| 1 |
<pre>Network Working Group A. Okmianski |
| 2 |
Request for Comments: 5426 Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 3 |
Category: Standards Track March 2009 |
| 4 |
|
| 5 |
|
| 6 |
<span class="h1">Transmission of Syslog Messages over UDP</span> |
| 7 |
|
| 8 |
Status of This Memo |
| 9 |
|
| 10 |
This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
| 11 |
Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
| 12 |
improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
| 13 |
Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
| 14 |
and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
| 15 |
|
| 16 |
Copyright Notice |
| 17 |
|
| 18 |
Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
| 19 |
document authors. All rights reserved. |
| 20 |
|
| 21 |
This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
| 22 |
Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of |
| 23 |
publication of this document (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>). |
| 24 |
Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights |
| 25 |
and restrictions with respect to this document. |
| 26 |
|
| 27 |
This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF |
| 28 |
Contributions published or made publicly available before November |
| 29 |
10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this |
| 30 |
material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow |
| 31 |
modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process. |
| 32 |
Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling |
| 33 |
the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified |
| 34 |
outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may |
| 35 |
not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format |
| 36 |
it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other |
| 37 |
than English. |
| 38 |
|
| 39 |
Abstract |
| 40 |
|
| 41 |
This document describes the transport for syslog messages over UDP/ |
| 42 |
IPv4 or UDP/IPv6. The syslog protocol layered architecture provides |
| 43 |
for support of any number of transport mappings. However, for |
| 44 |
interoperability purposes, syslog protocol implementers are required |
| 45 |
to support this transport mapping. |
| 46 |
|
| 47 |
|
| 48 |
|
| 49 |
|
| 50 |
|
| 51 |
|
| 52 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
| 53 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
| 54 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 55 |
|
| 56 |
|
| 57 |
Table of Contents |
| 58 |
|
| 59 |
<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a> |
| 60 |
<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 61 |
<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Transport Protocol ..............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 62 |
<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. One Message Per Datagram ...................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 63 |
<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Message Size ...............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
| 64 |
<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Source and Target Ports ....................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
| 65 |
<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Source IP Address ..........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
| 66 |
<a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. UDP/IP Structure ...........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
| 67 |
<a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. UDP Checksums ..............................................<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
| 68 |
<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Reliability Considerations ......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 69 |
<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Lost Datagrams .............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 70 |
<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Message Corruption .........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 71 |
<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Congestion Control .........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 72 |
<a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Sequenced Delivery .........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a> |
| 73 |
<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations .........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
| 74 |
<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Sender Authentication and Message Forgery ..................<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
| 75 |
<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Message Observation ........................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 76 |
<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Replaying ..................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 77 |
<a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Unreliable Delivery ........................................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 78 |
<a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Message Prioritization and Differentiation .................<a href="#page-7">7</a> |
| 79 |
<a href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>. Denial of Service ..........................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 80 |
<a href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations .............................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 81 |
<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements ................................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 82 |
<a href="#section-8">8</a>. References ......................................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 83 |
<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References .......................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
| 84 |
<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References .....................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
| 85 |
|
| 86 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
| 87 |
|
| 88 |
Informational <a href="./rfc3164">RFC 3164</a> [<a href="#ref-8" title=""The BSD Syslog Protocol"">8</a>] describes the syslog protocol as it was |
| 89 |
observed in existing implementations. It describes both the format |
| 90 |
of syslog messages and a UDP [<a href="#ref-1" title=""User Datagram Protocol"">1</a>] transport. Subsequently, a |
| 91 |
Standards-Track syslog protocol has been defined in <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title=""The Syslog Protocol"">2</a>]. |
| 92 |
|
| 93 |
<a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> specifies a layered architecture that provides for support |
| 94 |
of any number of transport layer mappings for transmitting syslog |
| 95 |
messages. This document describes the UDP transport mapping for the |
| 96 |
syslog protocol. |
| 97 |
|
| 98 |
The transport described in this document can be used for transmitting |
| 99 |
syslog messages over both IPv4 [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Internet Protocol"">3</a>] and IPv6 [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">4</a>]. |
| 100 |
|
| 101 |
|
| 102 |
|
| 103 |
|
| 104 |
|
| 105 |
|
| 106 |
|
| 107 |
|
| 108 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
| 109 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
| 110 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 111 |
|
| 112 |
|
| 113 |
Network administrators and architects should be aware of the |
| 114 |
significant reliability and security issues of this transport, which |
| 115 |
stem from the use of UDP. They are documented in this specification. |
| 116 |
However, this transport is lightweight and is built upon the existing |
| 117 |
popular use of UDP for syslog. |
| 118 |
|
| 119 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span> |
| 120 |
|
| 121 |
The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
| 122 |
"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
| 123 |
document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">5</a>]. |
| 124 |
|
| 125 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Transport Protocol</span> |
| 126 |
|
| 127 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. One Message Per Datagram</span> |
| 128 |
|
| 129 |
Each syslog UDP datagram MUST contain only one syslog message, which |
| 130 |
MAY be complete or truncated. The message MUST be formatted and |
| 131 |
truncated according to <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title=""The Syslog Protocol"">2</a>]. Additional data MUST NOT be |
| 132 |
present in the datagram payload. |
| 133 |
|
| 134 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Message Size</span> |
| 135 |
|
| 136 |
This transport mapping supports transmission of syslog messages up to |
| 137 |
65535 octets minus the UDP header length. This limit stems from the |
| 138 |
maximum supported UDP size of 65535 octets specified in <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a> [<a href="#ref-1" title=""User Datagram Protocol"">1</a>]. |
| 139 |
For IPv4, the maximum payload size is 65535 octets minus the UDP |
| 140 |
header and minus the IP header because IPv4 has a 16-bit length field |
| 141 |
that also includes the header length. |
| 142 |
|
| 143 |
IPv4 syslog receivers MUST be able to receive datagrams with message |
| 144 |
sizes up to and including 480 octets. IPv6 syslog receivers MUST be |
| 145 |
able to receive datagrams with message sizes up to and including 1180 |
| 146 |
octets. All syslog receivers SHOULD be able to receive datagrams |
| 147 |
with message sizes of up to and including 2048 octets. The ability |
| 148 |
to receive larger messages is encouraged. |
| 149 |
|
| 150 |
The above restrictions and recommendations establish a baseline for |
| 151 |
interoperability. The minimum required message size support was |
| 152 |
determined based on the minimum MTU size that Internet hosts are |
| 153 |
required to support: 576 octets for IPv4 [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Internet Protocol"">3</a>] and 1280 octets for IPv6 |
| 154 |
[<a href="#ref-4" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">4</a>]. Datagrams that conform to these limits have the greatest chance |
| 155 |
of being delivered because they do not require fragmentation. |
| 156 |
|
| 157 |
It is RECOMMENDED that syslog senders restrict message sizes such |
| 158 |
that IP datagrams do not exceed the smallest MTU of the network in |
| 159 |
use. This avoids datagram fragmentation and possible issues |
| 160 |
surrounding fragmentation such as incorrect MTU discovery. |
| 161 |
|
| 162 |
|
| 163 |
|
| 164 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
| 165 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
| 166 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 167 |
|
| 168 |
|
| 169 |
Fragmentation can be undesirable because it increases the risk of the |
| 170 |
message being lost due to loss of just one datagram fragment. Syslog |
| 171 |
has no acknowledgement facility, and therefore there is no effective |
| 172 |
way to handle retransmission. This makes it impossible for syslog to |
| 173 |
utilize packetization layer path MTU discovery [<a href="#ref-9" title=""Path MTU discovery"">9</a>]. When network MTU |
| 174 |
is not known in advance, the safest assumption is to restrict |
| 175 |
messages to 480 octets for IPv4 and 1180 octets for IPv6. |
| 176 |
|
| 177 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Source and Target Ports</span> |
| 178 |
|
| 179 |
Syslog receivers MUST support accepting syslog datagrams on the well- |
| 180 |
known UDP port 514, but MAY be configurable to listen on a different |
| 181 |
port. Syslog senders MUST support sending syslog message datagrams |
| 182 |
to the UDP port 514, but MAY be configurable to send messages to a |
| 183 |
different port. Syslog senders MAY use any source UDP port for |
| 184 |
transmitting messages. |
| 185 |
|
| 186 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Source IP Address</span> |
| 187 |
|
| 188 |
The source IP address of the UDP datagrams SHOULD NOT be interpreted |
| 189 |
as the identifier for the host that originated the syslog message. |
| 190 |
The entity sending the syslog message could be merely a relay. The |
| 191 |
syslog message itself contains the identifier of the originator of |
| 192 |
the message. |
| 193 |
|
| 194 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. UDP/IP Structure</span> |
| 195 |
|
| 196 |
Each UDP/IP datagram sent by the transport layer MUST completely |
| 197 |
adhere to the structure specified in the UDP <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a> [<a href="#ref-1" title=""User Datagram Protocol"">1</a>] and either |
| 198 |
the IPv4 <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a> [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Internet Protocol"">3</a>] or IPv6 <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">4</a>], depending on which |
| 199 |
protocol is used. |
| 200 |
|
| 201 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. UDP Checksums</span> |
| 202 |
|
| 203 |
Syslog senders MUST NOT disable UDP checksums. IPv4 syslog senders |
| 204 |
SHOULD use UDP checksums when sending messages. Note that <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a> |
| 205 |
[<a href="#ref-4" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">4</a>] mandates the use of UDP checksums when sending UDP datagrams over |
| 206 |
IPv6. |
| 207 |
|
| 208 |
Syslog receivers MUST NOT disable UDP checksum checks. IPv4 syslog |
| 209 |
receivers SHOULD check UDP checksums and SHOULD accept a syslog |
| 210 |
message with a zero checksum. Note that <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification"">4</a>] mandates the |
| 211 |
use of checksums for UDP over IPv6. |
| 212 |
|
| 213 |
|
| 214 |
|
| 215 |
|
| 216 |
|
| 217 |
|
| 218 |
|
| 219 |
|
| 220 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
| 221 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
| 222 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 223 |
|
| 224 |
|
| 225 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Reliability Considerations</span> |
| 226 |
|
| 227 |
The UDP is an unreliable, low-overhead protocol. This section |
| 228 |
discusses reliability issues inherent in UDP that implementers and |
| 229 |
users should be aware of. |
| 230 |
|
| 231 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Lost Datagrams</span> |
| 232 |
|
| 233 |
This transport mapping does not provide any mechanism to detect and |
| 234 |
correct loss of datagrams. Datagrams can be lost in transit due to |
| 235 |
congestion, corruption, or any other intermittent network problem. |
| 236 |
IP fragmentation exacerbates this problem because loss of a single |
| 237 |
fragment will result in the entire message being discarded. |
| 238 |
|
| 239 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Message Corruption</span> |
| 240 |
|
| 241 |
The UDP/IP datagrams can get corrupted in transit due to software, |
| 242 |
hardware, or network errors. This transport mapping specifies use of |
| 243 |
UDP checksums to enable corruption detection in addition to checksums |
| 244 |
used in IP and Layer 2 protocols. However, checksums do not |
| 245 |
guarantee corruption detection, and this transport mapping does not |
| 246 |
provide for message acknowledgement or retransmission mechanism. |
| 247 |
|
| 248 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Congestion Control</span> |
| 249 |
|
| 250 |
Because syslog can generate unlimited amounts of data, transferring |
| 251 |
this data over UDP is generally problematic, because UDP lacks |
| 252 |
congestion control mechanisms. Congestion control mechanisms that |
| 253 |
respond to congestion by reducing traffic rates and establish a |
| 254 |
degree of fairness between flows that share the same path are vital |
| 255 |
to the stable operation of the Internet [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Congestion Control Principles"">6</a>]. This is why the syslog |
| 256 |
TLS transport [<a href="#ref-7" title=""TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog"">7</a>] is REQUIRED to implement and RECOMMENDED for |
| 257 |
general use. |
| 258 |
|
| 259 |
The only environments where the syslog UDP transport MAY be used as |
| 260 |
an alternative to the TLS transport are managed networks, where the |
| 261 |
network path has been explicitly provisioned for UDP syslog traffic |
| 262 |
through traffic engineering mechanisms, such as rate limiting or |
| 263 |
capacity reservations. In all other environments, the TLS transport |
| 264 |
[<a href="#ref-7" title=""TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog"">7</a>] SHOULD be used. |
| 265 |
|
| 266 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Sequenced Delivery</span> |
| 267 |
|
| 268 |
The IP transport used by the UDP does not guarantee that the sequence |
| 269 |
of datagram delivery will match the order in which the datagrams were |
| 270 |
sent. The time stamp contained within each syslog message can serve |
| 271 |
as a rough guide in establishing sequence order. However, it will |
| 272 |
not help in cases where multiple messages were generated during the |
| 273 |
|
| 274 |
|
| 275 |
|
| 276 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
| 277 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
| 278 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 279 |
|
| 280 |
|
| 281 |
same time slot, the sender could not generate a time stamp, or |
| 282 |
messages originated from different hosts whose clocks were not |
| 283 |
synchronized. The order of syslog message arrival via this transport |
| 284 |
SHOULD NOT be used as an authoritative guide in establishing an |
| 285 |
absolute or relative sequence of events on the syslog sender hosts. |
| 286 |
|
| 287 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 288 |
|
| 289 |
Using this specification on an unsecured network is NOT RECOMMENDED. |
| 290 |
Several syslog security considerations are discussed in <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title=""The Syslog Protocol"">2</a>]. |
| 291 |
This section focuses on security considerations specific to the |
| 292 |
syslog transport over UDP. Some of the security issues raised in |
| 293 |
this section can be mitigated through the use of IPsec as defined in |
| 294 |
<a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a> [<a href="#ref-10" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">10</a>]. |
| 295 |
|
| 296 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Sender Authentication and Message Forgery</span> |
| 297 |
|
| 298 |
This transport mapping does not provide for strong sender |
| 299 |
authentication. The receiver of the syslog message will not be able |
| 300 |
to ascertain that the message was indeed sent from the reported |
| 301 |
sender, or whether the packet was sent from another device. This can |
| 302 |
also lead to a case of mistaken identity if an inappropriately |
| 303 |
configured machine sends syslog messages to a receiver representing |
| 304 |
itself as another machine. |
| 305 |
|
| 306 |
This transport mapping does not provide protection against syslog |
| 307 |
message forgery. An attacker can transmit syslog messages (either |
| 308 |
from the machine from which the messages are purportedly sent or from |
| 309 |
any other machine) to a receiver. |
| 310 |
|
| 311 |
In one case, an attacker can hide the true nature of an attack amidst |
| 312 |
many other messages. As an example, an attacker can start generating |
| 313 |
forged messages indicating a problem on some machine. This can get |
| 314 |
the attention of the system administrators, who will spend their time |
| 315 |
investigating the alleged problem. During this time, the attacker |
| 316 |
could be able to compromise a different machine or a different |
| 317 |
process on the same machine. |
| 318 |
|
| 319 |
Additionally, an attacker can generate false syslog messages to give |
| 320 |
untrue indications of the status of systems. As an example, an |
| 321 |
attacker can stop a critical process on a machine, which could |
| 322 |
generate a notification of exit. The attacker can subsequently |
| 323 |
generate a forged notification that the process had been restarted. |
| 324 |
The system administrators could accept that misinformation and not |
| 325 |
verify that the process had indeed not been restarted. |
| 326 |
|
| 327 |
|
| 328 |
|
| 329 |
|
| 330 |
|
| 331 |
|
| 332 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
| 333 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
| 334 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 335 |
|
| 336 |
|
| 337 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Message Observation</span> |
| 338 |
|
| 339 |
This transport mapping does not provide confidentiality of the |
| 340 |
messages in transit. If syslog messages are in clear text, this is |
| 341 |
how they will be transferred. In most cases, passing clear-text, |
| 342 |
human-readable messages is a benefit to the administrators. |
| 343 |
Unfortunately, an attacker could also be able to observe the human- |
| 344 |
readable contents of syslog messages. The attacker could then use |
| 345 |
the knowledge gained from these messages to compromise a machine. It |
| 346 |
is RECOMMENDED that no sensitive information be transmitted via this |
| 347 |
transport mapping or that transmission of such information be |
| 348 |
restricted to properly secured networks. |
| 349 |
|
| 350 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Replaying</span> |
| 351 |
|
| 352 |
Message forgery and observation can be combined into a replay attack. |
| 353 |
An attacker could record a set of messages that indicate normal |
| 354 |
activity of a machine. At a later time, an attacker could remove |
| 355 |
that machine from the network and replay the syslog messages with new |
| 356 |
time stamps. The administrators could find nothing unusual in the |
| 357 |
received messages, and their receipt would falsely indicate normal |
| 358 |
activity of the machine. |
| 359 |
|
| 360 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Unreliable Delivery</span> |
| 361 |
|
| 362 |
As was previously discussed in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>, Reliability Considerations, |
| 363 |
the UDP transport is not reliable, and packets containing syslog |
| 364 |
message datagrams can be lost in transit without any notice. There |
| 365 |
can be security consequences to the loss of one or more syslog |
| 366 |
messages. Administrators could be unaware of a developing and |
| 367 |
potentially serious problem. Messages could also be intercepted and |
| 368 |
discarded by an attacker as a way to hide unauthorized activities. |
| 369 |
|
| 370 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Message Prioritization and Differentiation</span> |
| 371 |
|
| 372 |
This transport mapping does not mandate prioritization of syslog |
| 373 |
messages either on the wire or when processed on the receiving host |
| 374 |
based on their severity. Unless some prioritization is implemented |
| 375 |
by sender, receiver, and/or network, the security implication of such |
| 376 |
behavior is that the syslog receiver or network devices could get |
| 377 |
overwhelmed with low-severity messages and be forced to discard |
| 378 |
potentially high-severity messages. |
| 379 |
|
| 380 |
|
| 381 |
|
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.6" href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>. Denial of Service</span> |
| 394 |
|
| 395 |
An attacker could overwhelm a receiver by sending more messages to it |
| 396 |
than could be handled by the infrastructure or the device itself. |
| 397 |
Implementers SHOULD attempt to provide features that minimize this |
| 398 |
threat, such as optionally restricting reception of messages to a set |
| 399 |
of known source IP addresses. |
| 400 |
|
| 401 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
This transport uses UDP port 514 for syslog, as recorded in the IANA |
| 404 |
port-numbers registry. |
| 405 |
|
| 406 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 407 |
|
| 408 |
The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of: Chris |
| 409 |
Lonvick, Rainer Gerhards, David Harrington, Andrew Ross, Albert |
| 410 |
Mietus, Bernie Volz, Mickael Graham, Greg Morris, Alexandra Fedorova, |
| 411 |
Devin Kowatch, Richard Graveman, and all others who have commented on |
| 412 |
the various versions of this proposal. |
| 413 |
|
| 414 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span> |
| 415 |
|
| 416 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 417 |
|
| 418 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a>, August |
| 419 |
1980. |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a>, March 2009. |
| 422 |
|
| 423 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>, September |
| 424 |
1981. |
| 425 |
|
| 426 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) |
| 427 |
Specification", <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>, December 1998. |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement |
| 430 |
Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp41">BCP 41</a>, <a href="./rfc2914">RFC 2914</a>, |
| 433 |
September 2000. |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Miao, F. and Y. Ma, "TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog", <a href="./rfc5425">RFC</a> |
| 436 |
<a href="./rfc5425">5425</a>, March 2009. |
| 437 |
|
| 438 |
|
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 450 |
|
| 451 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", <a href="./rfc3164">RFC 3164</a>, August 2001. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>, |
| 454 |
November 1990. |
| 455 |
|
| 456 |
[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet |
| 457 |
Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005. |
| 458 |
|
| 459 |
Author's Address |
| 460 |
|
| 461 |
Anton Okmianski |
| 462 |
Cisco Systems, Inc. |
| 463 |
595 Burrard St., Suite 2123 |
| 464 |
Vancouver, BC V7X 1J1 |
| 465 |
Canada |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
Phone: +1-978-936-1612 |
| 468 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 469 |
|
| 470 |
|
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
|
| 474 |
|
| 475 |
|
| 476 |
|
| 477 |
|
| 478 |
|
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
|
| 483 |
|
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
|
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
|
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
|
| 492 |
|
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
Okmianski Standards Track [Page 9] |
| 501 |
</pre> |