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<pre>Network Working Group P. Nikander |
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Request for Comments: 4225 J. Arkko |
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Category: Informational Ericsson Research NomadicLab |
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T. Aura |
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Microsoft Research |
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G. Montenegro |
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Microsoft Corporation |
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E. Nordmark |
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Sun Microsystems |
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December 2005 |
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|
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|
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<span class="h1">Mobile IP Version 6 Route Optimization Security Design Background</span> |
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|
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Status of This Memo |
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This memo provides information for the Internet community. It does |
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not specify an Internet standard of any kind. Distribution of this |
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memo is unlimited. |
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Copyright Notice |
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Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). |
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Abstract |
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This document is an account of the rationale behind the Mobile IPv6 |
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(MIPv6) Route Optimization security design. The purpose of this |
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document is to present the thinking and to preserve the reasoning |
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behind the Mobile IPv6 security design in 2001 - 2002. |
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The document has two target audiences: (1) helping MIPv6 implementors |
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to better understand the design choices in MIPv6 security procedures, |
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and (2) allowing people dealing with mobility or multi-homing to |
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avoid a number of potential security pitfalls in their designs. |
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<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 1]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-2" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
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Table of Contents |
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<a href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction ....................................................<a href="#page-3">3</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Assumptions about the Existing IP Infrastructure ...........<a href="#page-4">4</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. The Mobility Problem and the Mobile IPv6 Solution ..........<a href="#page-6">6</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Design Principles and Goals ................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3.1">1.3.1</a>. End-to-End Principle ..................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3.2">1.3.2</a>. Trust Assumptions .....................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.3.3">1.3.3</a>. Protection Level ......................................<a href="#page-8">8</a> |
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<a href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>. About Mobile IPv6 Mobility and its Variations ..............<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-2">2</a>. Avenues of Attack ...............................................<a href="#page-9">9</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Target ....................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Timing ....................................................<a href="#page-10">10</a> |
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<a href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Location ..................................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3">3</a>. Threats and Limitations ........................................<a href="#page-11">11</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Attacks Against Address 'Owners' ("Address Stealing").. ...<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Basic Address Stealing ...............................<a href="#page-12">12</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Stealing Addresses of Stationary Nodes ...............<a href="#page-13">13</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Future Address Sealing ...............................<a href="#page-14">14</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Attacks against Secrecy and Integrity ................<a href="#page-15">15</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Basic Denial-of-Service Attacks ......................<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.1.6">3.1.6</a>. Replaying and Blocking Binding Updates ...............<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Attacks Against Other Nodes and Networks (Flooding) .......<a href="#page-16">16</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Basic Flooding .......................................<a href="#page-17">17</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Return-to-Home Flooding ..............................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Attacks against Binding Update Protocols ..................<a href="#page-18">18</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. Inducing Unnecessary Binding Updates .................<a href="#page-19">19</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Forcing Non-Optimized Routing ........................<a href="#page-20">20</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Reflection and Amplification .........................<a href="#page-21">21</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Classification of Attacks .................................<a href="#page-22">22</a> |
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<a href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Problems with Infrastructure-Based Authorization ..........<a href="#page-23">23</a> |
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<a href="#section-4">4</a>. Solution Selected for Mobile IPv6 ..............................<a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Return Routability ........................................<a href="#page-24">24</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Home Address Check ...................................<a href="#page-26">26</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Care-of-Address Check ................................<a href="#page-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. Forming the First Binding Update .....................<a href="#page-27">27</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Creating State Safely .....................................<a href="#page-28">28</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Retransmissions and State Machine ....................<a href="#page-29">29</a> |
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<a href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Quick expiration of the Binding Cache Entries .............<a href="#page-29">29</a> |
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<a href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations ........................................<a href="#page-30">30</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Residual Threats as Compared to IPv4 ......................<a href="#page-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Interaction with IPsec ....................................<a href="#page-31">31</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Pretending to Be One's Neighbor ...........................<a href="#page-32">32</a> |
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<a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Two Mobile Nodes Talking to Each Other ....................<a href="#page-33">33</a> |
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<a href="#section-6">6</a>. Conclusions ....................................................<a href="#page-33">33</a> |
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<a href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements ...............................................<a href="#page-34">34</a> |
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<a href="#section-8">8</a>. Informative References .........................................<a href="#page-34">34</a> |
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<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 2]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-3" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
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<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-1" href="#section-1">1</a>. Introduction</span> |
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Mobile IPv4 is based on the idea of supporting mobility on top of |
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existing IP infrastructure, without requiring any modifications to |
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the routers, the applications, or the stationary end hosts. However, |
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in Mobile IPv6 [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">6</a>] (as opposed to Mobile IPv4), the stationary end |
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hosts may provide support for mobility, i.e., route optimization. In |
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route optimization, a correspondent node (CN) (i.e., a peer for a |
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mobile node) learns a binding between the mobile node's stationary |
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home address and its current temporary care-of address. This binding |
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is then used to modify the handling of outgoing (as well as the |
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processing of incoming) packets, leading to security risks. The |
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purpose of this document is to provide a relatively compact source |
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for the background assumptions, design choices, and other information |
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needed to understand the route optimization security design. This |
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document does not seek to compare the relative security of Mobile |
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IPv6 and other mobility protocols, or to list all the alternative |
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security mechanisms that were discussed during the Mobile IPv6 design |
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process. For a summary of the latter, we refer the reader to [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Security of Internet Location Management"">1</a>]. |
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Even though incidental implementation suggestions are included for |
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illustrative purposes, the goal of this document is not to provide a |
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guide to implementors. Instead, it is to explain the design choices |
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and rationale behind the current route optimization design. The |
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authors participated in the design team that produced the design and |
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hope, via this note, to capture some of the lessons and reasoning |
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behind that effort. |
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The authors' intent is to document the thinking behind that design |
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effort as it was. Even though this note may incorporate more recent |
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developments in order to illustrate the issues, it is not our intent |
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to present a new design. Rather, along with the lessons learned, |
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there is some effort to clarify differing opinions, questionable |
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assumptions, or newly discovered vulnerabilities, should such new |
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information be available today. This is also very important, because |
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it may benefit the working group's hindsight as it revises or |
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improves the Mobile IPv6 specification. |
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To fully understand the security implications of the relevant design |
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constraints, it is necessary to explore briefly the nature of the |
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existing IP infrastructure, the problems Mobile IP aims to solve, and |
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the design principles applied. In the light of this background, we |
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can then explore IP-based mobility in more detail and have a brief |
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look at the security problems. The background is given in the rest |
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of this section, starting from <a href="#section-1.1">Section 1.1</a>. |
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Although the introduction in <a href="#section-1.1">Section 1.1</a> may appear redundant to |
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readers who are already familiar with Mobile IPv6, it may be valuable |
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to read it anyway. The approach taken in this document is very |
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<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 3]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-4" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
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different from that in the Mobile IPv6 specification. That is, we |
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have explicitly aimed to expose the implicit assumptions and design |
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choices made in the base Mobile IPv6 design, while the Mobile IPv6 |
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specification aims to state the result of the design. By |
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understanding the background, it is much easier to understand the |
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source of some of the related security problems, and to understand |
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the limitations intrinsic to the provided solutions. |
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In particular, this document explains how the adopted design for |
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"Return Routability" (RR) protects against the identified threats |
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(<a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>). This is true except for attacks on the RR protocol |
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itself, which require other countermeasures based on heuristics and |
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judicious implementation (<a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>). |
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The rest of this document is organized as follows: after this |
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introductory section, we start by considering the avenues of attack |
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in <a href="#section-2">Section 2</a>. The security problems and countermeasures are studied |
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in detail in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> explains the overall operation and |
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design choices behind the current security design. <a href="#section-5">Section 5</a> |
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analyzes the design and discuss the remaining threats. Finally, |
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<a href="#section-6">Section 6</a> concludes this document. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1" href="#section-1.1">1.1</a>. Assumptions about the Existing IP Infrastructure</span> |
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One of the design goals in the Mobile IP design was to make mobility |
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possible without changing too much. This was especially important |
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for IPv4, with its large installed base, but the same design goals |
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were inherited by Mobile IPv6. Some alternative proposals take a |
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different approach and propose larger modifications to the Internet |
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architecture (see <a href="#section-1.4">Section 1.4</a>). |
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To understand Mobile IPv6, it is important to understand the MIPv6 |
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design view of the base IPv6 protocol and infrastructure. The most |
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important base assumptions can be expressed as follows: |
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1. The routing prefixes available to a node are determined by its |
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current location, and therefore the node must change its IP |
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address as it moves. |
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2. The routing infrastructure is assumed to be secure and well |
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functioning, delivering packets to their intended destinations as |
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identified by destination address. |
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Although these assumptions may appear to be trivial, let us explore |
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them a little further. First, in current IPv6 operational practice |
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the IP address prefixes are distributed in a hierarchical manner. |
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This limits the number of routing table entries each individual |
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router needs to handle. An important implication is that the |
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<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 4]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-5" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
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topology determines what globally routable IP addresses are available |
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at a given location. That is, the nodes cannot freely decide what |
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globally routable IP address to use; they must rely on the routing |
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prefixes served by the local routers via Router Advertisements or by |
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a DHCP server. In other words, IP addresses are just what the name |
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says, addresses (i.e., locators). |
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Second, in the current Internet structure, the routers collectively |
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maintain a distributed database of the network topology and forward |
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each packet towards the location determined by the destination |
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address carried in the packet. To maintain the topology information, |
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the routers must trust each other, at least to a certain extent. The |
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routers learn the topology information from the other routers, and |
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they have no option but to trust their neighbor routers about distant |
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topology. At the borders of administrative domains, policy rules are |
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used to limit the amount of perhaps faulty routing table information |
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received from the peer domains. While this is mostly used to weed |
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out administrative mistakes, it also helps with security. The aim is |
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to maintain a reasonably accurate idea of the network topology even |
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if someone is feeding faulty information to the routing system. |
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In the current Mobile IPv6 design, it is explicitly assumed that the |
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routers and the policy rules are configured in a reasonable way, and |
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that the resulting routing infrastructure is trustworthy enough. |
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That is, it is assumed that the routing system maintains accurate |
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information of the network topology, and that it is therefore able to |
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route packets to their destination locations. If this assumption is |
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broken, the Internet itself is broken in the sense that packets go to |
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wrong locations. Such a fundamental malfunction of the Internet |
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would render hopeless any other effort to assure correct packet |
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delivery (e.g., any efforts due to Mobile IP security |
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considerations). |
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<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.1.1" href="#section-1.1.1">1.1.1</a>. A Note on Source Addresses and Ingress Filtering</span> |
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Some of the threats and attacks discussed in this document take |
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advantage of the ease of source address spoofing. That is, in the |
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current Internet it is possible to send packets with a false source |
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IP address. The eventual introduction of ingress filtering is |
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assumed to prevent this. When ingress filtering is used, traffic |
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with spoofed addresses is not forwarded. This filtering can be |
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applied at different network borders, such as those between an |
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Internet service provider (ISP) and its customers, between downstream |
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and upstream ISPs, or between peer ISPs [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks"">5</a>]. Obviously, the |
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granularity of ingress filters specifies how much you can "spoof |
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inside a prefix". For example, if an ISP ingress filters a |
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customer's link but the customer does nothing, anything inside the |
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customer's /48 prefix could be spoofed. If the customer does |
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<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 5]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-6" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
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filtering at LAN subnets, anything inside the /64 prefixes could be |
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spoofed. Despite the limitations imposed by such "in-prefix |
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spoofing", in general, ingress filtering enables traffic to be |
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traceable to its real source network [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks"">5</a>]. |
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However, ingress filtering helps if and only if a large part of the |
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Internet uses it. Unfortunately, there are still some issues (e.g., |
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in the presence of site multi-homing) that, although not |
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insurmountable, do require careful handling, and that are likely to |
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limit or delay its usefulness [<a href="#ref-5" title=""Ingress Filtering for Multihomed Networks"">5</a>]. |
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<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.2" href="#section-1.2">1.2</a>. The Mobility Problem and the Mobile IPv6 Solution</span> |
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The Mobile IP design aims to solve two problems at the same time. |
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First, it allows transport layer sessions (TCP connections, UDP- |
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based transactions) to continue even if the underlying host(s) move |
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and change their IP addresses. Second, it allows a node to be |
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reached through a static IP address, a home address (HoA). |
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The latter design choice can also be stated in other words: Mobile |
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IPv6 aims to preserve the identifier nature of IP addresses. That |
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is, Mobile IPv6 takes the view that IP addresses can be used as |
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natural identifiers of nodes, as they have been used since the |
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beginning of the Internet. This must be contrasted to proposed and |
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existing alternative designs where the identifier and locator natures |
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of the IP addresses have been separated (see <a href="#section-1.4">Section 1.4</a>). |
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The basic idea in Mobile IP is to allow a home agent (HA) to work as |
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a stationary proxy for a mobile node (MN). Whenever the mobile node |
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is away from its home network, the home agent intercepts packets |
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destined to the node and forwards the packets by tunneling them to |
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the node's current address, the care-of address (CoA). The transport |
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layer (e.g., TCP, UDP) uses the home address as a stationary |
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identifier for the mobile node. Figure 1 illustrates this basic |
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arrangement. |
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The basic solution requires tunneling through the home agent, thereby |
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leading to longer paths and degraded performance. This tunneling is |
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sometimes called triangular routing since it was originally planned |
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that the packets from the mobile node to its peer could still |
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traverse directly, bypassing the home agent. |
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<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 6]</span></pre> |
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<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-7" ></span> |
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<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
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+----+ +----+ |
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| MN |=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=tunnel=#=#=#=#=#=#=#=#|#HA | |
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+----+ ____________ +-#--+ |
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| CoA ___/ \_____ # Home Link |
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-+-------/ Internet * * *-*-*-*-#-#-#-#----- |
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| * * | * Home Address |
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\___ * * _____/ + * -+ |
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\_____*______/ | MN | |
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* + - -+ |
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+----+ |
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| CN | Data path as * * * * |
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+----+ it appears to correspondent node |
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Real data path # # # # |
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Figure 1. Basic Mode of Operation in Mobile IPv6 |
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To alleviate the performance penalty, Mobile IPv6 includes a mode of |
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operation that allows the mobile node and its peer, a correspondent |
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node (CN), to exchange packets directly, bypassing the home agent |
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completely after the initial setup phase. This mode of operation is |
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called route optimization (RO). When route optimization is used, the |
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mobile node sends its current care-of address to the correspondent |
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node, using binding update (BU) messages. The correspondent node |
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stores the binding between the home address and care-of address into |
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its Binding Cache. |
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Whenever MIPv6 route optimization is used, the correspondent node |
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effectively functions in two roles. Firstly, it is the source of the |
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packets it sends, as usual. Secondly, it acts as the first router |
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for the packets, effectively performing source routing. That is, |
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when the correspondent node is sending out packets, it consults its |
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MIPv6 route optimization data structures and reroutes the packets, if |
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necessary. A Binding Cache Entry (BCE) contains the home address and |
| 371 |
the care-of address of the mobile node, and records the fact that |
| 372 |
packets destined to the home address should now be sent to the |
| 373 |
destination address. Thus, it represents a local routing exception. |
| 374 |
|
| 375 |
The packets leaving the correspondent node are source routed to the |
| 376 |
care-of address. Each packet includes a routing header that contains |
| 377 |
the home address of the mobile node. Thus, logically, the packet is |
| 378 |
first routed to the care-of address and then, virtually, from the |
| 379 |
care-of address to the home address. In practice, of course, the |
| 380 |
packet is consumed by the mobile node at the care-of address; the |
| 381 |
header just allows the mobile node to select a socket associated with |
| 382 |
the home address instead of one with the care-of address. However, |
| 383 |
the mechanism resembles source routing, as there is routing state |
| 384 |
involved at the correspondent node, and a routing header is used. |
| 385 |
|
| 386 |
|
| 387 |
|
| 388 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 7]</span></pre> |
| 389 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-8" ></span> |
| 390 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 391 |
|
| 392 |
|
| 393 |
Nevertheless, this routing header is special (type 2) to avoid the |
| 394 |
risks associated with using the more general (type 0) variant. |
| 395 |
|
| 396 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3" href="#section-1.3">1.3</a>. Design Principles and Goals</span> |
| 397 |
|
| 398 |
The MIPv6 design and security design aimed to follow the end-to-end |
| 399 |
principle, to notice the differences in trust relationships between |
| 400 |
the nodes, and to be explicit about delivering a practical (instead |
| 401 |
of an over-ambitious) level of protection. |
| 402 |
|
| 403 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.1" href="#section-1.3.1">1.3.1</a>. End-to-End Principle</span> |
| 404 |
|
| 405 |
Perhaps the leading design principle for Internet protocols is the |
| 406 |
so-called end-to-end principle [<a href="#ref-4" title=""Some Internet Architectural Guidelines and Philosophy"">4</a>][11]. According to this principle, |
| 407 |
it is beneficial to avoid polluting the network with state, and to |
| 408 |
limit new state creation to the involved end nodes. |
| 409 |
|
| 410 |
In the case of Mobile IPv6, the end-to-end principle is applied by |
| 411 |
restricting mobility-related state primarily to the home agent. |
| 412 |
Additionally, if route optimization is used, the correspondent nodes |
| 413 |
also maintain a soft state relating to the mobile nodes' current |
| 414 |
care-of addresses, the Binding Cache. This can be contrasted to an |
| 415 |
approach that would use individual host routes within the basic |
| 416 |
routing system. Such an approach would create state on a huge number |
| 417 |
of routers around the network. In Mobile IPv6, only the home agent |
| 418 |
and the communicating nodes need to create state. |
| 419 |
|
| 420 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.2" href="#section-1.3.2">1.3.2</a>. Trust Assumptions</span> |
| 421 |
|
| 422 |
In the Mobile IPv6 security design, different approaches were chosen |
| 423 |
for securing the communication between the mobile node and its home |
| 424 |
agent and between the mobile node and its correspondent nodes. In |
| 425 |
the home agent case, it was assumed that the mobile node and the home |
| 426 |
agent know each other through a prior arrangement, e.g., due to a |
| 427 |
business relationship. In contrast, it was strictly assumed that the |
| 428 |
mobile node and the correspondent node do not need to have any prior |
| 429 |
arrangement, thereby allowing Mobile IPv6 to function in a scalable |
| 430 |
manner, without requiring any configuration at the correspondent |
| 431 |
nodes. |
| 432 |
|
| 433 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.3.3" href="#section-1.3.3">1.3.3</a>. Protection Level</span> |
| 434 |
|
| 435 |
As a security goal, Mobile IPv6 design aimed to be "as secure as the |
| 436 |
(non-mobile) IPv4 Internet" was at the time of the design, in the |
| 437 |
period 2001 - 2002. In particular, that means that there is little |
| 438 |
protection against attackers that are able to attach themselves |
| 439 |
between a correspondent node and a home agent. The rationale is |
| 440 |
simple: in the 2001 Internet, if a node was able to attach itself to |
| 441 |
|
| 442 |
|
| 443 |
|
| 444 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 8]</span></pre> |
| 445 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-9" ></span> |
| 446 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 447 |
|
| 448 |
|
| 449 |
the communication path between two arbitrary nodes, it was able to |
| 450 |
disrupt, modify, and eavesdrop all the traffic between the two nodes, |
| 451 |
unless IPsec protection was used. Even when IPsec was used, the |
| 452 |
attacker was still able to block communication selectively by simply |
| 453 |
dropping the packets. The attacker in control of a router between |
| 454 |
the two nodes could also mount a flooding attack by redirecting the |
| 455 |
data flows between the two nodes (or, more practically, an equivalent |
| 456 |
flow of bogus data) to a third party. |
| 457 |
|
| 458 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-1.4" href="#section-1.4">1.4</a>. About Mobile IPv6 Mobility and its Variations</span> |
| 459 |
|
| 460 |
Taking a more abstract angle, IPv6 mobility can be defined as a |
| 461 |
mechanism for managing local exceptions to routing information in |
| 462 |
order to direct packets that are sent to one address (the home |
| 463 |
address) to another address (the care-of address). It is managing in |
| 464 |
the sense that the local routing exceptions (source routes) are |
| 465 |
created and deleted dynamically, according to instructions sent by |
| 466 |
the mobile node. It is local in the sense that the routing |
| 467 |
exceptions are valid only at the home agent, and in the correspondent |
| 468 |
nodes if route optimization is used. The created pieces of state are |
| 469 |
exceptions in the sense that they override the normal topological |
| 470 |
routing information carried collectively by the routers. |
| 471 |
|
| 472 |
Using the terminology introduced by J. Noel Chiappa [<a href="#ref-14" title=""Endpoints and Endpoint Names: A Proposed Enhancement to the Internet Architecture"">14</a>], we can say |
| 473 |
that the home address functions in the dual role of being an end- |
| 474 |
point identifier (EID) and a permanent locator. The care-of address |
| 475 |
is a pure, temporary locator, which identifies the current location |
| 476 |
of the mobile node. The correspondent nodes effectively perform |
| 477 |
source routing, redirecting traffic destined to the home address to |
| 478 |
the care-of address. This is even reflected in the packet structure: |
| 479 |
the packets carry an explicit routing header. |
| 480 |
|
| 481 |
The relationship between EIDs and permanent locators has been |
| 482 |
exploited by other proposals. Their technical merits and security |
| 483 |
problems, however, are beyond the scope of this document. |
| 484 |
|
| 485 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-2" href="#section-2">2</a>. Avenues of Attack</span> |
| 486 |
|
| 487 |
From the discussion above, it should now be clear that the dangers |
| 488 |
that Mobile IPv6 must protect from lie in creation (or deletion) of |
| 489 |
the local routing exceptions. In Mobile IPv6 terms, the danger is in |
| 490 |
the possibility of unauthorized creation of Binding Cache Entries |
| 491 |
(BCE). The effects of an attack differ depending on the target of |
| 492 |
the attack, the timing of the attack, and the location of the |
| 493 |
attacker. |
| 494 |
|
| 495 |
|
| 496 |
|
| 497 |
|
| 498 |
|
| 499 |
|
| 500 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 9]</span></pre> |
| 501 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-10" ></span> |
| 502 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 503 |
|
| 504 |
|
| 505 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.1" href="#section-2.1">2.1</a>. Target</span> |
| 506 |
|
| 507 |
Basically, the target of an attack can be any node or network in the |
| 508 |
Internet (stationary or mobile). The basic differences lie in the |
| 509 |
goals of the attack: does the attacker aim to divert (steal) the |
| 510 |
traffic destined to and/or sourced at the target node, or does it aim |
| 511 |
to cause denial-of-service to the target node or network? The target |
| 512 |
does not typically play much of an active role attack. As an |
| 513 |
example, an attacker may launch a denial-of-service attack on a given |
| 514 |
node, A, by contacting a large number of nodes, claiming to be A, and |
| 515 |
subsequently diverting the traffic at these other nodes so that A is |
| 516 |
no longer able to receive packets from those nodes. A itself need |
| 517 |
not be involved at all before its communications start to break. |
| 518 |
Furthermore, A is not necessarily a mobile node; it may well be |
| 519 |
stationary. |
| 520 |
|
| 521 |
Mobile IPv6 uses the same class of IP addresses for both mobile nodes |
| 522 |
(i.e., home and care-of addresses) and stationary nodes. That is, |
| 523 |
mobile and stationary addresses are indistinguishable from each |
| 524 |
other. Attackers can take advantage of this by taking any IP address |
| 525 |
and using it in a context where, normally, only mobile (home or |
| 526 |
care-of) addresses appear. This means that attacks that otherwise |
| 527 |
would only concern mobile nodes are, in fact, a threat to all IPv6 |
| 528 |
nodes. |
| 529 |
|
| 530 |
In fact, a mobile node appears to be best protected, since a mobile |
| 531 |
node does not need to maintain state about the whereabouts of some |
| 532 |
remote nodes. Conversely, the role of being a correspondent node |
| 533 |
appears to be the weakest, since there are very few assumptions upon |
| 534 |
which it can base its state formation. That is, an attacker has a |
| 535 |
much easier task in fooling a correspondent node to believe that a |
| 536 |
presumably mobile node is somewhere it is not, than in fooling a |
| 537 |
mobile node itself into believing something similar. On the other |
| 538 |
hand, since it is possible to attack a node indirectly by first |
| 539 |
targeting its peers, all nodes are equally vulnerable in some sense. |
| 540 |
Furthermore, a (usually) mobile node often also plays the role of |
| 541 |
being a correspondent node, since it can exchange packets with other |
| 542 |
mobile nodes (see also <a href="#section-5.4">Section 5.4</a>). |
| 543 |
|
| 544 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.2" href="#section-2.2">2.2</a>. Timing</span> |
| 545 |
|
| 546 |
An important aspect in understanding Mobile IPv6-related dangers is |
| 547 |
timing. In a stationary IPv4 network, an attacker must be between |
| 548 |
the communication nodes at the same time as the nodes communicate. |
| 549 |
With the Mobile IPv6 ability of creating binding cache entries, the |
| 550 |
situation changes. A new danger is created. Without proper |
| 551 |
protection, an attacker could attach itself between the home agent |
| 552 |
and a correspondent node for a while, create a BCE at the |
| 553 |
|
| 554 |
|
| 555 |
|
| 556 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 10]</span></pre> |
| 557 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-11" ></span> |
| 558 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 559 |
|
| 560 |
|
| 561 |
correspondent node, leave the position, and continuously update the |
| 562 |
correspondent node about the mobile node's whereabouts. This would |
| 563 |
make the correspondent node send packets destined to the mobile node |
| 564 |
to an incorrect address as long as the BCE remained valid, i.e., |
| 565 |
typically until the correspondent node is rebooted. The converse |
| 566 |
would also be possible: an attacker could also launch an attack by |
| 567 |
first creating a BCE and then letting it expire at a carefully |
| 568 |
selected time. If a large number of active BCEs carrying large |
| 569 |
amounts of traffic expired at the same time, the result might be an |
| 570 |
overload towards the home agent or the home network. (See <a href="#section-3.2.2">Section</a> |
| 571 |
<a href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a> for a more detailed explanation.) |
| 572 |
|
| 573 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-2.3" href="#section-2.3">2.3</a>. Location</span> |
| 574 |
|
| 575 |
In a static IPv4 Internet, an attacker can only receive packets |
| 576 |
destined to a given address if it is able to attach itself to, or to |
| 577 |
control, a node on the topological path between the sender and the |
| 578 |
recipient. On the other hand, an attacker can easily send spoofed |
| 579 |
packets from almost anywhere. If Mobile IPv6 allowed sending |
| 580 |
unprotected Binding Updates, an attacker could create a BCE on any |
| 581 |
correspondent node from anywhere in the Internet, simply by sending a |
| 582 |
fraudulent Binding Update to the correspondent node. Instead of |
| 583 |
being required to be between the two target nodes, the attacker could |
| 584 |
act from anywhere in the Internet. |
| 585 |
|
| 586 |
In summary, by introducing the new routing exception (binding cache) |
| 587 |
at the correspondent nodes, Mobile IPv6 introduces the dangers of |
| 588 |
time and space shifting. Without proper protection, Mobile IPv6 |
| 589 |
would allow an attacker to act from anywhere in the Internet and well |
| 590 |
before the time of the actual attack. In contrast, in the static |
| 591 |
IPv4 Internet, the attacking nodes must be present at the time of the |
| 592 |
attack and they must be positioned in a suitable way, or the attack |
| 593 |
would not be possible in the first place. |
| 594 |
|
| 595 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-3" href="#section-3">3</a>. Threats and Limitations</span> |
| 596 |
|
| 597 |
This section describes attacks against Mobile IPv6 Route Optimization |
| 598 |
and what protection mechanisms Mobile IPv6 applies against them. The |
| 599 |
goal of the attacker can be to corrupt the correspondent node's |
| 600 |
binding cache and to cause packets to be delivered to a wrong |
| 601 |
address. This can compromise secrecy and integrity of communication |
| 602 |
and cause denial-of-service (DoS) both at the communicating parties |
| 603 |
and at the address that receives the unwanted packets. The attacker |
| 604 |
may also exploit features of the Binding Update (BU) mechanism to |
| 605 |
exhaust the resources of the mobile node, the home agent, or the |
| 606 |
correspondent nodes. The aim of this section is to provide an |
| 607 |
overview of the various protocol mechanisms and their limitations. |
| 608 |
The details of the mechanisms are covered in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a>. |
| 609 |
|
| 610 |
|
| 611 |
|
| 612 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 11]</span></pre> |
| 613 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-12" ></span> |
| 614 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 615 |
|
| 616 |
|
| 617 |
It is essential to understand that some of the threats are more |
| 618 |
serious than others, that some can be mitigated but not removed, that |
| 619 |
some threats may represent acceptable risk, and that some threats may |
| 620 |
be considered too expensive to the attacker to be worth preventing. |
| 621 |
|
| 622 |
We consider only active attackers. The rationale behind this is that |
| 623 |
in order to corrupt the binding cache, the attacker must sooner or |
| 624 |
later send one or more messages. Thus, it makes little sense to |
| 625 |
consider attackers that only observe messages but do not send any. |
| 626 |
In fact, some active attacks are easier, for the average attacker, to |
| 627 |
launch than a passive one would be. That is, in many active attacks |
| 628 |
the attacker can initiate binding update processing at any time, |
| 629 |
while most passive attacks require the attacker to wait for suitable |
| 630 |
messages to be sent by the target nodes. |
| 631 |
|
| 632 |
Nevertheless, an important class of passive attacks remains: attacks |
| 633 |
on privacy. It is well known that simply by examining packets, |
| 634 |
eavesdroppers can track the movements of individual nodes (and |
| 635 |
potentially, users) [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6"">3</a>]. Mobile IPv6 exacerbates the problem by |
| 636 |
adding more potentially sensitive information into the packets (e.g., |
| 637 |
Binding Updates, routing headers or home address options). This |
| 638 |
document does not address these attacks. |
| 639 |
|
| 640 |
We first consider attacks against nodes that are supposed to have a |
| 641 |
specified address (<a href="#section-3.1">Section 3.1</a>), continuing with flooding attacks |
| 642 |
(<a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>) and attacks against the basic Binding Update protocol |
| 643 |
(<a href="#section-3.3">Section 3.3</a>). After that, we present a classification of the |
| 644 |
attacks (<a href="#section-3.4">Section 3.4</a>). Finally, we consider the applicability of |
| 645 |
solutions relying on some kind of a global security infrastructure |
| 646 |
(<a href="#section-3.5">Section 3.5</a>). |
| 647 |
|
| 648 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1" href="#section-3.1">3.1</a>. Attacks Against Address 'Owners' ("Address Stealing")</span> |
| 649 |
|
| 650 |
The most obvious danger in Mobile IPv6 is address "stealing", when an |
| 651 |
attacker illegitimately claims to be a given node at a given address |
| 652 |
and tries to "steal" traffic destined to that address. We first |
| 653 |
describe the basic variant of this attack, follow with a description |
| 654 |
of how the situation is affected if the target is a stationary node, |
| 655 |
and continue with more complicated issues related to timing (so |
| 656 |
called "future" attacks), confidentiality and integrity, and DoS |
| 657 |
aspects. |
| 658 |
|
| 659 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.1" href="#section-3.1.1">3.1.1</a>. Basic Address Stealing</span> |
| 660 |
|
| 661 |
If Binding Updates were not authenticated at all, an attacker could |
| 662 |
fabricate and send spoofed binding updates from anywhere in the |
| 663 |
Internet. All nodes that support the correspondent node |
| 664 |
functionality would become unwitting accomplices to this attack. As |
| 665 |
|
| 666 |
|
| 667 |
|
| 668 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 12]</span></pre> |
| 669 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-13" ></span> |
| 670 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 671 |
|
| 672 |
|
| 673 |
explained in <a href="#section-2.1">Section 2.1</a>, there is no way of telling which addresses |
| 674 |
belong to mobile nodes that really could send binding updates and |
| 675 |
which addresses belong to stationary nodes (see below), so |
| 676 |
potentially any node (including "static" nodes) is vulnerable. |
| 677 |
|
| 678 |
+---+ original +---+ new packet +---+ |
| 679 |
| B |<----------------| A |- - - - - - ->| C | |
| 680 |
+---+ packet flow +---+ flow +---+ |
| 681 |
^ |
| 682 |
| |
| 683 |
| False BU: B -> C |
| 684 |
| |
| 685 |
+----------+ |
| 686 |
| Attacker | |
| 687 |
+----------+ |
| 688 |
|
| 689 |
Figure 2. Basic Address Stealing |
| 690 |
|
| 691 |
Consider an IP node, A, sending IP packets to another IP node, B. |
| 692 |
The attacker could redirect the packets to an arbitrary address, C, |
| 693 |
by sending a Binding Update to A. The home address (HoA) in the |
| 694 |
binding update would be B and the care-of address (CoA) would be C. |
| 695 |
After receiving this binding update, A would send all packets |
| 696 |
intended for the node B to the address C. See Figure 2. |
| 697 |
|
| 698 |
The attacker might select the care-of address to be either its own |
| 699 |
current address, another address in its local network, or any other |
| 700 |
IP address. If the attacker selected a local care-of address |
| 701 |
allowing it to receive the packets, it would be able to send replies |
| 702 |
to the correspondent node. Ingress filtering at the attacker's |
| 703 |
local+ network does not prevent the spoofing of Binding Updates but |
| 704 |
forces the attacker either to choose a care-of address from inside |
| 705 |
its own network or to use the Alternate care-of address sub-option. |
| 706 |
|
| 707 |
The binding update authorization mechanism used in the MIPv6 security |
| 708 |
design is primarily intended to mitigate this threat, and to limit |
| 709 |
the location of attackers to the path between a correspondent node |
| 710 |
and the home agent. |
| 711 |
|
| 712 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.2" href="#section-3.1.2">3.1.2</a>. Stealing Addresses of Stationary Nodes</span> |
| 713 |
|
| 714 |
The attacker needs to know or guess the IP addresses of both the |
| 715 |
source of the packets to be diverted (A in the example above) and the |
| 716 |
destination of the packets (B, above). This means that it is |
| 717 |
difficult to redirect all packets to or from a specific node because |
| 718 |
the attacker would need to know the IP addresses of all the nodes |
| 719 |
with which it is communicating. |
| 720 |
|
| 721 |
|
| 722 |
|
| 723 |
|
| 724 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 13]</span></pre> |
| 725 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-14" ></span> |
| 726 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 727 |
|
| 728 |
|
| 729 |
Nodes with well-known addresses, such as servers and those using |
| 730 |
stateful configuration, are most vulnerable. Nodes that are a part |
| 731 |
of the network infrastructure, such as DNS servers, are particularly |
| 732 |
interesting targets for attackers and particularly easy to identify. |
| 733 |
|
| 734 |
Nodes that frequently change their address and use random addresses |
| 735 |
are relatively safe. However, if they register their address into |
| 736 |
Dynamic DNS, they become more exposed. Similarly, nodes that visit |
| 737 |
publicly accessible networks such as airport wireless LANs risk |
| 738 |
revealing their addresses. IPv6 addressing privacy features [<a href="#ref-3" title=""Privacy Extensions for Stateless Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6"">3</a>] |
| 739 |
mitigate these risks to an extent, but note that addresses cannot be |
| 740 |
completely recycled while there are still open sessions that use |
| 741 |
those addresses. |
| 742 |
|
| 743 |
Thus, it is not the mobile nodes that are most vulnerable to address |
| 744 |
stealing attacks; it is the well-known static servers. Furthermore, |
| 745 |
the servers often run old or heavily optimized operating systems and |
| 746 |
may not have any mobility related code at all. Thus, the security |
| 747 |
design cannot be based on the idea that mobile nodes might somehow be |
| 748 |
able to detect whether someone has stolen their address, and reset |
| 749 |
the state at the correspondent node. Instead, the security design |
| 750 |
must make reasonable measures to prevent the creation of fraudulent |
| 751 |
binding cache entries in the first place. |
| 752 |
|
| 753 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.3" href="#section-3.1.3">3.1.3</a>. Future Address Sealing</span> |
| 754 |
|
| 755 |
If an attacker knows an address that a node is likely to select in |
| 756 |
the future, it can launch a "future" address stealing attack. The |
| 757 |
attacker creates a Binding Cache Entry with the home address that it |
| 758 |
anticipates the target node will use. If the Home Agent allows |
| 759 |
dynamic home addresses, the attacker may be able to do this |
| 760 |
legitimately. That is, if the attacker is a client of the Home Agent |
| 761 |
and is able to acquire the home address temporarily, it may be able |
| 762 |
to do so and then to return the home address to the Home Agent once |
| 763 |
the BCE is in place. |
| 764 |
|
| 765 |
Now, if the BCE state had a long expiration time, the target node |
| 766 |
would acquire the same home address while the BCE is still effective, |
| 767 |
and the attacker would be able to launch a successful man-in-the- |
| 768 |
middle or denial-of-service attack. The mechanism applied in the |
| 769 |
MIPv6 security design is to limit the lifetime of Binding Cache |
| 770 |
Entries to a few minutes. |
| 771 |
|
| 772 |
Note that this attack applies only to fairly specific conditions. |
| 773 |
There are also some variations of this attack that are theoretically |
| 774 |
possible under some other conditions. However, all of these attacks |
| 775 |
are limited by the Binding Cache Entry lifetime, and therefore they |
| 776 |
are not a real concern with the current design. |
| 777 |
|
| 778 |
|
| 779 |
|
| 780 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 14]</span></pre> |
| 781 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-15" ></span> |
| 782 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 783 |
|
| 784 |
|
| 785 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.4" href="#section-3.1.4">3.1.4</a>. Attacks against Secrecy and Integrity</span> |
| 786 |
|
| 787 |
By spoofing Binding Updates, an attacker could redirect all packets |
| 788 |
between two IP nodes to itself. By sending a spoofed binding update |
| 789 |
to A, it could capture the data intended to B. That is, it could |
| 790 |
pretend to be B and highjack A's connections with B, or it could |
| 791 |
establish new spoofed connections. The attacker could also send |
| 792 |
spoofed binding updates to both A and B and insert itself in the |
| 793 |
middle of all connections between them (man-in-the-middle attack). |
| 794 |
Consequently, the attacker would be able to see and modify the |
| 795 |
packets sent between A and B. See Figure 3. |
| 796 |
|
| 797 |
Original data path, before man-in-the-middle attack |
| 798 |
|
| 799 |
+---+ +---+ |
| 800 |
| A | | B | |
| 801 |
+---+ +---+ |
| 802 |
\___________________________________/ |
| 803 |
|
| 804 |
Modified data path, after the falsified binding updates |
| 805 |
|
| 806 |
+---+ +---+ |
| 807 |
| A | | B | |
| 808 |
+---+ +---+ |
| 809 |
\ / |
| 810 |
\ / |
| 811 |
\ +----------+ / |
| 812 |
\---------| Attacker |-------/ |
| 813 |
+----------+ |
| 814 |
|
| 815 |
Figure 3. Man-in-the-Middle Attack |
| 816 |
|
| 817 |
Strong end-to-end encryption and integrity protection, such as |
| 818 |
authenticated IPsec, can prevent all the attacks against data secrecy |
| 819 |
and integrity. When the data is cryptographically protected, spoofed |
| 820 |
binding updates could result in denial of service (see below) but not |
| 821 |
in disclosure or corruption of sensitive data beyond revealing the |
| 822 |
existence of the traffic flows. Two fixed nodes could also protect |
| 823 |
communication between themselves by refusing to accept binding |
| 824 |
updates from each other. Ingress filtering, on the other hand, does |
| 825 |
not help, as the attacker is using its own address as the care-of |
| 826 |
address and is not spoofing source IP addresses. |
| 827 |
|
| 828 |
The protection adopted in MIPv6 Security Design is to authenticate |
| 829 |
(albeit weakly) the addresses by return routability (RR), which |
| 830 |
limits the topological locations from which the attack is possible |
| 831 |
(see <a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>). |
| 832 |
|
| 833 |
|
| 834 |
|
| 835 |
|
| 836 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 15]</span></pre> |
| 837 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-16" ></span> |
| 838 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 839 |
|
| 840 |
|
| 841 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.5" href="#section-3.1.5">3.1.5</a>. Basic Denial-of-Service Attacks</span> |
| 842 |
|
| 843 |
By sending spoofed binding updates, the attacker could redirect all |
| 844 |
packets sent between two IP nodes to a random or nonexistent address |
| 845 |
(or addresses). As a result, it might be able to stop or disrupt |
| 846 |
communication between the nodes. This attack is serious because any |
| 847 |
Internet node could be targeted, including fixed nodes belonging to |
| 848 |
the infrastructure (e.g., DNS servers) that are also vulnerable. |
| 849 |
Again, the selected protection mechanism is return routability (RR). |
| 850 |
|
| 851 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.1.6" href="#section-3.1.6">3.1.6</a>. Replaying and Blocking Binding Updates</span> |
| 852 |
|
| 853 |
Any protocol for authenticating binding updates has to consider |
| 854 |
replay attacks. That is, an attacker may be able to replay recently |
| 855 |
authenticated binding updates to the correspondent and, consequently, |
| 856 |
to direct packets to the mobile node's previous location. As with |
| 857 |
spoofed binding updates, this could be used both for capturing |
| 858 |
packets and for DoS. The attacker could capture the packets and |
| 859 |
impersonate the mobile node if it reserved the mobile's previous |
| 860 |
address after the mobile node has moved away and then replayed the |
| 861 |
previous binding update to redirect packets back to the previous |
| 862 |
location. |
| 863 |
|
| 864 |
In a related attack, the attacker blocks binding updates from the |
| 865 |
mobile at its new location, e.g., by jamming the radio link or by |
| 866 |
mounting a flooding attack. The attacker then takes over the |
| 867 |
mobile's connections at the old location. The attacker will be able |
| 868 |
to capture the packets sent to the mobile and to impersonate the |
| 869 |
mobile until the correspondent's Binding Cache entry expires. |
| 870 |
|
| 871 |
Both of the above attacks require that the attacker be on the same |
| 872 |
local network with the mobile, where it can relatively easily observe |
| 873 |
packets and block them even if the mobile does not move to a new |
| 874 |
location. Therefore, we believe that these attacks are not as |
| 875 |
serious as ones that can be mounted from remote locations. The |
| 876 |
limited lifetime of the Binding Cache entry and the associated nonces |
| 877 |
limit the time frame within which the replay attacks are possible. |
| 878 |
Replay protection is provided by the sequence number and MAC in the |
| 879 |
Binding Update. To not undermine this protection, correspondent |
| 880 |
nodes must exercise care upon deleting a binding cache entry, as per |
| 881 |
<a href="#section-5.2.8">section 5.2.8</a> ("Preventing Replay Attacks") in [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">6</a>]. |
| 882 |
|
| 883 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2" href="#section-3.2">3.2</a>. Attacks Against Other Nodes and Networks (Flooding)</span> |
| 884 |
|
| 885 |
By sending spoofed binding updates, an attacker could redirect |
| 886 |
traffic to an arbitrary IP address. This could be used to overload |
| 887 |
an arbitrary Internet address with an excessive volume of packets |
| 888 |
(known as a 'bombing attack'). The attacker could also target a |
| 889 |
|
| 890 |
|
| 891 |
|
| 892 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 16]</span></pre> |
| 893 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-17" ></span> |
| 894 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 895 |
|
| 896 |
|
| 897 |
network by redirecting data to one or more IP addresses within the |
| 898 |
network. There are two main variations of flooding: basic flooding |
| 899 |
and return-to-home flooding. We consider them separately. |
| 900 |
|
| 901 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.1" href="#section-3.2.1">3.2.1</a>. Basic Flooding</span> |
| 902 |
|
| 903 |
In the simplest attack, the attacker knows that there is a heavy data |
| 904 |
stream from node A to B and redirects this to the target address C. |
| 905 |
However, A would soon stop sending the data because it is not |
| 906 |
receiving acknowledgements from B. |
| 907 |
|
| 908 |
(B is attacker) |
| 909 |
|
| 910 |
+---+ original +---+ flooding packet +---+ |
| 911 |
| B |<================| A |==================>| C | |
| 912 |
+---+ packet flow +---+ flow +---+ |
| 913 |
| ^ |
| 914 |
\ / |
| 915 |
\__________________/ |
| 916 |
False binding update + false acknowledgements |
| 917 |
|
| 918 |
Figure 4. Basic Flooding Attack |
| 919 |
|
| 920 |
A more sophisticated attacker would act itself as B; see Figure 4. |
| 921 |
It would first subscribe to a data stream (e.g., a video stream) and |
| 922 |
redirect this stream to the target address C. The attacker would |
| 923 |
even be able to spoof the acknowledgements. For example, consider a |
| 924 |
TCP stream. The attacker would perform the TCP handshake itself and |
| 925 |
thus know the initial sequence numbers. After redirecting the data |
| 926 |
to C, the attacker would continue to send spoofed acknowledgements. |
| 927 |
It would even be able to accelerate the data rate by simulating a |
| 928 |
fatter pipe [<a href="#ref-12" title=""TCP Congestion Control with a Misbehaving Receiver"">12</a>]. |
| 929 |
|
| 930 |
This attack might be even easier with UDP/RTP. The attacker could |
| 931 |
create spoofed RTCP acknowledgements. Either way, the attacker would |
| 932 |
be able to redirect an increasing stream of unwanted data to the |
| 933 |
target address without doing much work itself. It could carry on |
| 934 |
opening more streams and refreshing the Binding Cache entries by |
| 935 |
sending a new binding update every few minutes. Thus, the limitation |
| 936 |
of BCE lifetime to a few minutes does not help here without |
| 937 |
additional measures. |
| 938 |
|
| 939 |
During the Mobile IPv6 design process, the effectiveness of this |
| 940 |
attack was debated. It was mistakenly assumed that the target node |
| 941 |
would send a TCP Reset to the source of the unwanted data stream, |
| 942 |
which would then stop sending. In reality, all practical TCP/IP |
| 943 |
implementations fail to send the Reset. The target node drops the |
| 944 |
unwanted packets at the IP layer because it does not have a Binding |
| 945 |
|
| 946 |
|
| 947 |
|
| 948 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 17]</span></pre> |
| 949 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-18" ></span> |
| 950 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 951 |
|
| 952 |
|
| 953 |
Update List entry corresponding to the Routing Header on the incoming |
| 954 |
packet. Thus, the flooding data is never processed at the TCP layer |
| 955 |
of the target node, and no Reset is sent. This means that the attack |
| 956 |
using TCP streams is more effective than was originally believed. |
| 957 |
|
| 958 |
This attack is serious because the target can be any node or network, |
| 959 |
not only a mobile one. What makes it particularly serious compared |
| 960 |
to the other attacks is that the target itself cannot do anything to |
| 961 |
prevent the attack. For example, it does not help if the target |
| 962 |
network stops using Route Optimization. The damage is compounded if |
| 963 |
these techniques are used to amplify the effect of other distributed |
| 964 |
denial-of-service (DDoS) attacks. Ingress filtering in the |
| 965 |
attacker's local network prevents the spoofing of source addresses |
| 966 |
but the attack would still be possible by setting the Alternate |
| 967 |
care-of address sub-option to the target address. |
| 968 |
|
| 969 |
Again, the protection mechanism adopted for MIPv6 is return |
| 970 |
routability. This time it is necessary to check that there is indeed |
| 971 |
a node at the new care-of address, and that the node is the one that |
| 972 |
requested redirecting packets to that very address (see <a href="#section-4.1.2">Section</a> |
| 973 |
<a href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>). |
| 974 |
|
| 975 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.2.2" href="#section-3.2.2">3.2.2</a>. Return-to-Home Flooding</span> |
| 976 |
|
| 977 |
A variation of the bombing attack would target the home address or |
| 978 |
the home network instead of the care-of address or a visited network. |
| 979 |
The attacker would claim to be a mobile with the home address equal |
| 980 |
to the target address. While claiming to be away from home, the |
| 981 |
attacker would start downloading a data stream. The attacker would |
| 982 |
then send a binding update cancellation (i.e., a request to delete |
| 983 |
the binding from the Binding Cache) or just allow the cache entry to |
| 984 |
expire. Either would redirect the data stream to the home network. |
| 985 |
As when bombing a care-of address, the attacker can keep the stream |
| 986 |
alive and even increase the data rate by spoofing acknowledgements. |
| 987 |
When successful, the bombing attack against the home network is just |
| 988 |
as serious as that against a care-of address. |
| 989 |
|
| 990 |
The basic protection mechanism adopted is return routability. |
| 991 |
However, it is hard to fully protect against this attack; see <a href="#section-4.1.1">Section</a> |
| 992 |
<a href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. |
| 993 |
|
| 994 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3" href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>. Attacks against Binding Update Protocols</span> |
| 995 |
|
| 996 |
Security protocols that successfully protect the secrecy and |
| 997 |
integrity of data can sometimes make the participants more vulnerable |
| 998 |
to denial-of-service attacks. In fact, the stronger the |
| 999 |
authentication, the easier it may be for an attacker to use the |
| 1000 |
|
| 1001 |
|
| 1002 |
|
| 1003 |
|
| 1004 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 18]</span></pre> |
| 1005 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-19" ></span> |
| 1006 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1007 |
|
| 1008 |
|
| 1009 |
protocol features to exhaust the mobile's or the correspondent's |
| 1010 |
resources. |
| 1011 |
|
| 1012 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.1" href="#section-3.3.1">3.3.1</a>. Inducing Unnecessary Binding Updates</span> |
| 1013 |
|
| 1014 |
When a mobile node receives an IP packet from a new correspondent via |
| 1015 |
the home agent, it may initiate the binding update protocol. An |
| 1016 |
attacker can exploit this by sending the mobile node a spoofed IP |
| 1017 |
packet (e.g., ping or TCP SYN packet) that appears to come from a new |
| 1018 |
correspondent node. Since the packet arrives via the home agent, the |
| 1019 |
mobile node may start the binding update protocol with the |
| 1020 |
correspondent node. The decision as to whether to initiate the |
| 1021 |
binding update procedure may depend on several factors (including |
| 1022 |
heuristics, cross layer information, and configuration options) and |
| 1023 |
is not specified by Mobile IPv6. Not initiating the binding update |
| 1024 |
procedure automatically may alleviate these attacks, but it will not, |
| 1025 |
in general, prevent them completely. |
| 1026 |
|
| 1027 |
In a real attack the attacker would induce the mobile node to |
| 1028 |
initiate binding update protocols with a large number of |
| 1029 |
correspondent nodes at the same time. If the correspondent addresses |
| 1030 |
are real addresses of existing IP nodes, then most instances of the |
| 1031 |
binding update protocol might even complete successfully. The |
| 1032 |
entries created in the Binding Cache are correct but useless. In |
| 1033 |
this way, the attacker can induce the mobile to execute the binding |
| 1034 |
update protocol unnecessarily, which can drain the mobile's |
| 1035 |
resources. |
| 1036 |
|
| 1037 |
A correspondent node (i.e., any IP node) can also be attacked in a |
| 1038 |
similar way. The attacker sends spoofed IP packets to a large number |
| 1039 |
of mobiles, with the target node's address as the source address. |
| 1040 |
These mobiles will initiate the binding update protocol with the |
| 1041 |
target node. Again, most of the binding update protocol executions |
| 1042 |
will complete successfully. By inducing a large number of |
| 1043 |
unnecessary binding updates, the attacker is able to consume the |
| 1044 |
target node's resources. |
| 1045 |
|
| 1046 |
This attack is possible against any binding update authentication |
| 1047 |
protocol. The more resources the binding update protocol consumes, |
| 1048 |
the more serious the attack. Therefore, strong cryptographic |
| 1049 |
authentication protocol is more vulnerable to the attack than a weak |
| 1050 |
one or unauthenticated binding updates. Ingress filtering helps a |
| 1051 |
little, since it makes it harder to forge the source address of the |
| 1052 |
spoofed packets, but it does not completely eliminate this threat. |
| 1053 |
|
| 1054 |
A node should protect itself from the attack by setting a limit on |
| 1055 |
the amount of resources (i.e., processing time, memory, and |
| 1056 |
communications bandwidth) that it uses for processing binding |
| 1057 |
|
| 1058 |
|
| 1059 |
|
| 1060 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 19]</span></pre> |
| 1061 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-20" ></span> |
| 1062 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1063 |
|
| 1064 |
|
| 1065 |
updates. When the limit is exceeded, the node can simply stop |
| 1066 |
attempting route optimization. Sometimes it is possible to process |
| 1067 |
some binding updates even when a node is under the attack. A mobile |
| 1068 |
node may have a local security policy listing a limited number of |
| 1069 |
addresses to which binding updates will be sent even when the mobile |
| 1070 |
node is under DoS attack. A correspondent node (i.e., any IP node) |
| 1071 |
may similarly have a local security policy listing a limited set of |
| 1072 |
addresses from which binding updates will be accepted even when the |
| 1073 |
correspondent is under a binding update DoS attack. |
| 1074 |
|
| 1075 |
The node may also recognize addresses with it had meaningful |
| 1076 |
communication in the past and only send binding updates to, or accept |
| 1077 |
them from, those addresses. Since it may be impossible for the IP |
| 1078 |
layer to know about the protocol state in higher protocol layers, a |
| 1079 |
good measure of the meaningfulness of the past communication is |
| 1080 |
probably per-address packet counts. Alternatively, Neighbor |
| 1081 |
Discovery [<a href="#ref-2" title=""Neighbor Discovery for IP Version 6 (IPv6)"">2</a>] (<a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>, Conceptual Data Structures) defines the |
| 1082 |
Destination Cache as a set of entries about destinations to which |
| 1083 |
traffic has been sent recently. Thus, implementors may wish to use |
| 1084 |
the information in the Destination Cache. |
| 1085 |
|
| 1086 |
<a href="#section-11.7.2">Section 11.7.2</a> ("Correspondent Registration") in [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">6</a>] does not specify |
| 1087 |
when such a route optimization procedure should be initiated. It |
| 1088 |
does indicate when it may justifiable to do so, but these hints are |
| 1089 |
not enough. This remains an area where more work is needed. |
| 1090 |
Obviously, given that route optimization is optional, any node that |
| 1091 |
finds the processing load excessive or unjustified may simply turn it |
| 1092 |
off (either selectively or completely). |
| 1093 |
|
| 1094 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.2" href="#section-3.3.2">3.3.2</a>. Forcing Non-Optimized Routing</span> |
| 1095 |
|
| 1096 |
As a variant of the previous attack, the attacker can prevent a |
| 1097 |
correspondent node from using route optimization by filling its |
| 1098 |
Binding Cache with unnecessary entries so that most entries for real |
| 1099 |
mobiles are dropped. |
| 1100 |
|
| 1101 |
Any successful DoS attack against a mobile or correspondent node can |
| 1102 |
also prevent the processing of binding updates. We have previously |
| 1103 |
suggested that the target of a DoS attack may respond by stopping |
| 1104 |
route optimization for all or some communication. Obviously, an |
| 1105 |
attacker can exploit this fallback mechanism and force the target to |
| 1106 |
use the less efficient home agent-based routing. The attacker only |
| 1107 |
needs to mount a noticeable DoS attack against the mobile or |
| 1108 |
correspondent, and the target will default to non-optimized routing. |
| 1109 |
|
| 1110 |
The target node can mitigate the effects of the attack by reserving |
| 1111 |
more space for the Binding Cache, by reverting to non-optimized |
| 1112 |
routing only when it cannot otherwise cope with the DoS attack, by |
| 1113 |
|
| 1114 |
|
| 1115 |
|
| 1116 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 20]</span></pre> |
| 1117 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-21" ></span> |
| 1118 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1119 |
|
| 1120 |
|
| 1121 |
trying aggressively to return to optimized routing, or by favoring |
| 1122 |
mobiles with which it has an established relationship. This attack |
| 1123 |
is not as serious as the ones described earlier, but applications |
| 1124 |
that rely on Route Optimization could still be affected. For |
| 1125 |
instance, conversational multimedia sessions can suffer drastically |
| 1126 |
from the additional delays caused by triangle routing. |
| 1127 |
|
| 1128 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.3.3" href="#section-3.3.3">3.3.3</a>. Reflection and Amplification</span> |
| 1129 |
|
| 1130 |
Attackers sometimes try to hide the source of a packet-flooding |
| 1131 |
attack by reflecting the traffic from other nodes [<a href="#ref-1" title=""Security of Internet Location Management"">1</a>]. That is, |
| 1132 |
instead of sending the flood of packets directly to the target, the |
| 1133 |
attacker sends data to other nodes, tricking them to send the same |
| 1134 |
number, or more, packets to the target. Such reflection can hide the |
| 1135 |
attacker's address even when ingress filtering prevents source |
| 1136 |
address spoofing. Reflection is particularly dangerous if the |
| 1137 |
packets can be reflected multiple times, if they can be sent into a |
| 1138 |
looping path, or if the nodes can be tricked into sending many more |
| 1139 |
packets than they receive from the attacker, because such features |
| 1140 |
can be used to amplify the traffic by a significant factor. When |
| 1141 |
designing protocols, one should avoid creating services that can be |
| 1142 |
used for reflection and amplification. |
| 1143 |
|
| 1144 |
Triangle routing would easily create opportunities for reflection: a |
| 1145 |
correspondent node receives packets (e.g., TCP SYN) from the mobile |
| 1146 |
node and replies to the home address given by the mobile node in the |
| 1147 |
Home Address Option (HAO). The mobile might not really be a mobile |
| 1148 |
and the home address could actually be the target address. The |
| 1149 |
target would only see the packets sent by the correspondent and could |
| 1150 |
not see the attacker's address (even if ingress filtering prevents |
| 1151 |
the attacker from spoofing its source address). |
| 1152 |
|
| 1153 |
+----------+ TCP SYN with HAO +-----------+ |
| 1154 |
| Attacker |-------------------->| Reflector | |
| 1155 |
+----------+ +-----------+ |
| 1156 |
| |
| 1157 |
| TCP SYN-ACK to HoA |
| 1158 |
V |
| 1159 |
+-----------+ |
| 1160 |
| Flooding | |
| 1161 |
| target | |
| 1162 |
+-----------+ |
| 1163 |
|
| 1164 |
Figure 5. Reflection Attack |
| 1165 |
|
| 1166 |
A badly designed binding update protocol could also be used for |
| 1167 |
reflection: the correspondent would respond to a data packet by |
| 1168 |
initiating the binding update authentication protocol, which usually |
| 1169 |
|
| 1170 |
|
| 1171 |
|
| 1172 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 21]</span></pre> |
| 1173 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-22" ></span> |
| 1174 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1175 |
|
| 1176 |
|
| 1177 |
involves sending a packet to the home address. In that case, the |
| 1178 |
reflection attack can be discouraged by copying the mobile's address |
| 1179 |
into the messages sent by the mobile to the correspondent. (The |
| 1180 |
mobile's source address is usually the same as the care-of address, |
| 1181 |
but an Alternative Care-of Address sub-option can specify a different |
| 1182 |
care-of address.) Some of the early proposals for MIPv6 security |
| 1183 |
used this approach and were prone to reflection attacks. |
| 1184 |
|
| 1185 |
In some of the proposals for binding update authentication protocols, |
| 1186 |
the correspondent node responded to an initial message from the |
| 1187 |
mobile with two packets (one to the home address, one to the care-of |
| 1188 |
address). It would have been possible to use this to amplify a |
| 1189 |
flooding attack by a factor of two. Furthermore, with public-key |
| 1190 |
authentication, the packets sent by the correspondent might have been |
| 1191 |
significantly larger than the one that triggers them. |
| 1192 |
|
| 1193 |
These types of reflection and amplification can be avoided by |
| 1194 |
ensuring that the correspondent only responds to the same address |
| 1195 |
from which it received a packet, and only with a single packet of the |
| 1196 |
same size. These principles have been applied to MIPv6 security |
| 1197 |
design. |
| 1198 |
|
| 1199 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.4" href="#section-3.4">3.4</a>. Classification of Attacks</span> |
| 1200 |
|
| 1201 |
Sect. Attack name Target Sev. Mitigation |
| 1202 |
--------------------------------------------------------------------- |
| 1203 |
3.1.1 Basic address stealing MN Med. RR |
| 1204 |
3.1.2 Stealing addresses of stationary nodes Any High RR |
| 1205 |
3.1.3 Future address stealing MN Low RR, lifetime |
| 1206 |
3.1.4 Attacks against secrecy and integrity MN Low RR, IPsec |
| 1207 |
3.1.5 Basic denial-of-service attacks Any Med. RR |
| 1208 |
3.1.6 Replaying and blocking binding updates MN Low lifetime, |
| 1209 |
seq number, |
| 1210 |
MAC |
| 1211 |
3.2.1 Basic flooding Any High RR |
| 1212 |
3.2.2 Return-to-home flooding Any High RR |
| 1213 |
3.3.1 Inducing unnecessary binding updates MN, CN Med. heuristics |
| 1214 |
3.3.2 Forcing non-optimized routing MN Low heuristics |
| 1215 |
3.3.3 Reflection and amplification N/A Med. BU design |
| 1216 |
|
| 1217 |
Figure 6. Summary of Discussed Attacks |
| 1218 |
|
| 1219 |
Figure 6 gives a summary of the attacks discussed. As it stands at |
| 1220 |
the time of writing, the return-to-the-home flooding and the |
| 1221 |
induction of unnecessary binding updates look like the threats |
| 1222 |
against which we have the least amount of protection, compared to |
| 1223 |
their severity. |
| 1224 |
|
| 1225 |
|
| 1226 |
|
| 1227 |
|
| 1228 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 22]</span></pre> |
| 1229 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-23" ></span> |
| 1230 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1231 |
|
| 1232 |
|
| 1233 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-3.5" href="#section-3.5">3.5</a>. Problems with Infrastructure-Based Authorization</span> |
| 1234 |
|
| 1235 |
Early in the MIPv6 design process, it was assumed that plain IPsec |
| 1236 |
could be the default way to secure Binding Updates with arbitrary |
| 1237 |
correspondent nodes. However, this turned out to be impossible. |
| 1238 |
Plain IPsec relies on an infrastructure for key management, which, to |
| 1239 |
be usable with any arbitrary pair of nodes, would need to be global |
| 1240 |
in scope. Such a "global PKI" does not exist, nor is it expected to |
| 1241 |
come into existence any time soon. |
| 1242 |
|
| 1243 |
More minor issues that also surfaced at the time were: (1) |
| 1244 |
insufficient filtering granularity for the state of IPsec at the |
| 1245 |
time, (2) cost to establish a security association (in terms of CPU |
| 1246 |
and round trip times), and (3) expressing the proper authorization |
| 1247 |
(as opposed to just authentication) for binding updates [<a href="#ref-13" title=""Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and Early Authentication in the IPv6 World"">13</a>]. These |
| 1248 |
issues are solvable, and, in particular, (1) and (3) have been |
| 1249 |
addressed for IPsec usage with binding updates between the mobile |
| 1250 |
node and the home agent [<a href="#ref-7" title=""Using IPsec to Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home Agents"">7</a>]. |
| 1251 |
|
| 1252 |
However, the lack of a global PKI remains unsolved. |
| 1253 |
|
| 1254 |
One way to provide a global key infrastructure for mobile IP could be |
| 1255 |
DNSSEC. Such a scheme is not completely supported by the existing |
| 1256 |
specifications, as it constitutes a new application of the KEY RR, |
| 1257 |
something explicitly limited to DNSSEC [<a href="#ref-8" title=""DNS Security Introduction and Requirements"">8</a>] [<a href="#ref-9" title=""Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions"">9</a>] [<a href="#ref-10" title=""Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions"">10</a>]. Nevertheless, |
| 1258 |
if one were to define it, one could proceed along the following |
| 1259 |
lines: A secure reverse DNS that provided a public key for each IP |
| 1260 |
address could be used to verify that a binding update is indeed |
| 1261 |
signed by an authorized party. However, in order to be secure, each |
| 1262 |
link in such a system must be secure. That is, there must be a chain |
| 1263 |
of keys and signatures all the way down from the root (or at least |
| 1264 |
starting from a trust anchor common to the mobile node and the |
| 1265 |
correspondent node) to the given IP address. Furthermore, it is not |
| 1266 |
enough that each key be signed by the key above it in the chain. It |
| 1267 |
is also necessary that each signature explicitly authorize the lower |
| 1268 |
key to manage the corresponding address block below. |
| 1269 |
|
| 1270 |
Even though it would be theoretically possible to build a secure |
| 1271 |
reverse DNS infrastructure along the lines shown above, the practical |
| 1272 |
problems would be daunting. Whereas the delegation and key signing |
| 1273 |
might work close to the root of the tree, it would probably break |
| 1274 |
down somewhere along the path to the individual nodes. Note that a |
| 1275 |
similar delegation tree is currently being proposed for Secure |
| 1276 |
Neighbor Discovery [<a href="#ref-15" title=""SEcure Neighbor Discovery (SEND)"">15</a>], although in this case only routers (not |
| 1277 |
necessarily every single potential mobile node) need to secure such a |
| 1278 |
certificate. Furthermore, checking all the signatures on the tree |
| 1279 |
would place a considerable burden on the correspondent nodes, making |
| 1280 |
route optimization prohibitive, or at least justifiable only in very |
| 1281 |
|
| 1282 |
|
| 1283 |
|
| 1284 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 23]</span></pre> |
| 1285 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-24" ></span> |
| 1286 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1287 |
|
| 1288 |
|
| 1289 |
particular circumstances. Finally, it is not enough simply to check |
| 1290 |
whether the mobile node is authorized to send binding updates |
| 1291 |
containing a given home address, because to protect against flooding |
| 1292 |
attacks, the care-of address must also be verified. |
| 1293 |
|
| 1294 |
Relying on this same secure DNS infrastructure to verify care-of |
| 1295 |
addresses would be even harder than verifying home addresses. |
| 1296 |
Instead, a different method would be required, e.g., a return |
| 1297 |
routability procedure. If so, the obvious question is whether the |
| 1298 |
gargantuan cost of deploying the global secure DNS infrastructure is |
| 1299 |
worth the additional protection it affords, as compared to simply |
| 1300 |
using return routability for both home address and care-of address |
| 1301 |
verification. |
| 1302 |
|
| 1303 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-4" href="#section-4">4</a>. Solution Selected for Mobile IPv6</span> |
| 1304 |
|
| 1305 |
The current Mobile IPv6 route optimization security has been |
| 1306 |
carefully designed to prevent or mitigate the threats that were |
| 1307 |
discussed in <a href="#section-3">Section 3</a>. The goal has been to produce a design with a |
| 1308 |
level of security close to that of a static IPv4-based Internet, and |
| 1309 |
with an acceptable cost in terms of packets, delay, and processing. |
| 1310 |
The result is not what one would expect: it is definitely not a |
| 1311 |
traditional cryptographic protocol. Instead, the result relies |
| 1312 |
heavily on the assumption of an uncorrupted routing infrastructure |
| 1313 |
and builds upon the idea of checking that an alleged mobile node is |
| 1314 |
indeed reachable through both its home address and its care-of |
| 1315 |
address. Furthermore, the lifetime of the state created at the |
| 1316 |
corresponded nodes is deliberately restricted to a few minutes, in |
| 1317 |
order to limit the potential threat from time shifting. |
| 1318 |
|
| 1319 |
This section describes the solution in reasonable detail (for further |
| 1320 |
details see the specification), starting from Return Routability |
| 1321 |
(<a href="#section-4.1">Section 4.1</a>), continuing with a discussion about state creation at |
| 1322 |
the correspondent node (<a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>), and completing the description |
| 1323 |
with a discussion about the lifetime of Binding Cache Entries |
| 1324 |
(<a href="#section-4.3">Section 4.3</a>). |
| 1325 |
|
| 1326 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1" href="#section-4.1">4.1</a>. Return Routability</span> |
| 1327 |
|
| 1328 |
Return Routability (RR) is the name of the basic mechanism deployed |
| 1329 |
by Mobile IPv6 route optimization security design. RR is based on |
| 1330 |
the idea that a node should be able to verify that there is a node |
| 1331 |
that is able to respond to packets sent to a given address. The |
| 1332 |
check yields false positives if the routing infrastructure is |
| 1333 |
compromised or if there is an attacker between the verifier and the |
| 1334 |
address to be verified. With these exceptions, it is assumed that a |
| 1335 |
successful reply indicates that there is indeed a node at the given |
| 1336 |
|
| 1337 |
|
| 1338 |
|
| 1339 |
|
| 1340 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 24]</span></pre> |
| 1341 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-25" ></span> |
| 1342 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1343 |
|
| 1344 |
|
| 1345 |
address, and that the node is willing to reply to the probes sent to |
| 1346 |
it. |
| 1347 |
|
| 1348 |
The basic return routability mechanism consists of two checks, a Home |
| 1349 |
Address check (see <a href="#section-4.1.1">Section 4.1.1</a>) and a care-of-address check (see |
| 1350 |
<a href="#section-4.1.2">Section 4.1.2</a>). The packet flow is depicted in Figure 7. First, the |
| 1351 |
mobile node sends two packets to the correspondent node: a Home Test |
| 1352 |
Init (HoTI) packet is sent through the home agent, and a Care-of Test |
| 1353 |
Init (CoTI) directly. The correspondent node replies to both of |
| 1354 |
these independently by sending a Home Test (HoT) in response to the |
| 1355 |
Home Test Init and a Care-of Test (CoT) in response to the Care-of |
| 1356 |
Test Init. Finally, once the mobile node has received both the Home |
| 1357 |
Test and Care-of Test packets, it sends a Binding Update to the |
| 1358 |
correspondent node. |
| 1359 |
|
| 1360 |
+------+ 1a) HoTI +------+ |
| 1361 |
| |---------------------->| | |
| 1362 |
| MN | 2a) HoT | HA | |
| 1363 |
| |<----------------------| | |
| 1364 |
+------+ +------+ |
| 1365 |
1b) CoTI | ^ | / ^ |
| 1366 |
| |2b| CoT / / |
| 1367 |
| | | / / |
| 1368 |
| | | 3) BU / / |
| 1369 |
V | V / / |
| 1370 |
+------+ 1a) HoTI / / |
| 1371 |
| |<----------------/ / |
| 1372 |
| CN | 2a) HoT / |
| 1373 |
| |------------------/ |
| 1374 |
+------+ |
| 1375 |
|
| 1376 |
Figure 7. Return Routability Packet Flow |
| 1377 |
|
| 1378 |
It might appear that the actual design was somewhat convoluted. That |
| 1379 |
is, the real return routability checks are the message pairs < Home |
| 1380 |
Test, Binding Update > and < Care-of Test, Binding Update >. The |
| 1381 |
Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init packets are only needed to |
| 1382 |
trigger the test packets, and the Binding Update acts as a combined |
| 1383 |
routability response to both of the tests. |
| 1384 |
|
| 1385 |
There are two main reasons behind this design: |
| 1386 |
|
| 1387 |
o avoidance of reflection and amplification (see <a href="#section-3.3.3">Section 3.3.3</a>), and |
| 1388 |
|
| 1389 |
o avoidance of state exhaustion DoS attacks (see <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>). |
| 1390 |
|
| 1391 |
The reason for sending two Init packets instead of one is to avoid |
| 1392 |
amplification. The correspondent node does not know anything about |
| 1393 |
|
| 1394 |
|
| 1395 |
|
| 1396 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 25]</span></pre> |
| 1397 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-26" ></span> |
| 1398 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1399 |
|
| 1400 |
|
| 1401 |
the mobile node, and therefore it just receives an unsolicited IP |
| 1402 |
packet from some arbitrary IP address. In a way, this is similar to |
| 1403 |
a server receiving a TCP SYN from a previously unknown client. If |
| 1404 |
the correspondent node were to send two packets in response to an |
| 1405 |
initial trigger, that would provide the potential for a DoS |
| 1406 |
amplification effect, as discussed in <a href="#section-3.3.3">Section 3.3.3</a>. |
| 1407 |
|
| 1408 |
This scheme also avoids providing for a potential reflection attack. |
| 1409 |
If the correspondent node were to reply to an address other than the |
| 1410 |
source address of the packet, that would create a reflection effect. |
| 1411 |
Thus, the only safe mechanism possible for a naive correspondent is |
| 1412 |
to reply to each received packet with just one packet, and to send |
| 1413 |
the reply to the source address of the received packet. Hence, two |
| 1414 |
initial triggers are needed instead of just one. |
| 1415 |
|
| 1416 |
Let us now consider the two return routability tests separately. In |
| 1417 |
the following sections, the derivation of cryptographic material from |
| 1418 |
each of these is shown in a simplified manner. For the real formulas |
| 1419 |
and more detail, please refer to [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">6</a>]. |
| 1420 |
|
| 1421 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.1" href="#section-4.1.1">4.1.1</a>. Home Address Check</span> |
| 1422 |
|
| 1423 |
The Home Address check consists of a Home Test (HoT) packet and a |
| 1424 |
subsequent Binding Update (BU). It is triggered by the arrival of a |
| 1425 |
Home Test Init (HoTI). A correspondent node replies to a Home Test |
| 1426 |
Init by sending a Home Test to the source address of the Home Test |
| 1427 |
Init. The source address is assumed to be the home address of a |
| 1428 |
mobile node, and therefore the Home Test is assumed to be tunneled by |
| 1429 |
the Home Agent to the mobile node. The Home Test contains a |
| 1430 |
cryptographically generated token, home keygen token, which is formed |
| 1431 |
by calculating a hash function over the concatenation of a secret |
| 1432 |
key, Kcn, known only by the correspondent node, the source address of |
| 1433 |
the Home Test Init packet, and a nonce. |
| 1434 |
|
| 1435 |
home keygen token = hash(Kcn | home address | nonce | 0) |
| 1436 |
|
| 1437 |
An index to the nonce is also included in the Home Test packet, |
| 1438 |
allowing the correspondent node to find the appropriate nonce more |
| 1439 |
easily. |
| 1440 |
|
| 1441 |
The token allows the correspondent node to make sure that any binding |
| 1442 |
update received subsequently has been created by a node that has seen |
| 1443 |
the Home Test packet; see <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>. |
| 1444 |
|
| 1445 |
In most cases, the Home Test packet is forwarded over two different |
| 1446 |
segments of the Internet. It first traverses from the correspondent |
| 1447 |
node to the Home Agent. On this trip, it is not protected and any |
| 1448 |
eavesdropper on the path can learn its contents. The Home Agent then |
| 1449 |
|
| 1450 |
|
| 1451 |
|
| 1452 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 26]</span></pre> |
| 1453 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-27" ></span> |
| 1454 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1455 |
|
| 1456 |
|
| 1457 |
forwards the packet to the mobile node. This path is taken inside an |
| 1458 |
IPsec ESP protected tunnel, making it impossible for the outsiders to |
| 1459 |
learn the contents of the packet. |
| 1460 |
|
| 1461 |
At first, it may sound unnecessary to protect the packet between the |
| 1462 |
home agent and the mobile node, since it travelled unprotected |
| 1463 |
between the correspondent node and the mobile node. If all links in |
| 1464 |
the Internet were equally insecure, the additional protection would |
| 1465 |
be unnecessary. However, in most practical settings the network is |
| 1466 |
likely to be more secure near the home agent than near the mobile |
| 1467 |
node. For example, if the home agent hosts a virtual home link and |
| 1468 |
the mobile nodes are never actually at home, an eavesdropper should |
| 1469 |
be close to the correspondent node or on the path between the |
| 1470 |
correspondent node and the home agent, since it could not eavesdrop |
| 1471 |
at the home agent. If the correspondent node is a major server, all |
| 1472 |
the links on the path between it and the home agent are likely to be |
| 1473 |
fairly secure. On the other hand, the Mobile Node is probably using |
| 1474 |
wireless access technology, making it sometimes trivial to eavesdrop |
| 1475 |
on its access link. Thus, it is fairly easy to eavesdrop on packets |
| 1476 |
that arrive at the mobile node. Consequently, protecting the HA-MN |
| 1477 |
path is likely to provide real security benefits even when the CN-HA |
| 1478 |
path remains unprotected. |
| 1479 |
|
| 1480 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.2" href="#section-4.1.2">4.1.2</a>. Care-of-Address Check</span> |
| 1481 |
|
| 1482 |
From the correspondent node's point of view, the Care-of-Address |
| 1483 |
check is very similar to the home check. The only difference is that |
| 1484 |
now the source address of the received Care-of Test Init packet is |
| 1485 |
assumed to be the care-of address of the mobile node. Furthermore, |
| 1486 |
the token is created in a slightly different manner in order to make |
| 1487 |
it impossible to use home tokens for care-of tokens or vice versa. |
| 1488 |
|
| 1489 |
care-of keygen token = hash(Kcn | care-of address | nonce | 1) |
| 1490 |
|
| 1491 |
The Care-of Test traverses only one leg, directly from the |
| 1492 |
correspondent node to the mobile node. It remains unprotected all |
| 1493 |
along the way, making it vulnerable to eavesdroppers near the |
| 1494 |
correspondent node, on the path from the correspondent node to the |
| 1495 |
mobile node, or near the mobile node. |
| 1496 |
|
| 1497 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.1.3" href="#section-4.1.3">4.1.3</a>. Forming the First Binding Update</span> |
| 1498 |
|
| 1499 |
When the mobile node has received both the Home Test and Care-of Test |
| 1500 |
messages, it creates a binding key, Kbm, by computing a hash function |
| 1501 |
over the concatenation of the tokens received. |
| 1502 |
|
| 1503 |
This key is used to protect the first and the subsequent binding |
| 1504 |
updates, as long as the key remains valid. |
| 1505 |
|
| 1506 |
|
| 1507 |
|
| 1508 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 27]</span></pre> |
| 1509 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-28" ></span> |
| 1510 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1511 |
|
| 1512 |
|
| 1513 |
Note that the key Kbm is available to anyone who is able to receive |
| 1514 |
both the Care-of Test and Home Test messages. However, they are |
| 1515 |
normally routed by different routes through the network, and the Home |
| 1516 |
Test is transmitted over an encrypted tunnel from the home agent to |
| 1517 |
the mobile node (see also <a href="#section-5.4">Section 5.4</a>). |
| 1518 |
|
| 1519 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2" href="#section-4.2">4.2</a>. Creating State Safely</span> |
| 1520 |
|
| 1521 |
The correspondent node may remain stateless until it receives the |
| 1522 |
first Binding Update. That is, it does not need to record receiving |
| 1523 |
and replying to the Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init messages. |
| 1524 |
The Home Test Init/Home Test and Care-of Test Init/Care-of Test |
| 1525 |
exchanges take place in parallel but independently of each other. |
| 1526 |
Thus, the correspondent can respond to each message immediately, and |
| 1527 |
it does not need to remember doing that. This helps in potential |
| 1528 |
denial-of-service situations: no memory needs to be reserved for |
| 1529 |
processing Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init messages. |
| 1530 |
Furthermore, Home Test Init and Care-of Test Init processing is |
| 1531 |
designed to be lightweight, and it can be rate limited if necessary. |
| 1532 |
|
| 1533 |
When receiving a first binding update, the correspondent node goes |
| 1534 |
through a rather complicated procedure. The purpose of this |
| 1535 |
procedure is to ensure that there is indeed a mobile node that has |
| 1536 |
recently received a Home Test and a Care-of Test that were sent to |
| 1537 |
the claimed home and care-of addresses, respectively, and to make |
| 1538 |
sure that the correspondent node does not unnecessarily spend CPU or |
| 1539 |
other resources while performing this check. |
| 1540 |
|
| 1541 |
Since the correspondent node does not have any state when the binding |
| 1542 |
update arrives, the binding update itself must contain enough |
| 1543 |
information so that relevant state can be created. To that end, the |
| 1544 |
binding update contains the following pieces of information: |
| 1545 |
|
| 1546 |
Source address: The care-of address specified in the Binding Update |
| 1547 |
must be equal to the source address used in the Care-of Test Init |
| 1548 |
message. Notice that this applies to the effective Care-of |
| 1549 |
Address of the Binding Update. In particular, if the Binding |
| 1550 |
Update includes an Alternate Care-of Address (AltCoA) [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">6</a>], the |
| 1551 |
effective CoA is, of course, this AltCoA. Thus, the Care-of Test |
| 1552 |
Init must have originated from the AltCoA. |
| 1553 |
|
| 1554 |
Home address: The home address specified in the Binding Update must |
| 1555 |
be equal to the source address used in the Home Test Init message. |
| 1556 |
|
| 1557 |
Two nonce indices: These are copied over from the Home Test and |
| 1558 |
Care-of Test messages, and together with the other information |
| 1559 |
they allow the correspondent node to re-create the tokens sent in |
| 1560 |
the Home Test and Care-of Test messages and used for creating Kbm. |
| 1561 |
|
| 1562 |
|
| 1563 |
|
| 1564 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 28]</span></pre> |
| 1565 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-29" ></span> |
| 1566 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1567 |
|
| 1568 |
|
| 1569 |
Without them, the correspondent node might need to try the 2-3 |
| 1570 |
latest nonces, leading to unnecessary resource consumption. |
| 1571 |
|
| 1572 |
Message Authentication Code (MAC): The binding update is |
| 1573 |
authenticated by computing a MAC function over the care-of |
| 1574 |
address, the correspondent node's address and the binding update |
| 1575 |
message itself. The MAC is keyed with the key Kbm. |
| 1576 |
|
| 1577 |
Given the addresses, the nonce indices (and thereby the nonces) and |
| 1578 |
the key Kcn, the correspondent node can re-create the home and care- |
| 1579 |
of tokens at the cost of a few memory lookups and computation of one |
| 1580 |
MAC and one hash function. |
| 1581 |
|
| 1582 |
Once the correspondent node has re-created the tokens, it hashes the |
| 1583 |
tokens together, giving the key Kbm. If the Binding Update is |
| 1584 |
authentic, Kbm is cached together with the binding. This key is then |
| 1585 |
used to verify the MAC that protects integrity and origin of the |
| 1586 |
actual Binding Update. Note that the same Kbm may be used for a |
| 1587 |
while, until the mobile node moves (and needs to get a new care-of- |
| 1588 |
address token), the care-of token expires, or the home token expires. |
| 1589 |
|
| 1590 |
<span class="h4"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.2.1" href="#section-4.2.1">4.2.1</a>. Retransmissions and State Machine</span> |
| 1591 |
|
| 1592 |
Note that since the correspondent node may remain stateless until it |
| 1593 |
receives a valid binding update, the mobile node is solely |
| 1594 |
responsible for retransmissions. That is, the mobile node should |
| 1595 |
keep sending the Home Test Init / Care-of Test Init messages until it |
| 1596 |
receives a Home Test / Care-of Test, respectively. Similarly, it may |
| 1597 |
need to send the binding update a few times in the case it is lost |
| 1598 |
while in transit. |
| 1599 |
|
| 1600 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-4.3" href="#section-4.3">4.3</a>. Quick expiration of the Binding Cache Entries</span> |
| 1601 |
|
| 1602 |
A Binding Cache Entry, along with the key Kbm, represents the return |
| 1603 |
routability state of the network at the time when the Home Test and |
| 1604 |
Care-of Test messages were sent out. It is possible that a specific |
| 1605 |
attacker is able to eavesdrop a Home Test message at some point of |
| 1606 |
time, but not later. If the Home Test had an infinite or a long |
| 1607 |
lifetime, that would allow the attacker to perform a time shifting |
| 1608 |
attack (see <a href="#section-2.2">Section 2.2</a>). That is, in the current IPv4 architecture |
| 1609 |
an attacker on the path between the correspondent node and the home |
| 1610 |
agent is able to perform attacks only as long as the attacker is able |
| 1611 |
to eavesdrop (and possibly disrupt) communications on that particular |
| 1612 |
path. A long living Home Test, and consequently the ability to send |
| 1613 |
valid binding updates for a long time, would allow the attacker to |
| 1614 |
continue its attack even after the attacker is no longer able to |
| 1615 |
eavesdrop on the path. |
| 1616 |
|
| 1617 |
|
| 1618 |
|
| 1619 |
|
| 1620 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 29]</span></pre> |
| 1621 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-30" ></span> |
| 1622 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1623 |
|
| 1624 |
|
| 1625 |
To limit the seriousness of this and other similar time shifting |
| 1626 |
threats, the validity of the tokens is limited to a few minutes. |
| 1627 |
This effectively limits the validity of the key Kbm and the lifetime |
| 1628 |
of the resulting binding updates and binding cache entries. |
| 1629 |
|
| 1630 |
Although short lifetimes are required by other aspects of the |
| 1631 |
security design and the goals, they are clearly detrimental for |
| 1632 |
efficiency and robustness. That is, a Home Test Init / Home Test |
| 1633 |
message pair must be exchanged through the home agent every few |
| 1634 |
minutes. These messages are unnecessary from a purely functional |
| 1635 |
point of view, thereby representing overhead. What is worse, though, |
| 1636 |
is that they make the home agent a single point of failure. That is, |
| 1637 |
if the Home Test Init / Home Test messages were not needed, the |
| 1638 |
existing connections from a mobile node to other nodes could continue |
| 1639 |
even when the home agent fails, but the current design forces the |
| 1640 |
bindings to expire after a few minutes. |
| 1641 |
|
| 1642 |
This concludes our walk-through of the selected security design. The |
| 1643 |
cornerstones of the design were the employment of the return |
| 1644 |
routability idea in the Home Test, Care-of Test, and binding update |
| 1645 |
messages, the ability to remain stateless until a valid binding |
| 1646 |
update is received, and the limiting of the binding lifetimes to a |
| 1647 |
few minutes. Next we briefly discuss some of the remaining threats |
| 1648 |
and other problems inherent to the design. |
| 1649 |
|
| 1650 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-5" href="#section-5">5</a>. Security Considerations</span> |
| 1651 |
|
| 1652 |
This section gives a brief analysis of the security design, mostly in |
| 1653 |
the light of what was known when the design was completed in Fall |
| 1654 |
2002. It should be noted that this section does not present a proper |
| 1655 |
security analysis of the protocol; it merely discusses a few issues |
| 1656 |
that were known at the time the design was completed. |
| 1657 |
|
| 1658 |
It should be kept in mind that the MIPv6 RO security design was never |
| 1659 |
intended to be fully secure. Instead, as we stated earlier, the goal |
| 1660 |
was to be roughly as secure as non-mobile IPv4 was known to be at the |
| 1661 |
time of the design. As it turns out, the result is slightly less |
| 1662 |
secure than IPv4, but the difference is small and most likely |
| 1663 |
insignificant in real life. |
| 1664 |
|
| 1665 |
The known residual threats as compared with IPv4 are discussed in |
| 1666 |
<a href="#section-5.1">Section 5.1</a>. Considerations related to the application of IPsec to |
| 1667 |
authorize route optimization are discussed in <a href="#section-5.2">Section 5.2</a>. <a href="#section-5.3">Section</a> |
| 1668 |
<a href="#section-5.3">5.3</a> discusses an attack against neighboring nodes. Finally, <a href="#section-5.4">Section</a> |
| 1669 |
<a href="#section-5.4">5.4</a> deals with the special case of two mobile nodes conversing and |
| 1670 |
performing the route optimization procedure with each other. |
| 1671 |
|
| 1672 |
|
| 1673 |
|
| 1674 |
|
| 1675 |
|
| 1676 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 30]</span></pre> |
| 1677 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-31" ></span> |
| 1678 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1679 |
|
| 1680 |
|
| 1681 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.1" href="#section-5.1">5.1</a>. Residual Threats as Compared to IPv4</span> |
| 1682 |
|
| 1683 |
As we mentioned in <a href="#section-4.2">Section 4.2</a>, the lifetime of a binding represents |
| 1684 |
a potential time shift in an attack. That is, an attacker that is |
| 1685 |
able to create a false binding is able to reap the benefits of the |
| 1686 |
binding as long as the binding lasts. Alternatively, the attacker is |
| 1687 |
able to delay a return-to-home flooding attack (<a href="#section-3.2.2">Section 3.2.2</a>) until |
| 1688 |
the binding expires. This is different from IPv4, where an attacker |
| 1689 |
may continue an attack only as long as it is on the path between the |
| 1690 |
two hosts. |
| 1691 |
|
| 1692 |
Since the binding lifetimes are severely restricted in the current |
| 1693 |
design, the ability to do a time shifting attack is equivalently |
| 1694 |
restricted. |
| 1695 |
|
| 1696 |
Threats possible because of the introduction of route optimization |
| 1697 |
are, of course, not present in a baseline IPv4 internet (<a href="#section-3.3">Section</a> |
| 1698 |
<a href="#section-3.3">3.3</a>). In particular, inducing unnecessary binding updates could |
| 1699 |
potentially be a severe attack, but this would be most likely due to |
| 1700 |
faulty implementations. As an extreme measure, a correspondent node |
| 1701 |
can protect against these attacks by turning off route optimization. |
| 1702 |
If so, it becomes obvious that the only residual attack against which |
| 1703 |
there is no clear-cut prevention (other than its severe limitation as |
| 1704 |
currently specified) is the time shifting attack mentioned above. |
| 1705 |
|
| 1706 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.2" href="#section-5.2">5.2</a>. Interaction with IPsec</span> |
| 1707 |
|
| 1708 |
A major motivation behind the current binding update design was |
| 1709 |
scalability, which implied the ability to run the protocol without |
| 1710 |
any existing security infrastructure. An alternative would have been |
| 1711 |
to rely on existing trust relationships, perhaps in the form of a |
| 1712 |
special-purpose Public Key Infrastructure in conjunction with IPsec. |
| 1713 |
That would have limited scalability, making route optimization |
| 1714 |
available only in environments where it is possible to create |
| 1715 |
appropriate IPsec security associations between the mobile nodes and |
| 1716 |
the corresponding nodes. |
| 1717 |
|
| 1718 |
There clearly are situations where there exists an appropriate |
| 1719 |
relationship between a mobile node and the correspondent node. For |
| 1720 |
example, if the correspondent node is a server that has pre- |
| 1721 |
established keys with the mobile node, that would be the case. |
| 1722 |
However, entity authentication or an authenticated session key is not |
| 1723 |
necessarily sufficient for accepting Binding Updates. |
| 1724 |
|
| 1725 |
Home Address Check: If one wants to replace the home address check |
| 1726 |
with cryptographic credentials, these must carry proper |
| 1727 |
authorization for the specific home address, and care must be |
| 1728 |
taken to make sure that the issuer of the certificate is entitled |
| 1729 |
|
| 1730 |
|
| 1731 |
|
| 1732 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 31]</span></pre> |
| 1733 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-32" ></span> |
| 1734 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1735 |
|
| 1736 |
|
| 1737 |
to express such authorization. At the time of the design work, |
| 1738 |
the route optimization security design team was not aware of |
| 1739 |
standardized certificate formats to do this, although more recent |
| 1740 |
efforts within the IETF are addressing this issue. Note that |
| 1741 |
there is plenty of motivation to do so, as any pre-existing |
| 1742 |
relationship with a correspondent node would involve the mobile |
| 1743 |
node's home address (instead of any of its possible care-of |
| 1744 |
addresses). Accordingly, the IKE exchange would most naturally |
| 1745 |
run between the correspondent node and the mobile node's home |
| 1746 |
address. This still leaves open the issue of checking the mobile |
| 1747 |
node's care-of address. |
| 1748 |
|
| 1749 |
Care-of Address Check: As for the care-of-address check, in |
| 1750 |
practice, it seems highly unlikely that nodes could completely |
| 1751 |
replace the care-of-address check with credentials. Since the |
| 1752 |
care-of addresses are ephemeral, in general it is very difficult |
| 1753 |
for a mobile node to present credentials that taken at face value |
| 1754 |
(by an arbitrary correspondent node) guarantee no misuse for, say, |
| 1755 |
flooding attacks (<a href="#section-3.2">Section 3.2</a>). As discussed before, a |
| 1756 |
reachability check goes a long way to alleviate such attacks. |
| 1757 |
Notice that, as part of the normal protocol exchange, establishing |
| 1758 |
IPsec security associations via IKE includes one such reachability |
| 1759 |
test. However, as per the previous section, the natural IKE |
| 1760 |
protocol exchange runs between the correspondent node and the |
| 1761 |
mobile node's home address. Hence, another reachability check is |
| 1762 |
needed to check the care-of address at which the node is currently |
| 1763 |
reachable. If this address changes, such a reachability test is |
| 1764 |
likewise necessary, and it is included in ongoing work aimed at |
| 1765 |
securely updating the node's current address. |
| 1766 |
|
| 1767 |
Nevertheless, the Mobile IPv6 base specification [<a href="#ref-6" title=""Mobility Support in IPv6"">6</a>] does not specify |
| 1768 |
how to use IPsec together with the mobility procedures between the |
| 1769 |
mobile node and correspondent node. On the other hand, the |
| 1770 |
specification is carefully written to allow the creation of the |
| 1771 |
binding management key Kbm through some different means. |
| 1772 |
Accordingly, where an appropriate relationship exists between a |
| 1773 |
mobile node and a correspondent node, the use of IPsec is possible, |
| 1774 |
and is, in fact, being pursued in more recent work. |
| 1775 |
|
| 1776 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.3" href="#section-5.3">5.3</a>. Pretending to Be One's Neighbor</span> |
| 1777 |
|
| 1778 |
One possible attack against the security design is to pretend to be a |
| 1779 |
neighboring node. To launch this attack, the mobile node establishes |
| 1780 |
route optimization with some arbitrary correspondent node. While |
| 1781 |
performing the return routability tests and creating the binding |
| 1782 |
management key Kbm, the attacker uses its real home address but a |
| 1783 |
faked care-of address. Indeed, the care-of address would be the |
| 1784 |
address of the neighboring node on the local link. The attacker is |
| 1785 |
|
| 1786 |
|
| 1787 |
|
| 1788 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 32]</span></pre> |
| 1789 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-33" ></span> |
| 1790 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1791 |
|
| 1792 |
|
| 1793 |
able to create the binding since it receives a valid Home Test |
| 1794 |
normally, and it is able to eavesdrop on the Care-of Test, as it |
| 1795 |
appears on the local link. |
| 1796 |
|
| 1797 |
This attack would allow the mobile node to divert unwanted traffic |
| 1798 |
towards the neighboring node, resulting in an flooding attack. |
| 1799 |
|
| 1800 |
However, this attack is not very serious in practice. First, it is |
| 1801 |
limited in the terms of location, since it is only possible against |
| 1802 |
neighbors. Second, the attack works also against the attacker, since |
| 1803 |
it shares the local link with the target. Third, a similar attack is |
| 1804 |
possible with Neighbor Discovery spoofing. |
| 1805 |
|
| 1806 |
<span class="h3"><a class="selflink" id="section-5.4" href="#section-5.4">5.4</a>. Two Mobile Nodes Talking to Each Other</span> |
| 1807 |
|
| 1808 |
When two mobile nodes want to establish route optimization with each |
| 1809 |
other, some care must be exercised in order not to reveal the reverse |
| 1810 |
tokens to an attacker. In this situation, both mobile nodes act |
| 1811 |
simultaneously in the mobile node and the correspondent node roles. |
| 1812 |
In the correspondent node role, the nodes are vulnerable to attackers |
| 1813 |
that are co-located at the same link. Such an attacker is able to |
| 1814 |
learn both the Home Test and Care-of Test sent by the mobile node, |
| 1815 |
and therefore it is able to spoof the location of the other mobile |
| 1816 |
host to the neighboring one. What is worse is that the attacker can |
| 1817 |
obtain a valid Care-of Test itself, combine it with the Home Test, |
| 1818 |
and then claim to the neighboring node that the other node has just |
| 1819 |
arrived at the same link. |
| 1820 |
|
| 1821 |
There is an easy way to avoid this attack. In the correspondent node |
| 1822 |
role, the mobile node should tunnel the Home Test messages that it |
| 1823 |
sends through its home agent. This prevents the co-located attacker |
| 1824 |
from learning any valid Home Test messages. |
| 1825 |
|
| 1826 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-6" href="#section-6">6</a>. Conclusions</span> |
| 1827 |
|
| 1828 |
This document discussed the security design rationale for the Mobile |
| 1829 |
IPv6 Route Optimization. We have tried to describe the dangers |
| 1830 |
created by Mobile IP Route Optimization, the security goals and |
| 1831 |
background of the design, and the actual mechanisms employed. |
| 1832 |
|
| 1833 |
We started the discussion with a background tour to the IP routing |
| 1834 |
architecture the definition of the mobility problem. After that, we |
| 1835 |
covered the avenues of attack: the targets, the time shifting |
| 1836 |
abilities, and the possible locations of an attacker. We outlined a |
| 1837 |
number of identified threat scenarios, and discussed how they are |
| 1838 |
mitigated in the current design. Finally, in <a href="#section-4">Section 4</a> we gave an |
| 1839 |
overview of the actual mechanisms employed, and the rational behind |
| 1840 |
them. |
| 1841 |
|
| 1842 |
|
| 1843 |
|
| 1844 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 33]</span></pre> |
| 1845 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-34" ></span> |
| 1846 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1847 |
|
| 1848 |
|
| 1849 |
As far as we know today, the only significant difference between the |
| 1850 |
security of an IPv4 Internet and that of an Internet with Mobile IPv6 |
| 1851 |
(and route optimization) concerns time shifting attacks. |
| 1852 |
Nevertheless, these are severely restricted in the current design. |
| 1853 |
|
| 1854 |
We have also briefly covered some of the known subtleties and |
| 1855 |
shortcomings, but that discussion cannot be exhaustive. It is quite |
| 1856 |
probable that new subtle problems will be discovered with the design. |
| 1857 |
As a consequence, it is most likely that the design needs to be |
| 1858 |
revised in the light of experience and insight. |
| 1859 |
|
| 1860 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-7" href="#section-7">7</a>. Acknowledgements</span> |
| 1861 |
|
| 1862 |
We are grateful for: Hesham Soliman for reminding us about the threat |
| 1863 |
explained in <a href="#section-5.3">Section 5.3</a>, Francis Dupont for first discussing the |
| 1864 |
case of two mobile nodes talking to each other (<a href="#section-5.4">Section 5.4</a>) and for |
| 1865 |
sundry other comments, Pekka Savola for his help in <a href="#section-1.1.1">Section 1.1.1</a>, |
| 1866 |
and Elwyn Davies for his thorough editorial review. |
| 1867 |
|
| 1868 |
<span class="h2"><a class="selflink" id="section-8" href="#section-8">8</a>. Informative References</span> |
| 1869 |
|
| 1870 |
[<a id="ref-1">1</a>] Aura, T., Roe, M., and J. Arkko, "Security of Internet Location |
| 1871 |
Management", Proc. 18th Annual Computer Security Applications |
| 1872 |
Conference, pages 78-87, Las Vegas, NV, USA, IEEE Press, |
| 1873 |
December 2002. |
| 1874 |
|
| 1875 |
[<a id="ref-2">2</a>] Narten, T., Nordmark, E., and W. Simpson, "Neighbor Discovery |
| 1876 |
for IP Version 6 (IPv6)", <a href="./rfc2461">RFC 2461</a>, December 1998. |
| 1877 |
|
| 1878 |
[<a id="ref-3">3</a>] Narten, T. and R. Draves, "Privacy Extensions for Stateless |
| 1879 |
Address Autoconfiguration in IPv6", <a href="./rfc3041">RFC 3041</a>, January 2001. |
| 1880 |
|
| 1881 |
[<a id="ref-4">4</a>] Bush, R. and D. Meyer, "Some Internet Architectural Guidelines |
| 1882 |
and Philosophy", <a href="./rfc3439">RFC 3439</a>, December 2002. |
| 1883 |
|
| 1884 |
[<a id="ref-5">5</a>] Baker, F. and P. Savola, "Ingress Filtering for Multihomed |
| 1885 |
Networks", <a href="https://www.rfc-editor.org/bcp/bcp84">BCP 84</a>, <a href="./rfc3704">RFC 3704</a>, March 2004. |
| 1886 |
|
| 1887 |
[<a id="ref-6">6</a>] Johnson, D., Perkins, C., and J. Arkko, "Mobility Support in |
| 1888 |
IPv6", <a href="./rfc3775">RFC 3775</a>, June 2004. |
| 1889 |
|
| 1890 |
[<a id="ref-7">7</a>] Arkko, J., Devarapalli, V., and F. Dupont, "Using IPsec to |
| 1891 |
Protect Mobile IPv6 Signaling Between Mobile Nodes and Home |
| 1892 |
Agents", <a href="./rfc3776">RFC 3776</a>, June 2004. |
| 1893 |
|
| 1894 |
[<a id="ref-8">8</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, |
| 1895 |
"DNS Security Introduction and Requirements", <a href="./rfc4033">RFC 4033</a>, March |
| 1896 |
2005. |
| 1897 |
|
| 1898 |
|
| 1899 |
|
| 1900 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 34]</span></pre> |
| 1901 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-35" ></span> |
| 1902 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1903 |
|
| 1904 |
|
| 1905 |
[<a id="ref-9">9</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, |
| 1906 |
"Resource Records for the DNS Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc4034">RFC 4034</a>, |
| 1907 |
March 2005. |
| 1908 |
|
| 1909 |
[<a id="ref-10">10</a>] Arends, R., Austein, R., Larson, M., Massey, D., and S. Rose, |
| 1910 |
"Protocol Modifications for the DNS Security Extensions", <a href="./rfc4035">RFC</a> |
| 1911 |
<a href="./rfc4035">4035</a>, March 2005. |
| 1912 |
|
| 1913 |
[<a id="ref-11">11</a>] Chiappa, J., "Will The Real 'End-End Principle' Please Stand |
| 1914 |
Up?", Private Communication, April 2002. |
| 1915 |
|
| 1916 |
[<a id="ref-12">12</a>] Savage, S., Cardwell, N., Wetherall, D., and T. Anderson, "TCP |
| 1917 |
Congestion Control with a Misbehaving Receiver", ACM Computer |
| 1918 |
Communication Review, 29:5, October 1999. |
| 1919 |
|
| 1920 |
[<a id="ref-13">13</a>] Nikander, P., "Denial-of-Service, Address Ownership, and Early |
| 1921 |
Authentication in the IPv6 World", Security Protocols 9th |
| 1922 |
International Workshop, Cambridge, UK, April 25-27 2001, LNCS |
| 1923 |
2467, pages 12-26, Springer, 2002. |
| 1924 |
|
| 1925 |
[<a id="ref-14">14</a>] Chiappa, J., "Endpoints and Endpoint Names: A Proposed |
| 1926 |
Enhancement to the Internet Architecture", Private |
| 1927 |
Communication, 1999. |
| 1928 |
|
| 1929 |
[<a id="ref-15">15</a>] Arkko, J., Kempf, J., Zill, B., and P. Nikander, "SEcure |
| 1930 |
Neighbor Discovery (SEND)", <a href="./rfc3971">RFC 3971</a>, March 2005. |
| 1931 |
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| 1956 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 35]</span></pre> |
| 1957 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-36" ></span> |
| 1958 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 1959 |
|
| 1960 |
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| 1961 |
Authors' Addresses |
| 1962 |
|
| 1963 |
Pekka Nikander |
| 1964 |
Ericsson Research NomadicLab |
| 1965 |
JORVAS FIN-02420 |
| 1966 |
FINLAND |
| 1967 |
|
| 1968 |
Phone: +358 9 299 1 |
| 1969 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1970 |
|
| 1971 |
|
| 1972 |
Jari Arkko |
| 1973 |
Ericsson Research NomadicLab |
| 1974 |
JORVAS FIN-02420 |
| 1975 |
FINLAND |
| 1976 |
|
| 1977 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1978 |
|
| 1979 |
|
| 1980 |
Tuomas Aura |
| 1981 |
Microsoft Research Ltd. |
| 1982 |
Roger Needham Building |
| 1983 |
7 JJ Thomson Avenue |
| 1984 |
Cambridge CB3 0FB |
| 1985 |
United Kingdom |
| 1986 |
|
| 1987 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1988 |
|
| 1989 |
|
| 1990 |
Gabriel Montenegro |
| 1991 |
Microsoft Corporation |
| 1992 |
One Microsoft Way |
| 1993 |
Redmond, WA 98052 |
| 1994 |
USA |
| 1995 |
|
| 1996 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 1997 |
|
| 1998 |
|
| 1999 |
Erik Nordmark |
| 2000 |
Sun Microsystems |
| 2001 |
17 Network Circle |
| 2002 |
Menlo Park, CA 94025 |
| 2003 |
USA |
| 2004 |
|
| 2005 |
EMail: [email protected] |
| 2006 |
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| 2007 |
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| 2008 |
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| 2009 |
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| 2010 |
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| 2012 |
<span class="grey">Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 36]</span></pre> |
| 2013 |
<hr class='noprint'/><!--NewPage--><pre class='newpage'><span id="page-37" ></span> |
| 2014 |
<span class="grey"><a href="./rfc4225">RFC 4225</a> Mobile IPv6 RO Security Design December 2005</span> |
| 2015 |
|
| 2016 |
|
| 2017 |
Full Copyright Statement |
| 2018 |
|
| 2019 |
Copyright (C) The Internet Society (2005). |
| 2020 |
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| 2021 |
This document is subject to the rights, licenses and restrictions |
| 2022 |
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| 2023 |
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| 2024 |
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| 2025 |
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| 2026 |
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| 2027 |
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| 2049 |
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| 2057 |
Acknowledgement |
| 2058 |
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| 2059 |
Funding for the RFC Editor function is currently provided by the |
| 2060 |
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| 2061 |
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| 2063 |
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| 2064 |
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| 2065 |
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| 2066 |
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| 2067 |
|
| 2068 |
Nikander, et al. Informational [Page 37] |
| 2069 |
</pre> |