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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) M. Bhatia |
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Request for Comments: 7492 Ionos Networks |
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Category: Informational D. Zhang |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Huawei |
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M. Jethanandani |
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Ciena Corporation |
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March 2015 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Analysis of Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) Security</span> |
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According to the Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) |
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Design Guidelines |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document analyzes the Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD) |
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protocol according to the guidelines set forth in Section 4.2 of <a href="./rfc6518">RFC</a> |
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<a href="./rfc6518">6518</a>, "Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design |
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Guidelines". |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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|
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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|
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents |
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc5741#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 5741</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7492">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7492</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (c) 2015 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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|
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements to Meet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Current State of Security Methods . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Impacts of BFD Replays . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Impact of New Authentication Requirements . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Considerations for Improvement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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This document performs a gap analysis of the current state of |
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Bidirectional Forwarding Detection [<a href="./rfc5880" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"">RFC5880</a>] according to the |
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requirements of KARP Design Guidelines [<a href="./rfc6518" title=""Keying and Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines"">RFC6518</a>]. Previously, the |
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OPSEC working group has provided an analysis of cryptographic issues |
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with BFD in "Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods |
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for Routing Protocols" [<a href="./rfc6039" title=""Issues with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing Protocols"">RFC6039</a>]. |
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|
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The existing BFD specifications provide a basic security solution. |
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Key ID is provided so that the key used in securing a packet can be |
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changed on demand. Two cryptographic algorithms (MD5 and SHA-1) are |
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supported for integrity protection of the control packets; the |
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algorithms are both demonstrated to be subject to collision attacks. |
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Routing protocols like "RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication" |
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[<a href="./rfc4822" title=""RIPv2 Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC4822</a>], "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc5310" title=""IS-IS Generic Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5310</a>], |
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and "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="./rfc5709" title=""OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic Authentication"">RFC5709</a>] have |
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started to use BFD for liveliness checks. Moving the routing |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
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protocols to a stronger algorithm while using a weaker algorithm for |
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BFD would allow the attacker to bring down BFD in order to bring down |
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the routing protocol. BFD therefore needs to match the routing |
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protocols in its strength of algorithm. |
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While BFD uses a non-decreasing, per-packet sequence number to |
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protect itself from intra-connection replay attacks, it still leaves |
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the protocol vulnerable to the inter-session replay attacks. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Requirements to Meet</span> |
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There are several requirements described in <a href="./rfc6862#section-4">Section 4 of [RFC6862]</a> |
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that BFD, as defined in BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"">RFC5880</a>], does not currently meet: |
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Replay Protection: BFD provides an incomplete intra-session and no |
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inter-session replay attack protection; this creates significant |
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denial-of-service opportunities. |
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Strong Algorithms: The cryptographic algorithms adopted for |
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message authentication in BFD are MD5 or SHA-1 based. However, |
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both algorithms are known to be vulnerable to collision attacks. |
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"BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication" [<a href="#ref-BFD-CRYPTO">BFD-CRYPTO</a>] and |
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"Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures" [<a href="#ref-BFD-HMAC" title=""Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures"">BFD-HMAC</a>] |
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together propose a solution to support Hashed Message |
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Authentication Code (HMAC) with the SHA-2 family of hash functions |
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for BFD. |
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Preventing DoS Attacks: BFD packets can be sent at millisecond |
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intervals (the protocol uses timers at microsecond intervals). |
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When malicious packets are sent at short intervals, with the |
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authentication bit set, it can cause a DoS attack. There is |
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currently no lightweight mechanism within BFD to address this |
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issue and is one of the reasons BFD authentication is still not |
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widely deployed in the field. |
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The remainder of this document explains the details of how these |
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requirements fail to be met and proposes mechanisms for addressing |
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them. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Current State of Security Methods</span> |
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BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"">RFC5880</a>] describes five authentication mechanisms for the |
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integrity protection of BFD control packets: Simple Password, Keyed |
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MD5 [<a href="./rfc1321" title=""The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"">RFC1321</a>], Meticulous Keyed MD5, Keyed SHA-1, and Meticulous |
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Keyed SHA-1. In the simple password mechanism, every control packet |
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is associated with a password transported in plain text; attacks |
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eavesdropping the network traffic can easily learn the password and |
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compromise the security of the corresponding BFD session. In the |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
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Keyed MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed MD5 mechanisms, BFD nodes use |
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shared secret keys to generate Keyed MD5 digests for control packets. |
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Similarly, in the Keyed SHA-1 and the Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 |
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mechanisms, BFD nodes use shared secret keys to generate Keyed SHA-1 |
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digests for control packets. Note that in the keyed authentication |
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mechanisms, every BFD control packet is associated with a non- |
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decreasing, 32-bit sequence number to resist replay attacks. In the |
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Keyed MD5 and the Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms, the sequence member is only |
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required to increase occasionally. However, in the Meticulous Keyed |
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MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms, the sequence member is |
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required to increase with each successive packet. |
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Additionally, limited key updating functionality is provided. There |
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is a Key ID in every authenticated BFD control packet indicating the |
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key used to hash the packet. However, there is no mechanism |
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described to provide a smooth key rollover that the BFD routers can |
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use when moving from one key to the other. |
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The BFD session timers are defined with the granularity of |
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microseconds, and it is common in practice to send BFD packets at |
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millisecond intervals. Since the cryptographic sequence number space |
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is only 32 bits, a sequence number used in a BFD session may reach |
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its maximum value and roll over within a limited period. For |
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instance, if a sequence number is increased by one every 3.3 |
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milliseconds, then it will reach its maximum value in less than 24 |
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weeks. This can result in potential inter-session replay attacks, |
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especially when BFD uses the non-meticulous authentication modes. |
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Note that when using authentication mechanisms, BFD drops all packets |
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that fall outside the limited range (3 times the Detection Time |
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multiplier). Therefore, when meticulous authentication modes are |
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used, a replayed BFD packet will be rejected if it cannot fit into a |
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relatively short window (3 times the detection interval of the |
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session). This introduces some difficulties for replaying packets. |
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However, in a non-meticulous authentication mode, such windows can be |
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large (as sequence numbers are only increased occasionally), thus |
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making it easier to perform replay attacks . |
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In a BFD session, each node needs to select a 32-bit discriminator to |
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identify itself. Therefore, a BFD session is identified by two |
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discriminators. If a node randomly selects a new discriminator for a |
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new session and uses authentication mechanisms to secure the control |
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packets, inter-session replay attacks can be mitigated to some |
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extent. However, in existing BFD demultiplexing mechanisms, the |
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discriminators used in a new BFD session may be predictable. In some |
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deployment scenarios, the discriminators of BFD routers may be |
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decided by the destination and source addresses. So, if the sequence |
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number of a BFD router rolls over for some reason (e.g., reboot), the |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
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discriminators used to identify the new session will be identical to |
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the ones used in the previous session. This makes performing a |
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replay attack relatively simple. |
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BFD allows a mode called the echo mode. Echo packets are not defined |
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in the BFD specification, though they can keep the BFD session up. |
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The format of the echo packet is local to the sending side, and there |
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are no guidelines on the properties of these packets beyond the |
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choice of the source and destination addresses. While the BFD |
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specification recommends applying security mechanisms to prevent |
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spoofing of these packets, there are no guidelines on what type of |
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mechanisms are appropriate. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Impacts of BFD Replays</span> |
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As discussed, BFD cannot meet the requirements of inter-session or |
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intra-session replay protection. This section discusses the impacts |
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of BFD replays. |
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When cryptographic authentication mechanisms are adopted for BFD, a |
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non-decreasing, 32-bit-long sequence number is used. In the Keyed |
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MD5 and the Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms, the sequence member is not |
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required to increase for every packet. Therefore, an attacker can |
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keep replaying the packets with the latest sequence number until the |
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sequence number is updated. This issue is eliminated in the |
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Meticulous Keyed MD5 and the Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 mechanisms. |
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However, note that a sequence number may reach its maximum and be |
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rolled over in a session. In this case, without the support from a |
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automatic key management mechanism, the BFD session will be |
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vulnerable to replay attacks performed by sending the packets before |
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the roll over of the sequence number. For instance, an attacker can |
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replay a packet with a sequence number that is larger than the |
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current one. If the replayed packet is accepted, the victim will |
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reject the legal packets whose sequence members are less than the one |
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in the replayed packet. Therefore, the attacker can get a good |
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chance to bring down the BFD session. This kind of attack assumes |
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that the attacker has access to the link when the BFD session is on a |
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point-to-point link or can inject packets for a BFD session with |
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multiple hops. |
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Additionally, the BFD specification allows for the change of |
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authentication state based on the state of a received packet. For |
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instance, according to BFD [<a href="./rfc5880" title=""Bidirectional Forwarding Detection (BFD)"">RFC5880</a>], if the state of an accepted |
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packet is down, the receiver of the packet needs to transfer its |
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state to down as well. Therefore, a carefully selected replayed |
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packet can cause a serious denial-of-service attack. |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
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BFD does not provide any solution to deal with inter-session replay |
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attacks. If two subsequent BFD sessions adopt an identical |
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discriminator pair and use the same cryptographic key to secure the |
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control packets, it is intuitive to use a malicious authenticated |
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packet (stored from the past session) to perform interconnection |
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replay attacks. |
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Any security issues in the BFD echo mode will directly affect the BFD |
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protocol and session states, and hence the network stability. For |
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instance, any replay attacks would be indistinguishable from normal |
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forwarding of the tested router. An attack would still cause a |
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faulty link to be believed to be up, but there is little that can be |
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done about it. However, if the echo packets are guessable, it may be |
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possible to spoof from an external source and cause BFD to believe |
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that a one-way link is really bidirectional. As a result, it is |
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important that the echo packets contain random material that is also |
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checked upon reception. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Impact of New Authentication Requirements</span> |
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BFD can be run in software or hardware. Hardware implementations run |
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BFD at a much smaller timeout, typically in the order of few |
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milliseconds. For instance, with a timeout of 3.3 milliseconds, a |
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BFD session is required to send or receive 3 packets every 10 |
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milliseconds. Software implementations typically run with a timeout |
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in hundreds of milliseconds. |
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Additionally, it is not common to find hardware support for computing |
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the authentication data for the BFD session in hardware or software. |
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In the Keyed MD5 and Keyed SHA-1 implementation where the sequence |
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number does not increase with every packet, software can be used to |
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compute the authentication data. This is true if the time between |
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the increasing sequence number is long enough to compute the data in |
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software. The ability to compute the hash in software is difficult |
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with Meticulous Keyed MD5 and Meticulous Keyed SHA-1 if the time |
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interval between transmits or between receives is small. The |
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computation problem becomes worse if hundred or thousands of sessions |
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require the hash to be recomputed every few milliseconds. |
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Smaller and cheaper boxes that have to support a few hundred BFD |
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sessions are boxes that also use a slower CPU. The CPU is used for |
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running the entire control plane software in addition to supporting |
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the BFD sessions. As a general rule, no more than 40-45% of the CPU |
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can be dedicated towards supporting BFD. Adding computation of the |
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hash for every BFD session can easily cause the CPU to exceed the |
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40-45% limit even with a few tens of sessions. On higher-end boxes |
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with faster and more CPU cores, the expectation is that the number of |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
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sessions that need to be supported are in the thousands, but the |
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number of BFD sessions with authentication that CPU can support is |
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still in the hundreds. |
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Implementors should assess the impact of authenticating BFD sessions |
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on their platform. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Considerations for Improvement</span> |
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This section suggests changes that can be adopted to improve the |
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protection of BFD. |
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The security risks brought by SHA-1 and MD5 have been well |
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understood. However, when using a stronger digest algorithm, e.g., |
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SHA-2, the imposed computing overhead will seriously affect the |
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performance of BFD implementation. In order to make the trade-off |
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between the strong algorithm requirement and the imposed overhead, |
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Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) can be a candidate option. |
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This algorithm is relatively effective and has been supported by |
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IPsec for data origin authentication. More detailed information can |
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be found in "The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in |
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IPsec ESP and AH" [<a href="./rfc4543" title=""The Use of Galois Message Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH"">RFC4543</a>]. |
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There has been some hallway conversation around the idea of using BFD |
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cryptographic authentication only when some data in the BFD payload |
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changes. The other BFD packets can be transmitted and received |
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without authentication enabled. The bulk of the BFD packets that are |
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transmitted and received have no state change associated with them. |
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Limiting authentication to BFD packets that affect a BFD session |
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state allows for more sessions to be supported for authentication. |
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This change can significantly help the routers since they don't have |
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to compute and verify the authentication digest for the BFD packets |
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coming at the millisecond intervals. This proposal needs some more |
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discussion in the BFD working group and is certainly a direction that |
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BFD could look at. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
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This document discusses vulnerabilities in the existing BFD protocol |
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and suggests possible mitigations. |
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In analyzing the improvements for BFD, the ability to repel a replay |
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attack is discussed. For example, increasing the sequence number to |
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a 64-bit value makes the wrap-around time much longer, and a replay |
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attack can be easily prevented. |
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<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Mindful of the impact that stronger algorithms can have on the |
| 394 |
performance of BFD, the document suggests GMAC as a possible |
| 395 |
candidate for MAC function. |
| 396 |
|
| 397 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span> |
| 398 |
|
| 399 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
[<a id="ref-RFC1321">RFC1321</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, |
| 402 |
April 1992, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321</a>>. |
| 403 |
|
| 404 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5880">RFC5880</a>] Katz, D. and D. Ward, "Bidirectional Forwarding Detection |
| 405 |
(BFD)", <a href="./rfc5880">RFC 5880</a>, June 2010, |
| 406 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5880</a>>. |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6039">RFC6039</a>] Manral, V., Bhatia, M., Jaeggli, J., and R. White, "Issues |
| 409 |
with Existing Cryptographic Protection Methods for Routing |
| 410 |
Protocols", <a href="./rfc6039">RFC 6039</a>, October 2010, |
| 411 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6039</a>>. |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 414 |
|
| 415 |
[<a id="ref-BFD-CRYPTO">BFD-CRYPTO</a>] |
| 416 |
Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Zhang, D., and M. Jethanandani, |
| 417 |
"BFD Generic Cryptographic Authentication", Work in |
| 418 |
Progress, <a href="./draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06">draft-ietf-bfd-generic-crypto-auth-06</a>, April |
| 419 |
2014. |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
[<a id="ref-BFD-HMAC">BFD-HMAC</a>] Zhang, D., Bhatia, M., Manral, V., and M. Jethanandani, |
| 422 |
"Authenticating BFD using HMAC-SHA-2 procedures", Work in |
| 423 |
Progress, <a href="./draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05">draft-ietf-bfd-hmac-sha-05</a>, July 2014. |
| 424 |
|
| 425 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4543">RFC4543</a>] McGrew, D. and J. Viega, "The Use of Galois Message |
| 426 |
Authentication Code (GMAC) in IPsec ESP and AH", <a href="./rfc4543">RFC 4543</a>, |
| 427 |
May 2006, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4543</a>>. |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
[<a id="ref-RFC4822">RFC4822</a>] Atkinson, R. and M. Fanto, "RIPv2 Cryptographic |
| 430 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc4822">RFC 4822</a>, February 2007, |
| 431 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4822">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4822</a>>. |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5310">RFC5310</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Li, T., Atkinson, R., White, R., |
| 434 |
and M. Fanto, "IS-IS Generic Cryptographic |
| 435 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5310">RFC 5310</a>, February 2009, |
| 436 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5310</a>>. |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc7492">RFC 7492</a> BFD Gap Analysis March 2015</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5709">RFC5709</a>] Bhatia, M., Manral, V., Fanto, M., White, R., Barnes, M., |
| 450 |
Li, T., and R. Atkinson, "OSPFv2 HMAC-SHA Cryptographic |
| 451 |
Authentication", <a href="./rfc5709">RFC 5709</a>, October 2009, |
| 452 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5709</a>>. |
| 453 |
|
| 454 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6518">RFC6518</a>] Lebovitz, G. and M. Bhatia, "Keying and Authentication for |
| 455 |
Routing Protocols (KARP) Design Guidelines", <a href="./rfc6518">RFC 6518</a>, |
| 456 |
February 2012, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6518">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6518</a>>. |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6862">RFC6862</a>] Lebovitz, G., Bhatia, M., and B. Weis, "Keying and |
| 459 |
Authentication for Routing Protocols (KARP) Overview, |
| 460 |
Threats, and Requirements", <a href="./rfc6862">RFC 6862</a>, March 2013, |
| 461 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6862">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6862</a>>. |
| 462 |
|
| 463 |
Acknowledgements |
| 464 |
|
| 465 |
We would like to thank Alexander Vainshtein for his comments on this |
| 466 |
document. |
| 467 |
|
| 468 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
Manav Bhatia |
| 471 |
Ionos Networks |
| 472 |
Bangalore |
| 473 |
India |
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
Dacheng Zhang |
| 479 |
Huawei |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
Mahesh Jethanandani |
| 485 |
Ciena Corporation |
| 486 |
3939 North 1st Street |
| 487 |
San Jose, CA 95134 |
| 488 |
United States |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
Phone: 408.904.2160 |
| 491 |
Fax: 408.436.5582 |
| 492 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
Bhatia, et al. Informational [Page 9] |
| 501 |
</pre> |