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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Harkins, Ed. |
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Request for Comments: 8110 HP Enterprise |
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Category: Informational W. Kumari, Ed. |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 Google |
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March 2017 |
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<span class="h1">Opportunistic Wireless Encryption</span> |
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Abstract |
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This memo specifies an extension to IEEE Std 802.11 to provide for |
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opportunistic (unauthenticated) encryption to the wireless media. |
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Status of This Memo |
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This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is |
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published for informational purposes. |
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents |
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approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet |
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Standard; see <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8110">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8110</a>. |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. 802.11 Network Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. OWE Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. OWE Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. OWE Post-Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. OWE PMK Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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This memo describes Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) -- a mode |
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of opportunistic security [<a href="./rfc7435" title=""Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time"">RFC7435</a>] for IEEE Std 802.11 that provides |
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encryption of the wireless medium but no authentication. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">RFC2119</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Notation</span> |
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This memo uses the following notation: |
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y = F(X) |
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An element-to-scalar mapping function. For an elliptic curve |
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group, it takes a point on the curve and returns the |
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x-coordinate; for a finite field element, it is the identity |
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function, just returning the element itself. |
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Z = DH(x,Y) |
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For an elliptic curve, DH(x,Y) is the multiplication of point Y |
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by the scalar value x, creating a point on the curve Z; for |
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finite field cryptography, DH(x,Y) is an exponentiation of |
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element Y to the power of x (implied modulo a field defining |
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prime, p) resulting in an element Z. |
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a = len(b) |
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Indicates the length in bits of the string b. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Background</span> |
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Internet access has become an expected service at many locations -- |
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for example, coffee shops, airports, and hotels. In many cases, this |
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is offered over "Open" (unencrypted) wireless networks, because |
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distributing a passphrase (or using other authentication solutions) |
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is not convenient or realistic. Ideally, users would always use a |
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VPN when using an untrusted network, but often they don't. This |
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leaves their traffic vulnerable to sniffing attacks, for example, |
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from someone in the adjacent hotel room running Wireshark, pervasive |
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monitors, etc. |
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In addition, many businesses (for example, coffee shops and bars) |
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offer free Wi-Fi as an inducement to customers to enter and remain in |
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the premises. Many customers will use the availability of free Wi-Fi |
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as a deciding factor in which business to patronize. Since these |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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businesses are not Internet service providers, they are often |
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unwilling and/or unqualified to perform complex configuration on |
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their network. In addition, customers are generally unwilling to do |
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complicated provisioning on their devices just to obtain free Wi-Fi. |
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This leads to a popular deployment technique -- a network protected |
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using a shared and public Pre-Shared Key (PSK) that is printed on a |
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sandwich board at the entrance, on a chalkboard on the wall, or on a |
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menu. The PSK is used in a cryptographic handshake, defined in |
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[<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], called the "4-way handshake" to prove knowledge of the |
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PSK and derive traffic encryption keys for bulk wireless data. |
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The belief is that this protects the wireless medium from passive |
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sniffing and simple attacks. That belief is erroneous. Since the |
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PSK is known by everyone, it is possible for a passive attacker to |
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observe the 4-way handshake and compute the traffic encryption keys |
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used by a client and access point (AP). If the attacker is too late |
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to observe this exchange, he can issue a forged "deauthenticate" |
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frame that will cause the client and/or AP to reset the 802.11 state |
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machine and cause them to go through the 4-way handshake again, |
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thereby allowing the passive attacker to determine the traffic keys. |
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With OWE, the client and AP perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange |
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during the access procedure and use the resulting pairwise secret |
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with the 4-way handshake instead of using a shared and public PSK in |
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the 4-way handshake. |
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OWE requires no special configuration or user interaction but |
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provides a higher level of security than a common, shared, and public |
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PSK. OWE not only provides more security to the end user, it is also |
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easier to use both for the provider and the end user because there |
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are no public keys to maintain, share, or manage. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. 802.11 Network Access</span> |
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Wi-Fi access points (APs) advertise their presence through frames |
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called "beacons". These frames inform clients within earshot of the |
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SSID (Service Set Identifier) the AP is advertising, the AP's Media |
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Access Control (MAC) address (known as its "BSSID" (Basic Service Set |
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Identifier)), security policy governing access, the symmetric ciphers |
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it uses for unicast and broadcast frames, QoS information, as well as |
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support for other optional features of [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]. Wi-Fi clients |
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can actively discover APs by issuing "probe requests", which are |
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queries for APs that respond with "probe responses". A probe |
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response carries essentially the same information as a beacon. |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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After an AP is discovered by a client, actively through probing or |
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passively through beacons, the client initiates a two-step method to |
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gain network access. The first step is "802.11 authentication". For |
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most methods of access, this is an empty exchange known as "Open |
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Authentication" -- basically, the client says, "authenticate me", and |
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the AP responds, "ok, you're authenticated". After 802.11 |
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authentication is 802.11 association, in which the client requests |
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network access from an AP (the SSID, a selection of the type of |
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subsequent authentication to be made, any pairwise and group ciphers, |
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etc.) using an 802.11 association request. The AP acknowledges the |
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request with an 802.11 association response. |
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If the network is Open (no authentication and no encryption), the |
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client has network access immediately after completion of 802.11 |
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association. If the network enforces PSK authentication, the 4-way |
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handshake is initiated by the AP using the PSK to authenticate the |
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client and derive traffic encryption keys. |
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To add an opportunistic encryption mode of access to [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], it |
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is necessary to perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange during 802.11 |
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authentication and use the resulting pairwise secret with the 4-way |
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handshake. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Cryptography</span> |
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Performing a Diffie-Hellman key exchange requires agreement on a |
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domain parameter set in which to perform the exchange. OWE uses a |
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registry (see [<a href="#ref-IKE-IANA" title=""Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs"">IKE-IANA</a>]) to map an integer into a complete domain |
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parameter set. OWE supports both Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC) |
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and Finite Field Cryptography (FFC). |
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OWE uses a hash algorithm for generation of a secret and a secret |
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identifier. The particular hash algorithm depends on the group |
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chosen for the Diffie-Hellman. For ECC, the hash algorithm depends |
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on the size of the prime defining the curve p: |
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o SHA-256: when len(p) <= 256 |
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o SHA-384: when 256 < len(p) <= 384 |
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o SHA-512: when 384 < len(p) |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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For FFC, the hash algorithm depends on the prime, p, defining the |
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finite field: |
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o SHA-256: when len(p) <= 2048 |
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o SHA-384: when 2048 < len(p) <= 3072 |
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o SHA-512: when 3072 < len(p) |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. OWE Discovery</span> |
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An access point advertises support for OWE using an Authentication |
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and Key Management (AKM) suite selector for OWE. This AKM is |
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illustrated in Table 1 and is added to the Robust Security Network |
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(RSN) element, defined in [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], in all beacons and probe |
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response frames the AP issues. |
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+----------+--------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+ |
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| OUI | Suite | Authentication | Key | Key | |
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| | Type | Type | Management | derivation | |
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| | | | Type | type | |
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+----------+--------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+ |
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| 00-0F-AC | 18 | Opportunistic | This | [<a href="./rfc5869" title=""HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"">RFC5869</a>] | |
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| | | Wireless | document | | |
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| | | Encryption | | | |
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+----------+--------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+ |
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Table 1: OWE AKM |
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Once a client discovers an OWE-compliant AP, it performs "Open |
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System" 802.11 authentication as defined in [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], and it then |
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proceeds to 802.11 association. |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. OWE Association</span> |
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Information is added to 802.11 association requests and responses |
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using TLVs that [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] calls "elements". Each element has an |
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"Element ID" (including any Element ID extension), a length, and a |
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value field that is element specific. These elements are appended to |
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each other to construct 802.11 association requests and responses. |
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OWE adds the Diffie-Hellman Parameter element (see Figure 1) to |
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802.11 association requests and responses. The client adds her |
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public key in the 802.11 association request, and the AP adds his |
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public key in the 802.11 association response. |
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+------------+----------+------------+------------------------+ |
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| Element ID | Length | Element ID | element-specific | |
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| | | Extension | data | |
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+------------+----------+------------+---------+--------------+ |
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| 255 | variable | 32 | group | public key | |
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+------------+----------+------------+---------+--------------+ |
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Figure 1: The Diffie-Hellman Parameter Element |
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where: |
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o group is an unsigned two-octet integer defined in [<a href="#ref-IKE-IANA" title=""Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs"">IKE-IANA</a>], in |
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little-endian format, that identifies a domain parameter set; |
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o public key is an octet string representing the Diffie-Hellman |
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public key; and, |
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o Element ID, Length, and Element ID Extension are all single-octet |
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integers. |
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The encoding of the public key depends on its type. FFC elements |
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SHALL be encoded per the integer-to-octet-string conversion technique |
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of [<a href="./rfc6090" title=""Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms"">RFC6090</a>]. For ECC elements, the encoding depends on the |
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definition of the curve, either that in [<a href="./rfc6090" title=""Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms"">RFC6090</a>] or [<a href="./rfc7748" title=""Elliptic Curves for Security"">RFC7748</a>]. If |
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the public key is from a curve defined in [<a href="./rfc6090" title=""Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms"">RFC6090</a>], compact |
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representation SHALL be used. |
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A client wishing to do OWE MUST indicate the OWE AKM in the RSN |
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element portion of the 802.11 association request and MUST include a |
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Diffie-Hellman Parameter element to its 802.11 association request. |
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An AP agreeing to do OWE MUST include the OWE AKM in the RSN element |
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portion of the 802.11 association response. If "PMK caching" (see |
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<a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a>) is not performed, it MUST also include a Diffie-Hellman |
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Parameter element. If "PMK caching" is not being performed, a client |
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MUST discard any 802.11 association response that indicates the OWE |
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<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
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AKM in the RSN element but does not have not a Diffie-Hellman |
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Parameter element. |
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For interoperability purposes, a compliant implementation MUST |
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support group nineteen (19), a 256-bit elliptic curve group. If the |
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AP does not support the group indicated in the received 802.11 |
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association request, it MUST respond with an 802.11 association |
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response with a status code of seventy-seven (77) indicating an |
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unsupported finite cyclic group. A client that receives an 802.11 |
| 402 |
association response with a status code of seventy-seven SHOULD retry |
| 403 |
OWE with a different supported group and, due to the unsecured nature |
| 404 |
of 802.11 association, MAY request association again using the group |
| 405 |
that resulted in failure. This failure SHOULD be logged, and if the |
| 406 |
client abandons association due to the failure to agree on any group, |
| 407 |
notification of this fact SHOULD be provided to the user. |
| 408 |
|
| 409 |
Received Diffie-Hellman Parameter elements are checked for validity |
| 410 |
upon receipt. For ECC, a validity check depends on the curve |
| 411 |
definition, either that in [<a href="./rfc6090" title=""Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms"">RFC6090</a>] or [<a href="./rfc7748" title=""Elliptic Curves for Security"">RFC7748</a>]. For FFC, elements |
| 412 |
are checked that they are between one (1) and one (1) less than the |
| 413 |
prime, p, exclusive (i.e., 1 < element < p-1). Invalid received |
| 414 |
Diffie-Hellman keys MUST result in unsuccessful association, a |
| 415 |
failure of OWE, and a reset of the 802.11 state machine. Due to the |
| 416 |
unsecured nature of 802.11 association, a client SHOULD retry OWE a |
| 417 |
number of times (this memo does not specify the number of times). |
| 418 |
This failure should be logged, and if the client abandons association |
| 419 |
due to the (repeated) receipt of invalid elements, notification of |
| 420 |
this fact should be provided to the user. |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. OWE Post-Association</span> |
| 423 |
|
| 424 |
Once the client and AP have finished 802.11 association, they then |
| 425 |
complete the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and create a Pairwise Master |
| 426 |
Key (PMK) and its associated identifier, PMKID [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]. Given a |
| 427 |
private key x and the peer's (AP's if client, client's if AP) public |
| 428 |
key Y, the following are generated: |
| 429 |
|
| 430 |
z = F(DH(x, Y)) |
| 431 |
|
| 432 |
prk = HKDF-extract(C | A | group, z) |
| 433 |
|
| 434 |
PMK = HKDF-expand(prk, "OWE Key Generation", n) |
| 435 |
|
| 436 |
where HKDF-expand() and HKDF-extract() are defined in [<a href="./rfc5869" title=""HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)"">RFC5869</a>]; "C | |
| 437 |
A | group" is a concatenation of the client's Diffie-Hellman public |
| 438 |
key, the AP's Diffie-Hellman public key (from the 802.11 association |
| 439 |
request and response, respectively), and the two-octet group from the |
| 440 |
Diffie-Hellman Parameter element (in little-endian format) and is |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
passed as the salt to the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key |
| 450 |
Derivation Function (HKDF) using the hash algorithm defined in |
| 451 |
<a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>; and n is the bit length of the digest produced by that |
| 452 |
hash algorithm. z and prk SHOULD be irretrievably deleted once the |
| 453 |
PMK has been generated. |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
The PMKID is generated by hashing the two Diffie-Hellman public keys |
| 456 |
(the data, as sent and received, from the "public key" portion of the |
| 457 |
Diffie-Hellman Parameter element in the 802.11 association request |
| 458 |
and response) and returning the leftmost 128 bits: |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
PMKID = Truncate-128(Hash(C | A)) |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
where C is the client's Diffie-Hellman public key from the 802.11 |
| 463 |
association request, A is the AP's Diffie-Hellman public key from the |
| 464 |
802.11 association response, and Hash is the hash algorithm defined |
| 465 |
in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>. |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
+---------+--------------+----------+-------+------------+----------+ |
| 468 |
| Hash | Integrity | KCK_bits | Size | Key-wrap | KEK_bits | |
| 469 |
| | Algorithm | | of | Algorithm | | |
| 470 |
| | | | MIC | | | |
| 471 |
+---------+--------------+----------+-------+------------+----------+ |
| 472 |
| SHA-256 | HMAC-SHA-256 | 128 | 16 | NIST AES | 128 | |
| 473 |
| | | | | Key-wrap | | |
| 474 |
| SHA-384 | HMAC-SHA-384 | 192 | 24 | NIST AES | 256 | |
| 475 |
| | | | | Key-wrap | | |
| 476 |
| SHA-512 | HMAC-SHA-521 | 256 | 32 | NIST AES | 256 | |
| 477 |
| | | | | Key-wrap | | |
| 478 |
+---------+--------------+----------+-------+------------+----------+ |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
Table 2: Integrity and Key Wrap Algorithms |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
Upon completion of 802.11 association, the AP initiates the 4-way |
| 483 |
handshake to the client using the PMK generated above. The 4-way |
| 484 |
handshake generates a Key-Encrypting Key (KEK), a Key-Confirmation |
| 485 |
Key (KCK), and a Message Integrity Code (MIC) to use for protection |
| 486 |
of the frames that define the 4-way handshake. The algorithms and |
| 487 |
key lengths used in the 4-way handshake depend on the hash algorithm |
| 488 |
selected in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a> and are listed in Table 2. |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
The result of the 4-way handshake is encryption keys to protect bulk |
| 491 |
unicast data and broadcast data. If the 4-way handshake fails, this |
| 492 |
information SHOULD be presented to the user. |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. OWE PMK Caching</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
[<a id="ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] defines "PMK caching" where a client and access point |
| 508 |
can cache a PMK for a certain period of time and reuse it with the |
| 509 |
4-way handshake after subsequent associations to bypass potentially |
| 510 |
expensive authentication. A client indicates its desire to do "PMK |
| 511 |
caching" by including the identifying PMKID in its 802.11 association |
| 512 |
request. If an AP has cached the PMK identified by that PMKID, it |
| 513 |
includes the PMKID in its 802.11 association response; otherwise, it |
| 514 |
ignores the PMKID and proceeds with normal 802.11 association. OWE |
| 515 |
supports the notion of "PMK caching". |
| 516 |
|
| 517 |
Since "PMK caching" is indicated in the same frame as the Diffie- |
| 518 |
Hellman Parameter element is passed, a client wishing to do "PMK |
| 519 |
caching" MUST include both in her 802.11 association request. If the |
| 520 |
AP has the PMK identified by the PMKID and wishes to perform "PMK |
| 521 |
caching", he will include the PMKID in his 802.11 association |
| 522 |
response but does not include a Diffie-Hellman Parameter element. If |
| 523 |
the AP does not have the PMK identified by the PMKID, it ignores the |
| 524 |
PMKID and proceeds with normal OWE 802.11 association by including a |
| 525 |
Diffie-Hellman Parameter element. |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
When attempting "PMK caching", a client SHALL ignore any Diffie- |
| 528 |
Hellman Parameter element in an 802.11 association response whose |
| 529 |
PMKID matches that of the client-issued 802.11 association request. |
| 530 |
If the 802.11 association response does not include a PMKID, or if |
| 531 |
the PMKID does not match that of the client-issued 802.11 association |
| 532 |
request, the client SHALL proceed with normal OWE association. |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
The client SHALL ignore a PMKID in any 802.11 association response |
| 535 |
frame for which it did not include a PMKID in the corresponding |
| 536 |
802.11 association request frame. |
| 537 |
|
| 538 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 539 |
|
| 540 |
This document does not require any IANA actions. |
| 541 |
|
| 542 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Implementation Considerations</span> |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
OWE is a replacement for 802.11 "Open" authentication. Therefore, |
| 545 |
when OWE-compliant access points are discovered, the presentation of |
| 546 |
the available SSID to users should not include special security |
| 547 |
symbols such as a "lock icon". To a user, an OWE SSID is the same as |
| 548 |
"Open"; it simply provides more security behind the scenes. |
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
When OWE is initially deployed as a replacement for an existing |
| 551 |
network that uses "Open" authentication or a shared and public PSK, |
| 552 |
it will be necessary to create an additional Basic Service Set |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
Identifier (BSSID) or a new Extended Service Set (ESS) with a |
| 562 |
separate Service Set Identifier (SSID) for OWE so two distinct 802.11 |
| 563 |
networks can exist on the same access point (see [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]). This |
| 564 |
arrangement should remain until the majority of users have switched |
| 565 |
over to OWE. |
| 566 |
|
| 567 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 568 |
|
| 569 |
Opportunistic encryption does not provide authentication. The client |
| 570 |
will have no authenticated identity for the access point, and vice |
| 571 |
versa. They will share pairwise traffic encryption keys and have a |
| 572 |
cryptographic assurance that a frame claimed to be from the peer is |
| 573 |
actually from the peer and was not modified in flight. |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
OWE only secures data sent over the wireless medium and does not |
| 576 |
provide security for end-to-end traffic. Users should still use |
| 577 |
application-level security to achieve security end-to-end. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
OWE is susceptible to an active attack in which an adversary |
| 580 |
impersonates an access point and induces a client to connect to it |
| 581 |
via OWE while it makes a connection to the legitimate access point. |
| 582 |
In this particular attack, the adversary is able to inspect, modify, |
| 583 |
and forge any data between the client and legitimate access point. |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
OWE is not a replacement for any authentication protocol specified in |
| 586 |
[<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] and is not intended to be used when an alternative that |
| 587 |
provides real authentication is available. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span> |
| 590 |
|
| 591 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
[<a id="ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] |
| 594 |
IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology-- |
| 595 |
Telecommunications and information exchange between |
| 596 |
systems Local and metropolitan area networks--Specific |
| 597 |
requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control |
| 598 |
(MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std |
| 599 |
802.11, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995. |
| 600 |
|
| 601 |
[<a id="ref-IKE-IANA">IKE-IANA</a>] IANA, "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform |
| 602 |
IDs", <<a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/">http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/</a>>. |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
[<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate |
| 605 |
Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, |
| 606 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 607 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
[<a id="ref-RFC5869">RFC5869</a>] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand |
| 618 |
Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", <a href="./rfc5869">RFC 5869</a>, |
| 619 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010, |
| 620 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869</a>>. |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
[<a id="ref-RFC6090">RFC6090</a>] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic |
| 623 |
Curve Cryptography Algorithms", <a href="./rfc6090">RFC 6090</a>, |
| 624 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011, |
| 625 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090</a>>. |
| 626 |
|
| 627 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7748">RFC7748</a>] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves |
| 628 |
for Security", <a href="./rfc7748">RFC 7748</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January |
| 629 |
2016, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748</a>>. |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
[<a id="ref-RFC7435">RFC7435</a>] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection |
| 634 |
Most of the Time", <a href="./rfc7435">RFC 7435</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435, |
| 635 |
December 2014, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435</a>>. |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 638 |
|
| 639 |
Dan Harkins (editor) |
| 640 |
HP Enterprise |
| 641 |
3333 Scott Boulevard |
| 642 |
Santa Clara, California 95054 |
| 643 |
United States of America |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
Phone: +1 415 555 1212 |
| 646 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
|
| 649 |
Warren Kumari (editor) |
| 650 |
Google |
| 651 |
1600 Amphitheatre Parkway |
| 652 |
Mountain View, California 94043 |
| 653 |
United States of America |
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
Phone: +1 408 555 1212 |
| 656 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 657 |
|
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
|
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
Harkins & Kumari Informational [Page 12] |
| 669 |
</pre> |