Debian Codegraph @

rfc7492.html

raw
1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Bhatia
2 Request for Comments: 7492 Ionos Networks
3 Category: Informational D. Zhang
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei
5 M. Jethanandani
6 Ciena Corporation
7 March 2015
8
9
10 <span class="h1">Analysis of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) Security</span>
11 According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP)
12 Design Guidelines
13
14 Abstract
15
16 This document analyzes the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)
17 protocol according to the guidelines set forth in Section 4.2 of <a href="./rfc6518">RFC</a>
18 <a href="./rfc6518">6518</a>, "Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design
19 Guidelines".
20
21 Status of This Memo
22
23 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
24 published for informational purposes.
25
26 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
27 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
28 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
29 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
30 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
31 Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 5741</a>.
32
33 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
34 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
35 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7492">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7492</a>.
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
75 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
76 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Current State of Security Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
77 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Impacts of BFD Replays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
78 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Impact of New Authentication Requirements . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
79 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Considerations for Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
80 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
81 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
82 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
83 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
84 Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
85 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
86
87 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
88
89 This document performs a gap analysis of the current state of
90 Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [<a href="./rfc5880" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)&quot;">RFC5880</a>] according to the
91 requirements of KARP Design Guidelines [<a href="./rfc6518" title="&quot;Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines&quot;">RFC6518</a>]. Previously, the
92 OPSEC working group has provided an analysis of cryptographic issues
93 with BFD in "Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods
94 for Routing Protocols" [<a href="./rfc6039" title="&quot;Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols&quot;">RFC6039</a>].
95
96 The existing BFD specifications provide a basic security solution.
97 Key ID is provided so that the key used in securing a packet can be
98 changed on demand. Two cryptographic algorithms (MD5 and SHA-1) are
99 supported for integrity protection of the control packets; the
100 algorithms are both demonstrated to be subject to collision attacks.
101 Routing protocols like "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"
102 [<a href="./rfc4822" title="&quot;RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC4822</a>], "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc5310" title="&quot;IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5310</a>],
103 and "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc5709" title="&quot;OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication&quot;">RFC5709</a>] have
104 started to use BFD for liveliness checks. Moving the routing
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
111
112
113 protocols to a stronger algorithm while using a weaker algorithm for
114 BFD would allow the attacker to bring down BFD in order to bring down
115 the routing protocol. BFD therefore needs to match the routing
116 protocols in its strength of algorithm.
117
118 While BFD uses a non-decreasing, per-packet sequence number to
119 protect itself from intra-connection replay attacks, it still leaves
120 the protocol vulnerable to the inter-session replay attacks.
121
122 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements to Meet</span>
123
124 There are several requirements described in <a href="./rfc6862#section-4">Section&nbsp;4 of [RFC6862]</a>
125 that BFD, as defined in BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)&quot;">RFC5880</a>], does not currently meet:
126
127 Replay Protection: BFD provides an incomplete intra-session and no
128 inter-session replay attack protection; this creates significant
129 denial-of-service opportunities.
130
131 Strong Algorithms: The cryptographic algorithms adopted for
132 message authentication in BFD are MD5 or SHA-1 based. However,
133 both algorithms are known to be vulnerable to collision attacks.
134 "BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="#ref-BFD-CRYPTO">BFD-CRYPTO</a>] and
135 "Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures" [<a href="#ref-BFD-HMAC" title="&quot;Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures&quot;">BFD-HMAC</a>]
136 together propose a solution to support Hashed Message
137 Authentication Code (HMAC) with the SHA-2 family of hash functions
138 for BFD.
139
140 Preventing DoS Attacks: BFD packets can be sent at millisecond
141 intervals (the protocol uses timers at microsecond intervals).
142 When malicious packets are sent at short intervals, with the
143 authentication bit set, it can cause a DoS attack. There is
144 currently no lightweight mechanism within BFD to address this
145 issue and is one of the reasons BFD authentication is still not
146 widely deployed in the field.
147
148 The remainder of this document explains the details of how these
149 requirements fail to be met and proposes mechanisms for addressing
150 them.
151
152 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Current State of Security Methods</span>
153
154 BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)&quot;">RFC5880</a>] describes five authentication mechanisms for the
155 integrity protection of BFD control packets: Simple Password, Keyed
156 MD5 [<a href="./rfc1321" title="&quot;The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm&quot;">RFC1321</a>], Meticulous Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, and Meticulous
157 Keyed SHA-1. In the simple password mechanism, every control packet
158 is associated with a password transported in plain text; attacks
159 eavesdropping the network traffic can easily learn the password and
160 compromise the security of the corresponding BFD session. In the
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
167
168
169 Keyed MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed MD5 mechanisms, BFD nodes use
170 shared secret keys to generate Keyed MD5 digests for control packets.
171 Similarly, in the Keyed SHA-1 and the Meticulous Keyed SHA-1
172 mechanisms, BFD nodes use shared secret keys to generate Keyed SHA-1
173 digests for control packets. Note that in the keyed authentication
174 mechanisms, every BFD control packet is associated with a non-
175 decreasing, 32-bit sequence number to resist replay attacks. In the
176 Keyed MD5 and the Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms, the sequence member is only
177 required to increase occasionally. However, in the Meticulous Keyed
178 MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms, the sequence member is
179 required to increase with each successive packet.
180
181 Additionally, limited key updating functionality is provided. There
182 is a Key ID in every authenticated BFD control packet indicating the
183 key used to hash the packet. However, there is no mechanism
184 described to provide a smooth key rollover that the BFD routers can
185 use when moving from one key to the other.
186
187 The BFD session timers are defined with the granularity of
188 microseconds, and it is common in practice to send BFD packets at
189 millisecond intervals. Since the cryptographic sequence number space
190 is only 32 bits, a sequence number used in a BFD session may reach
191 its maximum value and roll over within a limited period. For
192 instance, if a sequence number is increased by one every 3.3
193 milliseconds, then it will reach its maximum value in less than 24
194 weeks. This can result in potential inter-session replay attacks,
195 especially when BFD uses the non-meticulous authentication modes.
196
197 Note that when using authentication mechanisms, BFD drops all packets
198 that fall outside the limited range (3 times the Detection Time
199 multiplier). Therefore, when meticulous authentication modes are
200 used, a replayed BFD packet will be rejected if it cannot fit into a
201 relatively short window (3 times the detection interval of the
202 session). This introduces some difficulties for replaying packets.
203 However, in a non-meticulous authentication mode, such windows can be
204 large (as sequence numbers are only increased occasionally), thus
205 making it easier to perform replay attacks .
206
207 In a BFD session, each node needs to select a 32-bit discriminator to
208 identify itself. Therefore, a BFD session is identified by two
209 discriminators. If a node randomly selects a new discriminator for a
210 new session and uses authentication mechanisms to secure the control
211 packets, inter-session replay attacks can be mitigated to some
212 extent. However, in existing BFD demultiplexing mechanisms, the
213 discriminators used in a new BFD session may be predictable. In some
214 deployment scenarios, the discriminators of BFD routers may be
215 decided by the destination and source addresses. So, if the sequence
216 number of a BFD router rolls over for some reason (e.g., reboot), the
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
223
224
225 discriminators used to identify the new session will be identical to
226 the ones used in the previous session. This makes performing a
227 replay attack relatively simple.
228
229 BFD allows a mode called the echo mode. Echo packets are not defined
230 in the BFD specification, though they can keep the BFD session up.
231 The format of the echo packet is local to the sending side, and there
232 are no guidelines on the properties of these packets beyond the
233 choice of the source and destination addresses. While the BFD
234 specification recommends applying security mechanisms to prevent
235 spoofing of these packets, there are no guidelines on what type of
236 mechanisms are appropriate.
237
238 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Impacts of BFD Replays</span>
239
240 As discussed, BFD cannot meet the requirements of inter-session or
241 intra-session replay protection. This section discusses the impacts
242 of BFD replays.
243
244 When cryptographic authentication mechanisms are adopted for BFD, a
245 non-decreasing, 32-bit-long sequence number is used. In the Keyed
246 MD5 and the Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms, the sequence member is not
247 required to increase for every packet. Therefore, an attacker can
248 keep replaying the packets with the latest sequence number until the
249 sequence number is updated. This issue is eliminated in the
250 Meticulous Keyed MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms.
251 However, note that a sequence number may reach its maximum and be
252 rolled over in a session. In this case, without the support from a
253 automatic key management mechanism, the BFD session will be
254 vulnerable to replay attacks performed by sending the packets before
255 the roll over of the sequence number. For instance, an attacker can
256 replay a packet with a sequence number that is larger than the
257 current one. If the replayed packet is accepted, the victim will
258 reject the legal packets whose sequence members are less than the one
259 in the replayed packet. Therefore, the attacker can get a good
260 chance to bring down the BFD session. This kind of attack assumes
261 that the attacker has access to the link when the BFD session is on a
262 point-to-point link or can inject packets for a BFD session with
263 multiple hops.
264
265 Additionally, the BFD specification allows for the change of
266 authentication state based on the state of a received packet. For
267 instance, according to BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title="&quot;Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)&quot;">RFC5880</a>], if the state of an accepted
268 packet is down, the receiver of the packet needs to transfer its
269 state to down as well. Therefore, a carefully selected replayed
270 packet can cause a serious denial-of-service attack.
271
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
279
280
281 BFD does not provide any solution to deal with inter-session replay
282 attacks. If two subsequent BFD sessions adopt an identical
283 discriminator pair and use the same cryptographic key to secure the
284 control packets, it is intuitive to use a malicious authenticated
285 packet (stored from the past session) to perform interconnection
286 replay attacks.
287
288 Any security issues in the BFD echo mode will directly affect the BFD
289 protocol and session states, and hence the network stability. For
290 instance, any replay attacks would be indistinguishable from normal
291 forwarding of the tested router. An attack would still cause a
292 faulty link to be believed to be up, but there is little that can be
293 done about it. However, if the echo packets are guessable, it may be
294 possible to spoof from an external source and cause BFD to believe
295 that a one-way link is really bidirectional. As a result, it is
296 important that the echo packets contain random material that is also
297 checked upon reception.
298
299 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Impact of New Authentication Requirements</span>
300
301 BFD can be run in software or hardware. Hardware implementations run
302 BFD at a much smaller timeout, typically in the order of few
303 milliseconds. For instance, with a timeout of 3.3 milliseconds, a
304 BFD session is required to send or receive 3 packets every 10
305 milliseconds. Software implementations typically run with a timeout
306 in hundreds of milliseconds.
307
308 Additionally, it is not common to find hardware support for computing
309 the authentication data for the BFD session in hardware or software.
310 In the Keyed MD5 and Keyed SHA-1 implementation where the sequence
311 number does not increase with every packet, software can be used to
312 compute the authentication data. This is true if the time between
313 the increasing sequence number is long enough to compute the data in
314 software. The ability to compute the hash in software is difficult
315 with Meticulous Keyed MD5 and Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 if the time
316 interval between transmits or between receives is small. The
317 computation problem becomes worse if hundred or thousands of sessions
318 require the hash to be recomputed every few milliseconds.
319
320 Smaller and cheaper boxes that have to support a few hundred BFD
321 sessions are boxes that also use a slower CPU. The CPU is used for
322 running the entire control plane software in addition to supporting
323 the BFD sessions. As a general rule, no more than 40-45% of the CPU
324 can be dedicated towards supporting BFD. Adding computation of the
325 hash for every BFD session can easily cause the CPU to exceed the
326 40-45% limit even with a few tens of sessions. On higher-end boxes
327 with faster and more CPU cores, the expectation is that the number of
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
335
336
337 sessions that need to be supported are in the thousands, but the
338 number of BFD sessions with authentication that CPU can support is
339 still in the hundreds.
340
341 Implementors should assess the impact of authenticating BFD sessions
342 on their platform.
343
344 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Considerations for Improvement</span>
345
346 This section suggests changes that can be adopted to improve the
347 protection of BFD.
348
349 The security risks brought by SHA-1 and MD5 have been well
350 understood. However, when using a stronger digest algorithm, e.g.,
351 SHA-2, the imposed computing overhead will seriously affect the
352 performance of BFD implementation. In order to make the trade-off
353 between the strong algorithm requirement and the imposed overhead,
354 Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) can be a candidate option.
355 This algorithm is relatively effective and has been supported by
356 IPsec for data origin authentication. More detailed information can
357 be found in "The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in
358 IPsec ESP and AH" [<a href="./rfc4543" title="&quot;The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH&quot;">RFC4543</a>].
359
360 There has been some hallway conversation around the idea of using BFD
361 cryptographic authentication only when some data in the BFD payload
362 changes. The other BFD packets can be transmitted and received
363 without authentication enabled. The bulk of the BFD packets that are
364 transmitted and received have no state change associated with them.
365 Limiting authentication to BFD packets that affect a BFD session
366 state allows for more sessions to be supported for authentication.
367 This change can significantly help the routers since they don't have
368 to compute and verify the authentication digest for the BFD packets
369 coming at the millisecond intervals. This proposal needs some more
370 discussion in the BFD working group and is certainly a direction that
371 BFD could look at.
372
373 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
374
375 This document discusses vulnerabilities in the existing BFD protocol
376 and suggests possible mitigations.
377
378 In analyzing the improvements for BFD, the ability to repel a replay
379 attack is discussed. For example, increasing the sequence number to
380 a 64-bit value makes the wrap-around time much longer, and a replay
381 attack can be easily prevented.
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
391
392
393 Mindful of the impact that stronger algorithms can have on the
394 performance of BFD, the document suggests GMAC as a possible
395 candidate for MAC function.
396
397 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span>
398
399 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span>
400
401 [<a id="ref-RFC1321">RFC1321</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>,
402 April 1992, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321</a>&gt;.
403
404 [<a id="ref-RFC5880">RFC5880</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection
405 (BFD)", <a href="./rfc5880">RFC 5880</a>, June 2010,
406 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880</a>&gt;.
407
408 [<a id="ref-RFC6039">RFC6039</a>] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues
409 with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing
410 Protocols", <a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a>, October 2010,
411 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039</a>&gt;.
412
413 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span>
414
415 [<a id="ref-BFD-CRYPTO">BFD-CRYPTO</a>]
416 Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Zhang, D., and M. Jethanandani,
417 "BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication", Work in
418 Progress, <a href="./draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06">draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06</a>, April
419 2014.
420
421 [<a id="ref-BFD-HMAC">BFD-HMAC</a>] Zhang, D., Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and M. Jethanandani,
422 "Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures", Work in
423 Progress, <a href="./draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05">draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05</a>, July 2014.
424
425 [<a id="ref-RFC4543">RFC4543</a>] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message
426 Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc4543">RFC 4543</a>,
427 May 2006, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543</a>&gt;.
428
429 [<a id="ref-RFC4822">RFC4822</a>] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic
430 Authentication", <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a>, February 2007,
431 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4822">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4822</a>&gt;.
432
433 [<a id="ref-RFC5310">RFC5310</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R.,
434 and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic
435 Authentication", <a href="./rfc5310">RFC 5310</a>, February 2009,
436 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310</a>&gt;.
437
438
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span>
447
448
449 [<a id="ref-RFC5709">RFC5709</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M.,
450 Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic
451 Authentication", <a href="./rfc5709">RFC 5709</a>, October 2009,
452 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709</a>&gt;.
453
454 [<a id="ref-RFC6518">RFC6518</a>] Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for
455 Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", <a href="./rfc6518">RFC 6518</a>,
456 February 2012, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6518">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6518</a>&gt;.
457
458 [<a id="ref-RFC6862">RFC6862</a>] Lebovitz, G., Bhatia, M., and B. Weis, "Keying and
459 Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview,
460 Threats, and Requirements", <a href="./rfc6862">RFC 6862</a>, March 2013,
461 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6862">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6862</a>&gt;.
462
463 Acknowledgements
464
465 We would like to thank Alexander Vainshtein for his comments on this
466 document.
467
468 Authors' Addresses
469
470 Manav Bhatia
471 Ionos Networks
472 Bangalore
473 India
474
475 EMail: [email protected]
476
477
478 Dacheng Zhang
479 Huawei
480
481 EMail: [email protected]
482
483
484 Mahesh Jethanandani
485 Ciena Corporation
486 3939 North 1st Street
487 San Jose, CA 95134
488 United States
489
490 Phone: 408.904.2160
491 Fax: 408.436.5582
492 EMail: [email protected]
493
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 9]
501 </pre>