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1 <pre>Network Working Group J. Loughney
2 Request for Comments: 3788 Nokia Research Center
3 Category: Standards Track M. Tuexen, Ed.
4 Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster
5 J. Pastor-Balbas
6 Ericsson Espana S.A.
7 June 2004
8
9
10 <span class="h1">Security Considerations for</span>
11 <span class="h1">Signaling Transport (SIGTRAN) Protocols</span>
12
13 Status of this Memo
14
15 This document specifies an Internet standards track protocol for the
16 Internet community, and requests discussion and suggestions for
17 improvements. Please refer to the current edition of the "Internet
18 Official Protocol Standards" (STD 1) for the standardization state
19 and status of this protocol. Distribution of this memo is unlimited.
20
21 Copyright Notice
22
23 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004).
24
25 Abstract
26
27 This document discusses how Transport Layer Security (TLS) and IPsec
28 can be used to secure communication for SIGTRAN protocols. The main
29 goal is to recommend the minimum security means that a SIGTRAN node
30 must implement in order to attain secured communication. The support
31 of IPsec is mandatory for all nodes running SIGTRAN protocols. TLS
32 support is optional.
33
34
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52 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 1]</span></pre>
53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
55
56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-2">2</a>
61 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Abbreviations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
62 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Convention . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-3">3</a>
63 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Security in Telephony Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
64 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Threats and Goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-4">4</a>
65 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. IPsec Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-6">6</a>
66 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. TLS Usage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-7">7</a>
67 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Support of IPsec and TLS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-8">8</a>
68 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Peer-to-Peer Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-9">9</a>
69 <a href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
70 <a href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
71 <a href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-10">10</a>
72 <a href="#section-12">12</a>. References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
73 <a href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
74 <a href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-11">11</a>
75 <a href="#section-13">13</a>. Authors' Addresses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-12">12</a>
76 <a href="#section-14">14</a>. Full Copyright Statement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . <a href="#page-13">13</a>
77
78 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
79
80 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Overview</span>
81
82 The SIGTRAN protocols are designed to carry signaling messages for
83 telephony services. These protocols will be used between
84
85 o customer premise and service provider equipment in case of ISDN
86 Q.921 User Adaptation Layer (IUA) [<a href="#ref-9" title="&quot;ISDN Q.921-User Adaptation Layer&quot;">9</a>].
87
88 o service provider equipment only. This is the case for SS7 MTP2
89 User Adaptation Layer (M2UA) [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2) - User Adaptation Layer&quot;">12</a>], SS7 MTP2 Peer-to-Peer User
90 Adaptation Layer (M2PA) [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;SS7 MTP2-User Peer-to-Peer Adaptation Layer&quot;">15</a>], SS7 MTP3 User Adaptation Layer
91 (M3UA) [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 3 (MTP3) - User Adaptation Layer (M3UA)&quot;">13</a>] and SS7 SCCP User Adaptation Layer (SUA) [<a href="#ref-16" title="&quot;Signalling Connection Control Part User Adaptation Layer (SUA)&quot;">16</a>]. The
92 carriers may be different and may use other transport network
93 providers.
94
95 The security requirements for these situations may be different.
96
97 SIGTRAN protocols involve the security needs of several parties, the
98 end-users of the services, the service providers and the applications
99 involved. Additional security requirements may come from local
100 regulation. While having some overlapping security needs, any
101 security solution should fulfill all of the different parties' needs.
102
103 The SIGTRAN protocols assume that messages are secured by using
104 either IPsec or TLS.
105
106
107
108 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 2]</span></pre>
109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
111
112
113 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. Abbreviations</span>
114
115 This document uses the following abbreviations:
116
117 ASP: Application Server Process
118
119 CA: Certification Authority
120
121 DOI: Domain Of Interpretation
122
123 ESP: Encapsulating Security Payload
124
125 FQDN: Full-Qualified Domain Names
126
127 IPsec: IP Security Protocol
128
129 IKE: Internet Key Exchange Protocol
130
131 ISDN: Integrated Services Digital Network
132
133 IUA: ISDN Q.921 User Adaptation Layer
134
135 M2PA: SS7 MTP2 Peer-to-Peer User Adaptation Layer
136
137 M2UA: SS7 MTP2 User Adaptation Layer
138
139 M3UA: SS7 MTP3 User Adaptation Layer
140
141 PKI: Public Key Infrastructure
142
143 SA: Security Association
144
145 SCTP: Stream Control Transmission Protocol
146
147 SS7: Signaling System No. 7
148
149 SUA: SS7 SCCP User Adaptation Layer
150
151 TLS: Transport Layer Security
152
153 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Convention</span>
154
155 The keywords MUST, MUST NOT, REQUIRED, SHALL, SHALL NOT, SHOULD,
156 SHOULD NOT, RECOMMENDED, NOT RECOMMENDED, MAY, and OPTIONAL, when
157 they appear in this document, are to be interpreted as described in
158 [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement Levels&quot;">1</a>].
159
160
161
162
163
164 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 3]</span></pre>
165 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span>
166 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
167
168
169 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Security in Telephony Networks</span>
170
171 The security in telephony networks is mainly based on the closed
172 network principle. There are two main protocols used: Access
173 protocols (ISDN and others) are used for signaling in the access
174 network and the SS7 protocol stack in the core network.
175
176 As SS7 networks are often physically remote and/or inaccessible to
177 the user, it is assumed that they are protected from malicious users.
178 Equipment is often under lock and key. At network boundaries between
179 SS7 networks, packet filtering is sometimes used. End-users are not
180 directly connected to SS7 networks.
181
182 The access protocols are used for end-user signaling. End-user
183 signaling protocols are translated to SS7 based protocols by
184 telephone switches run by network operators.
185
186 Regulatory Authorities often require SS7 switches with connections to
187 different SS7 switches to be conformant to national and/or
188 international test specifications.
189
190 There are no standardized ways of using encryption technologies for
191 providing confidentiality or using technologies for authentication.
192
193 This description applies to telephony networks operated by a single
194 operator, and also to multiple telephony networks being connected and
195 operated by different operators.
196
197 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Threats and Goals</span>
198
199 The Internet threats can be divided into one of two main types. The
200 first one is called "passive attacks". It happens whenever the
201 attacker reads packets off the network but does not write them.
202 Examples of such attacks include confidentiality violations, password
203 sniffing and offline cryptographic attacks amongst others.
204
205 The second kind of threat is called "active attacks". In this case,
206 the attacker also writes data to the network. Examples for this
207 attack include replay attacks, message insertion, message deletion,
208 message modification or man-in-the-middle attacks, amongst others.
209
210 In general, Internet protocols have the following security
211 objectives:
212
213
214
215
216
217
218
219
220 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 4]</span></pre>
221 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span>
222 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
223
224
225 o Communication Security:
226
227 * Authentication of peers
228
229 * Integrity of user data transport
230
231 * Confidentiality of user data
232
233 * Replay protection
234
235 o Non-repudiation
236
237 o System Security, avoidance of:
238
239 * Unauthorized use
240
241 * Inappropriate use
242
243 * Denial of Service
244
245 Communication security is mandatory in some network scenarios to
246 prevent malicious attacks. The main goal of this document is to
247 recommend the minimum security means that a SIGTRAN node must
248 implement in order to attain secured communication. To achieve this
249 goal, we will explore the different existing security options
250 regarding communication.
251
252 All SIGTRAN protocols use the Stream Control Transmission Protocol
253 (SCTP) defined in [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;Stream Control Transmission Protocol&quot;">8</a>] and [<a href="#ref-11" title="&quot;Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change&quot;">11</a>] as its transport protocol. SCTP
254 provides certain transport related security features, such as
255 resistance against:
256
257 o Blind Denial of Service Attacks such as:
258
259 * Flooding.
260
261 * Masquerade.
262
263 * Improper Monopolization of Services.
264
265 There is no quick fix, one-size-fits-all solution for security.
266
267 When a network using SIGTRAN protocols involves more than one party,
268 it may not be reasonable to expect that all parties have implemented
269 security in a sufficient manner. End-to-end security should be the
270 goal; therefore, it is recommended that IPsec or TLS be used to
271 ensure confidentiality of user payload. Consult [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Security Architecture for the Internet Protocol&quot;">3</a>] for more
272 information on configuring IPsec services.
273
274
275
276 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 5]</span></pre>
277 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span>
278 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
279
280
281 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. IPsec Usage</span>
282
283 This section is only relevant for SIGTRAN nodes using IPsec to secure
284 communication between SIGTRAN nodes.
285
286 All SIGTRAN nodes using IPsec MUST implement IPsec ESP [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;IP Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP)&quot;">4</a>] in
287 transport mode with non-null encryption and authentication algorithms
288 to provide per-packet authentication, integrity protection and
289 confidentiality, and MUST implement the replay protection mechanisms
290 of IPsec. In those scenarios where IP layer protection is needed,
291 ESP in tunnel mode SHOULD be used. Non-null encryption should be
292 used when using IPSec ESP.
293
294 All SIGTRAN nodes MUST support IKE for peer authentication,
295 negotiation of security associations, and key management, using the
296 IPsec DOI [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation for ISAKMP&quot;">5</a>]. The IPsec implementations MUST support peer
297 authentication using a pre-shared key, and MAY support certificate-
298 based peer authentication using digital signatures. Peer
299 authentication using the public key encryption methods outlined in
300 IKE's sections <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a> and <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a> [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)&quot;">6</a>] SHOULD NOT be used.
301
302 Conformant implementations MUST support IKEs Main Mode and Aggressive
303 Mode. For transport mode, when pre-shared keys are used for
304 authentication, IKE Aggressive Mode SHOULD be used, and IKE Main Mode
305 SHOULD NOT be used. When digital signatures are used for
306 authentication, either IKE Main Mode or IKE Aggressive Mode MAY be
307 used. When using ESP tunnel mode, IKE Main Mode MAY be used to
308 create an ISAKMP association with identity protection during Phase 1.
309
310 When digital signatures are used to achieve authentication, an IKE
311 negotiator SHOULD use IKE Certificate Request Payload(s) to specify
312 the certification authority (or authorities) that is trusted in
313 accordance with its local policy. IKE negotiators SHOULD use
314 pertinent certificate revocation checks before accepting a PKI
315 certificate for use in IKE's authentication procedures. See [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate Revocation List (CRL) Profile&quot;">10</a>] for
316 certificate revocation and [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate Status Protocol - OCSP&quot;">7</a>] for online-checking.
317
318 The Phase 2 Quick Mode exchanges used to negotiate protection for
319 SIGTRAN sessions MUST explicitly carry the Identity Payload fields
320 (IDci and IDcr). The DOI provides for several types of
321 identification data. However, when used in conformant
322 implementations, each ID Payload MUST carry a single IP address and a
323 single non-zero port number, and MUST NOT use the IP Subnet or IP
324 Address Range formats. This allows the Phase 2 security association
325 to correspond to specific TCP and SCTP connections.
326
327
328
329
330
331
332 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 6]</span></pre>
333 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span>
334 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
335
336
337 Since IPsec acceleration hardware may only be able to handle a
338 limited number of active IKE Phase 2 SAs, Phase 2 delete messages may
339 be sent for idle SAs as a means of keeping the number of active Phase
340 2 SAs to a minimum. The receipt of an IKE Phase 2 delete message
341 SHOULD NOT be interpreted as a reason for tearing down a SIGTRAN
342 session. Rather, it is preferable to leave the connection up,
343 whereby another IKE Phase 2 SA will be brought up to protect it if
344 additional traffic is sent. This avoids the potential of continually
345 bringing connections up and down.
346
347 It should be noted that SCTP supports multi-homed hosts and this
348 results in the need for having multiple security associations for one
349 SCTP association. This disadvantage of IPsec has been addressed by
350 [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with IPsec&quot;">17</a>]. So IPsec implementations used by SIGTRAN nodes SHOULD support
351 the IPsec feature described in [<a href="#ref-17" title="&quot;On the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with IPsec&quot;">17</a>].
352
353 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. TLS Usage</span>
354
355 This section is only relevant for SIGTRAN nodes using TLS to secure
356 the communication between SIGTRAN nodes.
357
358 A SIGTRAN node that initiates a SCTP association to another SIGTRAN
359 node acts as a TLS client according to [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;The TLS Protocol Version 1.0&quot;">2</a>], and a SIGTRAN node that
360 accepts a connection acts as a TLS server. SIGTRAN peers
361 implementing TLS for security MUST mutually authenticate as part of
362 TLS session establishment. In order to ensure mutual authentication,
363 the SIGTRAN node acting as TLS server must request a certificate from
364 the SIGTRAN node acting as TLS client, and the SIGTRAN node acting as
365 TLS client MUST be prepared to supply a certificate on request.
366
367 [<a id="ref-14">14</a>] requires the support of the cipher suite
368 TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA. SIGTRAN nodes MAY negotiate other TLS
369 cipher suites.
370
371 TLS MUST be used on all bi-directional streams. Other uni-
372 directional streams MUST NOT be used.
373
374 It should also be noted that a SCTP implementation used for TLS over
375 SCTP MUST support fragmentation of user data and might also need to
376 support the partial delivery API. This holds even if all SIGTRAN
377 messages are small. Furthermore, the 'unordered delivery' feature of
378 SCTP can not be used in conjunction with TLS. See [<a href="#ref-14" title="&quot;Transport Layer Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol&quot;">14</a>] for more
379 details.
380
381 Because TLS only protects the payload, the SCTP header and all
382 control chunks are not protected. This can be used for DoS attacks.
383 This is a general problem with security provided at the transport
384 layer.
385
386
387
388 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 7]</span></pre>
389 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span>
390 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
391
392
393 The SIGTRAN protocols use the same SCTP port number and payload
394 protocol identifier when run over TLS. A session upgrade procedure
395 has to be used to initiate the TLS based communication.
396
397 The session upgrade procedure should be as follows:
398
399 o If an ASP has been configured to use TLS, it sends a STARTTLS
400 message on stream 0 and starts a timer T_TLS. This is the first
401 message sent and the ASP sends no other adaptation layer messages
402 until the TLS based communication has been established.
403
404 o If the peer does not support TLS, it sends back an ERROR message
405 indicating an unsupported message type. In this case, the SCTP
406 association is terminated and it is reported to the management
407 layer that the peer does not support TLS.
408
409 o If the peer does support TLS, it sends back a STARTTLS_ACK
410 message. The client then starts TLS based communication.
411
412 o If T_TLS expires without getting any of the above answers, the
413 association is terminated and the failure is reported to the
414 management layer.
415
416 All SIGTRAN adaptation layers share a common message format. The
417 STARTTLS message consists of a common header only using the message
418 class 10 and message type 1. The STARTTLS_ACK message uses the same
419 message class 10 and the message type 2. Neither messages contain
420 any parameters.
421
422 Using this procedure, it is possible for a man-in-the-middle to do a
423 denial of service attack by indicating that the peer does not support
424 TLS. But this kind of attack is always possible for a man-in-the-
425 middle.
426
427 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Support of IPsec and TLS</span>
428
429 If content of SIGTRAN protocol messages is to be protected, either
430 IPsec ESP or TLS can be used. In both IPsec ESP Transport Mode and
431 TLS cases, the IP header information is neither encrypted nor
432 protected. If IPsec ESP is chosen, the SCTP control information is
433 encrypted and protected whereas in the TLS based solution, the SCTP
434 control information is not encrypted and only protected by SCTP
435 procedures.
436
437 In general, both IPsec and TLS have enough mechanisms to secure the
438 SIGTRAN communications.
439
440
441
442
443
444 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 8]</span></pre>
445 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span>
446 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
447
448
449 Therefore, in order to have a secured model working as soon as
450 possible, the following recommendation is made: A SIGTRAN node MUST
451 support IPsec and MAY support TLS.
452
453 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Peer-to-Peer Considerations</span>
454
455 M2PA, M3UA and SUA support the peer-to-peer model as a generalization
456 to the client-server model which is supported by IUA and M2UA. A
457 SIGTRAN node running M2PA, M3UA or SUA and operating in the peer-to-
458 peer mode is called a SIGTRAN peer.
459
460 As with any peer-to-peer protocol, proper configuration of the trust
461 model within a peer is essential to security. When certificates are
462 used, it is necessary to configure the trust anchors trusted by the
463 peer. These trust anchors are likely to be unique to SIGTRAN usage
464 and distinct from the trust anchors that might be trusted for other
465 purposes such as Web browsing. In general, it is expected that those
466 trust anchors will be configured so as to reflect the business
467 relationships between the organization hosting the peer and other
468 organizations. As a result, a peer will not typically be configured
469 to allow connectivity with any arbitrary peer. When certificate
470 authentication peers may not be known beforehand, peer discovery may
471 be required.
472
473 Note that IPsec is considerably less flexible than TLS when it comes
474 to configuring trust anchors. Since use of Port identifiers is
475 prohibited within IKE Phase 1, it is not possible to uniquely
476 configure trusted trust anchors for each application individually
477 within IPsec; the same policy must be used for all applications.
478 This implies, for example, that a trust anchor trusted for use with a
479 SIGTRAN protocol must also be trusted to protect other protocols (for
480 example SNMP). These restrictions are awkward at best.
481
482 When pre-shared key authentication is used with IPsec to protect
483 SIGTRAN based communication, unique pre-shared keys are configured
484 with peers that are identified by their IP address (Main Mode), or
485 possibly their FQDN (AggressivenMode). As a result, it is necessary
486 for the set of peers to be known beforehand. Therefore, peer
487 discovery is typically not necessary.
488
489 The following is intended to provide some guidance on the issue.
490
491 It is recommended that SIGTRAN peers use the same security mechanism
492 (IPsec or TLS) across all its sessions with other SIGTRAN peers.
493 Inconsistent use of security mechanisms can result in redundant
494 security mechanisms being used (e.g., TLS over IPsec) or worse,
495 potential security vulnerabilities. When IPsec is used with a
496 SIGTRAN protocol, a typical security policy for outbound traffic is
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
503
504
505 "Initiate IPsec, from me to any, destination port P"; for inbound
506 traffic, the policy would be "Require IPsec, from any to me,
507 destination port P". Here, P denotes one of the registered port
508 numbers for a SIGTRAN protocol.
509
510 This policy causes IPsec to be used whenever a SIGTRAN peer initiates
511 a session to another SIGTRAN peer, and to be required whenever an
512 inbound SIGTRAN session occurs. This policy is attractive, since it
513 does not require policy to be set for each peer or dynamically
514 modified each time a new SIGTRAN session is created; an IPsec SA is
515 automatically created based on a simple static policy. Since IPsec
516 extensions are typically not available to the sockets API on most
517 platforms, and IPsec policy functionality is implementation
518 dependent, use of a simple static policy is the often the simplest
519 route to IPsec-enabling a SIGTRAN peer.
520
521 If IPsec is used to secure a SIGTRAN peer-to-peer session, IPsec
522 policy SHOULD be set so as to require IPsec protection for inbound
523 connections, and to initiate IPsec protection for outbound
524 connections. This can be accomplished via use of inbound and
525 outbound filter policy.
526
527 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-9" href="#section-9">9</a>. Security Considerations</span>
528
529 This document discusses the usage of IPsec and TLS for securing
530 SIGTRAN traffic.
531
532 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-10" href="#section-10">10</a>. IANA Considerations</span>
533
534 The message class 12 has been reserved in the Signaling User Adaption
535 Layer Assignments Registry. For this message class, message type 1
536 has been reserved for the STARTTLS message, and message type 2 for
537 the STARTTLS_ACK message.
538
539 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-11" href="#section-11">11</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
540
541 The authors would like to thank B. Aboba, K. Morneault and many
542 others for their invaluable comments and suggestions.
543
544
545
546
547
548
549
550
551
552
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
559
560
561 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-12" href="#section-12">12</a>. References</span>
562
563 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.1" href="#section-12.1">12.1</a>. Normative References</span>
564
565 [<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Bradner, S., "Key words for use in RFCs to Indicate Requirement
566 Levels", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp14">BCP 14</a>, <a href="./rfc2119">RFC 2119</a>, March 1997.
567
568 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-12.2" href="#section-12.2">12.2</a>. Informative References</span>
569
570 [<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Dierks, T. and C. Allen, "The TLS Protocol Version 1.0", <a href="./rfc2246">RFC</a>
571 <a href="./rfc2246">2246</a>, January 1999.
572
573 [<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "Security Architecture for the
574 Internet Protocol", <a href="./rfc2401">RFC 2401</a>, November 1998.
575
576 [<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Kent, S. and R. Atkinson, "IP Encapsulating Security Payload
577 (ESP)", <a href="./rfc2406">RFC 2406</a>, November 1998.
578
579 [<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Piper, D., "The Internet IP Security Domain of Interpretation
580 for ISAKMP", <a href="./rfc2407">RFC 2407</a>, November 1998.
581
582 [<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Harkins, D. and D. Carrel, "The Internet Key Exchange (IKE)",
583 <a href="./rfc2409">RFC 2409</a>, November 1998.
584
585 [<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Myers, M., Ankney, R., Malpani, A., Galperin, S. and C. Adams,
586 "X.509 Internet Public Key Infrastructure Online Certificate
587 Status Protocol - OCSP", <a href="./rfc2560">RFC 2560</a>, June 1999.
588
589 [<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Stewart, R., Xie, Q., Morneault, K., Sharp, C., Schwarzbauer,
590 H., Taylor, T., Rytina, I., Kalla, M., Zhang, L. and V. Paxson,
591 "Stream Control Transmission Protocol", <a href="./rfc2960">RFC 2960</a>, October 2000.
592
593 [<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Morneault, K., Rengasami, S., Kalla, M. and G. Sidebottom,
594 "ISDN Q.921-User Adaptation Layer", <a href="./rfc3057">RFC 3057</a>, February 2001.
595
596 [<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Housley, R., Polk, W., Ford, W. and D. Solo, "Internet X.509
597 Public Key Infrastructure Certificate and Certificate
598 Revocation List (CRL) Profile", <a href="./rfc3280">RFC 3280</a>, April 2002.
599
600 [<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Stone, J., Stewart, R. and D. Otis, "Stream Control
601 Transmission Protocol (SCTP) Checksum Change", <a href="./rfc3309">RFC 3309</a>,
602 September 2002.
603
604 [<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Morneault, K., Dantu, R., Sidebottom, G., Bidulock, B. and J.
605 Heitz, "Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 2 (MTP2)
606 - User Adaptation Layer", <a href="./rfc3331">RFC 3331</a>, September 2002.
607
608
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
615
616
617 [<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Sidebottom, G., Ed., Morneault, K., Ed. and J. Pastor-Balbas,
618 Ed., "Signaling System 7 (SS7) Message Transfer Part 3 (MTP3) -
619 User Adaptation Layer (M3UA)", <a href="./rfc3332">RFC 3332</a>, September 2002.
620
621 [<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Jungmaier, A., Rescorla, E. and M. Tuexen, "Transport Layer
622 Security over Stream Control Transmission Protocol", <a href="./rfc3436">RFC 3436</a>,
623 December 2002.
624
625 [<a id="ref-15">15</a>] George, T., <a style="text-decoration: none" href='https://www.google.com/search?sitesearch=datatracker.ietf.org%2Fdoc%2Fhtml%2F&amp;q=inurl:draft-+%22SS7+MTP2-User+Peer-to-Peer+Adaptation+Layer%22'>"SS7 MTP2-User Peer-to-Peer Adaptation Layer"</a>, Work
626 in Progress, February 2004.
627
628 [<a id="ref-16">16</a>] Loughney, J., "Signalling Connection Control Part User
629 Adaptation Layer (SUA)", Work in Progress, December 2003.
630
631 [<a id="ref-17">17</a>] Bellovin, S., Ioannidis, J., Keromytis, A. and R. Stewart, "On
632 the Use of Stream Control Transmission Protocol (SCTP) with
633 IPsec", <a href="./rfc3554">RFC 3554</a>, July 2003.
634
635 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-13" href="#section-13">13</a>. Authors' Addresses</span>
636
637 John Loughney
638 Nokia Research Center
639 PO Box 407
640 FIN-00045 Nokia Group
641 Finland
642
643 EMail: [email protected]
644
645
646 Michael Tuexen (editor)
647 Univ. of Applied Sciences Muenster
648 Stegerwaldstr. 39
649 48565 Steinfurt
650 Germany
651
652 EMail: [email protected]
653
654
655 Javier Pastor-Balbas
656 Ericsson Espana S.A.
657 Via de los Poblados, 13
658 28033 Madrid
659 Spain
660
661 EMail: [email protected]
662
663
664
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc3788">RFC 3788</a> SIGTRAN Security June 2004</span>
671
672
673 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-14" href="#section-14">14</a>. Full Copyright Statement</span>
674
675 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2004). This document is subject
676 to the rights, licenses and restrictions contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and
677 except as set forth therein, the authors retain all their rights.
678
679 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
680 "AS IS" basis and THE CONTRIBUTOR, THE ORGANIZATION HE/SHE REPRESENTS
681 OR IS SPONSORED BY (IF ANY), THE INTERNET SOCIETY AND THE INTERNET
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683 INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO ANY WARRANTY THAT THE USE OF THE
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685 WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE.
686
687 Intellectual Property
688
689 The IETF takes no position regarding the validity or scope of any
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697
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704
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710
711 Acknowledgement
712
713 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
714 Internet Society.
715
716
717
718
719
720
721
722
723
724 Loughney, et al. Standards Track [Page 13]
725 </pre>