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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) D. Harkins, Ed.
2 Request for Comments: 8110 HP Enterprise
3 Category: Informational W. Kumari, Ed.
4 ISSN: 2070-1721 Google
5 March 2017
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Opportunistic Wireless Encryption</span>
9
10 Abstract
11
12 This memo specifies an extension to IEEE Std 802.11 to provide for
13 opportunistic (unauthenticated) encryption to the wireless media.
14
15 Status of This Memo
16
17 This document is not an Internet Standards Track specification; it is
18 published for informational purposes.
19
20 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
21 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
22 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
23 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Not all documents
24 approved by the IESG are a candidate for any level of Internet
25 Standard; see <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
26
27 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
28 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
29 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8110">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8110</a>.
30
31 Copyright Notice
32
33 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
34 document authors. All rights reserved.
35
36 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
37 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
38 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
39 publication of this document. Please review these documents
40 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
41 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
42 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
43 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
44 described in the Simplified BSD License.
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56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
61 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Notation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
62 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
63 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. 802.11 Network Access . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
64 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
65 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Cryptography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
66 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. OWE Discovery . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
67 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. OWE Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
68 <a href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. OWE Post-Association . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
69 <a href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. OWE PMK Caching . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
70 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
71 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Implementation Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
72 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
73 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
74 <a href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
75 <a href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
76 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 This memo describes Opportunistic Wireless Encryption (OWE) -- a mode
116 of opportunistic security [<a href="./rfc7435" title="&quot;Opportunistic Security: Some Protection Most of the Time&quot;">RFC7435</a>] for IEEE Std 802.11 that provides
117 encryption of the wireless medium but no authentication.
118
119 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Requirements Language</span>
120
121 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
122 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
123 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="./rfc2119" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">RFC2119</a>].
124
125 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Notation</span>
126
127 This memo uses the following notation:
128
129 y = F(X)
130 An element-to-scalar mapping function. For an elliptic curve
131 group, it takes a point on the curve and returns the
132 x-coordinate; for a finite field element, it is the identity
133 function, just returning the element itself.
134
135 Z = DH(x,Y)
136 For an elliptic curve, DH(x,Y) is the multiplication of point Y
137 by the scalar value x, creating a point on the curve Z; for
138 finite field cryptography, DH(x,Y) is an exponentiation of
139 element Y to the power of x (implied modulo a field defining
140 prime, p) resulting in an element Z.
141
142 a = len(b)
143 Indicates the length in bits of the string b.
144
145 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Background</span>
146
147 Internet access has become an expected service at many locations --
148 for example, coffee shops, airports, and hotels. In many cases, this
149 is offered over "Open" (unencrypted) wireless networks, because
150 distributing a passphrase (or using other authentication solutions)
151 is not convenient or realistic. Ideally, users would always use a
152 VPN when using an untrusted network, but often they don't. This
153 leaves their traffic vulnerable to sniffing attacks, for example,
154 from someone in the adjacent hotel room running Wireshark, pervasive
155 monitors, etc.
156
157 In addition, many businesses (for example, coffee shops and bars)
158 offer free Wi-Fi as an inducement to customers to enter and remain in
159 the premises. Many customers will use the availability of free Wi-Fi
160 as a deciding factor in which business to patronize. Since these
161
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168
169 businesses are not Internet service providers, they are often
170 unwilling and/or unqualified to perform complex configuration on
171 their network. In addition, customers are generally unwilling to do
172 complicated provisioning on their devices just to obtain free Wi-Fi.
173 This leads to a popular deployment technique -- a network protected
174 using a shared and public Pre-Shared Key (PSK) that is printed on a
175 sandwich board at the entrance, on a chalkboard on the wall, or on a
176 menu. The PSK is used in a cryptographic handshake, defined in
177 [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], called the "4-way handshake" to prove knowledge of the
178 PSK and derive traffic encryption keys for bulk wireless data.
179
180 The belief is that this protects the wireless medium from passive
181 sniffing and simple attacks. That belief is erroneous. Since the
182 PSK is known by everyone, it is possible for a passive attacker to
183 observe the 4-way handshake and compute the traffic encryption keys
184 used by a client and access point (AP). If the attacker is too late
185 to observe this exchange, he can issue a forged "deauthenticate"
186 frame that will cause the client and/or AP to reset the 802.11 state
187 machine and cause them to go through the 4-way handshake again,
188 thereby allowing the passive attacker to determine the traffic keys.
189
190 With OWE, the client and AP perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange
191 during the access procedure and use the resulting pairwise secret
192 with the 4-way handshake instead of using a shared and public PSK in
193 the 4-way handshake.
194
195 OWE requires no special configuration or user interaction but
196 provides a higher level of security than a common, shared, and public
197 PSK. OWE not only provides more security to the end user, it is also
198 easier to use both for the provider and the end user because there
199 are no public keys to maintain, share, or manage.
200
201 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. 802.11 Network Access</span>
202
203 Wi-Fi access points (APs) advertise their presence through frames
204 called "beacons". These frames inform clients within earshot of the
205 SSID (Service Set Identifier) the AP is advertising, the AP's Media
206 Access Control (MAC) address (known as its "BSSID" (Basic Service Set
207 Identifier)), security policy governing access, the symmetric ciphers
208 it uses for unicast and broadcast frames, QoS information, as well as
209 support for other optional features of [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]. Wi-Fi clients
210 can actively discover APs by issuing "probe requests", which are
211 queries for APs that respond with "probe responses". A probe
212 response carries essentially the same information as a beacon.
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224
225 After an AP is discovered by a client, actively through probing or
226 passively through beacons, the client initiates a two-step method to
227 gain network access. The first step is "802.11 authentication". For
228 most methods of access, this is an empty exchange known as "Open
229 Authentication" -- basically, the client says, "authenticate me", and
230 the AP responds, "ok, you're authenticated". After 802.11
231 authentication is 802.11 association, in which the client requests
232 network access from an AP (the SSID, a selection of the type of
233 subsequent authentication to be made, any pairwise and group ciphers,
234 etc.) using an 802.11 association request. The AP acknowledges the
235 request with an 802.11 association response.
236
237 If the network is Open (no authentication and no encryption), the
238 client has network access immediately after completion of 802.11
239 association. If the network enforces PSK authentication, the 4-way
240 handshake is initiated by the AP using the PSK to authenticate the
241 client and derive traffic encryption keys.
242
243 To add an opportunistic encryption mode of access to [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], it
244 is necessary to perform a Diffie-Hellman key exchange during 802.11
245 authentication and use the resulting pairwise secret with the 4-way
246 handshake.
247
248 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Opportunistic Wireless Encryption</span>
249
250 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Cryptography</span>
251
252 Performing a Diffie-Hellman key exchange requires agreement on a
253 domain parameter set in which to perform the exchange. OWE uses a
254 registry (see [<a href="#ref-IKE-IANA" title="&quot;Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs&quot;">IKE-IANA</a>]) to map an integer into a complete domain
255 parameter set. OWE supports both Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)
256 and Finite Field Cryptography (FFC).
257
258 OWE uses a hash algorithm for generation of a secret and a secret
259 identifier. The particular hash algorithm depends on the group
260 chosen for the Diffie-Hellman. For ECC, the hash algorithm depends
261 on the size of the prime defining the curve p:
262
263 o SHA-256: when len(p) &lt;= 256
264
265 o SHA-384: when 256 &lt; len(p) &lt;= 384
266
267 o SHA-512: when 384 &lt; len(p)
268
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280
281 For FFC, the hash algorithm depends on the prime, p, defining the
282 finite field:
283
284 o SHA-256: when len(p) &lt;= 2048
285
286 o SHA-384: when 2048 &lt; len(p) &lt;= 3072
287
288 o SHA-512: when 3072 &lt; len(p)
289
290 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. OWE Discovery</span>
291
292 An access point advertises support for OWE using an Authentication
293 and Key Management (AKM) suite selector for OWE. This AKM is
294 illustrated in Table 1 and is added to the Robust Security Network
295 (RSN) element, defined in [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], in all beacons and probe
296 response frames the AP issues.
297
298 +----------+--------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+
299 | OUI | Suite | Authentication | Key | Key |
300 | | Type | Type | Management | derivation |
301 | | | | Type | type |
302 +----------+--------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+
303 | 00-0F-AC | 18 | Opportunistic | This | [<a href="./rfc5869" title="&quot;HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)&quot;">RFC5869</a>] |
304 | | | Wireless | document | |
305 | | | Encryption | | |
306 +----------+--------+-------------------+-------------+-------------+
307
308 Table 1: OWE AKM
309
310 Once a client discovers an OWE-compliant AP, it performs "Open
311 System" 802.11 authentication as defined in [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>], and it then
312 proceeds to 802.11 association.
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336
337 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. OWE Association</span>
338
339 Information is added to 802.11 association requests and responses
340 using TLVs that [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] calls "elements". Each element has an
341 "Element ID" (including any Element ID extension), a length, and a
342 value field that is element specific. These elements are appended to
343 each other to construct 802.11 association requests and responses.
344
345 OWE adds the Diffie-Hellman Parameter element (see Figure 1) to
346 802.11 association requests and responses. The client adds her
347 public key in the 802.11 association request, and the AP adds his
348 public key in the 802.11 association response.
349
350 +------------+----------+------------+------------------------+
351 | Element ID | Length | Element ID | element-specific |
352 | | | Extension | data |
353 +------------+----------+------------+---------+--------------+
354 | 255 | variable | 32 | group | public key |
355 +------------+----------+------------+---------+--------------+
356
357 Figure 1: The Diffie-Hellman Parameter Element
358
359 where:
360
361 o group is an unsigned two-octet integer defined in [<a href="#ref-IKE-IANA" title="&quot;Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform IDs&quot;">IKE-IANA</a>], in
362 little-endian format, that identifies a domain parameter set;
363
364 o public key is an octet string representing the Diffie-Hellman
365 public key; and,
366
367 o Element ID, Length, and Element ID Extension are all single-octet
368 integers.
369
370 The encoding of the public key depends on its type. FFC elements
371 SHALL be encoded per the integer-to-octet-string conversion technique
372 of [<a href="./rfc6090" title="&quot;Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms&quot;">RFC6090</a>]. For ECC elements, the encoding depends on the
373 definition of the curve, either that in [<a href="./rfc6090" title="&quot;Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms&quot;">RFC6090</a>] or [<a href="./rfc7748" title="&quot;Elliptic Curves for Security&quot;">RFC7748</a>]. If
374 the public key is from a curve defined in [<a href="./rfc6090" title="&quot;Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms&quot;">RFC6090</a>], compact
375 representation SHALL be used.
376
377 A client wishing to do OWE MUST indicate the OWE AKM in the RSN
378 element portion of the 802.11 association request and MUST include a
379 Diffie-Hellman Parameter element to its 802.11 association request.
380 An AP agreeing to do OWE MUST include the OWE AKM in the RSN element
381 portion of the 802.11 association response. If "PMK caching" (see
382 <a href="#section-4.5">Section 4.5</a>) is not performed, it MUST also include a Diffie-Hellman
383 Parameter element. If "PMK caching" is not being performed, a client
384 MUST discard any 802.11 association response that indicates the OWE
385
386
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392
393 AKM in the RSN element but does not have not a Diffie-Hellman
394 Parameter element.
395
396 For interoperability purposes, a compliant implementation MUST
397 support group nineteen (19), a 256-bit elliptic curve group. If the
398 AP does not support the group indicated in the received 802.11
399 association request, it MUST respond with an 802.11 association
400 response with a status code of seventy-seven (77) indicating an
401 unsupported finite cyclic group. A client that receives an 802.11
402 association response with a status code of seventy-seven SHOULD retry
403 OWE with a different supported group and, due to the unsecured nature
404 of 802.11 association, MAY request association again using the group
405 that resulted in failure. This failure SHOULD be logged, and if the
406 client abandons association due to the failure to agree on any group,
407 notification of this fact SHOULD be provided to the user.
408
409 Received Diffie-Hellman Parameter elements are checked for validity
410 upon receipt. For ECC, a validity check depends on the curve
411 definition, either that in [<a href="./rfc6090" title="&quot;Fundamental Elliptic Curve Cryptography Algorithms&quot;">RFC6090</a>] or [<a href="./rfc7748" title="&quot;Elliptic Curves for Security&quot;">RFC7748</a>]. For FFC, elements
412 are checked that they are between one (1) and one (1) less than the
413 prime, p, exclusive (i.e., 1 &lt; element &lt; p-1). Invalid received
414 Diffie-Hellman keys MUST result in unsuccessful association, a
415 failure of OWE, and a reset of the 802.11 state machine. Due to the
416 unsecured nature of 802.11 association, a client SHOULD retry OWE a
417 number of times (this memo does not specify the number of times).
418 This failure should be logged, and if the client abandons association
419 due to the (repeated) receipt of invalid elements, notification of
420 this fact should be provided to the user.
421
422 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.4" href="#section-4.4">4.4</a>. OWE Post-Association</span>
423
424 Once the client and AP have finished 802.11 association, they then
425 complete the Diffie-Hellman key exchange and create a Pairwise Master
426 Key (PMK) and its associated identifier, PMKID [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]. Given a
427 private key x and the peer's (AP's if client, client's if AP) public
428 key Y, the following are generated:
429
430 z = F(DH(x, Y))
431
432 prk = HKDF-extract(C | A | group, z)
433
434 PMK = HKDF-expand(prk, "OWE Key Generation", n)
435
436 where HKDF-expand() and HKDF-extract() are defined in [<a href="./rfc5869" title="&quot;HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key Derivation Function (HKDF)&quot;">RFC5869</a>]; "C |
437 A | group" is a concatenation of the client's Diffie-Hellman public
438 key, the AP's Diffie-Hellman public key (from the 802.11 association
439 request and response, respectively), and the two-octet group from the
440 Diffie-Hellman Parameter element (in little-endian format) and is
441
442
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448
449 passed as the salt to the HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand Key
450 Derivation Function (HKDF) using the hash algorithm defined in
451 <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>; and n is the bit length of the digest produced by that
452 hash algorithm. z and prk SHOULD be irretrievably deleted once the
453 PMK has been generated.
454
455 The PMKID is generated by hashing the two Diffie-Hellman public keys
456 (the data, as sent and received, from the "public key" portion of the
457 Diffie-Hellman Parameter element in the 802.11 association request
458 and response) and returning the leftmost 128 bits:
459
460 PMKID = Truncate-128(Hash(C | A))
461
462 where C is the client's Diffie-Hellman public key from the 802.11
463 association request, A is the AP's Diffie-Hellman public key from the
464 802.11 association response, and Hash is the hash algorithm defined
465 in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>.
466
467 +---------+--------------+----------+-------+------------+----------+
468 | Hash | Integrity | KCK_bits | Size | Key-wrap | KEK_bits |
469 | | Algorithm | | of | Algorithm | |
470 | | | | MIC | | |
471 +---------+--------------+----------+-------+------------+----------+
472 | SHA-256 | HMAC-SHA-256 | 128 | 16 | NIST AES | 128 |
473 | | | | | Key-wrap | |
474 | SHA-384 | HMAC-SHA-384 | 192 | 24 | NIST AES | 256 |
475 | | | | | Key-wrap | |
476 | SHA-512 | HMAC-SHA-521 | 256 | 32 | NIST AES | 256 |
477 | | | | | Key-wrap | |
478 +---------+--------------+----------+-------+------------+----------+
479
480 Table 2: Integrity and Key Wrap Algorithms
481
482 Upon completion of 802.11 association, the AP initiates the 4-way
483 handshake to the client using the PMK generated above. The 4-way
484 handshake generates a Key-Encrypting Key (KEK), a Key-Confirmation
485 Key (KCK), and a Message Integrity Code (MIC) to use for protection
486 of the frames that define the 4-way handshake. The algorithms and
487 key lengths used in the 4-way handshake depend on the hash algorithm
488 selected in <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a> and are listed in Table 2.
489
490 The result of the 4-way handshake is encryption keys to protect bulk
491 unicast data and broadcast data. If the 4-way handshake fails, this
492 information SHOULD be presented to the user.
493
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504
505 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.5" href="#section-4.5">4.5</a>. OWE PMK Caching</span>
506
507 [<a id="ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] defines "PMK caching" where a client and access point
508 can cache a PMK for a certain period of time and reuse it with the
509 4-way handshake after subsequent associations to bypass potentially
510 expensive authentication. A client indicates its desire to do "PMK
511 caching" by including the identifying PMKID in its 802.11 association
512 request. If an AP has cached the PMK identified by that PMKID, it
513 includes the PMKID in its 802.11 association response; otherwise, it
514 ignores the PMKID and proceeds with normal 802.11 association. OWE
515 supports the notion of "PMK caching".
516
517 Since "PMK caching" is indicated in the same frame as the Diffie-
518 Hellman Parameter element is passed, a client wishing to do "PMK
519 caching" MUST include both in her 802.11 association request. If the
520 AP has the PMK identified by the PMKID and wishes to perform "PMK
521 caching", he will include the PMKID in his 802.11 association
522 response but does not include a Diffie-Hellman Parameter element. If
523 the AP does not have the PMK identified by the PMKID, it ignores the
524 PMKID and proceeds with normal OWE 802.11 association by including a
525 Diffie-Hellman Parameter element.
526
527 When attempting "PMK caching", a client SHALL ignore any Diffie-
528 Hellman Parameter element in an 802.11 association response whose
529 PMKID matches that of the client-issued 802.11 association request.
530 If the 802.11 association response does not include a PMKID, or if
531 the PMKID does not match that of the client-issued 802.11 association
532 request, the client SHALL proceed with normal OWE association.
533
534 The client SHALL ignore a PMKID in any 802.11 association response
535 frame for which it did not include a PMKID in the corresponding
536 802.11 association request frame.
537
538 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
539
540 This document does not require any IANA actions.
541
542 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Implementation Considerations</span>
543
544 OWE is a replacement for 802.11 "Open" authentication. Therefore,
545 when OWE-compliant access points are discovered, the presentation of
546 the available SSID to users should not include special security
547 symbols such as a "lock icon". To a user, an OWE SSID is the same as
548 "Open"; it simply provides more security behind the scenes.
549
550 When OWE is initially deployed as a replacement for an existing
551 network that uses "Open" authentication or a shared and public PSK,
552 it will be necessary to create an additional Basic Service Set
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Kumari Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span>
559
560
561 Identifier (BSSID) or a new Extended Service Set (ESS) with a
562 separate Service Set Identifier (SSID) for OWE so two distinct 802.11
563 networks can exist on the same access point (see [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]). This
564 arrangement should remain until the majority of users have switched
565 over to OWE.
566
567 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
568
569 Opportunistic encryption does not provide authentication. The client
570 will have no authenticated identity for the access point, and vice
571 versa. They will share pairwise traffic encryption keys and have a
572 cryptographic assurance that a frame claimed to be from the peer is
573 actually from the peer and was not modified in flight.
574
575 OWE only secures data sent over the wireless medium and does not
576 provide security for end-to-end traffic. Users should still use
577 application-level security to achieve security end-to-end.
578
579 OWE is susceptible to an active attack in which an adversary
580 impersonates an access point and induces a client to connect to it
581 via OWE while it makes a connection to the legitimate access point.
582 In this particular attack, the adversary is able to inspect, modify,
583 and forge any data between the client and legitimate access point.
584
585 OWE is not a replacement for any authentication protocol specified in
586 [<a href="#ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>] and is not intended to be used when an alternative that
587 provides real authentication is available.
588
589 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. References</span>
590
591 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.1" href="#section-8.1">8.1</a>. Normative References</span>
592
593 [<a id="ref-IEEE802.11">IEEE802.11</a>]
594 IEEE, "IEEE Standard for Information technology--
595 Telecommunications and information exchange between
596 systems Local and metropolitan area networks--Specific
597 requirements - Part 11: Wireless LAN Medium Access Control
598 (MAC) and Physical Layer (PHY) Specifications", IEEE Std
599 802.11, DOI 10.1109/IEEESTD.2016.7786995.
600
601 [<a id="ref-IKE-IANA">IKE-IANA</a>] IANA, "Transform Type 4 - Diffie-Hellman Group Transform
602 IDs", &lt;<a href="http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/">http://www.iana.org/assignments/ikev2-parameters/</a>&gt;.
603
604 [<a id="ref-RFC2119">RFC2119</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate
605 Requirement Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>,
606 DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
607 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Harkins &amp; Kumari Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8110">RFC 8110</a> Opportunistic Wireless Encryption March 2017</span>
615
616
617 [<a id="ref-RFC5869">RFC5869</a>] Krawczyk, H. and P. Eronen, "HMAC-based Extract-and-Expand
618 Key Derivation Function (HKDF)", <a href="./rfc5869">RFC 5869</a>,
619 DOI 10.17487/RFC5869, May 2010,
620 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5869</a>&gt;.
621
622 [<a id="ref-RFC6090">RFC6090</a>] McGrew, D., Igoe, K., and M. Salter, "Fundamental Elliptic
623 Curve Cryptography Algorithms", <a href="./rfc6090">RFC 6090</a>,
624 DOI 10.17487/RFC6090, February 2011,
625 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6090</a>&gt;.
626
627 [<a id="ref-RFC7748">RFC7748</a>] Langley, A., Hamburg, M., and S. Turner, "Elliptic Curves
628 for Security", <a href="./rfc7748">RFC 7748</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7748, January
629 2016, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7748</a>&gt;.
630
631 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-8.2" href="#section-8.2">8.2</a>. Informative References</span>
632
633 [<a id="ref-RFC7435">RFC7435</a>] Dukhovni, V., "Opportunistic Security: Some Protection
634 Most of the Time", <a href="./rfc7435">RFC 7435</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7435,
635 December 2014, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7435</a>&gt;.
636
637 Authors' Addresses
638
639 Dan Harkins (editor)
640 HP Enterprise
641 3333 Scott Boulevard
642 Santa Clara, California 95054
643 United States of America
644
645 Phone: +1 415 555 1212
646 Email: [email protected]
647
648
649 Warren Kumari (editor)
650 Google
651 1600 Amphitheatre Parkway
652 Mountain View, California 94043
653 United States of America
654
655 Phone: +1 408 555 1212
656 Email: [email protected]
657
658
659
660
661
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 Harkins &amp; Kumari Informational [Page 12]
669 </pre>