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1 <pre>Network Working Group P. Savola
2 Request for Comments: 3964 CSC/FUNET
3 Category: Informational C. Patel
4 All Play, No Work
5 December 2004
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Security Considerations for 6to4</span>
9
10 Status of this Memo
11
12 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
13 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
14 memo is unlimited.
15
16 Copyright Notice
17
18 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
19
20 Abstract
21
22 The IPv6 interim mechanism 6to4 (<a href="./rfc3056">RFC3056</a>) uses automatic
23 IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling to interconnect IPv6 networks. The
24 architecture includes 6to4 routers and 6to4 relay routers, which
25 accept and decapsulate IPv4 protocol-41 ("IPv6-in-IPv4") traffic from
26 any node in the IPv4 internet. This characteristic enables a number
27 of security threats, mainly Denial of Service. It also makes it
28 easier for nodes to spoof IPv6 addresses. This document discusses
29 these issues in more detail and suggests enhancements to alleviate
30 the problems.
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52 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
60 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Different 6to4 Forwarding Scenarios . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
61 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. From 6to4 to 6to4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
62 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. From Native to 6to4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
63 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. From 6to4 to Native . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
64 <a href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Other Models . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
65 <a href="#section-2.4.1">2.4.1</a>. BGP between 6to4 Routers and Relays . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
66 <a href="#section-2.4.2">2.4.2</a>. 6to4 as an Optimization Method . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
67 <a href="#section-2.4.3">2.4.3</a>. 6to4 as Tunnel End-Point Addressing Mechanism . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
68 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Functionalities of 6to4 Network Components . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
69 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. 6to4 Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
70 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. 6to4 Relay Routers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
71 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Threat Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
72 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Attacks on 6to4 Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
73 <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Attacks with ND Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
74 <a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Spoofing Traffic to 6to4 Nodes . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
75 <a href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. Reflecting Traffic to 6to4 Nodes . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-17">17</a>
76 <a href="#section-4.1.4">4.1.4</a>. Local IPv4 Broadcast Attack . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-19">19</a>
77 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Attacks on Native IPv6 Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-20">20</a>
78 <a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Attacks with ND Messages . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
79 <a href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Spoofing Traffic to Native IPv6 Nodes. . . . . . <a href="#page-21">21</a>
80 <a href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Reflecting Traffic to Native IPv6 Nodes . . . . <a href="#page-23">23</a>
81 <a href="#section-4.2.4">4.2.4</a>. Local IPv4 Broadcast Attack . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-24">24</a>
82 <a href="#section-4.2.5">4.2.5</a>. Theft of Service . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-25">25</a>
83 <a href="#section-4.2.6">4.2.6</a>. Relay Operators Seen as Source of Abuse . . . . <a href="#page-26">26</a>
84 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Attacks on IPv4 Internet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
85 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Summary of the Attacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-28">28</a>
86 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Implementing Proper Security Checks in 6to4 . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-30">30</a>
87 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Encapsulating IPv6 into IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
88 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Decapsulating IPv4 into IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-31">31</a>
89 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. IPv4 and IPv6 Sanity Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-32">32</a>
90 <a href="#section-5.3.1">5.3.1</a>. IPv4 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-32">32</a>
91 <a href="#section-5.3.2">5.3.2</a>. IPv6 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
92 <a href="#section-5.3.3">5.3.3</a>. Optional Ingress Filtering . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
93 <a href="#section-5.3.4">5.3.4</a>. Notes about the Checks . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-33">33</a>
94 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Issues in 6to4 Implementation and Use . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>
95 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Implementation Considerations with Automatic Tunnels . . <a href="#page-34">34</a>
96 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. A Different Model for 6to4 Deployment . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-35">35</a>
97 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-36">36</a>
98 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-36">36</a>
99 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-37">37</a>
100 <a href="#appendix-A">A</a>. Some Trivial Attack Scenarios Outlined . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-39">39</a>
101 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-40">40</a>
102 Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-41">41</a>
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108 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 The IPv6 interim mechanism "6to4" [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] specifies automatic
116 IPv6-over-IPv4 tunneling to interconnect isolated IPv6 clouds by
117 embedding the tunnel IPv4 address in the IPv6 6to4 prefix.
118
119 Two characteristics of the 6to4 mechanism introduce most of the
120 security considerations:
121
122 1. All 6to4 routers must accept and decapsulate IPv4 packets from
123 every other 6to4 router, and from 6to4 relays.
124
125 2. 6to4 relay routers must accept traffic from any native IPv6 node.
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127 As the 6to4 router must accept traffic from any other 6to4 router or
128 relay, a certain requirement for trust is implied, and there are no
129 strict constraints on what the IPv6 packet may contain. Thus,
130 addresses within the IPv4 and IPv6 headers may be spoofed, and this
131 leads to various types of threats, including different flavors of
132 Denial of Service attacks.
133
134 The 6to4 specification outlined a few security considerations and
135 rules but was ambiguous as to their exact requirement level.
136 Moreover, the description of the considerations was rather short, and
137 some of them have proven difficult to understand or impossible to
138 implement.
139
140 This document analyzes the 6to4 security issues in more detail and
141 outlines some enhancements and caveats.
142
143 Sections <a href="#section-2">2</a> and <a href="#section-3">3</a> are more or less introductory, rehashing how 6to4 is
144 used today based on the 6to4 specification, so that it is easier to
145 understand how security could be affected. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> provides a
146 threat analysis for implementations that already implement most of
147 the security checks. <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> describes the optimal
148 decapsulation/encapsulation rules for 6to4 implementations, and
149 <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> provides further discussion on a few issues that have
150 proven difficult to implement. <a href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a> outlines a few possible
151 trivial attack scenarios in which very little or no security has been
152 implemented.
153
154 For the sake of simplicity, in this document, the native Internet is
155 assumed to encompass IPv6 networks formed by using other transition
156 mechanisms (e.g., <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">4</a>]), as these mechanisms cannot talk
157 directly to the 6to4 network.
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164 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
167
168
169 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
170 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
171 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">2</a>].
172
173 Throughout this memo, IPv4 addresses from blocks 7.0.0.0/24,
174 8.0.0.0/24, and 9.0.0.0/24 are used for demonstrative purposes, to
175 represent global IPv4 addresses that have no relation to each other.
176 This approach was chosen instead of just using addresses from
177 192.0.2.0/24 [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Special-Use IPv4 Addresses&quot;">5</a>] for two reasons: to use addresses whose 6to4 mapping
178 is glaringly obvious, and to make it obvious that the IPv4 addresses
179 of different 6to4 gateways need not have any relation to each other.
180
181 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Different 6to4 Forwarding Scenarios</span>
182
183 Note that when one communicates between 6to4 and native domains, the
184 6to4 relays that will be used in the two directions are very likely
185 different; routing is highly asymmetric. Because of this, it is not
186 feasible to limit relays from which 6to4 routers may accept traffic.
187
188 The first three subsections introduce the most common forms of 6to4
189 operation. Other models are presented in the fourth subsection.
190
191 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. From 6to4 to 6to4</span>
192
193 6to4 domains always exchange 6to4 traffic directly via IPv4
194 tunneling; the endpoint address V4ADDR is derived from 6to4 prefix
195 2002:V4ADDR::/48 of the destination.
196
197 .--------. _----_ .--------.
198 | 6to4 | _( IPv4 )_ | 6to4 |
199 | router | &lt;====&gt; ( Internet ) &lt;===&gt; | router |
200 '--------' (_ _) '--------'
201 ^ '----' ^
202 | Direct tunneling over IPv4 |
203 V V
204 .--------. .-------.
205 | 6to4 | | 6to4 |
206 | host | | host |
207 '--------' '--------'
208
209 Figure 1
210
211 It is required that every 6to4 router consider every other 6to4
212 router it wants to talk to be "on-link" (with IPv4 as the
213 link-layer).
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220 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
223
224
225 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. From Native to 6to4</span>
226
227 When native domains send traffic to 6to4 prefix 2002:V4ADDR::/48, it
228 will be routed to the topologically nearest advertising 6to4 relay
229 (advertising route to 2002::/16). The 6to4 relay will tunnel the
230 traffic over IPv4 to the corresponding IPv4 address V4ADDR.
231
232 Note that IPv4 address 9.0.0.1 here is just an example of a global
233 IPv4 address, and it is assigned to the 6to4 router's
234 pseudo-interface.
235
236 Closest to
237 "Native IPv6 node"
238 .--------. _----_ .------------. .--------.
239 | Native | _( IPv6 )_ | 6to4 relay | Tunneled | 6to4 |
240 | IPv6 | -&gt; ( Internet ) --&gt; | router | =========&gt; | router |
241 | node | (_ _) '------------' 9.0.0.1 '--------'
242 '--------' '----' dst_v6=2002:0900:0001::1 |
243 V
244 .-------.
245 | 6to4 |
246 | host |
247 '--------'
248
249 Figure 2
250
251 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. From 6to4 to Native</span>
252
253 6to4 domains send traffic to native domains by tunneling it over IPv4
254 to their configured 6to4 relay router, or the closest one found by
255 using 6to4 IPv4 Anycast [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers&quot;">3</a>]. The relay will decapsulate the packet
256 and forward it to native IPv6 Internet, as would any other IPv6
257 packet.
258
259 Note that the destination IPv6 address in the packet is a non-6to4
260 address and is assumed to be 2001:db8::1 in the example.
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276 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
279
280
281 Configured
282 -or-
283 found by IPv4 Anycast
284 .--------. _----_ .------------. .--------.
285 | Native | _( IPv6 )_ | 6to4 relay | Tunneled | 6to4 |
286 | Client | &lt;- ( Internet ) &lt;-- | router | &lt;========= | router |
287 '--------' (_ _) '------------' 192.88.99.1'--------'
288 2001:db8::1 '----' (or configured) ^
289 |
290 .-------.
291 | 6to4 |
292 | client |
293 '--------'
294
295 Figure 3
296
297 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4" href="#section-2.4">2.4</a>. Other Models</span>
298
299 These are more or less special cases of 6to4 operations. In later
300 chapters, unless otherwise stated, only the most generally used
301 models (above) will be considered.
302
303 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.1" href="#section-2.4.1">2.4.1</a>. BGP between 6to4 Routers and Relays</span>
304
305 Section 5.2.2.2 in [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] presents a model where, instead of static
306 configuration, BGP [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)&quot;">6</a>] is used between 6to4 relay routers and 6to4
307 routers (for outgoing relay selection only).
308
309 Going further than [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>], if the 6to4 router established a BGP session
310 between all the possible 6to4 relays and advertised its /48 prefix to
311 them, the traffic from non-6to4 sites would always come from a
312 "known" relay. Alternatively, the 6to4 relays might advertise the
313 more specific 6to4 routes between 6to4 relays.
314
315 Both of these approaches are obviously infeasible due to scalability
316 issues.
317
318 Neither of these models are known to be used at the time of writing;
319 this is probably because parties that need 6to4 are not able to run
320 BGP, and because setting up these sessions would be much more work
321 for relay operators.
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332 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
335
336
337 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.2" href="#section-2.4.2">2.4.2</a>. 6to4 as an Optimization Method</span>
338
339 Some sites seem to use 6to4 as an IPv6 connectivity "optimization
340 method"; that is, they also have non-6to4 addresses on their nodes
341 and border routers but also employ 6to4 to reach 6to4 sites.
342
343 This is typically done to be able to reach 6to4 destinations by
344 direct tunneling without using relays at all.
345
346 These sites also publish both 6to4 and non-6to4 addresses in DNS to
347 affect inbound connections. If the source host's default address
348 selection [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">7</a>] works properly, 6to4 sources will use 6to4 addresses to
349 reach the site and non-6to4 nodes use non-6to4 addresses. If this
350 behavior of foreign nodes can be assumed, the security threats to
351 such sites can be significantly simplified.
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388 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.4.3" href="#section-2.4.3">2.4.3</a>. 6to4 as Tunnel End-Point Addressing Mechanism</span>
394
395 6to4 addresses can also be used only as an IPv6-in-IPv4 tunnel
396 endpoint addressing and routing mechanism.
397
398 An example of this is interconnecting 10 branch offices where nodes
399 use non-6to4 addresses. Only the offices' border routers need to be
400 aware of 6to4, and use 6to4 addresses solely for addressing the
401 tunnels between different branch offices. An example is provided in
402 the figure below.
403
404 2001:db8:0:10::/60 2001:db8:0:20::/60
405 .--------. .--------.
406 ( Branch 1 ) ( Branch 2 )
407 '--------' '--------'
408 | |
409 .--------. _----_ .--------.
410 | 6to4 | _( IPv4 )_ | 6to4 |
411 | router | &lt;====&gt; ( Internet ) &lt;===&gt; | router |
412 '--------' (_ _) '--------'
413 9.0.0.1 '----' 8.0.0.2
414 ^^
415 ||
416 vv
417 .--------.
418 | 6to4 | 7.0.0.3
419 | router |
420 '--------'
421 | 2001:db8::/48
422 .-----------.
423 ( Main Office )
424 '-----------'
425 ^
426 |
427 v
428 _----_
429 _( IPv6 )_
430 ( Internet )
431 (_ _)
432 '----'
433
434 Figure 4
435
436 In the figure, the main office sets up two routes:
437
438 2001:db8:0:10::/60 -&gt; 2002:0900:0001::1
439
440 2001:db8:0:20::/60 -&gt; 2002:0800:0002::1
441
442
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444 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
447
448
449 And a branch office sets up two routes as well:
450
451 2001:db8:0:20::/60 -&gt; 2002:0800:0002::1
452
453 default -&gt; 2002:0700:0003::1
454
455 Thus, the IPv4 Internet is treated as an NBMA link-layer for
456 interconnecting 6to4-enabled sites; with explicit routes, 6to4
457 addressing need not be used in routers other than the 6to4 edge
458 routers. However, note that if a branch office sends a packet to any
459 6to4 destination, it will not go through the main office, as the 6to4
460 2002::/16 route overrides the default route.
461
462 This approach may make addressing and routing slightly easier in some
463 circumstances.
464
465 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Functionalities of 6to4 Network Components</span>
466
467 This section summarizes the main functionalities of the 6to4 network
468 components (6to4 routers, and 6to4 relays) and the security checks
469 they must do. The pseudo-code for the security checks is provided in
470 <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
471
472 This section summarizes the main functions of the various components
473 of a 6to4 network: 6to4 relay routers and 6to4 routers. Refer to
474 <a href="./rfc3056#section-1.1">Section&nbsp;1.1 of RFC 3056</a> [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] for 6to4-related definitions.
475
476 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. 6to4 Routers</span>
477
478 The 6to4 routers act as the border routers of a 6to4 domain. It does
479 not have a native global IPv6 address except in certain special
480 cases. Since the specification [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] uses the term "6to4 router", this
481 memo does the same; however, note that in this definition, we also
482 include a single host with a 6to4 pseudo-interface, which doesn't
483 otherwise act as a router. The main functions of the 6to4 router are
484 as follows:
485
486 o Provide IPv6 connectivity to local clients and routers.
487
488 o Tunnel packets sent to foreign 6to4 addresses to the destination
489 6to4 router using IPv4.
490
491 o Forward packets sent to locally configured 6to4 addresses to the
492 6to4 network.
493
494 o Tunnel packets sent to non-6to4 addresses to the configured/
495 closest-by-anycast 6to4 relay router.
496
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500 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
503
504
505 o Decapsulate directly received IPv4 packets from foreign 6to4
506 addresses.
507
508 o Decapsulate IPv4 packets received via the relay closest to the
509 native IPv6 sources. Note that it is not easily distinguishable
510 whether the packet was received from a 6to4 relay router or from a
511 spoofing third party.
512
513 The 6to4 router should also perform security checks on traffic that
514 it receives from other 6to4 relays, or 6to4 routers, or from within
515 the 6to4 site. These checks include the following:
516
517 o Disallow traffic that has private, broadcast or certain specific
518 reserved IPv4 addresses (see <a href="#section-5.3.1">Section 5.3.1</a> for details) in
519 tunnels, or the matching 6to4 prefixes.
520
521 o Disallow traffic from 6to4 routers in which the IPv4 tunnel source
522 address does not match the 6to4 prefix. (Note that the
523 pseudo-interface must pick the IPv4 address corresponding to the
524 prefix when encapsulating, or problems may ensue, e.g., on
525 multi-interface routers.)
526
527 o Disallow traffic in which the destination IPv6 address is not a
528 global address; in particular, link-local addresses, mapped
529 addresses, and such should not be used.
530
531 o Disallow traffic transmission to other 6to4 domains through 6to4
532 relay router or via some third party 6to4 router. (To avoid
533 transmission to the relay router, the pseudo-interface prefix
534 length must be configured correctly to /16. Further, to avoid the
535 traffic being discarded, 6to4 source addresses must always
536 correspond to the IPv4 address encapsulating the traffic.)
537
538 o Discard traffic received from other 6to4 domains via a 6to4 relay
539 router.
540
541 o Discard traffic received for prefixes other than one's own 6to4
542 prefix(es).
543
544 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. 6to4 Relay Routers</span>
545
546 The 6to4 relay router acts as a relay between all 6to4 domains and
547 native IPv6 networks; more specifically, it
548
549 o advertises the reachability of the 2002::/16 prefix to native IPv6
550 routing, thus receiving traffic to all 6to4 addresses from the
551 closest native IPv6 nodes,
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
559
560
561 o advertises (if <a href="./rfc3068">RFC 3068</a> [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers&quot;">3</a>] is implemented) the reachability of
562 IPv4 "6to4 relay anycast prefix" (192.88.99.0/24) to IPv4 routing,
563 thus receiving some tunneled traffic to native IPv6 nodes from
564 6to4 routers.
565
566 o decapsulates and forwards packets received from 6to4 addresses
567 through tunneling, by using normal IPv6 routing, and
568
569 o tunnels packets received through normal IPv6 routing from native
570 addresses that are destined for 2002::/16 to the corresponding
571 6to4 router.
572
573 The 6to4 relay should also perform security checks on traffic that it
574 receives from 6to4 routers, or from native IPv6 nodes. These checks
575 are as follows:
576
577 o Disallow traffic that has private, broadcast, or certain specific
578 reserved IPv4 addresses in tunnels, or in the matching 6to4
579 prefixes.
580
581 o Disallow traffic from 6to4 routers in which the IPv4 tunnel source
582 address does not match the 6to4 prefix. (Note that the
583 pseudo-interface must pick the IPv4 address corresponding to the
584 prefix when encapsulating, or problems may ensue, e.g., on
585 multi-interface routers.)
586
587 o Disallow traffic in which the destination IPv6 address is not a
588 global address; in particular, link-local addresses, mapped
589 addresses, and such should not be used.
590
591 o Discard traffic received from 6to4 routers with the destination as
592 a 6to4 prefix.
593
594 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Threat Analysis</span>
595
596 This section discusses attacks against the 6to4 network or attacks
597 caused by the 6to4 network. The threats are discussed in light of
598 the 6to4 deployment models defined in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>.
599
600 There are three general types of threats:
601
602 1. Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, in which a malicious node
603 prevents communication between the node under attack and other
604 nodes.
605
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
615
616
617 2. Reflection Denial-of-Service (DoS) attacks, in which a malicious
618 node reflects the traffic off unsuspecting nodes to a particular
619 node (node under attack) in order to prevent communication
620 between the node under attack and other nodes.
621
622 3. Service theft, in which a malicious node/site/operator may make
623 unauthorized use of service.
624
625 6to4 also provides a means for a "meta-threat", traffic laundering,
626 in which some other attack is channeled through the third parties to
627 make tracing the real origin of the attack more difficult. This is
628 used in conjunction with other threats, whether specific to 6to4 or
629 not.
630
631 At this point it is important to reiterate that the attacks are
632 possible because
633
634 1. 6to4 routers have to consider all 6to4 relays, and other 6to4
635 routers, as "on-link",
636
637 2. 6to4 relays have to consider all 6to4 routers as "on-link", and
638
639 3. it has been discovered that at least a couple of major 6to4
640 implementations do not implement all the security checks.
641
642 The attacks' descriptions are classified based on the target of the
643 attack:
644
645 1. Attacks on 6to4 networks.
646
647 2. Attacks on IPv6 networks.
648
649 3. Attacks on IPv4 networks.
650
651 Note that one of the mitigation methods listed for various attacks is
652 based on the premise that 6to4 relays could have a feature limiting
653 traffic to/from specific 6to4 sites. At the time of this writing,
654 this feature is speculative, and more work needs to be done to
655 determine the logistics.
656
657 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Attacks on 6to4 Networks</span>
658
659 This section describes attacks against 6to4 networks. Attacks that
660 leverage 6to4 networks, but for which the ultimate victim is
661 elsewhere (e.g., a native IPv6 user, an IPv4 user), are described
662 later in the memo.
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
671
672
673 6to4 relays and routers are IPv4 nodes, and there is no way for any
674 6to4 router to confirm the identity of the IPv4 node from which it
675 receives traffic -- whether from a legitimate 6to4 relay or some
676 other node. A 6to4 router has to process traffic from all IPv4
677 nodes. Malicious IPv4 nodes can exploit this property and attack
678 nodes within the 6to4 network.
679
680 It is possible to conduct a variety of attacks on the 6to4 nodes.
681 These attacks are as follows:
682
683 1. Attacks with Neighbor Discovery (ND) Messages
684
685 2. Spoofing traffic to 6to4 nodes
686
687 3. Reflecting traffic from 6to4 nodes
688
689 4. Local IPv4 broadcast attack
690
691 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Attacks with ND Messages</span>
692
693 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
694
695 Since the 6to4 router assumes that all the other 6to4 routers and
696 6to4 relays are "on-link", it is possible to attack the 6to4 router
697 by using ND messages from any node in the IPv4 network, unless a
698 prior trust relationship has been established.
699
700 The attacks target the 6to4 pseudo-interface. As long as the 6to4
701 addresses are not used in the source or destination address, the
702 security checks specified by 6to4 take no stance on these packets.
703 Typically they use link-local addresses.
704
705 For example, an attack could be a Route Advertisement or Neighbor
706 Advertisement message crafted specifically to cause havoc; the
707 addresses in such a packet could resemble to the following:
708
709 src_v6 = fe80::2 (forged address)
710 dst_v6 = fe80::1 (valid or invalid address)
711 src_v4 = 8.0.0.1 (valid or forged address)
712 dst_v4 = 9.0.0.2 (valid address, matches dst_v6)
713
714 These attacks are exacerbated if the implementation supports more
715 tunneling mechanisms than 6to4 (or configured tunneling) because it
716 is impossible to disambiguate such mechanisms, making it difficult to
717 enable strict security checks (see <a href="#section-6.1">Section 6.1</a>).
718
719 The Neighbor Discovery threats (Redirect DoS, or DoS) are described
720 in [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;IPv6 Neighbor Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats&quot;">8</a>]. Note that all attacks may not be applicable, as the 6to4
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
727
728
729 pseudo-interface is assumed not to have a link-layer address (<a href="#section-3.8">Section</a>
730 <a href="#section-3.8">3.8</a> <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">4</a>]). However, note that the 6to4 router can be either
731 a router or host from the Neighbor Discovery perspective.
732
733 THREAT ANALYSIS AND MITIGATION METHODS
734
735 The attacks can be mitigated by using any of the following methods:
736
737 o The usage of ND messages could be prohibited. This implies that
738 all packets using addresses of scope link-local will be silently
739 discarded. <a href="./rfc3056#section-3.1">Section&nbsp;3.1 of RFC 3056</a> [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] leaves scope for future
740 uses of link-local address. This method has its pitfalls: It
741 would prohibit any sort of ND message and thus close the doors on
742 development and use of other ND options. Whether this is a
743 significant problem is another thing.
744
745 o The 6to4 pseudo-interface could be insulated from the other
746 interfaces, particularly the other tunnel interfaces (if any), for
747 example by using a separate neighbor cache.
748
749 o If ND messages are needed, either IPsec [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">4</a>] or an extension of
750 SEND could be used [<a href="#ref-9" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">9</a>] to secure packet exchange using the
751 link-local address; vanilla SEND would not work, as the link-layer
752 does not have an address -- and IPsec would be rather complex.
753
754 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
755
756 Even though rather simply fixed, this attack is not new as such; the
757 same is possible by using automatic tunneling [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">4</a>] or configured
758 tunneling (if one is able to spoof source IPv4 address to that of the
759 tunnel end-point).
760
761 However, as 6to4 provides open decapsulation, and automatic tunneling
762 is being deprecated [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">10</a>], 6to4 provides an easy means, which would
763 not exist without it.
764
765 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Spoofing Traffic to 6to4 Nodes</span>
766
767 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
768
769 The attacker - a malicious IPv4 or IPv6 node - can send packets that
770 are difficult to trace (e.g., due to spoofing or going through a
771 relay) to a 6to4 node. This can be used e.g., to accomplish a DoS
772 attack.
773
774 The IPv6 and IPv4 addresses of the packets will be similar to the
775 following:
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
783
784
785 src_v6 = 2001:db8::1 (forged address)
786 dst_v6 = 2002:0900:0002::1 (valid address)
787 src_v4 = 8.0.0.1 (valid or forged address)
788 dst_v4 = 9.0.0.2 (valid address, matches dst_v6)
789
790 For attacks launched from a native IPv6 node, the src_v4 will be the
791 address of the relay through which the traffic will reach the 6to4
792 node. From IPv4 nodes, src_v4 can be either a spoofed source address
793 or the real one.
794
795 The 6to4 router receives these packets from 8.0.0.1, decapsulates
796 them, discards the IPv4 header containing the source address 8.0.0.1,
797 and processes them as normal (the attacker has guessed or obtained
798 "dst_v6" by using one of a number of techniques).
799
800 This is a DoS attack on 6to4 nodes.
801
802 This attack is similar to those shown in [<a href="#ref-11" title="&quot;Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home Address Options&quot;">11</a>].
803
804 EXTENSIONS
805
806 Replies to the traffic will be directed to the src_v6 address,
807 resulting in 6to4 nodes participating in a reflection DoS. This
808 attack is described in more detail in <a href="#section-4.2.3">Section 4.2.3</a>. The replies
809 (e.g., TCP SYN ACK, TCP RST, ICMPv6 Echo Reply, input sent to UDP
810 echo service, ICMPv6 Destination Unreachable) are sent to the victim
811 (src_v6), above. All the traces from the original attacker (src_v4)
812 have been discarded. These return packets will go through a relay.
813
814 Certain 6to4 networks may have a trivial ACL (Access Control List)
815 based firewall that allows traffic to pass through if it comes from
816 particular source(s). Such a firewalling mechanism can be bypassed
817 by address spoofing. This attack can therefore be used for trivial
818 ACL avoidance as well. These attacks might be hampered because the
819 replies from the 6to4 node to the spoofed address will be lost.
820
821 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
822
823 The Denial-of-Service attack based on traffic spoofing is not new;
824 the only twists come from the fact that traces of an attack are more
825 easily lost, and that spoofing the IPv6 address is possible even to
826 those who are unable to do so in their current networks. The 6to4
827 router typically does not log IPv4 addresses (as they would be
828 treated as L2 addresses), and thus the source of the attack (if
829 launched from an IPv4 node) is lost. Because traces to the src_v4
830 address are easily lost, these attacks can also be launched from IPv4
831 nodes whose connections are ingress-filtered.
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
839
840
841 However, often this is not a real factor, as usually the attackers
842 are just zombies and real attackers may not even care whether the
843 unspoofed source address is discovered.
844
845 Malicious native IPv6 nodes could be caught easily if ingress
846 filtering was enabled everywhere in the IPv6 Internet.
847
848 These attacks are easy to perform, but the extent of harm is limited:
849
850 o For every packet sent, at most one reply packet is generated:
851 there is no amplification factor.
852
853 o Attack packets, if initiated from an IPv6 node, will pass through
854 choke point(s), namely a 6to4 relay; in addition to physical
855 limitations, these could implement some form of 6to4-site-specific
856 traffic limiting.
857
858 On the other hand, a variety of factors can make the attacks serious:
859
860 o The attacker may have the ability to choose the relay, and he
861 might employ the ones best suited for the attacks. Also, many
862 relays use 192.88.99.1 [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers&quot;">3</a>] as the source address, making tracing
863 even more difficult (also see <a href="#section-4.2.6">Section 4.2.6</a>).
864
865 o The relay's IPv4 address may be used as a source address for these
866 attacks, potentially causing a lot of complaints or other actions,
867 as the relay might seem to be the source of the attack (see
868 <a href="#section-4.2.6">Section 4.2.6</a> for more).
869
870 Some of the mitigation methods for such attacks are as follows:
871
872 1. Ingress filtering in the native IPv6 networks to prevent packets
873 with spoofed IPv6 sources from being transmitted. This would,
874 thus, make it easy to identify the source of the attack.
875 Unfortunately, it would depend on significant (or even complete)
876 ingress filtering everywhere in other networks; while this is
877 highly desirable, it may not be feasible.
878
879 2. Security checks in the 6to4 relay. The 6to4 relay must drop
880 traffic (from the IPv6 Internet) that has 6to4 addresses as
881 source address; see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for more detail. This has very
882 little cost.
883
884 However, these mitigation methods do not address the case of an IPv4
885 node sending encapsulated IPv6 packets.
886
887 No simple way to prevent such attacks exists, and longer-term
888 solutions, such as ingress filtering [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address Spoofing&quot;">12</a>] or itrace [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;ICMP Traceback Messages&quot;">13</a>], would have
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
895
896
897 to be deployed in both IPv6 and IPv4 networks to help identify the
898 source of the attacks. A total penetration is likely impossible.
899 (Note that itrace work has been discontinued, as of this writing in
900 July 2004.)
901
902 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
903
904 Traffic spoofing is not a new phenomenon in IPv4 or IPv6. 6to4 just
905 makes it easier: Anyone can, regardless of ingress filtering, spoof a
906 native IPv6 address to a 6to4 node, even if "maximal security" would
907 be implemented and deployed. Losing trails is also easier.
908
909 Therefore, depending on how much one assumes ingress filtering is
910 deployed for IPv4 and IPv6, this could be considered either a very
911 serious issue or close to irrelevant compared to the IP spoofing
912 capabilities without 6to4.
913
914 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.3" href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. Reflecting Traffic to 6to4 Nodes</span>
915
916 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
917
918 Spoofed traffic (as described in <a href="#section-4.2.2">Section 4.2.2</a>) may be sent to native
919 IPv6 nodes to perform a reflection attack against 6to4 nodes.
920
921 The spoofed traffic is sent to a native IPv6 node, either from an
922 IPv4 node (through a 6to4 relay) or from a native IPv6 node (unless
923 ingress filtering has been deployed). With the former, the sent
924 packets would resemble the following:
925
926 src_v6 = 2002:1234:1234::1 (forged address of the target 6to4 node)
927 dst_v6 = 2002:0900:0002::1 (valid address)
928 src_v4 = 8.0.0.1 (valid or invalid address)
929 dst_v4 = 9.0.0.2 (valid address, matches dst_v6)
930
931 Note that an attack through the relay is prevented if the relay
932 implements proper decapsulation security checks (see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for
933 details) unless the IPv4 node can spoof the source address to match
934 src_v6. Similarly, the attack from native IPv6 nodes could be
935 prevented by global ingress filtering deployment.
936
937 These attacks can be initiated by native IPv6, IPv4, or 6to4 nodes.
938
939 EXTENSIONS
940
941 A distributed Reflection DoS can be performed if a large number of
942 nodes are involved in sending spoofed traffic with the same src_v6.
943
944
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
951
952
953 Malicious 6to4 nodes can also (try to) initiate this attack by
954 bouncing traffic off 6to4 nodes in other 6to4 sites. However, this
955 attack may not be possible, as the 6to4 router (in the site from
956 which the attack is launched) will filter packets with forged source
957 addresses (with security checks mentioned in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>).
958
959 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
960
961 In this case, the reverse traffic comprises replies to the messages
962 received by the 6to4 nodes. The attacker has less control on the
963 packet type, and this would inhibit certain types of attacks. For
964 example, flooding a 6to4 node with TCP SYN packets will not be
965 possible (but e.g., a SYN-ACK or RST would be).
966
967 These attacks may be mitigated in various ways:
968
969 o Implementation of ingress filtering by the IPv4 service providers.
970 This would prevent forging of the src_v4 address and help in
971 closing down on the culprit IPv4 nodes. Note that it will be
972 difficult to shut down the attack if a large number of IPv4 nodes
973 are involved.
974
975 These attacks may be also be stopped at the 6to4 sites if the
976 culprit src_v4 address is identified, and if it is constant, by
977 filtering traffic from this address. Note that it would be
978 difficult to implement this method if appropriate logging were not
979 done by the 6to4 router or if a large number of 6to4 nodes, and/or
980 a large number of IPv4 nodes were participating in the attack.
981
982 Unfortunately, because many IPv4 service providers don't implement
983 ingress filtering, for whatever reasons, this may not be a
984 satisfactory solution.
985
986 o Implementation of ingress filtering by all IPv6 service providers
987 would eliminate this attack, because src_v6 could not be spoofed
988 as a 6to4 address. However, expecting this to happen may not be
989 practical.
990
991 o Proper implementation of security checks (see <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>) both at
992 the 6to4 relays and routers would eliminate an attack launched
993 from an IPv4 node, except when the IPv4 source address was also
994 spoofed -- but then the attacker would have been able to attack
995 the ultimate destination directly.
996
997 o Rate limiting traffic at the 6to4 relays. In a scenario where
998 most of the traffic is passing through few 6to4 relays, these
999 relays can implement traffic rate-limiting features and rate-limit
1000 the traffic from 6to4 sites.
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1007
1008
1009 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1010
1011 This particular attack can be mitigated by proper implementation of
1012 security checks (which is quite straightforward) and ingress
1013 filtering; when ingress filtering is not implemented, it is typically
1014 easier to attack directly than through reflection -- unless "traffic
1015 laundering" is an explicit goal of the attack. Therefore, this
1016 attack does not seem very serious.
1017
1018 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.4" href="#section-4.1.4">4.1.4</a>. Local IPv4 Broadcast Attack</span>
1019
1020 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
1021
1022 This threat is applicable if the 6to4 router does not check whether
1023 the IPv4 address to which it tries to send encapsulated IPv6 packets
1024 is a local broadcast address or a multicast address.
1025
1026 This threat is described in the specification [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>], and implementing
1027 the checks eliminates this threat. However, as checks have not been
1028 widely implemented, the threat is included here for completeness.
1029
1030 There practically two kinds of attacks: when a local 6to4 user tries
1031 to send packets to the address corresponding to the broadcast
1032 address, and when someone is able to do so remotely.
1033
1034 In the first option, assume that 9.0.0.255 is the 6to4 router's
1035 broadcast address. After receiving the packet with a destination
1036 address like "2002:0900:00ff::bbbb" from a local 6to4 node, if the
1037 router doesn't check the destination address for subnet broadcast, it
1038 would send the encapsulated protocol-41 packet to 9.0.0.255. This
1039 would be received by all nodes in the subnet, and the responses would
1040 be directed to the 6to4 router.
1041
1042 Malicious sites may also embed forged 6to4 addresses in the DNS, use
1043 of which by a 6to4 node would result in a local broadcast by the 6to4
1044 router. One way to perform this attack would be to send an HTML mail
1045 containing a link to an invalid URL (for example,
1046 http://[2002:0900:00ff::bbbb]/index.html) to all users in a 6to4
1047 technology based network. Opening of the mail simultaneously would
1048 result in a broadcast storm.
1049
1050 The second kind of attack is more complex: The attack can be
1051 initiated by IPv4 nodes not belonging to the local network as long as
1052 they can send traffic with invalid (for example 2002:0900:00ff::bbbb)
1053 source address. The 6to4 router has to respond to the traffic by
1054 sending ICMPv6 packets back to the source, (e.g., Hop Limit Exceeded
1055 or Destination Unreachable). The packet would be as follows:
1056
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1063
1064
1065 src_v6 = 2002:0800:00ff::bbbb (broadcast address of the router)
1066 dst_v6 = 2002:0800:0001::0001 (valid non-existent address)
1067
1068 This is a DoS attack.
1069
1070 EXTENSIONS
1071
1072 The attacks could also be directed at non-local broadcast addresses,
1073 but these would be so-called "IPv4 directed broadcasts", which have
1074 (luckily enough) already been extensively blocked in the Internet.
1075
1076 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
1077
1078 The attack is based on the premise that the 6to4 router has to send a
1079 packet that embeds an invalid IPv4 address to an IPv6 address. Such
1080 an attack is easily thwarted by ensuring that the 6to4 router does
1081 not transmit packets to invalid IPv4 addresses. Specifically,
1082 traffic should not be sent to broadcast or multicast IPv4 addresses.
1083
1084 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1085
1086 The first threat is similar to what is already possible with IPv4,
1087 but IPv6 does not have broadcast addresses.
1088
1089 The second, a more complex threat, is, similarly, also available in
1090 IPv4.
1091
1092 In consequence, the security does not seem to be significantly worse
1093 than with IPv4, and even that is restricted to the site(s) with 6to4
1094 implementations that haven't been secured as described in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
1095
1096 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Attacks on Native IPv6 Internet</span>
1097
1098 This section describes attacks against native IPv6 Internet that
1099 somehow leverage 6to4 architecture. Attacks against 6to4 nodes were
1100 described in the previous section.
1101
1102 6to4 and IPv4 nodes can access native IPv6 nodes through the 6to4
1103 relay routers. Thus, the 6to4 relays play a crucial role in any
1104 attack on native IPv6 nodes by IPv4 nodes or 6to4 nodes.
1105
1106 6to4 relays have only one significant security check they must
1107 perform for general safety: When decapsulating IPv4 packets, they
1108 check that 2002:V4ADDR::/48 and V4ADDR match in the source address.
1109 If this is not done, several threats become more serious; in the
1110 following analysis, it is assumed that such checks are implemented.
1111
1112
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1119
1120
1121 6to4 relay should not relay packets between 6to4 addresses. In
1122 particular, packets decapsulated from 6to4 routers should not be
1123 encapsulated toward 6to4 routers, as described in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
1124 Similarly, packets with 6to4 source and destination addresses sent
1125 from IPv6 nodes should not be relayed. It is not clear whether this
1126 kind of check is typically implemented. The attacks described below
1127 assume that such checks are not implemented.
1128
1129 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Attacks with ND Messages</span>
1130
1131 These attacks are the same as those employed against 6to4 routers, as
1132 described in <a href="#section-4.1.1">Section 4.1.1</a>.
1133
1134 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.2" href="#section-4.2.2">4.2.2</a>. Spoofing Traffic to Native IPv6 Node</span>
1135
1136 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
1137
1138 The attacker - a malicious IPv4 or 6to4 node - can send packets with
1139 a spoofed (or not spoofed) 6to4 source address to a native IPv6 node
1140 to accomplish a DoS attack.
1141
1142 The threat is similar to that involving 6to4 routers, as described in
1143 <a href="#section-4.1.2">Section 4.1.2</a>.
1144
1145 The difference here is that the attack is initiated by IPv4 or 6to4
1146 nodes. The source IPv6 address may or may not be spoofed. Note
1147 that, as mentioned above, the relay is assumed to correlate the
1148 source IPv4 address with the address embedded in the source IPv6
1149 address during decapsulation. A side effect is that all spoofed
1150 traffic will have a 6to4 source address.
1151
1152 EXTENSIONS
1153
1154 Spoofed traffic may also be sent to native IPv6 nodes either by other
1155 native IPv6 nodes, by 6to4 nodes, or by malicious IPv4 nodes to
1156 conduct Reflection DoS on either native IPv6 nodes or 6to4 nodes.
1157
1158 Certain native IPv6 networks may have a trivial ACL (Access Control
1159 List) based firewall that allows traffic to pass through if it comes
1160 from particular source(s). Such a firewalling mechanism can be
1161 bypassed by address spoofing. This attack can therefore be used for
1162 trivial ACL avoidance as well. These attacks might be hampered by
1163 lost replies from the 6to4 node to the spoofed address.
1164
1165
1166
1167
1168
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1175
1176
1177 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
1178
1179 The Denial-of-Service attack based on traffic spoofing is not new;
1180 the only twist is that traces of an attack are more easily lost. The
1181 6to4 relay typically does not log IPv4 addresses (as they would be
1182 treated as L2 addresses), and thus the source of the attack (if
1183 launched from an IPv4 node) is lost. Because traces to the src_v4
1184 address are easily lost, these attacks can also be launched from IPv4
1185 nodes whose connections are ingress-filtered.
1186
1187 These attacks might not be easy to perform and might be hampered
1188 because of the following:
1189
1190 o It might be difficult to launch such attacks from 6to4 nodes
1191 because even if the 6to4 routers allow spoofing of the source IPv6
1192 address, the 6to4 relay would check whether the source V4ADDR is
1193 the same as the one embedded in the source IPv6 address. Thus,
1194 6to4 nodes will be forced to use the correct IPv6 prefix while
1195 launching an attack, making it easy to close such attacks.
1196
1197 o Packets may pass through choke point(s), namely a 6to4 relay. In
1198 addition to physical limitations, there could be some sort of
1199 traffic rate limiting mechanisms that may be implemented, and
1200 these could tone down the attack.
1201
1202 o For every packet sent, at most one reply packet is generated:
1203 There is no amplification factor.
1204
1205 Some of the mitigation methods for such attacks are as follows:
1206
1207 1. Ingress filtering in the IPv4 Internet to prevent packets with a
1208 spoofed IPv4 source from being transmitted. As the relay checks
1209 that the 6to4 address embeds the IPv4 address, no spoofing can be
1210 achieved unless IPv4 addresses can be spoofed. However, this
1211 would probably be an unfeasible requirement.
1212
1213 2. Security checks in the 6to4 relay. The 6to4 relay must drop
1214 traffic (from 6to4 nodes, or IPv4 nodes) with non-6to4 addresses
1215 as the source address, or for which the source IPv4 address does
1216 not match the address embedded in the source IPv6 address.
1217
1218 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1219
1220 Compared to <a href="#section-4.1.2">Section 4.1.2</a>, which describes more serious threats, this
1221 threat appears to be slightly more manageable. If the relays perform
1222 proper decapsulation checks, the spoofing can only be achieved, to a
1223 6to4 source address, when the IPv4 address is spoofable as well.
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1231
1232
1233 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.3" href="#section-4.2.3">4.2.3</a>. Reflecting Traffic to Native IPv6 Nodes</span>
1234
1235 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
1236
1237 These reflection attacks are similar to that involving 6to4 routers,
1238 as described in <a href="#section-4.1.3">Section 4.1.3</a>. Traffic may be reflected off native
1239 IPv6 nodes, or off 6to4 nodes. The attack can be initiated by one of
1240 the following:
1241
1242 o Native IPv6 nodes. These nodes can send invalid traffic with
1243 spoofed native IPv6 addresses to valid 6to4 nodes. Replies from
1244 the 6to4 nodes are part of a reflection attack.
1245
1246 o IPv4 nodes. These nodes can send traffic with native IPv6 source
1247 addresses (encapsulated by the IPv4 node itself into a protocol-41
1248 packet) to 6to4 nodes. Replies from the 6to4 nodes are part of a
1249 reflection attack.
1250
1251 o 6to4 nodes. These nodes can perform attacks similar to those by
1252 IPv4 nodes, but this would require spoofing of the source address
1253 at the 6to4 site before encapsulation, which is likely to be
1254 difficult.
1255
1256 When launched from a native IPv6 node, the traffic goes through 6to4
1257 relays twice, both before and after the reflection; when launched
1258 from a 6to4/IPv4 node, the traffic goes through a relay only after
1259 the reflection.
1260
1261 EXTENSIONS
1262
1263 A distributed reflection DoS can be performed if a large number of
1264 native IPv6 nodes or IPv4/6to4 nodes are involved in sending spoofed
1265 traffic with the same source IPv6 address.
1266
1267 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
1268
1269 Some of the mitigation methods for such attacks are as follows:
1270
1271 1. Attacks from the native IPv6 nodes could be stopped by
1272 implementing ingress filtering in the IPv6 Internet; hopefully
1273 this will become commonplace, but past experience of IPv4 ingress
1274 filtering deployment (or lack thereof) does not promise much.
1275
1276 2. Two measures are needed to stop or mitigate the attacks from IPv4
1277 nodes: 1) Implementing ingress filtering in the IPv4 internet,
1278 and 2) logging IPv4 source addresses in the 6to4 router.
1279
1280
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1287
1288
1289 3. Attacks from 6to4 nodes in other sites can be stopped if the 6to4
1290 routers in those sites implement egress filtering. This could be
1291 done by those sites, but the sites that are most likely to be
1292 abused are typically also those most likely to neglect installing
1293 appropriate filtering at their edges.
1294
1295 4. The traffic passes through one or two relays, and traffic rate
1296 limiting in the 6to4 relays might help tone down the reflection
1297 attack.
1298
1299 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1300
1301 Even though there are means to mitigate it, the attack is still
1302 rather efficient, especially when used by native IPv6 nodes with
1303 spoofed addresses. Using 6to4 relays and routers could easily take
1304 down the 6to4 relay system and/or provide an easy means for traffic
1305 laundering. However, if the attack is intended to DoS the victim,
1306 this can be achieved more smoothly by doing it directly (as the
1307 source address spoofing was available as well).
1308
1309 Therefore, the threat to the availability and stability of the 6to4
1310 relay system itself seems to be higher than to the native IPv6
1311 Internet.
1312
1313 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.4" href="#section-4.2.4">4.2.4</a>. Local IPv4 Broadcast Attack</span>
1314
1315 This attack is similar to the ones employed against 6to4 routers, as
1316 described in <a href="#section-4.1.4">Section 4.1.4</a>. There are slight differences with regard
1317 to the source of the attacks. This attack can be initiated by:
1318
1319 o native IPv6 nodes that may send traffic to the relay's subnet
1320 broadcast address, and
1321
1322 o IPv4 nodes that may send traffic with a spoofed source IP address
1323 (to be the relay's broadcast address) to elicit replies (e.g.,
1324 ICMPv6 Hop Limit Exceeded) from the 6to4 relay to its local nodes.
1325
1326 The first approach is more dangerous than those in <a href="#section-4.1.4">Section 4.1.4</a>
1327 because it can be initiated by any IPv6 node (allowed to use the
1328 relay); the approach is not limited to local users.
1329
1330 The second approach is trickier and not really useful. For it to
1331 succeed, the relay would have to accept native source addresses over
1332 the 6to4 pseudo-interface (we did not assume this check was
1333 implemented), as if coming from another relay, triggering an ICMPv6
1334 message to the relay's local IPv4 subnet. The former method is more
1335 lucrative.
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1343
1344
1345 EXTENSIONS
1346
1347 None.
1348
1349 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
1350
1351 The threat is restricted to the relay's local subnet and is fixed by
1352 tightening the 6to4 security checks.
1353
1354 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1355
1356 This scenario is caused by 6to4, but fortunately the issue is not
1357 serious.
1358
1359 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.5" href="#section-4.2.5">4.2.5</a>. Theft of Service</span>
1360
1361 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
1362
1363 The 6to4 relay administrators would often want to use some policy to
1364 limit the use of the relay to specific 6to4 sites and/or specific
1365 IPv6 sites.
1366
1367 The policy control is usually enacted by applying restrictions to
1368 where the routing information for 2002::/16 and/or 192.188.99.0/24
1369 (if the anycast address used [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers&quot;">3</a>]) will spread.
1370
1371 Some users may be able to use the service regardless of these
1372 controls, by
1373
1374 o configuring the address of the relay using its IPv4 address
1375 instead of 192.88.99.1, or
1376
1377 o using the routing header to route IPv6 packets to reach specific
1378 6to4 relays. (Other routing tricks, such as using static routes,
1379 may also be used.)
1380
1381 EXTENSIONS
1382
1383 None.
1384
1385 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
1386
1387 Attempts to use the relay's IPv4 address instead of 192.88.99.1 can
1388 be mitigated in the following ways:
1389
1390 1. IPv4 domains should prevent use of the actual IPv4 address of the
1391 relay instead of 192.88.99.1.
1392
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1399
1400
1401 2. Usage of access lists in the 6to4 relay to limit access. This is
1402 only feasible if the number of IP networks the relay is supposed
1403 to serve is relatively low.
1404
1405 3. The 6to4 relay should filter out arriving tunneled packets with
1406 protocol 41 (IPv6) that do not have 192.88.99.1 as the
1407 destination address.
1408
1409 The other threat, of using routing tricks in the IPv6 networks to
1410 reach the 6to4 relay, has similar solutions:
1411
1412 1. Usage of access lists in the relay to limit access.
1413
1414 2. Filtering out the packets with a routing header (although this
1415 may have other implications).
1416
1417 3. Monitoring the source addresses going through the relay to
1418 detect, e.g., peers setting up static routes.
1419
1420 Routing Header is not specific to 6to4. The main thing one could do
1421 with it here would be to select the relay. Some generic threats
1422 about routing header use are described in [<a href="#ref-11" title="&quot;Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home Address Options&quot;">11</a>].
1423
1424 As this threat does not have implications for anything other than the
1425 organization providing 6to4 relay, it is not analyzed any further.
1426
1427 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1428
1429 These threats are specific to 6to4 relays (or in general anycast
1430 services) and do not exist in networks without 6to4.
1431
1432 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.6" href="#section-4.2.6">4.2.6</a>. Relay Operators Seen as Source of Abuse</span>
1433
1434 ATTACK DESCRIPTION
1435
1436 Several attacks use 6to4 relays to anonymize the traffic; this often
1437 results in packets being tunneled from the relay to a supposedly-6to4
1438 site.
1439
1440 However, as was pointed out in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>, the IPv4 source address
1441 used by the relay could, on a cursory look, be seen as the source of
1442 these "protocol-41" attacks.
1443
1444 This could cause a number of concerns for the operators deploying
1445 6to4 relay service, including the following:
1446
1447 o being contacted a lot (via email, phone, fax, or lawyers) on
1448 suspected "abuse",
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1455
1456
1457 o having the whole IPv4 address range rejected as a source of abuse
1458 or spam, causing outage to other operations as well, or
1459
1460 o causing the whole IPv4 address range to be blacklisted in some
1461 "spammer databases", if the relay were used for those purposes.
1462
1463 This threat seems slightly similar to the outburst of SMTP abuse
1464 caused by open relays but is more generic.
1465
1466 EXTENSIONS
1467
1468 None.
1469
1470 THREAT ANALYSIS AND SOLUTIONS/MITIGATION METHODS
1471
1472 This problem can be avoided (or, really, "made someone else's
1473 problem") by using the 6to4 anycast address in 192.88.99.0/24 as the
1474 source address. Blacklisting or rejecting this should not cause
1475 problems to the other operations.
1476
1477 Further, when someone files complaints to the owner of
1478 192.88.99.0/24, depending on which registry they are querying, they
1479 might get, for example:
1480
1481 o knowledge that this is a special IANA address block, with no real
1482 contact person,
1483
1484 o knowledge that this is a special address block for <a href="./rfc3068">RFC 3068</a>, or
1485
1486 o knowledge that this is a special address block for <a href="./rfc3068">RFC 3068</a>, and
1487 that there are multiple entries by relay operators in the
1488 database.
1489
1490 Any of these, at least when processed by a human, should show that
1491 the 6to4 relay is in fact innocent. Of course, this could result in
1492 reports going to the closest anycast 6to4 relay as well, which had
1493 nothing to do with the incident.
1494
1495 However, the widespread usage of 192.88.99.1 as the source address
1496 may make it more difficult to disambiguate the relays, which might be
1497 a useful feature for debugging purposes.
1498
1499 COMPARISON TO SITUATION WITHOUT 6to4
1500
1501 This threat is caused by 6to4 deployment but can be avoided, at least
1502 in the short-term, by using 192.88.99.1 as the source address.
1503
1504
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1511
1512
1513 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Attacks on IPv4 Internet</span>
1514
1515 There are two types of attacks on the IPv4 internet - spoofed
1516 traffic, and reflection. These can be initiated by native IPv6
1517 nodes, 6to4 nodes, and IPv4 nodes.
1518
1519 Attacks initiated by IPv4 nodes that send spoofed traffic, which
1520 would not use the 6to4 infrastructure, are considered out of the
1521 scope of this document. 6to4 infrastructure may be used in
1522 reflection attacks initiated by IPv4 nodes.
1523
1524 It is difficult for these attacks to be effective, as the traffic
1525 sent out will be IPv6-in-IPv4. Such traffic will be rejected by most
1526 IPv4 nodes unless they have implemented some sort of IPv6-in-IPv4
1527 tunneling.
1528
1529 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Summary of the Attacks</span>
1530
1531 Columns:
1532
1533 o Section number. The section that describes the attack.
1534
1535 o Attack name.
1536
1537 o Initiator. The node that initiates the attack.
1538
1539 * I_4 - IPv4 node
1540
1541 * I_6 - native IPv6 node
1542
1543 * 6to4 - 6to4 node
1544
1545 * * - All of the above
1546
1547 o Victim. The victim node
1548
1549 * I_4 - IPv4 node
1550
1551 * I_6 - native IPv6 node
1552
1553 * 6to4 - 6to4 node
1554
1555 * Relay - 6to4 relay
1556
1557 * Router - 6to4 router
1558
1559
1560
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1567
1568
1569 o ToA. Type of Attack
1570
1571 * D - DoS
1572
1573 * R - Reflection DoS
1574
1575 * T - Theft of Service
1576
1577 o Fix. Specified who is responsible for fixing the attack.
1578
1579 * 6 - The 6to4 developer and/or operator can completely mitigate
1580 this attack.
1581
1582 * 6* - The 6to4 developer and/or operator can partially mitigate
1583 this attack.
1584
1585 * E - This threat cannot be fixed by the 6to4 developer or the
1586 6to4 operator.
1587
1588 Summary of attacks on a 6to4 network:
1589
1590 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1591 | Sec | Attack name |Initiator| Victim | ToA | Fix |
1592 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1593 | 4.1.1 | Attacks with ND | I_4 | Router | D | 6 |
1594 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1595 | 4.1.2 | Spoofing Traffic | I_4,I_6 | 6to4 | D | E |
1596 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1597 | 4.1.3 | Reflection Attacks | * | 6to4 | R | 6* |
1598 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1599 | 4.1.4 | Local IPv4 Broadcast | * | Router | D | 6 |
1600 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1601
1602 Figure 9
1603
1604
1605
1606
1607
1608
1609
1610
1611
1612
1613
1614
1615
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1623
1624
1625 Summary of attacks on the native IPv6 internet:
1626
1627 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1628 | Sec | Attack name |Initiator| Victim | ToA | Fix |
1629 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1630 | 4.2.1 | Attacks with ND | I_4 | Relay | D | 6 |
1631 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1632 | 4.2.2 | Spoofing Traffic | I_4,6to4| I_6 | D | 6* |
1633 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1634 | 4.2.3 | Reflection Attacks | * | I_6 | R | 6* |
1635 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1636 | 4.2.4 | Local IPv4 Broadcast | * | Relay | D | 6 |
1637 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1638 | 4.2.5 | Theft of Service | 6to4 | Relay | T | 6 |
1639 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1640 | 4.2.6 | Relay Operators ... | - | - | D | 1) |
1641 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1642
1643 Figure 10
1644
1645 Notes:
1646
1647 1) This attack is a side-effect of the other attacks and thus does
1648 not have any Initiator, Victim, and Fix. It is a Denial of Service
1649 attack not on the network but on the organization in-charge of the
1650 relay.
1651
1652 Summary of attacks on IPv4 internet:
1653
1654 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1655 | Sec | Attack name |Initiator| Victim | ToA | Fix |
1656 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1657 | 4.3 | Spoofing Traffic | * | I_4 | D | 6* |
1658 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1659 | 4.3 | Reflection Attacks | * | I_4 | R | 6* |
1660 +-------+----------------------+---------+----------+-----+-----+
1661
1662 Figure 11
1663
1664 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Implementing Proper Security Checks in 6to4</span>
1665
1666 This section describes several ways to implement the security checks
1667 required or implied by the specification [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] or augmented by this
1668 memo. These do not, in general, protect against most of the threats
1669 listed above in the "Threat Analysis" section. They are only
1670 prerequisites for a relatively safe and simple 6to4 implementation.
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1679
1680
1681 Note that, in general, the 6to4 router or relay does not know whether
1682 it is acting as a router or relay. It would be possible to include a
1683 toggle to specify the behaviour, to be used when, e.g., the interface
1684 is brought up, but as of February 2004, no implementations were known
1685 to do that. Therefore, the checks are described as that which works
1686 independently of whether the node is a router or relay.
1687
1688 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Encapsulating IPv6 into IPv4</span>
1689
1690 The checks described in this section are to be performed when
1691 encapsulating IPv6 into IPv4.
1692
1693 The encapsulation rules are mainly designed to keep implementors from
1694 "shooting themselves in the foot." For example, the source address
1695 check would verify that the packet will be acceptable to the
1696 decapsulator, or the sanity checks would ensure that addresses
1697 derived from private addresses are not used (which would be equally
1698 unacceptable).
1699
1700 src_v6 and dst_v6 MUST pass ipv6-sanity checks (see below) else drop
1701 if prefix (src_v6) == 2002::/16
1702 ipv4 address embedded in src_v6 MUST match src_v4
1703 else if prefix (dst_v6) == 2002::/16
1704 dst_v4 SHOULD NOT be assigned to the router
1705 else
1706 drop
1707 /* we somehow got a native-native ipv6 packet */
1708 fi
1709 accept
1710
1711 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Decapsulating IPv4 into IPv6</span>
1712
1713 The checks described in this section are to be performed when
1714 decapsulating IPv4 into IPv6. They will be performed in both the
1715 6to4 router and relay.
1716
1717 src_v4 and dst_v4 MUST pass ipv4-sanity checks, else drop
1718 src_v6 and dst_v6 MUST pass ipv6-sanity checks, else drop
1719 if prefix (dst_v6) == 2002::/16
1720 ipv4 address embedded in dst_v6 MUST match dst_v4
1721 if prefix (src_v6) == 2002::/16
1722 ipv4 address embedded in src_v6 MUST match src_v4
1723 dst_v4 SHOULD be assigned to the router
1724 fi
1725 elif prefix (src_v6) == 2002::/16
1726 ipv4 address embedded in src_v6 MUST match src_v4
1727 dst_v4 SHOULD be assigned to the router (see notes below)
1728
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1735
1736
1737 else
1738 drop
1739 /* the we somehow got a native-native ipv6 packet */
1740 fi
1741 accept
1742
1743 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. IPv4 and IPv6 Sanity Checks</span>
1744
1745 The encapsulation and decapsulation checks include certain sanity
1746 checks for both IPv4 and IPv6. These are described here in detail.
1747
1748 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.1" href="#section-5.3.1">5.3.1</a>. IPv4</span>
1749
1750 IPv4 address MUST be a global unicast address, as required by the
1751 6to4 specification. The disallowed addresses include those defined
1752 in [<a href="#ref-14" title="&quot;Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers&quot;">14</a>], and others widely used and known not to be global. These
1753 are
1754
1755 o 0.0.0.0/8 (the system has no address assigned yet)
1756
1757 o 10.0.0.0/8 (private)
1758
1759 o 127.0.0.0/8 (loopback)
1760
1761 o 172.16.0.0/12 (private)
1762
1763 o 192.168.0.0/16 (private)
1764
1765 o 169.254.0.0/16 (IANA Assigned DHCP link-local)
1766
1767 o 224.0.0.0/4 (multicast)
1768
1769 o 240.0.0.0/4 (reserved and broadcast)
1770
1771 In addition, the address MUST NOT be any of the system's broadcast
1772 addresses. This is especially important if the implementation is
1773 made so that it can
1774
1775 o receive and process encapsulated IPv4 packets arriving at its
1776 broadcast addresses, or
1777
1778 o send encapsulated IPv4 packets to one of its broadcast addresses.
1779
1780
1781
1782
1783
1784
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1791
1792
1793 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.2" href="#section-5.3.2">5.3.2</a>. IPv6</span>
1794
1795 IPv6 address MUST NOT be
1796
1797 o 0::/16 (compatible, mapped addresses, loopback, unspecified, ...)
1798
1799 o fe80::/10 (link-local)
1800
1801 o fec0::/10 (site-local)
1802
1803 o ff00::/8 (any multicast)
1804
1805 Note: Only link-local multicast would be strictly required, but it is
1806 believed that multicast with 6to4 will not be feasible, so it has
1807 been disallowed as well.
1808
1809 In addition, it MUST be checked that equivalent 2002:V4ADDR::/48
1810 checks, where V4ADDR is any of the above IPv4 addresses, will not be
1811 passed.
1812
1813 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.3" href="#section-5.3.3">5.3.3</a>. Optional Ingress Filtering</span>
1814
1815 In addition, the implementation in the 6to4 router may perform some
1816 form of ingress filtering (e.g., Unicast Reverse Path Forwarding
1817 checks). For example, if the 6to4 router has multiple interfaces, of
1818 which some are "internal", receiving either IPv4 or IPv6 packets with
1819 source address belonging to any of these internal networks from the
1820 Internet might be disallowed.
1821
1822 If these checks are implemented and enabled by default, it's
1823 recommended that there be a toggle to disable them if needed.
1824
1825 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3.4" href="#section-5.3.4">5.3.4</a>. Notes about the Checks</span>
1826
1827 The rule "dst_v4 SHOULD be assigned to the router" is not needed if
1828 the 6to4 router implementation only accepts and processes
1829 encapsulated IPv4 packets arriving to its unicast IPv4 addresses, and
1830 when the destination address is known to be a local broadcast
1831 address, it does not try to encapsulate and send packets to it. (See
1832 Sections <a href="#section-4.1.4">4.1.4</a> and 4.2.4 about this threat.)
1833
1834 Some checks, especially the IPv4/IPv6 Sanity Checks, could be at
1835 least partially implementable with system-level access lists, if one
1836 would like to avoid placing too many restrictions in the 6to4
1837 implementation itself. This depends on how many hooks are in place
1838 for the access lists. In practice, it seems that this could not be
1839 done effectively enough unless the access list mechanism is able to
1840 parse the encapsulated packets.
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1847
1848
1849 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Issues in 6to4 Implementation and Use</span>
1850
1851 This section tries to give an overview of some of the problems 6to4
1852 implementations face, and the kind of generic problems the 6to4 users
1853 could come up with.
1854
1855 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Implementation Considerations with Automatic Tunnels</span>
1856
1857 There is a problem with multiple transition mechanisms if strict
1858 security checks are implemented. This may vary a bit from
1859 implementation to implementation.
1860
1861 Consider three mechanisms using automatic tunneling: 6to4, ISATAP
1862 [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Intra-Site Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)&quot;">15</a>], and Automatic Tunneling using Compatible Addresses [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">4</a>]
1863 (currently removed [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;Basic Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">10</a>] but typically still supported). All of these
1864 use IP-IP (protocol 41) [<a href="#ref-16" title="&quot;IP in IP Tunneling&quot;">16</a>] IPv4 encapsulation with, more or less, a
1865 pseudo-interface.
1866
1867 When a router, which has any two of these enabled, receives an IPv4
1868 encapsulated IPv6 packet
1869
1870 src_v6 = 2001:db8::1
1871 dst_v6 = 2002:1010:1010::2
1872 src_v4 = 10.0.0.1
1873 dst_v4 = 20.20.20.20
1874
1875 What can it do? How should it decide which transition mechanism this
1876 belongs to; there is no "transition mechanism number" in the IPv6 or
1877 IPv4 header to signify this. (This can also be viewed as a
1878 flexibility benefit.)
1879
1880 Without any kind of security checks (in any of the implemented
1881 methods), these often just "work", as the mechanisms aren't
1882 differentiated but handled in "one big lump".
1883
1884 Configured tunneling [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Transition Mechanisms for IPv6 Hosts and Routers&quot;">4</a>] does not suffer from this, as it is
1885 point-to-point and based on src_v6/dst_v6 pairs of both IPv4 and IPv6
1886 addresses, so the tunnel interface can be logically deduced.
1887
1888 Solutions for this include 1) not using more than one automatic
1889 tunneling mechanism in a node and 2) binding different mechanisms to
1890 different IPv4 addresses.
1891
1892
1893
1894
1895
1896
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1903
1904
1905 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. A Different Model for 6to4 Deployment</span>
1906
1907 Even though this was already discussed in <a href="#section-4.1.2">Section 4.1.2</a>, it bears
1908 some additional elaboration, as it was the only problem that cannot
1909 be even partially solved using the current deployment model. There
1910 are some mitigation methods.
1911
1912 6to4 routers receive traffic from non-6to4 ("native") sources via
1913 6to4 relays. 6to4 routers have no way of matching the IPv4 source
1914 address of the relay with the non-6to4 IPv6 address of the source.
1915 Consequently, anyone can spoof any non-6to4 IPv6 address by sending
1916 traffic, encapsulated, directly to 6to4 routers.
1917
1918 It could be possible to turn the deployment assumptions of 6to4
1919 around a bit to eliminate some threats caused by untrusted 6to4
1920 relays:
1921
1922 o Every dual-stack site (or even ISP) would be required to have its
1923 own 6to4 relay. (This assumes that IPv6-only is so far away that
1924 6to4 would be retired by that point.) That is, there would not be
1925 third-party relays, and 2002::/16 and 192.88.99.0/24 routes would
1926 not need to be advertised globally.
1927
1928 o The security implications of 6to4 use could be pushed back to the
1929 level of trust inside the site or ISP (or their acceptable use
1930 policies). This is something that the sites and ISPs should
1931 already be familiar with already.
1932
1933 However, this presents a number of problems:
1934
1935 This model would shift most of the burden of supporting 6to4 to IPv6
1936 sites that don't employ or use 6to4 at all, i.e., "those who deploy
1937 proper native dual-stack." It could be argued that the deployment
1938 pain should be borne by 6to4 users, not by the others.
1939
1940 The main advantage of 6to4 is easy deployment and free relays. This
1941 would require that everyone the 6to4 sites wish to communicate with
1942 implement these measures.
1943
1944 The model would not fix the "relay spoofing problem", unless
1945 everybody also deployed 6to4 addresses on the nodes (alongside with
1946 native addresses, if necessary), which would in turn change 6to4 to
1947 operate without relays completely.
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
1959
1960
1961 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
1962
1963 This document discusses security considerations of 6to4.
1964
1965 Even if proper checks are implemented, there are a large number of
1966 different security threats; these threats are analyzed in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.
1967
1968 There are mainly four classes of potential problem sources:
1969
1970 1. 6to4 routers not being able to identify whether relays are
1971 legitimate
1972
1973 2. Wrong or impartially implemented 6to4 router or relay security
1974 checks
1975
1976 3. 6to4 architecture used to participate in DoS or reflected DoS
1977 attacks or made to participate in "packet laundering", i.e.,
1978 making another attack harder to trace
1979
1980 4. 6to4 relays being subject to "administrative abuse" e.g., theft
1981 of service or being seen as a source of abuse.
1982
1983 The first is the toughest problem, still under research. The second
1984 can be fixed by ensuring the correctness of implementations; this is
1985 important. The third is also a very difficult problem, impossible to
1986 solve completely; therefore it is important to be able to analyze
1987 whether this results in a significant increase of threats. The
1988 fourth problem seems to have feasible solutions.
1989
1990 These are analyzed in detail in "Threat Analysis", in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.
1991
1992 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments</span>
1993
1994 Some issues were first brought up by Itojun Hagino in [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;Possible abuse against IPv6 transition technologies&quot;">17</a>], and Alain
1995 Durand introduced one specific problem at IETF51 in August 2001
1996 (though there was some discussion on the list prior to that); these
1997 two gave the authors the push to start looking into the details of
1998 securing 6to4.
1999
2000 Alexey Kuznetsov brought up the implementation problem with IPv6
2001 martian checks. Christian Huitema formulated the rules that rely on
2002 6to4 relays using only anycast. Keith Moore brought up the point
2003 about reduced flexibility. Brian Carpenter, Tony Hain, and Vladislav
2004 Yasevich are acknowledged for lengthy discussions. Alain Durand
2005 reminded the authors about relay spoofing problems. Brian Carpenter
2006 reminded the authors about the BGP-based 6to4 router model.
2007 Christian Huitema gave a push for a more complete threat analysis.
2008 Itojun Hagino spelled out the operators' fears about 6to4 relay
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
2015
2016
2017 abuse. Rob Austein brought up the idea of a different 6to4
2018 deployment model.
2019
2020 In the latter phase, discussions with Christian Huitema, Brian
2021 Carpenter, and Alain Durand were helpful when improving the document.
2022
2023 David Malone, Iljitsch van Beijnum, and Tim Chown gave feedback on
2024 the document.
2025
2026 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
2027
2028 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
2029
2030 [<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Carpenter, B. and K. Moore, "Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4
2031 Clouds", <a href="./rfc3056">RFC 3056</a>, February 2001.
2032
2033 [<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
2034 Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
2035
2036 [<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Huitema, C., "An Anycast Prefix for 6to4 Relay Routers", <a href="./rfc3068">RFC</a>
2037 <a href="./rfc3068">3068</a>, June 2001.
2038
2039 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
2040
2041 [<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Gilligan, R. and E. Nordmark, "Transition Mechanisms for IPv6
2042 Hosts and Routers", <a href="./rfc2893">RFC 2893</a>, August 2000.
2043
2044 [<a id="ref-5">5</a>] IANA, "Special-Use IPv4 Addresses", <a href="./rfc3330">RFC 3330</a>, September 2002.
2045
2046 [<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Rekhter, Y. and T. Li, "A Border Gateway Protocol 4 (BGP-4)",
2047 <a href="./rfc1771">RFC 1771</a>, March 1995.
2048
2049 [<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Draves, R., "Default Address Selection for Internet Protocol
2050 version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc3484">RFC 3484</a>, February 2003.
2051
2052 [<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Nikander, P., Kempf, J., and E. Nordmark, "IPv6 Neighbor
2053 Discovery (ND) Trust Models and Threats", <a href="./rfc3756">RFC 3756</a>, May 2004.
2054
2055 [<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Sommerfeld, B., Zill, B., and P. Nikander,
2056 "SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", Work in Progress, July 2004.
2057
2058 [<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Nordmark, E. and R. Gilligan, "Basic Transition Mechanisms for
2059 IPv6 Hosts and Routers", Work in Progress, September 2004.
2060
2061 [<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Savola, P., "Security of IPv6 Routing Header and Home Address
2062 Options", Work in Progress, March 2002.
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 37]</span></pre>
2069 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-38" ></span>
2070 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
2071
2072
2073 [<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Ferguson, P. and D. Senie, "Network Ingress Filtering: Defeating
2074 Denial of Service Attacks which employ IP Source Address
2075 Spoofing", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp38">BCP 38</a>, <a href="./rfc2827">RFC 2827</a>, May 2000.
2076
2077 [<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Bellovin, S., Leech, M. and T. Taylor, "ICMP Traceback
2078 Messages", Work in Progress, February 2003.
2079
2080 [<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", <a href="./rfc1812">RFC 1812</a>,
2081 June 1995.
2082
2083 [<a id="ref-15">15</a>] Templin, F., Gleeson, T., Talwar, M. and D. Thaler, "Intra-Site
2084 Automatic Tunnel Addressing Protocol (ISATAP)", Work in
2085 Progress, May 2004.
2086
2087 [<a id="ref-16">16</a>] Simpson, W., "IP in IP Tunneling", <a href="./rfc1853">RFC 1853</a>, October 1995.
2088
2089 [<a id="ref-17">17</a>] Hagino, J., "Possible abuse against IPv6 transition
2090 technologies", Work in Progress, July 2000.
2091
2092
2093
2094
2095
2096
2097
2098
2099
2100
2101
2102
2103
2104
2105
2106
2107
2108
2109
2110
2111
2112
2113
2114
2115
2116
2117
2118
2119
2120
2121
2122
2123
2124 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 38]</span></pre>
2125 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-39" ></span>
2126 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
2127
2128
2129 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="appendix-A" href="#appendix-A">Appendix A</a>. Some Trivial Attack Scenarios Outlined</span>
2130
2131 Here, a few trivial attack scenarios are outlined -- ones that are
2132 prevented by implementing checks listed in [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Connection of IPv6 Domains via IPv4 Clouds&quot;">1</a>] or in <a href="#section-6">section 6</a>.
2133
2134 When two 6to4 routers send traffic to each others' domains, the
2135 packet sent by RA to RB resembles the following:
2136
2137 src_v6 = 2002:0800:0001::aaaa
2138 dst_v6 = 2002:0800:0002::bbbb
2139 src_v4 = 8.0.0.1 (added when encapsulated to IPv4)
2140 dst_v4 = 8.0.0.2 (added when encapsulated to IPv4)
2141
2142 When the packet is received by IPv4 stack on RB, it will be
2143 decapsulated so that only src_v6 and dst_v6 remain, as originally
2144 sent by RA:
2145
2146 src_v6 = 2002:0800:0001::aaaa
2147 dst_v6 = 2002:0800:0002::bbbb
2148
2149 As every other node is just one hop away (IPv6-wise) and the
2150 link-layer (IPv4) addresses are lost, this may open many
2151 possibilities for misuse.
2152
2153 As an example, unidirectional IPv6 spoofing is made trivial because
2154 nobody can check (without delving into IP-IP packets) whether the
2155 encapsulated IPv6 addresses were authentic. (With native IPv6, this
2156 can be done by, e.g., RPF-like mechanisms or access lists in upstream
2157 routers.)
2158
2159 src_v6 = 2002:1234:5678::aaaa (forged)
2160 dst_v6 = 2002:0800:0002::bbbb
2161 src_v4 = 8.0.0.1 (added when encapsulated to IPv4)
2162 dst_v4 = 8.0.0.2 (added when encapsulated to IPv4)
2163
2164 A similar attack with "src" being the native address is made
2165 possible, even with the security checks, by having the sender node
2166 pretend to be a 6to4 relay router.
2167
2168 More worries come into the picture if, e.g.,
2169
2170 src_v6 = ::ffff:[some trusted IPv4 in a private network]
2171 src_v6/dst_v6 = ::ffff:127.0.0.1
2172 src_v6/dst_v6 = ::1
2173 src_v6/dst_v6 = ...
2174
2175
2176
2177
2178
2179
2180 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 39]</span></pre>
2181 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-40" ></span>
2182 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
2183
2184
2185 Some implementations might have been careful enough to design the
2186 stack so as to avoid the incoming (or reply) packets going to IPv4
2187 packet processing through special addresses (e.g., IPv4-mapped
2188 addresses), but who can say for all ...
2189
2190 Authors' Addresses
2191
2192 Pekka Savola
2193 CSC/FUNET
2194 Espoo
2195 Finland
2196
2197 EMail: [email protected]
2198
2199
2200 Chirayu Patel
2201 All Play, No Work
2202 185, Defence Colony
2203 Bangalore, Karnataka 560038
2204 India
2205
2206 Phone: +91-98452-88078
2207 EMail: [email protected]
2208 URI: <a href="http://www.chirayu.org">http://www.chirayu.org</a>
2209
2210
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2236 <span class="grey">Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 40]</span></pre>
2237 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-41" ></span>
2238 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3964">RFC 3964</a> Security Considerations for 6to4 December 2004</span>
2239
2240
2241 Full Copyright Statement
2242
2243 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
2244
2245 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
2246 contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
2247 retain all their rights.
2248
2249 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
2250 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
2251 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
2252 ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED,
2253 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
2254 INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED
2255 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
2256
2257 Intellectual Property
2258
2259 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
2260 Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to
2261 pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in
2262 this document or the extent to which any license under such rights
2263 might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has
2264 made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information
2265 on the IETF's procedures with respect to rights in IETF Documents can
2266 be found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>.
2267
2268 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
2269 assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an
2270 attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of
2271 such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this
2272 specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at
2273 <a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>.
2274
2275 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
2276 copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary
2277 rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement
2278 this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf-
2279 [email protected].
2280
2281 Acknowledgement
2282
2283 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
2284 Internet Society.
2285
2286
2287
2288
2289
2290
2291
2292 Savola &amp; Patel Informational [Page 41]
2293 </pre>