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<pre>Network Working Group P. Eronen, Ed. |
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Request for Comments: 4279 Nokia |
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Category: Standards Track H. Tschofenig, Ed. |
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Siemens |
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December 2005 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Pre-Shared Key Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)</span> |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document specifies three sets of new ciphersuites for the |
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Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol to support authentication |
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based on pre-shared keys (PSKs). These pre-shared keys are symmetric |
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keys, shared in advance among the communicating parties. The first |
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set of ciphersuites uses only symmetric key operations for |
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authentication. The second set uses a Diffie-Hellman exchange |
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authenticated with a pre-shared key, and the third set combines |
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public key authentication of the server with pre-shared key |
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authentication of the client. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Applicability Statement ....................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document ..........................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm ......................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm ..................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm ..................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements ........................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. PSK Identity Encoding ......................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Identity Hint ..............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Requirements for TLS Implementations .......................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Requirements for Management Interfaces .....................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations ............................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS) .............................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks ........................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Identity Privacy ..........................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.4">7.4</a>. Implementation Notes ......................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References .....................................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References ......................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References ....................................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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Usually, TLS uses public key certificates [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"">TLS</a>] or Kerberos [<a href="#ref-KERB" title=""Addition of Kerberos Cipher Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">KERB</a>] |
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for authentication. This document describes how to use symmetric |
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keys (later called pre-shared keys or PSKs), shared in advance among |
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the communicating parties, to establish a TLS connection. |
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There are basically two reasons why one might want to do this: |
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o First, using pre-shared keys can, depending on the ciphersuite, |
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avoid the need for public key operations. This is useful if TLS |
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is used in performance-constrained environments with limited CPU |
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power. |
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|
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o Second, pre-shared keys may be more convenient from a key |
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management point of view. For instance, in closed environments |
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where the connections are mostly configured manually in advance, |
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it may be easier to configure a PSK than to use certificates. |
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Another case is when the parties already have a mechanism for |
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setting up a shared secret key, and that mechanism could be used |
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to "bootstrap" a key for authenticating a TLS connection. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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This document specifies three sets of new ciphersuites for TLS. |
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These ciphersuites use new key exchange algorithms, and reuse |
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existing cipher and MAC algorithms from [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"">TLS</a>] and [<a href="#ref-AES" title=""Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">AES</a>]. A summary |
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of these ciphersuites is shown below. |
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|
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CipherSuite Key Exchange Cipher Hash |
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|
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TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA PSK RC4_128 SHA |
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TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA PSK 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA |
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TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA PSK AES_128_CBC SHA |
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TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA PSK AES_256_CBC SHA |
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TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA DHE_PSK RC4_128 SHA |
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TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA DHE_PSK 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA |
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TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA DHE_PSK AES_128_CBC SHA |
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TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA DHE_PSK AES_256_CBC SHA |
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TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA RSA_PSK RC4_128 SHA |
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TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA RSA_PSK 3DES_EDE_CBC SHA |
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TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA RSA_PSK AES_128_CBC SHA |
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TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA RSA_PSK AES_256_CBC SHA |
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The ciphersuites in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a> (with PSK key exchange algorithm) use |
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only symmetric key algorithms and are thus especially suitable for |
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performance-constrained environments. |
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The ciphersuites in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a> (with DHE_PSK key exchange algorithm) |
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use a PSK to authenticate a Diffie-Hellman exchange. These |
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ciphersuites protect against dictionary attacks by passive |
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eavesdroppers (but not active attackers) and also provide Perfect |
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Forward Secrecy (PFS). |
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The ciphersuites in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> (with RSA_PSK key exchange algorithm) |
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combine public-key-based authentication of the server (using RSA and |
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certificates) with mutual authentication using a PSK. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Applicability Statement</span> |
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The ciphersuites defined in this document are intended for a rather |
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limited set of applications, usually involving only a very small |
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number of clients and servers. Even in such environments, other |
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alternatives may be more appropriate. |
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If the main goal is to avoid Public-Key Infrastructures (PKIs), |
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another possibility worth considering is using self-signed |
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certificates with public key fingerprints. Instead of manually |
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configuring a shared secret in, for instance, some configuration |
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file, a fingerprint (hash) of the other party's public key (or |
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certificate) could be placed there instead. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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It is also possible to use the SRP (Secure Remote Password) |
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ciphersuites for shared secret authentication [<a href="#ref-SRP" title=""Using SRP for TLS Authentication"">SRP</a>]. SRP was |
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designed to be used with passwords, and it incorporates protection |
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against dictionary attacks. However, it is computationally more |
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expensive than the PSK ciphersuites in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in [<a href="#ref-KEYWORDS" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">KEYWORDS</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. PSK Key Exchange Algorithm</span> |
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This section defines the PSK key exchange algorithm and associated |
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ciphersuites. These ciphersuites use only symmetric key algorithms. |
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It is assumed that the reader is familiar with the ordinary TLS |
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handshake, shown below. The elements in parenthesis are not included |
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when the PSK key exchange algorithm is used, and "*" indicates a |
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situation-dependent message that is not always sent. |
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Client Server |
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------ ------ |
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ClientHello --------> |
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ServerHello |
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(Certificate) |
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ServerKeyExchange* |
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(CertificateRequest) |
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<-------- ServerHelloDone |
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(Certificate) |
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ClientKeyExchange |
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(CertificateVerify) |
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ChangeCipherSpec |
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Finished --------> |
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ChangeCipherSpec |
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<-------- Finished |
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Application Data <-------> Application Data |
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The client indicates its willingness to use pre-shared key |
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authentication by including one or more PSK ciphersuites in the |
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ClientHello message. If the TLS server also wants to use pre-shared |
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keys, it selects one of the PSK ciphersuites, places the selected |
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ciphersuite in the ServerHello message, and includes an appropriate |
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ServerKeyExchange message (see below). The Certificate and |
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CertificateRequest payloads are omitted from the response. |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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|
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Both clients and servers may have pre-shared keys with several |
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different parties. The client indicates which key to use by |
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including a "PSK identity" in the ClientKeyExchange message (note |
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that unlike in [<a href="#ref-SHAREDKEYS" title=""Use of Shared Keys in the TLS Protocol"">SHAREDKEYS</a>], the session_id field in ClientHello |
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message keeps its usual meaning). To help the client in selecting |
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which identity to use, the server can provide a "PSK identity hint" |
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in the ServerKeyExchange message. If no hint is provided, the |
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ServerKeyExchange message is omitted. See <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> for a more |
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detailed description of these fields. |
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The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages is |
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shown below. |
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|
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struct { |
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select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
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/* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */ |
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case psk: /* NEW */ |
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opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; |
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}; |
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} ServerKeyExchange; |
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struct { |
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select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
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/* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */ |
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case psk: /* NEW */ |
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opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; |
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} exchange_keys; |
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} ClientKeyExchange; |
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The premaster secret is formed as follows: if the PSK is N octets |
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long, concatenate a uint16 with the value N, N zero octets, a second |
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uint16 with the value N, and the PSK itself. |
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Note 1: All the ciphersuites in this document share the same |
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general structure for the premaster secret, namely, |
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struct { |
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opaque other_secret<0..2^16-1>; |
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opaque psk<0..2^16-1>; |
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}; |
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Here "other_secret" either is zeroes (plain PSK case) or comes |
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from the Diffie-Hellman or RSA exchange (DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK, |
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respectively). See Sections <a href="#section-3">3</a> and <a href="#section-4">4</a> for a more detailed |
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description. |
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Note 2: Using zeroes for "other_secret" effectively means that |
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only the HMAC-SHA1 part (but not the HMAC-MD5 part) of the TLS PRF |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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is used when constructing the master secret. This was considered |
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more elegant from an analytical viewpoint than, for instance, |
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using the same key for both the HMAC-MD5 and HMAC-SHA1 parts. See |
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[<a href="#ref-KRAWCZYK" title=""Re: TLS shared keys PRF"">KRAWCZYK</a>] for a more detailed rationale. |
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The TLS handshake is authenticated using the Finished messages as |
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usual. |
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If the server does not recognize the PSK identity, it MAY respond |
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with an "unknown_psk_identity" alert message. Alternatively, if the |
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server wishes to hide the fact that the PSK identity was not known, |
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it MAY continue the protocol as if the PSK identity existed but the |
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key was incorrect: that is, respond with a "decrypt_error" alert. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. DHE_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm</span> |
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This section defines additional ciphersuites that use a PSK to |
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authenticate a Diffie-Hellman exchange. These ciphersuites give some |
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additional protection against dictionary attacks and also provide |
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Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). See <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> for discussion of |
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related security considerations. |
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When these ciphersuites are used, the ServerKeyExchange and |
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ClientKeyExchange messages also include the Diffie-Hellman |
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parameters. The PSK identity and identity hint fields have the same |
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meaning as in the previous section (note that the ServerKeyExchange |
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message is always sent, even if no PSK identity hint is provided). |
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The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange messages is |
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shown below. |
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|
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struct { |
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select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
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/* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */ |
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case diffie_hellman_psk: /* NEW */ |
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opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; |
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ServerDHParams params; |
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}; |
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} ServerKeyExchange; |
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|
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struct { |
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select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
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/* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */ |
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case diffie_hellman_psk: /* NEW */ |
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opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; |
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ClientDiffieHellmanPublic public; |
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} exchange_keys; |
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} ClientKeyExchange; |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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|
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The premaster secret is formed as follows. First, perform the |
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Diffie-Hellman computation in the same way as for other |
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Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites in [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"">TLS</a>]. Let Z be the value |
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produced by this computation (with leading zero bytes stripped as in |
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other Diffie-Hellman-based ciphersuites). Concatenate a uint16 |
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containing the length of Z (in octets), Z itself, a uint16 containing |
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the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself. |
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|
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This corresponds to the general structure for the premaster secrets |
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(see Note 1 in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>) in this document, with "other_secret" |
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containing Z. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. RSA_PSK Key Exchange Algorithm</span> |
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The ciphersuites in this section use RSA and certificates to |
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authenticate the server, in addition to using a PSK. |
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As in normal RSA ciphersuites, the server must send a Certificate |
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message. The format of the ServerKeyExchange and ClientKeyExchange |
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messages is shown below. If no PSK identity hint is provided, the |
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ServerKeyExchange message is omitted. |
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|
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struct { |
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select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
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/* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */ |
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case rsa_psk: /* NEW */ |
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opaque psk_identity_hint<0..2^16-1>; |
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}; |
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} ServerKeyExchange; |
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|
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struct { |
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select (KeyExchangeAlgorithm) { |
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/* other cases for rsa, diffie_hellman, etc. */ |
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case rsa_psk: /* NEW */ |
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opaque psk_identity<0..2^16-1>; |
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EncryptedPreMasterSecret; |
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} exchange_keys; |
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} ClientKeyExchange; |
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|
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The EncryptedPreMasterSecret field sent from the client to the server |
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contains a 2-byte version number and a 46-byte random value, |
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encrypted using the server's RSA public key as described in <a href="#section-7.4.7.1">Section</a> |
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<a href="#section-7.4.7.1">7.4.7.1</a> of [<a href="#ref-TLS" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"">TLS</a>]. The actual premaster secret is formed by both |
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parties as follows: concatenate a uint16 with the value 48, the |
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2-byte version number and the 46-byte random value, a uint16 |
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containing the length of the PSK (in octets), and the PSK itself. |
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(The premaster secret is thus 52 octets longer than the PSK.) |
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<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
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|
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|
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This corresponds to the general structure for the premaster secrets |
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(see Note 1 in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>) in this document, with "other_secret" |
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containing both the 2-byte version number and the 46-byte random |
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value. |
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|
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Neither the normal RSA ciphersuites nor these RSA_PSK ciphersuites |
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themselves specify what the certificates contain (in addition to the |
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RSA public key), or how the certificates are to be validated. In |
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particular, it is possible to use the RSA_PSK ciphersuites with |
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unvalidated self-signed certificates to provide somewhat similar |
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protection against dictionary attacks, as the DHE_PSK ciphersuites |
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define in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Conformance Requirements</span> |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
It is expected that different types of identities are useful for |
| 409 |
different applications running over TLS. This document does not |
| 410 |
therefore mandate the use of any particular type of identity (such as |
| 411 |
IPv4 address or Fully Qualified Domain Name (FQDN)). |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
However, the TLS client and server clearly have to agree on the |
| 414 |
identities and keys to be used. To improve interoperability, this |
| 415 |
document places requirements on how the identity is encoded in the |
| 416 |
protocol, and what kinds of identities and keys implementations have |
| 417 |
to support. |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
The requirements for implementations are divided into two categories, |
| 420 |
requirements for TLS implementations and management interfaces. In |
| 421 |
this context, "TLS implementation" refers to a TLS library or module |
| 422 |
that is intended to be used for several different purposes, while |
| 423 |
"management interface" would typically be implemented by a particular |
| 424 |
application that uses TLS. |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
This document does not specify how the server stores the keys and |
| 427 |
identities, or how exactly it finds the key corresponding to the |
| 428 |
identity it receives. For instance, if the identity is a domain |
| 429 |
name, it might be appropriate to do a case-insensitive lookup. It is |
| 430 |
RECOMMENDED that before looking up the key, the server processes the |
| 431 |
PSK identity with a stringprep profile [<a href="#ref-STRINGPREP" title=""Preparation of Internationalized Strings ("">STRINGPREP</a>] appropriate for |
| 432 |
the identity in question (such as Nameprep [<a href="#ref-NAMEPREP" title=""Nameprep: A Stringprep Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)"">NAMEPREP</a>] for components |
| 433 |
of domain names or SASLprep for usernames [<a href="#ref-SASLPREP" title=""SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User Names and Passwords"">SASLPREP</a>]). |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. PSK Identity Encoding</span> |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
The PSK identity MUST be first converted to a character string, and |
| 438 |
then encoded to octets using UTF-8 [<a href="#ref-UTF8" title=""UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO 10646"">UTF8</a>]. For instance, |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
o IPv4 addresses are sent as dotted-decimal strings (e.g., |
| 450 |
"192.0.2.1"), not as 32-bit integers in network byte order. |
| 451 |
|
| 452 |
o Domain names are sent in their usual text form [<a href="#ref-DNS" title=""Domain names - implementation and specification"">DNS</a>] (e.g., |
| 453 |
"www.example.com" or "embedded\.dot.example.net"), not in DNS |
| 454 |
protocol format. |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
o X.500 Distinguished Names are sent in their string representation |
| 457 |
[<a href="#ref-LDAPDN" title=""LDAP: String Representation of Distinguished Names"">LDAPDN</a>], not as BER-encoded ASN.1. |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
This encoding is clearly not optimal for many types of identities. |
| 460 |
It was chosen to avoid identity-type-specific parsing and encoding |
| 461 |
code in implementations where the identity is configured by a person |
| 462 |
using some kind of management interface. Requiring such identity- |
| 463 |
type-specific code would also increase the chances for |
| 464 |
interoperability problems resulting from different implementations |
| 465 |
supporting different identity types. |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Identity Hint</span> |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
In the absence of an application profile specification specifying |
| 470 |
otherwise, servers SHOULD NOT provide an identity hint and clients |
| 471 |
MUST ignore the identity hint field. Applications that do use this |
| 472 |
field MUST specify its contents, how the value is chosen by the TLS |
| 473 |
server, and what the TLS client is expected to do with the value. |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Requirements for TLS Implementations</span> |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
TLS implementations supporting these ciphersuites MUST support |
| 478 |
arbitrary PSK identities up to 128 octets in length, and arbitrary |
| 479 |
PSKs up to 64 octets in length. Supporting longer identities and |
| 480 |
keys is RECOMMENDED. |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Requirements for Management Interfaces</span> |
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
In the absence of an application profile specification specifying |
| 485 |
otherwise, a management interface for entering the PSK and/or PSK |
| 486 |
identity MUST support the following: |
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
o Entering PSK identities consisting of up to 128 printable Unicode |
| 489 |
characters. Supporting as wide a character repertoire and as long |
| 490 |
identities as feasible is RECOMMENDED. |
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
o Entering PSKs up to 64 octets in length as ASCII strings and in |
| 493 |
hexadecimal encoding. |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
IANA does not currently have a registry for TLS ciphersuite or alert |
| 508 |
numbers, so there are no IANA actions associated with this document. |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
For easier reference in the future, the ciphersuite numbers defined |
| 511 |
in this document are summarized below. |
| 512 |
|
| 513 |
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8A }; |
| 514 |
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8B }; |
| 515 |
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8C }; |
| 516 |
CipherSuite TLS_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8D }; |
| 517 |
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8E }; |
| 518 |
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x8F }; |
| 519 |
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x90 }; |
| 520 |
CipherSuite TLS_DHE_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x91 }; |
| 521 |
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_RC4_128_SHA = { 0x00, 0x92 }; |
| 522 |
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_3DES_EDE_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x93 }; |
| 523 |
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x94 }; |
| 524 |
CipherSuite TLS_RSA_PSK_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA = { 0x00, 0x95 }; |
| 525 |
|
| 526 |
This document also defines a new TLS alert message, |
| 527 |
unknown_psk_identity(115). |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 530 |
|
| 531 |
As with all schemes involving shared keys, special care should be |
| 532 |
taken to protect the shared values and to limit their exposure over |
| 533 |
time. |
| 534 |
|
| 535 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.1" href="#section-7.1">7.1</a>. Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS)</span> |
| 536 |
|
| 537 |
The PSK and RSA_PSK ciphersuites defined in this document do not |
| 538 |
provide Perfect Forward Secrecy (PFS). That is, if the shared secret |
| 539 |
key (in PSK ciphersuites), or both the shared secret key and the RSA |
| 540 |
private key (in RSA_PSK ciphersuites), is somehow compromised, an |
| 541 |
attacker can decrypt old conversations. |
| 542 |
|
| 543 |
The DHE_PSK ciphersuites provide Perfect Forward Secrecy if a fresh |
| 544 |
Diffie-Hellman private key is generated for each handshake. |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.2" href="#section-7.2">7.2</a>. Brute-Force and Dictionary Attacks</span> |
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
Use of a fixed shared secret of limited entropy (for example, a PSK |
| 549 |
that is relatively short, or was chosen by a human and thus may |
| 550 |
contain less entropy than its length would imply) may allow an |
| 551 |
attacker to perform a brute-force or dictionary attack to recover the |
| 552 |
secret. This may be either an off-line attack (against a captured |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
TLS handshake messages) or an on-line attack where the attacker |
| 562 |
attempts to connect to the server and tries different keys. |
| 563 |
|
| 564 |
For the PSK ciphersuites, an attacker can get the information |
| 565 |
required for an off-line attack by eavesdropping on a TLS handshake, |
| 566 |
or by getting a valid client to attempt connection with the attacker |
| 567 |
(by tricking the client to connect to the wrong address, or by |
| 568 |
intercepting a connection attempt to the correct address, for |
| 569 |
instance). |
| 570 |
|
| 571 |
For the DHE_PSK ciphersuites, an attacker can obtain the information |
| 572 |
by getting a valid client to attempt connection with the attacker. |
| 573 |
Passive eavesdropping alone is not sufficient. |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
For the RSA_PSK ciphersuites, only the server (authenticated using |
| 576 |
RSA and certificates) can obtain sufficient information for an |
| 577 |
off-line attack. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
It is RECOMMENDED that implementations that allow the administrator |
| 580 |
to manually configure the PSK also provide a functionality for |
| 581 |
generating a new random PSK, taking [<a href="#ref-RANDOMNESS" title=""Randomness Requirements for Security"">RANDOMNESS</a>] into account. |
| 582 |
|
| 583 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.3" href="#section-7.3">7.3</a>. Identity Privacy</span> |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
The PSK identity is sent in cleartext. Although using a user name or |
| 586 |
other similar string as the PSK identity is the most straightforward |
| 587 |
option, it may lead to problems in some environments since an |
| 588 |
eavesdropper is able to identify the communicating parties. Even |
| 589 |
when the identity does not reveal any information itself, reusing the |
| 590 |
same identity over time may eventually allow an attacker to perform |
| 591 |
traffic analysis to identify the parties. It should be noted that |
| 592 |
this is no worse than client certificates, since they are also sent |
| 593 |
in cleartext. |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-7.4" href="#section-7.4">7.4</a>. Implementation Notes</span> |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
The implementation notes in [<a href="#ref-TLS11" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.1"">TLS11</a>] about correct implementation and |
| 598 |
use of RSA (including <a href="#section-7.4.7.1">Section 7.4.7.1</a>) and Diffie-Hellman (including |
| 599 |
<a href="#appendix-F.1.1.3">Appendix F.1.1.3</a>) apply to the DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK ciphersuites as |
| 600 |
well. |
| 601 |
|
| 602 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
The protocol defined in this document is heavily based on work by Tim |
| 605 |
Dierks and Peter Gutmann, and borrows some text from [<a href="#ref-SHAREDKEYS" title=""Use of Shared Keys in the TLS Protocol"">SHAREDKEYS</a>] and |
| 606 |
[<a href="#ref-AES" title=""Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">AES</a>]. The DHE_PSK and RSA_PSK ciphersuites are based on earlier |
| 607 |
work in [<a href="#ref-KEYEX" title=""Pre-Shared-Key key Exchange methods for TLS"">KEYEX</a>]. |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
Valuable feedback was also provided by Bernard Aboba, Lakshminath |
| 618 |
Dondeti, Philip Ginzboorg, Peter Gutmann, Sam Hartman, Russ Housley, |
| 619 |
David Jablon, Nikos Mavroyanopoulos, Bodo Moeller, Eric Rescorla, and |
| 620 |
Mika Tervonen. |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
When the first version of this document was almost ready, the authors |
| 623 |
learned that something similar had been proposed already in 1996 |
| 624 |
[<a href="#ref-PASSAUTH" title=""Addition of Shared Key Authentication to Transport Layer Security (TLS)"">PASSAUTH</a>]. However, this document is not intended for web password |
| 625 |
authentication, but rather for other uses of TLS. |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
| 628 |
|
| 629 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
[<a id="ref-AES">AES</a>] Chown, P., "Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) |
| 632 |
Ciphersuites for Transport Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc3268">RFC</a> |
| 633 |
<a href="./rfc3268">3268</a>, June 2002. |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
[<a id="ref-KEYWORDS">KEYWORDS</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 636 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 637 |
|
| 638 |
[<a id="ref-RANDOMNESS">RANDOMNESS</a>] Eastlake, D., 3rd, Schiller, J., and S. Crocker, |
| 639 |
"Randomness Requirements for Security", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp106">BCP 106</a>, <a href="./rfc4086">RFC</a> |
| 640 |
<a href="./rfc4086">4086</a>, June 2005. |
| 641 |
|
| 642 |
[<a id="ref-TLS">TLS</a>] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", |
| 643 |
<a href="./rfc2246">RFC 2246</a>, January 1999. |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
[<a id="ref-UTF8">UTF8</a>] Yergeau, F., "UTF-8, a transformation format of ISO |
| 646 |
10646", STD 63, <a href="./rfc3629">RFC 3629</a>, November 2003. |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
[<a id="ref-DNS">DNS</a>] Mockapetris, P., "Domain names - implementation and |
| 651 |
specification", STD 13, <a href="./rfc1035">RFC 1035</a>, November 1987. |
| 652 |
|
| 653 |
[<a id="ref-KERB">KERB</a>] Medvinsky, A. and M. Hur, "Addition of Kerberos Cipher |
| 654 |
Suites to Transport Layer Security (TLS)", <a href="./rfc2712">RFC 2712</a>, |
| 655 |
October 1999. |
| 656 |
|
| 657 |
[<a id="ref-KEYEX">KEYEX</a>] Badra, M., Cherkaoui, O., Hajjeh, I. and A. Serhrouchni, |
| 658 |
"Pre-Shared-Key key Exchange methods for TLS", Work in |
| 659 |
Progress, August 2004. |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
[<a id="ref-KRAWCZYK">KRAWCZYK</a>] Krawczyk, H., "Re: TLS shared keys PRF", message on |
| 662 |
[email protected] mailing list 2004-01-13, |
| 663 |
<a href="http://www.imc.org/ietf-tls/mail-archive/msg04098.html">http://www.imc.org/ietf-tls/mail-archive/msg04098.html</a>. |
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
[<a id="ref-LDAPDN">LDAPDN</a>] Zeilenga, K., "LDAP: String Representation of |
| 674 |
Distinguished Names", Work in Progress, February 2005. |
| 675 |
|
| 676 |
[<a id="ref-NAMEPREP">NAMEPREP</a>] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Nameprep: A Stringprep |
| 677 |
Profile for Internationalized Domain Names (IDN)", <a href="./rfc3491">RFC</a> |
| 678 |
<a href="./rfc3491">3491</a>, March 2003. |
| 679 |
|
| 680 |
[<a id="ref-PASSAUTH">PASSAUTH</a>] Simon, D., "Addition of Shared Key Authentication to |
| 681 |
Transport Layer Security (TLS)", Work in Progress, |
| 682 |
November 1996. |
| 683 |
|
| 684 |
[<a id="ref-SASLPREP">SASLPREP</a>] Zeilenga, K., "SASLprep: Stringprep Profile for User |
| 685 |
Names and Passwords", <a href="./rfc4013">RFC 4013</a>, February 2005. |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
[<a id="ref-SHAREDKEYS">SHAREDKEYS</a>] Gutmann, P., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22Use+of+Shared+Keys+in+the+TLS+Protocol%22'>"Use of Shared Keys in the TLS Protocol"</a>, |
| 688 |
Work in Progress, October 2003. |
| 689 |
|
| 690 |
[<a id="ref-SRP">SRP</a>] Taylor, D., Wu, T., Mavroyanopoulos, N. and T. Perrin, |
| 691 |
"Using SRP for TLS Authentication", Work in Progress, |
| 692 |
March 2005. |
| 693 |
|
| 694 |
[<a id="ref-STRINGPREP">STRINGPREP</a>] Hoffman, P. and M. Blanchet, "Preparation of |
| 695 |
Internationalized Strings ("stringprep")", <a href="./rfc3454">RFC 3454</a>, |
| 696 |
December 2002. |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
[<a id="ref-TLS11">TLS11</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The TLS Protocol Version |
| 699 |
1.1", Work in Progress, June 2005. |
| 700 |
|
| 701 |
Authors' and Contributors' Addresses |
| 702 |
|
| 703 |
Pasi Eronen |
| 704 |
Nokia Research Center |
| 705 |
P.O. Box 407 |
| 706 |
FIN-00045 Nokia Group |
| 707 |
Finland |
| 708 |
|
| 709 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
Hannes Tschofenig |
| 713 |
Siemens |
| 714 |
Otto-Hahn-Ring 6 |
| 715 |
Munich, Bayern 81739 |
| 716 |
Germany |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
Mohamad Badra |
| 730 |
ENST Paris |
| 731 |
46 rue Barrault |
| 732 |
75634 Paris |
| 733 |
France |
| 734 |
|
| 735 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 736 |
|
| 737 |
|
| 738 |
Omar Cherkaoui |
| 739 |
UQAM University |
| 740 |
Montreal (Quebec) |
| 741 |
Canada |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
|
| 746 |
Ibrahim Hajjeh |
| 747 |
ESRGroups |
| 748 |
17 passage Barrault |
| 749 |
75013 Paris |
| 750 |
France |
| 751 |
|
| 752 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 753 |
|
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
Ahmed Serhrouchni |
| 756 |
ENST Paris |
| 757 |
46 rue Barrault |
| 758 |
75634 Paris |
| 759 |
France |
| 760 |
|
| 761 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 762 |
|
| 763 |
|
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
|
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
|
| 768 |
|
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
|
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
|
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4279">RFC 4279</a> PSK Ciphersuites for TLS December 2005</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). |
| 788 |
|
| 789 |
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions |
| 790 |
contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors |
| 791 |
retain all their rights. |
| 792 |
|
| 793 |
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an |
| 794 |
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS |
| 795 |
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET |
| 796 |
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, |
| 797 |
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE |
| 798 |
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED |
| 799 |
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 800 |
|
| 801 |
Intellectual Property |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any |
| 804 |
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to |
| 805 |
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in |
| 806 |
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights |
| 807 |
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has |
| 808 |
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information |
| 809 |
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be |
| 810 |
found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>. |
| 811 |
|
| 812 |
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any |
| 813 |
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an |
| 814 |
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of |
| 815 |
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this |
| 816 |
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at |
| 817 |
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>. |
| 818 |
|
| 819 |
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any |
| 820 |
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary |
| 821 |
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement |
| 822 |
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- |
| 823 |
[email protected]. |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
Acknowledgement |
| 826 |
|
| 827 |
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the |
| 828 |
Internet Society. |
| 829 |
|
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
Eronen & Tschofenig Standards Track [Page 15] |
| 837 |
</pre> |