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1 <pre>Network Working Group P. Nikander
2 Request for Comments: 4225 J. Arkko
3 Category: Informational Ericsson Research NomadicLab
4 T. Aura
5 Microsoft Research
6 G. Montenegro
7 Microsoft Corporation
8 E. Nordmark
9 Sun Microsystems
10 December 2005
11
12
13 <span class="h1">Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security Design Background</span>
14
15 Status of This Memo
16
17 This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does
18 not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this
19 memo is unlimited.
20
21 Copyright Notice
22
23 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
24
25 Abstract
26
27 This document is an account of the rationale behind the Mobile IPv6
28 (MIPv6) Route Optimization security design. The purpose of this
29 document is to present the thinking and to preserve the reasoning
30 behind the Mobile IPv6 security design in 2001 - 2002.
31
32 The document has two target audiences: (1) helping MIPv6 implementors
33 to better understand the design choices in MIPv6 security procedures,
34 and (2) allowing people dealing with mobility or multi-homing to
35 avoid a number of potential security pitfalls in their designs.
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53 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span>
54 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
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56
57 Table of Contents
58
59 <a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a>
60 <a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Assumptions about the Existing IP Infrastructure ...........<a href="#page-4">4</a>
61 <a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. The Mobility Problem and the Mobile IPv6 Solution ..........<a href="#page-6">6</a>
62 <a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Design Principles and Goals ................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
63 <a href="#section-1.3.1">1.3.1</a>. End-to-End Principle ..................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
64 <a href="#section-1.3.2">1.3.2</a>. Trust Assumptions .....................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
65 <a href="#section-1.3.3">1.3.3</a>. Protection Level ......................................<a href="#page-8">8</a>
66 <a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>. About Mobile IPv6 Mobility and its Variations ..............<a href="#page-9">9</a>
67 <a href="#section-2">2</a>. Avenues of Attack ...............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a>
68 <a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Target ....................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
69 <a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Timing ....................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a>
70 <a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Location ..................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
71 <a href="#section-3">3</a>. Threats and Limitations ........................................<a href="#page-11">11</a>
72 <a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Attacks Against Address 'Owners' ("Address Stealing").. ...<a href="#page-12">12</a>
73 <a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Basic Address Stealing ...............................<a href="#page-12">12</a>
74 <a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Stealing Addresses of Stationary Nodes ...............<a href="#page-13">13</a>
75 <a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Future Address Sealing ...............................<a href="#page-14">14</a>
76 <a href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Attacks against Secrecy and Integrity ................<a href="#page-15">15</a>
77 <a href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Basic Denial-of-Service Attacks ......................<a href="#page-16">16</a>
78 <a href="#section-3.1.6">3.1.6</a>. Replaying and Blocking Binding Updates ...............<a href="#page-16">16</a>
79 <a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Attacks Against Other Nodes and Networks (Flooding) .......<a href="#page-16">16</a>
80 <a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Basic Flooding .......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a>
81 <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Return-to-Home Flooding ..............................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
82 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Attacks against Binding Update Protocols ..................<a href="#page-18">18</a>
83 <a href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. Inducing Unnecessary Binding Updates .................<a href="#page-19">19</a>
84 <a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Forcing Non-Optimized Routing ........................<a href="#page-20">20</a>
85 <a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Reflection and Amplification .........................<a href="#page-21">21</a>
86 <a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Classification of Attacks .................................<a href="#page-22">22</a>
87 <a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Problems with Infrastructure-Based Authorization ..........<a href="#page-23">23</a>
88 <a href="#section-4">4</a>. Solution Selected for Mobile IPv6 ..............................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
89 <a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Return Routability ........................................<a href="#page-24">24</a>
90 <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Home Address Check ...................................<a href="#page-26">26</a>
91 <a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Care-of-Address Check ................................<a href="#page-27">27</a>
92 <a href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. Forming the First Binding Update .....................<a href="#page-27">27</a>
93 <a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Creating State Safely .....................................<a href="#page-28">28</a>
94 <a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Retransmissions and State Machine ....................<a href="#page-29">29</a>
95 <a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Quick expiration of the Binding Cache Entries .............<a href="#page-29">29</a>
96 <a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-30">30</a>
97 <a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Residual Threats as Compared to IPv4 ......................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
98 <a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Interaction with IPsec ....................................<a href="#page-31">31</a>
99 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Pretending to Be One's Neighbor ...........................<a href="#page-32">32</a>
100 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Two Mobile Nodes Talking to Each Other ....................<a href="#page-33">33</a>
101 <a href="#section-6">6</a>. Conclusions ....................................................<a href="#page-33">33</a>
102 <a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-34">34</a>
103 <a href="#section-8">8</a>. Informative References .........................................<a href="#page-34">34</a>
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109 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span>
110 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
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112
113 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span>
114
115 Mobile IPv4 is based on the idea of supporting mobility on top of
116 existing IP infrastructure, without requiring any modifications to
117 the routers, the applications, or the stationary end hosts. However,
118 in Mobile IPv6 [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">6</a>] (as opposed to Mobile IPv4), the stationary end
119 hosts may provide support for mobility, i.e., route optimization. In
120 route optimization, a correspondent node (CN) (i.e., a peer for a
121 mobile node) learns a binding between the mobile node's stationary
122 home address and its current temporary care-of address. This binding
123 is then used to modify the handling of outgoing (as well as the
124 processing of incoming) packets, leading to security risks. The
125 purpose of this document is to provide a relatively compact source
126 for the background assumptions, design choices, and other information
127 needed to understand the route optimization security design. This
128 document does not seek to compare the relative security of Mobile
129 IPv6 and other mobility protocols, or to list all the alternative
130 security mechanisms that were discussed during the Mobile IPv6 design
131 process. For a summary of the latter, we refer the reader to [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Security of Internet Location Management&quot;">1</a>].
132 Even though incidental implementation suggestions are included for
133 illustrative purposes, the goal of this document is not to provide a
134 guide to implementors. Instead, it is to explain the design choices
135 and rationale behind the current route optimization design. The
136 authors participated in the design team that produced the design and
137 hope, via this note, to capture some of the lessons and reasoning
138 behind that effort.
139
140 The authors' intent is to document the thinking behind that design
141 effort as it was. Even though this note may incorporate more recent
142 developments in order to illustrate the issues, it is not our intent
143 to present a new design. Rather, along with the lessons learned,
144 there is some effort to clarify differing opinions, questionable
145 assumptions, or newly discovered vulnerabilities, should such new
146 information be available today. This is also very important, because
147 it may benefit the working group's hindsight as it revises or
148 improves the Mobile IPv6 specification.
149
150 To fully understand the security implications of the relevant design
151 constraints, it is necessary to explore briefly the nature of the
152 existing IP infrastructure, the problems Mobile IP aims to solve, and
153 the design principles applied. In the light of this background, we
154 can then explore IP-based mobility in more detail and have a brief
155 look at the security problems. The background is given in the rest
156 of this section, starting from <a href="#section-1.1">Section 1.1</a>.
157
158 Although the introduction in <a href="#section-1.1">Section 1.1</a> may appear redundant to
159 readers who are already familiar with Mobile IPv6, it may be valuable
160 to read it anyway. The approach taken in this document is very
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169 different from that in the Mobile IPv6 specification. That is, we
170 have explicitly aimed to expose the implicit assumptions and design
171 choices made in the base Mobile IPv6 design, while the Mobile IPv6
172 specification aims to state the result of the design. By
173 understanding the background, it is much easier to understand the
174 source of some of the related security problems, and to understand
175 the limitations intrinsic to the provided solutions.
176
177 In particular, this document explains how the adopted design for
178 "Return Routability" (RR) protects against the identified threats
179 (<a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>). This is true except for attacks on the RR protocol
180 itself, which require other countermeasures based on heuristics and
181 judicious implementation (<a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>).
182
183 The rest of this document is organized as follows: after this
184 introductory section, we start by considering the avenues of attack
185 in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>. The security problems and countermeasures are studied
186 in detail in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> explains the overall operation and
187 design choices behind the current security design. <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a>
188 analyzes the design and discuss the remaining threats. Finally,
189 <a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> concludes this document.
190
191 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Assumptions about the Existing IP Infrastructure</span>
192
193 One of the design goals in the Mobile IP design was to make mobility
194 possible without changing too much. This was especially important
195 for IPv4, with its large installed base, but the same design goals
196 were inherited by Mobile IPv6. Some alternative proposals take a
197 different approach and propose larger modifications to the Internet
198 architecture (see <a href="#section-1.4">Section 1.4</a>).
199
200 To understand Mobile IPv6, it is important to understand the MIPv6
201 design view of the base IPv6 protocol and infrastructure. The most
202 important base assumptions can be expressed as follows:
203
204 1. The routing prefixes available to a node are determined by its
205 current location, and therefore the node must change its IP
206 address as it moves.
207
208 2. The routing infrastructure is assumed to be secure and well
209 functioning, delivering packets to their intended destinations as
210 identified by destination address.
211
212 Although these assumptions may appear to be trivial, let us explore
213 them a little further. First, in current IPv6 operational practice
214 the IP address prefixes are distributed in a hierarchical manner.
215 This limits the number of routing table entries each individual
216 router needs to handle. An important implication is that the
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225 topology determines what globally routable IP addresses are available
226 at a given location. That is, the nodes cannot freely decide what
227 globally routable IP address to use; they must rely on the routing
228 prefixes served by the local routers via Router Advertisements or by
229 a DHCP server. In other words, IP addresses are just what the name
230 says, addresses (i.e., locators).
231
232 Second, in the current Internet structure, the routers collectively
233 maintain a distributed database of the network topology and forward
234 each packet towards the location determined by the destination
235 address carried in the packet. To maintain the topology information,
236 the routers must trust each other, at least to a certain extent. The
237 routers learn the topology information from the other routers, and
238 they have no option but to trust their neighbor routers about distant
239 topology. At the borders of administrative domains, policy rules are
240 used to limit the amount of perhaps faulty routing table information
241 received from the peer domains. While this is mostly used to weed
242 out administrative mistakes, it also helps with security. The aim is
243 to maintain a reasonably accurate idea of the network topology even
244 if someone is feeding faulty information to the routing system.
245
246 In the current Mobile IPv6 design, it is explicitly assumed that the
247 routers and the policy rules are configured in a reasonable way, and
248 that the resulting routing infrastructure is trustworthy enough.
249 That is, it is assumed that the routing system maintains accurate
250 information of the network topology, and that it is therefore able to
251 route packets to their destination locations. If this assumption is
252 broken, the Internet itself is broken in the sense that packets go to
253 wrong locations. Such a fundamental malfunction of the Internet
254 would render hopeless any other effort to assure correct packet
255 delivery (e.g., any efforts due to Mobile IP security
256 considerations).
257
258 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1.1" href="#section-1.1.1">1.1.1</a>. A Note on Source Addresses and Ingress Filtering</span>
259
260 Some of the threats and attacks discussed in this document take
261 advantage of the ease of source address spoofing. That is, in the
262 current Internet it is possible to send packets with a false source
263 IP address. The eventual introduction of ingress filtering is
264 assumed to prevent this. When ingress filtering is used, traffic
265 with spoofed addresses is not forwarded. This filtering can be
266 applied at different network borders, such as those between an
267 Internet service provider (ISP) and its customers, between downstream
268 and upstream ISPs, or between peer ISPs [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks&quot;">5</a>]. Obviously, the
269 granularity of ingress filters specifies how much you can "spoof
270 inside a prefix". For example, if an ISP ingress filters a
271 customer's link but the customer does nothing, anything inside the
272 customer's /48 prefix could be spoofed. If the customer does
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281 filtering at LAN subnets, anything inside the /64 prefixes could be
282 spoofed. Despite the limitations imposed by such "in-prefix
283 spoofing", in general, ingress filtering enables traffic to be
284 traceable to its real source network [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks&quot;">5</a>].
285
286 However, ingress filtering helps if and only if a large part of the
287 Internet uses it. Unfortunately, there are still some issues (e.g.,
288 in the presence of site multi-homing) that, although not
289 insurmountable, do require careful handling, and that are likely to
290 limit or delay its usefulness [<a href="#ref-5" title="&quot;Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks&quot;">5</a>].
291
292 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. The Mobility Problem and the Mobile IPv6 Solution</span>
293
294 The Mobile IP design aims to solve two problems at the same time.
295 First, it allows transport layer sessions (TCP connections, UDP-
296 based transactions) to continue even if the underlying host(s) move
297 and change their IP addresses. Second, it allows a node to be
298 reached through a static IP address, a home address (HoA).
299
300 The latter design choice can also be stated in other words: Mobile
301 IPv6 aims to preserve the identifier nature of IP addresses. That
302 is, Mobile IPv6 takes the view that IP addresses can be used as
303 natural identifiers of nodes, as they have been used since the
304 beginning of the Internet. This must be contrasted to proposed and
305 existing alternative designs where the identifier and locator natures
306 of the IP addresses have been separated (see <a href="#section-1.4">Section 1.4</a>).
307
308 The basic idea in Mobile IP is to allow a home agent (HA) to work as
309 a stationary proxy for a mobile node (MN). Whenever the mobile node
310 is away from its home network, the home agent intercepts packets
311 destined to the node and forwards the packets by tunneling them to
312 the node's current address, the care-of address (CoA). The transport
313 layer (e.g., TCP, UDP) uses the home address as a stationary
314 identifier for the mobile node. Figure 1 illustrates this basic
315 arrangement.
316
317 The basic solution requires tunneling through the home agent, thereby
318 leading to longer paths and degraded performance. This tunneling is
319 sometimes called triangular routing since it was originally planned
320 that the packets from the mobile node to its peer could still
321 traverse directly, bypassing the home agent.
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336
337 +----+ +----+
338 | MN |=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=tunnel=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=#|#HA |
339 +----+ ____________ +-#--+
340 | CoA ___/ \_____ # Home Link
341 -+-------/ Internet * * *-*-*-*-#-#-#-#-----
342 | * * | * Home Address
343 \___ * * _____/ + * -+
344 \_____*______/ | MN |
345 * + - -+
346 +----+
347 | CN | Data path as * * * *
348 +----+ it appears to correspondent node
349
350 Real data path # # # #
351
352 Figure 1. Basic Mode of Operation in Mobile IPv6
353
354 To alleviate the performance penalty, Mobile IPv6 includes a mode of
355 operation that allows the mobile node and its peer, a correspondent
356 node (CN), to exchange packets directly, bypassing the home agent
357 completely after the initial setup phase. This mode of operation is
358 called route optimization (RO). When route optimization is used, the
359 mobile node sends its current care-of address to the correspondent
360 node, using binding update (BU) messages. The correspondent node
361 stores the binding between the home address and care-of address into
362 its Binding Cache.
363
364 Whenever MIPv6 route optimization is used, the correspondent node
365 effectively functions in two roles. Firstly, it is the source of the
366 packets it sends, as usual. Secondly, it acts as the first router
367 for the packets, effectively performing source routing. That is,
368 when the correspondent node is sending out packets, it consults its
369 MIPv6 route optimization data structures and reroutes the packets, if
370 necessary. A Binding Cache Entry (BCE) contains the home address and
371 the care-of address of the mobile node, and records the fact that
372 packets destined to the home address should now be sent to the
373 destination address. Thus, it represents a local routing exception.
374
375 The packets leaving the correspondent node are source routed to the
376 care-of address. Each packet includes a routing header that contains
377 the home address of the mobile node. Thus, logically, the packet is
378 first routed to the care-of address and then, virtually, from the
379 care-of address to the home address. In practice, of course, the
380 packet is consumed by the mobile node at the care-of address; the
381 header just allows the mobile node to select a socket associated with
382 the home address instead of one with the care-of address. However,
383 the mechanism resembles source routing, as there is routing state
384 involved at the correspondent node, and a routing header is used.
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393 Nevertheless, this routing header is special (type 2) to avoid the
394 risks associated with using the more general (type 0) variant.
395
396 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Design Principles and Goals</span>
397
398 The MIPv6 design and security design aimed to follow the end-to-end
399 principle, to notice the differences in trust relationships between
400 the nodes, and to be explicit about delivering a practical (instead
401 of an over-ambitious) level of protection.
402
403 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.1" href="#section-1.3.1">1.3.1</a>. End-to-End Principle</span>
404
405 Perhaps the leading design principle for Internet protocols is the
406 so-called end-to-end principle [<a href="#ref-4" title="&quot;Some Internet Architectural Guidelines and Philosophy&quot;">4</a>][11]. According to this principle,
407 it is beneficial to avoid polluting the network with state, and to
408 limit new state creation to the involved end nodes.
409
410 In the case of Mobile IPv6, the end-to-end principle is applied by
411 restricting mobility-related state primarily to the home agent.
412 Additionally, if route optimization is used, the correspondent nodes
413 also maintain a soft state relating to the mobile nodes' current
414 care-of addresses, the Binding Cache. This can be contrasted to an
415 approach that would use individual host routes within the basic
416 routing system. Such an approach would create state on a huge number
417 of routers around the network. In Mobile IPv6, only the home agent
418 and the communicating nodes need to create state.
419
420 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.2" href="#section-1.3.2">1.3.2</a>. Trust Assumptions</span>
421
422 In the Mobile IPv6 security design, different approaches were chosen
423 for securing the communication between the mobile node and its home
424 agent and between the mobile node and its correspondent nodes. In
425 the home agent case, it was assumed that the mobile node and the home
426 agent know each other through a prior arrangement, e.g., due to a
427 business relationship. In contrast, it was strictly assumed that the
428 mobile node and the correspondent node do not need to have any prior
429 arrangement, thereby allowing Mobile IPv6 to function in a scalable
430 manner, without requiring any configuration at the correspondent
431 nodes.
432
433 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.3" href="#section-1.3.3">1.3.3</a>. Protection Level</span>
434
435 As a security goal, Mobile IPv6 design aimed to be "as secure as the
436 (non-mobile) IPv4 Internet" was at the time of the design, in the
437 period 2001 - 2002. In particular, that means that there is little
438 protection against attackers that are able to attach themselves
439 between a correspondent node and a home agent. The rationale is
440 simple: in the 2001 Internet, if a node was able to attach itself to
441
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449 the communication path between two arbitrary nodes, it was able to
450 disrupt, modify, and eavesdrop all the traffic between the two nodes,
451 unless IPsec protection was used. Even when IPsec was used, the
452 attacker was still able to block communication selectively by simply
453 dropping the packets. The attacker in control of a router between
454 the two nodes could also mount a flooding attack by redirecting the
455 data flows between the two nodes (or, more practically, an equivalent
456 flow of bogus data) to a third party.
457
458 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>. About Mobile IPv6 Mobility and its Variations</span>
459
460 Taking a more abstract angle, IPv6 mobility can be defined as a
461 mechanism for managing local exceptions to routing information in
462 order to direct packets that are sent to one address (the home
463 address) to another address (the care-of address). It is managing in
464 the sense that the local routing exceptions (source routes) are
465 created and deleted dynamically, according to instructions sent by
466 the mobile node. It is local in the sense that the routing
467 exceptions are valid only at the home agent, and in the correspondent
468 nodes if route optimization is used. The created pieces of state are
469 exceptions in the sense that they override the normal topological
470 routing information carried collectively by the routers.
471
472 Using the terminology introduced by J. Noel Chiappa [<a href="#ref-14" title="&quot;Endpoints and Endpoint Names: A Proposed Enhancement to the Internet Architecture&quot;">14</a>], we can say
473 that the home address functions in the dual role of being an end-
474 point identifier (EID) and a permanent locator. The care-of address
475 is a pure, temporary locator, which identifies the current location
476 of the mobile node. The correspondent nodes effectively perform
477 source routing, redirecting traffic destined to the home address to
478 the care-of address. This is even reflected in the packet structure:
479 the packets carry an explicit routing header.
480
481 The relationship between EIDs and permanent locators has been
482 exploited by other proposals. Their technical merits and security
483 problems, however, are beyond the scope of this document.
484
485 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Avenues of Attack</span>
486
487 From the discussion above, it should now be clear that the dangers
488 that Mobile IPv6 must protect from lie in creation (or deletion) of
489 the local routing exceptions. In Mobile IPv6 terms, the danger is in
490 the possibility of unauthorized creation of Binding Cache Entries
491 (BCE). The effects of an attack differ depending on the target of
492 the attack, the timing of the attack, and the location of the
493 attacker.
494
495
496
497
498
499
500 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre>
501 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span>
502 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
503
504
505 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Target</span>
506
507 Basically, the target of an attack can be any node or network in the
508 Internet (stationary or mobile). The basic differences lie in the
509 goals of the attack: does the attacker aim to divert (steal) the
510 traffic destined to and/or sourced at the target node, or does it aim
511 to cause denial-of-service to the target node or network? The target
512 does not typically play much of an active role attack. As an
513 example, an attacker may launch a denial-of-service attack on a given
514 node, A, by contacting a large number of nodes, claiming to be A, and
515 subsequently diverting the traffic at these other nodes so that A is
516 no longer able to receive packets from those nodes. A itself need
517 not be involved at all before its communications start to break.
518 Furthermore, A is not necessarily a mobile node; it may well be
519 stationary.
520
521 Mobile IPv6 uses the same class of IP addresses for both mobile nodes
522 (i.e., home and care-of addresses) and stationary nodes. That is,
523 mobile and stationary addresses are indistinguishable from each
524 other. Attackers can take advantage of this by taking any IP address
525 and using it in a context where, normally, only mobile (home or
526 care-of) addresses appear. This means that attacks that otherwise
527 would only concern mobile nodes are, in fact, a threat to all IPv6
528 nodes.
529
530 In fact, a mobile node appears to be best protected, since a mobile
531 node does not need to maintain state about the whereabouts of some
532 remote nodes. Conversely, the role of being a correspondent node
533 appears to be the weakest, since there are very few assumptions upon
534 which it can base its state formation. That is, an attacker has a
535 much easier task in fooling a correspondent node to believe that a
536 presumably mobile node is somewhere it is not, than in fooling a
537 mobile node itself into believing something similar. On the other
538 hand, since it is possible to attack a node indirectly by first
539 targeting its peers, all nodes are equally vulnerable in some sense.
540 Furthermore, a (usually) mobile node often also plays the role of
541 being a correspondent node, since it can exchange packets with other
542 mobile nodes (see also <a href="#section-5.4">Section 5.4</a>).
543
544 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Timing</span>
545
546 An important aspect in understanding Mobile IPv6-related dangers is
547 timing. In a stationary IPv4 network, an attacker must be between
548 the communication nodes at the same time as the nodes communicate.
549 With the Mobile IPv6 ability of creating binding cache entries, the
550 situation changes. A new danger is created. Without proper
551 protection, an attacker could attach itself between the home agent
552 and a correspondent node for a while, create a BCE at the
553
554
555
556 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre>
557 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span>
558 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
559
560
561 correspondent node, leave the position, and continuously update the
562 correspondent node about the mobile node's whereabouts. This would
563 make the correspondent node send packets destined to the mobile node
564 to an incorrect address as long as the BCE remained valid, i.e.,
565 typically until the correspondent node is rebooted. The converse
566 would also be possible: an attacker could also launch an attack by
567 first creating a BCE and then letting it expire at a carefully
568 selected time. If a large number of active BCEs carrying large
569 amounts of traffic expired at the same time, the result might be an
570 overload towards the home agent or the home network. (See <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section</a>
571 <a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> for a more detailed explanation.)
572
573 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Location</span>
574
575 In a static IPv4 Internet, an attacker can only receive packets
576 destined to a given address if it is able to attach itself to, or to
577 control, a node on the topological path between the sender and the
578 recipient. On the other hand, an attacker can easily send spoofed
579 packets from almost anywhere. If Mobile IPv6 allowed sending
580 unprotected Binding Updates, an attacker could create a BCE on any
581 correspondent node from anywhere in the Internet, simply by sending a
582 fraudulent Binding Update to the correspondent node. Instead of
583 being required to be between the two target nodes, the attacker could
584 act from anywhere in the Internet.
585
586 In summary, by introducing the new routing exception (binding cache)
587 at the correspondent nodes, Mobile IPv6 introduces the dangers of
588 time and space shifting. Without proper protection, Mobile IPv6
589 would allow an attacker to act from anywhere in the Internet and well
590 before the time of the actual attack. In contrast, in the static
591 IPv4 Internet, the attacking nodes must be present at the time of the
592 attack and they must be positioned in a suitable way, or the attack
593 would not be possible in the first place.
594
595 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Threats and Limitations</span>
596
597 This section describes attacks against Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization
598 and what protection mechanisms Mobile IPv6 applies against them. The
599 goal of the attacker can be to corrupt the correspondent node's
600 binding cache and to cause packets to be delivered to a wrong
601 address. This can compromise secrecy and integrity of communication
602 and cause denial-of-service (DoS) both at the communicating parties
603 and at the address that receives the unwanted packets. The attacker
604 may also exploit features of the Binding Update (BU) mechanism to
605 exhaust the resources of the mobile node, the home agent, or the
606 correspondent nodes. The aim of this section is to provide an
607 overview of the various protocol mechanisms and their limitations.
608 The details of the mechanisms are covered in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>.
609
610
611
612 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre>
613 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span>
614 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
615
616
617 It is essential to understand that some of the threats are more
618 serious than others, that some can be mitigated but not removed, that
619 some threats may represent acceptable risk, and that some threats may
620 be considered too expensive to the attacker to be worth preventing.
621
622 We consider only active attackers. The rationale behind this is that
623 in order to corrupt the binding cache, the attacker must sooner or
624 later send one or more messages. Thus, it makes little sense to
625 consider attackers that only observe messages but do not send any.
626 In fact, some active attacks are easier, for the average attacker, to
627 launch than a passive one would be. That is, in many active attacks
628 the attacker can initiate binding update processing at any time,
629 while most passive attacks require the attacker to wait for suitable
630 messages to be sent by the target nodes.
631
632 Nevertheless, an important class of passive attacks remains: attacks
633 on privacy. It is well known that simply by examining packets,
634 eavesdroppers can track the movements of individual nodes (and
635 potentially, users) [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6&quot;">3</a>]. Mobile IPv6 exacerbates the problem by
636 adding more potentially sensitive information into the packets (e.g.,
637 Binding Updates, routing headers or home address options). This
638 document does not address these attacks.
639
640 We first consider attacks against nodes that are supposed to have a
641 specified address (<a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>), continuing with flooding attacks
642 (<a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>) and attacks against the basic Binding Update protocol
643 (<a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>). After that, we present a classification of the
644 attacks (<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>). Finally, we consider the applicability of
645 solutions relying on some kind of a global security infrastructure
646 (<a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>).
647
648 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Attacks Against Address 'Owners' ("Address Stealing")</span>
649
650 The most obvious danger in Mobile IPv6 is address "stealing", when an
651 attacker illegitimately claims to be a given node at a given address
652 and tries to "steal" traffic destined to that address. We first
653 describe the basic variant of this attack, follow with a description
654 of how the situation is affected if the target is a stationary node,
655 and continue with more complicated issues related to timing (so
656 called "future" attacks), confidentiality and integrity, and DoS
657 aspects.
658
659 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Basic Address Stealing</span>
660
661 If Binding Updates were not authenticated at all, an attacker could
662 fabricate and send spoofed binding updates from anywhere in the
663 Internet. All nodes that support the correspondent node
664 functionality would become unwitting accomplices to this attack. As
665
666
667
668 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre>
669 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span>
670 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
671
672
673 explained in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>, there is no way of telling which addresses
674 belong to mobile nodes that really could send binding updates and
675 which addresses belong to stationary nodes (see below), so
676 potentially any node (including "static" nodes) is vulnerable.
677
678 +---+ original +---+ new packet +---+
679 | B |&lt;----------------| A |- - - - - - -&gt;| C |
680 +---+ packet flow +---+ flow +---+
681 ^
682 |
683 | False BU: B -&gt; C
684 |
685 +----------+
686 | Attacker |
687 +----------+
688
689 Figure 2. Basic Address Stealing
690
691 Consider an IP node, A, sending IP packets to another IP node, B.
692 The attacker could redirect the packets to an arbitrary address, C,
693 by sending a Binding Update to A. The home address (HoA) in the
694 binding update would be B and the care-of address (CoA) would be C.
695 After receiving this binding update, A would send all packets
696 intended for the node B to the address C. See Figure 2.
697
698 The attacker might select the care-of address to be either its own
699 current address, another address in its local network, or any other
700 IP address. If the attacker selected a local care-of address
701 allowing it to receive the packets, it would be able to send replies
702 to the correspondent node. Ingress filtering at the attacker's
703 local+ network does not prevent the spoofing of Binding Updates but
704 forces the attacker either to choose a care-of address from inside
705 its own network or to use the Alternate care-of address sub-option.
706
707 The binding update authorization mechanism used in the MIPv6 security
708 design is primarily intended to mitigate this threat, and to limit
709 the location of attackers to the path between a correspondent node
710 and the home agent.
711
712 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Stealing Addresses of Stationary Nodes</span>
713
714 The attacker needs to know or guess the IP addresses of both the
715 source of the packets to be diverted (A in the example above) and the
716 destination of the packets (B, above). This means that it is
717 difficult to redirect all packets to or from a specific node because
718 the attacker would need to know the IP addresses of all the nodes
719 with which it is communicating.
720
721
722
723
724 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre>
725 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span>
726 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
727
728
729 Nodes with well-known addresses, such as servers and those using
730 stateful configuration, are most vulnerable. Nodes that are a part
731 of the network infrastructure, such as DNS servers, are particularly
732 interesting targets for attackers and particularly easy to identify.
733
734 Nodes that frequently change their address and use random addresses
735 are relatively safe. However, if they register their address into
736 Dynamic DNS, they become more exposed. Similarly, nodes that visit
737 publicly accessible networks such as airport wireless LANs risk
738 revealing their addresses. IPv6 addressing privacy features [<a href="#ref-3" title="&quot;Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6&quot;">3</a>]
739 mitigate these risks to an extent, but note that addresses cannot be
740 completely recycled while there are still open sessions that use
741 those addresses.
742
743 Thus, it is not the mobile nodes that are most vulnerable to address
744 stealing attacks; it is the well-known static servers. Furthermore,
745 the servers often run old or heavily optimized operating systems and
746 may not have any mobility related code at all. Thus, the security
747 design cannot be based on the idea that mobile nodes might somehow be
748 able to detect whether someone has stolen their address, and reset
749 the state at the correspondent node. Instead, the security design
750 must make reasonable measures to prevent the creation of fraudulent
751 binding cache entries in the first place.
752
753 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Future Address Sealing</span>
754
755 If an attacker knows an address that a node is likely to select in
756 the future, it can launch a "future" address stealing attack. The
757 attacker creates a Binding Cache Entry with the home address that it
758 anticipates the target node will use. If the Home Agent allows
759 dynamic home addresses, the attacker may be able to do this
760 legitimately. That is, if the attacker is a client of the Home Agent
761 and is able to acquire the home address temporarily, it may be able
762 to do so and then to return the home address to the Home Agent once
763 the BCE is in place.
764
765 Now, if the BCE state had a long expiration time, the target node
766 would acquire the same home address while the BCE is still effective,
767 and the attacker would be able to launch a successful man-in-the-
768 middle or denial-of-service attack. The mechanism applied in the
769 MIPv6 security design is to limit the lifetime of Binding Cache
770 Entries to a few minutes.
771
772 Note that this attack applies only to fairly specific conditions.
773 There are also some variations of this attack that are theoretically
774 possible under some other conditions. However, all of these attacks
775 are limited by the Binding Cache Entry lifetime, and therefore they
776 are not a real concern with the current design.
777
778
779
780 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre>
781 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span>
782 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
783
784
785 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.4" href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Attacks against Secrecy and Integrity</span>
786
787 By spoofing Binding Updates, an attacker could redirect all packets
788 between two IP nodes to itself. By sending a spoofed binding update
789 to A, it could capture the data intended to B. That is, it could
790 pretend to be B and highjack A's connections with B, or it could
791 establish new spoofed connections. The attacker could also send
792 spoofed binding updates to both A and B and insert itself in the
793 middle of all connections between them (man-in-the-middle attack).
794 Consequently, the attacker would be able to see and modify the
795 packets sent between A and B. See Figure 3.
796
797 Original data path, before man-in-the-middle attack
798
799 +---+ +---+
800 | A | | B |
801 +---+ +---+
802 \___________________________________/
803
804 Modified data path, after the falsified binding updates
805
806 +---+ +---+
807 | A | | B |
808 +---+ +---+
809 \ /
810 \ /
811 \ +----------+ /
812 \---------| Attacker |-------/
813 +----------+
814
815 Figure 3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack
816
817 Strong end-to-end encryption and integrity protection, such as
818 authenticated IPsec, can prevent all the attacks against data secrecy
819 and integrity. When the data is cryptographically protected, spoofed
820 binding updates could result in denial of service (see below) but not
821 in disclosure or corruption of sensitive data beyond revealing the
822 existence of the traffic flows. Two fixed nodes could also protect
823 communication between themselves by refusing to accept binding
824 updates from each other. Ingress filtering, on the other hand, does
825 not help, as the attacker is using its own address as the care-of
826 address and is not spoofing source IP addresses.
827
828 The protection adopted in MIPv6 Security Design is to authenticate
829 (albeit weakly) the addresses by return routability (RR), which
830 limits the topological locations from which the attack is possible
831 (see <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>).
832
833
834
835
836 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre>
837 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span>
838 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
839
840
841 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.5" href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Basic Denial-of-Service Attacks</span>
842
843 By sending spoofed binding updates, the attacker could redirect all
844 packets sent between two IP nodes to a random or nonexistent address
845 (or addresses). As a result, it might be able to stop or disrupt
846 communication between the nodes. This attack is serious because any
847 Internet node could be targeted, including fixed nodes belonging to
848 the infrastructure (e.g., DNS servers) that are also vulnerable.
849 Again, the selected protection mechanism is return routability (RR).
850
851 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.6" href="#section-3.1.6">3.1.6</a>. Replaying and Blocking Binding Updates</span>
852
853 Any protocol for authenticating binding updates has to consider
854 replay attacks. That is, an attacker may be able to replay recently
855 authenticated binding updates to the correspondent and, consequently,
856 to direct packets to the mobile node's previous location. As with
857 spoofed binding updates, this could be used both for capturing
858 packets and for DoS. The attacker could capture the packets and
859 impersonate the mobile node if it reserved the mobile's previous
860 address after the mobile node has moved away and then replayed the
861 previous binding update to redirect packets back to the previous
862 location.
863
864 In a related attack, the attacker blocks binding updates from the
865 mobile at its new location, e.g., by jamming the radio link or by
866 mounting a flooding attack. The attacker then takes over the
867 mobile's connections at the old location. The attacker will be able
868 to capture the packets sent to the mobile and to impersonate the
869 mobile until the correspondent's Binding Cache entry expires.
870
871 Both of the above attacks require that the attacker be on the same
872 local network with the mobile, where it can relatively easily observe
873 packets and block them even if the mobile does not move to a new
874 location. Therefore, we believe that these attacks are not as
875 serious as ones that can be mounted from remote locations. The
876 limited lifetime of the Binding Cache entry and the associated nonces
877 limit the time frame within which the replay attacks are possible.
878 Replay protection is provided by the sequence number and MAC in the
879 Binding Update. To not undermine this protection, correspondent
880 nodes must exercise care upon deleting a binding cache entry, as per
881 <a href="#section-5.2.8">section 5.2.8</a> ("Preventing Replay Attacks") in [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">6</a>].
882
883 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Attacks Against Other Nodes and Networks (Flooding)</span>
884
885 By sending spoofed binding updates, an attacker could redirect
886 traffic to an arbitrary IP address. This could be used to overload
887 an arbitrary Internet address with an excessive volume of packets
888 (known as a 'bombing attack'). The attacker could also target a
889
890
891
892 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre>
893 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span>
894 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
895
896
897 network by redirecting data to one or more IP addresses within the
898 network. There are two main variations of flooding: basic flooding
899 and return-to-home flooding. We consider them separately.
900
901 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Basic Flooding</span>
902
903 In the simplest attack, the attacker knows that there is a heavy data
904 stream from node A to B and redirects this to the target address C.
905 However, A would soon stop sending the data because it is not
906 receiving acknowledgements from B.
907
908 (B is attacker)
909
910 +---+ original +---+ flooding packet +---+
911 | B |&lt;================| A |==================&gt;| C |
912 +---+ packet flow +---+ flow +---+
913 | ^
914 \ /
915 \__________________/
916 False binding update + false acknowledgements
917
918 Figure 4. Basic Flooding Attack
919
920 A more sophisticated attacker would act itself as B; see Figure 4.
921 It would first subscribe to a data stream (e.g., a video stream) and
922 redirect this stream to the target address C. The attacker would
923 even be able to spoof the acknowledgements. For example, consider a
924 TCP stream. The attacker would perform the TCP handshake itself and
925 thus know the initial sequence numbers. After redirecting the data
926 to C, the attacker would continue to send spoofed acknowledgements.
927 It would even be able to accelerate the data rate by simulating a
928 fatter pipe [<a href="#ref-12" title="&quot;TCP Congestion Control with a Misbehaving Receiver&quot;">12</a>].
929
930 This attack might be even easier with UDP/RTP. The attacker could
931 create spoofed RTCP acknowledgements. Either way, the attacker would
932 be able to redirect an increasing stream of unwanted data to the
933 target address without doing much work itself. It could carry on
934 opening more streams and refreshing the Binding Cache entries by
935 sending a new binding update every few minutes. Thus, the limitation
936 of BCE lifetime to a few minutes does not help here without
937 additional measures.
938
939 During the Mobile IPv6 design process, the effectiveness of this
940 attack was debated. It was mistakenly assumed that the target node
941 would send a TCP Reset to the source of the unwanted data stream,
942 which would then stop sending. In reality, all practical TCP/IP
943 implementations fail to send the Reset. The target node drops the
944 unwanted packets at the IP layer because it does not have a Binding
945
946
947
948 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre>
949 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span>
950 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
951
952
953 Update List entry corresponding to the Routing Header on the incoming
954 packet. Thus, the flooding data is never processed at the TCP layer
955 of the target node, and no Reset is sent. This means that the attack
956 using TCP streams is more effective than was originally believed.
957
958 This attack is serious because the target can be any node or network,
959 not only a mobile one. What makes it particularly serious compared
960 to the other attacks is that the target itself cannot do anything to
961 prevent the attack. For example, it does not help if the target
962 network stops using Route Optimization. The damage is compounded if
963 these techniques are used to amplify the effect of other distributed
964 denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Ingress filtering in the
965 attacker's local network prevents the spoofing of source addresses
966 but the attack would still be possible by setting the Alternate
967 care-of address sub-option to the target address.
968
969 Again, the protection mechanism adopted for MIPv6 is return
970 routability. This time it is necessary to check that there is indeed
971 a node at the new care-of address, and that the node is the one that
972 requested redirecting packets to that very address (see <a href="#section-4.1.2">Section</a>
973 <a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>).
974
975 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Return-to-Home Flooding</span>
976
977 A variation of the bombing attack would target the home address or
978 the home network instead of the care-of address or a visited network.
979 The attacker would claim to be a mobile with the home address equal
980 to the target address. While claiming to be away from home, the
981 attacker would start downloading a data stream. The attacker would
982 then send a binding update cancellation (i.e., a request to delete
983 the binding from the Binding Cache) or just allow the cache entry to
984 expire. Either would redirect the data stream to the home network.
985 As when bombing a care-of address, the attacker can keep the stream
986 alive and even increase the data rate by spoofing acknowledgements.
987 When successful, the bombing attack against the home network is just
988 as serious as that against a care-of address.
989
990 The basic protection mechanism adopted is return routability.
991 However, it is hard to fully protect against this attack; see <a href="#section-4.1.1">Section</a>
992 <a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>.
993
994 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Attacks against Binding Update Protocols</span>
995
996 Security protocols that successfully protect the secrecy and
997 integrity of data can sometimes make the participants more vulnerable
998 to denial-of-service attacks. In fact, the stronger the
999 authentication, the easier it may be for an attacker to use the
1000
1001
1002
1003
1004 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre>
1005 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span>
1006 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1007
1008
1009 protocol features to exhaust the mobile's or the correspondent's
1010 resources.
1011
1012 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. Inducing Unnecessary Binding Updates</span>
1013
1014 When a mobile node receives an IP packet from a new correspondent via
1015 the home agent, it may initiate the binding update protocol. An
1016 attacker can exploit this by sending the mobile node a spoofed IP
1017 packet (e.g., ping or TCP SYN packet) that appears to come from a new
1018 correspondent node. Since the packet arrives via the home agent, the
1019 mobile node may start the binding update protocol with the
1020 correspondent node. The decision as to whether to initiate the
1021 binding update procedure may depend on several factors (including
1022 heuristics, cross layer information, and configuration options) and
1023 is not specified by Mobile IPv6. Not initiating the binding update
1024 procedure automatically may alleviate these attacks, but it will not,
1025 in general, prevent them completely.
1026
1027 In a real attack the attacker would induce the mobile node to
1028 initiate binding update protocols with a large number of
1029 correspondent nodes at the same time. If the correspondent addresses
1030 are real addresses of existing IP nodes, then most instances of the
1031 binding update protocol might even complete successfully. The
1032 entries created in the Binding Cache are correct but useless. In
1033 this way, the attacker can induce the mobile to execute the binding
1034 update protocol unnecessarily, which can drain the mobile's
1035 resources.
1036
1037 A correspondent node (i.e., any IP node) can also be attacked in a
1038 similar way. The attacker sends spoofed IP packets to a large number
1039 of mobiles, with the target node's address as the source address.
1040 These mobiles will initiate the binding update protocol with the
1041 target node. Again, most of the binding update protocol executions
1042 will complete successfully. By inducing a large number of
1043 unnecessary binding updates, the attacker is able to consume the
1044 target node's resources.
1045
1046 This attack is possible against any binding update authentication
1047 protocol. The more resources the binding update protocol consumes,
1048 the more serious the attack. Therefore, strong cryptographic
1049 authentication protocol is more vulnerable to the attack than a weak
1050 one or unauthenticated binding updates. Ingress filtering helps a
1051 little, since it makes it harder to forge the source address of the
1052 spoofed packets, but it does not completely eliminate this threat.
1053
1054 A node should protect itself from the attack by setting a limit on
1055 the amount of resources (i.e., processing time, memory, and
1056 communications bandwidth) that it uses for processing binding
1057
1058
1059
1060 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre>
1061 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span>
1062 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1063
1064
1065 updates. When the limit is exceeded, the node can simply stop
1066 attempting route optimization. Sometimes it is possible to process
1067 some binding updates even when a node is under the attack. A mobile
1068 node may have a local security policy listing a limited number of
1069 addresses to which binding updates will be sent even when the mobile
1070 node is under DoS attack. A correspondent node (i.e., any IP node)
1071 may similarly have a local security policy listing a limited set of
1072 addresses from which binding updates will be accepted even when the
1073 correspondent is under a binding update DoS attack.
1074
1075 The node may also recognize addresses with it had meaningful
1076 communication in the past and only send binding updates to, or accept
1077 them from, those addresses. Since it may be impossible for the IP
1078 layer to know about the protocol state in higher protocol layers, a
1079 good measure of the meaningfulness of the past communication is
1080 probably per-address packet counts. Alternatively, Neighbor
1081 Discovery [<a href="#ref-2" title="&quot;Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)&quot;">2</a>] (<a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>, Conceptual Data Structures) defines the
1082 Destination Cache as a set of entries about destinations to which
1083 traffic has been sent recently. Thus, implementors may wish to use
1084 the information in the Destination Cache.
1085
1086 <a href="#section-11.7.2">Section 11.7.2</a> ("Correspondent Registration") in [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">6</a>] does not specify
1087 when such a route optimization procedure should be initiated. It
1088 does indicate when it may justifiable to do so, but these hints are
1089 not enough. This remains an area where more work is needed.
1090 Obviously, given that route optimization is optional, any node that
1091 finds the processing load excessive or unjustified may simply turn it
1092 off (either selectively or completely).
1093
1094 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Forcing Non-Optimized Routing</span>
1095
1096 As a variant of the previous attack, the attacker can prevent a
1097 correspondent node from using route optimization by filling its
1098 Binding Cache with unnecessary entries so that most entries for real
1099 mobiles are dropped.
1100
1101 Any successful DoS attack against a mobile or correspondent node can
1102 also prevent the processing of binding updates. We have previously
1103 suggested that the target of a DoS attack may respond by stopping
1104 route optimization for all or some communication. Obviously, an
1105 attacker can exploit this fallback mechanism and force the target to
1106 use the less efficient home agent-based routing. The attacker only
1107 needs to mount a noticeable DoS attack against the mobile or
1108 correspondent, and the target will default to non-optimized routing.
1109
1110 The target node can mitigate the effects of the attack by reserving
1111 more space for the Binding Cache, by reverting to non-optimized
1112 routing only when it cannot otherwise cope with the DoS attack, by
1113
1114
1115
1116 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre>
1117 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span>
1118 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1119
1120
1121 trying aggressively to return to optimized routing, or by favoring
1122 mobiles with which it has an established relationship. This attack
1123 is not as serious as the ones described earlier, but applications
1124 that rely on Route Optimization could still be affected. For
1125 instance, conversational multimedia sessions can suffer drastically
1126 from the additional delays caused by triangle routing.
1127
1128 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3" href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Reflection and Amplification</span>
1129
1130 Attackers sometimes try to hide the source of a packet-flooding
1131 attack by reflecting the traffic from other nodes [<a href="#ref-1" title="&quot;Security of Internet Location Management&quot;">1</a>]. That is,
1132 instead of sending the flood of packets directly to the target, the
1133 attacker sends data to other nodes, tricking them to send the same
1134 number, or more, packets to the target. Such reflection can hide the
1135 attacker's address even when ingress filtering prevents source
1136 address spoofing. Reflection is particularly dangerous if the
1137 packets can be reflected multiple times, if they can be sent into a
1138 looping path, or if the nodes can be tricked into sending many more
1139 packets than they receive from the attacker, because such features
1140 can be used to amplify the traffic by a significant factor. When
1141 designing protocols, one should avoid creating services that can be
1142 used for reflection and amplification.
1143
1144 Triangle routing would easily create opportunities for reflection: a
1145 correspondent node receives packets (e.g., TCP SYN) from the mobile
1146 node and replies to the home address given by the mobile node in the
1147 Home Address Option (HAO). The mobile might not really be a mobile
1148 and the home address could actually be the target address. The
1149 target would only see the packets sent by the correspondent and could
1150 not see the attacker's address (even if ingress filtering prevents
1151 the attacker from spoofing its source address).
1152
1153 +----------+ TCP SYN with HAO +-----------+
1154 | Attacker |--------------------&gt;| Reflector |
1155 +----------+ +-----------+
1156 |
1157 | TCP SYN-ACK to HoA
1158 V
1159 +-----------+
1160 | Flooding |
1161 | target |
1162 +-----------+
1163
1164 Figure 5. Reflection Attack
1165
1166 A badly designed binding update protocol could also be used for
1167 reflection: the correspondent would respond to a data packet by
1168 initiating the binding update authentication protocol, which usually
1169
1170
1171
1172 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre>
1173 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span>
1174 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1175
1176
1177 involves sending a packet to the home address. In that case, the
1178 reflection attack can be discouraged by copying the mobile's address
1179 into the messages sent by the mobile to the correspondent. (The
1180 mobile's source address is usually the same as the care-of address,
1181 but an Alternative Care-of Address sub-option can specify a different
1182 care-of address.) Some of the early proposals for MIPv6 security
1183 used this approach and were prone to reflection attacks.
1184
1185 In some of the proposals for binding update authentication protocols,
1186 the correspondent node responded to an initial message from the
1187 mobile with two packets (one to the home address, one to the care-of
1188 address). It would have been possible to use this to amplify a
1189 flooding attack by a factor of two. Furthermore, with public-key
1190 authentication, the packets sent by the correspondent might have been
1191 significantly larger than the one that triggers them.
1192
1193 These types of reflection and amplification can be avoided by
1194 ensuring that the correspondent only responds to the same address
1195 from which it received a packet, and only with a single packet of the
1196 same size. These principles have been applied to MIPv6 security
1197 design.
1198
1199 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Classification of Attacks</span>
1200
1201 Sect. Attack name Target Sev. Mitigation
1202 ---------------------------------------------------------------------
1203 3.1.1 Basic address stealing MN Med. RR
1204 3.1.2 Stealing addresses of stationary nodes Any High RR
1205 3.1.3 Future address stealing MN Low RR, lifetime
1206 3.1.4 Attacks against secrecy and integrity MN Low RR, IPsec
1207 3.1.5 Basic denial-of-service attacks Any Med. RR
1208 3.1.6 Replaying and blocking binding updates MN Low lifetime,
1209 seq number,
1210 MAC
1211 3.2.1 Basic flooding Any High RR
1212 3.2.2 Return-to-home flooding Any High RR
1213 3.3.1 Inducing unnecessary binding updates MN, CN Med. heuristics
1214 3.3.2 Forcing non-optimized routing MN Low heuristics
1215 3.3.3 Reflection and amplification N/A Med. BU design
1216
1217 Figure 6. Summary of Discussed Attacks
1218
1219 Figure 6 gives a summary of the attacks discussed. As it stands at
1220 the time of writing, the return-to-the-home flooding and the
1221 induction of unnecessary binding updates look like the threats
1222 against which we have the least amount of protection, compared to
1223 their severity.
1224
1225
1226
1227
1228 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre>
1229 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span>
1230 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1231
1232
1233 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Problems with Infrastructure-Based Authorization</span>
1234
1235 Early in the MIPv6 design process, it was assumed that plain IPsec
1236 could be the default way to secure Binding Updates with arbitrary
1237 correspondent nodes. However, this turned out to be impossible.
1238 Plain IPsec relies on an infrastructure for key management, which, to
1239 be usable with any arbitrary pair of nodes, would need to be global
1240 in scope. Such a "global PKI" does not exist, nor is it expected to
1241 come into existence any time soon.
1242
1243 More minor issues that also surfaced at the time were: (1)
1244 insufficient filtering granularity for the state of IPsec at the
1245 time, (2) cost to establish a security association (in terms of CPU
1246 and round trip times), and (3) expressing the proper authorization
1247 (as opposed to just authentication) for binding updates [<a href="#ref-13" title="&quot;Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and Early Authentication in the IPv6 World&quot;">13</a>]. These
1248 issues are solvable, and, in particular, (1) and (3) have been
1249 addressed for IPsec usage with binding updates between the mobile
1250 node and the home agent [<a href="#ref-7" title="&quot;Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents&quot;">7</a>].
1251
1252 However, the lack of a global PKI remains unsolved.
1253
1254 One way to provide a global key infrastructure for mobile IP could be
1255 DNSSEC. Such a scheme is not completely supported by the existing
1256 specifications, as it constitutes a new application of the KEY RR,
1257 something explicitly limited to DNSSEC [<a href="#ref-8" title="&quot;DNS Security Introduction and Requirements&quot;">8</a>] [<a href="#ref-9" title="&quot;Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions&quot;">9</a>] [<a href="#ref-10" title="&quot;Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions&quot;">10</a>]. Nevertheless,
1258 if one were to define it, one could proceed along the following
1259 lines: A secure reverse DNS that provided a public key for each IP
1260 address could be used to verify that a binding update is indeed
1261 signed by an authorized party. However, in order to be secure, each
1262 link in such a system must be secure. That is, there must be a chain
1263 of keys and signatures all the way down from the root (or at least
1264 starting from a trust anchor common to the mobile node and the
1265 correspondent node) to the given IP address. Furthermore, it is not
1266 enough that each key be signed by the key above it in the chain. It
1267 is also necessary that each signature explicitly authorize the lower
1268 key to manage the corresponding address block below.
1269
1270 Even though it would be theoretically possible to build a secure
1271 reverse DNS infrastructure along the lines shown above, the practical
1272 problems would be daunting. Whereas the delegation and key signing
1273 might work close to the root of the tree, it would probably break
1274 down somewhere along the path to the individual nodes. Note that a
1275 similar delegation tree is currently being proposed for Secure
1276 Neighbor Discovery [<a href="#ref-15" title="&quot;SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)&quot;">15</a>], although in this case only routers (not
1277 necessarily every single potential mobile node) need to secure such a
1278 certificate. Furthermore, checking all the signatures on the tree
1279 would place a considerable burden on the correspondent nodes, making
1280 route optimization prohibitive, or at least justifiable only in very
1281
1282
1283
1284 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre>
1285 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span>
1286 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1287
1288
1289 particular circumstances. Finally, it is not enough simply to check
1290 whether the mobile node is authorized to send binding updates
1291 containing a given home address, because to protect against flooding
1292 attacks, the care-of address must also be verified.
1293
1294 Relying on this same secure DNS infrastructure to verify care-of
1295 addresses would be even harder than verifying home addresses.
1296 Instead, a different method would be required, e.g., a return
1297 routability procedure. If so, the obvious question is whether the
1298 gargantuan cost of deploying the global secure DNS infrastructure is
1299 worth the additional protection it affords, as compared to simply
1300 using return routability for both home address and care-of address
1301 verification.
1302
1303 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Solution Selected for Mobile IPv6</span>
1304
1305 The current Mobile IPv6 route optimization security has been
1306 carefully designed to prevent or mitigate the threats that were
1307 discussed in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. The goal has been to produce a design with a
1308 level of security close to that of a static IPv4-based Internet, and
1309 with an acceptable cost in terms of packets, delay, and processing.
1310 The result is not what one would expect: it is definitely not a
1311 traditional cryptographic protocol. Instead, the result relies
1312 heavily on the assumption of an uncorrupted routing infrastructure
1313 and builds upon the idea of checking that an alleged mobile node is
1314 indeed reachable through both its home address and its care-of
1315 address. Furthermore, the lifetime of the state created at the
1316 corresponded nodes is deliberately restricted to a few minutes, in
1317 order to limit the potential threat from time shifting.
1318
1319 This section describes the solution in reasonable detail (for further
1320 details see the specification), starting from Return Routability
1321 (<a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>), continuing with a discussion about state creation at
1322 the correspondent node (<a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>), and completing the description
1323 with a discussion about the lifetime of Binding Cache Entries
1324 (<a href="#section-4.3">Section 4.3</a>).
1325
1326 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Return Routability</span>
1327
1328 Return Routability (RR) is the name of the basic mechanism deployed
1329 by Mobile IPv6 route optimization security design. RR is based on
1330 the idea that a node should be able to verify that there is a node
1331 that is able to respond to packets sent to a given address. The
1332 check yields false positives if the routing infrastructure is
1333 compromised or if there is an attacker between the verifier and the
1334 address to be verified. With these exceptions, it is assumed that a
1335 successful reply indicates that there is indeed a node at the given
1336
1337
1338
1339
1340 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 24]</span></pre>
1341 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span>
1342 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1343
1344
1345 address, and that the node is willing to reply to the probes sent to
1346 it.
1347
1348 The basic return routability mechanism consists of two checks, a Home
1349 Address check (see <a href="#section-4.1.1">Section 4.1.1</a>) and a care-of-address check (see
1350 <a href="#section-4.1.2">Section 4.1.2</a>). The packet flow is depicted in Figure 7. First, the
1351 mobile node sends two packets to the correspondent node: a Home Test
1352 Init (HoTI) packet is sent through the home agent, and a Care-of Test
1353 Init (CoTI) directly. The correspondent node replies to both of
1354 these independently by sending a Home Test (HoT) in response to the
1355 Home Test Init and a Care-of Test (CoT) in response to the Care-of
1356 Test Init. Finally, once the mobile node has received both the Home
1357 Test and Care-of Test packets, it sends a Binding Update to the
1358 correspondent node.
1359
1360 +------+ 1a) HoTI +------+
1361 | |----------------------&gt;| |
1362 | MN | 2a) HoT | HA |
1363 | |&lt;----------------------| |
1364 +------+ +------+
1365 1b) CoTI | ^ | / ^
1366 | |2b| CoT / /
1367 | | | / /
1368 | | | 3) BU / /
1369 V | V / /
1370 +------+ 1a) HoTI / /
1371 | |&lt;----------------/ /
1372 | CN | 2a) HoT /
1373 | |------------------/
1374 +------+
1375
1376 Figure 7. Return Routability Packet Flow
1377
1378 It might appear that the actual design was somewhat convoluted. That
1379 is, the real return routability checks are the message pairs &lt; Home
1380 Test, Binding Update &gt; and &lt; Care-of Test, Binding Update &gt;. The
1381 Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init packets are only needed to
1382 trigger the test packets, and the Binding Update acts as a combined
1383 routability response to both of the tests.
1384
1385 There are two main reasons behind this design:
1386
1387 o avoidance of reflection and amplification (see <a href="#section-3.3.3">Section 3.3.3</a>), and
1388
1389 o avoidance of state exhaustion DoS attacks (see <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>).
1390
1391 The reason for sending two Init packets instead of one is to avoid
1392 amplification. The correspondent node does not know anything about
1393
1394
1395
1396 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 25]</span></pre>
1397 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span>
1398 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1399
1400
1401 the mobile node, and therefore it just receives an unsolicited IP
1402 packet from some arbitrary IP address. In a way, this is similar to
1403 a server receiving a TCP SYN from a previously unknown client. If
1404 the correspondent node were to send two packets in response to an
1405 initial trigger, that would provide the potential for a DoS
1406 amplification effect, as discussed in <a href="#section-3.3.3">Section 3.3.3</a>.
1407
1408 This scheme also avoids providing for a potential reflection attack.
1409 If the correspondent node were to reply to an address other than the
1410 source address of the packet, that would create a reflection effect.
1411 Thus, the only safe mechanism possible for a naive correspondent is
1412 to reply to each received packet with just one packet, and to send
1413 the reply to the source address of the received packet. Hence, two
1414 initial triggers are needed instead of just one.
1415
1416 Let us now consider the two return routability tests separately. In
1417 the following sections, the derivation of cryptographic material from
1418 each of these is shown in a simplified manner. For the real formulas
1419 and more detail, please refer to [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">6</a>].
1420
1421 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Home Address Check</span>
1422
1423 The Home Address check consists of a Home Test (HoT) packet and a
1424 subsequent Binding Update (BU). It is triggered by the arrival of a
1425 Home Test Init (HoTI). A correspondent node replies to a Home Test
1426 Init by sending a Home Test to the source address of the Home Test
1427 Init. The source address is assumed to be the home address of a
1428 mobile node, and therefore the Home Test is assumed to be tunneled by
1429 the Home Agent to the mobile node. The Home Test contains a
1430 cryptographically generated token, home keygen token, which is formed
1431 by calculating a hash function over the concatenation of a secret
1432 key, Kcn, known only by the correspondent node, the source address of
1433 the Home Test Init packet, and a nonce.
1434
1435 home keygen token = hash(Kcn | home address | nonce | 0)
1436
1437 An index to the nonce is also included in the Home Test packet,
1438 allowing the correspondent node to find the appropriate nonce more
1439 easily.
1440
1441 The token allows the correspondent node to make sure that any binding
1442 update received subsequently has been created by a node that has seen
1443 the Home Test packet; see <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>.
1444
1445 In most cases, the Home Test packet is forwarded over two different
1446 segments of the Internet. It first traverses from the correspondent
1447 node to the Home Agent. On this trip, it is not protected and any
1448 eavesdropper on the path can learn its contents. The Home Agent then
1449
1450
1451
1452 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 26]</span></pre>
1453 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span>
1454 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1455
1456
1457 forwards the packet to the mobile node. This path is taken inside an
1458 IPsec ESP protected tunnel, making it impossible for the outsiders to
1459 learn the contents of the packet.
1460
1461 At first, it may sound unnecessary to protect the packet between the
1462 home agent and the mobile node, since it travelled unprotected
1463 between the correspondent node and the mobile node. If all links in
1464 the Internet were equally insecure, the additional protection would
1465 be unnecessary. However, in most practical settings the network is
1466 likely to be more secure near the home agent than near the mobile
1467 node. For example, if the home agent hosts a virtual home link and
1468 the mobile nodes are never actually at home, an eavesdropper should
1469 be close to the correspondent node or on the path between the
1470 correspondent node and the home agent, since it could not eavesdrop
1471 at the home agent. If the correspondent node is a major server, all
1472 the links on the path between it and the home agent are likely to be
1473 fairly secure. On the other hand, the Mobile Node is probably using
1474 wireless access technology, making it sometimes trivial to eavesdrop
1475 on its access link. Thus, it is fairly easy to eavesdrop on packets
1476 that arrive at the mobile node. Consequently, protecting the HA-MN
1477 path is likely to provide real security benefits even when the CN-HA
1478 path remains unprotected.
1479
1480 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Care-of-Address Check</span>
1481
1482 From the correspondent node's point of view, the Care-of-Address
1483 check is very similar to the home check. The only difference is that
1484 now the source address of the received Care-of Test Init packet is
1485 assumed to be the care-of address of the mobile node. Furthermore,
1486 the token is created in a slightly different manner in order to make
1487 it impossible to use home tokens for care-of tokens or vice versa.
1488
1489 care-of keygen token = hash(Kcn | care-of address | nonce | 1)
1490
1491 The Care-of Test traverses only one leg, directly from the
1492 correspondent node to the mobile node. It remains unprotected all
1493 along the way, making it vulnerable to eavesdroppers near the
1494 correspondent node, on the path from the correspondent node to the
1495 mobile node, or near the mobile node.
1496
1497 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.3" href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. Forming the First Binding Update</span>
1498
1499 When the mobile node has received both the Home Test and Care-of Test
1500 messages, it creates a binding key, Kbm, by computing a hash function
1501 over the concatenation of the tokens received.
1502
1503 This key is used to protect the first and the subsequent binding
1504 updates, as long as the key remains valid.
1505
1506
1507
1508 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 27]</span></pre>
1509 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span>
1510 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1511
1512
1513 Note that the key Kbm is available to anyone who is able to receive
1514 both the Care-of Test and Home Test messages. However, they are
1515 normally routed by different routes through the network, and the Home
1516 Test is transmitted over an encrypted tunnel from the home agent to
1517 the mobile node (see also <a href="#section-5.4">Section 5.4</a>).
1518
1519 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Creating State Safely</span>
1520
1521 The correspondent node may remain stateless until it receives the
1522 first Binding Update. That is, it does not need to record receiving
1523 and replying to the Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init messages.
1524 The Home Test Init/Home Test and Care-of Test Init/Care-of Test
1525 exchanges take place in parallel but independently of each other.
1526 Thus, the correspondent can respond to each message immediately, and
1527 it does not need to remember doing that. This helps in potential
1528 denial-of-service situations: no memory needs to be reserved for
1529 processing Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init messages.
1530 Furthermore, Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init processing is
1531 designed to be lightweight, and it can be rate limited if necessary.
1532
1533 When receiving a first binding update, the correspondent node goes
1534 through a rather complicated procedure. The purpose of this
1535 procedure is to ensure that there is indeed a mobile node that has
1536 recently received a Home Test and a Care-of Test that were sent to
1537 the claimed home and care-of addresses, respectively, and to make
1538 sure that the correspondent node does not unnecessarily spend CPU or
1539 other resources while performing this check.
1540
1541 Since the correspondent node does not have any state when the binding
1542 update arrives, the binding update itself must contain enough
1543 information so that relevant state can be created. To that end, the
1544 binding update contains the following pieces of information:
1545
1546 Source address: The care-of address specified in the Binding Update
1547 must be equal to the source address used in the Care-of Test Init
1548 message. Notice that this applies to the effective Care-of
1549 Address of the Binding Update. In particular, if the Binding
1550 Update includes an Alternate Care-of Address (AltCoA) [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">6</a>], the
1551 effective CoA is, of course, this AltCoA. Thus, the Care-of Test
1552 Init must have originated from the AltCoA.
1553
1554 Home address: The home address specified in the Binding Update must
1555 be equal to the source address used in the Home Test Init message.
1556
1557 Two nonce indices: These are copied over from the Home Test and
1558 Care-of Test messages, and together with the other information
1559 they allow the correspondent node to re-create the tokens sent in
1560 the Home Test and Care-of Test messages and used for creating Kbm.
1561
1562
1563
1564 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 28]</span></pre>
1565 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span>
1566 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1567
1568
1569 Without them, the correspondent node might need to try the 2-3
1570 latest nonces, leading to unnecessary resource consumption.
1571
1572 Message Authentication Code (MAC): The binding update is
1573 authenticated by computing a MAC function over the care-of
1574 address, the correspondent node's address and the binding update
1575 message itself. The MAC is keyed with the key Kbm.
1576
1577 Given the addresses, the nonce indices (and thereby the nonces) and
1578 the key Kcn, the correspondent node can re-create the home and care-
1579 of tokens at the cost of a few memory lookups and computation of one
1580 MAC and one hash function.
1581
1582 Once the correspondent node has re-created the tokens, it hashes the
1583 tokens together, giving the key Kbm. If the Binding Update is
1584 authentic, Kbm is cached together with the binding. This key is then
1585 used to verify the MAC that protects integrity and origin of the
1586 actual Binding Update. Note that the same Kbm may be used for a
1587 while, until the mobile node moves (and needs to get a new care-of-
1588 address token), the care-of token expires, or the home token expires.
1589
1590 <span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Retransmissions and State Machine</span>
1591
1592 Note that since the correspondent node may remain stateless until it
1593 receives a valid binding update, the mobile node is solely
1594 responsible for retransmissions. That is, the mobile node should
1595 keep sending the Home Test Init / Care-of Test Init messages until it
1596 receives a Home Test / Care-of Test, respectively. Similarly, it may
1597 need to send the binding update a few times in the case it is lost
1598 while in transit.
1599
1600 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Quick expiration of the Binding Cache Entries</span>
1601
1602 A Binding Cache Entry, along with the key Kbm, represents the return
1603 routability state of the network at the time when the Home Test and
1604 Care-of Test messages were sent out. It is possible that a specific
1605 attacker is able to eavesdrop a Home Test message at some point of
1606 time, but not later. If the Home Test had an infinite or a long
1607 lifetime, that would allow the attacker to perform a time shifting
1608 attack (see <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>). That is, in the current IPv4 architecture
1609 an attacker on the path between the correspondent node and the home
1610 agent is able to perform attacks only as long as the attacker is able
1611 to eavesdrop (and possibly disrupt) communications on that particular
1612 path. A long living Home Test, and consequently the ability to send
1613 valid binding updates for a long time, would allow the attacker to
1614 continue its attack even after the attacker is no longer able to
1615 eavesdrop on the path.
1616
1617
1618
1619
1620 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 29]</span></pre>
1621 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span>
1622 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1623
1624
1625 To limit the seriousness of this and other similar time shifting
1626 threats, the validity of the tokens is limited to a few minutes.
1627 This effectively limits the validity of the key Kbm and the lifetime
1628 of the resulting binding updates and binding cache entries.
1629
1630 Although short lifetimes are required by other aspects of the
1631 security design and the goals, they are clearly detrimental for
1632 efficiency and robustness. That is, a Home Test Init / Home Test
1633 message pair must be exchanged through the home agent every few
1634 minutes. These messages are unnecessary from a purely functional
1635 point of view, thereby representing overhead. What is worse, though,
1636 is that they make the home agent a single point of failure. That is,
1637 if the Home Test Init / Home Test messages were not needed, the
1638 existing connections from a mobile node to other nodes could continue
1639 even when the home agent fails, but the current design forces the
1640 bindings to expire after a few minutes.
1641
1642 This concludes our walk-through of the selected security design. The
1643 cornerstones of the design were the employment of the return
1644 routability idea in the Home Test, Care-of Test, and binding update
1645 messages, the ability to remain stateless until a valid binding
1646 update is received, and the limiting of the binding lifetimes to a
1647 few minutes. Next we briefly discuss some of the remaining threats
1648 and other problems inherent to the design.
1649
1650 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span>
1651
1652 This section gives a brief analysis of the security design, mostly in
1653 the light of what was known when the design was completed in Fall
1654 2002. It should be noted that this section does not present a proper
1655 security analysis of the protocol; it merely discusses a few issues
1656 that were known at the time the design was completed.
1657
1658 It should be kept in mind that the MIPv6 RO security design was never
1659 intended to be fully secure. Instead, as we stated earlier, the goal
1660 was to be roughly as secure as non-mobile IPv4 was known to be at the
1661 time of the design. As it turns out, the result is slightly less
1662 secure than IPv4, but the difference is small and most likely
1663 insignificant in real life.
1664
1665 The known residual threats as compared with IPv4 are discussed in
1666 <a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>. Considerations related to the application of IPsec to
1667 authorize route optimization are discussed in <a href="#section-5.2">Section 5.2</a>. <a href="#section-5.3">Section</a>
1668 <a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a> discusses an attack against neighboring nodes. Finally, <a href="#section-5.4">Section</a>
1669 <a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a> deals with the special case of two mobile nodes conversing and
1670 performing the route optimization procedure with each other.
1671
1672
1673
1674
1675
1676 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 30]</span></pre>
1677 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span>
1678 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1679
1680
1681 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Residual Threats as Compared to IPv4</span>
1682
1683 As we mentioned in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>, the lifetime of a binding represents
1684 a potential time shift in an attack. That is, an attacker that is
1685 able to create a false binding is able to reap the benefits of the
1686 binding as long as the binding lasts. Alternatively, the attacker is
1687 able to delay a return-to-home flooding attack (<a href="#section-3.2.2">Section 3.2.2</a>) until
1688 the binding expires. This is different from IPv4, where an attacker
1689 may continue an attack only as long as it is on the path between the
1690 two hosts.
1691
1692 Since the binding lifetimes are severely restricted in the current
1693 design, the ability to do a time shifting attack is equivalently
1694 restricted.
1695
1696 Threats possible because of the introduction of route optimization
1697 are, of course, not present in a baseline IPv4 internet (<a href="#section-3.3">Section</a>
1698 <a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>). In particular, inducing unnecessary binding updates could
1699 potentially be a severe attack, but this would be most likely due to
1700 faulty implementations. As an extreme measure, a correspondent node
1701 can protect against these attacks by turning off route optimization.
1702 If so, it becomes obvious that the only residual attack against which
1703 there is no clear-cut prevention (other than its severe limitation as
1704 currently specified) is the time shifting attack mentioned above.
1705
1706 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Interaction with IPsec</span>
1707
1708 A major motivation behind the current binding update design was
1709 scalability, which implied the ability to run the protocol without
1710 any existing security infrastructure. An alternative would have been
1711 to rely on existing trust relationships, perhaps in the form of a
1712 special-purpose Public Key Infrastructure in conjunction with IPsec.
1713 That would have limited scalability, making route optimization
1714 available only in environments where it is possible to create
1715 appropriate IPsec security associations between the mobile nodes and
1716 the corresponding nodes.
1717
1718 There clearly are situations where there exists an appropriate
1719 relationship between a mobile node and the correspondent node. For
1720 example, if the correspondent node is a server that has pre-
1721 established keys with the mobile node, that would be the case.
1722 However, entity authentication or an authenticated session key is not
1723 necessarily sufficient for accepting Binding Updates.
1724
1725 Home Address Check: If one wants to replace the home address check
1726 with cryptographic credentials, these must carry proper
1727 authorization for the specific home address, and care must be
1728 taken to make sure that the issuer of the certificate is entitled
1729
1730
1731
1732 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 31]</span></pre>
1733 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span>
1734 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1735
1736
1737 to express such authorization. At the time of the design work,
1738 the route optimization security design team was not aware of
1739 standardized certificate formats to do this, although more recent
1740 efforts within the IETF are addressing this issue. Note that
1741 there is plenty of motivation to do so, as any pre-existing
1742 relationship with a correspondent node would involve the mobile
1743 node's home address (instead of any of its possible care-of
1744 addresses). Accordingly, the IKE exchange would most naturally
1745 run between the correspondent node and the mobile node's home
1746 address. This still leaves open the issue of checking the mobile
1747 node's care-of address.
1748
1749 Care-of Address Check: As for the care-of-address check, in
1750 practice, it seems highly unlikely that nodes could completely
1751 replace the care-of-address check with credentials. Since the
1752 care-of addresses are ephemeral, in general it is very difficult
1753 for a mobile node to present credentials that taken at face value
1754 (by an arbitrary correspondent node) guarantee no misuse for, say,
1755 flooding attacks (<a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>). As discussed before, a
1756 reachability check goes a long way to alleviate such attacks.
1757 Notice that, as part of the normal protocol exchange, establishing
1758 IPsec security associations via IKE includes one such reachability
1759 test. However, as per the previous section, the natural IKE
1760 protocol exchange runs between the correspondent node and the
1761 mobile node's home address. Hence, another reachability check is
1762 needed to check the care-of address at which the node is currently
1763 reachable. If this address changes, such a reachability test is
1764 likewise necessary, and it is included in ongoing work aimed at
1765 securely updating the node's current address.
1766
1767 Nevertheless, the Mobile IPv6 base specification [<a href="#ref-6" title="&quot;Mobility Support in IPv6&quot;">6</a>] does not specify
1768 how to use IPsec together with the mobility procedures between the
1769 mobile node and correspondent node. On the other hand, the
1770 specification is carefully written to allow the creation of the
1771 binding management key Kbm through some different means.
1772 Accordingly, where an appropriate relationship exists between a
1773 mobile node and a correspondent node, the use of IPsec is possible,
1774 and is, in fact, being pursued in more recent work.
1775
1776 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Pretending to Be One's Neighbor</span>
1777
1778 One possible attack against the security design is to pretend to be a
1779 neighboring node. To launch this attack, the mobile node establishes
1780 route optimization with some arbitrary correspondent node. While
1781 performing the return routability tests and creating the binding
1782 management key Kbm, the attacker uses its real home address but a
1783 faked care-of address. Indeed, the care-of address would be the
1784 address of the neighboring node on the local link. The attacker is
1785
1786
1787
1788 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 32]</span></pre>
1789 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span>
1790 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1791
1792
1793 able to create the binding since it receives a valid Home Test
1794 normally, and it is able to eavesdrop on the Care-of Test, as it
1795 appears on the local link.
1796
1797 This attack would allow the mobile node to divert unwanted traffic
1798 towards the neighboring node, resulting in an flooding attack.
1799
1800 However, this attack is not very serious in practice. First, it is
1801 limited in the terms of location, since it is only possible against
1802 neighbors. Second, the attack works also against the attacker, since
1803 it shares the local link with the target. Third, a similar attack is
1804 possible with Neighbor Discovery spoofing.
1805
1806 <span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Two Mobile Nodes Talking to Each Other</span>
1807
1808 When two mobile nodes want to establish route optimization with each
1809 other, some care must be exercised in order not to reveal the reverse
1810 tokens to an attacker. In this situation, both mobile nodes act
1811 simultaneously in the mobile node and the correspondent node roles.
1812 In the correspondent node role, the nodes are vulnerable to attackers
1813 that are co-located at the same link. Such an attacker is able to
1814 learn both the Home Test and Care-of Test sent by the mobile node,
1815 and therefore it is able to spoof the location of the other mobile
1816 host to the neighboring one. What is worse is that the attacker can
1817 obtain a valid Care-of Test itself, combine it with the Home Test,
1818 and then claim to the neighboring node that the other node has just
1819 arrived at the same link.
1820
1821 There is an easy way to avoid this attack. In the correspondent node
1822 role, the mobile node should tunnel the Home Test messages that it
1823 sends through its home agent. This prevents the co-located attacker
1824 from learning any valid Home Test messages.
1825
1826 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Conclusions</span>
1827
1828 This document discussed the security design rationale for the Mobile
1829 IPv6 Route Optimization. We have tried to describe the dangers
1830 created by Mobile IP Route Optimization, the security goals and
1831 background of the design, and the actual mechanisms employed.
1832
1833 We started the discussion with a background tour to the IP routing
1834 architecture the definition of the mobility problem. After that, we
1835 covered the avenues of attack: the targets, the time shifting
1836 abilities, and the possible locations of an attacker. We outlined a
1837 number of identified threat scenarios, and discussed how they are
1838 mitigated in the current design. Finally, in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> we gave an
1839 overview of the actual mechanisms employed, and the rational behind
1840 them.
1841
1842
1843
1844 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 33]</span></pre>
1845 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span>
1846 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1847
1848
1849 As far as we know today, the only significant difference between the
1850 security of an IPv4 Internet and that of an Internet with Mobile IPv6
1851 (and route optimization) concerns time shifting attacks.
1852 Nevertheless, these are severely restricted in the current design.
1853
1854 We have also briefly covered some of the known subtleties and
1855 shortcomings, but that discussion cannot be exhaustive. It is quite
1856 probable that new subtle problems will be discovered with the design.
1857 As a consequence, it is most likely that the design needs to be
1858 revised in the light of experience and insight.
1859
1860 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements</span>
1861
1862 We are grateful for: Hesham Soliman for reminding us about the threat
1863 explained in <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>, Francis Dupont for first discussing the
1864 case of two mobile nodes talking to each other (<a href="#section-5.4">Section 5.4</a>) and for
1865 sundry other comments, Pekka Savola for his help in <a href="#section-1.1.1">Section 1.1.1</a>,
1866 and Elwyn Davies for his thorough editorial review.
1867
1868 <span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Informative References</span>
1869
1870 [<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Aura, T., Roe, M., and J. Arkko, "Security of Internet Location
1871 Management", Proc. 18th Annual Computer Security Applications
1872 Conference, pages 78-87, Las Vegas, NV, USA, IEEE Press,
1873 December 2002.
1874
1875 [<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery
1876 for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc2461">RFC 2461</a>, December 1998.
1877
1878 [<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless
1879 Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", <a href="./rfc3041">RFC 3041</a>, January 2001.
1880
1881 [<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Bush, R. and D. Meyer, "Some Internet Architectural Guidelines
1882 and Philosophy", <a href="./rfc3439">RFC 3439</a>, December 2002.
1883
1884 [<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed
1885 Networks", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp84">BCP 84</a>, <a href="./rfc3704">RFC 3704</a>, March 2004.
1886
1887 [<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in
1888 IPv6", <a href="./rfc3775">RFC 3775</a>, June 2004.
1889
1890 [<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to
1891 Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home
1892 Agents", <a href="./rfc3776">RFC 3776</a>, June 2004.
1893
1894 [<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
1895 "DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", <a href="./rfc4033">RFC 4033</a>, March
1896 2005.
1897
1898
1899
1900 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 34]</span></pre>
1901 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span>
1902 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1903
1904
1905 [<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
1906 "Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc4034">RFC 4034</a>,
1907 March 2005.
1908
1909 [<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose,
1910 "Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc4035">RFC</a>
1911 <a href="./rfc4035">4035</a>, March 2005.
1912
1913 [<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Chiappa, J., "Will The Real 'End-End Principle' Please Stand
1914 Up?", Private Communication, April 2002.
1915
1916 [<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Savage, S., Cardwell, N., Wetherall, D., and T. Anderson, "TCP
1917 Congestion Control with a Misbehaving Receiver", ACM Computer
1918 Communication Review, 29:5, October 1999.
1919
1920 [<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Nikander, P., "Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and Early
1921 Authentication in the IPv6 World", Security Protocols 9th
1922 International Workshop, Cambridge, UK, April 25-27 2001, LNCS
1923 2467, pages 12-26, Springer, 2002.
1924
1925 [<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint Names: A Proposed
1926 Enhancement to the Internet Architecture", Private
1927 Communication, 1999.
1928
1929 [<a id="ref-15">15</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure
1930 Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>, March 2005.
1931
1932
1933
1934
1935
1936
1937
1938
1939
1940
1941
1942
1943
1944
1945
1946
1947
1948
1949
1950
1951
1952
1953
1954
1955
1956 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 35]</span></pre>
1957 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span>
1958 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
1959
1960
1961 Authors' Addresses
1962
1963 Pekka Nikander
1964 Ericsson Research NomadicLab
1965 JORVAS FIN-02420
1966 FINLAND
1967
1968 Phone: +358 9 299 1
1969 EMail: [email protected]
1970
1971
1972 Jari Arkko
1973 Ericsson Research NomadicLab
1974 JORVAS FIN-02420
1975 FINLAND
1976
1977 EMail: [email protected]
1978
1979
1980 Tuomas Aura
1981 Microsoft Research Ltd.
1982 Roger Needham Building
1983 7 JJ Thomson Avenue
1984 Cambridge CB3 0FB
1985 United Kingdom
1986
1987 EMail: [email protected]
1988
1989
1990 Gabriel Montenegro
1991 Microsoft Corporation
1992 One Microsoft Way
1993 Redmond, WA 98052
1994 USA
1995
1996 EMail: [email protected]
1997
1998
1999 Erik Nordmark
2000 Sun Microsystems
2001 17 Network Circle
2002 Menlo Park, CA 94025
2003 USA
2004
2005 EMail: [email protected]
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012 <span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 36]</span></pre>
2013 <hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span>
2014 <span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span>
2015
2016
2017 Full Copyright Statement
2018
2019 Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005).
2020
2021 This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions
2022 contained in <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp78">BCP 78</a>, and except as set forth therein, the authors
2023 retain all their rights.
2024
2025 This document and the information contained herein are provided on an
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2032
2033 Intellectual Property
2034
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2043
2044 Copies of IPR disclosures made to the IETF Secretariat and any
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2050
2051 The IETF invites any interested party to bring to its attention any
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2056
2057 Acknowledgement
2058
2059 Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the
2060 Internet Society.
2061
2062
2063
2064
2065
2066
2067
2068 Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 37]
2069 </pre>