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1 <pre>Network Working Group A. Okmianski
2 Request for Comments: 5426 Cisco Systems, Inc.
3 Category: Standards Track March 2009
4
5
6 <span class="h1">Transmission of Syslog Messages over UDP</span>
7
8 Status of This Memo
9
10 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
11 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
12 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
13 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
14 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
15
16 Copyright Notice
17
18 Copyright (c) 2009 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
19 document authors. All rights reserved.
20
21 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
22 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents in effect on the date of
23 publication of this document (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>).
24 Please review these documents carefully, as they describe your rights
25 and restrictions with respect to this document.
26
27 This document may contain material from IETF Documents or IETF
28 Contributions published or made publicly available before November
29 10, 2008. The person(s) controlling the copyright in some of this
30 material may not have granted the IETF Trust the right to allow
31 modifications of such material outside the IETF Standards Process.
32 Without obtaining an adequate license from the person(s) controlling
33 the copyright in such materials, this document may not be modified
34 outside the IETF Standards Process, and derivative works of it may
35 not be created outside the IETF Standards Process, except to format
36 it for publication as an RFC or to translate it into languages other
37 than English.
38
39 Abstract
40
41 This document describes the transport for syslog messages over UDP/
42 IPv4 or UDP/IPv6. The syslog protocol layered architecture provides
43 for support of any number of transport mappings. However, for
44 interoperability purposes, syslog protocol implementers are required
45 to support this transport mapping.
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52 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
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56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-2">2</a>
60 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document ...............................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
61 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Transport Protocol ..............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
62 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. One Message Per Datagram ...................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
63 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Message Size ...............................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
64 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Source and Target Ports ....................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
65 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Source IP Address ..........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
66 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. UDP/IP Structure ...........................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
67 <a href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. UDP Checksums ..............................................<a href="#page-4">4</a>
68 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Reliability Considerations ......................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
69 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Lost Datagrams .............................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
70 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Message Corruption .........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
71 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Congestion Control .........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
72 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Sequenced Delivery .........................................<a href="#page-5">5</a>
73 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations .........................................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
74 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Sender Authentication and Message Forgery ..................<a href="#page-6">6</a>
75 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Message Observation ........................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
76 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Replaying ..................................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
77 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Unreliable Delivery ........................................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
78 <a href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Message Prioritization and Differentiation .................<a href="#page-7">7</a>
79 <a href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>. Denial of Service ..........................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
80 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations .............................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
81 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements ................................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
82 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. References ......................................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
83 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References .......................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
84 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References .....................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
85
86 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
87
88 Informational <a href="./rfc3164">RFC 3164</a> [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;The BSD Syslog Protocol&quot;">8</a>] describes the syslog protocol as it was
89 observed in existing implementations. It describes both the format
90 of syslog messages and a UDP [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;User Datagram Protocol&quot;">1</a>] transport. Subsequently, a
91 Standards-Track syslog protocol has been defined in <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;The Syslog Protocol&quot;">2</a>].
92
93 <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> specifies a layered architecture that provides for support
94 of any number of transport layer mappings for transmitting syslog
95 messages. This document describes the UDP transport mapping for the
96 syslog protocol.
97
98 The transport described in this document can be used for transmitting
99 syslog messages over both IPv4 [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Internet Protocol&quot;">3</a>] and IPv6 [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">4</a>].
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108 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
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112
113 Network administrators and architects should be aware of the
114 significant reliability and security issues of this transport, which
115 stem from the use of UDP. They are documented in this specification.
116 However, this transport is lightweight and is built upon the existing
117 popular use of UDP for syslog.
118
119 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Conventions Used in This Document</span>
120
121 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
122 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
123 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">5</a>].
124
125 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Transport Protocol</span>
126
127 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. One Message Per Datagram</span>
128
129 Each syslog UDP datagram MUST contain only one syslog message, which
130 MAY be complete or truncated. The message MUST be formatted and
131 truncated according to <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;The Syslog Protocol&quot;">2</a>]. Additional data MUST NOT be
132 present in the datagram payload.
133
134 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Message Size</span>
135
136 This transport mapping supports transmission of syslog messages up to
137 65535 octets minus the UDP header length. This limit stems from the
138 maximum supported UDP size of 65535 octets specified in <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a> [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;User Datagram Protocol&quot;">1</a>].
139 For IPv4, the maximum payload size is 65535 octets minus the UDP
140 header and minus the IP header because IPv4 has a 16-bit length field
141 that also includes the header length.
142
143 IPv4 syslog receivers MUST be able to receive datagrams with message
144 sizes up to and including 480 octets. IPv6 syslog receivers MUST be
145 able to receive datagrams with message sizes up to and including 1180
146 octets. All syslog receivers SHOULD be able to receive datagrams
147 with message sizes of up to and including 2048 octets. The ability
148 to receive larger messages is encouraged.
149
150 The above restrictions and recommendations establish a baseline for
151 interoperability. The minimum required message size support was
152 determined based on the minimum MTU size that Internet hosts are
153 required to support: 576 octets for IPv4 [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Internet Protocol&quot;">3</a>] and 1280 octets for IPv6
154 [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">4</a>]. Datagrams that conform to these limits have the greatest chance
155 of being delivered because they do not require fragmentation.
156
157 It is RECOMMENDED that syslog senders restrict message sizes such
158 that IP datagrams do not exceed the smallest MTU of the network in
159 use. This avoids datagram fragmentation and possible issues
160 surrounding fragmentation such as incorrect MTU discovery.
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164 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
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168
169 Fragmentation can be undesirable because it increases the risk of the
170 message being lost due to loss of just one datagram fragment. Syslog
171 has no acknowledgement facility, and therefore there is no effective
172 way to handle retransmission. This makes it impossible for syslog to
173 utilize packetization layer path MTU discovery [<a href="#ref-9" title="&quot;Path MTU discovery&quot;">9</a>]. When network MTU
174 is not known in advance, the safest assumption is to restrict
175 messages to 480 octets for IPv4 and 1180 octets for IPv6.
176
177 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Source and Target Ports</span>
178
179 Syslog receivers MUST support accepting syslog datagrams on the well-
180 known UDP port 514, but MAY be configurable to listen on a different
181 port. Syslog senders MUST support sending syslog message datagrams
182 to the UDP port 514, but MAY be configurable to send messages to a
183 different port. Syslog senders MAY use any source UDP port for
184 transmitting messages.
185
186 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Source IP Address</span>
187
188 The source IP address of the UDP datagrams SHOULD NOT be interpreted
189 as the identifier for the host that originated the syslog message.
190 The entity sending the syslog message could be merely a relay. The
191 syslog message itself contains the identifier of the originator of
192 the message.
193
194 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. UDP/IP Structure</span>
195
196 Each UDP/IP datagram sent by the transport layer MUST completely
197 adhere to the structure specified in the UDP <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a> [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;User Datagram Protocol&quot;">1</a>] and either
198 the IPv4 <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a> [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Internet Protocol&quot;">3</a>] or IPv6 <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">4</a>], depending on which
199 protocol is used.
200
201 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.6" href="#section-3.6">3.6</a>. UDP Checksums</span>
202
203 Syslog senders MUST NOT disable UDP checksums. IPv4 syslog senders
204 SHOULD use UDP checksums when sending messages. Note that <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>
205 [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">4</a>] mandates the use of UDP checksums when sending UDP datagrams over
206 IPv6.
207
208 Syslog receivers MUST NOT disable UDP checksum checks. IPv4 syslog
209 receivers SHOULD check UDP checksums and SHOULD accept a syslog
210 message with a zero checksum. Note that <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a> [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6) Specification&quot;">4</a>] mandates the
211 use of checksums for UDP over IPv6.
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220 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
223
224
225 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Reliability Considerations</span>
226
227 The UDP is an unreliable, low-overhead protocol. This section
228 discusses reliability issues inherent in UDP that implementers and
229 users should be aware of.
230
231 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Lost Datagrams</span>
232
233 This transport mapping does not provide any mechanism to detect and
234 correct loss of datagrams. Datagrams can be lost in transit due to
235 congestion, corruption, or any other intermittent network problem.
236 IP fragmentation exacerbates this problem because loss of a single
237 fragment will result in the entire message being discarded.
238
239 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Message Corruption</span>
240
241 The UDP/IP datagrams can get corrupted in transit due to software,
242 hardware, or network errors. This transport mapping specifies use of
243 UDP checksums to enable corruption detection in addition to checksums
244 used in IP and Layer 2 protocols. However, checksums do not
245 guarantee corruption detection, and this transport mapping does not
246 provide for message acknowledgement or retransmission mechanism.
247
248 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Congestion Control</span>
249
250 Because syslog can generate unlimited amounts of data, transferring
251 this data over UDP is generally problematic, because UDP lacks
252 congestion control mechanisms. Congestion control mechanisms that
253 respond to congestion by reducing traffic rates and establish a
254 degree of fairness between flows that share the same path are vital
255 to the stable operation of the Internet [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Congestion Control Principles&quot;">6</a>]. This is why the syslog
256 TLS transport [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog&quot;">7</a>] is REQUIRED to implement and RECOMMENDED for
257 general use.
258
259 The only environments where the syslog UDP transport MAY be used as
260 an alternative to the TLS transport are managed networks, where the
261 network path has been explicitly provisioned for UDP syslog traffic
262 through traffic engineering mechanisms, such as rate limiting or
263 capacity reservations. In all other environments, the TLS transport
264 [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog&quot;">7</a>] SHOULD be used.
265
266 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. Sequenced Delivery</span>
267
268 The IP transport used by the UDP does not guarantee that the sequence
269 of datagram delivery will match the order in which the datagrams were
270 sent. The time stamp contained within each syslog message can serve
271 as a rough guide in establishing sequence order. However, it will
272 not help in cases where multiple messages were generated during the
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276 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
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280
281 same time slot, the sender could not generate a time stamp, or
282 messages originated from different hosts whose clocks were not
283 synchronized. The order of syslog message arrival via this transport
284 SHOULD NOT be used as an authoritative guide in establishing an
285 absolute or relative sequence of events on the syslog sender hosts.
286
287 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
288
289 Using this specification on an unsecured network is NOT RECOMMENDED.
290 Several syslog security considerations are discussed in <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a> [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;The Syslog Protocol&quot;">2</a>].
291 This section focuses on security considerations specific to the
292 syslog transport over UDP. Some of the security issues raised in
293 this section can be mitigated through the use of IPsec as defined in
294 <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a> [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">10</a>].
295
296 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Sender Authentication and Message Forgery</span>
297
298 This transport mapping does not provide for strong sender
299 authentication. The receiver of the syslog message will not be able
300 to ascertain that the message was indeed sent from the reported
301 sender, or whether the packet was sent from another device. This can
302 also lead to a case of mistaken identity if an inappropriately
303 configured machine sends syslog messages to a receiver representing
304 itself as another machine.
305
306 This transport mapping does not provide protection against syslog
307 message forgery. An attacker can transmit syslog messages (either
308 from the machine from which the messages are purportedly sent or from
309 any other machine) to a receiver.
310
311 In one case, an attacker can hide the true nature of an attack amidst
312 many other messages. As an example, an attacker can start generating
313 forged messages indicating a problem on some machine. This can get
314 the attention of the system administrators, who will spend their time
315 investigating the alleged problem. During this time, the attacker
316 could be able to compromise a different machine or a different
317 process on the same machine.
318
319 Additionally, an attacker can generate false syslog messages to give
320 untrue indications of the status of systems. As an example, an
321 attacker can stop a critical process on a machine, which could
322 generate a notification of exit. The attacker can subsequently
323 generate a forged notification that the process had been restarted.
324 The system administrators could accept that misinformation and not
325 verify that the process had indeed not been restarted.
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332 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
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336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Message Observation</span>
338
339 This transport mapping does not provide confidentiality of the
340 messages in transit. If syslog messages are in clear text, this is
341 how they will be transferred. In most cases, passing clear-text,
342 human-readable messages is a benefit to the administrators.
343 Unfortunately, an attacker could also be able to observe the human-
344 readable contents of syslog messages. The attacker could then use
345 the knowledge gained from these messages to compromise a machine. It
346 is RECOMMENDED that no sensitive information be transmitted via this
347 transport mapping or that transmission of such information be
348 restricted to properly secured networks.
349
350 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Replaying</span>
351
352 Message forgery and observation can be combined into a replay attack.
353 An attacker could record a set of messages that indicate normal
354 activity of a machine. At a later time, an attacker could remove
355 that machine from the network and replay the syslog messages with new
356 time stamps. The administrators could find nothing unusual in the
357 received messages, and their receipt would falsely indicate normal
358 activity of the machine.
359
360 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Unreliable Delivery</span>
361
362 As was previously discussed in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>, Reliability Considerations,
363 the UDP transport is not reliable, and packets containing syslog
364 message datagrams can be lost in transit without any notice. There
365 can be security consequences to the loss of one or more syslog
366 messages. Administrators could be unaware of a developing and
367 potentially serious problem. Messages could also be intercepted and
368 discarded by an attacker as a way to hide unauthorized activities.
369
370 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.5" href="#section-5.5">5.5</a>. Message Prioritization and Differentiation</span>
371
372 This transport mapping does not mandate prioritization of syslog
373 messages either on the wire or when processed on the receiving host
374 based on their severity. Unless some prioritization is implemented
375 by sender, receiver, and/or network, the security implication of such
376 behavior is that the syslog receiver or network devices could get
377 overwhelmed with low-severity messages and be forced to discard
378 potentially high-severity messages.
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388 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
391
392
393 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.6" href="#section-5.6">5.6</a>. Denial of Service</span>
394
395 An attacker could overwhelm a receiver by sending more messages to it
396 than could be handled by the infrastructure or the device itself.
397 Implementers SHOULD attempt to provide features that minimize this
398 threat, such as optionally restricting reception of messages to a set
399 of known source IP addresses.
400
401 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
402
403 This transport uses UDP port 514 for syslog, as recorded in the IANA
404 port-numbers registry.
405
406 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
407
408 The author gratefully acknowledges the contributions of: Chris
409 Lonvick, Rainer Gerhards, David Harrington, Andrew Ross, Albert
410 Mietus, Bernie Volz, Mickael Graham, Greg Morris, Alexandra Fedorova,
411 Devin Kowatch, Richard Graveman, and all others who have commented on
412 the various versions of this proposal.
413
414 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span>
415
416 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span>
417
418 [<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Postel, J., "User Datagram Protocol", STD 6, <a href="./rfc768">RFC 768</a>, August
419 1980.
420
421 [<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Gerhards, R., "The Syslog Protocol", <a href="./rfc5424">RFC 5424</a>, March 2009.
422
423 [<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Postel, J., "Internet Protocol", STD 5, <a href="./rfc791">RFC 791</a>, September
424 1981.
425
426 [<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Deering, S. and R. Hinden, "Internet Protocol, Version 6 (IPv6)
427 Specification", <a href="./rfc2460">RFC 2460</a>, December 1998.
428
429 [<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
430 Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
431
432 [<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Floyd, S., "Congestion Control Principles", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp41">BCP 41</a>, <a href="./rfc2914">RFC 2914</a>,
433 September 2000.
434
435 [<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Miao, F. and Y. Ma, "TLS Transport Mapping for Syslog", <a href="./rfc5425">RFC</a>
436 <a href="./rfc5425">5425</a>, March 2009.
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444 <span class="grey">Okmianski Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc5426">RFC 5426</a> Syslog UDP Transport March 2009</span>
447
448
449 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span>
450
451 [<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Lonvick, C., "The BSD Syslog Protocol", <a href="./rfc3164">RFC 3164</a>, August 2001.
452
453 [<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Mogul, J. and S. Deering, "Path MTU discovery", <a href="./rfc1191">RFC 1191</a>,
454 November 1990.
455
456 [<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Kent, S. and K. Seo, "Security Architecture for the Internet
457 Protocol", <a href="./rfc4301">RFC 4301</a>, December 2005.
458
459 Author's Address
460
461 Anton Okmianski
462 Cisco Systems, Inc.
463 595 Burrard St., Suite 2123
464 Vancouver, BC V7X 1J1
465 Canada
466
467 Phone: +1-978-936-1612
468 EMail: [email protected]
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