0 0 End of Options List [<a href="./rfc791">RFC791</a>] |
| 967 |
0 0 1 No Operation [<a href="./rfc791">RFC791</a>] |
| 968 |
1 0 2 Security [RFC1108(historic but in use)] |
| 969 |
1 0 5 Extended Security [RFC1108(historic but in use)] |
| 970 |
1 0 6 Commercial Security [expired I-D, now US MIL STD] |
| 971 |
1 0 20 Router Alert [<a href="./rfc2113">RFC2113</a>] |
| 972 |
1 0 21 Sender Directed Multi- [<a href="./rfc1770">RFC1770</a>] |
| 973 |
Destination Delivery |
| 974 |
MUTABLE -- zeroed |
| 975 |
1 0 3 Loose Source Route [<a href="./rfc791">RFC791</a>] |
| 976 |
0 2 4 Time Stamp [<a href="./rfc791">RFC791</a>] |
| 977 |
0 0 7 Record Route [<a href="./rfc791">RFC791</a>] |
| 978 |
1 0 9 Strict Source Route [<a href="./rfc791">RFC791</a>] |
| 979 |
0 2 18 Traceroute [<a href="./rfc1393">RFC1393</a>] |
| 980 |
|
| 981 |
EXPERIMENTAL, SUPERCEDED -- zeroed |
| 982 |
1 0 8 Stream ID [RFC791, <a href="./rfc1122">RFC1122</a> (Host Req)] |
| 983 |
0 0 11 MTU Probe [RFC1063, <a href="./rfc1191">RFC1191</a> (PMTU)] |
| 984 |
0 0 12 MTU Reply [RFC1063, <a href="./rfc1191">RFC1191</a> (PMTU)] |
| 985 |
1 0 17 Extended Internet Proto [RFC1385, <a href="./rfc1883">RFC1883</a> (IPv6)] |
| 986 |
0 0 10 Experimental Measurement [ZSu] |
| 987 |
1 2 13 Experimental Flow Control [Finn] |
| 988 |
1 0 14 Experimental Access Ctl [Estrin] |
| 989 |
0 0 15 ??? [VerSteeg] |
| 990 |
1 0 16 IMI Traffic Descriptor [Lee] |
| 991 |
1 0 19 Address Extension [Ullmann IPv7] |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
NOTE: Use of the Router Alert option is potentially incompatible with |
| 994 |
use of IPsec. Although the option is immutable, its use implies that |
| 995 |
each router along a packet's path will "process" the packet and |
| 996 |
consequently might change the packet. This would happen on a hop by |
| 997 |
hop basis as the packet goes from router to router. Prior to being |
| 998 |
processed by the application to which the option contents are |
| 999 |
directed, e.g., RSVP/IGMP, the packet should encounter AH processing. |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
However, AH processing would require that each router along the path |
| 1010 |
is a member of a multicast-SA defined by the SPI. This might pose |
| 1011 |
problems for packets that are not strictly source routed, and it |
| 1012 |
requires multicast support techniques not currently available. |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
NOTE: Addition or removal of any security labels (BSO, ESO, CIPSO) by |
| 1015 |
systems along a packet's path conflicts with the classification of |
| 1016 |
these IP Options as immutable and is incompatible with the use of |
| 1017 |
IPsec. |
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
NOTE: End of Options List options SHOULD be repeated as necessary to |
| 1020 |
ensure that the IP header ends on a 4 byte boundary in order to |
| 1021 |
ensure that there are no unspecified bytes which could be used for a |
| 1022 |
covert channel. |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
A2. IPv6 Extension Headers |
| 1025 |
|
| 1026 |
This table shows how the IPv6 Extension Headers are classified with |
| 1027 |
regard to "mutability". |
| 1028 |
|
| 1029 |
Option/Extension Name Reference |
| 1030 |
----------------------------------- --------- |
| 1031 |
MUTABLE BUT PREDICTABLE -- included in ICV calculation |
| 1032 |
Routing (Type 0) [<a href="./rfc1883">RFC1883</a>] |
| 1033 |
|
| 1034 |
BIT INDICATES IF OPTION IS MUTABLE (CHANGES UNPREDICTABLY DURING TRANSIT) |
| 1035 |
Hop by Hop options [<a href="./rfc1883">RFC1883</a>] |
| 1036 |
Destination options [<a href="./rfc1883">RFC1883</a>] |
| 1037 |
|
| 1038 |
NOT APPLICABLE |
| 1039 |
Fragmentation [<a href="./rfc1883">RFC1883</a>] |
| 1040 |
|
| 1041 |
Options -- IPv6 options in the Hop-by-Hop and Destination |
| 1042 |
Extension Headers contain a bit that indicates whether the |
| 1043 |
option might change (unpredictably) during transit. For |
| 1044 |
any option for which contents may change en-route, the |
| 1045 |
entire "Option Data" field must be treated as zero-valued |
| 1046 |
octets when computing or verifying the ICV. The Option |
| 1047 |
Type and Opt Data Len are included in the ICV calculation. |
| 1048 |
All options for which the bit indicates immutability are |
| 1049 |
included in the ICV calculation. See the IPv6 |
| 1050 |
specification [<a href="#ref-DH95" title=""Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">DH95</a>] for more information. |
| 1051 |
|
| 1052 |
Routing (Type 0) -- The IPv6 Routing Header "Type 0" will |
| 1053 |
rearrange the address fields within the packet during |
| 1054 |
transit from source to destination. However, the contents |
| 1055 |
of the packet as it will appear at the receiver are known |
| 1056 |
to the sender and to all intermediate hops. Hence, the |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
IPv6 Routing Header "Type 0" is included in the |
| 1066 |
Authentication Data calculation as mutable but predictable. |
| 1067 |
The sender must order the field so that it appears as it |
| 1068 |
will at the receiver, prior to performing the ICV |
| 1069 |
computation. |
| 1070 |
|
| 1071 |
Fragmentation -- Fragmentation occurs after outbound IPsec |
| 1072 |
processing (<a href="#section-3.3">section 3.3</a>) and reassembly occurs before |
| 1073 |
inbound IPsec processing (<a href="#section-3.4">section 3.4</a>). So the |
| 1074 |
Fragmentation Extension Header, if it exists, is not seen |
| 1075 |
by IPsec. |
| 1076 |
|
| 1077 |
Note that on the receive side, the IP implementation could |
| 1078 |
leave a Fragmentation Extension Header in place when it |
| 1079 |
does re-assembly. If this happens, then when AH receives |
| 1080 |
the packet, before doing ICV processing, AH MUST "remove" |
| 1081 |
(or skip over) this header and change the previous header's |
| 1082 |
"Next Header" field to be the "Next Header" field in the |
| 1083 |
Fragmentation Extension Header. |
| 1084 |
|
| 1085 |
Note that on the send side, the IP implementation could |
| 1086 |
give the IPsec code a packet with a Fragmentation Extension |
| 1087 |
Header with Offset of 0 (first fragment) and a More |
| 1088 |
Fragments Flag of 0 (last fragment). If this happens, then |
| 1089 |
before doing ICV processing, AH MUST first "remove" (or |
| 1090 |
skip over) this header and change the previous header's |
| 1091 |
"Next Header" field to be the "Next Header" field in the |
| 1092 |
Fragmentation Extension Header. |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
References |
| 1095 |
|
| 1096 |
[<a id="ref-ATK95">ATK95</a>] Atkinson, R., "The IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc1826">RFC 1826</a>, |
| 1097 |
August 1995. |
| 1098 |
|
| 1099 |
[<a id="ref-Bra97">Bra97</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1100 |
Requirement Level", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
[<a id="ref-DH95">DH95</a>] Deering, S., and B. Hinden, "Internet Protocol version 6 |
| 1103 |
(IPv6) Specification", <a href="./rfc1883">RFC 1883</a>, December 1995. |
| 1104 |
|
| 1105 |
[<a id="ref-HC98">HC98</a>] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange |
| 1106 |
(IKE)", <a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998. |
| 1107 |
|
| 1108 |
[<a id="ref-KA97a">KA97a</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the |
| 1109 |
Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998. |
| 1110 |
|
| 1111 |
[<a id="ref-KA97b">KA97b</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security |
| 1112 |
Payload (ESP)", <a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a>, November 1998. |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
[<a id="ref-MG97a">MG97a</a>] Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within |
| 1122 |
ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a>, November 1998. |
| 1123 |
|
| 1124 |
[<a id="ref-MG97b">MG97b</a>] Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within |
| 1125 |
ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2404">RFC 2404</a>, November 1998. |
| 1126 |
|
| 1127 |
[<a id="ref-STD-2">STD-2</a>] Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, <a href="./rfc1700">RFC</a> |
| 1128 |
<a href="./rfc1700">1700</a>, October 1994. See also: |
| 1129 |
<a href="http://www.iana.org/numbers.html">http://www.iana.org/numbers.html</a> |
| 1130 |
|
| 1131 |
Disclaimer |
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
The views and specification here are those of the authors and are not |
| 1134 |
necessarily those of their employers. The authors and their |
| 1135 |
employers specifically disclaim responsibility for any problems |
| 1136 |
arising from correct or incorrect implementation or use of this |
| 1137 |
specification. |
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 |
Author Information |
| 1140 |
|
| 1141 |
Stephen Kent |
| 1142 |
BBN Corporation |
| 1143 |
70 Fawcett Street |
| 1144 |
Cambridge, MA 02140 |
| 1145 |
USA |
| 1146 |
|
| 1147 |
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 |
| 1148 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1149 |
|
| 1150 |
|
| 1151 |
Randall Atkinson |
| 1152 |
@Home Network |
| 1153 |
425 Broadway, |
| 1154 |
Redwood City, CA 94063 |
| 1155 |
USA |
| 1156 |
|
| 1157 |
Phone: +1 (415) 569-5000 |
| 1158 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1159 |
|
| 1160 |
|
| 1161 |
|
| 1162 |
|
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
|
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
|
| 1167 |
|
| 1168 |
|
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2402">RFC 2402</a> IP Authentication Header November 1998</span> |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
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This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
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others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
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or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published |
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and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
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kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
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included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
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document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
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the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
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Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
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developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
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copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
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followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
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English. |
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
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revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
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This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
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"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
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BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
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MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
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Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 22] |
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</pre> |