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<pre>Network Working Group S. Kent |
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Request for Comments: 2406 BBN Corp |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc1827">1827</a> R. Atkinson |
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Category: Standards Track @Home Network |
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November 1998 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)</span> |
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|
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction..................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Encapsulating Security Payload Packet Format..................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Security Parameters Index................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Sequence Number .........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a> Payload Data.............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a> Padding (for Encryption).................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.5">2.5</a> Pad Length...............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.6">2.6</a> Next Header..............................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.7">2.7</a> Authentication Data......................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Encapsulating Security Protocol Processing....................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> ESP Header Location......................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Algorithms..............................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> Encryption Algorithms..............................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> Authentication Algorithms..........................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Outbound Packet Processing..............................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a> Security Association Lookup........................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a> Packet Encryption..................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a> Sequence Number Generation.........................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a> Integrity Check Value Calculation..................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.5">3.3.5</a> Fragmentation......................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a> Inbound Packet Processing...............................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a> Reassembly.........................................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a> Security Association Lookup........................<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.3">3.4.3</a> Sequence Number Verification.......................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4.4">3.4.4</a> Integrity Check Value Verification.................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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<a href="#section-3.4.5">3.4.5</a> Packet Decryption..................................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Auditing.....................................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements.....................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations......................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a>....................................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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Acknowledgements................................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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References......................................................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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Disclaimer......................................................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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Author Information..............................................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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Full Copyright Statement........................................<a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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|
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The Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) header is designed to |
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provide a mix of security services in IPv4 and IPv6. ESP may be |
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applied alone, in combination with the IP Authentication Header (AH) |
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[<a href="#ref-KA97b" title=""IP Authentication Header"">KA97b</a>], or in a nested fashion, e.g., through the use of tunnel mode |
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(see "Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol" [<a href="#ref-KA97a" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">KA97a</a>], |
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hereafter referred to as the Security Architecture document). |
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Security services can be provided between a pair of communicating |
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hosts, between a pair of communicating security gateways, or between |
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a security gateway and a host. For more details on how to use ESP |
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and AH in various network environments, see the Security Architecture |
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document [<a href="#ref-KA97a" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">KA97a</a>]. |
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|
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The ESP header is inserted after the IP header and before the upper |
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layer protocol header (transport mode) or before an encapsulated IP |
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header (tunnel mode). These modes are described in more detail |
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below. |
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|
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ESP is used to provide confidentiality, data origin authentication, |
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connectionless integrity, an anti-replay service (a form of partial |
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sequence integrity), and limited traffic flow confidentiality. The |
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set of services provided depends on options selected at the time of |
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Security Association establishment and on the placement of the |
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implementation. Confidentiality may be selected independent of all |
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other services. However, use of confidentiality without |
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integrity/authentication (either in ESP or separately in AH) may |
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subject traffic to certain forms of active attacks that could |
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undermine the confidentiality service (see [<a href="#ref-Bel96" title=""Problem Areas for the IP Security Protocols"">Bel96</a>]). Data origin |
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authentication and connectionless integrity are joint services |
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(hereafter referred to jointly as "authentication) and are offered as |
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an option in conjunction with (optional) confidentiality. The anti- |
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replay service may be selected only if data origin authentication is |
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selected, and its election is solely at the discretion of the |
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receiver. (Although the default calls for the sender to increment |
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the Sequence Number used for anti-replay, the service is effective |
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only if the receiver checks the Sequence Number.) Traffic flow |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
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|
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confidentiality requires selection of tunnel mode, and is most |
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effective if implemented at a security gateway, where traffic |
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aggregation may be able to mask true source-destination patterns. |
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Note that although both confidentiality and authentication are |
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optional, at least one of them MUST be selected. |
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|
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It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the terms and concepts |
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described in the Security Architecture document. In particular, the |
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reader should be familiar with the definitions of security services |
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offered by ESP and AH, the concept of Security Associations, the ways |
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in which ESP can be used in conjunction with the Authentication |
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Header (AH), and the different key management options available for |
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ESP and AH. (With regard to the last topic, the current key |
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management options required for both AH and ESP are manual keying and |
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automated keying via IKE [<a href="#ref-HC98" title=""The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">HC98</a>].) |
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|
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The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, |
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SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when they appear in this |
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document, are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-Bra97" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Level"">Bra97</a>]. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Encapsulating Security Payload Packet Format</span> |
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|
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The protocol header (IPv4, IPv6, or Extension) immediately preceding |
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the ESP header will contain the value 50 in its Protocol (IPv4) or |
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Next Header (IPv6, Extension) field [<a href="#ref-STD-2" title=""Assigned Numbers"">STD-2</a>]. |
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|
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0 1 2 3 |
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0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 0 1 |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ---- |
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| Security Parameters Index (SPI) | ^Auth. |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |Cov- |
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| Sequence Number | |erage |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | ---- |
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| Payload Data* (variable) | | ^ |
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~ ~ | | |
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| | |Conf. |
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+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |Cov- |
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| | Padding (0-255 bytes) | |erage* |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ +-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ | | |
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| | Pad Length | Next Header | v v |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ ------ |
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| Authentication Data (variable) | |
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~ ~ |
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| | |
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+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+-+ |
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|
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* If included in the Payload field, cryptographic |
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synchronization data, e.g., an Initialization Vector (IV, see |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">Section 2.3</a>), usually is not encrypted per se, although it |
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often is referred to as being part of the ciphertext. |
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|
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The following subsections define the fields in the header format. |
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"Optional" means that the field is omitted if the option is not |
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selected, i.e., it is present in neither the packet as transmitted |
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nor as formatted for computation of an Integrity Check Value (ICV, |
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see <a href="#section-2.7">Section 2.7</a>). Whether or not an option is selected is defined as |
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part of Security Association (SA) establishment. Thus the format of |
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ESP packets for a given SA is fixed, for the duration of the SA. In |
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contrast, "mandatory" fields are always present in the ESP packet |
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format, for all SAs. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a> Security Parameters Index</span> |
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|
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The SPI is an arbitrary 32-bit value that, in combination with the |
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destination IP address and security protocol (ESP), uniquely |
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identifies the Security Association for this datagram. The set of |
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SPI values in the range 1 through 255 are reserved by the Internet |
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Assigned Numbers Authority (IANA) for future use; a reserved SPI |
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value will not normally be assigned by IANA unless the use of the |
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assigned SPI value is specified in an RFC. It is ordinarily selected |
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by the destination system upon establishment of an SA (see the |
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Security Architecture document for more details). The SPI field is |
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mandatory. |
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|
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The SPI value of zero (0) is reserved for local, implementation- |
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specific use and MUST NOT be sent on the wire. For example, a key |
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management implementation MAY use the zero SPI value to mean "No |
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Security Association Exists" during the period when the IPsec |
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implementation has requested that its key management entity establish |
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a new SA, but the SA has not yet been established. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a> Sequence Number</span> |
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|
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This unsigned 32-bit field contains a monotonically increasing |
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counter value (sequence number). It is mandatory and is always |
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present even if the receiver does not elect to enable the anti-replay |
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service for a specific SA. Processing of the Sequence Number field |
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is at the discretion of the receiver, i.e., the sender MUST always |
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transmit this field, but the receiver need not act upon it (see the |
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discussion of Sequence Number Verification in the "Inbound Packet |
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Processing" section below). |
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|
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The sender's counter and the receiver's counter are initialized to 0 |
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when an SA is established. (The first packet sent using a given SA |
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will have a Sequence Number of 1; see <a href="#section-3.3.3">Section 3.3.3</a> for more details |
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on how the Sequence Number is generated.) If anti-replay is enabled |
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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(the default), the transmitted Sequence Number must never be allowed |
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to cycle. Thus, the sender's counter and the receiver's counter MUST |
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be reset (by establishing a new SA and thus a new key) prior to the |
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transmission of the 2^32nd packet on an SA. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a> Payload Data</span> |
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|
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Payload Data is a variable-length field containing data described by |
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the Next Header field. The Payload Data field is mandatory and is an |
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integral number of bytes in length. If the algorithm used to encrypt |
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the payload requires cryptographic synchronization data, e.g., an |
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Initialization Vector (IV), then this data MAY be carried explicitly |
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in the Payload field. Any encryption algorithm that requires such |
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explicit, per-packet synchronization data MUST indicate the length, |
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any structure for such data, and the location of this data as part of |
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an RFC specifying how the algorithm is used with ESP. If such |
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synchronization data is implicit, the algorithm for deriving the data |
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MUST be part of the RFC. |
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|
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Note that with regard to ensuring the alignment of the (real) |
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ciphertext in the presence of an IV: |
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o For some IV-based modes of operation, the receiver treats |
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the IV as the start of the ciphertext, feeding it into the |
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algorithm directly. In these modes, alignment of the start |
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of the (real) ciphertext is not an issue at the receiver. |
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o In some cases, the receiver reads the IV in separately from |
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the ciphertext. In these cases, the algorithm |
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specification MUST address how alignment of the (real) |
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ciphertext is to be achieved. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a> Padding (for Encryption)</span> |
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|
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Several factors require or motivate use of the Padding field. |
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|
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o If an encryption algorithm is employed that requires the |
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plaintext to be a multiple of some number of bytes, e.g., |
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the block size of a block cipher, the Padding field is used |
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to fill the plaintext (consisting of the Payload Data, Pad |
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Length and Next Header fields, as well as the Padding) to |
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the size required by the algorithm. |
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|
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o Padding also may be required, irrespective of encryption |
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algorithm requirements, to ensure that the resulting |
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ciphertext terminates on a 4-byte boundary. Specifically, |
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
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|
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the Pad Length and Next Header fields must be right aligned |
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within a 4-byte word, as illustrated in the ESP packet |
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format figure above, to ensure that the Authentication Data |
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field (if present) is aligned on a 4-byte boundary. |
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|
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o Padding beyond that required for the algorithm or alignment |
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reasons cited above, may be used to conceal the actual |
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length of the payload, in support of (partial) traffic flow |
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confidentiality. However, inclusion of such additional |
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padding has adverse bandwidth implications and thus its use |
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should be undertaken with care. |
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|
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The sender MAY add 0-255 bytes of padding. Inclusion of the Padding |
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field in an ESP packet is optional, but all implementations MUST |
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support generation and consumption of padding. |
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|
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a. For the purpose of ensuring that the bits to be encrypted |
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are a multiple of the algorithm's blocksize (first bullet |
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above), the padding computation applies to the Payload |
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Data exclusive of the IV, the Pad Length, and Next Header |
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fields. |
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|
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b. For the purposes of ensuring that the Authentication Data |
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is aligned on a 4-byte boundary (second bullet above), the |
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padding computation applies to the Payload Data inclusive |
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of the IV, the Pad Length, and Next Header fields. |
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|
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If Padding bytes are needed but the encryption algorithm does not |
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specify the padding contents, then the following default processing |
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MUST be used. The Padding bytes are initialized with a series of |
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(unsigned, 1-byte) integer values. The first padding byte appended |
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to the plaintext is numbered 1, with subsequent padding bytes making |
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up a monotonically increasing sequence: 1, 2, 3, ... When this |
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padding scheme is employed, the receiver SHOULD inspect the Padding |
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field. (This scheme was selected because of its relative simplicity, |
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ease of implementation in hardware, and because it offers limited |
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protection against certain forms of "cut and paste" attacks in the |
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absence of other integrity measures, if the receiver checks the |
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padding values upon decryption.) |
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|
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Any encryption algorithm that requires Padding other than the default |
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described above, MUST define the Padding contents (e.g., zeros or |
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random data) and any required receiver processing of these Padding |
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bytes in an RFC specifying how the algorithm is used with ESP. In |
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such circumstances, the content of the Padding field will be |
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determined by the encryption algorithm and mode selected and defined |
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in the corresponding algorithm RFC. The relevant algorithm RFC MAY |
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specify that a receiver MUST inspect the Padding field or that a |
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|
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|
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|
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<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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receiver MUST inform senders of how the receiver will handle the |
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Padding field. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.5" href="#section-2.5">2.5</a> Pad Length</span> |
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|
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The Pad Length field indicates the number of pad bytes immediately |
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preceding it. The range of valid values is 0-255, where a value of |
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zero indicates that no Padding bytes are present. The Pad Length |
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field is mandatory. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.6" href="#section-2.6">2.6</a> Next Header</span> |
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|
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The Next Header is an 8-bit field that identifies the type of data |
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contained in the Payload Data field, e.g., an extension header in |
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IPv6 or an upper layer protocol identifier. The value of this field |
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is chosen from the set of IP Protocol Numbers defined in the most |
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recent "Assigned Numbers" [<a href="#ref-STD-2" title=""Assigned Numbers"">STD-2</a>] RFC from the Internet Assigned |
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Numbers Authority (IANA). The Next Header field is mandatory. |
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|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.7" href="#section-2.7">2.7</a> Authentication Data</span> |
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|
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The Authentication Data is a variable-length field containing an |
| 359 |
Integrity Check Value (ICV) computed over the ESP packet minus the |
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Authentication Data. The length of the field is specified by the |
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authentication function selected. The Authentication Data field is |
| 362 |
optional, and is included only if the authentication service has been |
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selected for the SA in question. The authentication algorithm |
| 364 |
specification MUST specify the length of the ICV and the comparison |
| 365 |
rules and processing steps for validation. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Encapsulating Security Protocol Processing</span> |
| 368 |
|
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a> ESP Header Location</span> |
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|
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Like AH, ESP may be employed in two ways: transport mode or tunnel |
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mode. The former mode is applicable only to host implementations and |
| 373 |
provides protection for upper layer protocols, but not the IP header. |
| 374 |
(In this mode, note that for "bump-in-the-stack" or "bump-in-the- |
| 375 |
wire" implementations, as defined in the Security Architecture |
| 376 |
document, inbound and outbound IP fragments may require an IPsec |
| 377 |
implementation to perform extra IP reassembly/fragmentation in order |
| 378 |
to both conform to this specification and provide transparent IPsec |
| 379 |
support. Special care is required to perform such operations within |
| 380 |
these implementations when multiple interfaces are in use.) |
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
In transport mode, ESP is inserted after the IP header and before an |
| 383 |
upper layer protocol, e.g., TCP, UDP, ICMP, etc. or before any other |
| 384 |
IPsec headers that have already been inserted. In the context of |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
IPv4, this translates to placing ESP after the IP header (and any |
| 394 |
options that it contains), but before the upper layer protocol. |
| 395 |
(Note that the term "transport" mode should not be misconstrued as |
| 396 |
restricting its use to TCP and UDP. For example, an ICMP message MAY |
| 397 |
be sent using either "transport" mode or "tunnel" mode.) The |
| 398 |
following diagram illustrates ESP transport mode positioning for a |
| 399 |
typical IPv4 packet, on a "before and after" basis. (The "ESP |
| 400 |
trailer" encompasses any Padding, plus the Pad Length, and Next |
| 401 |
Header fields.) |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
BEFORE APPLYING ESP |
| 404 |
---------------------------- |
| 405 |
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | | | |
| 406 |
|(any options)| TCP | Data | |
| 407 |
---------------------------- |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
AFTER APPLYING ESP |
| 410 |
------------------------------------------------- |
| 411 |
IPv4 |orig IP hdr | ESP | | | ESP | ESP| |
| 412 |
|(any options)| Hdr | TCP | Data | Trailer |Auth| |
| 413 |
------------------------------------------------- |
| 414 |
|<----- encrypted ---->| |
| 415 |
|<------ authenticated ----->| |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
In the IPv6 context, ESP is viewed as an end-to-end payload, and thus |
| 419 |
should appear after hop-by-hop, routing, and fragmentation extension |
| 420 |
headers. The destination options extension header(s) could appear |
| 421 |
either before or after the ESP header depending on the semantics |
| 422 |
desired. However, since ESP protects only fields after the ESP |
| 423 |
header, it generally may be desirable to place the destination |
| 424 |
options header(s) after the ESP header. The following diagram |
| 425 |
illustrates ESP transport mode positioning for a typical IPv6 packet. |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
BEFORE APPLYING ESP |
| 428 |
--------------------------------------- |
| 429 |
IPv6 | | ext hdrs | | | |
| 430 |
| orig IP hdr |if present| TCP | Data | |
| 431 |
--------------------------------------- |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
AFTER APPLYING ESP |
| 450 |
--------------------------------------------------------- |
| 451 |
IPv6 | orig |hop-by-hop,dest*,| |dest| | | ESP | ESP| |
| 452 |
|IP hdr|routing,fragment.|ESP|opt*|TCP|Data|Trailer|Auth| |
| 453 |
--------------------------------------------------------- |
| 454 |
|<---- encrypted ---->| |
| 455 |
|<---- authenticated ---->| |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
* = if present, could be before ESP, after ESP, or both |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
ESP and AH headers can be combined in a variety of modes. The IPsec |
| 460 |
Architecture document describes the combinations of security |
| 461 |
associations that must be supported. |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
Tunnel mode ESP may be employed in either hosts or security gateways. |
| 464 |
When ESP is implemented in a security gateway (to protect subscriber |
| 465 |
transit traffic), tunnel mode must be used. In tunnel mode, the |
| 466 |
"inner" IP header carries the ultimate source and destination |
| 467 |
addresses, while an "outer" IP header may contain distinct IP |
| 468 |
addresses, e.g., addresses of security gateways. In tunnel mode, ESP |
| 469 |
protects the entire inner IP packet, including the entire inner IP |
| 470 |
header. The position of ESP in tunnel mode, relative to the outer IP |
| 471 |
header, is the same as for ESP in transport mode. The following |
| 472 |
diagram illustrates ESP tunnel mode positioning for typical IPv4 and |
| 473 |
IPv6 packets. |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
----------------------------------------------------------- |
| 476 |
IPv4 | new IP hdr* | | orig IP hdr* | | | ESP | ESP| |
| 477 |
|(any options)| ESP | (any options) |TCP|Data|Trailer|Auth| |
| 478 |
----------------------------------------------------------- |
| 479 |
|<--------- encrypted ---------->| |
| 480 |
|<----------- authenticated ---------->| |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 483 |
IPv6 | new* |new ext | | orig*|orig ext | | | ESP | ESP| |
| 484 |
|IP hdr| hdrs* |ESP|IP hdr| hdrs * |TCP|Data|Trailer|Auth| |
| 485 |
------------------------------------------------------------ |
| 486 |
|<--------- encrypted ----------->| |
| 487 |
|<---------- authenticated ---------->| |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
* = if present, construction of outer IP hdr/extensions |
| 490 |
and modification of inner IP hdr/extensions is |
| 491 |
discussed below. |
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a> Algorithms</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
The mandatory-to-implement algorithms are described in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>, |
| 508 |
"Conformance Requirements". Other algorithms MAY be supported. Note |
| 509 |
that although both confidentiality and authentication are optional, |
| 510 |
at least one of these services MUST be selected hence both algorithms |
| 511 |
MUST NOT be simultaneously NULL. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a> Encryption Algorithms</span> |
| 514 |
|
| 515 |
The encryption algorithm employed is specified by the SA. ESP is |
| 516 |
designed for use with symmetric encryption algorithms. Because IP |
| 517 |
packets may arrive out of order, each packet must carry any data |
| 518 |
required to allow the receiver to establish cryptographic |
| 519 |
synchronization for decryption. This data may be carried explicitly |
| 520 |
in the payload field, e.g., as an IV (as described above), or the |
| 521 |
data may be derived from the packet header. Since ESP makes |
| 522 |
provision for padding of the plaintext, encryption algorithms |
| 523 |
employed with ESP may exhibit either block or stream mode |
| 524 |
characteristics. Note that since encryption (confidentiality) is |
| 525 |
optional, this algorithm may be "NULL". |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> Authentication Algorithms</span> |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
The authentication algorithm employed for the ICV computation is |
| 530 |
specified by the SA. For point-to-point communication, suitable |
| 531 |
authentication algorithms include keyed Message Authentication Codes |
| 532 |
(MACs) based on symmetric encryption algorithms (e.g., DES) or on |
| 533 |
one-way hash functions (e.g., MD5 or SHA-1). For multicast |
| 534 |
communication, one-way hash algorithms combined with asymmetric |
| 535 |
signature algorithms are appropriate, though performance and space |
| 536 |
considerations currently preclude use of such algorithms. Note that |
| 537 |
since authentication is optional, this algorithm may be "NULL". |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a> Outbound Packet Processing</span> |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
In transport mode, the sender encapsulates the upper layer protocol |
| 542 |
information in the ESP header/trailer, and retains the specified IP |
| 543 |
header (and any IP extension headers in the IPv6 context). In tunnel |
| 544 |
mode, the outer and inner IP header/extensions can be inter-related |
| 545 |
in a variety of ways. The construction of the outer IP |
| 546 |
header/extensions during the encapsulation process is described in |
| 547 |
the Security Architecture document. If there is more than one IPsec |
| 548 |
header/extension required by security policy, the order of the |
| 549 |
application of the security headers MUST be defined by security |
| 550 |
policy. |
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a> Security Association Lookup</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
ESP is applied to an outbound packet only after an IPsec |
| 564 |
implementation determines that the packet is associated with an SA |
| 565 |
that calls for ESP processing. The process of determining what, if |
| 566 |
any, IPsec processing is applied to outbound traffic is described in |
| 567 |
the Security Architecture document. |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a> Packet Encryption</span> |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
In this section, we speak in terms of encryption always being applied |
| 572 |
because of the formatting implications. This is done with the |
| 573 |
understanding that "no confidentiality" is offered by using the NULL |
| 574 |
encryption algorithm. Accordingly, the sender: |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
1. encapsulates (into the ESP Payload field): |
| 577 |
- for transport mode -- just the original upper layer |
| 578 |
protocol information. |
| 579 |
- for tunnel mode -- the entire original IP datagram. |
| 580 |
2. adds any necessary padding. |
| 581 |
3. encrypts the result (Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and |
| 582 |
Next Header) using the key, encryption algorithm, algorithm |
| 583 |
mode indicated by the SA and cryptographic synchronization |
| 584 |
data (if any). |
| 585 |
- If explicit cryptographic synchronization data, e.g., |
| 586 |
an IV, is indicated, it is input to the encryption |
| 587 |
algorithm per the algorithm specification and placed |
| 588 |
in the Payload field. |
| 589 |
- If implicit cryptographic synchronication data, e.g., |
| 590 |
an IV, is indicated, it is constructed and input to |
| 591 |
the encryption algorithm as per the algorithm |
| 592 |
specification. |
| 593 |
|
| 594 |
The exact steps for constructing the outer IP header depend on the |
| 595 |
mode (transport or tunnel) and are described in the Security |
| 596 |
Architecture document. |
| 597 |
|
| 598 |
If authentication is selected, encryption is performed first, before |
| 599 |
the authentication, and the encryption does not encompass the |
| 600 |
Authentication Data field. This order of processing facilitates |
| 601 |
rapid detection and rejection of replayed or bogus packets by the |
| 602 |
receiver, prior to decrypting the packet, hence potentially reducing |
| 603 |
the impact of denial of service attacks. It also allows for the |
| 604 |
possibility of parallel processing of packets at the receiver, i.e., |
| 605 |
decryption can take place in parallel with authentication. Note that |
| 606 |
since the Authentication Data is not protected by encryption, a keyed |
| 607 |
authentication algorithm must be employed to compute the ICV. |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3" href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a> Sequence Number Generation</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
The sender's counter is initialized to 0 when an SA is established. |
| 620 |
The sender increments the Sequence Number for this SA and inserts the |
| 621 |
new value into the Sequence Number field. Thus the first packet sent |
| 622 |
using a given SA will have a Sequence Number of 1. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
If anti-replay is enabled (the default), the sender checks to ensure |
| 625 |
that the counter has not cycled before inserting the new value in the |
| 626 |
Sequence Number field. In other words, the sender MUST NOT send a |
| 627 |
packet on an SA if doing so would cause the Sequence Number to cycle. |
| 628 |
An attempt to transmit a packet that would result in Sequence Number |
| 629 |
overflow is an auditable event. (Note that this approach to Sequence |
| 630 |
Number management does not require use of modular arithmetic.) |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
The sender assumes anti-replay is enabled as a default, unless |
| 633 |
otherwise notified by the receiver (see 3.4.3). Thus, if the counter |
| 634 |
has cycled, the sender will set up a new SA and key (unless the SA |
| 635 |
was configured with manual key management). |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
If anti-replay is disabled, the sender does not need to monitor or |
| 638 |
reset the counter, e.g., in the case of manual key management (see |
| 639 |
<a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>). However, the sender still increments the counter and |
| 640 |
when it reaches the maximum value, the counter rolls over back to |
| 641 |
zero. |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.4" href="#section-3.3.4">3.3.4</a> Integrity Check Value Calculation</span> |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
If authentication is selected for the SA, the sender computes the ICV |
| 646 |
over the ESP packet minus the Authentication Data. Thus the SPI, |
| 647 |
Sequence Number, Payload Data, Padding (if present), Pad Length, and |
| 648 |
Next Header are all encompassed by the ICV computation. Note that |
| 649 |
the last 4 fields will be in ciphertext form, since encryption is |
| 650 |
performed prior to authentication. |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
For some authentication algorithms, the byte string over which the |
| 653 |
ICV computation is performed must be a multiple of a blocksize |
| 654 |
specified by the algorithm. If the length of this byte string does |
| 655 |
not match the blocksize requirements for the algorithm, implicit |
| 656 |
padding MUST be appended to the end of the ESP packet, (after the |
| 657 |
Next Header field) prior to ICV computation. The padding octets MUST |
| 658 |
have a value of zero. The blocksize (and hence the length of the |
| 659 |
padding) is specified by the algorithm specification. This padding |
| 660 |
is not transmitted with the packet. Note that MD5 and SHA-1 are |
| 661 |
viewed as having a 1-byte blocksize because of their internal padding |
| 662 |
conventions. |
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.5" href="#section-3.3.5">3.3.5</a> Fragmentation</span> |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
If necessary, fragmentation is performed after ESP processing within |
| 676 |
an IPsec implementation. Thus, transport mode ESP is applied only to |
| 677 |
whole IP datagrams (not to IP fragments). An IP packet to which ESP |
| 678 |
has been applied may itself be fragmented by routers en route, and |
| 679 |
such fragments must be reassembled prior to ESP processing at a |
| 680 |
receiver. In tunnel mode, ESP is applied to an IP packet, the |
| 681 |
payload of which may be a fragmented IP packet. For example, a |
| 682 |
security gateway or a "bump-in-the-stack" or "bump-in-the-wire" IPsec |
| 683 |
implementation (as defined in the Security Architecture document) may |
| 684 |
apply tunnel mode ESP to such fragments. |
| 685 |
|
| 686 |
NOTE: For transport mode -- As mentioned at the beginning of <a href="#section-3.1">Section</a> |
| 687 |
<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>, bump-in-the-stack and bump-in-the-wire implementations may have |
| 688 |
to first reassemble a packet fragmented by the local IP layer, then |
| 689 |
apply IPsec, and then fragment the resulting packet. |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
NOTE: For IPv6 -- For bump-in-the-stack and bump-in-the-wire |
| 692 |
implementations, it will be necessary to walk through all the |
| 693 |
extension headers to determine if there is a fragmentation header and |
| 694 |
hence that the packet needs reassembling prior to IPsec processing. |
| 695 |
|
| 696 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a> Inbound Packet Processing</span> |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.1" href="#section-3.4.1">3.4.1</a> Reassembly</span> |
| 699 |
|
| 700 |
If required, reassembly is performed prior to ESP processing. If a |
| 701 |
packet offered to ESP for processing appears to be an IP fragment, |
| 702 |
i.e., the OFFSET field is non-zero or the MORE FRAGMENTS flag is set, |
| 703 |
the receiver MUST discard the packet; this is an auditable event. The |
| 704 |
audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI value, |
| 705 |
date/time received, Source Address, Destination Address, Sequence |
| 706 |
Number, and (in IPv6) the Flow ID. |
| 707 |
|
| 708 |
NOTE: For packet reassembly, the current IPv4 spec does NOT require |
| 709 |
either the zero'ing of the OFFSET field or the clearing of the MORE |
| 710 |
FRAGMENTS flag. In order for a reassembled packet to be processed by |
| 711 |
IPsec (as opposed to discarded as an apparent fragment), the IP code |
| 712 |
must do these two things after it reassembles a packet. |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.2" href="#section-3.4.2">3.4.2</a> Security Association Lookup</span> |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
Upon receipt of a (reassembled) packet containing an ESP Header, the |
| 717 |
receiver determines the appropriate (unidirectional) SA, based on the |
| 718 |
destination IP address, security protocol (ESP), and the SPI. (This |
| 719 |
process is described in more detail in the Security Architecture |
| 720 |
document.) The SA indicates whether the Sequence Number field will |
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
be checked, whether the Authentication Data field should be present, |
| 730 |
and it will specify the algorithms and keys to be employed for |
| 731 |
decryption and ICV computations (if applicable). |
| 732 |
|
| 733 |
If no valid Security Association exists for this session (for |
| 734 |
example, the receiver has no key), the receiver MUST discard the |
| 735 |
packet; this is an auditable event. The audit log entry for this |
| 736 |
event SHOULD include the SPI value, date/time received, Source |
| 737 |
Address, Destination Address, Sequence Number, and (in IPv6) the |
| 738 |
cleartext Flow ID. |
| 739 |
|
| 740 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.3" href="#section-3.4.3">3.4.3</a> Sequence Number Verification</span> |
| 741 |
|
| 742 |
All ESP implementations MUST support the anti-replay service, though |
| 743 |
its use may be enabled or disabled by the receiver on a per-SA basis. |
| 744 |
This service MUST NOT be enabled unless the authentication service |
| 745 |
also is enabled for the SA, since otherwise the Sequence Number field |
| 746 |
has not been integrity protected. (Note that there are no provisions |
| 747 |
for managing transmitted Sequence Number values among multiple |
| 748 |
senders directing traffic to a single SA (irrespective of whether the |
| 749 |
destination address is unicast, broadcast, or multicast). Thus the |
| 750 |
anti-replay service SHOULD NOT be used in a multi-sender environment |
| 751 |
that employs a single SA.) |
| 752 |
|
| 753 |
If the receiver does not enable anti-replay for an SA, no inbound |
| 754 |
checks are performed on the Sequence Number. However, from the |
| 755 |
perspective of the sender, the default is to assume that anti-replay |
| 756 |
is enabled at the receiver. To avoid having the sender do |
| 757 |
unnecessary sequence number monitoring and SA setup (see <a href="#section-3.3.3">section</a> |
| 758 |
<a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>), if an SA establishment protocol such as IKE is employed, the |
| 759 |
receiver SHOULD notify the sender, during SA establishment, if the |
| 760 |
receiver will not provide anti-replay protection. |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
If the receiver has enabled the anti-replay service for this SA, the |
| 763 |
receive packet counter for the SA MUST be initialized to zero when |
| 764 |
the SA is established. For each received packet, the receiver MUST |
| 765 |
verify that the packet contains a Sequence Number that does not |
| 766 |
duplicate the Sequence Number of any other packets received during |
| 767 |
the life of this SA. This SHOULD be the first ESP check applied to a |
| 768 |
packet after it has been matched to an SA, to speed rejection of |
| 769 |
duplicate packets. |
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
Duplicates are rejected through the use of a sliding receive window. |
| 772 |
(How the window is implemented is a local matter, but the following |
| 773 |
text describes the functionality that the implementation must |
| 774 |
exhibit.) A MINIMUM window size of 32 MUST be supported; but a |
| 775 |
window size of 64 is preferred and SHOULD be employed as the default. |
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
Another window size (larger than the MINIMUM) MAY be chosen by the |
| 786 |
receiver. (The receiver does NOT notify the sender of the window |
| 787 |
size.) |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
The "right" edge of the window represents the highest, validated |
| 790 |
Sequence Number value received on this SA. Packets that contain |
| 791 |
Sequence Numbers lower than the "left" edge of the window are |
| 792 |
rejected. Packets falling within the window are checked against a |
| 793 |
list of received packets within the window. An efficient means for |
| 794 |
performing this check, based on the use of a bit mask, is described |
| 795 |
in the Security Architecture document. |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
If the received packet falls within the window and is new, or if the |
| 798 |
packet is to the right of the window, then the receiver proceeds to |
| 799 |
ICV verification. If the ICV validation fails, the receiver MUST |
| 800 |
discard the received IP datagram as invalid; this is an auditable |
| 801 |
event. The audit log entry for this event SHOULD include the SPI |
| 802 |
value, date/time received, Source Address, Destination Address, the |
| 803 |
Sequence Number, and (in IPv6) the Flow ID. The receive window is |
| 804 |
updated only if the ICV verification succeeds. |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
DISCUSSION: |
| 807 |
|
| 808 |
Note that if the packet is either inside the window and new, or is |
| 809 |
outside the window on the "right" side, the receiver MUST |
| 810 |
authenticate the packet before updating the Sequence Number window |
| 811 |
data. |
| 812 |
|
| 813 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.4" href="#section-3.4.4">3.4.4</a> Integrity Check Value Verification</span> |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
If authentication has been selected, the receiver computes the ICV |
| 816 |
over the ESP packet minus the Authentication Data using the specified |
| 817 |
authentication algorithm and verifies that it is the same as the ICV |
| 818 |
included in the Authentication Data field of the packet. Details of |
| 819 |
the computation are provided below. |
| 820 |
|
| 821 |
If the computed and received ICV's match, then the datagram is valid, |
| 822 |
and it is accepted. If the test fails, then the receiver MUST |
| 823 |
discard the received IP datagram as invalid; this is an auditable |
| 824 |
event. The log data SHOULD include the SPI value, date/time |
| 825 |
received, Source Address, Destination Address, the Sequence Number, |
| 826 |
and (in IPv6) the cleartext Flow ID. |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
DISCUSSION: |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
Begin by removing and saving the ICV value (Authentication Data |
| 831 |
field). Next check the overall length of the ESP packet minus the |
| 832 |
Authentication Data. If implicit padding is required, based on |
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
the blocksize of the authentication algorithm, append zero-filled |
| 842 |
bytes to the end of the ESP packet directly after the Next Header |
| 843 |
field. Perform the ICV computation and compare the result with |
| 844 |
the saved value, using the comparison rules defined by the |
| 845 |
algorithm specification. (For example, if a digital signature and |
| 846 |
one-way hash are used for the ICV computation, the matching |
| 847 |
process is more complex.) |
| 848 |
|
| 849 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4.5" href="#section-3.4.5">3.4.5</a> Packet Decryption</span> |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
As in <a href="#section-3.3.2">section 3.3.2</a>, "Packet Encryption", we speak here in terms of |
| 852 |
encryption always being applied because of the formatting |
| 853 |
implications. This is done with the understanding that "no |
| 854 |
confidentiality" is offered by using the NULL encryption algorithm. |
| 855 |
Accordingly, the receiver: |
| 856 |
|
| 857 |
1. decrypts the ESP Payload Data, Padding, Pad Length, and Next |
| 858 |
Header using the key, encryption algorithm, algorithm mode, |
| 859 |
and cryptographic synchronization data (if any), indicated by |
| 860 |
the SA. |
| 861 |
- If explicit cryptographic synchronization data, e.g., |
| 862 |
an IV, is indicated, it is taken from the Payload |
| 863 |
field and input to the decryption algorithm as per the |
| 864 |
algorithm specification. |
| 865 |
- If implicit cryptographic synchronization data, e.g., |
| 866 |
an IV, is indicated, a local version of the IV is |
| 867 |
constructed and input to the decryption algorithm as |
| 868 |
per the algorithm specification. |
| 869 |
2. processes any padding as specified in the encryption |
| 870 |
algorithm specification. If the default padding scheme (see |
| 871 |
<a href="#section-2.4">Section 2.4</a>) has been employed, the receiver SHOULD inspect |
| 872 |
the Padding field before removing the padding prior to |
| 873 |
passing the decrypted data to the next layer. |
| 874 |
3. reconstructs the original IP datagram from: |
| 875 |
- for transport mode -- original IP header plus the |
| 876 |
original upper layer protocol information in the ESP |
| 877 |
Payload field |
| 878 |
- for tunnel mode -- tunnel IP header + the entire IP |
| 879 |
datagram in the ESP Payload field. |
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
The exact steps for reconstructing the original datagram depend on |
| 882 |
the mode (transport or tunnel) and are described in the Security |
| 883 |
Architecture document. At a minimum, in an IPv6 context, the |
| 884 |
receiver SHOULD ensure that the decrypted data is 8-byte aligned, to |
| 885 |
facilitate processing by the protocol identified in the Next Header |
| 886 |
field. |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
If authentication has been selected, verification and decryption MAY |
| 898 |
be performed serially or in parallel. If performed serially, then |
| 899 |
ICV verification SHOULD be performed first. If performed in |
| 900 |
parallel, verification MUST be completed before the decrypted packet |
| 901 |
is passed on for further processing. This order of processing |
| 902 |
facilitates rapid detection and rejection of replayed or bogus |
| 903 |
packets by the receiver, prior to decrypting the packet, hence |
| 904 |
potentially reducing the impact of denial of service attacks. Note: |
| 905 |
|
| 906 |
If the receiver performs decryption in parallel with authentication, |
| 907 |
care must be taken to avoid possible race conditions with regard to |
| 908 |
packet access and reconstruction of the decrypted packet. |
| 909 |
|
| 910 |
Note that there are several ways in which the decryption can "fail": |
| 911 |
|
| 912 |
a. The selected SA may not be correct -- The SA may be |
| 913 |
mis-selected due to tampering with the SPI, destination |
| 914 |
address, or IPsec protocol type fields. Such errors, if they |
| 915 |
map the packet to another extant SA, will be |
| 916 |
indistinguishable from a corrupted packet, (case c). |
| 917 |
Tampering with the SPI can be detected by use of |
| 918 |
authentication. However, an SA mismatch might still occur |
| 919 |
due to tampering with the IP Destination Address or the IPsec |
| 920 |
protocol type field. |
| 921 |
|
| 922 |
b. The pad length or pad values could be erroneous -- Bad pad |
| 923 |
lengths or pad values can be detected irrespective of the use |
| 924 |
of authentication. |
| 925 |
|
| 926 |
c. The encrypted ESP packet could be corrupted -- This can be |
| 927 |
detected if authentication is selected for the SA., |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
In case (a) or (c), the erroneous result of the decryption operation |
| 930 |
(an invalid IP datagram or transport-layer frame) will not |
| 931 |
necessarily be detected by IPsec, and is the responsibility of later |
| 932 |
protocol processing. |
| 933 |
|
| 934 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Auditing</span> |
| 935 |
|
| 936 |
Not all systems that implement ESP will implement auditing. However, |
| 937 |
if ESP is incorporated into a system that supports auditing, then the |
| 938 |
ESP implementation MUST also support auditing and MUST allow a system |
| 939 |
administrator to enable or disable auditing for ESP. For the most |
| 940 |
part, the granularity of auditing is a local matter. However, |
| 941 |
several auditable events are identified in this specification and for |
| 942 |
each of these events a minimum set of information that SHOULD be |
| 943 |
included in an audit log is defined. Additional information also MAY |
| 944 |
be included in the audit log for each of these events, and additional |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
events, not explicitly called out in this specification, also MAY |
| 954 |
result in audit log entries. There is no requirement for the |
| 955 |
receiver to transmit any message to the purported sender in response |
| 956 |
to the detection of an auditable event, because of the potential to |
| 957 |
induce denial of service via such action. |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements</span> |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
Implementations that claim conformance or compliance with this |
| 962 |
specification MUST implement the ESP syntax and processing described |
| 963 |
here and MUST comply with all requirements of the Security |
| 964 |
Architecture document. If the key used to compute an ICV is manually |
| 965 |
distributed, correct provision of the anti-replay service would |
| 966 |
require correct maintenance of the counter state at the sender, until |
| 967 |
the key is replaced, and there likely would be no automated recovery |
| 968 |
provision if counter overflow were imminent. Thus a compliant |
| 969 |
implementation SHOULD NOT provide this service in conjunction with |
| 970 |
SAs that are manually keyed. A compliant ESP implementation MUST |
| 971 |
support the following mandatory-to-implement algorithms: |
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
- DES in CBC mode [<a href="#ref-MD97" title=""The ESP DES-CBC Cipher Algorithm With Explicit IV"">MD97</a>] |
| 974 |
- HMAC with MD5 [<a href="#ref-MG97a" title=""The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within ESP and AH"">MG97a</a>] |
| 975 |
- HMAC with SHA-1 [<a href="#ref-MG97b" title=""The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within ESP and AH"">MG97b</a>] |
| 976 |
- NULL Authentication algorithm |
| 977 |
- NULL Encryption algorithm |
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
Since ESP encryption and authentication are optional, support for the |
| 980 |
2 "NULL" algorithms is required to maintain consistency with the way |
| 981 |
these services are negotiated. NOTE that while authentication and |
| 982 |
encryption can each be "NULL", they MUST NOT both be "NULL". |
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
Security is central to the design of this protocol, and thus security |
| 987 |
considerations permeate the specification. Additional security- |
| 988 |
relevant aspects of using the IPsec protocol are discussed in the |
| 989 |
Security Architecture document. |
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Differences from <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a></span> |
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
This document differs from <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a> [<a href="#ref-ATK95" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">ATK95</a>] in several significant |
| 994 |
ways. The major difference is that, this document attempts to |
| 995 |
specify a complete framework and context for ESP, whereas <a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a> |
| 996 |
provided a "shell" that was completed through the definition of |
| 997 |
transforms. The combinatorial growth of transforms motivated the |
| 998 |
reformulation of the ESP specification as a more complete document, |
| 999 |
with options for security services that may be offered in the context |
| 1000 |
of ESP. Thus, fields previously defined in transform documents are |
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
now part of this base ESP specification. For example, the fields |
| 1010 |
necessary to support authentication (and anti-replay) are now defined |
| 1011 |
here, even though the provision of this service is an option. The |
| 1012 |
fields used to support padding for encryption, and for next protocol |
| 1013 |
identification, are now defined here as well. Packet processing |
| 1014 |
consistent with the definition of these fields also is included in |
| 1015 |
the document. |
| 1016 |
|
| 1017 |
Acknowledgements |
| 1018 |
|
| 1019 |
Many of the concepts embodied in this specification were derived from |
| 1020 |
or influenced by the US Government's SP3 security protocol, ISO/IEC's |
| 1021 |
NLSP, or from the proposed swIPe security protocol. [SDNS89, ISO92, |
| 1022 |
IB93]. |
| 1023 |
|
| 1024 |
For over 3 years, this document has evolved through multiple versions |
| 1025 |
and iterations. During this time, many people have contributed |
| 1026 |
significant ideas and energy to the process and the documents |
| 1027 |
themselves. The authors would like to thank Karen Seo for providing |
| 1028 |
extensive help in the review, editing, background research, and |
| 1029 |
coordination for this version of the specification. The authors |
| 1030 |
would also like to thank the members of the IPsec and IPng working |
| 1031 |
groups, with special mention of the efforts of (in alphabetic order): |
| 1032 |
Steve Bellovin, Steve Deering, Phil Karn, Perry Metzger, David |
| 1033 |
Mihelcic, Hilarie Orman, Norman Shulman, William Simpson and Nina |
| 1034 |
Yuan. |
| 1035 |
|
| 1036 |
References |
| 1037 |
|
| 1038 |
[<a id="ref-ATK95">ATK95</a>] Atkinson, R., "IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)", |
| 1039 |
<a href="./rfc1827">RFC 1827</a>, August 1995. |
| 1040 |
|
| 1041 |
[<a id="ref-Bel96">Bel96</a>] Steven M. Bellovin, "Problem Areas for the IP Security |
| 1042 |
Protocols", Proceedings of the Sixth Usenix Unix Security |
| 1043 |
Symposium, July, 1996. |
| 1044 |
|
| 1045 |
[<a id="ref-Bra97">Bra97</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 1046 |
Requirement Level", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 1047 |
|
| 1048 |
[<a id="ref-HC98">HC98</a>] Harkins, D., and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange |
| 1049 |
(IKE)", <a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998. |
| 1050 |
|
| 1051 |
[<a id="ref-IB93">IB93</a>] John Ioannidis & Matt Blaze, "Architecture and |
| 1052 |
Implementation of Network-layer Security Under Unix", |
| 1053 |
Proceedings of the USENIX Security Symposium, Santa Clara, |
| 1054 |
CA, October 1993. |
| 1055 |
|
| 1056 |
|
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
[<a id="ref-ISO92">ISO92</a>] ISO/IEC JTC1/SC6, Network Layer Security Protocol, ISO-IEC |
| 1066 |
DIS 11577, International Standards Organisation, Geneva, |
| 1067 |
Switzerland, 29 November 1992. |
| 1068 |
|
| 1069 |
[<a id="ref-KA97a">KA97a</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the |
| 1070 |
Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998. |
| 1071 |
|
| 1072 |
[<a id="ref-KA97b">KA97b</a>] Kent, S., and R. Atkinson, "IP Authentication Header", <a href="./rfc2402">RFC</a> |
| 1073 |
<a href="./rfc2402">2402</a>, November 1998. |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
[<a id="ref-MD97">MD97</a>] Madson, C., and N. Doraswamy, "The ESP DES-CBC Cipher |
| 1076 |
Algorithm With Explicit IV", <a href="./rfc2405">RFC 2405</a>, November 1998. |
| 1077 |
|
| 1078 |
[<a id="ref-MG97a">MG97a</a>] Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-MD5-96 within |
| 1079 |
ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2403">RFC 2403</a>, November 1998. |
| 1080 |
|
| 1081 |
[<a id="ref-MG97b">MG97b</a>] Madson, C., and R. Glenn, "The Use of HMAC-SHA-1-96 within |
| 1082 |
ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc2404">RFC 2404</a>, November 1998. |
| 1083 |
|
| 1084 |
[<a id="ref-STD-2">STD-2</a>] Reynolds, J., and J. Postel, "Assigned Numbers", STD 2, <a href="./rfc1700">RFC</a> |
| 1085 |
<a href="./rfc1700">1700</a>, October 1994. See also: |
| 1086 |
<a href="http://www.iana.org/numbers.html">http://www.iana.org/numbers.html</a> |
| 1087 |
|
| 1088 |
[<a id="ref-SDNS89">SDNS89</a>] SDNS Secure Data Network System, Security Protocol 3, SP3, |
| 1089 |
Document SDN.301, Revision 1.5, 15 May 1989, as published |
| 1090 |
in NIST Publication NIST-IR-90-4250, February 1990. |
| 1091 |
|
| 1092 |
Disclaimer |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
The views and specification here are those of the authors and are not |
| 1095 |
necessarily those of their employers. The authors and their |
| 1096 |
employers specifically disclaim responsibility for any problems |
| 1097 |
arising from correct or incorrect implementation or use of this |
| 1098 |
specification. |
| 1099 |
|
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
|
| 1102 |
|
| 1103 |
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| 1104 |
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| 1105 |
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| 1106 |
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| 1107 |
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| 1108 |
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| 1109 |
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| 1110 |
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| 1111 |
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| 1112 |
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| 1113 |
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| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
Author Information |
| 1122 |
|
| 1123 |
Stephen Kent |
| 1124 |
BBN Corporation |
| 1125 |
70 Fawcett Street |
| 1126 |
Cambridge, MA 02140 |
| 1127 |
USA |
| 1128 |
|
| 1129 |
Phone: +1 (617) 873-3988 |
| 1130 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1131 |
|
| 1132 |
|
| 1133 |
Randall Atkinson |
| 1134 |
@Home Network |
| 1135 |
425 Broadway, |
| 1136 |
Redwood City, CA 94063 |
| 1137 |
USA |
| 1138 |
|
| 1139 |
Phone: +1 (415) 569-5000 |
| 1140 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1141 |
|
| 1142 |
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| 1143 |
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| 1144 |
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| 1145 |
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| 1146 |
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| 1147 |
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| 1148 |
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| 1156 |
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| 1159 |
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| 1160 |
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| 1161 |
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| 1162 |
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| 1163 |
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| 1164 |
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| 1165 |
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| 1166 |
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| 1167 |
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| 1168 |
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| 1169 |
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| 1170 |
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| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a> IP Encapsulating Security Payload November 1998</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 1178 |
|
| 1179 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
| 1180 |
|
| 1181 |
This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
| 1182 |
others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
| 1183 |
or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published |
| 1184 |
and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
| 1185 |
kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
| 1186 |
included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
| 1187 |
document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
| 1188 |
the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
| 1189 |
Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
| 1190 |
developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
| 1191 |
copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
| 1192 |
followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
| 1193 |
English. |
| 1194 |
|
| 1195 |
The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
| 1196 |
revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
| 1197 |
|
| 1198 |
This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
| 1199 |
"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
| 1200 |
TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
| 1201 |
BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
| 1202 |
HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
| 1203 |
MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 1204 |
|
| 1205 |
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| 1206 |
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| 1207 |
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| 1208 |
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| 1209 |
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| 1210 |
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| 1227 |
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| 1228 |
Kent & Atkinson Standards Track [Page 22] |
| 1229 |
</pre> |