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<pre>Network Working Group P. Ferguson |
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Request for Comments: 2267 Cisco Systems, Inc. |
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Category: Informational D. Senie |
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BlazeNet, Inc. |
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January 1998 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Network Ingress Filtering:</span> |
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<span class="h1">Defeating Denial of Service Attacks which employ</span> |
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<span class="h1">IP Source Address Spoofing</span> |
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|
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does |
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not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this |
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memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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|
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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Recent occurrences of various Denial of Service (DoS) attacks which |
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have employed forged source addresses have proven to be a troublesome |
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issue for Internet Service Providers and the Internet community |
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overall. This paper discusses a simple, effective, and |
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straightforward method for using ingress traffic filtering to |
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prohibit DoS attacks which use forged IP addresses to be propagated |
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from 'behind' an Internet Service Provider's (ISP) aggregation point. |
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|
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Table of Contents |
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|
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Restricting forged traffic . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Further capabilities for networking equipment. . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Liabilities. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Summary. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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|
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A resurgence of Denial of Service Attacks [<a href="#ref-1">1</a>] aimed at various |
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targets in the Internet have produced new challenges within the |
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Internet Service Provider (ISP) and network security communities to |
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find new and innovative methods to mitigate these types of attacks. |
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The difficulties in reaching this goal are numerous; some simple |
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tools already exist to limit the effectiveness and scope of these |
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attacks, but they have not been widely implemented. |
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|
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This method of attack has been known for some time. Defending against |
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it, however, has been an ongoing concern. Bill Cheswick is quoted in |
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[<a href="#ref-2" title=""Hacker Tangles Panix Web Site"">2</a>] as saying that he pulled a chapter from his book, "Firewalls and |
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Internet Security" [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker"">3</a>], at the last minute because there was no way |
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for an administrator of the system under attack to effectively defend |
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the system. By mentioning the method, he was concerned about |
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encouraging it's use. |
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|
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While the filtering method discussed in this document does |
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absolutely nothing to protect against flooding attacks which |
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originate from valid prefixes (IP addresses), it will prohibit an |
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attacker within the originating network from launching an attack of |
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this nature using forged source addresses that do not conform to |
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ingress filtering rules. All providers of Internet connectivity are |
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urged to implement filtering described in this document to prohibit |
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attackers from using forged source addresses which do not reside |
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within a range of legitimately advertised prefixes. In other words, |
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if an ISP is aggregating routing announcements for multiple |
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downstream networks, strict traffic filtering should be used to |
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prohibit traffic which claims to have originated from outside of |
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these aggregated announcements. |
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An additional benefit of implementing this type of filtering is that |
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it enables the originator to be easily traced to it's true source, |
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since the attacker would have to use a valid, and legitimately |
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reachable, source address. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Background</span> |
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|
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A simplified diagram of the TCP SYN flooding problem is depicted |
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below: |
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9.0.0.0/8 |
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host <----- router <--- Internet <----- router <-- attacker |
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TCP/SYN |
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<--------------------------------------------- |
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Source: 192.168.0.4/32 |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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SYN/ACK |
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no route |
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TCP/SYN |
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<--------------------------------------------- |
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Source: 10.0.0.13/32 |
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SYN/ACK |
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no route |
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TCP/SYN |
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<--------------------------------------------- |
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Source: 172.16.0.2/32 |
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SYN/ACK |
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no route |
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[<a id="ref-etc.">etc.</a>] |
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Assume: |
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o The "host" is the targeted machine. |
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o The attacker resides within the "valid" prefix, 9.0.0.0/8. |
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o The attacker launches the attack using randomly changing source |
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addresses; in this example, the source addresses are depicted as |
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from within [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Address Allocation for Private Internets"">4</a>], which are not generally present in the global |
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Internet routing tables, and therefore, unreachable. However, any |
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unreachable prefix could be used to perpetrate this attack |
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method. |
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|
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Also worthy of mention is a case wherein the source address is forged |
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to appear to have originated from within another legitimate network |
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which appears in the global routing table(s). For example, an |
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attacker using a valid network address could wreak havoc by making |
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the attack appear to come from an organization which did not, in |
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fact, originate the attack and was completely innocent. In such |
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cases, the administrator of a system under attack may be inclined to |
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filter all traffic coming from the apparent attack source. Adding |
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such a filter would then result in a denial of service to |
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legitimate, non-hostile end-systems. In this case, the administrator |
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of the system under attack unwittingly becomes an accomplice of the |
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attacker. |
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Further complicating matters, TCP SYN flood attacks will result in |
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SYN-ACK packets being sent to one or many hosts which have no |
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involvement in the attack, but which become secondary victims. This |
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allows the attacker to abuse two or more systems at once. |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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Similar attacks have been attempted using UDP and ICMP flooding. |
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The former attack (UDP flooding) uses forged packets to try and |
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connect the chargen UDP service to the echo UDP service at another |
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site. Systems administrators should NEVER allow UDP packets destined |
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for system diagnostic ports from outside of their administrative |
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domain to reach their systems. The latter attack (ICMP flooding), |
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uses an insidious feature in IP subnet broadcast replication |
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mechanics. This attack relies on a router serving a large multi- |
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access broadcast network to frame an IP broadcast address (such as |
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one destined for 10.255.255.255) into a Layer 2 broadcast frame (for |
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ethernet, FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF). Ethernet NIC hardware (MAC-layer |
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hardware, specifically) will only listen to a select number of |
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addresses in normal operation. The one MAC address that all devices |
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share in common in normal operation is the media broadcast, or |
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FF:FF:FF:FF:FF:FF. In this case, a device will take the packet and |
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send an interrupt for processing. Thus, a flood of these broadcast |
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frames will consume all available resources on an end-system [<a href="#ref-9">9</a>]. It |
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is perhaps prudent that system administrators should consider |
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ensuring that their border routers do not allow directed broadcast |
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packets to be forwarded through their routers as a default. |
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When an TCP SYN attack is launched using unreachable source address, |
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the target host attempts to reserve resources waiting for a |
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response. The attacker repeatedly changes the bogus source address |
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on each new packet sent, thus exhausting additional host resources. |
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Alternatively, if the attacker uses someone else's valid host |
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address as the source address, the system under attack will send a |
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large number of SYN/ACK packets to what it believes is the originator |
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of the connection establishment sequence. In this fashion, the |
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attacker does damage to two systems: the destination target system, |
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as well as the system which is actually using the spoofed address in |
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the global routing system. |
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The result of both attack methods is extremely degraded performance, |
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or worse, a system crash. |
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In response to this threat, most operating system vendors have |
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modified their software to allow the targeted servers to sustain |
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attacks with very high connection attempt rates. This is a welcome |
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and necessary part of the solution to the problem. Ingress filtering |
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will take time to be implemented pervasively and be fully effective, |
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but the extensions to the operating systems can be implemented |
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quickly. This combination should prove effective against source |
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address spoofing. See [<a href="#ref-1">1</a>] for vendor and platform software upgrade |
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information. |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Restricting forged traffic</span> |
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|
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The problems encountered with this type of attack are numerous, and |
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involve shortcomings in host software implementations, routing |
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methodologies, and the TCP/IP protocols themselves. However, by |
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restricting transit traffic which originates from a downstream |
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network to known, and intentionally advertised, prefix(es), the |
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problem of source address spoofing can be virtually eliminated in |
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this attack scenario. |
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|
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11.0.0.0/8 |
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/ |
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router 1 |
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/ |
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/ |
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/ 9.0.0.0/8 |
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ISP <----- ISP <---- ISP <--- ISP <-- router <-- attacker |
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A B C D 2 |
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/ |
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/ |
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/ |
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router 3 |
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/ |
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12.0.0.0/8 |
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In the example above, the attacker resides within 9.0.0.0/8, which is |
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provided Internet connectivity by ISP D. An input traffic filter on |
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the ingress (input) link of "router 2", which provides connectivity |
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to the attacker's network, restricts traffic to allow only traffic |
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originating from source addresses within the 9.0.0.0/8 prefix, and |
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prohibits an attacker from using "invalid" source addresses which |
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reside outside of this prefix range. |
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In other words, the ingress filter on "router 2" above would check: |
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|
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IF packet's source address from within 9.0.0.0/8 |
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THEN forward as appropriate |
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|
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IF packet's source address is anything else |
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THEN deny packet |
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Network administrators should log information on packets which are |
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dropped. This then provides a basis for monitoring any suspicious |
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activity. |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Further possible capabilities for networking equipment</span> |
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Additional functions should be considered for future platform |
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implementations. The following one is worth noting: |
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|
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o Implementation of automatic filtering on remote access servers. |
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In most cases, a user dialing into an access server is an |
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individual user on a single PC. The ONLY valid source IP address |
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for packets originating from that PC is the one assigned by the |
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ISP (whether statically or dynamically assigned). The remote |
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access server could check every packet on ingress to ensure the |
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user is not spoofing the source address on the packets which he |
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is originating. Obviously, provisions also need to be made for |
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cases where the customer legitimately is attaching a net or |
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subnet via a remote router, but this could certainly be |
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implemented as an optional parameter. We have received reports |
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that some vendors and some ISPs are already starting to |
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implement this capability. |
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|
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We considered suggesting routers also validate the source IP address |
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of the sender as suggested in [<a href="#ref-8" title=""Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers"">8</a>], but that methodology will not |
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operate well in the real networks out there today. The method |
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suggested is to look up source addresses to see that the return path |
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to that address would flow out the same interface as the packet |
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arrived upon. With the number of asymmetric routes in the Internet, |
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this would clearly be problematic. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Liabilities</span> |
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|
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Filtering of this nature has the potential to break some types of |
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"special" services. It is in the best interest of the ISP offering |
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these types of special services, however, to consider alternate |
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methods of implementing these services to avoid being affected by |
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ingress traffic filtering. |
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Mobile IP, as defined in [<a href="#ref-6" title=""IP Mobility Support"">6</a>], is specifically affected by ingress |
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traffic filtering. As specified, traffic to the mobile node is |
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tunneled, but traffic from the mobile node is not tunneled. This |
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results in packets from the mobile node(s) which have source |
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addresses that do not match with the network where the station is |
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attached. The Mobile IP Working Group is addressing this problem by |
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specifying "reverse tunnels" in [<a href="#ref-7" title=""Reverse Tunneling Mobile IP"">7</a>]. This work in progress provides |
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a method for the data transmitted from the mobile node to be tunneled |
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to the home agent before transmission to the Internet. There are |
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additional benefits to the reverse tunneling scheme, including better |
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handling of multicast traffic. Those implementing mobile IP systems |
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are encouraged to implement this method of reverse tunneling. |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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|
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|
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As mentioned previously, while ingress traffic filtering drastically |
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reduces the success of source address spoofing, it does not preclude |
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an attacker using a forged source address of another host within the |
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permitted prefix filter range. It does, however, ensure that when an |
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attack of this nature does indeed occur, a network administrator can |
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be sure that the attack is actually originating from within the known |
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prefixes that are being advertised. This simplifies tracking down the |
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culprit, and at worst, the administrator can block a range of source |
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addresses until the problem is resolved. |
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|
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If ingress filtering is used in an environment where DHCP or BOOTP is |
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used, the network administrator would be well advised to ensure that |
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packets with a source address of 0.0.0.0 and a destination of |
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255.255.255.255 are allowed to reach the relay agent in routers when |
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appropriate. The scope of directed broadcast replication should be |
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controlled, however, and not arbitrarily forwarded. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Summary</span> |
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|
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Ingress traffic filtering at the periphery of Internet connected |
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networks will reduce the effectiveness of source address spoofing |
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denial of service attacks. Network service providers and |
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administrators have already begun implementing this type of filtering |
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on periphery routers, and it is recommended that all service |
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providers do so as soon as possible. In addition to aiding the |
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Internet community as a whole to defeat this attack method, it can |
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also assist service providers in locating the source of the attack if |
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service providers can categorically demonstrate that their network |
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already has ingress filtering in place on customer links. |
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|
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Corporate network administrators should implement filtering to ensure |
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their corporate networks are not the source of such problems. Indeed, |
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filtering could be used within an organization to ensure users do not |
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cause problems by improperly attaching systems to the wrong networks. |
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The filtering could also, in practice, block a disgruntled employee |
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from anonymous attacks. |
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It is the responsibility of all network administrators to ensure they |
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do not become the unwitting source of an attack of this nature. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
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|
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The primary intent of this document is to inherently increase |
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security practices and awareness for the Internet community as a |
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whole; as more Internet Providers and corporate network |
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administrators implement ingress filtering, the opportunity for an |
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attacker to use forged source addresses as an attack methodology will |
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significantly lessen. Tracking the source of an attack is simplified |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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|
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when the source is more likely to be "valid." By reducing the number |
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and frequency of attacks in the Internet as a whole, there will be |
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more resources for tracking the attacks which ultimately do occur. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Acknowledgments</span> |
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The North American Network Operators Group (NANOG) [<a href="#ref-5">5</a>] group as a |
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whole deserves special credit for openly discussing these issues and |
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actively seeking possible solutions. Also, thanks to Justin Newton |
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[Priori Networks] and Steve Bielagus [OpenROUTE Networks, Inc.] for |
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their comments and contributions. |
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|
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
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|
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[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] CERT Advisory CA-96.21; TCP SYN Flooding and IP Spoofing |
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Attacks; September 24, 1996. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] B. Ziegler, "Hacker Tangles Panix Web Site", Wall Street |
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Journal, 12 September 1996. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] "Firewalls and Internet Security: Repelling the Wily Hacker"; |
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William R. Cheswick and Steven M. Bellovin, Addison-Wesley |
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Publishing Company, 1994; ISBN 0-201-63357-4. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Rekhter, Y., Moskowitz, R., Karrenberg, D., de Groot, G., and |
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E. Lear, "Address Allocation for Private Internets", <a href="./rfc1918">RFC 1918</a>, |
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February 1996. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] The North American Network Operators Group; |
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<a href="http://www.nanog.org">http://www.nanog.org</a>. |
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|
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[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Perkins, C., "IP Mobility Support", <a href="./rfc2002">RFC 2002</a>, October 1996. |
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[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Montenegro, G., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22Reverse+Tunneling+Mobile+IP%22'>"Reverse Tunneling Mobile IP"</a>, |
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Work in Progress. |
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[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Baker, F., "Requirements for IP Version 4 Routers", <a href="./rfc1812">RFC 1812</a>, |
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June 1995. |
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[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Thanks to: Craig Huegen; |
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See: <a href="http://www.quadrunner.com/~chuegen/smurf.txt">http://www.quadrunner.com/~chuegen/smurf.txt</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. Authors' Addresses</span> |
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Paul Ferguson |
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cisco Systems, Inc. |
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400 Herndon Parkway |
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Herndon, VA USA 20170 |
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EMail: [email protected] |
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Daniel Senie |
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BlazeNet, Inc. |
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4 Mechanic Street |
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Natick, MA USA 01760 |
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EMail: [email protected] |
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<span class="grey">Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc2267">RFC 2267</a> Network Ingress Filtering January 1998</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Full Copyright Statement</span> |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (1998). All Rights Reserved. |
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This document and translations of it may be copied and furnished to |
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others, and derivative works that comment on or otherwise explain it |
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or assist in its implementation may be prepared, copied, published |
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and distributed, in whole or in part, without restriction of any |
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kind, provided that the above copyright notice and this paragraph are |
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included on all such copies and derivative works. However, this |
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document itself may not be modified in any way, such as by removing |
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the copyright notice or references to the Internet Society or other |
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Internet organizations, except as needed for the purpose of |
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developing Internet standards in which case the procedures for |
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copyrights defined in the Internet Standards process must be |
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followed, or as required to translate it into languages other than |
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English. |
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The limited permissions granted above are perpetual and will not be |
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revoked by the Internet Society or its successors or assigns. |
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This document and the information contained herein is provided on an |
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"AS IS" basis and THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET ENGINEERING |
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TASK FORCE DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING |
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BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE INFORMATION |
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HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF |
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MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
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Ferguson & Senie Informational [Page 10] |
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</pre> |