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<pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Lennox |
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Request for Comments: 8122 Vidyo |
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Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc4572">4572</a> C. Holmberg |
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Category: Standards Track Ericsson |
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ISSN: 2070-1721 March 2017 |
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<span class="h1">Connection-Oriented Media Transport over</span> |
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<span class="h1">the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol</span> |
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<span class="h1">in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)</span> |
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Abstract |
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This document specifies how to establish secure connection-oriented |
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media transport sessions over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
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protocol using the Session Description Protocol (SDP). It defines |
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the SDP protocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS'. It also defines the syntax |
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and semantics for an SDP 'fingerprint' attribute that identifies the |
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certificate that will be presented for the TLS session. This |
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mechanism allows media transport over TLS connections to be |
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established securely, so long as the integrity of session |
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descriptions is assured. |
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This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> by clarifying the usage of multiple |
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fingerprints. |
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Status of This Memo |
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This is an Internet Standards Track document. |
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This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force |
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(IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has |
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received public review and has been approved for publication by the |
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Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on |
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Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section 2 of RFC 7841</a>. |
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|
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Information about the current status of this document, any errata, |
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and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at |
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<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122</a>. |
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<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the |
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document authors. All rights reserved. |
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This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal |
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Provisions Relating to IETF Documents |
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(<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of |
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publication of this document. Please review these documents |
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carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect |
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to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must |
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include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of |
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the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as |
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described in the Simplified BSD License. |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. SDP Operational Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. The Need for Self-Signed Certificates . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example SDP Description for TLS Connection . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Fingerprint Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Multiple Fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Certificate Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Certificate Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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The Session Description Protocol (SDP) [<a href="#ref-8" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">8</a>] provides a general-purpose |
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format for describing multimedia sessions in announcements or |
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invitations. For many applications, it is desirable to establish, as |
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part of a multimedia session, a media stream that uses a connection- |
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oriented transport. <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>, "TCP-Based Media Transport in the |
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Session Description Protocol (SDP)" [<a href="#ref-7" title=""TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">7</a>], specifies a general |
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mechanism for describing and establishing such connection-oriented |
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streams; however, the only transport protocol it directly supports is |
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TCP. In many cases, session participants wish to provide |
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confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media |
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sessions. Therefore, this document extends the TCP-Based Media |
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specification to allow session descriptions to describe media |
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sessions that use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [<a href="#ref-10" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">10</a>]. |
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The TLS protocol allows applications to communicate over a channel |
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that provides confidentiality and data integrity. The TLS |
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specification, however, does not specify how specific protocols |
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establish and use this secure channel; particularly, TLS leaves the |
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question of how to interpret and validate authentication certificates |
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as an issue for the protocols that run over TLS. This document |
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specifies such usage for the case of connection-oriented media |
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transport. |
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Complicating this issue, endpoints exchanging media will often be |
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unable to obtain authentication certificates signed by a well-known |
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root certification authority (CA). Most certificate authorities |
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charge for signed certificates, particularly host-based certificates; |
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additionally, there is a substantial administrative overhead to |
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obtaining signed certificates, as certification authorities must be |
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able to confirm that they are issuing the signed certificates to the |
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correct party. Furthermore, in many cases the endpoints' IP |
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addresses and host names are dynamic, for example, they may be |
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obtained from DHCP. It is impractical to obtain a CA-signed |
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certificate valid for the duration of a DHCP lease. For such hosts, |
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self-signed certificates are usually the only option. This |
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specification defines a mechanism that allows self-signed |
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certificates to be used securely, provided that the integrity of the |
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SDP description is assured. It allows for endpoints to include a |
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secure hash of their certificate, known as the "certificate |
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fingerprint", within the session description. Provided that the |
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fingerprint of the offered certificate matches the one in the session |
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description, end hosts can trust even self-signed certificates. |
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<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
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The rest of this document is laid out as follows. An overview of the |
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problem and threat model is given in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> gives the |
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basic mechanism for establishing TLS-based connected-oriented media |
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in SDP. <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> describes the SDP fingerprint attribute, which, |
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assuming that the integrity of the SDP content is assured, allows the |
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secure use of self-signed certificates. <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> describes which |
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X.509 certificates are presented and how they are used in TLS. |
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<a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> discusses additional security considerations. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a></span> |
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This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">20</a>] but remains backwards |
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compatible with older implementations. The changes from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> |
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[<a href="#ref-20" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">20</a>] are as follows: |
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o clarifies that multiple 'fingerprint' attributes can be used to |
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carry fingerprints (calculated using different hash functions) |
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associated with a given certificate and to carry fingerprints |
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associated with multiple certificates. |
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o clarifies the fingerprint matching procedure when multiple |
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fingerprints are provided. |
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o updates the preferred hash function with a stronger cipher suite |
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and removes the requirement to use the same hash function for |
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calculating a certificate fingerprint and certificate signature. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology</span> |
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The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT", |
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"SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this |
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document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">3</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Overview</span> |
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This section discusses the threat model that motivates TLS transport |
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for connection-oriented media streams. It also discusses, in more |
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detail, the need for end systems to use self-signed certificates. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. SDP Operational Modes</span> |
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There are two principal operational modes for multimedia sessions: |
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advertised and offer-answer. Advertised sessions are the simpler |
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mode. In this mode, a server publishes, in some manner, an SDP |
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session description of a multimedia session it is making available. |
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The classic example of this mode of operation is the Session |
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Announcement Protocol (SAP) [<a href="#ref-15" title=""Session Announcement Protocol"">15</a>], in which SDP session descriptions |
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are periodically transmitted to a well-known multicast group. |
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<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
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Traditionally, these descriptions involve multicast conferences, but |
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unicast sessions are also possible. (Obviously, connection-oriented |
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media cannot use multicast.) Recipients of a session description |
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connect to the addresses published in the session description. These |
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recipients may not have been previously known to the advertiser of |
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the session description. |
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Alternatively, SDP conferences can operate in offer-answer mode [<a href="#ref-4" title=""An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">4</a>]. |
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This mode allows two participants in a multimedia session to |
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negotiate the multimedia session between them. In this model, one |
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participant offers the other a description of the desired session |
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from its perspective, and the other participant answers with the |
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desired session from its own perspective. In this mode, each of the |
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participants in the session has knowledge of the other one. This is |
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the mode of operation used by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) |
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[<a href="#ref-17" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">17</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Threat Model</span> |
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Participants in multimedia conferences often wish to guarantee |
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confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media |
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sessions. This section describes various types of attackers and the |
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ways they attempt to violate these guarantees. It then describes how |
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the TLS protocol can be used to thwart the attackers. |
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The simplest type of attacker is one who listens passively to the |
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traffic associated with a multimedia session. This attacker might, |
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for example, be on the same local-area or wireless network as one of |
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the participants in a conference. This sort of attacker does not |
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threaten a connection's data integrity or authentication, and almost |
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any operational mode of TLS can provide media-stream confidentiality. |
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More sophisticated is an attacker who can send his own data traffic |
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over the network, but who cannot modify or redirect valid traffic. |
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In SDP's 'advertised' operational mode, this can barely be considered |
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an attack; media sessions are expected to be initiated from anywhere |
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on the network. In SDP's offer-answer mode, however, this type of |
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attack is more serious. An attacker could initiate a connection to |
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one or both of the endpoints of a session, thus impersonating an |
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endpoint or acting as a man in the middle to listen in on their |
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communications. To thwart these attacks, TLS uses endpoint |
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certificates. So long as the certificates' private keys have not |
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been compromised, the endpoints have an externally trusted mechanism |
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(most commonly, a mutually trusted certification authority) to |
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validate certificates. Because the endpoints know what certificate |
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identity to expect, endpoints can be certain that such an attack has |
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not taken place. |
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<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
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Finally, the most serious type of attacker is one who can modify or |
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redirect session descriptions: for example, a compromised or |
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malicious SIP proxy server. Neither TLS itself nor any mechanisms |
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that use it can protect an SDP session against such an attacker. |
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Instead, the SDP description itself must be secured through some |
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mechanism; SIP, for example, defines how S/MIME [<a href="#ref-22" title=""Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification"">22</a>] can be used to |
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secure session descriptions. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. The Need for Self-Signed Certificates</span> |
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SDP session descriptions are created by any endpoint that needs to |
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participate in a multimedia session. In many cases, such as SIP |
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phones, such endpoints have dynamically configured IP addresses and |
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host names and must be deployed with nearly zero configuration. For |
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such an endpoint, it is, for practical purposes, impossible to obtain |
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a certificate signed by a well-known certification authority. |
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If two endpoints have no prior relationship, self-signed certificates |
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cannot generally be trusted, as there is no guarantee that an |
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attacker is not launching a man-in-the-middle attack. Fortunately, |
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however, if the integrity of SDP session descriptions can be assured, |
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it is possible to consider those SDP descriptions themselves as a |
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prior relationship: certificates can be securely described in the |
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session description itself. This is done by providing a secure hash |
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of a certificate, or "certificate fingerprint", as an SDP attribute; |
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this mechanism is described in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example SDP Description for TLS Connection</span> |
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Figure 1 illustrates an SDP offer that signals the availability of a |
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T.38 fax session over TLS. For the purpose of brevity, the main |
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portion of the session description is omitted in the example, showing |
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only the 'm' line and its attributes. (This example is the same as |
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the first one in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> [<a href="#ref-7" title=""TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">7</a>], except for the proto parameter and the |
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fingerprint attribute.) See the subsequent sections for explanations |
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of the example's TLS-specific attributes. |
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Note: due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP |
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across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters. A backslash |
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character marks where this line folding has taken place. This |
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backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in |
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actual SDP content. |
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<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
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m=image 54111 TCP/TLS t38 |
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c=IN IP4 192.0.2.2 |
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a=setup:passive |
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a=connection:new |
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a=fingerprint:SHA-256 \ |
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12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF: \ |
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3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD |
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a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \ |
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4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB |
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Figure 1: Example SDP Description Offering a TLS Media Stream |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers</span> |
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The 'm' line in SDP specifies, among other items, the transport |
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protocol to be used for the media in the session. See the "Media |
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Descriptions" section of SDP [<a href="#ref-8" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">8</a>] for a discussion on transport |
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protocol identifiers. |
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This specification defines the protocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS', which |
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indicates that the media described will use the Transport Layer |
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Security protocol [<a href="#ref-10" title=""The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2"">10</a>] over TCP. (Using TLS over other transport |
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protocols is not discussed in this document.) The 'TCP/TLS' protocol |
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identifier describes only the transport protocol, not the upper-layer |
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protocol. An 'm' line that specifies 'TCP/TLS' MUST further qualify |
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the protocol using an fmt identifier to indicate the application |
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being run over TLS. |
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Media sessions described with this identifier follow the procedures |
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defined in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> [<a href="#ref-7" title=""TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">7</a>]. They also use the SDP attributes defined in |
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that specification, 'setup' and 'connection'. |
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|
| 369 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Fingerprint Attribute</span> |
| 370 |
|
| 371 |
Parties to a TLS session indicate their identities by presenting |
| 372 |
authentication certificates as part of the TLS handshake procedure. |
| 373 |
Authentication certificates are X.509 [<a href="#ref-2" title=""Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- The Directory -- Part 8: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks"">2</a>] certificates, as profiled |
| 374 |
by RFCs 3279 [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">5</a>], 5280 [<a href="#ref-11" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">11</a>], and 4055 [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">6</a>]. |
| 375 |
|
| 376 |
In order to associate media streams with connections and to prevent |
| 377 |
unauthorized barge-in attacks on the media streams, endpoints MUST |
| 378 |
provide a certificate fingerprint. If the X.509 certificate |
| 379 |
presented for the TLS connection matches the fingerprint presented in |
| 380 |
the SDP, the endpoint can be confident that the author of the SDP is |
| 381 |
indeed the initiator of the connection. |
| 382 |
|
| 383 |
|
| 384 |
|
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
A certificate fingerprint is a secure one-way hash of the |
| 394 |
Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form of the certificate. |
| 395 |
(Certificate fingerprints are widely supported by tools that |
| 396 |
manipulate X.509 certificates; for instance, the command "openssl |
| 397 |
x509 -fingerprint" causes the command-line tool of the openssl |
| 398 |
package to print a certificate fingerprint, and the certificate |
| 399 |
managers for Mozilla and Internet Explorer display them when viewing |
| 400 |
the details of a certificate.) |
| 401 |
|
| 402 |
A fingerprint is represented in SDP as an attribute (an 'a' line). |
| 403 |
It consists of the name of the hash function used, followed by the |
| 404 |
hash value itself. The hash value is represented as a sequence of |
| 405 |
uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated by colons. The number of |
| 406 |
bytes is defined by the hash function. (This is the syntax used by |
| 407 |
openssl and by the browsers' certificate managers. It is different |
| 408 |
from the syntax used to represent hash values in, for example, HTTP |
| 409 |
digest authentication [<a href="#ref-24" title=""HTTP Digest Access Authentication"">24</a>], which uses unseparated lowercase |
| 410 |
hexadecimal bytes. Consistency with other applications of |
| 411 |
fingerprints was considered more important.) |
| 412 |
|
| 413 |
The formal syntax of the fingerprint attribute is given in Augmented |
| 414 |
Backus-Naur Form [<a href="#ref-9" title=""Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF"">9</a>] in Figure 2. This syntax extends the BNF syntax |
| 415 |
of SDP [<a href="#ref-8" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">8</a>]. |
| 416 |
|
| 417 |
attribute =/ fingerprint-attribute |
| 418 |
|
| 419 |
fingerprint-attribute = "fingerprint" ":" hash-func SP fingerprint |
| 420 |
|
| 421 |
hash-func = "sha-1" / "sha-224" / "sha-256" / |
| 422 |
"sha-384" / "sha-512" / |
| 423 |
"md5" / "md2" / token |
| 424 |
; Additional hash functions can only come |
| 425 |
; from updates to <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
fingerprint = 2UHEX *(":" 2UHEX) |
| 428 |
; Each byte in upper-case hex, separated |
| 429 |
; by colons. |
| 430 |
|
| 431 |
UHEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 ; A-F uppercase |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
Figure 2: Augmented Backus-Naur Syntax for the Fingerprint Attribute |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
Following <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">5</a>] as updated by <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">6</a>], the defined hash |
| 436 |
functions are 'SHA-1' [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">1</a>] [<a href="#ref-16" title=""US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)"">16</a>], 'SHA-224' [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">1</a>], 'SHA-256' [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">1</a>], 'SHA- |
| 437 |
384' [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">1</a>], 'SHA-512' [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Secure Hash Standard (SHS)"">1</a>], 'MD5' [<a href="#ref-13" title=""The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm"">13</a>], and 'MD2' [<a href="#ref-23" title=""MD2 to Historic Status"">23</a>], with 'SHA-256' |
| 438 |
preferred. A new IANA registry, named "Hash Function Textual Names", |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
specified in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>, allows for the addition of future tokens, but |
| 450 |
they may only be added if they are included in RFCs that update or |
| 451 |
obsolete <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">5</a>]. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
Implementations compliant with this specification MUST NOT use the |
| 454 |
MD2 and MD5 hash functions to calculate fingerprints or to verify |
| 455 |
received fingerprints that have been calculated using them. |
| 456 |
|
| 457 |
Note: The MD2 and MD5 hash functions are listed in this specification |
| 458 |
so that implementations can recognize them. Implementations that log |
| 459 |
unused hash functions might log occurrences of these algorithms |
| 460 |
differently to unknown hash algorithms. |
| 461 |
|
| 462 |
The fingerprint attribute may be either a session-level or a media- |
| 463 |
level SDP attribute. If it is a session-level attribute, it applies |
| 464 |
to all TLS sessions for which no media-level fingerprint attribute is |
| 465 |
defined. |
| 466 |
|
| 467 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Multiple Fingerprints</span> |
| 468 |
|
| 469 |
Multiple SDP fingerprint attributes can be associated with an 'm' |
| 470 |
line. This can occur if multiple fingerprints have been calculated |
| 471 |
for a certificate using different hash functions. It can also occur |
| 472 |
if one or more fingerprints associated with multiple certificates |
| 473 |
have been calculated. This might be needed if multiple certificates |
| 474 |
will be used for media associated with an 'm' line (e.g., if separate |
| 475 |
certificates are used for RTP and the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)) or |
| 476 |
where it is not known which certificate will be used when the |
| 477 |
fingerprints are exchanged. In such cases, one or more fingerprints |
| 478 |
MUST be calculated for each possible certificate. |
| 479 |
|
| 480 |
An endpoint MUST, as a minimum, calculate a fingerprint using both |
| 481 |
the 'SHA-256' hash function algorithm and the hash function used to |
| 482 |
generate the signature on the certificate for each possible |
| 483 |
certificate. Including the hash from the signature algorithm ensures |
| 484 |
interoperability with strict implementations of <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">20</a>]. |
| 485 |
Either of these fingerprints MAY be omitted if the endpoint includes |
| 486 |
a hash with a stronger hash algorithm that it knows that the peer |
| 487 |
supports, if it is known that the peer does not support the hash |
| 488 |
algorithm, or if local policy mandates use of stronger algorithms. |
| 489 |
|
| 490 |
If fingerprints associated with multiple certificates are calculated, |
| 491 |
the same set of hash functions MUST be used to calculate fingerprints |
| 492 |
for each certificate associated with the 'm' line. |
| 493 |
|
| 494 |
An endpoint MUST select the set of fingerprints that use its most |
| 495 |
preferred hash function (out of those offered by the peer) and verify |
| 496 |
that each certificate used matches one fingerprint out of that set. |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
If a certificate does not match any such fingerprint, the endpoint |
| 506 |
MUST NOT establish the TLS connection. |
| 507 |
|
| 508 |
Note: The SDP fingerprint attribute does not contain a reference to a |
| 509 |
specific certificate. Endpoints need to compare the fingerprint with |
| 510 |
a certificate hash in order to look for a match. |
| 511 |
|
| 512 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Endpoint Identification</span> |
| 513 |
|
| 514 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Certificate Choice</span> |
| 515 |
|
| 516 |
An X.509 certificate binds an identity and a public key. If SDP |
| 517 |
describing a TLS session is transmitted over a mechanism that |
| 518 |
provides integrity protection, a certificate asserting any |
| 519 |
syntactically valid identity MAY be used. For example, an SDP |
| 520 |
description sent over HTTP/TLS [<a href="#ref-14" title=""HTTP Over TLS"">14</a>] or secured by S/MIME [<a href="#ref-22" title=""Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification"">22</a>] MAY |
| 521 |
assert any identity in the certificate securing the media connection. |
| 522 |
|
| 523 |
Security protocols that provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection |
| 524 |
(e.g., the SIPS scheme [<a href="#ref-17" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">17</a>], SIP over TLS) are considered |
| 525 |
sufficiently secure to allow the mode in which any valid identity is |
| 526 |
accepted. However, see <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> for a discussion of some security |
| 527 |
implications of this fact. |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
In situations where the SDP is not integrity-protected, the |
| 530 |
certificate provided for a TLS connection MUST certify an appropriate |
| 531 |
identity for the connection. In these scenarios, the certificate |
| 532 |
presented by an endpoint MUST certify either the SDP connection |
| 533 |
address or the identity of the creator of the SDP message, as |
| 534 |
follows: |
| 535 |
|
| 536 |
o If the connection address for the media description is specified |
| 537 |
as an IP address, the endpoint MAY use a certificate with an |
| 538 |
iPAddress subjectAltName that exactly matches the IP in the |
| 539 |
connection-address in the session description's 'c' line. |
| 540 |
Similarly, if the connection address for the media description is |
| 541 |
specified as a fully qualified domain name, the endpoint MAY use a |
| 542 |
certificate with a dNSName subjectAltName matching the specified |
| 543 |
'c' line connection-address exactly. (Wildcard patterns MUST NOT |
| 544 |
be used.) |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
o Alternately, if the SDP session description of the session was |
| 547 |
transmitted over a protocol (such as SIP [<a href="#ref-17" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">17</a>]) for which the |
| 548 |
identities of session participants are defined by Uniform Resource |
| 549 |
Identifiers (URIs), the endpoint MAY use a certificate with a |
| 550 |
uniformResourceIdentifier subjectAltName corresponding to the |
| 551 |
identity of the endpoint that generated the SDP. The details of |
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
what URIs are valid are dependent on the transmitting protocol. |
| 562 |
(For more details on the validity of URIs, see <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>. |
| 563 |
|
| 564 |
Identity matching is performed using the matching rules specified by |
| 565 |
<a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a> [<a href="#ref-11" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">11</a>]. If more than one identity of a given type is present |
| 566 |
in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name), a match in any |
| 567 |
one of the set is considered acceptable. To support the use of |
| 568 |
certificate caches, as described in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>, endpoints SHOULD |
| 569 |
consistently provide the same certificate for each identity they |
| 570 |
support. |
| 571 |
|
| 572 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Certificate Presentation</span> |
| 573 |
|
| 574 |
In all cases, an endpoint acting as the TLS server (i.e., one taking |
| 575 |
the 'setup:passive' role, in the terminology of connection-oriented |
| 576 |
media) MUST present a certificate during TLS initiation, following |
| 577 |
the rules presented in <a href="#section-6.1">Section 6.1</a>. If the certificate does not |
| 578 |
match the original fingerprint, the client endpoint MUST terminate |
| 579 |
the media connection with a bad_certificate error. |
| 580 |
|
| 581 |
If the SDP offer/answer model [<a href="#ref-4" title=""An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">4</a>] is being used, the client (the |
| 582 |
endpoint with the 'setup:active' role) MUST also present a |
| 583 |
certificate following the rules of <a href="#section-6.1">Section 6.1</a>. The server MUST |
| 584 |
request a certificate; if the client does not provide one, or if the |
| 585 |
certificate does not match a provided fingerprint, the server |
| 586 |
endpoint MUST terminate the media connection with a bad_certificate |
| 587 |
error. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
Note that when the offer/answer model is being used, it is possible |
| 590 |
for a media connection to outrace the answer back to the offerer. |
| 591 |
Thus, if the offerer has offered a 'setup:passive' or 'setup:actpass' |
| 592 |
role, it MUST (as specified in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> [<a href="#ref-7" title=""TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">7</a>]) begin listening for an |
| 593 |
incoming connection as soon as it sends its offer. However, it MUST |
| 594 |
NOT assume that the data transmitted over the TLS connection is valid |
| 595 |
until it has received a matching fingerprint in an SDP answer. If |
| 596 |
the fingerprint, once it arrives, does not match the client's |
| 597 |
certificate, the server endpoint MUST terminate the media connection |
| 598 |
with a bad_certificate error, as stated in the previous paragraph. |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
If offer/answer is not being used (e.g., if the SDP was sent over the |
| 601 |
Session Announcement Protocol [<a href="#ref-15" title=""Session Announcement Protocol"">15</a>]), there is no secure channel |
| 602 |
available for clients to communicate certificate fingerprints to |
| 603 |
servers. In this case, servers MAY request client certificates, |
| 604 |
which SHOULD be signed by a well-known certification authority, or |
| 605 |
MAY allow clients to connect without a certificate. |
| 606 |
|
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 618 |
|
| 619 |
This entire document concerns itself with security. The problem to |
| 620 |
be solved is addressed in <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>, and a high-level overview is |
| 621 |
presented in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. See the SDP specification [<a href="#ref-8" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">8</a>] for security |
| 622 |
considerations applicable to SDP in general. |
| 623 |
|
| 624 |
Offering a TCP/TLS connection in SDP (or agreeing to one in the SDP |
| 625 |
offer/answer mode) does not create an obligation for an endpoint to |
| 626 |
accept any TLS connection with the given fingerprint. Instead, the |
| 627 |
endpoint must engage in the standard TLS negotiation procedure to |
| 628 |
ensure that the TLS stream cipher and MAC algorithm chosen meet the |
| 629 |
security needs of the higher-level application. (For example, an |
| 630 |
offered stream cipher of TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL SHOULD be rejected |
| 631 |
in almost every application scenario.) |
| 632 |
|
| 633 |
Like all SDP messages, SDP messages describing TLS streams are |
| 634 |
conveyed in an encapsulating application protocol (e.g., SIP, Media |
| 635 |
Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), etc.). It is the responsibility of |
| 636 |
the encapsulating protocol to ensure the integrity of the SDP |
| 637 |
security descriptions. Therefore, the application protocol SHOULD |
| 638 |
either invoke its own security mechanisms (e.g., secure multiparts) |
| 639 |
or, alternatively, utilize a lower-layer security service (e.g., TLS |
| 640 |
or IPsec). This security service SHOULD provide strong message |
| 641 |
authentication as well as effective replay protection. |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
However, such integrity protection is not always possible. For these |
| 644 |
cases, end systems SHOULD maintain a cache of certificates that other |
| 645 |
parties have previously presented using this mechanism. If possible, |
| 646 |
users SHOULD be notified when an unsecured certificate associated |
| 647 |
with a previously unknown end system is presented and SHOULD be |
| 648 |
strongly warned if a different unsecured certificate is presented by |
| 649 |
a party with which they have communicated in the past. In this way, |
| 650 |
even in the absence of integrity protection for SDP, the security of |
| 651 |
this document's mechanism is equivalent to that of the Secure Shell |
| 652 |
(SSH) protocol [<a href="#ref-18" title=""The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture"">18</a>], which is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks |
| 653 |
when two parties first communicate but can detect ones that occur |
| 654 |
subsequently. (Note that a precise definition of the "other party" |
| 655 |
depends on the application protocol carrying the SDP message.) Users |
| 656 |
SHOULD NOT, however, in any circumstances be notified about |
| 657 |
certificates described in the SDP descriptions sent over an |
| 658 |
integrity-protected channel. |
| 659 |
|
| 660 |
To aid interoperability and deployment, security protocols that |
| 661 |
provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection (e.g., the SIPS scheme |
| 662 |
[<a href="#ref-17" title=""SIP: Session Initiation Protocol"">17</a>], SIP over TLS) are considered sufficiently secure to allow the |
| 663 |
mode in which any syntactically valid identity is accepted in a |
| 664 |
certificate. This decision was made because SIPS is currently the |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
integrity mechanism most likely to be used in deployed networks in |
| 674 |
the short to medium term. However, in this mode, SDP integrity is |
| 675 |
vulnerable to attacks by compromised or malicious middleboxes, e.g., |
| 676 |
SIP proxy servers. End systems MAY warn users about SDP sessions |
| 677 |
that are secured in only a hop-by-hop manner, and definitions of |
| 678 |
media formats running over TCP/TLS MAY specify that only end-to-end |
| 679 |
integrity mechanisms be used. |
| 680 |
|
| 681 |
Depending on how SDP messages are transmitted, it is not always |
| 682 |
possible to determine whether or not a subjectAltName presented in a |
| 683 |
remote certificate is expected for the remote party. In particular, |
| 684 |
given call forwarding, third-party call control, or session |
| 685 |
descriptions generated by endpoints controlled by the Gateway Control |
| 686 |
Protocol [<a href="#ref-21" title=""Reclassification of RFC 3525 to Historic"">21</a>], it is not always possible in SIP to determine what |
| 687 |
entity ought to have generated a remote SDP response. In general, |
| 688 |
when not using authenticity and integrity protection of the SDP |
| 689 |
descriptions, a certificate transmitted over SIP SHOULD assert the |
| 690 |
endpoint's SIP Address of Record as a uniformResourceIndicator |
| 691 |
subjectAltName. When an endpoint receives a certificate over SIP |
| 692 |
asserting an identity (including an iPAddress or dNSName identity) |
| 693 |
other than the one to which it placed or received the call, it SHOULD |
| 694 |
alert the user and ask for confirmation. This applies whether |
| 695 |
certificates are self-signed or signed by certification authorities; |
| 696 |
a certificate for "sip:[email protected]" may be legitimately signed by |
| 697 |
a certification authority, but it may still not be acceptable for a |
| 698 |
call to "sip:[email protected]". (This issue is not one specific to |
| 699 |
this specification; the same consideration applies for S/MIME-signed |
| 700 |
SDP carried over SIP.) |
| 701 |
|
| 702 |
This document does not define a mechanism for securely transporting |
| 703 |
RTP and RTCP packets over a connection-oriented channel. Please see |
| 704 |
<a href="./rfc7850">RFC 7850</a> [<a href="#ref-19" title=""Framing Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Packets over Connection-Oriented Transport"">19</a>] for more details. |
| 705 |
|
| 706 |
TLS is not always the most appropriate choice for secure connection- |
| 707 |
oriented media; in some cases, a higher- or lower-level security |
| 708 |
protocol may be appropriate. |
| 709 |
|
| 710 |
This document improves security from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">20</a>]. It updates the |
| 711 |
preferred hash function from SHA-1 to SHA-256 and deprecates the |
| 712 |
usage of the MD2 and MD5 hash functions. |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
By clarifying the usage and handling of multiple fingerprints, the |
| 715 |
document also enables hash agility and incremental deployment of |
| 716 |
newer and more secure hash functions. |
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 730 |
|
| 731 |
IANA has updated the registrations defined in <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">20</a>] to refer |
| 732 |
to this specification. |
| 733 |
|
| 734 |
This document defines an SDP proto value: 'TCP/TLS'. Its format is |
| 735 |
defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. This proto value has been registered by IANA |
| 736 |
under the "proto" registry within the "Session Description Protocol |
| 737 |
(SDP) Parameters" registry. |
| 738 |
|
| 739 |
This document defines an SDP session and media-level attribute: |
| 740 |
'fingerprint'. Its format is defined in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. This attribute |
| 741 |
has been registered by IANA under the "att-field (both session and |
| 742 |
media level)" registry within the "Session Description Protocol (SDP) |
| 743 |
Parameters" registry. |
| 744 |
|
| 745 |
The SDP specification [<a href="#ref-8" title=""SDP: Session Description Protocol"">8</a>] states that specifications defining new |
| 746 |
proto values, like the 'TCP/TLS' proto value defined in this one, |
| 747 |
must define the rules by which their media format (fmt) namespace is |
| 748 |
managed. For the TCP/TLS protocol, new formats SHOULD have an |
| 749 |
associated MIME registration. Use of an existing MIME subtype for |
| 750 |
the format is encouraged. If no MIME subtype exists, it is |
| 751 |
RECOMMENDED that a suitable one be registered through the IETF |
| 752 |
process [<a href="#ref-12" title=""Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures"">12</a>] by production of, or reference to, a Standards Track RFC |
| 753 |
that defines the transport protocol for the format. |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
IANA has updated the "Hash Function Textual Names" registry (which |
| 756 |
was originally created in [<a href="#ref-20" title=""Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)"">20</a>]) to refer to this document. |
| 757 |
|
| 758 |
The names of hash functions used for certificate fingerprints are |
| 759 |
registered by the IANA. Hash functions MUST be defined by Standards |
| 760 |
Track RFCs that update or obsolete <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">5</a>]. |
| 761 |
|
| 762 |
When registering a new hash function textual name, the following |
| 763 |
information MUST be provided: |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
o The textual name of the hash function. |
| 766 |
|
| 767 |
o The Object Identifier (OID) of the hash function as used in X.509 |
| 768 |
certificates. |
| 769 |
|
| 770 |
o A reference to the Standards Track RFC that updates or obsoletes |
| 771 |
<a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">5</a>] and defines the use of the hash function in X.509 |
| 772 |
certificates. |
| 773 |
|
| 774 |
|
| 775 |
|
| 776 |
|
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
Table 1 contains the initial values of this registry. |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
+--------------------+------------------------+-----------+ |
| 788 |
| Hash Function Name | OID | Reference | |
| 789 |
+--------------------+------------------------+-----------+ |
| 790 |
| "md2" | 1.2.840.113549.2.2 | <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> | |
| 791 |
| "md5" | 1.2.840.113549.2.5 | <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> | |
| 792 |
| "sha-1" | 1.3.14.3.2.26 | <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> | |
| 793 |
| "sha-224" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> | |
| 794 |
| "sha-256" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> | |
| 795 |
| "sha-384" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> | |
| 796 |
| "sha-512" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> | |
| 797 |
+--------------------+------------------------+-----------+ |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
Table 1: IANA Hash Function Textual Name Registry |
| 800 |
|
| 801 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span> |
| 802 |
|
| 803 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 804 |
|
| 805 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash |
| 806 |
Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4, |
| 807 |
August 2015, <<a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/</a> |
| 808 |
<a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf</a>>. |
| 809 |
|
| 810 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] International Organization for Standardization, "Information |
| 811 |
technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- The Directory -- |
| 812 |
Part 8: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks", |
| 813 |
ISO/IEC 9594-8:2014, March 2014, |
| 814 |
<<a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/64854.html">https://www.iso.org/standard/64854.html</a>>. |
| 815 |
|
| 816 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement |
| 817 |
Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997, |
| 818 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>>. |
| 819 |
|
| 820 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with |
| 821 |
Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc3264">RFC 3264</a>, |
| 822 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002, |
| 823 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264</a>>. |
| 824 |
|
| 825 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and |
| 826 |
Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure |
| 827 |
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", |
| 828 |
<a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002, |
| 829 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279</a>>. |
| 830 |
|
| 831 |
|
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms |
| 842 |
and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet |
| 843 |
X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate |
| 844 |
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055, |
| 845 |
June 2005, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055</a>>. |
| 846 |
|
| 847 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in the |
| 848 |
Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>, |
| 849 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC4145, September 2005, |
| 850 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4145">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4145</a>>. |
| 851 |
|
| 852 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session |
| 853 |
Description Protocol", <a href="./rfc4566">RFC 4566</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566, July |
| 854 |
2006, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566</a>>. |
| 855 |
|
| 856 |
[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax |
| 857 |
Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, <a href="./rfc5234">RFC 5234</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234, |
| 858 |
January 2008, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234</a>>. |
| 859 |
|
| 860 |
[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS) |
| 861 |
Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August |
| 862 |
2008, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246</a>>. |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
[<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R., |
| 865 |
and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure |
| 866 |
Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile", |
| 867 |
<a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008, |
| 868 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>>. |
| 869 |
|
| 870 |
[<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type |
| 871 |
Specifications and Registration Procedures", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp13">BCP 13</a>, <a href="./rfc6838">RFC 6838</a>, |
| 872 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013, |
| 873 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838</a>>. |
| 874 |
|
| 875 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 876 |
|
| 877 |
[<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>, |
| 878 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992, |
| 879 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321</a>>. |
| 880 |
|
| 881 |
[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", <a href="./rfc2818">RFC 2818</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818, |
| 882 |
May 2000, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>>. |
| 883 |
|
| 884 |
[<a id="ref-15">15</a>] Handley, M., Perkins, C., and E. Whelan, "Session Announcement |
| 885 |
Protocol", <a href="./rfc2974">RFC 2974</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2974, October 2000, |
| 886 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2974">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2974</a>>. |
| 887 |
|
| 888 |
|
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
[<a id="ref-16">16</a>] Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 |
| 898 |
(SHA1)", <a href="./rfc3174">RFC 3174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001, |
| 899 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174</a>>. |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
[<a id="ref-17">17</a>] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A., |
| 902 |
Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP: |
| 903 |
Session Initiation Protocol", <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261, |
| 904 |
June 2002, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261</a>>. |
| 905 |
|
| 906 |
[<a id="ref-18">18</a>] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol |
| 907 |
Architecture", <a href="./rfc4251">RFC 4251</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251, January 2006, |
| 908 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251</a>>. |
| 909 |
|
| 910 |
[<a id="ref-19">19</a>] Lazzaro, J., "Framing Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP |
| 911 |
Control Protocol (RTCP) Packets over Connection-Oriented |
| 912 |
Transport", <a href="./rfc4571">RFC 4571</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4571, July 2006, |
| 913 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4571">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4571</a>>. |
| 914 |
|
| 915 |
[<a id="ref-20">20</a>] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the |
| 916 |
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session |
| 917 |
Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4572, |
| 918 |
July 2006, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572</a>>. |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
[<a id="ref-21">21</a>] Taylor, T., "Reclassification of <a href="./rfc3525">RFC 3525</a> to Historic", |
| 921 |
<a href="./rfc5125">RFC 5125</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5125, February 2008, |
| 922 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5125">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5125</a>>. |
| 923 |
|
| 924 |
[<a id="ref-22">22</a>] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail |
| 925 |
Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification", |
| 926 |
<a href="./rfc5751">RFC 5751</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751, January 2010, |
| 927 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751</a>>. |
| 928 |
|
| 929 |
[<a id="ref-23">23</a>] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD2 to Historic Status", <a href="./rfc6149">RFC 6149</a>, |
| 930 |
DOI 10.17487/RFC6149, March 2011, |
| 931 |
<<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6149">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6149</a>>. |
| 932 |
|
| 933 |
[<a id="ref-24">24</a>] Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP Digest |
| 934 |
Access Authentication", <a href="./rfc7616">RFC 7616</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7616, |
| 935 |
September 2015, <<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616</a>>. |
| 936 |
|
| 937 |
|
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
|
| 940 |
|
| 941 |
|
| 942 |
|
| 943 |
|
| 944 |
|
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
Acknowledgments |
| 954 |
|
| 955 |
This document included significant contributions by Cullen Jennings, |
| 956 |
Paul Kyzivat, Roman Shpount, and Martin Thomson. Elwyn Davies |
| 957 |
performed the Gen-ART review of the document. |
| 958 |
|
| 959 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 960 |
|
| 961 |
Jonathan Lennox |
| 962 |
Vidyo |
| 963 |
|
| 964 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 965 |
|
| 966 |
|
| 967 |
Christer Holmberg |
| 968 |
Ericsson |
| 969 |
|
| 970 |
Email: [email protected] |
| 971 |
|
| 972 |
|
| 973 |
|
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
|
| 976 |
|
| 977 |
|
| 978 |
|
| 979 |
|
| 980 |
|
| 981 |
|
| 982 |
|
| 983 |
|
| 984 |
|
| 985 |
|
| 986 |
|
| 987 |
|
| 988 |
|
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
|
| 991 |
|
| 992 |
|
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
|
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
|
| 997 |
|
| 998 |
|
| 999 |
|
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
Lennox & Holmberg Standards Track [Page 18] |
| 1005 |
</pre> |