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1 <pre>Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) J. Lennox
2 Request for Comments: 8122 Vidyo
3 Obsoletes: <a href="./rfc4572">4572</a> C. Holmberg
4 Category: Standards Track Ericsson
5 ISSN: 2070-1721 March 2017
6
7
8 <span class="h1">Connection-Oriented Media Transport over</span>
9 <span class="h1">the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol</span>
10 <span class="h1">in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)</span>
11
12 Abstract
13
14 This document specifies how to establish secure connection-oriented
15 media transport sessions over the Transport Layer Security (TLS)
16 protocol using the Session Description Protocol (SDP). It defines
17 the SDP protocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS'. It also defines the syntax
18 and semantics for an SDP 'fingerprint' attribute that identifies the
19 certificate that will be presented for the TLS session. This
20 mechanism allows media transport over TLS connections to be
21 established securely, so long as the integrity of session
22 descriptions is assured.
23
24 This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> by clarifying the usage of multiple
25 fingerprints.
26
27 Status of This Memo
28
29 This is an Internet Standards Track document.
30
31 This document is a product of the Internet Engineering Task Force
32 (IETF). It represents the consensus of the IETF community. It has
33 received public review and has been approved for publication by the
34 Internet Engineering Steering Group (IESG). Further information on
35 Internet Standards is available in <a href="./rfc7841#section-2">Section&nbsp;2 of RFC 7841</a>.
36
37 Information about the current status of this document, any errata,
38 and how to provide feedback on it may be obtained at
39 <a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc8122</a>.
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52 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
55
56
57 Copyright Notice
58
59 Copyright (c) 2017 IETF Trust and the persons identified as the
60 document authors. All rights reserved.
61
62 This document is subject to <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and the IETF Trust's Legal
63 Provisions Relating to IETF Documents
64 (<a href="http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info">http://trustee.ietf.org/license-info</a>) in effect on the date of
65 publication of this document. Please review these documents
66 carefully, as they describe your rights and restrictions with respect
67 to this document. Code Components extracted from this document must
68 include Simplified BSD License text as described in Section 4.e of
69 the Trust Legal Provisions and are provided without warranty as
70 described in the Simplified BSD License.
71
72 Table of Contents
73
74 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
75 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
76 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
77 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. SDP Operational Modes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Threat Model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-5">5</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. The Need for Self-Signed Certificates . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example SDP Description for TLS Connection . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
82 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
83 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Fingerprint Attribute . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
84 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Multiple Fingerprints . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
85 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Endpoint Identification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
86 <a href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Certificate Choice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
87 <a href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Certificate Presentation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
88 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
89 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-14">14</a>
90 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
91 <a href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-15">15</a>
92 <a href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-16">16</a>
93 Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
94 Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-18">18</a>
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108 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 The Session Description Protocol (SDP) [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">8</a>] provides a general-purpose
116 format for describing multimedia sessions in announcements or
117 invitations. For many applications, it is desirable to establish, as
118 part of a multimedia session, a media stream that uses a connection-
119 oriented transport. <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>, "TCP-Based Media Transport in the
120 Session Description Protocol (SDP)" [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">7</a>], specifies a general
121 mechanism for describing and establishing such connection-oriented
122 streams; however, the only transport protocol it directly supports is
123 TCP. In many cases, session participants wish to provide
124 confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media
125 sessions. Therefore, this document extends the TCP-Based Media
126 specification to allow session descriptions to describe media
127 sessions that use the Transport Layer Security (TLS) protocol [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">10</a>].
128
129 The TLS protocol allows applications to communicate over a channel
130 that provides confidentiality and data integrity. The TLS
131 specification, however, does not specify how specific protocols
132 establish and use this secure channel; particularly, TLS leaves the
133 question of how to interpret and validate authentication certificates
134 as an issue for the protocols that run over TLS. This document
135 specifies such usage for the case of connection-oriented media
136 transport.
137
138 Complicating this issue, endpoints exchanging media will often be
139 unable to obtain authentication certificates signed by a well-known
140 root certification authority (CA). Most certificate authorities
141 charge for signed certificates, particularly host-based certificates;
142 additionally, there is a substantial administrative overhead to
143 obtaining signed certificates, as certification authorities must be
144 able to confirm that they are issuing the signed certificates to the
145 correct party. Furthermore, in many cases the endpoints' IP
146 addresses and host names are dynamic, for example, they may be
147 obtained from DHCP. It is impractical to obtain a CA-signed
148 certificate valid for the duration of a DHCP lease. For such hosts,
149 self-signed certificates are usually the only option. This
150 specification defines a mechanism that allows self-signed
151 certificates to be used securely, provided that the integrity of the
152 SDP description is assured. It allows for endpoints to include a
153 secure hash of their certificate, known as the "certificate
154 fingerprint", within the session description. Provided that the
155 fingerprint of the offered certificate matches the one in the session
156 description, end hosts can trust even self-signed certificates.
157
158
159
160
161
162
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164 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
167
168
169 The rest of this document is laid out as follows. An overview of the
170 problem and threat model is given in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> gives the
171 basic mechanism for establishing TLS-based connected-oriented media
172 in SDP. <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> describes the SDP fingerprint attribute, which,
173 assuming that the integrity of the SDP content is assured, allows the
174 secure use of self-signed certificates. <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> describes which
175 X.509 certificates are presented and how they are used in TLS.
176 <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> discusses additional security considerations.
177
178 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Changes from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a></span>
179
180 This document obsoletes <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">20</a>] but remains backwards
181 compatible with older implementations. The changes from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a>
182 [<a href="#ref-20" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">20</a>] are as follows:
183
184 o clarifies that multiple 'fingerprint' attributes can be used to
185 carry fingerprints (calculated using different hash functions)
186 associated with a given certificate and to carry fingerprints
187 associated with multiple certificates.
188
189 o clarifies the fingerprint matching procedure when multiple
190 fingerprints are provided.
191
192 o updates the preferred hash function with a stronger cipher suite
193 and removes the requirement to use the same hash function for
194 calculating a certificate fingerprint and certificate signature.
195
196 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Terminology</span>
197
198 The key words "MUST", "MUST NOT", "REQUIRED", "SHALL", "SHALL NOT",
199 "SHOULD", "SHOULD NOT", "RECOMMENDED", "MAY", and "OPTIONAL" in this
200 document are to be interpreted as described in <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a> [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">3</a>].
201
202 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Overview</span>
203
204 This section discusses the threat model that motivates TLS transport
205 for connection-oriented media streams. It also discusses, in more
206 detail, the need for end systems to use self-signed certificates.
207
208 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. SDP Operational Modes</span>
209
210 There are two principal operational modes for multimedia sessions:
211 advertised and offer-answer. Advertised sessions are the simpler
212 mode. In this mode, a server publishes, in some manner, an SDP
213 session description of a multimedia session it is making available.
214 The classic example of this mode of operation is the Session
215 Announcement Protocol (SAP) [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Session Announcement Protocol&quot;">15</a>], in which SDP session descriptions
216 are periodically transmitted to a well-known multicast group.
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
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224
225 Traditionally, these descriptions involve multicast conferences, but
226 unicast sessions are also possible. (Obviously, connection-oriented
227 media cannot use multicast.) Recipients of a session description
228 connect to the addresses published in the session description. These
229 recipients may not have been previously known to the advertiser of
230 the session description.
231
232 Alternatively, SDP conferences can operate in offer-answer mode [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">4</a>].
233 This mode allows two participants in a multimedia session to
234 negotiate the multimedia session between them. In this model, one
235 participant offers the other a description of the desired session
236 from its perspective, and the other participant answers with the
237 desired session from its own perspective. In this mode, each of the
238 participants in the session has knowledge of the other one. This is
239 the mode of operation used by the Session Initiation Protocol (SIP)
240 [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;SIP: Session Initiation Protocol&quot;">17</a>].
241
242 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Threat Model</span>
243
244 Participants in multimedia conferences often wish to guarantee
245 confidentiality, data integrity, and authentication for their media
246 sessions. This section describes various types of attackers and the
247 ways they attempt to violate these guarantees. It then describes how
248 the TLS protocol can be used to thwart the attackers.
249
250 The simplest type of attacker is one who listens passively to the
251 traffic associated with a multimedia session. This attacker might,
252 for example, be on the same local-area or wireless network as one of
253 the participants in a conference. This sort of attacker does not
254 threaten a connection's data integrity or authentication, and almost
255 any operational mode of TLS can provide media-stream confidentiality.
256
257 More sophisticated is an attacker who can send his own data traffic
258 over the network, but who cannot modify or redirect valid traffic.
259 In SDP's 'advertised' operational mode, this can barely be considered
260 an attack; media sessions are expected to be initiated from anywhere
261 on the network. In SDP's offer-answer mode, however, this type of
262 attack is more serious. An attacker could initiate a connection to
263 one or both of the endpoints of a session, thus impersonating an
264 endpoint or acting as a man in the middle to listen in on their
265 communications. To thwart these attacks, TLS uses endpoint
266 certificates. So long as the certificates' private keys have not
267 been compromised, the endpoints have an externally trusted mechanism
268 (most commonly, a mutually trusted certification authority) to
269 validate certificates. Because the endpoints know what certificate
270 identity to expect, endpoints can be certain that such an attack has
271 not taken place.
272
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
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280
281 Finally, the most serious type of attacker is one who can modify or
282 redirect session descriptions: for example, a compromised or
283 malicious SIP proxy server. Neither TLS itself nor any mechanisms
284 that use it can protect an SDP session against such an attacker.
285 Instead, the SDP description itself must be secured through some
286 mechanism; SIP, for example, defines how S/MIME [<a href="#ref-22" title="&quot;Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification&quot;">22</a>] can be used to
287 secure session descriptions.
288
289 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. The Need for Self-Signed Certificates</span>
290
291 SDP session descriptions are created by any endpoint that needs to
292 participate in a multimedia session. In many cases, such as SIP
293 phones, such endpoints have dynamically configured IP addresses and
294 host names and must be deployed with nearly zero configuration. For
295 such an endpoint, it is, for practical purposes, impossible to obtain
296 a certificate signed by a well-known certification authority.
297
298 If two endpoints have no prior relationship, self-signed certificates
299 cannot generally be trusted, as there is no guarantee that an
300 attacker is not launching a man-in-the-middle attack. Fortunately,
301 however, if the integrity of SDP session descriptions can be assured,
302 it is possible to consider those SDP descriptions themselves as a
303 prior relationship: certificates can be securely described in the
304 session description itself. This is done by providing a secure hash
305 of a certificate, or "certificate fingerprint", as an SDP attribute;
306 this mechanism is described in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>.
307
308 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Example SDP Description for TLS Connection</span>
309
310 Figure 1 illustrates an SDP offer that signals the availability of a
311 T.38 fax session over TLS. For the purpose of brevity, the main
312 portion of the session description is omitted in the example, showing
313 only the 'm' line and its attributes. (This example is the same as
314 the first one in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">7</a>], except for the proto parameter and the
315 fingerprint attribute.) See the subsequent sections for explanations
316 of the example's TLS-specific attributes.
317
318 Note: due to RFC formatting conventions, this document splits SDP
319 across lines whose content would exceed 72 characters. A backslash
320 character marks where this line folding has taken place. This
321 backslash and its trailing CRLF and whitespace would not appear in
322 actual SDP content.
323
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332 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
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336
337 m=image 54111 TCP/TLS t38
338 c=IN IP4 192.0.2.2
339 a=setup:passive
340 a=connection:new
341 a=fingerprint:SHA-256 \
342 12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF: \
343 3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB:4A:AD
344 a=fingerprint:SHA-1 \
345 4A:AD:B9:B1:3F:82:18:3B:54:02:12:DF:3E:5D:49:6B:19:E5:7C:AB
346
347 Figure 1: Example SDP Description Offering a TLS Media Stream
348
349 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Protocol Identifiers</span>
350
351 The 'm' line in SDP specifies, among other items, the transport
352 protocol to be used for the media in the session. See the "Media
353 Descriptions" section of SDP [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">8</a>] for a discussion on transport
354 protocol identifiers.
355
356 This specification defines the protocol identifier, 'TCP/TLS', which
357 indicates that the media described will use the Transport Layer
358 Security protocol [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;The Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol Version 1.2&quot;">10</a>] over TCP. (Using TLS over other transport
359 protocols is not discussed in this document.) The 'TCP/TLS' protocol
360 identifier describes only the transport protocol, not the upper-layer
361 protocol. An 'm' line that specifies 'TCP/TLS' MUST further qualify
362 the protocol using an fmt identifier to indicate the application
363 being run over TLS.
364
365 Media sessions described with this identifier follow the procedures
366 defined in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">7</a>]. They also use the SDP attributes defined in
367 that specification, 'setup' and 'connection'.
368
369 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Fingerprint Attribute</span>
370
371 Parties to a TLS session indicate their identities by presenting
372 authentication certificates as part of the TLS handshake procedure.
373 Authentication certificates are X.509 [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;Information technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- The Directory -- Part 8: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks&quot;">2</a>] certificates, as profiled
374 by RFCs 3279 [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">5</a>], 5280 [<a href="#ref-11" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">11</a>], and 4055 [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">6</a>].
375
376 In order to associate media streams with connections and to prevent
377 unauthorized barge-in attacks on the media streams, endpoints MUST
378 provide a certificate fingerprint. If the X.509 certificate
379 presented for the TLS connection matches the fingerprint presented in
380 the SDP, the endpoint can be confident that the author of the SDP is
381 indeed the initiator of the connection.
382
383
384
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
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392
393 A certificate fingerprint is a secure one-way hash of the
394 Distinguished Encoding Rules (DER) form of the certificate.
395 (Certificate fingerprints are widely supported by tools that
396 manipulate X.509 certificates; for instance, the command "openssl
397 x509 -fingerprint" causes the command-line tool of the openssl
398 package to print a certificate fingerprint, and the certificate
399 managers for Mozilla and Internet Explorer display them when viewing
400 the details of a certificate.)
401
402 A fingerprint is represented in SDP as an attribute (an 'a' line).
403 It consists of the name of the hash function used, followed by the
404 hash value itself. The hash value is represented as a sequence of
405 uppercase hexadecimal bytes, separated by colons. The number of
406 bytes is defined by the hash function. (This is the syntax used by
407 openssl and by the browsers' certificate managers. It is different
408 from the syntax used to represent hash values in, for example, HTTP
409 digest authentication [<a href="#ref-24" title="&quot;HTTP Digest Access Authentication&quot;">24</a>], which uses unseparated lowercase
410 hexadecimal bytes. Consistency with other applications of
411 fingerprints was considered more important.)
412
413 The formal syntax of the fingerprint attribute is given in Augmented
414 Backus-Naur Form [<a href="#ref-9" title="&quot;Augmented BNF for Syntax Specifications: ABNF&quot;">9</a>] in Figure 2. This syntax extends the BNF syntax
415 of SDP [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">8</a>].
416
417 attribute =/ fingerprint-attribute
418
419 fingerprint-attribute = "fingerprint" ":" hash-func SP fingerprint
420
421 hash-func = "sha-1" / "sha-224" / "sha-256" /
422 "sha-384" / "sha-512" /
423 "md5" / "md2" / token
424 ; Additional hash functions can only come
425 ; from updates to <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a>
426
427 fingerprint = 2UHEX *(":" 2UHEX)
428 ; Each byte in upper-case hex, separated
429 ; by colons.
430
431 UHEX = DIGIT / %x41-46 ; A-F uppercase
432
433 Figure 2: Augmented Backus-Naur Syntax for the Fingerprint Attribute
434
435 Following <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">5</a>] as updated by <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Additional Algorithms and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">6</a>], the defined hash
436 functions are 'SHA-1' [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">1</a>] [<a href="#ref-16" title="&quot;US Secure Hash Algorithm 1 (SHA1)&quot;">16</a>], 'SHA-224' [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">1</a>], 'SHA-256' [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">1</a>], 'SHA-
437 384' [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">1</a>], 'SHA-512' [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Secure Hash Standard (SHS)&quot;">1</a>], 'MD5' [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm&quot;">13</a>], and 'MD2' [<a href="#ref-23" title="&quot;MD2 to Historic Status&quot;">23</a>], with 'SHA-256'
438 preferred. A new IANA registry, named "Hash Function Textual Names",
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
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448
449 specified in <a href="#section-8">Section 8</a>, allows for the addition of future tokens, but
450 they may only be added if they are included in RFCs that update or
451 obsolete <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">5</a>].
452
453 Implementations compliant with this specification MUST NOT use the
454 MD2 and MD5 hash functions to calculate fingerprints or to verify
455 received fingerprints that have been calculated using them.
456
457 Note: The MD2 and MD5 hash functions are listed in this specification
458 so that implementations can recognize them. Implementations that log
459 unused hash functions might log occurrences of these algorithms
460 differently to unknown hash algorithms.
461
462 The fingerprint attribute may be either a session-level or a media-
463 level SDP attribute. If it is a session-level attribute, it applies
464 to all TLS sessions for which no media-level fingerprint attribute is
465 defined.
466
467 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Multiple Fingerprints</span>
468
469 Multiple SDP fingerprint attributes can be associated with an 'm'
470 line. This can occur if multiple fingerprints have been calculated
471 for a certificate using different hash functions. It can also occur
472 if one or more fingerprints associated with multiple certificates
473 have been calculated. This might be needed if multiple certificates
474 will be used for media associated with an 'm' line (e.g., if separate
475 certificates are used for RTP and the RTP Control Protocol (RTCP)) or
476 where it is not known which certificate will be used when the
477 fingerprints are exchanged. In such cases, one or more fingerprints
478 MUST be calculated for each possible certificate.
479
480 An endpoint MUST, as a minimum, calculate a fingerprint using both
481 the 'SHA-256' hash function algorithm and the hash function used to
482 generate the signature on the certificate for each possible
483 certificate. Including the hash from the signature algorithm ensures
484 interoperability with strict implementations of <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">20</a>].
485 Either of these fingerprints MAY be omitted if the endpoint includes
486 a hash with a stronger hash algorithm that it knows that the peer
487 supports, if it is known that the peer does not support the hash
488 algorithm, or if local policy mandates use of stronger algorithms.
489
490 If fingerprints associated with multiple certificates are calculated,
491 the same set of hash functions MUST be used to calculate fingerprints
492 for each certificate associated with the 'm' line.
493
494 An endpoint MUST select the set of fingerprints that use its most
495 preferred hash function (out of those offered by the peer) and verify
496 that each certificate used matches one fingerprint out of that set.
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
503
504
505 If a certificate does not match any such fingerprint, the endpoint
506 MUST NOT establish the TLS connection.
507
508 Note: The SDP fingerprint attribute does not contain a reference to a
509 specific certificate. Endpoints need to compare the fingerprint with
510 a certificate hash in order to look for a match.
511
512 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Endpoint Identification</span>
513
514 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.1" href="#section-6.1">6.1</a>. Certificate Choice</span>
515
516 An X.509 certificate binds an identity and a public key. If SDP
517 describing a TLS session is transmitted over a mechanism that
518 provides integrity protection, a certificate asserting any
519 syntactically valid identity MAY be used. For example, an SDP
520 description sent over HTTP/TLS [<a href="#ref-14" title="&quot;HTTP Over TLS&quot;">14</a>] or secured by S/MIME [<a href="#ref-22" title="&quot;Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification&quot;">22</a>] MAY
521 assert any identity in the certificate securing the media connection.
522
523 Security protocols that provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection
524 (e.g., the SIPS scheme [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;SIP: Session Initiation Protocol&quot;">17</a>], SIP over TLS) are considered
525 sufficiently secure to allow the mode in which any valid identity is
526 accepted. However, see <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a> for a discussion of some security
527 implications of this fact.
528
529 In situations where the SDP is not integrity-protected, the
530 certificate provided for a TLS connection MUST certify an appropriate
531 identity for the connection. In these scenarios, the certificate
532 presented by an endpoint MUST certify either the SDP connection
533 address or the identity of the creator of the SDP message, as
534 follows:
535
536 o If the connection address for the media description is specified
537 as an IP address, the endpoint MAY use a certificate with an
538 iPAddress subjectAltName that exactly matches the IP in the
539 connection-address in the session description's 'c' line.
540 Similarly, if the connection address for the media description is
541 specified as a fully qualified domain name, the endpoint MAY use a
542 certificate with a dNSName subjectAltName matching the specified
543 'c' line connection-address exactly. (Wildcard patterns MUST NOT
544 be used.)
545
546 o Alternately, if the SDP session description of the session was
547 transmitted over a protocol (such as SIP [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;SIP: Session Initiation Protocol&quot;">17</a>]) for which the
548 identities of session participants are defined by Uniform Resource
549 Identifiers (URIs), the endpoint MAY use a certificate with a
550 uniformResourceIdentifier subjectAltName corresponding to the
551 identity of the endpoint that generated the SDP. The details of
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
559
560
561 what URIs are valid are dependent on the transmitting protocol.
562 (For more details on the validity of URIs, see <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>.
563
564 Identity matching is performed using the matching rules specified by
565 <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a> [<a href="#ref-11" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">11</a>]. If more than one identity of a given type is present
566 in the certificate (e.g., more than one dNSName name), a match in any
567 one of the set is considered acceptable. To support the use of
568 certificate caches, as described in <a href="#section-7">Section 7</a>, endpoints SHOULD
569 consistently provide the same certificate for each identity they
570 support.
571
572 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-6.2" href="#section-6.2">6.2</a>. Certificate Presentation</span>
573
574 In all cases, an endpoint acting as the TLS server (i.e., one taking
575 the 'setup:passive' role, in the terminology of connection-oriented
576 media) MUST present a certificate during TLS initiation, following
577 the rules presented in <a href="#section-6.1">Section 6.1</a>. If the certificate does not
578 match the original fingerprint, the client endpoint MUST terminate
579 the media connection with a bad_certificate error.
580
581 If the SDP offer/answer model [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;An Offer/Answer Model with Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">4</a>] is being used, the client (the
582 endpoint with the 'setup:active' role) MUST also present a
583 certificate following the rules of <a href="#section-6.1">Section 6.1</a>. The server MUST
584 request a certificate; if the client does not provide one, or if the
585 certificate does not match a provided fingerprint, the server
586 endpoint MUST terminate the media connection with a bad_certificate
587 error.
588
589 Note that when the offer/answer model is being used, it is possible
590 for a media connection to outrace the answer back to the offerer.
591 Thus, if the offerer has offered a 'setup:passive' or 'setup:actpass'
592 role, it MUST (as specified in <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a> [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;TCP-Based Media Transport in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">7</a>]) begin listening for an
593 incoming connection as soon as it sends its offer. However, it MUST
594 NOT assume that the data transmitted over the TLS connection is valid
595 until it has received a matching fingerprint in an SDP answer. If
596 the fingerprint, once it arrives, does not match the client's
597 certificate, the server endpoint MUST terminate the media connection
598 with a bad_certificate error, as stated in the previous paragraph.
599
600 If offer/answer is not being used (e.g., if the SDP was sent over the
601 Session Announcement Protocol [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;Session Announcement Protocol&quot;">15</a>]), there is no secure channel
602 available for clients to communicate certificate fingerprints to
603 servers. In this case, servers MAY request client certificates,
604 which SHOULD be signed by a well-known certification authority, or
605 MAY allow clients to connect without a certificate.
606
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
615
616
617 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Security Considerations</span>
618
619 This entire document concerns itself with security. The problem to
620 be solved is addressed in <a href="#section-1">Section 1</a>, and a high-level overview is
621 presented in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. See the SDP specification [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">8</a>] for security
622 considerations applicable to SDP in general.
623
624 Offering a TCP/TLS connection in SDP (or agreeing to one in the SDP
625 offer/answer mode) does not create an obligation for an endpoint to
626 accept any TLS connection with the given fingerprint. Instead, the
627 endpoint must engage in the standard TLS negotiation procedure to
628 ensure that the TLS stream cipher and MAC algorithm chosen meet the
629 security needs of the higher-level application. (For example, an
630 offered stream cipher of TLS_NULL_WITH_NULL_NULL SHOULD be rejected
631 in almost every application scenario.)
632
633 Like all SDP messages, SDP messages describing TLS streams are
634 conveyed in an encapsulating application protocol (e.g., SIP, Media
635 Gateway Control Protocol (MGCP), etc.). It is the responsibility of
636 the encapsulating protocol to ensure the integrity of the SDP
637 security descriptions. Therefore, the application protocol SHOULD
638 either invoke its own security mechanisms (e.g., secure multiparts)
639 or, alternatively, utilize a lower-layer security service (e.g., TLS
640 or IPsec). This security service SHOULD provide strong message
641 authentication as well as effective replay protection.
642
643 However, such integrity protection is not always possible. For these
644 cases, end systems SHOULD maintain a cache of certificates that other
645 parties have previously presented using this mechanism. If possible,
646 users SHOULD be notified when an unsecured certificate associated
647 with a previously unknown end system is presented and SHOULD be
648 strongly warned if a different unsecured certificate is presented by
649 a party with which they have communicated in the past. In this way,
650 even in the absence of integrity protection for SDP, the security of
651 this document's mechanism is equivalent to that of the Secure Shell
652 (SSH) protocol [<a href="#ref-18" title="&quot;The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol Architecture&quot;">18</a>], which is vulnerable to man-in-the-middle attacks
653 when two parties first communicate but can detect ones that occur
654 subsequently. (Note that a precise definition of the "other party"
655 depends on the application protocol carrying the SDP message.) Users
656 SHOULD NOT, however, in any circumstances be notified about
657 certificates described in the SDP descriptions sent over an
658 integrity-protected channel.
659
660 To aid interoperability and deployment, security protocols that
661 provide only hop-by-hop integrity protection (e.g., the SIPS scheme
662 [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;SIP: Session Initiation Protocol&quot;">17</a>], SIP over TLS) are considered sufficiently secure to allow the
663 mode in which any syntactically valid identity is accepted in a
664 certificate. This decision was made because SIPS is currently the
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
671
672
673 integrity mechanism most likely to be used in deployed networks in
674 the short to medium term. However, in this mode, SDP integrity is
675 vulnerable to attacks by compromised or malicious middleboxes, e.g.,
676 SIP proxy servers. End systems MAY warn users about SDP sessions
677 that are secured in only a hop-by-hop manner, and definitions of
678 media formats running over TCP/TLS MAY specify that only end-to-end
679 integrity mechanisms be used.
680
681 Depending on how SDP messages are transmitted, it is not always
682 possible to determine whether or not a subjectAltName presented in a
683 remote certificate is expected for the remote party. In particular,
684 given call forwarding, third-party call control, or session
685 descriptions generated by endpoints controlled by the Gateway Control
686 Protocol [<a href="#ref-21" title="&quot;Reclassification of RFC 3525 to Historic&quot;">21</a>], it is not always possible in SIP to determine what
687 entity ought to have generated a remote SDP response. In general,
688 when not using authenticity and integrity protection of the SDP
689 descriptions, a certificate transmitted over SIP SHOULD assert the
690 endpoint's SIP Address of Record as a uniformResourceIndicator
691 subjectAltName. When an endpoint receives a certificate over SIP
692 asserting an identity (including an iPAddress or dNSName identity)
693 other than the one to which it placed or received the call, it SHOULD
694 alert the user and ask for confirmation. This applies whether
695 certificates are self-signed or signed by certification authorities;
696 a certificate for "sip:[email protected]" may be legitimately signed by
697 a certification authority, but it may still not be acceptable for a
698 call to "sip:[email protected]". (This issue is not one specific to
699 this specification; the same consideration applies for S/MIME-signed
700 SDP carried over SIP.)
701
702 This document does not define a mechanism for securely transporting
703 RTP and RTCP packets over a connection-oriented channel. Please see
704 <a href="./rfc7850">RFC 7850</a> [<a href="#ref-19" title="&quot;Framing Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP Control Protocol (RTCP) Packets over Connection-Oriented Transport&quot;">19</a>] for more details.
705
706 TLS is not always the most appropriate choice for secure connection-
707 oriented media; in some cases, a higher- or lower-level security
708 protocol may be appropriate.
709
710 This document improves security from <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">20</a>]. It updates the
711 preferred hash function from SHA-1 to SHA-256 and deprecates the
712 usage of the MD2 and MD5 hash functions.
713
714 By clarifying the usage and handling of multiple fingerprints, the
715 document also enables hash agility and incremental deployment of
716 newer and more secure hash functions.
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
727
728
729 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
730
731 IANA has updated the registrations defined in <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a> [<a href="#ref-20" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">20</a>] to refer
732 to this specification.
733
734 This document defines an SDP proto value: 'TCP/TLS'. Its format is
735 defined in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. This proto value has been registered by IANA
736 under the "proto" registry within the "Session Description Protocol
737 (SDP) Parameters" registry.
738
739 This document defines an SDP session and media-level attribute:
740 'fingerprint'. Its format is defined in <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>. This attribute
741 has been registered by IANA under the "att-field (both session and
742 media level)" registry within the "Session Description Protocol (SDP)
743 Parameters" registry.
744
745 The SDP specification [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;SDP: Session Description Protocol&quot;">8</a>] states that specifications defining new
746 proto values, like the 'TCP/TLS' proto value defined in this one,
747 must define the rules by which their media format (fmt) namespace is
748 managed. For the TCP/TLS protocol, new formats SHOULD have an
749 associated MIME registration. Use of an existing MIME subtype for
750 the format is encouraged. If no MIME subtype exists, it is
751 RECOMMENDED that a suitable one be registered through the IETF
752 process [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Media Type Specifications and Registration Procedures&quot;">12</a>] by production of, or reference to, a Standards Track RFC
753 that defines the transport protocol for the format.
754
755 IANA has updated the "Hash Function Textual Names" registry (which
756 was originally created in [<a href="#ref-20" title="&quot;Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session Description Protocol (SDP)&quot;">20</a>]) to refer to this document.
757
758 The names of hash functions used for certificate fingerprints are
759 registered by the IANA. Hash functions MUST be defined by Standards
760 Track RFCs that update or obsolete <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">5</a>].
761
762 When registering a new hash function textual name, the following
763 information MUST be provided:
764
765 o The textual name of the hash function.
766
767 o The Object Identifier (OID) of the hash function as used in X.509
768 certificates.
769
770 o A reference to the Standards Track RFC that updates or obsoletes
771 <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Algorithms and Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">5</a>] and defines the use of the hash function in X.509
772 certificates.
773
774
775
776
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
783
784
785 Table 1 contains the initial values of this registry.
786
787 +--------------------+------------------------+-----------+
788 | Hash Function Name | OID | Reference |
789 +--------------------+------------------------+-----------+
790 | "md2" | 1.2.840.113549.2.2 | <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> |
791 | "md5" | 1.2.840.113549.2.5 | <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> |
792 | "sha-1" | 1.3.14.3.2.26 | <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a> |
793 | "sha-224" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.4 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> |
794 | "sha-256" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.1 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> |
795 | "sha-384" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.2 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> |
796 | "sha-512" | 2.16.840.1.101.3.4.2.3 | <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a> |
797 +--------------------+------------------------+-----------+
798
799 Table 1: IANA Hash Function Textual Name Registry
800
801 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. References</span>
802
803 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.1" href="#section-9.1">9.1</a>. Normative References</span>
804
805 [<a id="ref-1">1</a>] National Institute of Standards and Technology, "Secure Hash
806 Standard (SHS)", FIPS PUB 180-4, DOI 10.6028/NIST.FIPS.180-4,
807 August 2015, &lt;<a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/</a>
808 <a href="http://nvlpubs.nist.gov/nistpubs/FIPS/NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf">NIST.FIPS.180-4.pdf</a>&gt;.
809
810 [<a id="ref-2">2</a>] International Organization for Standardization, "Information
811 technology -- Open Systems Interconnection -- The Directory --
812 Part 8: Public-key and attribute certificate frameworks",
813 ISO/IEC 9594-8:2014, March 2014,
814 &lt;<a href="https://www.iso.org/standard/64854.html">https://www.iso.org/standard/64854.html</a>&gt;.
815
816 [<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
817 Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2119, March 1997,
818 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2119</a>&gt;.
819
820 [<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Rosenberg, J. and H. Schulzrinne, "An Offer/Answer Model with
821 Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc3264">RFC 3264</a>,
822 DOI 10.17487/RFC3264, June 2002,
823 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3264</a>&gt;.
824
825 [<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Bassham, L., Polk, W., and R. Housley, "Algorithms and
826 Identifiers for the Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
827 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
828 <a href="./rfc3279">RFC 3279</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3279, April 2002,
829 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3279</a>&gt;.
830
831
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
839
840
841 [<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Schaad, J., Kaliski, B., and R. Housley, "Additional Algorithms
842 and Identifiers for RSA Cryptography for use in the Internet
843 X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
844 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc4055">RFC 4055</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4055,
845 June 2005, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4055</a>&gt;.
846
847 [<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Yon, D. and G. Camarillo, "TCP-Based Media Transport in the
848 Session Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4145">RFC 4145</a>,
849 DOI 10.17487/RFC4145, September 2005,
850 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4145">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4145</a>&gt;.
851
852 [<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Handley, M., Jacobson, V., and C. Perkins, "SDP: Session
853 Description Protocol", <a href="./rfc4566">RFC 4566</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4566, July
854 2006, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4566</a>&gt;.
855
856 [<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Crocker, D., Ed. and P. Overell, "Augmented BNF for Syntax
857 Specifications: ABNF", STD 68, <a href="./rfc5234">RFC 5234</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5234,
858 January 2008, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5234</a>&gt;.
859
860 [<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Dierks, T. and E. Rescorla, "The Transport Layer Security (TLS)
861 Protocol Version 1.2", <a href="./rfc5246">RFC 5246</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5246, August
862 2008, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5246</a>&gt;.
863
864 [<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Cooper, D., Santesson, S., Farrell, S., Boeyen, S., Housley, R.,
865 and W. Polk, "Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure
866 Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile",
867 <a href="./rfc5280">RFC 5280</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5280, May 2008,
868 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5280</a>&gt;.
869
870 [<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Freed, N., Klensin, J., and T. Hansen, "Media Type
871 Specifications and Registration Procedures", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp13">BCP 13</a>, <a href="./rfc6838">RFC 6838</a>,
872 DOI 10.17487/RFC6838, January 2013,
873 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6838</a>&gt;.
874
875 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-9.2" href="#section-9.2">9.2</a>. Informative References</span>
876
877 [<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Rivest, R., "The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm", <a href="./rfc1321">RFC 1321</a>,
878 DOI 10.17487/RFC1321, April 1992,
879 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc1321</a>&gt;.
880
881 [<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Rescorla, E., "HTTP Over TLS", <a href="./rfc2818">RFC 2818</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2818,
882 May 2000, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2818</a>&gt;.
883
884 [<a id="ref-15">15</a>] Handley, M., Perkins, C., and E. Whelan, "Session Announcement
885 Protocol", <a href="./rfc2974">RFC 2974</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC2974, October 2000,
886 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2974">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc2974</a>&gt;.
887
888
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
895
896
897 [<a id="ref-16">16</a>] Eastlake 3rd, D. and P. Jones, "US Secure Hash Algorithm 1
898 (SHA1)", <a href="./rfc3174">RFC 3174</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3174, September 2001,
899 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3174</a>&gt;.
900
901 [<a id="ref-17">17</a>] Rosenberg, J., Schulzrinne, H., Camarillo, G., Johnston, A.,
902 Peterson, J., Sparks, R., Handley, M., and E. Schooler, "SIP:
903 Session Initiation Protocol", <a href="./rfc3261">RFC 3261</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC3261,
904 June 2002, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc3261</a>&gt;.
905
906 [<a id="ref-18">18</a>] Ylonen, T. and C. Lonvick, Ed., "The Secure Shell (SSH) Protocol
907 Architecture", <a href="./rfc4251">RFC 4251</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4251, January 2006,
908 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4251</a>&gt;.
909
910 [<a id="ref-19">19</a>] Lazzaro, J., "Framing Real-time Transport Protocol (RTP) and RTP
911 Control Protocol (RTCP) Packets over Connection-Oriented
912 Transport", <a href="./rfc4571">RFC 4571</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4571, July 2006,
913 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4571">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4571</a>&gt;.
914
915 [<a id="ref-20">20</a>] Lennox, J., "Connection-Oriented Media Transport over the
916 Transport Layer Security (TLS) Protocol in the Session
917 Description Protocol (SDP)", <a href="./rfc4572">RFC 4572</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC4572,
918 July 2006, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc4572</a>&gt;.
919
920 [<a id="ref-21">21</a>] Taylor, T., "Reclassification of <a href="./rfc3525">RFC 3525</a> to Historic",
921 <a href="./rfc5125">RFC 5125</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5125, February 2008,
922 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5125">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5125</a>&gt;.
923
924 [<a id="ref-22">22</a>] Ramsdell, B. and S. Turner, "Secure/Multipurpose Internet Mail
925 Extensions (S/MIME) Version 3.2 Message Specification",
926 <a href="./rfc5751">RFC 5751</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC5751, January 2010,
927 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc5751</a>&gt;.
928
929 [<a id="ref-23">23</a>] Turner, S. and L. Chen, "MD2 to Historic Status", <a href="./rfc6149">RFC 6149</a>,
930 DOI 10.17487/RFC6149, March 2011,
931 &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6149">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc6149</a>&gt;.
932
933 [<a id="ref-24">24</a>] Shekh-Yusef, R., Ed., Ahrens, D., and S. Bremer, "HTTP Digest
934 Access Authentication", <a href="./rfc7616">RFC 7616</a>, DOI 10.17487/RFC7616,
935 September 2015, &lt;<a href="http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616">http://www.rfc-editor.org/info/rfc7616</a>&gt;.
936
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948 <span class="grey">Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc8122">RFC 8122</a> Comedia over TLS in SDP March 2017</span>
951
952
953 Acknowledgments
954
955 This document included significant contributions by Cullen Jennings,
956 Paul Kyzivat, Roman Shpount, and Martin Thomson. Elwyn Davies
957 performed the Gen-ART review of the document.
958
959 Authors' Addresses
960
961 Jonathan Lennox
962 Vidyo
963
964 Email: [email protected]
965
966
967 Christer Holmberg
968 Ericsson
969
970 Email: [email protected]
971
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1004 Lennox &amp; Holmberg Standards Track [Page 18]
1005 </pre>