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<pre>Network Working Group J. Loughney |
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Request for Comments: 3788 Nokia Research Center |
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Category: Standards Track M. Tuexen, Ed. |
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Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster |
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J. Pastor-Balbas |
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Ericsson Espana S.A. |
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June 2004 |
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<span class="h1">Security Considerations for</span> |
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<span class="h1">Signaling Transport (SIGTRAN) Protocols</span> |
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Status of this Memo |
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|
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This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the |
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Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for |
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improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet |
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Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state |
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and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited. |
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|
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). |
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|
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Abstract |
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|
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This document discusses how Transport Layer Security (TLS) and IPsec |
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can be used to secure communication for SIGTRAN protocols. The main |
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goal is to recommend the minimum security means that a SIGTRAN node |
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must implement in order to attain secured communication. The support |
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of IPsec is mandatory for all nodes running SIGTRAN protocols. TLS |
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support is optional. |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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|
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|
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Security in Telephony Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Threats and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. IPsec Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. TLS Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Support of IPsec and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Peer-to-Peer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-12">12</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-13">13</a>. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-14">14</a>. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Overview</span> |
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The SIGTRAN protocols are designed to carry signaling messages for |
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telephony services. These protocols will be used between |
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o customer premise and service provider equipment in case of ISDN |
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Q.921 User Adaptation Layer (IUA) [<a href="#ref-9" title=""ISDN Q.921-User Adaptation Layer"">9</a>]. |
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o service provider equipment only. This is the case for SS7 MTP2 |
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User Adaptation Layer (M2UA) [<a href="#ref-12" title=""Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2) - User Adaptation Layer"">12</a>], SS7 MTP2 Peer-to-Peer User |
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Adaptation Layer (M2PA) [<a href="#ref-15" title=""SS7 MTP2-User Peer-to-Peer Adaptation Layer"">15</a>], SS7 MTP3 User Adaptation Layer |
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(M3UA) [<a href="#ref-13" title=""Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 3 (MTP3) - User Adaptation Layer (M3UA)"">13</a>] and SS7 SCCP User Adaptation Layer (SUA) [<a href="#ref-16" title=""Signalling Connection Control Part User Adaptation Layer (SUA)"">16</a>]. The |
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carriers may be different and may use other transport network |
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providers. |
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The security requirements for these situations may be different. |
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SIGTRAN protocols involve the security needs of several parties, the |
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end-users of the services, the service providers and the applications |
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involved. Additional security requirements may come from local |
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regulation. While having some overlapping security needs, any |
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security solution should fulfill all of the different parties' needs. |
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The SIGTRAN protocols assume that messages are secured by using |
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either IPsec or TLS. |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Abbreviations</span> |
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This document uses the following abbreviations: |
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ASP: Application Server Process |
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CA: Certification Authority |
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DOI: Domain Of Interpretation |
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ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload |
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FQDN: Full-Qualified Domain Names |
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IPsec: IP Security Protocol |
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IKE: Internet Key Exchange Protocol |
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ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network |
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IUA: ISDN Q.921 User Adaptation Layer |
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M2PA: SS7 MTP2 Peer-to-Peer User Adaptation Layer |
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M2UA: SS7 MTP2 User Adaptation Layer |
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M3UA: SS7 MTP3 User Adaptation Layer |
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PKI: Public Key Infrastructure |
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SA: Security Association |
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SCTP: Stream Control Transmission Protocol |
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SS7: Signaling System No. 7 |
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SUA: SS7 SCCP User Adaptation Layer |
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TLS: Transport Layer Security |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Convention</span> |
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The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD, |
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SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when |
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they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in |
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[<a href="#ref-1" title=""Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels"">1</a>]. |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Security in Telephony Networks</span> |
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The security in telephony networks is mainly based on the closed |
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network principle. There are two main protocols used: Access |
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protocols (ISDN and others) are used for signaling in the access |
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network and the SS7 protocol stack in the core network. |
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As SS7 networks are often physically remote and/or inaccessible to |
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the user, it is assumed that they are protected from malicious users. |
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Equipment is often under lock and key. At network boundaries between |
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SS7 networks, packet filtering is sometimes used. End-users are not |
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directly connected to SS7 networks. |
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The access protocols are used for end-user signaling. End-user |
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signaling protocols are translated to SS7 based protocols by |
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telephone switches run by network operators. |
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Regulatory Authorities often require SS7 switches with connections to |
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different SS7 switches to be conformant to national and/or |
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international test specifications. |
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There are no standardized ways of using encryption technologies for |
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providing confidentiality or using technologies for authentication. |
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This description applies to telephony networks operated by a single |
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operator, and also to multiple telephony networks being connected and |
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operated by different operators. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Threats and Goals</span> |
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The Internet threats can be divided into one of two main types. The |
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first one is called "passive attacks". It happens whenever the |
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attacker reads packets off the network but does not write them. |
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Examples of such attacks include confidentiality violations, password |
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sniffing and offline cryptographic attacks amongst others. |
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The second kind of threat is called "active attacks". In this case, |
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the attacker also writes data to the network. Examples for this |
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attack include replay attacks, message insertion, message deletion, |
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message modification or man-in-the-middle attacks, amongst others. |
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In general, Internet protocols have the following security |
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objectives: |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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|
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o Communication Security: |
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* Authentication of peers |
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* Integrity of user data transport |
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* Confidentiality of user data |
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* Replay protection |
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o Non-repudiation |
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o System Security, avoidance of: |
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* Unauthorized use |
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* Inappropriate use |
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* Denial of Service |
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Communication security is mandatory in some network scenarios to |
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prevent malicious attacks. The main goal of this document is to |
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recommend the minimum security means that a SIGTRAN node must |
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implement in order to attain secured communication. To achieve this |
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goal, we will explore the different existing security options |
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regarding communication. |
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All SIGTRAN protocols use the Stream Control Transmission Protocol |
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(SCTP) defined in [<a href="#ref-8" title=""Stream Control Transmission Protocol"">8</a>] and [<a href="#ref-11" title=""Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change"">11</a>] as its transport protocol. SCTP |
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provides certain transport related security features, such as |
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resistance against: |
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o Blind Denial of Service Attacks such as: |
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* Flooding. |
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* Masquerade. |
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* Improper Monopolization of Services. |
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There is no quick fix, one-size-fits-all solution for security. |
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When a network using SIGTRAN protocols involves more than one party, |
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it may not be reasonable to expect that all parties have implemented |
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security in a sufficient manner. End-to-end security should be the |
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goal; therefore, it is recommended that IPsec or TLS be used to |
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ensure confidentiality of user payload. Consult [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol"">3</a>] for more |
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information on configuring IPsec services. |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IPsec Usage</span> |
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This section is only relevant for SIGTRAN nodes using IPsec to secure |
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communication between SIGTRAN nodes. |
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All SIGTRAN nodes using IPsec MUST implement IPsec ESP [<a href="#ref-4" title=""IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)"">4</a>] in |
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transport mode with non-null encryption and authentication algorithms |
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to provide per-packet authentication, integrity protection and |
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confidentiality, and MUST implement the replay protection mechanisms |
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of IPsec. In those scenarios where IP layer protection is needed, |
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ESP in tunnel mode SHOULD be used. Non-null encryption should be |
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used when using IPSec ESP. |
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All SIGTRAN nodes MUST support IKE for peer authentication, |
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negotiation of security associations, and key management, using the |
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IPsec DOI [<a href="#ref-5" title=""The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP"">5</a>]. The IPsec implementations MUST support peer |
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authentication using a pre-shared key, and MAY support certificate- |
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based peer authentication using digital signatures. Peer |
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authentication using the public key encryption methods outlined in |
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IKE's sections <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> and <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a> [<a href="#ref-6" title=""The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)"">6</a>] SHOULD NOT be used. |
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Conformant implementations MUST support IKEs Main Mode and Aggressive |
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Mode. For transport mode, when pre-shared keys are used for |
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authentication, IKE Aggressive Mode SHOULD be used, and IKE Main Mode |
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SHOULD NOT be used. When digital signatures are used for |
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authentication, either IKE Main Mode or IKE Aggressive Mode MAY be |
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used. When using ESP tunnel mode, IKE Main Mode MAY be used to |
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create an ISAKMP association with identity protection during Phase 1. |
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When digital signatures are used to achieve authentication, an IKE |
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negotiator SHOULD use IKE Certificate Request Payload(s) to specify |
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the certification authority (or authorities) that is trusted in |
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accordance with its local policy. IKE negotiators SHOULD use |
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pertinent certificate revocation checks before accepting a PKI |
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certificate for use in IKE's authentication procedures. See [<a href="#ref-10" title=""Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile"">10</a>] for |
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certificate revocation and [<a href="#ref-7" title=""X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP"">7</a>] for online-checking. |
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The Phase 2 Quick Mode exchanges used to negotiate protection for |
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SIGTRAN sessions MUST explicitly carry the Identity Payload fields |
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(IDci and IDcr). The DOI provides for several types of |
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identification data. However, when used in conformant |
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implementations, each ID Payload MUST carry a single IP address and a |
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single non-zero port number, and MUST NOT use the IP Subnet or IP |
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Address Range formats. This allows the Phase 2 security association |
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to correspond to specific TCP and SCTP connections. |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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Since IPsec acceleration hardware may only be able to handle a |
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limited number of active IKE Phase 2 SAs, Phase 2 delete messages may |
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be sent for idle SAs as a means of keeping the number of active Phase |
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2 SAs to a minimum. The receipt of an IKE Phase 2 delete message |
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SHOULD NOT be interpreted as a reason for tearing down a SIGTRAN |
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session. Rather, it is preferable to leave the connection up, |
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whereby another IKE Phase 2 SA will be brought up to protect it if |
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additional traffic is sent. This avoids the potential of continually |
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bringing connections up and down. |
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It should be noted that SCTP supports multi-homed hosts and this |
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results in the need for having multiple security associations for one |
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SCTP association. This disadvantage of IPsec has been addressed by |
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[<a href="#ref-17" title=""On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with IPsec"">17</a>]. So IPsec implementations used by SIGTRAN nodes SHOULD support |
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the IPsec feature described in [<a href="#ref-17" title=""On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with IPsec"">17</a>]. |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. TLS Usage</span> |
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This section is only relevant for SIGTRAN nodes using TLS to secure |
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the communication between SIGTRAN nodes. |
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A SIGTRAN node that initiates a SCTP association to another SIGTRAN |
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node acts as a TLS client according to [<a href="#ref-2" title=""The TLS Protocol Version 1.0"">2</a>], and a SIGTRAN node that |
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accepts a connection acts as a TLS server. SIGTRAN peers |
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implementing TLS for security MUST mutually authenticate as part of |
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TLS session establishment. In order to ensure mutual authentication, |
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the SIGTRAN node acting as TLS server must request a certificate from |
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the SIGTRAN node acting as TLS client, and the SIGTRAN node acting as |
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TLS client MUST be prepared to supply a certificate on request. |
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[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] requires the support of the cipher suite |
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TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. SIGTRAN nodes MAY negotiate other TLS |
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cipher suites. |
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TLS MUST be used on all bi-directional streams. Other uni- |
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directional streams MUST NOT be used. |
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It should also be noted that a SCTP implementation used for TLS over |
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SCTP MUST support fragmentation of user data and might also need to |
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support the partial delivery API. This holds even if all SIGTRAN |
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messages are small. Furthermore, the 'unordered delivery' feature of |
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SCTP can not be used in conjunction with TLS. See [<a href="#ref-14" title=""Transport Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol"">14</a>] for more |
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details. |
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Because TLS only protects the payload, the SCTP header and all |
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control chunks are not protected. This can be used for DoS attacks. |
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This is a general problem with security provided at the transport |
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layer. |
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<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
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|
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The SIGTRAN protocols use the same SCTP port number and payload |
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protocol identifier when run over TLS. A session upgrade procedure |
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has to be used to initiate the TLS based communication. |
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The session upgrade procedure should be as follows: |
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o If an ASP has been configured to use TLS, it sends a STARTTLS |
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message on stream 0 and starts a timer T_TLS. This is the first |
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message sent and the ASP sends no other adaptation layer messages |
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until the TLS based communication has been established. |
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|
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o If the peer does not support TLS, it sends back an ERROR message |
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indicating an unsupported message type. In this case, the SCTP |
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association is terminated and it is reported to the management |
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layer that the peer does not support TLS. |
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o If the peer does support TLS, it sends back a STARTTLS_ACK |
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message. The client then starts TLS based communication. |
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o If T_TLS expires without getting any of the above answers, the |
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association is terminated and the failure is reported to the |
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management layer. |
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All SIGTRAN adaptation layers share a common message format. The |
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STARTTLS message consists of a common header only using the message |
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class 10 and message type 1. The STARTTLS_ACK message uses the same |
| 419 |
message class 10 and the message type 2. Neither messages contain |
| 420 |
any parameters. |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
Using this procedure, it is possible for a man-in-the-middle to do a |
| 423 |
denial of service attack by indicating that the peer does not support |
| 424 |
TLS. But this kind of attack is always possible for a man-in-the- |
| 425 |
middle. |
| 426 |
|
| 427 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Support of IPsec and TLS</span> |
| 428 |
|
| 429 |
If content of SIGTRAN protocol messages is to be protected, either |
| 430 |
IPsec ESP or TLS can be used. In both IPsec ESP Transport Mode and |
| 431 |
TLS cases, the IP header information is neither encrypted nor |
| 432 |
protected. If IPsec ESP is chosen, the SCTP control information is |
| 433 |
encrypted and protected whereas in the TLS based solution, the SCTP |
| 434 |
control information is not encrypted and only protected by SCTP |
| 435 |
procedures. |
| 436 |
|
| 437 |
In general, both IPsec and TLS have enough mechanisms to secure the |
| 438 |
SIGTRAN communications. |
| 439 |
|
| 440 |
|
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
Therefore, in order to have a secured model working as soon as |
| 450 |
possible, the following recommendation is made: A SIGTRAN node MUST |
| 451 |
support IPsec and MAY support TLS. |
| 452 |
|
| 453 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Peer-to-Peer Considerations</span> |
| 454 |
|
| 455 |
M2PA, M3UA and SUA support the peer-to-peer model as a generalization |
| 456 |
to the client-server model which is supported by IUA and M2UA. A |
| 457 |
SIGTRAN node running M2PA, M3UA or SUA and operating in the peer-to- |
| 458 |
peer mode is called a SIGTRAN peer. |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
As with any peer-to-peer protocol, proper configuration of the trust |
| 461 |
model within a peer is essential to security. When certificates are |
| 462 |
used, it is necessary to configure the trust anchors trusted by the |
| 463 |
peer. These trust anchors are likely to be unique to SIGTRAN usage |
| 464 |
and distinct from the trust anchors that might be trusted for other |
| 465 |
purposes such as Web browsing. In general, it is expected that those |
| 466 |
trust anchors will be configured so as to reflect the business |
| 467 |
relationships between the organization hosting the peer and other |
| 468 |
organizations. As a result, a peer will not typically be configured |
| 469 |
to allow connectivity with any arbitrary peer. When certificate |
| 470 |
authentication peers may not be known beforehand, peer discovery may |
| 471 |
be required. |
| 472 |
|
| 473 |
Note that IPsec is considerably less flexible than TLS when it comes |
| 474 |
to configuring trust anchors. Since use of Port identifiers is |
| 475 |
prohibited within IKE Phase 1, it is not possible to uniquely |
| 476 |
configure trusted trust anchors for each application individually |
| 477 |
within IPsec; the same policy must be used for all applications. |
| 478 |
This implies, for example, that a trust anchor trusted for use with a |
| 479 |
SIGTRAN protocol must also be trusted to protect other protocols (for |
| 480 |
example SNMP). These restrictions are awkward at best. |
| 481 |
|
| 482 |
When pre-shared key authentication is used with IPsec to protect |
| 483 |
SIGTRAN based communication, unique pre-shared keys are configured |
| 484 |
with peers that are identified by their IP address (Main Mode), or |
| 485 |
possibly their FQDN (AggressivenMode). As a result, it is necessary |
| 486 |
for the set of peers to be known beforehand. Therefore, peer |
| 487 |
discovery is typically not necessary. |
| 488 |
|
| 489 |
The following is intended to provide some guidance on the issue. |
| 490 |
|
| 491 |
It is recommended that SIGTRAN peers use the same security mechanism |
| 492 |
(IPsec or TLS) across all its sessions with other SIGTRAN peers. |
| 493 |
Inconsistent use of security mechanisms can result in redundant |
| 494 |
security mechanisms being used (e.g., TLS over IPsec) or worse, |
| 495 |
potential security vulnerabilities. When IPsec is used with a |
| 496 |
SIGTRAN protocol, a typical security policy for outbound traffic is |
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
"Initiate IPsec, from me to any, destination port P"; for inbound |
| 506 |
traffic, the policy would be "Require IPsec, from any to me, |
| 507 |
destination port P". Here, P denotes one of the registered port |
| 508 |
numbers for a SIGTRAN protocol. |
| 509 |
|
| 510 |
This policy causes IPsec to be used whenever a SIGTRAN peer initiates |
| 511 |
a session to another SIGTRAN peer, and to be required whenever an |
| 512 |
inbound SIGTRAN session occurs. This policy is attractive, since it |
| 513 |
does not require policy to be set for each peer or dynamically |
| 514 |
modified each time a new SIGTRAN session is created; an IPsec SA is |
| 515 |
automatically created based on a simple static policy. Since IPsec |
| 516 |
extensions are typically not available to the sockets API on most |
| 517 |
platforms, and IPsec policy functionality is implementation |
| 518 |
dependent, use of a simple static policy is the often the simplest |
| 519 |
route to IPsec-enabling a SIGTRAN peer. |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
If IPsec is used to secure a SIGTRAN peer-to-peer session, IPsec |
| 522 |
policy SHOULD be set so as to require IPsec protection for inbound |
| 523 |
connections, and to initiate IPsec protection for outbound |
| 524 |
connections. This can be accomplished via use of inbound and |
| 525 |
outbound filter policy. |
| 526 |
|
| 527 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 528 |
|
| 529 |
This document discusses the usage of IPsec and TLS for securing |
| 530 |
SIGTRAN traffic. |
| 531 |
|
| 532 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span> |
| 533 |
|
| 534 |
The message class 12 has been reserved in the Signaling User Adaption |
| 535 |
Layer Assignments Registry. For this message class, message type 1 |
| 536 |
has been reserved for the STARTTLS message, and message type 2 for |
| 537 |
the STARTTLS_ACK message. |
| 538 |
|
| 539 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 540 |
|
| 541 |
The authors would like to thank B. Aboba, K. Morneault and many |
| 542 |
others for their invaluable comments and suggestions. |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
|
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
|
| 547 |
|
| 548 |
|
| 549 |
|
| 550 |
|
| 551 |
|
| 552 |
|
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. References</span> |
| 562 |
|
| 563 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References</span> |
| 564 |
|
| 565 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement |
| 566 |
Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997. |
| 567 |
|
| 568 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 569 |
|
| 570 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", <a href="./rfc2246">RFC</a> |
| 571 |
<a href="./rfc2246">2246</a>, January 1999. |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the |
| 574 |
Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998. |
| 575 |
|
| 576 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload |
| 577 |
(ESP)", <a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a>, November 1998. |
| 578 |
|
| 579 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation |
| 580 |
for ISAKMP", <a href="./rfc2407">RFC 2407</a>, November 1998. |
| 581 |
|
| 582 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)", |
| 583 |
<a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998. |
| 584 |
|
| 585 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S. and C. Adams, |
| 586 |
"X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate |
| 587 |
Status Protocol - OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>, June 1999. |
| 588 |
|
| 589 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer, |
| 590 |
H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L. and V. Paxson, |
| 591 |
"Stream Control Transmission Protocol", <a href="./rfc2960">RFC 2960</a>, October 2000. |
| 592 |
|
| 593 |
[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Morneault, K., Rengasami, S., Kalla, M. and G. Sidebottom, |
| 594 |
"ISDN Q.921-User Adaptation Layer", <a href="./rfc3057">RFC 3057</a>, February 2001. |
| 595 |
|
| 596 |
[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509 |
| 597 |
Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate |
| 598 |
Revocation List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc3280">RFC 3280</a>, April 2002. |
| 599 |
|
| 600 |
[<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Stone, J., Stewart, R. and D. Otis, "Stream Control |
| 601 |
Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", <a href="./rfc3309">RFC 3309</a>, |
| 602 |
September 2002. |
| 603 |
|
| 604 |
[<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Morneault, K., Dantu, R., Sidebottom, G., Bidulock, B. and J. |
| 605 |
Heitz, "Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2) |
| 606 |
- User Adaptation Layer", <a href="./rfc3331">RFC 3331</a>, September 2002. |
| 607 |
|
| 608 |
|
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
[<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Sidebottom, G., Ed., Morneault, K., Ed. and J. Pastor-Balbas, |
| 618 |
Ed., "Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 3 (MTP3) - |
| 619 |
User Adaptation Layer (M3UA)", <a href="./rfc3332">RFC 3332</a>, September 2002. |
| 620 |
|
| 621 |
[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E. and M. Tuexen, "Transport Layer |
| 622 |
Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol", <a href="./rfc3436">RFC 3436</a>, |
| 623 |
December 2002. |
| 624 |
|
| 625 |
[<a id="ref-15">15</a>] George, T., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&q=inurl:draft-+%22SS7+MTP2-User+Peer-to-Peer+Adaptation+Layer%22'>"SS7 MTP2-User Peer-to-Peer Adaptation Layer"</a>, Work |
| 626 |
in Progress, February 2004. |
| 627 |
|
| 628 |
[<a id="ref-16">16</a>] Loughney, J., "Signalling Connection Control Part User |
| 629 |
Adaptation Layer (SUA)", Work in Progress, December 2003. |
| 630 |
|
| 631 |
[<a id="ref-17">17</a>] Bellovin, S., Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A. and R. Stewart, "On |
| 632 |
the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with |
| 633 |
IPsec", <a href="./rfc3554">RFC 3554</a>, July 2003. |
| 634 |
|
| 635 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. Authors' Addresses</span> |
| 636 |
|
| 637 |
John Loughney |
| 638 |
Nokia Research Center |
| 639 |
PO Box 407 |
| 640 |
FIN-00045 Nokia Group |
| 641 |
Finland |
| 642 |
|
| 643 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 644 |
|
| 645 |
|
| 646 |
Michael Tuexen (editor) |
| 647 |
Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster |
| 648 |
Stegerwaldstr. 39 |
| 649 |
48565 Steinfurt |
| 650 |
Germany |
| 651 |
|
| 652 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 653 |
|
| 654 |
|
| 655 |
Javier Pastor-Balbas |
| 656 |
Ericsson Espana S.A. |
| 657 |
Via de los Poblados, 13 |
| 658 |
28033 Madrid |
| 659 |
Spain |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 662 |
|
| 663 |
|
| 664 |
|
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-14" href="#section-14">14</a>. Full Copyright Statement</span> |
| 674 |
|
| 675 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject |
| 676 |
to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and |
| 677 |
except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights. |
| 678 |
|
| 679 |
This document and the information contained herein are provided on an |
| 680 |
"AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS |
| 681 |
OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET |
| 682 |
ENGINEERING TASK FORCE DISCLAIM ALL WARRANTIES, EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, |
| 683 |
INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE |
| 684 |
INFORMATION HEREIN WILL NOT INFRINGE ANY RIGHTS OR ANY IMPLIED |
| 685 |
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. |
| 686 |
|
| 687 |
Intellectual Property |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any |
| 690 |
Intellectual Property Rights or other rights that might be claimed to |
| 691 |
pertain to the implementation or use of the technology described in |
| 692 |
this document or the extent to which any license under such rights |
| 693 |
might or might not be available; nor does it represent that it has |
| 694 |
made any independent effort to identify any such rights. Information |
| 695 |
on the procedures with respect to rights in RFC documents can be |
| 696 |
found in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a> and <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp79">BCP 79</a>. |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any |
| 699 |
assurances of licenses to be made available, or the result of an |
| 700 |
attempt made to obtain a general license or permission for the use of |
| 701 |
such proprietary rights by implementers or users of this |
| 702 |
specification can be obtained from the IETF on-line IPR repository at |
| 703 |
<a href="http://www.ietf.org/ipr">http://www.ietf.org/ipr</a>. |
| 704 |
|
| 705 |
The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any |
| 706 |
copyrights, patents or patent applications, or other proprietary |
| 707 |
rights that may cover technology that may be required to implement |
| 708 |
this standard. Please address the information to the IETF at ietf- |
| 709 |
[email protected]. |
| 710 |
|
| 711 |
Acknowledgement |
| 712 |
|
| 713 |
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the |
| 714 |
Internet Society. |
| 715 |
|
| 716 |
|
| 717 |
|
| 718 |
|
| 719 |
|
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 13] |
| 725 |
</pre> |